[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 207 (Friday, December 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S19228-S19231]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 BOSNIA


                        i. Mistakes of the Past

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, many mistakes have been made in Yugoslavia, 
the most tragic by the parties themselves. All of the mistakes made by 
the international community added together do not even register on the 
scale compared to what the parties have done to each other.
  Nevertheless, we should learn from our mistakes. Such mistakes 
include premature international recognition of the separate states 
before any agreement on minority rights or before any basic test for 
state viability. Another mistake was the United States and European 
failure--primarily, at the first instance, European failure--to deal 
decisively with the first Serb aggression. Commitment of a lightly 
armed U.N. peacekeeping force in the middle of a civil war was another 
mistake. Dual-key arrangements required for military action with the 
United Nations in control was certainly a fundamental violation of any 
kind of a real effective command structure. And the United Nations 
constantly posed threats and deadlines with no followthrough, thereby 
steadily losing credibility. I could go on and on.
  This is not, however, meant to denigrate in any way the efforts, 
often heroic, of the U.N. forces and the numerous international 
organizations that provided humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian 
people. Tens of thousands of lives were saved.
  There are many lessons for Europe, the United Nations, for NATO, and 
for our own country in this tragedy that has caused so much hardship 
and cost so many lost lives.
  Mr. President, the job now is to learn from the past and also face 
the reality of the future. United States and NATO forces face many 
obstacles and risks in Bosnia, but there is also a bright side based on 
events that have already occurred and also an opportunity for the 
future.


                           II. Positive Side

  Let me start today with the positive side. On the positive side, the 
NATO allies finally seem to mean business. Just a few examples: French 
President Chirac led an effort to provide greater combat capability to 
the U.N. protection force, and he exercised leadership in firming up 
the allies' commitment. NATO, urged by the Clinton administration, sent 
a clear and unmistakable signal of its determination with its bombing 
campaign against Bosnian Serb command, control and communication 
facilities when they continued to flaunt their own obligations.
  President Clinton seized the opportunity presented by the bombing 
campaign and the Federation ground campaign to launch an intensive 
diplomatic effort under the effective leadership of Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke that resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement between the 
parties. The Croatian and the Federation ground campaign, together with 
the peace agreement, greatly improved the clarity of lines separating 
the parties making a peace enforcement mission more feasible and less 
dangerous.
  Finally, strong leadership by President Clinton and the United States 
in this area is producing tangible and positive results in NATO. Just a 
few of those results in NATO, some of which are truly remarkable.
  First of all, Germany is providing troops for this first time ``out 
of area'' NATO operation. Second, French troops will be operating under 
NATO command and control. France has announced its return to regular 
participation in the NATO military committee. This is a reversal, Mr. 
President, of 30 years of French policy. Russia has agreed to place its 
forces under the operational control of an American general. Russia 
will consult with NATO on a 16-nation to one-nation basis, but will not 
have a veto over NATO decisions.
  These events have the potential to lead to future developments with 
Russia that could have a decidedly positive impact on European security 
in the years ahead. There are also, of course, potential downsides to 
this arrangement. There will be no substitute for constant high-level 
vigilance to this Russian military participation, both in Washington 
and in Moscow, as well as in the field. This one bears very careful and 
close nurturing and attention.
  All NATO nations except Iceland, as well as many other nations, have 
committed forces to Bosnia. The United States forces will be primarily 
in the Tuzla area where the roads and terrain are difficult but not as 
severe as some other areas of Bosnia. The Nordic brigade comprised of 
Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and recently joined by Poland, that 
will be colocated with American forces, have operated in the area for 
some time. They have heavy equipment. They have not tolerated 
interference. They have been friendly with the people of the area, and 
they have been firm. They are helping our advance team immensely with 
their advice and their knowledge of the area and of the people.
  The Turkish brigade will be near American troops, which should help 
to temper the more extreme elements of the Moslem communities. Turkey 
is a key NATO ally with strong influence in the moderate Muslim world.
  All of our commanders who have testified before our committee or who 
have spoken to me privately believe that the rules of engagement are 
clear, they are robust, and they are appropriate. They authorize the 
use of force, including deadly force, in response to both hostile acts 
as well as, in the judgment of the commander, hostile intent. These are 
the same rules of engagement as were utilized in Haiti. Most 
importantly, the mission and the military task are doable, according to 
all of our military witnesses.


