[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 207 (Friday, December 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S19206-S19223]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




TREATY WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION 
           OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE START II TREATY)

  The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I am very pleased--as all of my fellow 
Members should be--that the Senate will now be considering whether to 
give its consent to ratification of the START II Treaty.
  We can anticipate that the floor debate will be relatively brief by 
contrast with the time devoted to previous strategic offensive arms 
accords--the 1972 Interim Agreement and the 1991 START Treaty.
  This treaty deserves the Senate's careful consideration, and 
approval. In the nearly 3 years since it was negotiated, the treaty has 
been carefully weighed, and I believe it to be clear now to almost all 
Members that START II is a logical and significant successor to the 
first START Treaty, which is also assuredly in the national security 
interests of the United States.
  The Russian legislature has started, but not finished, its work on 
this treaty. The Russian Federation has just had elections, and the 
consideration and approval process, if successful, will involve many 
new members heretofore unfamiliar with START. I deeply believe that 
Russian legislators will carefully consider the present political, 
economic and military situation of their nation, will weigh priorities, 
and will see that START is a significant achievement that is clearly in 
their national interests. I believe very strongly that our activities 
and action in committee and the consideration being taken in the Senate 
today will serve to reassure their legislature that we are a serious 
party to this endeavor and will be of value as they consider their 
approach to the treaty.
  Mr. President, the START II Treaty, which builds upon START, was 
signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January 3, 
1993, and was transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on January 
15, 1993. The treaty builds upon the reductions of offensive strategic 
nuclear arms required by START.
  The START Treaty, Members will recall, requires about a one-third 
reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear arms of the United States 
and, collectively, of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The 
treaty specifically cuts the former Soviet Union's heavy ICBM totals in 
half.
  In addition the START Treaty and the subsequent Lisbon protocol 
obligates Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up all of their 
nuclear weapons and to join the START II Treaty, which is a bilateral 
treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation.
  The START II Treaty has several critically important aspects:
  First, it will reduce by 2003, Russian and American deployed 
strategic warheads to a level at or below 3,500--a more than two-thirds 
reduction over pre-START levels.
  Second, it bans deployment of multiple-warhead intercontinental 
ballistic missiles [MIRVed ICBMs]. These missiles are generally 
considered to be the most threatening component of each nation's 
strategic arsenal.
  Third, it legally obligates Russia to destroy all 154 SS-18 heavy 
ICBMs and to destroy or convert all silo launchers for such missiles. 
The SS-18 missile is the largest and most destabilizing ICBM in the 
world. Half of them were eliminated by START. This treaty will finish 
the elimination process.
  These are three very important accomplishments. All of them are 
important to strategic stability. The details make that evident.
  The START II Treaty calls for reductions, in two phases, in ICBMs, 
ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, SLBM warheads, 
heavy bombers and nuclear armaments on heavy bombers.
  The first phase of reductions is to be completed no later than seven 
years after entry into force of the START Treaty.
  The second reduction phase, to be completed no later than January 1, 
2003, requires each party to achieve the following final reduction 
limits:
  Between 3,000 and 3,500, for the aggregate number of warheads on 
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
  Between 1,700 and 1,750, for warheads on deployed SLBMs;
  Zero, for warheads on deployed MIRVed ICBMs; and
  Zero, for warheads on deployed Russian heavy ICBMs (SS-18s).
  Mr. President, the START II Treaty was considered thoroughly in 
hearings that I chaired in May and June 1993, and that Senator Lugar, 
my colleague from Indiana, chaired in January, February, and March 
1995. Witnesses included Secretary of State Warren Christopher; former 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger; Secretary of Defense William 
Perry; General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
Ambassador Linton Brooks, chief negotiator of the treaty; Thomas 
Graham, Jr., Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency; Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. James Woolsey and Douglas 
MacEachin, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
Agency. Non-governmental witnesses included Steven Hadley, an attorney 
with Shea and Gardner; Sven Kraemer, president, Global 2000; Michael 
Krepon, president, Henry L. Stimson Center, and Jack Mendelsohn, deputy 
director of the Arms Control Association.

  Earlier this month, the committee considered and approved a 
resolution of ratification in an 18 to 0 vote. The resolution contains 
six conditions and seven declarations, none of which will require any 
renegotiation of the provisions or the further agreement of the Russian 
Federation. These are the key points of the conditions and 
declarations:
  Condition 1, on noncompliance makes it clear that the Senate would 
view as a most serious matter actions by the parties to START or by the 
Russian Federation with regard to START II that are inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of the treaties or in violation of the treaties. 
In such an event, it specifies courses of action to be taken by the 
President with regard to the Senate and the noncompliant party.
  Condition 2, makes it clear that the Senate, in approving START II, 
is not obligating the United States to accept any modification of the 
1972 ABM Treaty.
  Condition 3, makes clear that Russian ratification and implementation 
of START II is not contingent upon a United States-Russian agreement 
for financial aid.
  Condition 4, makes clear that specified exchanges of letters are of 
the same force and effect as treaty obligations.
  Condition 5, recognizes that the administration has reached an 
agreement with the Russians under which there will be strict 
accountability for all ballistic missiles associated with START. The 
Senate reaffirms its view that space-launch vehicles containing items 
limited by START are subject to the relevant treaty terms.
  Condition 6, embraces the administration's view that the START and 
START II provisions on national technical means do not preclude the 
United States from pursuing options to urge the Russian Federation to 
dismantle its electronic eavesdropping facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
  Declaration 1, deals with cooperative threat reduction. Vigorous 
continuation of the Safe and Secure Dismantlement talks is urged. The 
resolution makes clear the importance of confirming the irreversibility 
of the process of nuclear weapons reduction.
  Declaration 2, urges the President to regulate reductions so as to 
avoid any strategic imbalance endangering the national security.
  Declaration 3, expressed the sense of the Senate that the President 
should  

[[Page S19207]]

consult with the Senate as to whether START II remains in the national 
interest should any nation other that Russia expand its strategic 
arsenal so as to jeopardize the United States'--security--interests.
  Declaration 4, recalls earlier commitments to reduce armaments and 
calls upon the United States and Russia to seek further strategic 
offensive arms reductions and calls upon the other three nuclear-weapon 
states to give careful and early consideration to corresponding 
reductions.
  Declaration 5, urges the President to insist that Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine abide by the guidelines of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime.
  Declaration 6, states that the Senate will consider agreements 
obligating the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or 
armaments in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to treaty 
power as set forth in the Constitution.
  Declaration 7, affirms the applicability to all treaties of the 
constitutionally based principles set forth in condition 1 of the 
resolution of ratification of the INF-Treaty.
  The START and START II Treaties and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty limiting strategic defensive arms, truly represent a continuum 
of arms control that has already had considerable benefits to the 
nations involved and promise still more over the next 7 years.
  There is no question that all of this effort, more than two decades-
long, characterized by new initiatives that build upon earlier 
achievements step-by-step, has been critically important in the effort 
to curb the costly and essentially pointless arms competition that 
characterized much of the postwar period prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. While I, together with many others, am pleased that we 
finally have reached a point at which we can anticipate the elimination 
of the most destabilizing weapons--land-based missiles with multiple 
warheads, it also is saddening to realize that this Nation's leaders 
might have been wiser earlier. The pointless and wasteful MIRV 
competition that has been central to the arms race well might have been 
averted.

  It is useful to recall that the Committee and the Senate endeavored 
in 1970 to forestall the development of MIRVed systems.
  Senate Resolution 211 stated in part:

       Whereas development of multiple independently targetable 
     reentry vehicles by both the United States and the Soviet 
     Union represents a fundamental and radical challenge to such 
     stability;
       Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over strategic 
     forces appears likely to diminish greatly if testing and 
     deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry 
     vehicles proceed;
       Resolved further, That the President should propose to the 
     Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an 
     immediate suspension . . . of the further development of all 
     offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, 
     subject to national verification or such measures of 
     observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

  Senate Resolution 211 was introduced by Senator Edward Brooke and 39 
cosponsors with three later additions on June 17, 1969. The Foreign 
Relations Committee reported favorably Senate Resolution 211 on March 
24, 1970, and it passed the Senate on April 9, 1970, on a vote of 72 to 
6.
  I remember well making the case to several senior administration 
officials that we would do well to do our best to avoid a race in 
multiple-warhead missiles. Nonetheless, the administration did not 
agree with the Senate on the matter, believing instead that the United 
States enjoyed a technological lead over the Soviet Union, and would do 
better if MIRVs were allowed. Accordingly, the United States never 
proposed, in any serious way, that MIRV's be banned in SALT I. Two 
decades later, Soviet MIRVs have become a matter of considerable 
concern, and much effort in START and further effort in connection with 
the de-MIRVing Treaty have been required to deal with the problem. Now, 
25 years later, it is clear how prescient the Senate was. Now that we 
are coming full circle, only five of Senate Resolution 211's 
cosponsors--Senators Dole, Hatfield, Inouye, Kennedy, and I--remain in 
the Senate.
  The achievements of SALT, START, and the ABM Treaty demonstrate that 
the United States and the successors to the Soviet Union are fulfilling 
pledges made repeatedly since the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to 
reduce their nuclear arsenals. These pledges were seen as justification 
by other nations for decisions to refrain from nuclear weapons testing, 
join the non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and, 
earlier this year, to agree upon the permanent extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
  I hope very much that we will have the wisdom to understand what has 
been achieved, the resolve to preserve our achievements, and the 
foresight to build upon them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, yesterday I wrote to the majority leader 
to indicate that I intended to object to any time agreement or other 
agreement to conclude debate on the START II Treaty until the 
administration is willing to support the defense authorization 
conference report. In my letter to the leader I made it clear that I do 
not oppose the START II Treaty and will eventually support an agreement 
for expedited consideration of the treaty.
  I also indicated, however, that the administration and Senate 
Democrats have linked START II to the fiscal year 1996 Defense 
Authorization Conference Report. While I strongly reject such linkage, 
given the administration's insistence that linkage exists, I now have 
no choice but to clarify what I believe is a misleading assertion.
  In order to clarify what the defense authorization conference report 
actually requires, and the fact that it contains nothing that could 
cause Russia to reject START II, I will require a significant amount of 
time. I had not intended to offer any amendments or declarations to the 
START II resolution of ratification, but it now appears as if I will be 
forced to. I simply cannot stand by while the administration spreads 
misleading information regarding the defense authorization conference 
report.
  Let us be clear about what does and does not threaten START II. START 
II will be ratified by the United States. The treaty enjoys 
overwhelming support in the Senate; there is no threat to it here. In 
Russia, however, there are many groups opposed to START II, including 
factions in the military and many hard-line nationalists. These 
Russians who oppose START II do so for reasons having nothing to do 
with anything in our conference report.
  But these same Russian opponents of START II have found all kinds of 
convenient excuses to justify their real objections, including 
opposition to the expansion of NATO and United States policy in Bosnia. 
What the administration has done by arguing that the ballistic missile 
defense provisions in this conference report threaten START II is to 
create yet another excuse for Russian opponents of START II. Those who 
have already decided to oppose START II will simply repeat the 
administration's rhetoric.
  If anything in the United States threatens START II in Russia it is 
the administration's own rhetoric. False assertions about how the 
defense authorization conference report violates the ABM Treaty are 
prepackaged Christmas presents for the Russian opponents of START II.
  The day after the Senate passed the defense authorization conference 
report, the chairman of the House National Security Committee and I 
wrote to the President to clarify that nothing in the conference report 
required or advocated a violation of the ABM Treaty.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a copy of that letter written 
to the President, dated December 20, 1995, be printed at this point in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                Washington, DC, December 20, 1995.
     The President of the United States,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: As you know, the House and Senate have 
     now passed the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization 
     Conference Report. Given the importance of this legislation 
     for our military men and women and their families, and for 
     the national security of the United States, we are disturbed 
     by the fact that your Statement of Administration Policy 
     (SAP) indicates that you intend to 

[[Page S19208]]
     veto this conference report, primarily because of provisions regarding 
     ballistic missile defense.
       We are writing to clarify misconceptions contained in your 
     SAP that the ballistic missile defense provisions in this 
     conference report either constitute a breach of, or establish 
     an intent to breach, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 
     In fact, there is nothing in the conference report that 
     advocates or requires any action by the United States to 
     breach its obligations under the ABM Treaty. Our conferees 
     went to great length to ensure that Administration concerns 
     in this regard were fully addressed.
       Our conference report does require deployment of a national 
     missile defense (NMD) system by 2003, and it urges you to 
     enter into negotiations with the Russian Federation to amend 
     the ABM Treaty to allow for a multiple-site NMD deployment. 
     There is no requirement, explicit or implied, for the United 
     States to deploy a multiple-site NMD system by 2003. In fact, 
     the language in the conference report regarding ABM sites is 
     taken verbatim from the Senate-passed bill, which the 
     Administration has endorsed.
       We urge you to join us in working with Russia to allow both 
     sides to eventually deploy a multiple-site NMD system. We 
     believe that it is in the interests of both countries to do 
     so. However, nowhere does this legislation mandate such a 
     deployment. Therefore, the concerns raised in your SAP 
     concerning Russian responses are not supported by the 
     legislation itself.
       With the only operational ABM system in the world deployed 
     around Moscow, and since it is fully within our treaty rights 
     to deploy a single-site NMD system, we find it difficult to 
     understand your Administration's linking this conference 
     report to Russia's consideration of the START II Treaty. Such 
     linkage is highly questionable and extremely risky, both for 
     START II and for United States national security.
       It is unclear to us whether or not your Administration 
     supports deployment of even the most limited NMD system. 
     However, to maintain that your objections concerning 
     ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference 
     report are based on a putative requirement to breach the ABM 
     Treaty is simply not consistent with the actual legislation.
       We respectfully urge you to more carefully examine the 
     ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference 
     report. We believe that you will conclude that there is 
     nothing even approaching a commitment to violate the ABM 
     Treaty contained therein.
       This conference report adequately addresses the ballistic 
     missile defense concerns raised by your Administration over 
     the last several months. Therefore, we urge you to sign the 
     conference report and thereby ensure that the men and women 
     of our armed forces receive the benefits and material support 
     that they so badly need and deserve.
           Respectfully,
     Floyd Spence,
       Chairman, Committee on National Security, House of 
     Representatives.
     Strom Thurmond,
       Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.

