[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 207 (Friday, December 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S19185-S19195]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 CONFEREES HAVE FAILED TO PROTECT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF INTERNET USERS

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, on another matter, 2 weeks ago I came to 
the Senate floor to urge my colleagues who are telecommunications 
conferees not to adopt potentially unconstitutional legislation in our 
efforts to protect children on the Internet. I was concerned about the 
substantial chilling effect this legislation would have on 
constitutionally protected speech. The media had just reported recently 
an online service provider's censorship of the word ``breast'' because 
it was vulgar, supposedly, despite the fact that that term merely 
refers to a part of the anatomy. 

[[Page S19186]]

  I was and remain concerned that this is the first word of many that 
will ultimately be censored if legislation criminalizing indecent 
speech is passed as part of the telecommunications legislation. It 
seems the conferees have agreed upon a variation of the Communications 
Decency Act for inclusion in the conference report for the 
telecommunications legislation.
  Mr. President, the language very simply would criminalize indecent 
speech via the Internet that is already today protected in other forms 
of the media. Vagueness associated with the definition of indecency 
undoubtedly, Mr. President, will lead to far more censorship than 
simply the word ``breast.''
  Mr. President, these measures, although perhaps well-intended, are 
poorly targeted to the stated problem. And they will do very little to 
protect children. If signed into law however, it is very clear that 
this legislation will be very effective at censoring constitutionally 
protected speech on the Internet.
  As I pointed out before, I am extremely concerned about recent 
congressional focus on ``indecent speech.'' The promoters of this 
legislation contend they are trying to protect children from 
obscenity--not indecency but obscenity. The transmission of obscenity 
is already a violation of criminal law. Use of the word or definition 
for ``indecency'' makes this legislation overly broad, capturing speech 
that I do not think many Senators intend or wish to prohibit.
  Let me give my colleagues an example. The World Wide Web Page for 
HotWired, the online version of Wired magazine contains a strongly 
worded editorial about congressional action on the pending indecency 
legislation. The opinion piece contained at least three ``indecent'' 
words, based on FCC's current definition, and potentially more 
depending on the definition used by others.
  I am not going to say these words on the floor of the U.S. Senate, 
Mr. President, but this editorial is a political speech, with Members 
of Congress and Senators as its target.
  Are the words of this piece harsh? Yes, they are. Will some adults 
consider the words offensive? Yes, they will. Does the text contain 
words many of us would not want our children to read? Yes, it does.
  But does the text contain words that most children have not heard 
before in the school yard? No, it does not. It does not contain 
anything unusual in that regard.
  Is the language in this piece, this alleged profanity in this piece, 
protected by the first amendment? Yes, it is. You bet it is. But would 
the writers or transmitters of these words on the Internet be subject 
to criminal sanctions if the pending legislation passes?
  I am afraid, Mr. President, the answer is probably yes.
  Because even though the words do not fall under the definition of 
``obscenity,'' and even though you may express these words in any other 
media and probably be safe from criminal prosecution, under this 
proposal in the telecommunications bill, these words would probably be 
defined as indecent and the person who communicates them may be subject 
to severe criminal penalties.
  I give this example to point out that the legislation considered by 
the telecommunications conference committee in its most recent 
incarnation is overly broad. It will result in censorship, either self-
censorship driven out of the fear of criminal prosecution, or 
censorship by online providers themselves who must protect themselves 
from criminal liability.
  America Online's censorship of the word ``breast'', an anatomical 
reference, was only the beginning. Mr. President, either type of 
censorship is completely unacceptable and totally unnecessary.
  The Internet indecency legislation currently under consideration is 
overly broad, not just in the material covered by the proposed 
language, but also in the way that such materials are covered. The 
language would subject anyone who ``displays in a manner available'' to 
minors so-called indecent materials to criminal penalties.
  While the proponents of the language are intending to target those 
who directly provide such materials to minors, it captures a much 
larger group of people, Mr. President. The term ``available'' has an 
entirely different meaning in cyberspace than it does in other forms of 
media. That is because online communications are entirely different 
than communications over other media.
  The words ``displays in a manner available'' captures speech over 
public bulletin boards, USENET groups or World Wide Web Pages that are 
accessible to anyone with a modem, an Internet connection and the right 
software. There is no way to know, Mr. President, who will read the 
message you have posted on these forums or how old that person is, just 
like there is no way for HotWired to know who on my staff accessed the 
editorial on their Home Page or the age of that staff person.
  Simply posting a message which contains profanity on free public 
access Internet forums expose Internet users to criminal liability if a 
minor accesses those forums--even if the sender had no intention at all 
of providing these materials to minors.
  Let me provide my colleagues with some other examples of some of the 
socially valuable public forums that one can access on the Internet 
that may contain indecent speech under the definition in the 
telecommunications bill.
  One news group called ``news.newusers.questions'' had the following 
message posted by an individual:

       I need urgent information on the prevention of teenage 
     pregnancy. Could someone please help me?