                         III. Military Mission

                         A. Mission Definition

  The military mission is a subject of considerable importance in how 
it is defined. General Shalikashvili has defined our military mission 
as follows: ``In an evenhanded manner, monitor and enforce compliance 
with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement.''
  General Shalikashvili has further listed the military tasks of the 
Dayton agreement as follows: Supervise selective marking of cease-fire 
line, inter-entity boundary line and zones of separation.
  Monitor and, if necessary enforce, withdrawal of forces to their 
respective territories within agreed periods as follows:
  Ensure withdrawal of forces behind zones of separation within 30 days 
of transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to the Implementation Force;
  Ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one 
entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority;
  Ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an 
additional 45 days;
  Establish and man a 4-kilometer zone of separation--2 kilometers on 
either side of cease fire/inter-entity boundary line;
  Establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities; and
  Create a Joint Military Commission and subordinate military 
commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties.
  In order to accomplish these military tasks, the Military Annex to 
the General Framework Agreement provides that ``the IFOR Commander 
shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any 
Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, 
including the use of military force, to protect the IFOR and to carry 
out the responsibilities'' under the agreement. The peace agreement, 
thus, gives the NATO Implementation Force well defined 
responsibilities--basically to separate the parties and create a stable 
environment--and grants it broad authorities to carry out its mission 
and to protect itself. In many ways, NATO's clearly defined 
responsibility with very broad authority and robust capability is the 
opposite of what the U.N. forces evolved into: broad and ill-defined 
responsibility with narrow authority and limited capability. The worst 
kind of combination. General Shalikashvili has testified that the 
military mission and the military tasks are appropriate and executable.

[[Page S19229]]



               B. Definition of success and Exit Strategy

  There is a strong correlation between the definition of success when 
you are using military forces and also the exit strategy. I would like 
to briefly discuss those.
  In discussing the obstacles to the success of the military mission we 
first must avoid confusing the military mission with the much broader 
U.S. and international political goals in Bosnia. It is a part of the 
overall political goals, but it is only one part of the broader goal.
  In my view, we should view the military mission as a success if the 
Implementation Force provides the time and space for the parties, 
assisted by the international community, to begin a peaceful building 
process. I use the term ``building'' in both the physical and political 
sense; that is, both building the democratic processes for a unified 
nation and reconstructing the economy and the physical infrastructure 
of the nation.
  The military part of the mission is to create the climate and 
stability required to begin the building process. The civilian part of 
the mission is to build the political and civil institutions that can 
endure. In the long run, only the parties themselves can bring about 
this success.
  The building process is separate and distinct from the military 
mission. It is entirely possible that the military mission will be 
carried out with great professionalism and accomplish the military goal 
and still have the civilian building process end in dismal failure. 
That is what I think we have to recognize.
  The success of the military mission will require a great deal of 
coordination with the Parties' military and civilian representatives 
and with the High Representative and the participating civilian 
organizations. The Joint Military Commission and subordinate military 
commissions at the brigade and battalion level will bring all of these 
parties together under the chairmanship of the Implementation Force 
commander and his local commanders. One of the principal uses of these 
forums is for the IFOR commander--U.S. Admiral Smith--and his 
subordinate commanders to work with the military commanders of the 
Federation and the Bosnian Serbs at all levels to convince them that 
peace is in the best interests of their respective peoples and that the 
military goal of regaining and holding lost territory is not 
achievable.
  Mr. President, they do not have perfect civilian control in this part 
of the world. If we are going to really get a peace there that endures, 
a key part of that will be having the military leaders of each one of 
the parties, the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, to 
recognize that peace is in the interests of the people that they 
represent. That is a key. Our military forces will play a key role in 
that kind of understanding. This is very, very important.
  Bringing the military leadership of the opposing parties together 
under U.S. and NATO auspices to begin the slow and tortuous process of 
building trust and cooperation may be one of the most important NATO 
challenges and opportunities.
  The exit strategy and the definition of a successful military mission 
flow together, in my view. Separating the parties--providing time and 
space for the civil building process--creating an environment of peace 
and stability--and through non-U.S. military means, leaving a 
reasonable military balance which gives the parties an opportunity to 
defend their own borders. These are all key components of ``success'' 
in the broad context and are required for a successful exit of U.S. and 
NATO forces within approximately 1 year.