  Mr. THURMOND. Let me clarify some of the false assertions about the 
defense authorization conference report. It has been asserted that the 
conference report requires the United States to deploy a multiple-site 
national missile defense system and even a space-based system. Both of 
these assertions are flat wrong.
  The conference report does require the Secretary of Defense to deploy 
a ground-based national missile defense system by the end of 2003. But 
nothing in the conference report requires the system to include 
multiple-sites.
  I continue to believe that the United States should ultimately deploy 
a multiple-site system, but nothing in this conference report requires 
such a system. Nor does the conference report advocate, let alone 
require, a violation of the ABM Treaty.
  The language in the conference report urges the President to 
undertake negotiations with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for 
deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense system. This and 
other provisions in this conference report envision a cooperative 
process, not unilateral abrogation.
  It has been asserted that there is no way to defend the territory of 
the United States from a single site, and therefore this conference 
report indirectly requires a multiple-site system. While I believe that 
a multiple-site system should be our goal, I must point out that the 
Army has concluded that it can defend all 50 States, including Alaska 
and Hawaii, from a single, ABM treaty-compliant, site. I would also 
point out that the Army's report on this subject was prepared at the 
request of the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee.
  Unfortunately, despite all our efforts in conference to resolve 
concerns related to the ABM Treaty, we continue to hear the artificial 
argument that this conference report constitutes an ``anticipatory 
breach'' of the ABM Treaty. Since there is no requirement to deploy a 
multiple-site national missile defense system in this conference 
report, there can be no ``anticipatory-breach'' contained in it.
  But even if there were a multiple-site requirement, this would still 
not constitute an ``anticipatory breach''. Since there are treaty-
compliant ways to get to a multiple-site system, just having a policy 
that points us in that direction cannot constitute an ``anticipatory 
breach.'' To quote the senior Senator from Alabama, who was a 
distinguished judge prior to coming to the Senate, ``While there are 
legal methods to deploy multiple sites within the framework of the ABM 
Treaty, there can be no anticipatory breach.''
  It has also been argued that this conference report requires a space-
based defense. The conference report does call on the Department of 
Defense to preserve the option of deploying a layered defense in the 
future. But there is no requirement to deploy any specific space-based 
system or to structure an acquisition program that includes space-based 
weapons. The conference report does increase funding for the space-
based laser program. But this increase is merely to keep a technology 
program alive. We have asked for a report to illustrate what a 
deployment program would look like, but this is hardly a mandate to 
deploy.
  We can certainly debate the merits of what this conference report 
requires. But let's be clear about what it actually contains. If 
Senators want to debate the need for deployment of a national missile 
defense system by 2003, that is a legitimate debate. But to argue, as 
several Senators have, that this conference report requires deployment 
of space-based weapons and mandates a violation of the ABM Treaty is 
simply an act of disinformation. Senators are entitled to their views, 
but they owe the American people an honest statement of fact.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I think we have come to a very auspicious 
time in our United States history, the history of the Russian 
Federation, and probably the history of the world because we have the 
opportunity now to move forward and ratify START II and hopefully 
implement it.
  As the Senate knows, this is the second such treaty, following on the 
precedent set by the first START Treaty. We are doing our best to 
further reduce the United States and Russian strategic offensive 
nuclear weapons.
  I believe it is the result of President Reagan's vision. He certainly 
led the United States and the former Soviet Union to begin negotiations 
on the first START Treaty back in 1982. President Reagan's initiatives 
were carried on by President Bush, who, through his leadership 
concluded this effort that resulted in the signing of the first START 
Treaty on July 31, 1991.
  START mandates reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons, 
including intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBM's, and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBM's, and heavy bombers.
  START also limits each country to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600 
strategic offensive nuclear weapons. These limits reduce the number of 
warheads carried on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons carried on 
heavy bombers by about 30 percent from the 1990 levels.
  Just before the end of President Bush's term in office on January 3, 
1993, the United States and Russia signed the second effort to further 
reduce these nuclear weapons, and this is treaty before us now--START 
II.
  For the record the START II Treaty is formally titled ``The Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Further Reductions and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.''
  This second treaty limits each country to 3,500 accountable warheads 
on strategic offensive nuclear weapons and reduces the number of 
warheads on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons on bombers in each 
country to about one-third of the 1990 levels.
  I think that we have to really consider seriously where we are going 
with 

[[Page S19209]]
START II. It is I think the right direction for this country. It has 
come about not only because of the administration's commitment--both 
the prior administrations and this administration--to the reduction of 
these systems. But, also, I think because of the members of the 
committees on both sides of the aisle here in the Senate and the staffs 
of those committees involved, the Senate Committees on Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, and Appropriations, as well as 
the staff of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group.
  I want to have the Record show my deep appreciation for those who 
have been so much involved in this process.
  On this side of the aisle, certainly the floor manager of this bill, 
Senator Richard Lugar, deserves a great deal of credit; our 
distinguished President pro tempore, Senator Thurmond; and I want to 
note that Senator Cochran and our relatively new Senator, Senator Kyl, 
brought a great deal of leadership and direction into this world-
shaping issue. And I commend the counsel that has been given to us from 
the other side of the aisle, particularly from my good friend, whom I 
see returning to his seat right now, former chairman and now 
distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Pell. Senator Nunn, and Senator Levin have also been very much 
involved, and their counsel is likewise appreciated.
  Let me also mention, Mr. President, the support and thoughtful 
insights provided by the administration's representative in these 
negotiations--he is well known to us--he served on the Senate committee 
and is now the Special Assistant to the President, Bob Bell.
  One particular reason for my statement now is to make a record of 
what has happened with regard to the Arms Control Observer Group 
participation in these efforts. In 1985, this group was created by our 
leader, Senator Dole, in an effort to have greater Senate participation 
in the negotiations and the processes that would lead to arms control 
agreements. Along with other Arms Control Observer Group Senators, I 
made trips in 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, and on through the 1990's to 
Geneva, to Vienna, to Brussels, to the former Soviet Union, then to 
Russia, and to many of the countries of the former Soviet Union.
  We did so in order to see to it that the Senate was involved in the 
discussions and the negotiations so that there would be no surprises in 
the START process.
  We are now seeing the fruits of the Senate's wisdom in creating the 
Arms Control Observer Group, and I congratulate my good friend, Senator 
Dole. He did this in 1985 in his first year as being the Senate leader.
  It has given the Senate the ability to move through a very 
deliberative process, and it does so through this group of Arms Control 
Observer Group Senators who come from the Foreign Relations Committee, 
the Armed Services Committee, and the Intelligence Committee, as well 
as the Appropriations Committee.
  We have had a very dedicated staff who have assisted us. And it is 
through staff behind the scenes efforts as well as the members 
consensus, which is the result of the continued participation of the 
members of this group, which I think brings us to START II today. It is 
a relatively noncontroversial subject, Mr. President, because we have 
been able to give the Senate knowledge of what is going on. We have 
been able to hold hearings and deliberate on various issues. We have 
had a series of hearings where representatives of the administration 
and the military and the intelligence community have come and answered 
our questions. Only recently now we have come through an additional new 
process, and that is the process of working up a series of amendments 
which will soon be presented here as part of the managers' package.

  I congratulate all concerned in regard to this. Many of those 
initiatives came from the Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl]. Others have 
added to them. And we now have a package which I think represents the 
viewpoints of all who have participated in the ongoing efforts of the 
Arms Control Observer Group.
  I can think of no finer gift to give the American people or the 
people of the Russian Federation and literally all mankind this holiday 
season than to deliver them a package which says that the Senate is 
prepared to take a major step for the world's really great major 
nuclear power. We will make the historic move that I think could 
significantly reduce the threat of nuclear conflagration, and that is 
the step to ratify this START II treaty.
  I wish to congratulate again the two managers of the bill. I think 
through their wisdom and knowledge and experience in handling this 
subject, that it is a subject which any Member of the Senate should be 
proud to participate in the deliberation of and hopefully the vote for 
the ratification of the START II Treaty. I hope that it will take place 
before end of the year, Mr. President. I look forward to the discussion 
with my friend from Arizona on some of the points that we have 
intensely reviewed now for the past week or so, and I wish to 
congratulate him and his staff for working with me and particularly 
John Roots who is on my staff now working on this matter. I am grateful 
to them for their assistance.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to again thank Senator Stevens for his 
leadership role in bringing together a group of Senators who wanted to 
put the finishing touches on the declarations here and to do that in a 
very short period of time. I appreciate his leadership in bringing the 
group together and getting this job done so that we could begin the 
discussion of the treaty now prior to the end of the year.
  Mr. President, let me begin by asking unanimous consent to have 
printed in the Record several items which pertain to the matters which 
I will be discussing relative to the START II Treaty.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:


                         Baseline START I Force

                    [For purpose of amendment No. 2]

ICBM:
  Minuteman III.....................................................500
  Peacekeeper......................................................  50
                                                               ________

      Total.........................................................550
Submarines:
  Trident I.........................................................  8
  Trident II.........................................................10
                                                               ________

      Total..........................................................18
                                                               ========

Bombers:
  B-52H..............................................................66
  B-1B...............................................................96
  B-2................................................................20
                                                               ________

182 Total............................................................
                                                                    ____

     From AMEMBASSY MOSCOW.
     To SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1623, INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL 
         COLLECTIVE, Sept. 1995.
     Subject: Internal Duma report recommends major amendments to 
         START-2 treaty
       1. Decontrol upon receipt--sensitive but unclassified--
     protect accordingly.
       2. Summary: The Embassy recently acquired an internal state 
     Duma study of the START-2 treaty that recommends ratification 
     certain important amendments (copy being faxed to EUR/RUS). 
     The amendments are designed to correct what the authors see 
     as imbalances in the treaty in favor of the United States. 
     The report recommends that the Duma ratify the treaty while 
     stressing the link between strategic weapons reduction and 
     observance of the ABM treaty. It also recommends amending the 
     treaty to:
       Permit each side to keep Mirved ICBM's with four warheads 
     or less, rather than banning Mirved ICBM's altogether;
       Provide for the controlled liquidation of warheads removed 
     from Mirved ICBM's and SLBM's as part of the process of 
     meeting treaty-mandates levels of weaponry;
       Require liquidation of old launch platforms and their 
     replacement with platforms designed specifically to bear 
     fewer warheads;
       In order to reduce the cost of reconfiguring the land-based 
     leg of Russia's deterrent, permit utilization of 154 launch 
     silos built for heavy ICBM's to house single-warhead 
     missiles;
       Delete the requirement to fill with concrete such ICBM 
     launch silos;
       Permit redefinition of all 170 RS-18 missiles as single-
     warhead missiles;
       Push back the implementation deadline for START-2 by 2-3 
     years.


                       Start-2 and the ABM Treaty

       3. The Duma study, written by the parliament's analytical 
     center before the July START-2 hearings, strongly attacks 
     U.S. plans to develop limited anti-missile defense systems. 
     It states that, ``In Reality, deployment of such a limited 
     ABM system, coupled with radical cuts in strategic nuclear 
     forces, 

[[Page S19210]]
     is no less destabilizing a factor than constructing a full-scale ABM 
     system. Since a limited ABM system requires establishing a 
     full infrastructure (Information Systems, Communications, and 
     Military Command), it can grow very quickly to a size at 
     which a retaliatory strike by our strategic nuclear forces 
     could be neutralized.'' Thus, the report concludes, it is 
     essential for the duma to lay down an unbreakable link 
     between strategic force reductions and observance of the 1972 
     ABM treaty.


                          abm recommendations

       4. Thus, the study recommends that, ``When ratifying the 
     START-2 treaty, the state duma of the Russian Federation 
     should declare that the `exceptional circumstances' mentioned 
     in paragraph 4, article VI of the treaty include as well 
     circumstances arising in connection with one of the parties 
     ceasing to observe the 1972 ABM treaty, or its substantial 
     violation.'' The report goes yet further, and also recommends 
     that, ``Attainment of a coordination and officially confirmed 
     agreement on demarcation of strategic and ``nonstrategic'' 
     ABM systems should precede ratification of START-2.'' The 
     report states that such an agreement on the demarcation issue 
     must include ``precise quantitative limitations on deployment 
     of ``nonstrategic''ABM systems.


                             mirved icbm's

       5. The report notes that the current text of the START-2 
     treaty calls for total elimination of MIRVed ICBM's. It calls 
     this provision unacceptable, because it is contrary to 
     Russia's National Security interests and favorable to the 
     interests of the U.S. The study's authors note that 50 
     percent of Russia's strategic forces consist of land-based 
     MIRVed ICBM's They recommend that the treaty be amended to 
     ban only MIRVed ICM's with more than 4 warheads
       6. The authors admit that the effective life of Russia's 
     SS-18 and SS-24 missiles will run out in 10-15 years, and 
     that production of more such missiles will be next to 
     impossible, since the facilities for doing so are in Ukraine. 
     Russia cannot today afford to build a comparable defense 
     industrial infrastructure for producing new SS-18's and SS-
     24's on its own soil, they note. However, they call for 
     developing a new, Mirved sea-based missile that could also be 
     deployed on land. In the future, they believe, Russia will 
     need to maintain a proper balance between Mirved and single-
     warhead ICBM's in both its strategic rocket forces and fleet.


              elimininating launch platforms and warheads

       7. The Dama study states that START-2 would permit the U.S. 
     to maintain essentially intact a large number of launch 
     platforms for nuclear weapons that, while formally speaking 
     no longer used for nuclear purposes, could in a ``Crisis 
     Situation'' be rapidly refitted with nuclear warheads. The 
     report charges that, under the treaty, ``the U.S. would 
     assure itself of a favorable regime for reducing nuclear 
     weapons that would not require liquidation of the carriers of 
     nuclear weaponry, except for 50 MX ICBMs and part of its 
     older B-52 heavy bombers.'' Russia, on the other hand, would 
     have to undertake an expensive reconfiguration of much of its 
     strategic forces. It adds: ``The START-2 Treaty allows the 
     possibility of rapidly deploying the nuclear potential of the 
     U.S. in all components of the Strategic Nuclear triad.''
       8. The study asserts that the U.S. would quickly be able to 
     redeploy previously removed nuclear warheads on still extant 
     Minuteman-3 and Trident-2 missiles in a crisis. Similarly, 
     nuclear weapons could be quickly reloaded onto B-LB bombers, 
     since ``START-2 does not require them to be refitted in order 
     to be re-oriented toward non-nuclear tasks.'' ``After 
     realization of START-2 the U.S. will have the possibility in 
     a crisis situation of operationally increasing its nuclear 
     potential by more than 4000 nuclear warheads. Russia cannot 
     compensate such an increase.'' Hence, the report's authors 
     recommend amending the START-2 Treaty to require liquidation 
     of warheads removed from Mirved ICBM's and SLBM's as part of 
     the process of meeting treaty-mandates levels of weaponry. 
     They also call for altering START-2 to require liquidation of 
     old launch platforms and their replacement with platforms 
     designed specifically to bear fewer warheads.


        reducing the financial cost of implementation to russia

       9. The Study charges that START-2 essentially favors the 
     U.S., permitting it to reduce its nuclear forces in the most 
     economical way, while imposing an unacceptably high burden on 
     Russia. It calls treaty provisions permitting Russia to re-
     fit 90 launch silos for heavy ICBM's and re-utilize them for 
     single-warhead missiles insufficient. Its answer is to call 
     for amending the treaty to permit Russia to re-use 154 launch 
     silos built for heavy ICBM's to house single-warhead 
     missiles, to delete the requirement to fill with concrete 
     such ICBM launch silos, and to permit redefinition of all 170 
     RS-18 missiles as single-warhead missiles.


                     delaying treaty implementation

       10. Finally, the study's authors also call for delaying 
     implementation of the START-2 treaty by 2-3 years. The report 
     argues that, since the seven-year implementation period for 
     START-1 will end in 2001, only one year will remain for 
     completing implementation of START-2. This is not enough 
     time, and so, when ratifying START-2. This is not enough 
     time, and so, when ratifying START-2, the Duma should 
     ``extend'' the implementation period by 2-3 years, in order 
     to avoid ``significant financial and production difficulty.''