  There was no indication the sender of this message was a minor. The 
sender could be an educator, a parent or a social service provider. One 
reader responded electronically and suggested this individual access a 
news group called ``alt.parenting.solutions'' and 
``alt.parents.teens,'' both of which address the issue in responsible 
ways. Another reader responded simply with the advice that teens should 
abstain from sex.
  Presumably, there will ultimately be a response from a reader that 
gives explicit rather than general advice. That advice could contain 
indecent language or explicit words describing preventive measures. 
Under this proposal in the telecommunications bill, that advice could 
land the giver of the advice in jail if a minor happens to read the 
message.
  Another news group called ``misc.kids.pregnancy'' contained a 
discussion about breastfeeding, pregnancy, and other adult topics 
relating to childbirth. Again, some of the language in these 
discussions was explicit but in no way irresponsible.
  There is a World Wide Web Page called ``Go Ask Alice'' which is a 
forum wherein participants ask questions about sexuality, including 
pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS, birth control, breast 
implants, rape, menopause and reproductive health. Many of these topics 
and questions are sexually explicit and contain graphic, but 
constitutionally protected, language.
  Another Web page is called ``Truth or Dare: Sex in the 90's.'' This 
Web page was a forum devoted almost entirely to the topic of ``safe 
sex.'' One topic discussed was the relationship between some sexually 
transmitted diseases and cervical cancer in women. Some of the 
information on this Web page, while it may be distasteful and offensive 
to some, it is important to many users of this forum.
  There is also a Web page devoted to prostate cancer--its symptoms, 
detection, and treatment. There is language on this page, Mr. 
President, that could be considered indecent. Recall that America 
Online censored the word ``breast'' because it was on a list of vulgar 
words, even though the word was used in the scientific context of 
breast cancer survivors forum.
  There are Web pages devoted to the detection and prevention of child 
abuse, including sexual assault. For example, the Sexual Assault 
Information Page includes a variety of information about abuse as well 
as access to other Web pages and Internet services dealing with child 
abuse and assault recovery, such as the Survivors and Victims Empowered 
Web Page. The SAVE Page is an online support service for victims of 
abuse, or the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network. There is also a 
USENET group, accessible to anyone, called ``alt.sexual.abuse'' which 
is a recovery support forum for those who were abused as children or 
adults. 

[[Page S19187]]

  There may be so-called indecent speech in all of these forums which 
minors can access. Make no mistake about it, many of these forums 
contain adult topics of a mature nature. Some of the language is 
offensive. However, these forums do serve a valuable social function 
from the standpoint of public health and safety.
  Mr. President, the material on these forums is not what the 
congressional proponents of the indecency legislation are targeting, or 
at least I assume they are not. Proponents are targeting obscenity and 
pornography. Unfortunately, the legislation will capture speech on all 
the forums I have mentioned and thousands more like them. If the 
pending legislation passes, these forums may cease to exist because the 
users will fear criminal prosecution.


        Less Restrictive Means are Available to Protect Children

  There is a better way to protect children, Mr. President, that will 
not criminalize constitutionally protected speech. Currently there are 
many software programs available to parents, sometimes for no charge, 
which allow them to screen out or block their children's access to 
forums where explicit language is used, including profanity. ``Net 
Nanny'' prevents children from accessing areas on the Internet that the 
parents deem inappropriate, and also prevents kids from giving out 
their names, addresses, phone numbers, credit card numbers or other 
information that could put them in harms way.
  Parents can screen out not only indecency but also Websites that 
include rap music, violent topics, hate speech, political topics, or 
other types of information that they don't want their children to see. 
Parents have the option of screening as much or as little as they want.
  ``Cybersitter'' allows parents to monitor what their children are 
accessing on the Internet and prevents children from downloading 
pictures or other graphic images. Mr. President, there are many other 
types of software available to parents that allow them to decide what 
is appropriate for their children, based on the characteristics of 
their family and the maturity of their children. That is the role of 
the parent, not of the Federal Government.
  Mr. President, I have spoken in opposition to unconstitutional 
restrictions on speech via the Internet. I have argued that the pending 
legislation is likely unconstitutional. I have argued that the 
legislation is impractical. I have argued that the legislation will not 
achieve its objective. And I have argued that the legislation will 
stifle the growth of online communications technology.
  But, Mr. President, I have received a lot of electronic mail on the 
legislation being considered by the conference committee in recent 
weeks from Wisconsinites, who do use the Internet daily. Rather than 
restate my arguments, I want to let my constituents speak for 
themselves on this issue. Here is what some of them have said:
  A photographer, historian and writer in Madison, WI, says:

       . . . I am deeply concerned that this legislation will 
     overreach its intended purpose. Instead of simply protecting 
     children, this legislation will be so restrictive of 
     communication via e-mail, list service, the World Wide Web, 
     etc, that it will prevent adults from conducting perfectly 
     legitimate exchanges of information. . . . I conduct a great 
     deal of business communication via the Internet and I am 
     fearful about what this latest ill-conceived legislation will 
     do.

  A father from Madison, WI writes:

       It concerns me that certain politicians may take advantage 
     of fears held by the public to enact laws that limit our 
     freedom of speech. I myself am a parent and am concerned 
     about some of the trashier content that can be found on the 
     internet. However, I feel that each of us has the right and 
     the responsibility to discern good from bad in our own minds. 
     I raise my son to make good choices in his life . . . I 
     desire to protect him for harm but I would not insulate him 
     from the world and lock him in ignorance . . . the government 
     should never limit his access to the truth.

  An e-mail from a Milwaukee constituent stated:

       I strongly urge you to consider other less restrictive 
     means for regulating access to objectionable material by 
     minors such as placing the responsibility in the hands of the 
     parents, where it belongs, not by forcing unconstitutional 
     censorship on the medium.

  From Shorewood, WI, a parent writes:
       I am a voting, tax-paying adult U.S. citizen. I am also a 
     church going parent. I feel that it is unacceptable that I 
     could be convicted of a felony for sending a love-letter to 
     my wife. I feel it equally unacceptable that an unenforceable 
     legal regulation of morality infringes upon my right to 
     govern what my daughter may or may not see based on some 
     narrow-minded and likely unconstitutional definition of 
     indecency, especially when technological means of controlling 
     her access are available to me now.

  From Appleton, WI, an Internet-using constituent says:

       We all know that the best parental censor to TV is the on-
     off button. Well, I and many others have installed our own 
     button on the computer. My choice is a program called 
     KidSafe. This program identifies and shows how to lock out 
     adult sites. Indeed a parent can lock out almost anything. . 
     . . I want to tell you that this program is free. And there 
     are all kinds of links to it all over the Web. The cost? A 
     few minutes to download and install it. I count myself among 
     the more conservative citizens. However, I believe some of my 
     co-believers have gone too far.
       The attempt by any governmental or quasi-governmental body 
     to come into the newsroom and rule on what shall and what 
     shall not be printed in the paper would be shouted down by 
     the populace as naked aggressive censorship. In this case, 
     the computer replaces newsprint, ink and delivery system. 
     Fundamentally though, it's no different.

  From Reedsburg, WI, an employee of an Internet access provider 
writes:

       To enact a law such as the one that just passed the House 
     is paramount to going after manufacturers of baseball bats 
     because someone decided to beat his next door neighbor . . . 
     with one.
       The farmers in our community use the Internet to access the 
     University of Wisconsin Ag Department . . . Many of our small 
     businesses use it to communicate with customers around the 
     world. Grocery stores and vendors are using the Web to e-mail 
     product orders to vendors. The uses are growing. Please don't 
     stifle growth.

  An Appleton resident suggested that:

       The pending legislation is akin to asking telephone 
     companies to monitor all of their phone traffic in order to 
     prevent obscene calls.

  From Fox Point WI, a constituent writes that:

       We are all familiar with government intervention and 
     unintended consequences. In this instance, the consequences 
     are clear and devastating to a free and open exchange.

  A university professor in Wausau, WI, e-mailed:

       Although the intent [of the computer indecency legislation] 
     is a noble one, the consequences of the bill, if passed, 
     could have a disastrous effect on the Internet as a viable 
     medium for expression, education and commerce. Libraries will 
     not be able to put their entire collections on line and 
     people like me will risk massive fines and prison sentences 
     for public discussions someone might consider indecent.

  A Hudson, WI, parent shared this advice for Congress and other 
parents:

       I've always believed that people should take responsibility 
     for what their children view. This is why my children cannot 
     access the Internet without my consent. They don't have the 
     password. It's that simple.