                               iv. risks

                    a. risks to the military mission

  Mr. President, I get a lot of letters, and I know all of my 
colleagues do, about the risks to the United States military forces. 
These risks are very much on the minds of all of us as we send our 
young men and women to this dangerous area of the world.
  There are certainly risks involved in this military operation.
  There are a number of risks to U.S. military personnel. First, I 
believe, is accidents, based on all the records of the U.N. Forces. 
Then landmines, snipers, attacks by extremists, hostage taking, and, 
finally, one that is overlooked many times; complacency of our military 
forces when things are going well. This complacency can lead to 
carelessness and can only be avoided by strong leadership from the unit 
level right on up.
  General Shalikashvili testified that he does not believe that our 
forces will be subjected to attacks from organized combat units. He 
believes the greatest risk will come from accidents on the dangerous 
Bosnian roads. In this regard, it should be noted that the U.N. 
Protection Force sustained 213 deaths, of which 80 were due to combat 
and 133 due to other causes.
  I am confident that the excellent equipment, training and discipline 
of our forces should minimize the risks, but there will undoubtedly be 
American casualties. Potential attackers should be on notice that the 
forces available to NATO and the robust rules of engagement mean that 
swift and overpowering responses will take place if NATO forces are 
attacked or provoked.
  Our forces are supposed to be even-handed, and I am sure they will 
be. But evenhanded does not mean, nor should it imply, being gentle 
when they are either attacked or when they detect hostile intent. NATO 
and the United States must insist that President Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 
fully meet his commitment to ensure that the mujahedin forces depart 
Bosnia within 30 days of the signing of the peace agreement. This has 
been a firm pledge by the Bosnian President.
  This will be seen by the United States as well as a number of other 
parties, including the Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, as well as the 
Bosnian Serbs, as an indication of the extent of the Iranian and other 
outside Islamic fundamentalist influence on the Bosnian Moslems.
  It is hard to imagine that the Bosnian Moslem and Croat Federation 
could hold together if there is a pervasive extreme Islamic 
fundamentalist influence within the Bosnian Muslim entity.
  It is also hard to believe that the Bosnian Serbs, particularly those 
who are living in the suburbs of Sarajevo, and whose cooperation or at 
least acquiescence is necessary to the security of the forces of the 
French contingent in that area, will be reassured if the mujahedin do 
not depart as scheduled. Although I will not dwell on this today, while 
we are talking about risk, there is also a risk of renewed conflict in 
Eastern Slavonia or a flare-up in Kosovo.


                B. Risks relating to arming and training

  There are also risks relating to arming and training, which is a 
mission that I would like to discuss just for a few minutes.
  The Regional Stabilization Annex to the Framework Agreement gives the 
parties 180 days after the agreement was signed to negotiate limits on 
the levels of armaments. These negotiations are to be carried out under 
the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). I want to emphasize that this is a civilian and not a military 
task and the NATO Implementation Force is not responsible for this 
effort. The fact that it is a civilian task does not mean that the 
United States will not play a leadership role in this effort. On the 
contrary, the United States should endeavor to play a strong leadership 
role since a general reduction in the number of arms in former 
Yugoslavia will reduce the risk to the United States and allied forces 
participating in the Implementation Force as well as improve the chance 
for lasting peace.