                                comment

       11. This study was prepared as a guide for Duma deputies by 
     the Duma's Analytical Center, and thus reflects the views of 
     the Duma's in-house defense and security analysts. While pro-
     ratification in principle, they are clearly eager to see 
     changes in the treaty that would substantially alter its 
     character in ways that appear to be unacceptable from the 
     standpoint of U.S. policy. In the first round of START 
     hearings in July, deputies did not raise the kind of 
     fundamental amendments addressed in this paper, though they 
     did stress the link between START-2 and the ABM Treaty. The 
     upcoming second round of hearings will show whether many 
     deputies agree with the views outlined in the START study, 
     and, indeed, whether the Duma is willing to ratify START-2 in 
     any form before the December parliamentary elections.
       12. The START study also indicates that Russian Government 
     analysts are thinking carefully about how to restructure the 
     country's nuclear deterrent to adapt to the Government's 
     current straitened economic circumstances while maintaining 
     the force's effectiveness. If this study is any indication, 
     at least some analysts are envisaging a Russian deterrent 
     that would still contain significant numbers of Mirved ICBM, 
     both land-based and at sea--in contradiction of what START-2 
     calls for.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, in considering whether the United States 
should ratify the START II Treaty, I believe it is critical that the 
terms of the treaty be reviewed in the context of the national 
deterrent strategy of the United States.
  Further, it is important to recall why this treaty came about and how 
it was intended to complement the strategic posture of the United 
States.
  The treaty, in other words, Mr. President, is based on assumptions. 
If these assumptions change, we have to reassess our position with 
respect to the treaty. What are some of these assumptions? First, the 
Bush legacy, how the treaty came into being. As the Soviet communism 
and the Warsaw Pact were collapsing, President Bush moved to establish 
a new framework for U.S. strategic forces, and it had two key elements. 
First involved a restructuring and downsizing of U.S. offensive nuclear 
forces and operations. This was the precursor for START II.
  Second, it involved refocusing the strategic defense initiative from 
the previous Reagan administration to provide protection against 
ballistic missile attacks on the United States, our troops deployed 
abroad, and United States allies, and an offer to work cooperatively 
with Russia and the allies in developing and fielding such defenses.
  President Bush's commitment to a new strategic framework based on 
fewer but still potent nuclear forces and the development and 
deployment of effective ballistic missile defenses was perhaps best 
highlighted during June 1992 when he and President Yeltsin had their 
famous summit. At that meeting, the two Presidents reached an agreement 
on the outlines of the START II agreement which committed both sides to 
reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads, 
significantly below the force levels permitted by START I. Importantly, 
they also agreed to explore creation of a global ballistic missile 
defense system and to cooperate in the development of missile defense 
technologies.
  The administration's framework rightly retained a strong commitment 
to ensuring nuclear deterrence and supporting infrastructure over the 
long term. President Bush and his advisors correctly believed that 
nuclear weapons should retain a legitimate, albeit more limited, role 
in U.S. national security policy. They also recognized that efforts to 
delegitimize or to eliminate nuclear weapons could have the paradoxical 
effect of increasing national instability and the likelihood of 
conflict.
  Finally, they prudently believed that given the possibility of 
reversal of reform in Russia, the United States should retain a healthy 
nuclear capability as a residual deterrent.
  In sum, President Bush and his advisers understood that there was 
simply too much uncertainty in the international arena to justify 
eliminating what was a central element of U.S. national security 
policy.
  Likewise, President Bush's support for a more prominent role for 
ballistic 

[[Page S19211]]
missile defenses in the United States and allied security policy was 
correctly seen as a means of bolstering, not replacing, nuclear 
deterrence at reduced strategic offensive force levels. Such defenses 
also could protect our allies and forward-deployed United States troops 
from threat posed by short and medium-ranged missiles and provide 
substantial population defense in the event of an accidental, 
unauthorized or limited attack on the American homeland from Russia or 
any other country.
  From that foundation, we come to the Clinton administration. This 
administration has essentially rejected the Bush framework and instead 
has embraced what I believe is a dangerous and ill-conceived policy of 
proactive denuclearization. The administration has taken steps to lock 
in perhaps for decades to come America's vulnerability to missile 
attack and has used the arms control process to impede development and 
deployment of effective defenses against short and medium-ranged 
missiles and has used the arms control process to impede development 
and deployment of effective defenses against short- and medium-ranged 
missiles.

  The Clinton administration's antinuclear sentiments are perhaps best 
illustrated by reviewing the declining health of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons infrastructure. America's core nuclear competency is made up 
primarily of skilled and motivated people, modern facilities, adequate 
funding, and continued nuclear testing.
  I would like to discuss each of these briefly. The concept, Mr. 
President, is this: When we draw our forces down from a very large 
component of nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems to a much 
more modest one under START I, and an even more modest level under 
START II, we have to be in a position to guarantee that what we are 
left with will work for the purpose for which it is intended, to deter 
anyone from a nuclear attack. That is why it is necessary to ensure 
that our infrastructure is not eroded or dismantled.
  I mentioned that the first critical element of this group are the 
people themselves. The critical skill base, or the expertise of 
individuals at the weapons laboratories, is rapidly eroding and poses 
an immediate problem, Mr. President.
  As noted in a recent Congressional Research Service report:

       The experience gained from testing is irreplaceable, and 
     aspects of it may be lost unless it is passed on to the next 
     generation. Yet demographic data . . . indicate that skill 
     base is eroding rapidly. The weapons program is losing skills 
     as many experienced scientists retire and few new ones are 
     hired. As a result, gaps in the skill base are opening that 
     have adverse consequences for stewardship.

  This means the stewardship of our nuclear stockpile.

       The weapons programs face further strain from a budget that 
     is shrinking no end in sight and from a growth in mandated 
     non-programmed risks.

  The CRS report further notes that a majority of weapons designers 
will be facing retirement within the next 10 to 15 years and that the 
labs have already lost certain experimental capabilities, and in other 
areas the labs are only one person deep.
  The next critical element of our U.S. nuclear infrastructure are the 
facilities. Currently the United States has no capacity to produce 
tritium, a critical gaseous element not only for our new nuclear 
warheads but also for replenishment of the active inventory.
  In sum, Mr. President, our weapons do not work without tritium, which 
decays at such a rapid rate that it must constantly be reinterjected 
into the weapons.
  Energy Secretary O'Leary has twice delayed a decision to select a new 
production reactor technology as a replacement for the K reactor at 
Savannah River, SC. The Department of Defense now indicates that a 
decision on the selected technology for a future tritium production 
capability will be made soon. But given the numerous delays by the 
Department of Defense, I hope you will forgive my skepticism.
  For all practical purposes, the United States has lost its capacity 
to produce critical plutonium components, including the vital pits of 
our nuclear warheads. And yet the Department of Defense has not decided 
on where such a production facility will be located.
  Meanwhile, the Pantex facility in Texas is so overloaded with the 
task of dismantling warheads for disposal that it risks not being able 
to conduct a rigorous program of stockpile surveillance.

  The next component for a robust stockpile, Mr. President, is nuclear 
testing. The Clinton administration continues to embrace a nuclear 
testing moratorium and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as central to 
its arms control policy.
  Contrary to President Clinton's beliefs, I believe that a moratorium, 
a continued moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing will do nothing to aid 
in the fight against proliferation. Extension of the NPT matters little 
to the pariah nations that are or at least should be the primary object 
of our nuclear proliferation efforts. And with these states, U.S. 
nuclear testing has no bearing on their nuclear ambitions and programs.
  In fact, Mr. President, Charles Krauthammer captured the essence of 
this point in a Washington Post op-ed of July 16, 1993, of which he 
said:

       There is something lunatic about saying that if we devalue 
     and degrade our arsenal, nukes will then have less value for 
     the North Koreas of the world. On the contrary. . . . The 
     future nuclear weapons reliably held by the great powers, the 
     greater the premium--the power--conferred upon the have-not 
     who acquires them.

  At the same time, Mr. President, nuclear testing is needed to assure 
the long-term safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, and with 
it our ability to deter Russian nuclear aggression and to convince our 
allies, such as Germany and Japan, that abstaining from the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons makes sense as well. Even though U.S. nuclear 
weapons are at present safe and reliable, it is only through the 
continued explosive testing that the United States will be able to 
monitor and improve the stockpile safety and reliability well into the 
future.
  I talked before, Mr. President, about U.S. missile defense plans. And 
as I said, all of the premises of the START II Treaty are important to 
understanding why the START II Treaty is believed to be advantageous, 
but in the event these assumptions change, our position would obviously 
have to be reassessed.
  To the issue of a combination of offense and defense, which was 
contemplated by the Bush administration at the time that the treaty was 
signed, I would note that following the Persian Gulf war, which 
certainly focused attention on the proliferation of missile defenses 
and weapons of mass destruction, the Congress passed the Missile 
Defense Act of 1991 to continue this movement toward the development of 
a robust missile defense system in the United States.
  The act urged accelerated deployment of effective theater missile 
defense capability. Perhaps more importantly, it served as a sign of 
intent that the Congress was prepared to adequately fund and support a 
robust U.S. missile defense capability, both the theater missile system 
and a national missile defense.
  But the consensus was short lived. One of the first casualties of 
President Clinton's quest to cut defense spending in order to pay for 
costly social programs was the budget for ballistic missile defenses. 
The DOD Bottom-Up Review of 1993 cut the fiscal year 1994 to 1999 5-
year budget for the Strategic Defense Initiative by approximately 60 
percent from $41 billion to $18 billion. Hit hardest by this cut was 
the National Missile Defense Account. DOD not only rejected the option 
to deploy a defense of the American homeland, but also rejected even a 
robust research and development effort.

  The Clinton administration has also used arms control to further 
erode the U.S. ability to effectively deploy TMD and NMD systems. Since 
November 1993, the administration has been engaged in negotiations with 
Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union in an effort to 
demarcate the line between permitted TMD systems and those activities 
and systems that are banned under the 1972 Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty.
  In those talks, the United States has taken the following positions: 
First, we are no longer seeking to amend the ABM Treaty to allow 
multiple ground-based ABM sites in the United States, nor is the United 
States continuing to propose that the treaty be amended to 