  From Plymouth, WI, a pastor in a United Church of Christ Congregation 
writes:

       I am concerned about pornography and ``cybersex'' but this 
     [legislation] isn't the direction we should be heading. 
     Personal responsibility needs to be taken and how can that be 
     legislated?

  Mr. President, there is a lot of wisdom coming from our constituents 
on this matter. These are people who are using the technology to 
contact their Senators and Representatives instead of pencil and paper. 
Unlike many of us here, they rely on cybercommunications in their daily 
lives. I think my colleagues would do well to listen to their advice.
  While, I recognize it is unlikely in these late stages of the 
telecommunications conference that conferees will change their 
direction on regulating cyberspace, I urge my colleagues to think 
carefully about this legislation.
  Including this language in a bill that purports to deregulate 
telecommunications markets is exactly the wrong direction to take.
  Mr. President, constituents in my State, parents and others are very 
concerned about the overbreadth of these provisions, the fact that it 
may inhibit their ability to communicate in their work or in their own 
private lives.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Indiana.
  
[[Page S19188]]


TREATY WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION 
           OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE START II TREATY)

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, will the Chair please state the pending 
business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the START II treaty.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following 
staff members be accorded the privilege of the floor during 
consideration by the Senate of the START II treaty: Kenneth A. Myers 
III, Linton Brooks, a CNA fellow in my office and K. A. Myers, Jr., a 
professional staff member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
Ronald Marks, legislative fellow on the majority leader's staff.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to join once again with my 
colleague, Senator Claiborne Pell, in bringing before the Senate a 
strategic arms reduction agreement negotiated between the Russian 
Federation and the United States--the START II Treaty. Senator Pell and 
I collaborated on the ratification process attendant to the START I 
Treaty, and it is only fitting that Senator Pell will be handling the 
manager's task for the Democratic side on the START II Treaty.
  The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has 
asked me to manage these treaty deliberations on the Republican side, 
and I am pleased to do so.
  For the benefit of our colleagues who may be curious as to the 
schedule on a Friday afternoon before Christmas, let me outline how we 
will proceed in these deliberations on the START II Treaty.
  Following opening statements by the two managers, we will entertain 
similar statements by other Members.
  We will then move to consideration of any amendments to the text of 
the treaty itself. Senator Pell and I are aware of no proposed 
amendments to alter the treaty text.
  Then the Senate will move to consideration of the resolution of 
ratification that will reflect the terms by which the Senate is 
providing its advice and its decision to the President regarding 
ratification of the START II Treaty. In reporting the START II Treaty 
to the full Senate by a unanimous vote of 18-0, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee approved a resolution of ratification that 
contained a number of conditions and declarations.
  Subsequent to the filing of the Committee's report on the START II 
Treaty, interested Senators from other committees came together in a 
bipartisan spirit to try to develop some consensus on other conditions 
and declarations that would either modify or be added to the resolution 
of ratification approved by the Foreign Relations Committee. That 
effort at consensus-building has been successful, and I want to thank 
Senator Stevens, Senator Kyl, Senator Cochran, Senator Pell, Senator 
Levin, and Senator Nunn for the constructive manner in which they 
approached the resolution of ratification. As a result of their 
efforts, we have arrived at a package of amendments that enjoys the 
support of Members participating in those negotiations. That package 
will be offered in the form of manager's amendments as modifications or 
additions to the original resolution reported by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.
  That resolution of ratification, as amended, will then be open to 
further debate and amendment.
  Mr. President, I have elaborated somewhat on the process we will 
employ in considering this treaty so that Members might plan their 