  The U.S. commitment to lead an international effort to arm and train 
the Federation forces was essential to securing the peace agreement but 
we should make no mistake that it carries substantial risk. An 
assessment is already underway to identify the capabilities of the 
Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Federation, to assess what the 
Federation needs to redress its deficiencies, to plan how those needs 
will be met, and to commence training, since training may be provided 
immediately under the Regional Stabilization Annex and the UN Security 
Council resolution that lifts the arms embargo.
  If arming and training is not carried out with care, it could wind up 
increasing the risk to United States forces in Bosnia and alienating 
our allies. It will be important to ensure that United 

[[Page S19230]]
States forces in Bosnia are not involved and that the involvement of 
active duty United States military personnel is kept to administrative 
functions. In this regard, I was pleased to note that President 
Clinton, in his letter of December 12, 1995 to Senator Dole on this 
issue, stated that ``I will do nothing that I believe will endanger the 
safety of American troops on the ground in Bosnia.'' Mr. President, I 
believe all of us agree with that goal. It will also be important for 
the Administration to keep our allies informed on the steps we are 
taking and to take into consideration their comments.

  The use of a third country, such as Turkey--a secular Muslim country, 
to carry out the training seems to be the best choice.
  In the case of training, I believe the emphasis should be on small 
unit training and the maintenance, repair and use of defensive weapons 
and equipment.
  In the case of arming, I believe that whatever arms are provided to 
the Federation, the emphasis must be on defensive capability. By 
defensive capability, I mean that the weapons, equipment, and training 
that are provided are suited to allow the force to defend itself rather 
than to enable it to conduct offensive operations to gain and hold 
territory. That is a very important distinction--in the kind of 
equipment we encourage to be furnished by other countries. In the case 
or weapons and equipment, it would mean emphasizing counter battery 
radar, night vision devices, communications equipment, anti-armor, 
ammunition, light vehicles, and the like rather than providing large 
numbers of tanks and artillery tubes. There also may be a need to 
perform some modest military construction to relocate the Federation 
forces out of the cities and towns in which they are presently located.
  There are also risks to the military mission that relate to the 
accomplishment of the civilian political goals.


                  C. Risks to Civilian/Political Goals

  It is obvious that the planning for the accomplishment of the 
military tasks is far ahead of that for the civilian tasks and that 
there is a serious and growing gap between the two.
  NATO planning at the strategic and operational levels benefitted 
greatly from the planning accomplished over the last year relating to a 
possible NATO operation to extract the United Nations Protection Force 
from Bosnia.
  Our military people have been going through contingency planning on 
this situation for some time.
  Both planning efforts required a common set of data relating to the 
all-important logistics effort to insert forces rapidly, to stabilize 
the security situation, and to extract the force safely once the 
mission had been carried out. Additionally, NATO has an in-place staff 
that specializes in such planning and is trained to adapt its plans as 
more information on the specific military tasks become available, as 
was the case during the negotiation of the General Framework Agreement 
and its Annexes.
  By comparison, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe and the other organizations that will be involved in the civil 
political mission have no counterpart planning staffs and have no 
experience in carrying out many of the tasks they will carry out in 
Bosnia. For example, the High Representative was only named a little 
more than a week ago to the London Conference.
  The broad international political goal is to preserve Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a unified country in a region in which peace and 
stability endures. Accomplishing that broad goal would require 
overcoming a number of obstacles that could defy its attainment and the 
civilian side of this will really have to address many of these 
obstacles.

  Mr. President, all we have to do is look at Haiti to find out that 
you can have a military mission go extremely well but not have the 
economic development, the infrastructure development, and even the 
political development keep up with that. And you can still have a 
country that is hanging on the bare edge. That is the case in Haiti 
today, and that will also be the case in Bosnia unless the civilian 
side begins to catch up with the military side and really understand 
the obstacle to having stability in this region.
  Such obstacles include the history of the region, the ethnic 
consciousness of significant parts of the population, the residual 
hatred resulting from the cruel and inhuman behavior of the warring 
parties, such as ethnic cleansing carried out by but not limited to the 
Bosnian Serbs, and the tendency of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian 
Serbs to identify with Croatia and Serbia respectively rather than with 
a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Faced with such obstacles, reaching 
the broad political goals will be extremely difficult. The underlying 
causes of the conflict cannot be cured by the military mission. And it 
is important for all of us to understand that.