[[Page S19212]]
allow space-based interceptors; for example, the so-called Brilliant 
Eyes program, to perform direct battle management functions or 
otherwise substitute for ABM radars. This is despite the fact that the 
space-based system offers unique capabilities for sensing and 
intercepting missile threats that ground-based systems simply do not 
have.
  As described above, the United States needs to begin fielding a 
national missile defense system now in order to be able to have it in 
place by the time the new threat is deployed.
  Second, the administration has agreed to multilateralize the ABM 
Treaty and accept as treaty partners any of the former 10 Soviet states 
who want to be secessionites. And this means that all former Soviet 
Union states will be required to approve any changes to the treaty. So 
the administration approach will make it much more difficult for any 
future administration modifying the treaty, for example, to permit 
multiple ground-based ABM sites or space-based interceptors since, of 
course, these modifications must be blessed, not only by Russia, but 
also several other former republics of the Soviet Union.
  Third, in November 1993, the administration proposed a standard for 
determining compliance of TMD systems with the ABM Treaty based on the 
demonstrated capability of such systems. More recently, however, the 
administration has accepted specific design/performance limitations on 
TMD systems and is considering numerical and deployment-area 
limitations on such systems as well.
  The limitations now under discussion are more restrictive than the 
ABM system limitations already in the treaty. If accepted, such new 
limitations would effectively transform the ABM Treaty into a Theater 
Missile Defense/ABM Treaty and would preclude the United States from 
deploying one or more promising concepts for countering the growing 
threat posed by theater missiles.
  I have reference to the Navy Upper Tier program. Despite five letters 
from Senate Republicans and clear language from the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the House National Security Committee, the 
administration has kept up its assault on theater ballistic missile 
defenses.
  A clearly stated objective of the Nuclear Posture Review, which was 
publicly released by the administration on September 22, 1994, was to 
provide planning stability for the U.S. strategic forces between now 
and the year 2003, the year that START II is to be fully implemented.
  This raises the next important point with regard to the assumptions 
underlying the START II treaty, Mr. President, because, of course, the 
Nuclear Posture Review is the document which determines the number and 
nature of our nuclear warheads and the targets to which they would be 
assigned.
  The administration in this review embraced a force structure of 66 
nuclear-capable B-52H bombers, down from previously 94; 450 to 500 
ICBM's--currently the number is 550--and 14 missile-carrying Trident 
submarines, down from 18, all to be backfitted with the D-5 missile.
  This force structure was linked to the so-called ``hedge strategy'' 
designed to take into account the possibility of a reversal of reforms 
in Russia and the much slower paced nuclear drawdown there. But no 
sooner had the Defense Department released the results of the nuclear 
posture review, the President moved to overturn it. Just 5 days after 
the NPR was released, President Clinton stated his willingness to begin 
discussions with Russia on a possible START III agreement to reduce 
strategic forces below the 3,500 weapons permitted by START II and to 
deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under 
START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to 
remove them from combat status.
  The President's declarations served to undermine whatever hoped-for 
planning stability associated with U.S. strategic forces existed as a 
result of the NPR. Since 1988, U.S. strategic nuclear forces have been 
reduced by approximately 50 percent and U.S. nonstrategic nuclear 
forces by approximately 90 percent.
  Furthermore, the annual budget for strategic forces has been reduced 
from roughly $50 billion per year at the height of the cold war to 
below $13 billion today, and the United States has no new strategic 
systems under development.
  By contrast, Russia continues to modernize its strategic arsenal. The 
Russian program involves the development for deployment of two new 
ICBM's, one new SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile, and 
continuation of deep underground bunkers for control and command and 
leadership survivor. This seems to indicate, despite severe economic 
difficulties, Russia intends to modernize down to lower force levels.
  In addition, Russia's new doctrine places much greater emphasis on 
retaliation against conventional attacks on targets in Russia. That 
brings us to where we are today in consideration of the START II 
treaty.
  START II on January 3, 1993, President George Bush and Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin signed the treaty. START II builds on the START 
I treaty which reduces strategic offensive arsenals on both sides by 
about one-third and which focuses on the conversion and destruction of 
missile launchers--bombers, silos, submarine launchers--rather than the 
missiles and the warheads.
  START II reduces both countries' nuclear arsenal to about 3,300 
warheads for the United States and about 3,000 for Russia. The treaty 
requires Russia to eliminate all MIRV'd missiles. These are the 
missiles that have more than one warhead on top of them and present a 
special threat launched by either side. But it does allow the country 
to download 105 of the six-warhead SS-19's to a single warhead each, 
and to make 90 SS-18 silos inoperable by partly filling them with 
concrete, but it allows Russia to house the less powerful SS-25 missile 
in the converted silo.
  In addition, the treaty allows Russia to inspect, for the first time, 
the bomb-bays of the B-2, the U.S. bomber, to ensure that the warhead 
limits are adhered to. It actually also counts the warheads on the B-1 
bomber cruise missiles, and it ensures that 100 U.S. bombers have been 
reassigned to conventional use.
  START II requires the United States to scrap or modify its 50 MX 
missiles, which have 10 warheads each, and to cut by about one-half the 
number of warheads on its submarine-launched missiles from 3,456 to 
1,728.
  START II is to be implemented in two phases: the first is to be 
completed within 7 years of ratification and the second by the year 
2003. When reductions are complete, the U.S. level will return to those 
of the 1960's and the Russian levels to those of the 1970's.
  Mr. President, I want to make it very clear that while I believe the 
START II treaty is fair and is advantageous to the United States, it is 
only in the interest of the United States if certain key provisions of 
the treaty are not changed or are not weakened in any way.
  I do not think it is too much to expect those in the Senate who 
ratify this treaty, who support ratification, to expect that the treaty 
will be adhered to by both sides and will not be changed or weakened in 
any way. I know that some in the defense community have real concerns 
with provisions of the treaty. The Washington-based Center for Security 
Policy, for example, has listed the following provisions as 
particularly troublesome:
  First, the right on the part of the Russians to retain the SS-18 
silos. As I said, the START II treaty will not eliminate the 
infrastructure associated with this most dangerous of the former Soviet 
Union MIRV'd missile, SS-18 heavy ICBM's. Instead, it allows Moscow to 
retain 90 of the SS-18 silos and associated launch facilities and 
support complexes. As the United States has no idea how many SS-18 
missiles the Russians actually have in their inventory, even the 
monitored destruction of ``declared'' heavy ICBM's could leave Moscow 
in a position to utilize these silos in the future to launch SS-18's. 
So this is a matter of some concern.
  The right to retain the SS-19's: Under START II, Moscow may retain as 
many as 105 deployed SS-19's as long as these missiles are 
``downloaded,'' a process by which five of the six warheads are 
removed. Unfortunately, as long as the Russians retain replacement 
warheads, it can, with little fear of U.S. detection, rapidly reverse 
the 

[[Page S19213]]
downloading process. In this manner, the Russians can retain a 
militarily significant breakout capability. This is an obvious concern. 
Since there are no limits on either START I or START II on the number 
of ``nondeployed'' SS-19's, the Russians may be able to keep as many of 
these missiles, even in a fully loaded status, as they wish.
  As I said before, the United States agreed to onsite inspections of 
the B-2. The effect of this provision, though considered necessary for 
the agreement of the treaty, will be to degrade the deterrent value of 
this air-breathing leg of the U.S. strategic triad.
  This is by no means a comprehensive list of some of the problematic 
aspects of the treaty. I call my colleagues' attention to the testimony 
before the Foreign Relations Committee by one of the critics of the 
treaty, Sven Kraemer, former Director of Arms Control at the National 
Security Council, in which he lists a comprehensive listing of some of 
the more troublesome aspects of the treaty.
  I note these simply to indicate, Mr. President, that while I believe 
this treaty, on balance, represents a fair and constructive way to 
approach the problem of reducing the number of these dangerous weapons 
as to the interests of the United States, that it is not without 
concern and that those of us who support the treaty, I think, should be 
respected in our delineation of these concerns, because, as I have 
said, much depends on the assumptions that underlie the treaty, and if 
those assumptions later change, obviously we would have to reassess our 
position under the treaty.

  President Reagan said it well: ``Trust but verify.'' The problem here 
is that it is not easy to verify. There are some things that are just 
very, very difficult to verify in this treaty, difficult if not 
impossible. So, to some extent, there is an element of trust required, 
and I suspect that all of us base some of our position here on an 
element of hope as well.
  But the point is that as we bring the number of these weapons down to 
a relatively lower number, much smaller number, we better make sure 
that they work, we better make sure that the other side does not cheat, 
because cheating, when both sides only have a few, is much more 
dangerous than if we both have very large components in our nuclear 
arsenal.
  I also note, Mr. President, that the Russians have certain concerns 
with START II. This would be, I think, obvious in any negotiation where 
both sides give and take. So we are not the only ones who have 
concerns. As a matter of fact, an internal Duma report prepared by the 
Duma's analytical center and reporting in an unclassified memo from the 
American Embassy, we note that there are seven specific amendments 
recommended to the treaty. I will not go into these, although I will be 
submitting my entire statement for the Record, which identifies these 
particular proposed changes from the standpoint of the Russian Duma. 
None of these amendments, suffice it to say, would be acceptable to the 
United States. In fact, if any one of these were to be accepted by the 
Russian Duma, it would gut the central provisions of START II. That is 
why, despite the fact that there are those who believe that some 
amendments might have made the treaty more acceptable from the United 
States' perspective and urged that we actually offer amendments to the 
treaty in that regard, I think others of us felt that it was better to 
keep the treaty as it was negotiated and signed by the two parties, 
because we did not want to begin the process of amendment which would 
then give those in the Russian Duma a greater capability to argue the 
appropriateness of making amendments from their perspective.

  That is why it is important that there be no amendments from either 
side. We have declarations and one condition, which we think help to 
establish the basis of the treaty from our perspective. Clearly, no 
amendment to the treaty, along the previously suggested lines, by the 
Russian Duma would be appropriate. That would be a basis for our 
withdrawal from the treaty.
  I want to make it very clear that there is one thing in particular I 
would very strongly oppose. I will very strongly oppose any attempt by 
the administration, or anyone else, to walk back the MIRV downloading 
provision of the treaty, to allow the Russians to either increase the 
numbers of SS-18's, or to modify the structural changes to the SS-18 
silos, or to delay the implementation of START II. I believe that any 
changes to the treaty, especially in these two key areas, would 
obviously require Senate advice and consent.
  Mr. President, if there is anyone who, during the course of this 
discussion, disagrees with that, I would like them to say that. I would 
like to have a dialog with that individual. I doubt that anyone could 
conceivably come to that conclusion. But, clearly, we have to have it 
established, as we vote to ratify this treaty, that in those two most 
important respects the U.S. Senate would have to provide advice and 
consent.
  I know the administration has agreed with that proposition as of now. 
I cannot imagine any disagreement. I note, for the Record, that with 
regard to walking back the MIRV downloading, Mr. Bob Bell, Special 
Assistant to the President, and an individual well known here in the 
Senate, who has assisted Senator Nunn for many years, has written, 
``This report is totally unsubstantiated and pure fantasy.'' By the 
way, he was referring to a report that there may be some move toward 
some MIRV downloading in the treaty. ``The administration is not 
planning and does not have under consideration any such proposal.''
  Mr. President, I accept that statement from Mr. Bob Bell, and I 
certainly would not oppose the treaty based on assurances from the 
administration that MIRV downloading will not occur. But, it is an 
illustration, Mr. President, of the kinds of things which at least have 
been talked about as possible changes and which I think we have to be 
very, very careful in considering prior to the ratification of the 
treaty, so that if those kinds of changes should ever be suggested to 
us, the record has been very clear that, A, it would require the advice 
and consent of the Senate, and, B, it would not be in the best interest 
of the United States.

  One more note about Russian compliance with the arms control 
agreement, Mr. President. Questions about verifiability of the treaty 
are important because of concerns about whether the Russians will, in 
fact, abide by the terms of START II. Obviously, we all hope and 
require that the Russians fully comply with START II. But their record, 
and the record of the former Soviet Union, with respect to compliance 
with arms control agreements is somewhat dubious. I will note just a 
few of the areas of violation in the past:
  The Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Agreements, 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, START I, and the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaties. All of these agreements have provisions that 
Russia has, in one way or another, failed to comply.
  I mention this and the previous arms control agreements to underscore 
the importance of assuring that the Russians comply with the START II 
Treaty--not that they intend to comply, but that they are complying. An 
assumption of Russian compliance with the terms of START II is one 
significant consideration in my decision to support the treaty. I have 
confidence that they will comply, and that is the basis for my support 
of the treaty.
  The final substantive point, Mr. President, I would make is this, and 
it has to do with linkage to the ABM Treaty.
  There is no linkage between the ABM Treaty and the START II Treaty--
although this is a favorite argument of some members of the 
administration and of opponents of ballistic missile defenses in the 
Russian Duma. There is no linkage between these two treaties. There 
never was and never will be.
  There are those who believe that the ABM Treaty and START II are 
linked; further, that action relating to ballistic missile defenses in 
the United States will somehow affect ratification of START II in 
Russia. In fact, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that the 
Russians have concerns about ratifying START II irrespective of Senate 
action on the ABM Treaty.
  It is incontroverted by a variety of Russian spokesmen themselves, 
who have made the point crystal clear that their concerns about START 
II have to do with the treaty itself, with their requirements under the 
treaty, and with 

[[Page S19214]]
the costs that their compliance will entail, and not with the United 
States position with respect to the ABM Treaty.
  For example, chairman of the Duma's Foreign Relations Committee, 
Vladimir Lukin, said ``We need big money to carry out these reductions 
[in START II], and we don't have it. We do not want to ratify this 
Treaty and then not be able to comply with its terms. We will have to 
wait until we see how to pay for our promises.'' As quoted by Jim 
Hoagland in the Washington Post, July 2, 1995.
  Other Russians tie START II ratification to other international 
issues. Speaker of the Federation Council [upper chamber], Vladimir 
Shumeyko, stated, ``We closely link [START II] ratification with the 
overall situation existing between Russia and NATO. We consider the 
perseverance of NATO as a stumbling block to our cooperation in the 
area of disarmament and advancement on the road to peace.''--Interfax, 
1255 GMT, April 3, 1995.
  And, still others see START II as inimical to Russian interests. 
Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, 
commented, ``If this treaty [START II] is fully implemented, the United 
States will almost double its superiority, while the damage to Russia's 
national security will be unrecoverable.''--ITAR-Tass, 1849 GMT, 
February 18, 1995.
  There are also political problems with Russian ratification of START 
II. Aleksander Konovalov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
USA and Canada Institute, observed, ``The outlook for the treaty's 
[START II] ratification by the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly is 
not at all promising. Some deputies support the treaty in its current 
version, but they are obviously the minority in parliament. A sizable 
group of opposition deputies will probably vote against the 
ratification of START II for purely political reasons.''--Segodnya, 
November 15, 1994, p.10.
  Sergei Karaganov, adviser to President Yeltsin, was quoted as saying, 
``There is widespread feeling now that the United States pushed too 
hard when Russia was weak and that the treaty is unfair.'' As quoted by 
Jack Mendelshon, from ACDA, week of July 3, 1995.
  The U.S. ambassador to the START II talks, Linton Brooks, wrote in a 
memo dated November 5, 1995 about other factors affecting Duma 
consideration of START II. Brooks said, ``The major reason START II is 
in trouble in the Yeltsin government is not pushing it. Indeed, the 
government has been unable to say what the Russian force structure will 
be under START II, how much it will cost, or how Russia will pay for 
it.''
  Brooks further stated, ``The bluntest political analysis I heard came 
from Alexei Mitrofanov of the Liberal Democratic Party. He argued that 
running against START II was good politics. In the LDP analysis, the 
Russian public associates the ``reforms'' which have ruined their 
country with the United States. As a result, there is growing, deep-
rooted, exploitable, anti-American sentiments in the Russian 
electorate. START II is associated with the United States and thus no 
politician will want to support it.''
  Finally, Brooks correctly concluded ``without more action by the 
Russian government, nothing that the United States does will matter.'' 
I say ``amen'' to any further discussion about the negative impact of 
Senate action on the ballistic missile defenses and the negative impact 
on Duma passage of the START II Treaty.
  Now, I want to move from those substantive points to the final point 
of my presentation, which has to do with the nine managers' amendments 
to the resolution of ratification--not treaty amendments, but rather 
declarations, and, in one case, a condition. Again, I express my 
appreciation to Senator Stevens, who is chairman of the Arms Control 
Observer Group, who called the group together to consider these ideas, 
and Senator Lugar, who was active in participating in the discussions, 
and to all of the Members on the other side of the aisle, who were 
active in negotiating and, in fact, also to Bob Bell, representing the 
administration's point of view.
  As a result of these discussions, we were able to agree to these nine 
managers' amendments. They will be discussed shortly, and I hope they 
will be agreed to because they express, in important ways, the 
substance of what I have been saying here. For example, that there is 
no linkage between the START II Treaty and ballistic missile defenses; 
that the President must consult closely with the Senate if he changes 
the nuclear force structure; that the President must submit for advice 
and consent any material modification or amendment or reinterpretation 
of the START II Treaty; that the Senate is concerned about the impact 
of allowing Russia and Ukraine to use excess ballistic missiles for 
space launch vehicles; and that the Senate is concerned about the 
maintenance and preservation of the nuclear weapons stockpile and the 
attendant facilities.
  These are important declarations, and I believe that in adopting 
them, the Senate is putting the administration and Russians, and 
everybody else, on notice that this drawdown must be accomplished 
carefully and with full cognizance of the impact on the future 
deterrent posture of the United States.
  The declarations also place the administration on notice that the 
Senate must be closely consulted with while it continues to negotiate 
with the Russians about the precise implementation of START II.
  Mr. President, in conclusion, I think President Bush got it right 
when he moved to reduce nuclear force levels and the role of nuclear 
weapons in the U.S. national security strategy. But he was also correct 
in maintaining a strong commitment to ensuring the long-term viability 
and efficacy of U.S. nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. 
Likewise, his determination to refocus the SDI program on providing 
defenses against limited missile strikes reflect the widespread 
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and 
the apparent willingness of regional aggressors to use those weapons.
  Furthermore, once the United States' ability to manufacture and test 
new nuclear weapons and repair unsafe or unreliable old ones has 
disappeared, then neither we nor our allies will be able to count on 
our arsenal or deter aggression. At that point, we will have become 
effectively disarmed. Such a situation would result in a rethinking by 
our allies of their current commitment not to build their own nuclear 
arsenal--although they are technically capable of doing so--with 
dramatic consequences for U.S. national security.
  Likewise, the administration's abandonment of President Bush's plan 
to effect the TMD and NMD systems as a means of protection from 
strikes, at least on the timetable and in the way we believe is 
important, based on its view of the world, I think, represents a 
strategic blunder of major proportions.
  I will be working in the future to try to readdress that issue so 
that we can, at the same time we are drawing down our strategic 
offensive forces, provide a robust national and regional missile 
defense system.
  Mr. President, I hope that in the discussion of the declarations and 
the condition that will transpire in just a moment, that it would be 
clear to all of our colleagues that we have tried to express our 
concerns about the context in which the treaty must be considered, and 
that our colleagues will agree with us that these are all important 
declarations and it is an important condition that we place upon the 
treaty. I, of course, strongly urge the acceptance of that document.
  Finally, Mr. President, I, too, would like to make some comments when 
this matter is finally debated and voted on because I think it is 
important for all of our colleagues to hear something of the background 
of this treaty prior to the time--I say immediately prior to the time--
that the treaty is voted upon.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to commend Senators Helms, Lugar, 
and Pell for their fine work on the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks II 
[START II] Treaty. I rise to support this treaty, which builds on the 
reductions established under the START I Agreement.
  Taken together, START I and START II will reduce the deployed 
strategic offensive arms of the United States and Russia by more than 
two-thirds. This treaty, signed by Presidents George Bush and Boris 
Yeltsin in 1993, limits both sides to between 3,500 and 3,000 deployed 
warheads, Moreover, 