schedules accordingly. Unfortunately, we have not been able to arrive 
at a time agreement for considering the treaty, but I hope these 
remarks will give Members some sense as to how the Senate will proceed 
in carrying out its duties in the treaty-making process.
  Mr. President, the START II Treaty has been awaiting action by the 
Senate for over 2 years. The opportunity has now arrived for the Senate 
to play its role in the treaty-making process, and I am grateful to 
those of my colleagues who have worked so diligently to provide the 
conditions under which the Senate can consent to the ratification of 
this treaty.
  The START I Treaty was the first arms control agreement that actually 
reduced the number of strategic offensive weapons. It mandated an 
overall strategic nuclear force reduction of about one-third, and a 
reduction of up to 50 percent in one of the most dangerous and 
destabilizing categories of nuclear weapons--heavy ICBM's. START I also 
broke new ground in establishing effective verification regimes by 
providing levels of visibility and confidence that exceeded any 
previous nuclear arms control effort. Thus, the START I Treaty was a 
vigorous step toward a more stable nuclear balance because it resulted 
in a reduction in the numbers of destabilizing first strike systems; it 
fostered greater reliance on more survivable nuclear systems; and it 
provided increased certainty about the other side's strategic posture. 
In December 1994, these gains were formalized with the entry into force 
of the START I Treaty.
  The disintegration of the Soviet Union offered the opportunity to 
build on the gains of START I and to go even further in reducing the 
nuclear dangers to our Nation. The START II Treaty accomplishes just 
this purpose. When enacted, this treaty will dramatically reduce the 
numbers of weapons in the two most destabilizing and dangerous 
categories of nuclear arsenals--ICBM's with multiple independently 
targeted reentry vehicles [MIRV's] and the last of the heavy ICBM's, 
the SS-18's; and it will enable each party to reduce its strategic 
arsenal on the basis of an effective verification regime built upon 
both confidence building measures and intrusive inspections. Both 
parties will be left at rough equivalence in strategic forces, but the 
result will be smaller, more stable strategic nuclear forces for both 
the United States and Russia.
  The START I Treaty was signed as a bilateral agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991, after 9 years of 
negotiation. The treaty was transmitted to the Senate for its advice 
and consent to ratification on November 25, 1991, but the Soviet Union 
dissolved formally on December 25, 1991, before the Senate could take 
action or the treaty could enter into force.
  The breakup of the Soviet Union created a number of complex state 
succession issues with respect to the treaty. The most important of 
these issues was that strategic offensive nuclear weapons were left 
deployed in four former Soviet republics.
  In order to resolve this key succession problem, the START I Treaty 
was converted into a multilateral treaty among the United States, 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan by means of the May 23, 1992, 
Lisbon Protocol (Treaty Doc. 102-32).
  The Protocol constituted an amendment to, and integral part of, the 
START I Treaty. It provided that the four former Soviet republics would 
together assume the legal obligations of the U.S.S.R. for the START I 
Treaty. It further obligated the four states to make arrangements among 
themselves as necessary to implement the treaty's limitations, to 
permit verification of the treaty's provisions on their territory, and 
to allocate costs. The Lisbon Protocol also obligated Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Kazakhstan to accede to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NPT as nonnuclear weapons states as soon as possible.
  In letters submitted with the Protocol, Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan pledged to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic 
offensive arms on their respective territory within 7 years after entry 
into force of the START I Treaty. To date, all tactical nuclear weapons 
have been removed from the three states and transferred to Russia. 
While Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were under no legal obligation 
to transfer any nuclear weapons to Russia, and could have, at least in 
theory, eliminated such weapons on their own territories, those 
remaining strategic nuclear weapons are, in fact, being transferred and 
eliminated in Russia.
  Based on the clarifications and obligations associated with the 
Lisbon Protocol, the Senate provided its advice and consent to 
ratification of the START I Treaty in a 93 to 6 vote on October 1, 
1992. 