                   D. Bosnia--One Nation or Partition

  Mr. President, the broad goal is to have one nation called Bosnia. 
There are other tugs in the direction of partition and those tugs have 
not ended.
  The General Framework Agreement and its 11 Annexes contain a number 
of provisions that both reinforce and undermine the broad political 
goal of a united Bosnia.
  On the positive side for unity, for example, the following provisions 
reinforce that goal: the commitment to free and fair elections and the 
protection of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the agreement; the vesting of responsibility in the Federal 
Government for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, immigration, and 
monetary policy; the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly, a 
Presidency, and a Constitutional Court; and the arrangements for 
international assistance for rehabilitation.
  On the other hand the following provisions are contrary to that goal 
of one Bosnia. On that side of the ledger, the recognition of two semi-
autonomous entities, the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnian Serb 
Republic, within clearly demarcated geographic boundaries, each of whom 
will have their own army; a Parliamentary Assembly whose legislation 
can be blocked by two-thirds of the representatives from the Federation 
or the Serb Republic or, in the case of a proposed decision deemed to 
be ``destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb 
people,'' by a majority of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates.
  We can understand in this parliamentary body how dicey that 
proposition is.
  A three-member Presidency, consisting of one Bosnian, one Croat, and 
one Serb, in which a decision may be blocked by declaration of one 
Member that it is ``destructive of the vital interest of the Entity'' 
he represents.


                         e. fragile assumptions

  Another very tricky proposition, Mr. President, that I would like to 
mention before closing today are two fragile assumptions that are very 
important to the overall peace agreement. These are fragile 
assumptions, and they are interrelated assumptions.
  The first assumption is that the Moslem-Croat Federation, which was 
formed as a result of a U.S. diplomatic initiative in the February 1994 
Washington Agreement, will stay together. One only has to recall that 
the Muslims and Croats armies were actively fighting each other prior 
to the Washington Agreement and that, even afterwards, the functioning 
of the city of Mostar has essentially been stymied for more than a year 
as a result of the inability of the Moslem and Croat mayors to work 
together. So that is a very questionable assumption.
  The second assumption, pertains to the Sub-Regional Arms Control 
Annex which contains a ``default'' formula for limits on armaments that 
kicks in if the Parties cannot agree otherwise within 180 days. They 
first have the opportunity to negotiate. If they do not negotiate, then 
this so-called default formula and ratios kick in. The assumption is 
that it is stabilizing to establish a ratio based on the population of 
the respective parties.

  Under that formula, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commonly 
referred to as Serbia, has a baseline or a limit of 5. The Republic of 
Croatia has a limit of 2 compared to 5. And Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
a limit of 2. So the ratio is 5 Serbia, 2 Croatia, and 2 for the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina entity. The limit for Bosnia is further divided on the 
basis of a ratio for the Federation 2 and 1 for the Serb Republic.
  Assuming the ratios are met in the default formula--it requires a 
great leap of faith--but even if they are 