[[Page S19215]]
START II obligates Russia and the United States to ban all land-based, 
multiple warhead ballistic missiles and limits the number of warheads 
deployed on submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs]. In addition, 
START II achieves a long-standing U.S. goal of eliminating the threat 
of Russia's heavy ICBM missile, the 10 warhead SS-18 missiles and their 
launch canisters.
  At the same time, however, the START II Treaty is not without 
loopholes. For instance, while the Russians are obligated to eliminate 
their heavy SS-18s ICBM by January 2003, the treaty allows Russia to 
retain 90 SS-18 silos to be converted to accommodate only single-
warhead missiles of the SS-25-type. Of course, the United States is 
allowed to inspect such conversion to ensure Russia retains only 
single-warhead missiles, as outlined by the Treaty. But one concern I 
have is that the ``new type'' SS-25 missile Russia is now testing is an 
advanced follow-on Topol-M missile, larger than the U.S. MX Peacekeeper 
missiles.
  On the whole, however, I support this treaty, particularly in light 
of the conditions and declarations added to the Resolution of 
Ratification by the Foreign Relations Committee, and those proposed in 
the form of the ``Manager's Amendment.'' I believe these amendments 
provide a historical record of the Senate's view on a number of 
national security issues associated with the START II Treaty. It is 
with this understanding that I can conditionally support ratification 
of the START II Treaty.
  I will address a few what I believe are the most important conditions 
and declarations proposed by the committee and the managers' 
amendments.


         1. start ii and the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty

  The Foreign Relations Committee Resolution of Ratification contains a 
condition stating that the U.S. government does not accept the view 
implied by the Russian Federation that Russian ratification of START II 
is contingent upon continued adherence by the United States to Russian 
interpretations of United States obligations under the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This condition makes clear that U.S. 
ratification of the START II Treaty does not obligate the United States 
to accept any modification, change in scope or extension of the ABM 
Treaty.
  This condition is wholly warranted, given Russian attempts to expand 
the scope of the ABM Treaty to include systems never intended to be 
covered by that Treaty--theater ballistic missile defenses. Further, by 
giving its advice and consent to the START II Treaty, the Senate is 
only agreeing to those limitations, eliminations and reductions of 
strategic offensive weapons contained in that Treaty.
  At the same time, I believe it is important to be on record stating 
the converse. Namely, that Senate ratification of START II must in no 
way be construed by Russia as changing our rights to renegotiate 
changes to the ABM Treaty or our right to withdraw from that Treaty 
should supreme national interests warrant it. Which is why I believe 
the Managers's amendment, in the form of a declaration, is an essential 
supplement to the language already contained in the Committee's 
resolution of ratification.
  This manager's amendment adds a new section to specify that 
ratification does not change any of the rights of either Party with 
respect to Articles 13 (which allows continual United States/Russian 
consultation on changes in the strategic situation and their meaning 
for the ABM Treaty); Article 14 (allowing either Party to propose 
amendments to the treaty), and Article 15 (allowing either Party to 
withdraw if supreme national interests are jeopardized).
  I believe Articles 13, 14, and 15 are critical provisions of the ABM 
Treaty. The ABM Treaty is outdated. It may have been relevant to the 
strategic situation in 1972, when deterrence was based on Mutual 
Assured Destruction [MAD]. But MAD is completely irrelevant to the 
strategic environment of the 1990's. The Soviet Union no longer exists. 
Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction are proliferating 
throughout the Third World. In a 1994 speech, Secretary of Defense 
William Perry declared that, ``we now have the opportunity to create a 
new relationship, based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, 
but rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.'' [Speech 
before the Harry L. Stimson Center, 9/20/94]. The United States and 
Russia should, as the ABM Treaty envisioned, be discussing plans to 
deploy a mutual protection system against these growing threats, 
including the possibility of amending the ABM Treaty to allow more than 
one missile defense site.


                     2. Implementation Arrangements

  One particular concern of mine is whether and when the Russian Duma 
will ratify START II. Perhaps the worst of all possible worlds would be 
if the United States began drawing down its strategic nuclear arsenal 
to conform with the limits established under START II, and Russia had 
not yet ratified the treaty.
  I believe, however, that this concern is addressed by a declaration 
on implementation arrangements proposed in the managers' amendment. 
Specifically, the language states that the START II Treaty shall not be 
binding on the United States until such time as the Duma has ratified 
the Treaty and the Treaty has entered into force. Equally important is 
the two-step process set up if the President plans to go below the 
number of forces currently planned and consistent with the START II 
Treaty. Under these circumstances, the President is called upon to: 
First, consult with the Senate on how these reductions would effect 
U.S. national security; and second, take no such action until a 
Presidential determination is sent to the Senate stating that such 
reductions are in the U.S. national security interest.


                            3. Noncompliance

  Recognizing that compliance is critical to the integrity of any arms 
control agreement, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Resolution of 
Ratification contains a condition on noncompliance. This condition 
states that if the President determines that a Party to either START I 
or START II is acting inconsistently with the object and purpose of 
either Treaty, the President shall submit a report to the Senate 
detailing the impact of such noncompliance on the Treaty and seek to 
bring the noncompliant Party into compliance through diplomatic means. 
Further, any modification or change in obligations shall be submitted 
for Senate advice and consent. If such noncompliance persists, the 
President is called upon a to seek a Senate resolution in support of 
continued U.S. adherence to the Treaty or Treaties in question.
  I believe this condition is important for several reasons. First, it 
sets a standard for evaluating noncompliant behavior. Second, 
underlying the reporting requirement is the understanding that 
noncompliant behavior by Russia could actually affect the United States 
continuing as a party to that treaty. Third, and most important, is 
that this condition answers the decade-old question of what should be 
done after a violation is detected. In the case of persistent 
noncompliance, the Senate, at the President's request, is to vote on 
whether to remain a party to that treaty.
  While this condition addresses a number of compliance concerns, the 
managers' amendment builds on this language by adding several 
declarations. Each of these declarations will help ensure the Senate is 
apprised of compliance concerns the United States Government may raise 
with the Russian Federation through various channels and the outcome of 
such discussions.
  And finally, this language declares that the Senate expects the 
Russian Federation to be ``in strict compliance with the terms of START 
II, as presented to the Senate for advice and consent.''


                        4. Nature of Deterrence

  In addition to the declarations offered by the Foreign Relations 
Committee in its Resolution of Ratification, is a declaration, proposed 
by the managers, on the nature of deterrence. This declaration 
recognizes that offensive forms of deterrence alone cannot address the 
emerging threats to U.S. national security and states that missile 
defenses are ``a necessary part of new deterrence strategies.''
  I believe missile defenses make sense not only for addressing growing 
proliferation threats, but also within the 

[[Page S19216]]
strategic equation where the United States is reducing its nuclear 
arsenal to significantly lower levels.
  The START II Treaty could actually create conditions conducive to 
deploying effective ballistic missile defenses. As the United States 
and the Russian Federation deploy only single warhead missiles, the old 
argument that missile defenses could be saturated by multiple warheads 
becomes moot. Further, at the low levels of warheads required by START 
II, both sides should have an incentive to pursue mutual missile 
defense deployments. Finally, as with other arms control treaties, 
START II contains loopholes Russia could exploit to retain a larger, 
more lethal arsenal, ballistic missile defenses could provide a hedge, 
or insurance policy against possible Russian treaty violations.
  My concerns about the impact of START II on U.S. national security 
have been adequately addressed by the Foreign Relations Committee's 
actions and the Managers' amendments which add important conditions and 
declarations to the Resolution of Ratification. With this in mind, I 
will support the START II Treaty Resolution of Ratification, with the 
understanding that these conditions and declarations specify certain 
U.S. obligations to be fulfilled.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the ratification of the 
START II Treaty by the Senate. The case for ratification is, I believe, 
overwhelming. Both the START I Treaty, negotiated under President 
Reagan, and the START II Treaty, negotiated under President Bush, are 
the end products of bipartisan arms control support by the Congress and 
the American people. Ratification of the START II Treaty is supported 
by the President as well as by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary 
Perry, as well as General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs.
  The START II Treaty is a continuation of the substantial reductions 
in strategic weaponry brought about by the signing of the START I 
Treaty. The signing of the START I Treaty occurred after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall at the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, and the development of democratic movements and free 
elections in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These events have 
transformed the longstanding bipolar relationship between the United 
States and the now vanished Soviet Union.
  Given these historic changes, ratification of the START II Treaty is 
a very logical step. Upon entry into full force, the START II Treaty 
will further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads held in 
the active inventories of the United States and Russia from about 8,000 
weapons in START I levels, to between 3,000 and 3,500 weapons, a 
reduction of more than 50 percent.
  By the time START II is fully implemented, the START I and START II 
Treaties will have led to more than a threefold reduction in the 
numbers of strategic nuclear warheads online in both sides. Moreover, 
the entry into force of this country will eliminate all of the land-
based multiple warhead or MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles from 
the arsenal of both sides.
  It has long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy both under 
Republican and Democratic Presidents and Congresses to eliminate these 
poised for instant launch MIRV ICBM's from the inventories of both 
sides. There was too much incentive on both sides if there was warning 
of some attack to feel that these weapons had to be used or lost in 
large numbers, and the ratios gave the wrong incentives. Elimination of 
these land-based ICBM's, a required measure of the START II Treaty, 
will help avoid a return to hair-trigger strategic posture on both 
sides and put an end to any conceivable incentive for a bolt-from-the-
blue attack.
  Ratification of the START II Treaty is a highly cost-effective way to 
reduce the threat to the United States' national security interest 
posed by nuclear weapons. It will eliminate 5,000 warheads from the 
Russian force. Our modest verification costs will be dwarfed by U.S. 
defense budget savings that will flow both from the reduced threat and 
the retirements of our excess nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the ratification of 
the START II Treaty today and to work to build support and 
understanding of the advantages of the START II Treaty among the 
members of the Russian Duma prior to the consideration of the treaty 
next year.
  There is considerable work that has to be done, Mr. President, by I 
think Members of this legislative body if we are going to see the 
Russian Duma ratify this treaty. They are very dubious about the 
treaty. They are very concerned about the antiballistic missile 
developments and discussion and legislation in this country, and it is 
going to take a considerable amount of effort on the part of the United 
States and our other allies, as well as friends of Russia, to see that 
they ratify this treaty also. It is their decision. We cannot force it. 
But certainly we ought to have every dialog we can with them on this 
because this treaty is truly in the interests not only of both the 
United States and Russia but also of mankind.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of ratification 
of the START II Treaty.
  I would like to begin by summarizing what I see as the three major 
features of this treaty. First, given that Russia remains the only 
country that presents a serious nuclear strategic threat to the United 
States, the treaty effectively addresses three key aspects of this 
threat: It will eliminate all Russian heavy inter-continental ballistic 
missiles [ICBMs], it will ban all multiple-warhead ICBMs, and it will 
put a ceiling of 1,750 on the number of nuclear warheads deployed on 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Second, the treaty continues a 
process of arms reductions that is vital not just to U.S. national 
security but that is also good for the U.S. economy: It will require a 
two-thirds reduction of the number of deployed United States and 
Russian strategic nuclear stockpiles by the year 2003. Third, 
reductions in nuclear stockpiles will help to curtail the global 
proliferation of nuclear weapons both by helping to fulfill America's 
commitment under the NPT to seek an end to the nuclear arms race.
  In these times of partisan bickering on all sorts of issues, I am 
gratified to see that this treaty had the support of all 18 members of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In my remarks today, I will 
speak about the importance of the Senate providing its advice and 
consent to the START II ty Treaty--I will not address today any of the 
specific non-binding policy declarations that appear in the resolution, 
some of which I find agreeable, and some I do not support. Instead, I 
believe it is better to focus on the overall attributes of the Treaty 
and how it advances the U.S. national security interest.
                          A Verifiable Treaty

  As with all of our arms control and nonproliferation agreements, the 
United States will depend heavily (but not exclusively) on ``national 
technical means'' to verify the START II treaty. Though I cannot 
discuss in any great detail the nature of these methods, I am gratified 
at the confidence that the Joint Chiefs and other members of our 
national security community have shown in the verification measures in 
this treaty.
  On March 1, 1995, Gen. John Shalikashvili, as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that:

       We believe that the verification procedures are adequate to 
     ensure that we will be able to detect any significant 
     violations. Conversely, we also believe that the verification 
     provisions are sufficiently restrictive to protect ourselves 
     against unnecessary intrusion.