[[Page S19189]]

  The treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, or the START II Treaty, was signed by the United States and the 
Russian Federation on January 3, 1993, and was transmitted by President 
Bush to the Senate on January 15, 1993.
  The START II Treaty builds upon and goes even further than the START 
I Treaty. START II's central limits require the parties to reduce their 
strategic offensive arms so that specified limits are reached by the 
year 2003. The START II Treaty, together with the START I Treaty, will 
reduce both nations' deployed strategic offensive arms by more than 
two-thirds, and will completely eliminate land-based intercontinental 
ballistic missiles [ICBM's] deployed with multiple warheads. Strict, 
lower limits will be imposed on all deployed strategic offensive arms, 
including warheads carried on ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles [SLBM's], and heavy bombers. Stabilized sea-based forces will 
be retained but will carry significantly lower numbers of warheads. In 
contrast to the START I Treaty, all heavy bombers will be attributed 
with warheads based on the number of nuclear weapons for which they are 
actually equipped.
  There are five parties to the START I Treaty; in contrast, the START 
II Treaty is bilateral: the United States and the Russian Federation 
are its only parties. According to the Lisbon Protocol, no nuclear 
warheads or deployed strategic offensive arms will be located on former 
Soviet territories other than Russia, at the time the first phase of 
the reductions in this treaty are required to be completed. 
Nevertheless, the START II Treaty draws upon the START I Treaty for 
definitions, counting rules, prohibitions, and verification provisions 
and only modifies those as necessary to meet unique requirements of the 
START II Treaty.
  The terms of the START II Treaty are based on the joint understanding 
signed between the United States and Russia on June 17, 1992. Its 
impetus was the desire to strengthen stability by eliminating the most 
destabilizing systems remaining under the START I Treaty. The joint 
understanding established the START II Treaty guidelines.
  The START II Treaty, unlike START I, is relatively brief and 
straightforward. The START II Treaty calls for reductions, in two 
phases, in ICBM's, ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, SLBM's, SLBM 
launchers, SLBM warheads, heavy bombers, and heavy bomber nuclear 
armaments. Seven years after entry into force of the START I Treaty, 
the aggregate number for each party shall not exceed 4,250 deployed 
strategic warheads. By the same date the following sublimits are to be 
reached as well: between 3,800 and 4,250, for the aggregate number of 
warheads on deployed ICBM's, deployed SLBM's, and deployed heavy 
bombers; 2,160, for warheads on deployed SLBM's; 1,200, for warheads on 
deployed multiple-warhead ICBM's; and 650, for warheads on deployed 
Russian heavy ICBM's (SS-18s).
  Upon the completion of the above reductions during the second and 
final phase, the parties shall further reduce their strategic offensive 
arms so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the 
aggregate number for each party shall not exceed 3,500 deployed 
strategic warheads. By the same date the following sublimits would also 
apply: between 3,000 and 3,500, for the aggregate number of warheads on 
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM's, and deployed heavy bombers; between 
1,700 and 1,750, for warheads on deployed SLBM's; Zero, for warheads on 
deployed multiple-warhead ICBM's; and Zero, for warheads on deployed 
heavy ICBM's.
  The START II Treaty provides that after January 1, 2003, neither 
party may deploy land-based missiles with more than one warhead and all 
heavy ICBM's must be destroyed. Specifically, all launchers of ICBM's 
to which more than one warhead is attributed under article III of this 
Treaty, including test and training launchers, must either by destroyed 
or be converted to launchers of ICBM's to which no more than one 
warhead is attributed. This will require the United States to eliminate 
or convert Peacekeeper ICBM's and their launchers. The Russians will 
have to eliminate or convert SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM launchers, except 
those that contain the permitted number of SS-19's downloaded to a 
single-warhead configuration. Also exempt from this provision are 
launchers of non-heavy ICBM's located at space launch facilities that 
are permitted under the START I Treaty. For the United States, this 
means the Peacekeeper can be used as a vehicle for space launch. All 
SS-18 ICBM launchers, including all those at space launch facilities, 
must be physically destroyed. There is one exception--90 deployed 
launchers may be converted, under agreed provisions, to single-warhead 
SS-25 type ICBM launchers with canisters no more than 2.5 meters in 
diameter, such that rapid reconversion is effectively precluded.
  All United States Minuteman III ICBM's, and 105 of the 170 Russian 
SS-19 ICBM's, may be retained and downloaded to one warhead pursuant to 
article III of this Treaty. Any number of SLBM's with multiple warheads 
may also be downloaded by up to four warheads per missile. Thus, the 
United States could theoretically meet the numerical constraints of the 
START II Treaty on SLBM warheads by downloading and retaining up to 18 
Trident submarines with missile warhead loads reduced from eight 
warheads to four.
  The START I Treaty requires that 154 of the 308 former Soviet heavy 
ICBM launchers must be destroyed by the end of the 7-year reduction 
period. The START II Treaty goes further and requires the elimination 
or physical conversion of all heavy ICBM launchers. The Russian 
Federation will be allowed to convert, under agreed constraints and 
subject to inspection, 90 of these deployed missile launchers within 
which only SS-25 single-warhead ICBM's may be deployed. The remaining 
64 heavy ICBM launchers must be destroyed by the end of the second 
phase of reductions in accordance with START II Treaty procedures. The 
constraints on SS-18 silo conversion require that the Russians pour 
concrete to a height of five meters above the silo base and mount in 
the upper portion of the silo a restrictive ring that is smaller in 
diameter than the diameter of the SS-18. These modifications preclude 
an SS-18 from being launched from these silos, and would be extremely 
difficult and time-consuming to reverse. The constraints also require 
the destruction of all deployed and nondeployed SS-18 missiles and 
their launch canisters.
  In the START II Treaty, all deployed heavy bomber nuclear armaments 
will be counted according to how the bombers are actually equipped. 
Each deployed heavy bomber--except for 100 bombers reoriented to a 
conventional role--will be attributed with the aggregate number of 
long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, nuclear-armed air-to-
surface missiles with ranges of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear 
gravity bombs for which it is actually equipped. Under this agreement, 
heavy bombers will be attributed with a realistic number of warheads 
that reflects operational considerations; in many cases, this number 
may be lower than the maximum number of weapons that could be 
physically loaded on the aircraft using all available attachment 
points. In addition, each party may reorient 100 of its heavy bombers 
to a conventional role; these bombers were never accountable under the 
START I Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCM's. 
Such bombers would not count toward START II warhead ceilings, but 
would continue to count against the START I Treaty limits.
  Each party may, on a one-time basis, return such bombers back to a 
nuclear role, if it wishes. If some, but not all, bombers within a 
specific type or variant, under the START I Treaty, are reoriented to a 
conventional role, they must be given a difference observable by 
national technical means from the bombers within that type or variant 
that remain in a nuclear role. Likewise, if a bomber that has been 
reoriented to a conventional role is subsequently returned to a nuclear 
role, it must receive an observable difference from other heavy bombers 
of the same type and variant.
  The START I Treaty provisions will be used to verify the START II 
Treaty's limits, except as otherwise provided. The START II Treaty 
provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination of heavy 
ICBM's and 