[[Page S19231]]
reached, unless there has been significant political and economic 
progress, stability is far from assured.
  If the Moslem Croat Federation stays together, the Bosnian Serbs' 2 
to 1 disadvantage in arms compared to the Federation could serve as an 
incentive for them to align more closely with Serbia, to the detriment 
of the goal of a unified Bosnia.
  If, on the other hand, the Federation does not stay together, the 
Bosnian Moslems will be at a 2 to 1 disadvantage in a potential two-
front conflict with the combined strength of the Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosnian Serbs.
  Now, I would say that it is unlikely that the Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosnian Serbs will join in some kind of unified or coordinated attack 
against the Bosnian Muslims, but the Bosnian Muslims could in the 
future easily find themselves in a conflict with both parties. These 
fragile assumptions, which could go awry very easily, make it even more 
essential from my perspective that the goal of the arms control 
builddown, the first effort to build down the weapons, as well as any 
arm-and-train program, leave all the parties with primarily a defensive 
capability.
  If we start basically building up offensive arms, these ratios and 
all the complexities are going to be vast.
  In spite of these fragile and questionable assumptions, I believe 
that a builddown process is worth a try. I believe that we must 
undertake at least the effort.
  Finally, it will be imperative for the United States to remain 
engaged at the highest diplomatic levels to assure that the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other civilian 
organizations utilize the time available to them to undertake an 
intensive and focused effort to accomplish their task.


        F. risks to military mission relating to civilian tasks

  Mr. President, possibly the greatest risk to the military mission is 
that there will be confusion of the military mission and the much 
broader U.S. and international political goals--confusion in the 
Congress and confusion in the country.
  This has two aspects. The first is that there will be mission creep 
on the ground with the U.S. military being expected to assume more and 
more responsibility for the political or civilian aspects of the 
framework agreement. These include the task of continuing humanitarian 
aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the 
return of displaced persons and refugees, the holding of free 
elections, police functions within borders, and the like.
  One of the trickiest areas is not about separating the forces. That 
is a clear military mission. But what happens within an area if you 
start having murders take place within the borders? Whose job is it to 
take on the policing of that? Certainly, the civilian mission will be 
to do what they can to restore the function of the police forces, but 
in the meantime what does the United States military and what do other 
NATO militaries do when there is really chaos within the borders?
  These are a few of the areas that could very easily lead to mission 
creep.
  The second danger--and this is something I think all of us in the 
Congress have a keen responsibility to keep in mind in our remarks--
relates to public perception of how we define the military mission's 
success or lack thereof. I noted earlier that the military mission is 
limited. Assuming the United States military leaves Bosnia in 
approximately 1 year and the conflict there resumes shortly thereafter, 
has the military mission been a failure under these circumstances? If 
the news media and the American public confuse our narrowly defined 1-
year military mission with the long-term political goals for a united 
and stable and peaceful Bosnia, the perception of failure after 1 year 
is possible and perhaps even probable. So I think it is important for 
us to define these terms very carefully.


                           V. residual force

  Since the plans for carrying out the civilian tasks are far behind 
the military side and since they are so important to the building 
process, the best case is that there will be a solid beginning toward 
accomplishing the civilian tasks during the first year of the military 
deployment. But it will be far from complete. Because of this, I 
believe that planning must start now for a residual military force to 
replace the NATO implementation force at the end of a year to give the 
parties and the organizations helping them the secure environment and 
confidence they need to continue the longer-term civilian task which 
without any doubt is going to take far longer than 1 year.
  A residual force should not include United States ground forces, in 
my view, but could be supported by the United States in those military 
areas where we have unique capabilities. Such a residual force can be a 
United Nations peacekeeping force or a coalition of forces from 
European and other nations that are committed to seeing the building 
process continued. This will in most likelihood take a number of years. 
The point is that the planning for a residual force needs to commence 
as soon as possible.
  Finally, as a necessary contingency, the United States should begin 
to work with our allies to ensure continuing cooperation to contain the 
conflict if the peace process breaks down, either while our troops are 
there or after we leave in about a year. NATO's vital interests in my 
view have never been involved in Bosnia itself--important interests, 
but not vital. But NATO's vital interests could certainly be involved 
if there is a spread of this conflict. Strategic planning within NATO 
must begin now for a long-term containment strategy if that breakdown 
occurs.
  Mr. President, the United Nations deployment to Macedonia in which 
United States and Nordic forces are participating is a first step, only 
a first step but at least a first step, toward this broader containment 
strategy which may be essential in the long run.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their attention, and I thank 
the Chair for the time. I would at this point yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________