  Similarly, on May 17, 1995, Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, the JCS Director 
for Strategic Plans and Policy, testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that:

       We are confident that the majority of monitoring 
     requirements for START II can be accomplished with high 
     confidence and there is little chance that the Russians can 
     engage in militarily significant cheating. Further, the Joint 
     Staff judges that the military risk to U.S. security 
     associated with any monitoring uncertainties is low. In short 
     the START II Treaty is effectively verifiable.

  Echoing General Shalikashvili, General Clark added that:

       I am confident that the Treaty verification procedures are 
     sufficiently restrictive to protect ourselves from 
     unnecessary intrusion.

  The treaty follows closely the extensive verification regime 
established to monitor the START I Treaty. In addition, START II 
includes some new verification measures, such as: U.S. observation of 
SS-18 silo conversion and  

[[Page S19217]]

missile elimination procedures; exhibitions and inspections of all 
heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads; and exhibitions of heavy bombers 
reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable 
differences.
  The START verification regime for conducting on-site inspections is 
not an anytime, anywhere type of regime. As a result, both parties to 
the treaty must always be on the watch for covert facilities or 
activities. Last February 28, CIA Deputy Director Douglas MacEachin 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

       . . . when estimating our chances of detecting and 
     correctly interpreting potential cheating, we judged that the 
     increased openness of Russia and the former Soviet republics 
     makes cheating increasingly difficult to conceal.
  He added later that:

       The Intelligence Community continues to doubt that Russia 
     will be able to initiate and successfully execute a 
     significant cheating program.

  The use of the term ``increasingly difficult'' rather than 
impossible, however, only underscores the vital importance of 
maintaining America's intelligence capabilities (both for collection 
and analysis) to monitor compliance with this treaty. I think this 
conclusion equally applies to all of America's arms control and 
nonproliferation agreements.
  From my vantage points on the Armed Services Committee and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I will do my best to ensure that our country 
has the resources it needs to ensure a high standard of compliance with 
all of these agreements, most particularly START II.


                             Looking Ahead

  Ratification of this treaty will constitute an important arms control 
milestone--it does not, however, constitute the end of the road by any 
means. Ratification will set the stage for several additional arms 
control measures that are vitally needed to strengthen U.S. national 
security. The treaty should thus not be viewed in isolation, but should 
instead be seen as a key stepping stone toward a safer world. By any 
measure, the agenda ahead is a lengthy one.
  We need to get on with ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. We need to strengthen the safeguards that are used to 
monitor compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We need 
to ensure the conclusion in 1996 of a treaty banning all underground 
nuclear explosions. We need to ensure that our export controls and 
sanctions policies are enforced and implemented in a manner that is 
consistent with our treaty obligations--and we have a long way to go, I 
am afraid, before we achieve that particular goal. We need to bring the 
British, French, and Chinese nuclear stockpiles into the global arms 
reductions process, particularly in the context of START III Treaty 
negotiations. We need to recognize the continuing value of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty in stabilizing nuclear deterrence and in 
holding down defense expenditures in a post-cold war world.
  We need to do more--much more--to strengthen controls over bomb-
usable nuclear materials that are being produced particularly in 
Europe, Russia, and Japan for commercial uses. It is not enough merely 
to pursue a treaty banning the production of such materials for bombs 
or outside of safeguards--the security-related and environmental 
hazards of plutonium recognize no national borders or spurious 
distinctions between civilian and military uses. We should not seek to 
facilitate or to legitimize large-scale commercial uses of plutonium--
whether safeguarded or not--but should instead explore new measures to 
discourage such uses before the nuclear terrorist threat catches up 
with us.
  Above all, we need to recognize the relationships that exist between 
all of these important arms control regimes.
  If the nuclear-weapons states fail to live up to their obligations to 
reduce their strategic stockpiles, this will inevitably have an effect 
on the rate of the proliferation of such weapons to additional 
countries.
  If the United States abandons the ABM Treaty, this will inevitably 
affect in a most negative way the calculations of Russian leaders on 
both offensive and defensive nuclear strategies.
  If we succeed in reducing the stockpiles of the nuclear weapons 
states, but fail to curb the burgeoning production of new bomb-usable 
nuclear materials (especially plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) 
for commercial purposes, we should not be surprised to find ourselves 
facing new nightmares of nuclear terrorism, blackmail, proliferation, 
and extortion down the road.
  If we neglect the importance of traditional approaches to 
nonproliferation (in particular export controls and sanctions) and 
concentrate our energies and resources merely on developing offensive 
and defensive military countermeasures to proliferation, we will again 
face a more dangerous world--our priority must remain to prevent, 
rather than to manage, the global spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.


                               Conclusion

  With these terms in mind, I urge all my colleagues to vote in favor 
of ratification of the START II Treaty. I would like to take this 
occasion to recognize the debt that this treaty owes to the persistent 
work of Senators Pell, Levin, and other long-time supporters of the 
START II Treaty in the Senate. I also credit the leadership of 
President Bill Clinton in encouraging timely action by the Senate in 
ratifying this important treaty.
  I can only hope that the bipartisanship the Senate is showing today 
in voting, I hope overwhelmingly, to approve this treaty will echo into 
the next session, where I am sure it will be needed as much if not more 
than the treaty itself.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the START II 
Treaty which has finally been brought to the floor of the Senate after 
a long, unnecessary, and perhaps fatal delay. I will elaborate on that 
last point in a moment.
  But first, let me say that START II represents an unprecedented 
opportunity to dismantle the Soviet nuclear arsenal. I say ``Soviet,'' 
Mr. President, because START II would, if implemented, eliminate the 
most devastating nuclear missiles built by the Soviet Union in the 
1970's and 1980's: Hundreds of multi-warhead missiles of cataclysmic 
destructive power--among them, the infamous SS-18, which became the 
very symbol of the Soviet threat.
  Even as we speak today, these missiles remain deployed in launching 
silos scattered across a Russian nation undergoing enormous political 
turmoil. They could at a moment's notice be targeted on the United 
States of America.
  For the American people, the future of those missiles is a 
fundamental, compelling national security question.
  The salient feature of START II is its planned elimination of every 
land-based multi-warhead missile in the Soviet-now-Russian arsenal. 
These were the weapons that, for years, so worried our defense 
establishment that we expended hundreds of billions of dollars to 
counter their first-strike potential.
  Mr. President, that apocalyptic potential remains today.
  As matters now stand, this threat carries with it considerable irony. 
For months, the Senate has engaged in yet another round of controversy 
over whether to build an anti-missile system intended to protect the 
United States from missile attack.
  Earlier this week, this body passed a defense authorization 
confernece report that would require deployment of such a system by 
2003, putting us on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, which has 
been the basis for all strategic arms controls agreements over the past 
two decades.
  Any such system, if built, would be monumentally expensive, of highly 
uncertain reliability, likely to provoke additional offensive 
deployments, and available, at best, only sometime in the next century. 
Yet, the START II Treaty during that same period would eliminate with 
verifiable certainty the one serious missile threat the United States 
has ever faced.
  The effort over the past several months to eviscerate the ABM Treaty 
has been driven by those who do not favor the limits in START II, and, 
correspondingly, never much cared for the ABM Treaty. They believe that 
the ABM Treaty prevents us from constructing an impenetrable shield 
against all types of ballistic missiles.
  I admit--a ballistic missile shield is a comforting image. But, as 
our experience with star wars in the 1980's demonstrated, it is not 
grounded in reality.  

[[Page S19218]]

Unfortunately, that ballistic missile shield, if it could ever overcome 
awesome technical and financial barriers--and I doubt it would, would 
provide a false sense of security.
  That is because it would not alleviate a much greater threat--a 
terrorist transporting a nuclear device or its components into the 
United States through very conventional means, and detonating that 
device near an important landmark.
  Our focus ought to be in preventing that possibility by improving our 
capabilities to tract terrorists and securing the many tons of fissile 
material spread across the territory of the former Soviet Union.
  My colleagues know that last Sunday, the Russian people went to the 
polls and decided to elect a Duma apparently dominated by Communists 
and nationalists who are skeptical about START II and suspicious about 
American motives on the ABM treaty. They do not regard as a mere 
coincidence that 2003 is the year established for final compliance with 
the central limits in START II, as well as the target date 
for deployment of a national missile defense system in the Republican 
plan.

  From their perspective, START II will take away their most effective 
means of countering a national missile defense--overwhelming it with 
offensive missiles.
  While Russian concerns alone should not determine our policy 
decisions, it would be shortsighted, to say the least, to ignore them 
altogether when Russian behavior and Russian missiles can have a direct 
bearing on our national security.
  If the Russians decide that we are intent on abrogating the ABM 
Treaty, then they will likely refuse to ratify START II, halt START I 
implementation, and begin a strategic build-up. We would have to follow 
suit and waste vast sums of money on deploying more offensive missiles 
and developing more missile defenses.
  How ironic that would be--in the post-cold war era when we are on the 
verge of ratifying a historic reduction in strategic nuclear weapons--
to set off an offense-defense spiral that the ABM Treaty was designed 
to prevent, and did prevent for over 20 years.
  For the past several months many here saw the Communist and 
nationalist clouds building in Russia, and for that reason we 
repeatedly called for early United States ratification of START II in 
order to encourage similar action by the Duma. That could have locked 
in the gains promised by START II. Unfortunately, we did not act.
  Now, some reports suggest that the new Duma may wait to see the 
results of our presidential election before approving START II. I hope 
that is not the case, because between now and then Russia will hold its 
own presidential election. That election has the potential to rearrange 
Russian politics in ways we cannot predict.
  Our action today can send a clear signal that we are serious about 
implementing START II, and provide the incentive for quick action by 
the Duma.
  It is my hope that the Senate's advice and consent to START II will 
encourage the Duma to act in kind prior to the G-7 Nuclear Safety 
Summit in Moscow next April. Due to the crowded political calendar in 
both countries later in the year, the summit would be the ideal, and 
maybe last, opportunity for Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to exchange 
instruments of ratification. I would also hope that the two leaders can 
at that time agree to begin negotiations toward a new agreement on even 
further reductions.
  I would just like to add here that I am concerned with some of the 
hortatory language that is contained both within the committee report 
and the proposed managers' amendment. In particular, I find the 
language on missile defenses and nuclear testing to be particularly 
problematic. However, I have decided not to object at this time because 
I believe it is absolutely critical that we act quickly and favorably 
on START II. I think it is also important to emphasize for all 
concerned that the language to which I and many of my colleagues object 
is non-binding.
  Mr. President, the ultimate entry into force of the START II Treaty 
may well depend on a choice we must make in the months ahead: Do we 
pursue a technically questionable and prohibitively expensive national 
missile defense which would doom START II, or do we pursue a path that 
promises with greater certainty and less cost to eliminate the very 
missiles such a system would defend against?
  In my view, there is not much of a choice. Star Wars technology is 
uncertain, costly, and likely to undermine our national security. On 
the other hand, arms control agreements like START II are proven, cost-
effective, and will reduce the nuclear threat to the United States.
  The American people, having sent us here to protect the security of 
their homes and children, are entitled to the only rational choice: We 
should ratify START II and abandon the reckless plans for an ABM 
Treaty-busting national missile defense system.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today is a very important day in the 
history of the modern world. It is a crucially important day in the 
history of human-kind's efforts to achieve peace and avoid armed 
conflict.
  For over 50 years following the end of the World War II, the United 
States was locked in what came to be known universally as the cold war. 
That war, while it only occasionally broke into open armed conflict, 
was a very destructive conflict. It consumed the wealth of much of the 
world as armaments were stacked upon armaments to prepare for the open 
conflict that we hoped would never come.
  There have been countless periods in the history of the world during 
which there have been uneasy periods of standoff of one power against 
another. But there has been none even nearly approximating the cold 
war. The reason is terrifyingly simple. The cold war was the first time 
in the world's history when human beings possessed weapons of mass 
destruction in the form of thermonuclear weapons. First the United 
States and then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obtained the 
ability to manufacture and use nuclear weapons. Eventually that 
capability was acquired by other nations. The use of just one such 
weapon is sufficient to annihilate an entire city.
  The use of many not only could obliterate an entire nation and all 
its people from the face of the earth, but arguably might set in motion 
natural reactions which could lead to the extinguishment of most if not 
all life on this planet.
  All of us in this Chamber endured most if not all of the cold war. We 
know of many of its human costs, although they will never be fully 
calculated. We also know today that there were a number of occasions 
where the world teetered on the very brink of the use of such weapons, 
which very likely would have been followed by a general exchange 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and which very likely 
would have involved use of their nuclear weapons by the other nations 
possessing them.

  What we also know, Mr. President, is that there was and is no higher 
objective--while preserving the liberties for which this Nation was 
founded and for the preservation of which so many have sacrificed so 
greatly--than to reduce both the threat of and the ability to wage 
nuclear war.
  This objective has been reflected in numerous efforts initiated by 
both Republican and Democratic administrations to negotiate limits on 
the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons, to negotiate limits on 
the types, capabilities, and numbers of weapons systems armed with 
nuclear devices, and to negotiate various other measures designed to 
reduce the likelihood that a nuclear weapon will be used in anger.
  The treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive 
arms--the so-called START II Treaty--which is before the Senate today 
is one of the most significant milestones among these efforts. It 
builds upon the foundation established by the original START Treaty 
signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 1991.
  That first START Treaty was the first treaty that provided for real 
reductions--rather than just limits on further growth--of 
strategic offensive arms of both nations. It provided for overall 
reductions of 30 to 40 percent, and reductions of up to 50 percent in 
the most threatening systems. That treaty now acts to emphasize and 
enhance stability in times of international crisis. It provides for 
rough  

[[Page S19219]]


equality of strategic forces between the two sides, and was 
painstakingly crafted to be effectively verifiable. That treaty will 
result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems 
from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and accession 
of these three states to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons [the NPT] as non-nuclear state parties. As a result, after 7 
years, of the states formed upon the disintegration of the former 
Soviet Union, only Russia will possess deployed strategic offensive 
arms.
  START II adds to these very significant accomplishments. It increases 
the stability of the nuclear balance. It bans deployment of the most 
destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system--land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently 
targetable nuclear warheads [or MIRV's]. Under its terms, Russia and 
the United States will reduce the number of nuclear weapons each 
possesses to 3,500.
  Mr. President, some believe that with the passing of the former 
Soviet Union, and the economic weakness and chaos that have in many 
respects permeated its successor states, there no longer is a danger of 
nuclear conflict. Some would argue that these nations and their people, 
already struggling to make their way in a world that passed them by 
during the cold war period, would never risk losing literally 
everything they are and have by initiating a nuclear conflict. But that 
is an incomplete if not naive view of the world situation.
  As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger they will be 
used. Disagreements can escalate, and sometimes become dangerously 
personalized as national leaders struggle to maintain power and 
control. It is conceivable that rogue elements of a nation's military 
could gain control of one or more weapons--or even the entire nuclear 
apparatus of a nation--and launch one or more or many of those weapons. 
There are countless scenarios where those weapons could be employed. 
There is no better reason than this simple reality, Mr. President, for 
putting in place the reductions contained in the START II Treaty.
  As we seek to bring to a conclusion the business of the Senate prior 
to this weekend of great significance to families and religions, I will 
not take the Senate's time to exhaustively detail all of the reason why 
this treaty will provide increased stability to the world, will reduce 
the danger of nuclear conflict and nuclear accidents, and will do this 
while preserving the defensive capability of the United States so that 
it unquestionably can effectively defend our democracy and liberties 
that are so precious to us. The legislative record of the treaty is 
available for all to see, and other Senators already have spoken 
eloquently to these issues.
  There is simply no question, Mr. President, that the immediate 
ratification of this treaty is in the best interests of the United 
States and, indeed, the world. All of our most senior national security 
leadership concurs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff joined by 
all the Chiefs have so testified. Our intelligence leadership has so 
testified. Our diplomatic leadership has to testified. The agreement is 
neither partisan nor regional. While exceedingly little of vital 
importance occurs with absolutely unanimity, the START II Treaty comes 
as close as any major foreign policy or national security issue of 
which I am aware.

  It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I was distressed, and 
remain distressed, that the Senate's action on this treaty was delayed 
for many months when the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
held it hostage in an attempt to compel Members of this body to 
acquiesce to his plan to constrain the diplomatic capacity and media 
that are of critical importance to our Nation and its leaders--
regardless of their party affiliation. For months many other Members of 
this body and I struggled to free this treaty for Senate action.
  Finally, last month, the negotiation effort succeeded, and we were 
assured the Senate would at least take up the treaty before the end of 
this year. I am pleased to have helped accomplish this.
  It is not just that it was and is regrettable that, because of this 
hostage-taking, the United States did not do everything in its power to 
speed this beneficial treaty into effect, and thereby the increased 
safety and security it offers have been unnecessarily delayed. That is 
regrettable enough--and I only hope that history does not show that 
this failure resulted in loss of life. The delay, in fact, has placed 
the entire treaty in jeopardy. While I think there is virtually no 
doubt that the Senate, when it is permitted to finally act on this 
treaty, will vote overwhelmingly on a bipartisan basis to approve it, 
the deteriorating situation in the Russian Federation makes approval by 
the Russian Duma increasingly uncertain. As nationalists and 
reconstructed Communists push successfully for greater influence in 
Russia, it is quite possible they will reject an treaty they see as 
resulting in too great a reduction in power-projecting weapons systems.
  So, ironically, in the very kind of situation where the reduced 
threat of nuclear conflict would be most significant and valuable, the 
short-sighted actions here in the Senate could deny us and the world 
the heightened security this treaty offers. That would be a catastrophe 
of monumental proportions, Mr. President. If it comes to pass, history 
will properly and caustically criticize those who have delayed Senate 
action or acquiesced in that delay.

  Before I complete my remarks, Mr. President, I want to address a 
related issue that is of great importance. There are some who would 
draw a connection between this treaty and the establishment of a 
ballistic missile defense. That, in turn, raises questions of continued 
adherence to the anti-ballistic missile or ABM Treaty. Such a linkage 
of this treaty to the question of ballistic missile defense is not 
necessary, is inappropriate, and could be tremendously 
counterproductive.
  I have long and strongly supported development of effective defenses 
against theater and short-range ballistic missiles. Our troops and 
sailors deserve such protection whenever they are sent into harm's way. 
But I have equally fervently supported the ABM Treaty as a critical 
link in the chain of United States-Russian relations. So much about the 
cold war--and so much in our new and still unfamiliar post-Soviet 
relationship--is dependent on each nation feeling confident of its 
ability to protect its homeland and repel aggressors. The ABM Treaty 
has made and continues to make an absolutely vital contribution to that 
confidence. The treaty provides confidence that, in case of an attack 
launched by the other side, the attacked nation would be able to 
effectively counterattack with its ballistic missiles. This uneasy but 
effective balance acted to keep the cold war from ever going hot.
  Now, in the form of the START Treaty and the START II Treaty, we are 
reducing the terror arrayed on both sides, and reducing the likelihood 
that what remains will be used in anger. But the confidence must 
remain. The START II Treaty increases confidence on both sides. Nothing 
in it prejudices the consideration of how to provide for defense 
against theater and short-range ballistic missiles while maintaining 
the critical balancing tool of the ABM Treaty. Ratification of the 
START II Treaty certainly does not increase the need for a national 
missile defense that would be in violation of the ABM Treaty--to the 
contrary, it reduces the danger of attack and removes the most 
threatening of the Russian nuclear delivery systems.
  Mr. President, immediately is not too soon to provide the Senate's 
overwhelming approval of this treaty. All who labored in its 
negotiation are to be commended for their service to the security of 
this Nation, the security of the world, and the safety of our citizens 
and those around the globe. I compliment especially the distinguished 
Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, and the distinguished ranking 
Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, and 
their staffs, for their roles in managing the treaty and moving it 
toward approval by the Senate. I urge the majority leader, and the 
Democratic leader, to ensure that the Senate acts finally and 
expeditiously on the treaty just as soon as the Senate returns to 
session after the holidays.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, today--at long last--we discuss START II. 
I urge this body to ratify it quickly.
  START II is a truly historic treaty. It will cut the number of the 
world's 

[[Page S19220]]
nuclear weapons in half, getting rid of nearly 4,000 deployed H-bombs 
in Russia and about the same number here. An overwhelming number of our 
citizens favor implementing this treaty, and a large number of elected 
officials on both sides of the aisle have expressed their support for 
it.
  Mr. President, START II should be ratified for many reasons. First, 
START II destroys weapons. This reduces the risk of an accidental 
launch. Second, every Russian weapon destroyed is a weapon we don't 
need to defend against. The following table, which I ask unanimous 
consent be printed in the Record, shows the numbers and kinds of ICBMs 
that can be eliminated under START II.
  There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

     Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles--Eliminated Under START II     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Delivery system                  Launchers     Warheads 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-18.........................................          188        1,880
SS-19.........................................      \1\ 170        1,020
SS-24.........................................           46          460
SLBM's........................................  ...........      \2\ 600
                                               -------------------------
      Total...................................          304        3,960
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Some SS-19s may be converted to carry only a single warhead in order
  to offset the cost of developing a new launcher.                      
\2\ Based on limit of 1,750 submarine launched ballistic missiles. The  
  current Russian arsenal of SLBMs is estimated at 2,350.               
                                                                        
Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Nuclear Notebook, September/     
  October 1995.                                                         

  Mr. HARKIN. Additionally, destroying weapons saves taxpayers' money. 
Just look at the current defense authorization bill. As my friend from 
New Mexico pointed out in the report to the Defense Authorization Act, 
the act ``proposes a nuclear weapons manufacturing complex sized to 
meet a need of a hedge stockpile far above the active START II 
stockpile of 3,500 weapons.'' The total cost of producing our nuclear 
weapons to date is about $4 trillion. Compare that with our $5 trillion 
national debt. In 1995 alone, $12.4 billion was spent to build, 
operate, and maintain strategic nuclear weapons. If we ratify START II 
we can give taxpayers the double peace dividend of higher security at 
lower cost.
  Even if START II were fully implemented, we would have more than 
3,000 deployed strategic missiles--500 warheads on missiles in silos, 
1,680 warheads on submarine-launched missiles, and 1,320 on airplanes. 
Furthermore, an additional 4,000 nuclear weapons would remain in our 
stockpile. Surely, this will be more than enough atomic fire-power to 
counter any conceivable threat to the United States.
  Mr. President, Russia and other former Soviet Republics are more open 
than ever before. We have all seen the unprecedented pictures on 
television of Russian missiles and airplanes being destroyed. This new 
openness will make START II even more verifiable then START I. With the 
recent Russian elections and the presidential election season just 
starting, we must act now to keep this olive branch from withering.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, we need to ratify START II quickly. It 
is not in the national interest to play politics over the ratification 
of any treaty. Russian President Yeltsin needs quick American 
ratification of START II to help get the Russian Parliament to ratify 
it. We need the security of fewer Russian warheads now. We need to stop 
spending so much money making our nuclear weapons now. We can use the 
warheads we have now to defend America. We need to ratify START II now.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we have checked with both sides of the 
aisle to make certain that all parties are in agreement, and after 
that, I ask unanimous consent that the START II Treaty be advanced 
through its various parliamentary procedure stages up to and including 
the presentation of the resolution of ratification, and the managers' 
amendments which I will offer after consultation with Senator Pell be 
deemed agreed to, and that no further amendments be in order to the 
resolution of ratification.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the treaty will be 
considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up 
to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, 
which the clerk will state.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the 
     ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on 
     January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and 
     memorandum of understanding, all such documents being 
     integral parts of and collectively referred to as the ``START 
     II Treaty'' (contained in Treaty Document 103-1), subject to 
     the conditions of subsection (b) and the declarations of 
     subsection (c):
       (1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of 
     Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo 
     Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the 
     United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
     Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
     (also known as the ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
       (2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy 
     Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and 
     the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
     Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Exhibitions and 
     Inspections Protocol'')
       (3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution 
     and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the 
     United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
     Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
     (also known as the ``Memorandum on Attribution'').
       (b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
     following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a 
     party to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
     the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on 
     July 3, 1991 (in this resolution referred to as the ``START 
     Treaty'') or to the START II Treaty is acting in a manner 
     that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
     respective Treaty or is in violation of either the START or 
     START II Treaty so as to threaten the national security 
     interests of the United States, then the President shall--
       (A) consult with and promptly submit a report to the Senate 
     detailing the effect of such actions on the START Treaties;
       (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest 
     diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
       (C) in the event that a party other than the Russian 
     Federation is determined not to be in compliance--
       (i) request consultations with the Russian Federation to 
     assess the viability of both START Treaties and to determine 
     if a change in obligations is required in either treaty to 
     accommodate the changed circumstances, and
       (ii) submit for the Senate's advice and consent to 
     ratification any agreement changing the obligations of the 
     United States; and
       (D) in the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate 
     resolution of support of continued adherence to one or both 
     of the START Treaties, notwithstanding the changed 
     circumstances affecting the object and purpose of one or both 
     of the START Treaties.
       (2) Treaty Obligations.--Ratification by the United States 
     of the START II Treaty obligates the United States to meet 
     the conditions contained in this resolution of ratification 
     and shall not be interpreted as an obligation by the United 
     States to accept any modification, change in scope, or 
     extension of the Treaty Between the United States of America 
     and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation 
     of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 
     26, 1972 (commonly referred to as the ``ABM Treaty'').
       (3) Financing Implementation.--The United States 
     understands that in order to be assured of the Russian 
     commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must 
     maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation 
     of the START II Treaty. The costs of implementing the START 
     II Treaty should be borne by both parties to the Treaty. The 
     exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II 
     Treaty shall not be contingent upon the United States 
     providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of 
     commitments by Russia under the START II Treaty.
       (4) Exchange of Letters.--The exchange of letters--
       (A) between Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and 
     Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 
     29, 1992, regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the 
     territory of Kazakstan,
       (B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Minister of 
     Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, and 
     December 31, 1992, regarding heavy bombers, and
       (C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Secretary 
     of Defense Richard 

[[Page S19221]]
     Cheney, dated December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, making assurances 
     on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention of 
     90 silo launchers of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles (ICBMs) (all having been submitted to the Senate 
     associated with the START II Treaty),

     are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the 
     START II Treaty. The United States shall regard actions 
     inconsistent with obligations under those exchanges of 
     letters as equivalent under international law to actions 
     inconsistent with the START II Treaty.
       (5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles composed 
     of items that are limited by the START Treaty or the START II 
     Treaty shall be subject to the obligations undertaken in the 
     respective treaty.
       NTM and cuba.--The obligation of the United States under 
     the START Treaty not to interfere with the national technical 
     means (NTM) of verification of the other party to the Treaty 
     does not preclude the United States from pursuing the 
     question of the removal of the electronic intercept facility 
     operated by the Government of the Russian Federation at 
     Lourdes, Cuba.
       (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
     following declarations, which express the intent of the 
     Senate:
       (1) Cooperative threat reductions.--Pursuant to the Joint 
     Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the 
     Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to in Moscow, May 
     10, 1995, between the President of the United States and the 
     President of the Russian Federation, it is the sense of the 
     Senate that both parties to the START II Treaty should attach 
     high priority to--
       (A) the exchange of detailed information on aggregate 
     stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile 
     materials, and on their safety and security;
       (B) the maintenance at distinct and secure storage 
     facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of fissile materials 
     removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to 
     national security requirements for the purpose of confirming 
     the irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons 
     reduction; and
       (C) the adoption of other cooperative measures to enhance 
     confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material 
     stockpiles.
       (2) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the START or 
     START II Treaty, the President should, within the parameters 
     of the elimination schedules provided for in the START 
     Treaties, regulate reductions in the United States strategic 
     nuclear forces so that the number of accountable warheads 
     under the START and START II Treaties possessed by the 
     Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number 
     of accountable warheads possessed by the United States to an 
     extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the national 
     security interests of the United States results.
       (3) Expanding strategic arsenals in countries other than 
     russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that, if during the 
     time the START II Treaty remains in force or in advance of 
     any further strategic offensive arms reductions the President 
     determines there has been an expansion of the strategic 
     arsenal of any country not party to the START II Treaty so as 
     to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, 
     then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the 
     Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II Treaty 
     remains in the national interest of the United States.
       (4) Substantial further reductions.--Cognizant of the 
     obligation of the United States under Article VI of the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 
     1968 ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
     measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
     any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on 
     general and complete disarmament under strict and 
     effective international control'', it is the sense of the 
     Senate that in anticipation of the ratification and entry 
     into force of the START II Treaty, the Senate calls upon 
     the parties to the START II Treaty to seek further 
     strategic offensive arms reductions consistent with their 
     national security interests and calls upon the other 
     nuclear-weapon states to give careful and early 
     consideration to corresponding reductions of their own 
     nuclear arsenals.
       (5) Missile technology control regime.--The Senate urges 
     the President to insist that the Republic of Belarus, the 
     Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation 
     abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control 
     Regime (MTCR). For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
     ``Missile Technology Control Regime'' means the policy 
     statement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
     Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and 
     Japan, announced April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive 
     missile relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any 
     amendment thereto.
       (6) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
     declares its intention to consider for approval international 
     agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
     limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
     militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty 
     power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
     Constitution.
       (7) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition 
     (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF 
     Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF 
     Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 
     27, 1988.

  Mr. Pell. Mr. President, the amendments the Senator from Indiana [Mr. 
Lugar] and I will accept today, represent a bipartisan effort to reach 
a reasonable consensus in the committee and with regard to the floor 
action. In particular, I would note the effective and valuable role 
played in this process by the bipartisan Senate Arms Control Observer 
Group at the initiative of its administrative cochairman, the Senator 
from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], who worked very closely with a number of the 
group's members in the START II issue, including Senator Lugar, Senator 
Levin, and myself.
  The package also includes an amendment included on behalf of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requiring a Presidential 
certification that we have sufficient national technical means to 
verify Russian compliance. The amendment is a positive addition, and we 
accept it.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that when 
the Senate resumes executive session to consider the resolution of 
ratification, there be 6 hours for debate, to be equally divided in the 
usual form, with unlimited additional time under the control of Senator 
Thurmond; and following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the 
Senate proceed to vote on adoption of the resolution of ratification, 
without further action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. PELL. Certainly.
  Mr. STEVENS. I think we should show that Mira Baratta, working with 
Senator Dole, has been very helpful in working with this group.
  Mr. PELL. I concur in your thought.
  Mr. LUGAR. A point of parliamentary clarification. Am I correct to 
assume that the report of the Foreign Relations Committee resolution 
ratification is before the body?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Chair's understanding of the 
unanimous-consent propounded.


                           Amendment No. 3111

         (Purpose: Regarding interpretation of the ABM Treaty)

  Mr. LUGAR. The unanimous-consent request stated I would submit, as a 
manager, amendments. I have submitted those to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. For the information of the Senate, the clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself and Mr. 
     PELL, proposes amendments en bloc numbered 3111.

  Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In section 1(b)(2) of the resolution of ratification, 
     insert ``(A)'' after ``START II Treaty''.
       In section 1(b)(2), before the period at the end, insert 
     ``, and (B) changes none of the rights of either Party with 
     respect to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, in particular, 
     Articles 13, 14, and 15''.
       At the end of section 1(b) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new condition:
       (7) Implementation arrangements.--(A) The START II Treaty 
     shall not be binding on the United States until such time as 
     the Duma of the Russian Federation has acted pursuant to its 
     constitutional responsibilities and the START II Treaty 
     enters into force in accordance with Article VI of the 
     Treaty.
       (B) If the START II Treaty does not enter into force 
     pursuant to subparagraph (A), and if the President plans to 
     implement reductions of United States strategic nuclear 
     forces below those currently planned and consistent with the 
     START Treaty, then the President shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such 
     reductions on the national security of the United States; and
       (ii) take no action to reduce United States strategic 
     nuclear forces below that currently planned and consistent 
     with the START Treaty until he submits to the Senate his 
     determination that such reductions are in the 

[[Page S19222]]
     national security interest of the United States.
       In section 1(c)(2) of the resolution of ratification, 
     insert ``(A)'' immediately after ``Reductions.--''.

       At the end of section 1(c)(2), insert the following:
       (B) Recognizing that instability could result from an 
     imbalance in the levels of strategic offensive arms, the 
     Senate calls upon the President to submit a report in 
     unclassified form to the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
     Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of 
     each year beginning with January 31, 1997, and continuing 
     through such time as the reductions called for in the START 
     II Treaty are completed by both parties, which report will 
     provide--
       (i) details on the progress of each party's reductions in 
     strategic offensive arms during the previous year;
       (ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in 
     compliance with the terms of the START II Treaty or specifies 
     any act of noncompliance by the Russian Federation; and
       (iii) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance 
     endangering the national security interests of the United 
     States exists.
       In section 1(c)(4) of the resolution of ratification--
       (1) strike ``the parties'' and all that follows through 
     ``national security interests'' and insert ``the President to 
     seek further strategic offensive arms reductions to the 
     extent consistent with United States national security 
     interests''; and
       (2) strike ``it is the sense of the Senate that'' and 
     insert in ``and''.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declarations:
       (8) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear past pattern of 
     Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and 
     continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation, 
     the Senate declares that--
       (A) the START II Treaty is in the interests of the United 
     States only if both the United States and the Russian 
     Federation are in strict compliance with the terms of the 
     Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent 
     to ratification, such compliance being measured by 
     performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to 
     comply;
       (B) the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be in 
     strict compliance with its obligations under the terms of the 
     START II Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification; and
       (C) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate 
     expects the Administration to offer regular briefings, but 
     not less than four times per year, to the Committees on 
     Foreign Relations and Armed Services on compliance issues 
     related to the START II Treaty. Such briefings shall include 
     a description of all U.S. efforts in U.S./Russian diplomatic 
     channels and bilateral fora to resolve the compliance issues 
     and shall include, but would not necessarily be limited to, 
     the following:
       i. Any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Implementation 
     Commission, in advance of such meetings;
       ii. Any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral 
     Implementation Commission, within thirty days of such 
     meetings; and
       iii. Any Presidential determination that the Russian 
     Federation is in non-compliance with or is otherwise acting 
     in a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
     START II Treaty, within thirty days of such a determination, 
     in which case the President shall also submit a written 
     report, with an unclassified summary, explaining why it is in 
     the national security interests of the United States to 
     continue as a party to the START II Treaty.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--The 
     Senate declares that following Senate advice and consent to 
     ratification of the START II Treaty, any agreement or 
     understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or 
     reinterprets United States or Russian obligations under the 
     START II Treaty, including the time frame for implementation 
     of the Treaty, should be submitted to the Senate for its 
     advice and consent to ratification.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) Nature of deterrence.--(A) On June 17, 1992, Presidents 
     Bush and Yeltsin issued a Joint Understanding and a Joint 
     Statement at the conclusion of their Washington Summit, the 
     first of which became the foundation for the START II Treaty. 
     The second, the Joint Statement on a Global Protection 
     System, endorsed the cooperative development of a defensive 
     system against ballistic missile attack and demonstrated the 
     belief by the governments of the United States and the 
     Russian Federation that strategic offensive reductions and 
     certain defenses against ballistic missiles are stabilizing, 
     compatible, and reinforcing.
       (B) It is, therefore, the sense of the Senate that:
       (i) The long-term perpetuation of deterrence based on 
     mutual and severe offensive nuclear threats would be outdated 
     in a strategic environment in which the United States and the 
     Russian Federation are seeking to put aside their past 
     adversarial relationship and instead build a relationship 
     based upon trust rather than fear.
       (ii) An offense-only form of deterrence cannot address by 
     itself the emerging strategic environment in which, as 
     Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in January 1994, 
     proliferators acquiring missiles and weapons of mass 
     destruction ``may have acquired such weapons for the express 
     purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a 
     fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence. 
     . . . New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new 
     strategies should deterrence fail.''.
       (iii) Defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for 
     new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should 
     deterrence fail. Because deterrence may be inadequate to 
     protect United States forces and allies abroad, theater 
     missile defense is necessary, particularly the most capable 
     systems of the United States such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, 
     and the Space and Missile Tracking System. Similarly, because 
     deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States 
     against long-range missile threats, missile defenses are a 
     necessary part of new deterrent strategies. Such defenses 
     also are wholly in consonance with the summit statements from 
     June 1992 of the Presidents of the United States and the 
     Russian Federation and the September 1994 statement by 
     Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who said, ``We now 
     have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not 
     on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on 
     another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''.
       (iv) As the governments of the United States and Russia 
     have built upon the June 17, 1992, Joint Understanding in 
     agreeing to the START II Treaty, so too should these 
     governments promptly undertake discussions based on the Joint 
     Statement to move forward cooperatively in the development 
     and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) Report on use of foreign excess ballistic missiles for 
     launch services.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
     President should not issue licenses for the use of a foreign 
     excess ballistic missile for launch services without first 
     submitting a report to Congress, on a one-time basis, on the 
     implications of the licensing approval on nonproliferation 
     efforts under the Treaty and on the United States space 
     launch industry.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) United states commitments ensuring the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.--The 
     Senate declares that the United States is committed to 
     ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its 
     nuclear forces. To this end, the United States undertakes the 
     following additional commitments:
       (A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a 
     robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining 
     nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that 
     will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the 
     United States nuclear arsenal at the START II levels and meet 
     requirements for hedging against possible international 
     developments or technical problems, in conformance with 
     United States policies and to underpin deterrence.
       (B) The United States is committed to reestablishing and 
     maintaining sufficient levels of production to support 
     requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of 
     United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain 
     production capabilities and capacities.
       (C) The United States is committed to maintaining United 
     States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core 
     nuclear weapons competencies therein.
       (D) As tritium is essential to the performance of modern 
     nuclear weapons, but decays radioactively at a relatively 
     rapid rate, and the United States now has no meaningful 
     tritium production capacity, the United States is committed 
     to ensuring rapid access to a new production source of 
     tritium within the next decade.
       (E) As warhead design flaws or aging problems may occur 
     that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve, the 
     United States reserves the right, consistent with United 
     States law, to resume underground nuclear testing if that is 
     necessary to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons 
     stockpile. The United States is committed to maintaining the 
     Nevada Test Site at a level in which the United States will 
     be able to resume testing, within one year, following a 
     national decision to do so.
       (F) The United States reserves the right to invoke the 
     supreme national interest of the United States to withdraw 
     from any future arms control agreement to limit underground 
     nuclear testing.


                               condition

       (a) Conditions.--The Senate's advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
     following condition, which shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) Presidential certification and report on national 
     technical means.--Within ninety days after the United States 
     deposits instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty, 
     the President shall certify that U.S. National Technical 
     Means are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of 
     Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty 

[[Page S19223]]
     governing the capabilities of strategic missile systems. This 
     certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate 
     of the United States indicating how U.S. National Technical 
     Means, including collection, processing and analytic 
     resources, will be marshalled to ensure effective monitoring. 
     Such report may be supplemented by a classified annex, which 
     shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
     Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would note that under the previous 
order those amendments are now agreed to.
  So the amendment (No. 3111) was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. STEVENS. Was there a summary of those amendments and a 
explanation along with the Senator's submission?
  Mr. LUGAR. I respond to the distinguished Senator that a summary was 
not included with the text.
  Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that we be permitted to insert 
in the Record an explanation of each of the provisions within that 
amendment.
  There being no objection, the explanation was ordered to be printed 
in the Record, as follows:

                          Amendment Summaries

       Amendment No. 1: Nothing in START II changes the rights of 
     either party to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
       Amendment No. 2: Adds the condition that the U.S. shall not 
     implement START II reductions until the Treaty has entered 
     into force.
       Amendment No. 3: Requires the President to report yearly on 
     symmetrical nuclear weapons reductions.
       Amendment No. 4: Calls upon the President to consider 
     whether to seek only those strategic future reductions 
     consistent with U.S. National Security interests.
       Amendment No. 5: States the compliance expectations of the 
     Senate and asks for periodic updates from the administration 
     on compliance issues.
       Amendment No. 6: States the requirement for Senate advice 
     and consent to any possible future amendments to START II.
       Amendment No. 7: Discusses the compatibility of offensive 
     deterrence and defenses against ballistic missiles, and calls 
     upon the United States and Russia to implement the Bush/
     Yeltsin Joint Statement on a Global Protection System.
       Amendment No. 8: Requests that the President suspend 
     licenses for the use of foreign excess ballistic missiles 
     until he submits a report to the Congress on the implications 
     of the licensing approval on the American space launch 
     industry and on non-proliferation efforts.
       Amendment No. 9: Declares the United States commitment to 
     ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of its 
     nuclear forces. This includes declaring support for a new 
     production source of tritium and maintaining the capability 
     of resuming underground nuclear testing if there is a 
     national decision to do so.
       Amendment No. 10: Reviews Intelligence Committee issues.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, one more point of parliamentary inquiry. Is 
the status now of the START II Treaty proceedings at a point at which 
no further amendments are in order and the next stage of activity will 
be when the Senate is next in executive session and this is called 
forward, that 6 hours of debate plus potential unlimited time allotted 
to Senator Thurmond would be in order at that time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, to the Chair's 
understanding.
  Mr. LUGAR. Followed by disposition of the treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Chair's understanding.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
  I ask my distinguished colleague if he has further comment?
  Mr. PELL. No, no further suggestions. Just to congratulate you, Mr. 
Chairman, and Senator Stevens, on guiding this legislation through. I 
thank my own staff, Bill Ashworth, very much indeed.
  Mr. LUGAR. I join the distinguished Senator in thanking the minority 
staff. Of course I thank Kenny Myers and Lindon Brooks, who has been an 
able backup negotiator of this treaty.
  In particular, my colleague from Alaska, Senator Stevens, who, in his 
cochairmanship of the Arms Control Observer Group, did a remarkable job 
in pulling this together for four sessions, with many Senators from 
both sides of the aisle, to think through the implications of this 
treaty, to refine the language of the managers' amendment that has been 
submitted and adopted today.
  Does Senator Stevens have further comment?
  Mr. STEVENS. No, Mr. President. I do not have. I am grateful for the 
comments of my two friends. I do have another statement if we are 
finished with this matter, though.
  Mr. LUGAR. Is it relevant to START II?
  Mr. STEVENS. No.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, for the moment I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Let me ask the Chair, is it proper now to make 
statements on another matter?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will inform the Senator the Senate 
is still in executive session.

                          ____________________