[[Page S19190]]
their launch canisters, as well as additional inspections to confirm 
the conversions of heavy ICBM silo launchers. In addition, the START II 
Treaty provides for exhibitions and inspections to observe the number 
of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers are actually equipped and 
their relevant observable differences.
  The START II Treaty requires the elimination or conversion of 
launchers of deployed ICBM's with multiple warheads. To reinforce this 
limitation, the acquisition of such weapons from another state is 
prohibited after the second phase of reductions. After that date, the 
START II Treaty also prohibits the production, flight-testing--except 
from space launch facilities--or deployment of ICBM's to which more 
than one warhead is attributed. The parties are obligated under the 
treaty not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more 
warheads than it has been attributed under the START II Treaty. Also, 
the parties are obligated not to transfer heavy ICBM's to any other 
state, including any other party to the START I Treaty. The START II 
Treaty provides that this last prohibition is to be applied 
provisionally from the date of signature of the START II Treaty. This 
has no effect on the United States since there are no U.S. heavy 
ICBM's.
  To provide a forum for discussion of implementation of the START II 
Treaty, the treaty establishes the bilateral implementation commission 
[BIC]. Through the BIC, the parties can resolve questions of compliance 
and agree upon additional measures to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of the treaty.

  The START II Treaty will enter into force upon the exchange of 
instruments or ratification by the parties. However, since the START II 
Treaty is built upon the START I Treaty, it could not have entered into 
force prior to the START I Treaty's entry into force in December 1994. 
It will remain in force as long as the START I Treaty remains in force.
  The START II Treaty consists of the main treaty text and three 
documents which are integral parts thereof:

       The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy 
     ICBM's and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo 
     Launchers of Heavy ICBM's Relating to the Treaty Between the 
     United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
     Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
     Arms--the Elimination and Conversion Protocol;
       The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy 
     Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--the Exhibitions and 
     Inspections Protocol; and
       The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and 
     Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United 
     States of America and the Russian Federation on Further 
     Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--the 
     Memorandum on Attribution.

  Also submitted to the Senate for its information are documents that 
are associated with, but not integral parts of, the START II Treaty. 
These include three exchanges of letters by the sides addressing SS-18 
missiles on the territory of Kazakhstan, heavy bomber armaments, and 
heavy ICBM silo conversion. Although not submitted for the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are relevant to 
the consideration of the START II Treaty.
  The first exchange of letters relates to the negotiation of an 
agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding SS-18 missiles and 
launchers on the territory of Kazakhstan. In his December 29, 1992, 
response to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's commitment of December 
29, 1992, to spare no effort to conclude such an agreement, Secretary 
of State Eagleburger confirmed that the START II Treaty would be 
submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent on the 
understanding that the agreement referred to by Minister Kozyrev--
providing for the movement to Russia and elimination of heavy ICBM's 
from Kazakhstan--would be signed and implemented, and that, not later 
than 7 years after entry into force of the START I Treaty, all deployed 
and nondeployed heavy ICBM's now located on the territory of Kazakhstan 
will have been moved to Russia where they and their launch canisters 
will have been destroyed.
  The second exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and December 31, 
1992, between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Russian Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev relates to heavy bombers, and constitutes the 
assurance of the United States, during the duration of the START II 
Treaty, never to have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber 
than the number specified in the memorandum on attribution for that 
type or variant. This letter creates no new legal obligation for the 
United States but merely reiterates the obligation already assumed 
under paragraph 3 of article IV of the START II Treaty.
  The third exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and January 3, 
1993, between Russian Minister of Defense Grachev and Secretary of 
Defense Cheney, sets forth a number of assurances on Russian intent 
regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers of RS-20--
referred to by the U.S. as SS-18--heavy ICBM's. In his letter, which is 
politically binding on Russia, Minister Grachev reaffirms the steps 
that Russia will take to convert these silos and assures the Secretary 
of Defense that missiles of the SS-25 type will be deployed in these 
converted silos.
  In January 1992, President Bush proposed to ban land-based MIRVed 
ICBM's and to cap actual warheads at 4,700, while cutting U.S. Trident 
warheads by one-third. President Yeltsin agreed with the ban, but 
wanted deeper cuts to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. President Yeltsin 
considered the Bush proposal too inequitable because it cut the 
Russians where they were the strongest, the land-based MIRVed systems, 
while letting the U.S. retain its supremacy in bombers and submarines. 
In addition, the Russians would lose considerable forces in 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The breakthrough came when the United 
States agreed to reductions in its submarine-based ballistic missile 
warheads. On June 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed a joint 
understanding in Washington that called for a treaty on deep cuts. The 
joint understanding paved the way for the conclusion of the START II 
Treaty.


                ASSESSMENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

  The U.S. START II negotiating position was based on a Joint Chiefs of 
Staff assessment of how many and what kind of nuclear forces were 
necessary to retain a credible deterrent force beyond the year 2003. 
The logic at the time, and during the negotiations, was to reduce the 
numbers of warheads but to preserve a balanced force--a mix of ICBM's, 
SLBM's, and bombers sufficient in size and capability to meet future 
U.S. deterrent requirements. It was the JCS view, that with the 3,500 
warheads allowed under this treaty, the United States would remain 
capable of holding at risk a broad enough range of high value political 
and military targets to deter any rational adversary from launching a 
nuclear attack against the United States or against its allies.
  In September 1994, the United States completed the nuclear posture 
review [NPR]--an effort chartered to determine what roles its nuclear 
forces must meet to protect against future challenges to U.S. national 
security interests. The NPR assumed the post-START II nuclear force 
levels and its analysis reconfirmed the calculations that were done 
before and during the negotiations for START II. The review reaffirmed 
both that the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent in 
the post-cold war world and that 3,500 warheads will be sufficient to 
hold at risk those assets which any foreseeable enemy would most 
value--the core determinant of effective deterrence.
  More specifically, the JCS concluded that the START II/NPR force is 
sufficient to prevent any foreseeable enemy from achieving his war aims 
against the United States or its allies, no matter how a nuclear attack 
against the United States is designed. In practice, this means that 
U.S. nuclear forces must be robust enough to sustain the ability to 
support an appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable range of 
response options, even in the event of a powerful first strike that 
attempts to disarm U.S. nuclear forces. The JCS analysis shows that, 
even under the worst conditions, the START II force levels provide 
enough survivable 

[[Page S19191]]
forces, and survivable, sustained command and control to accomplish 
U.S. targeting objectives.
  This force will consist of 14 Trident submarines equipped with the D-
5 missile system, 66 B-52 bombers, 20 B-2 bombers, and 450-500 
Minuteman III missiles. When the START II reductions are completed, 
United States strategic forces will be roughly equivalent to those of 
Russia and will be sufficient to meet our deterrent requirements.


                            Crisis Stability

  The START II Treaty builds upon the accomplishments of START I by 
further reducing strategic arms in a way that increases crisis 
stability. START II does this by eliminating the most destabilizing 
nuclear weapons--land based MIRVed ICBM's and heavy ICBM's.
  In the past, with MIRVed ICBM's a significant part of the forces of 
both sides, there was much greater incentive to shoot first during a 
crisis. The inherent vulnerability of land-based missiles to a first 
strike, compounded by the consideration of losing the multiple warheads 
on MIRVed missiles, argued for launching these weapons before they 
could be disabled by an enemy strike. Thus, according to the JCS 
analysis, eliminating this entire category of nuclear weapons relieves 
the incentive to launch first, adding greatly to crisis stability. 
START II also eliminates the last of the heavy ICBM's--the remaining 
Russian SS-18's--which are hostage to the same logic and are therefore 
equally destabilizing in a crisis.
  In addition to eliminating these two kinds of systems, the JCS 
concluded that the restructuring of the U.S. triad made under the terms 
of this treaty will improve stability in its own right. The U.S. START 
II ICBM leg will be a less attractive target than has been the case in 
the past. All remaining ICBM's will have single warheads; making them 
less valuable targets than MIRVed missiles. But, in addition, the 
combined calculus of rough equivalency in overall warheads between the 
United States and Russia, and the fact that all remaining ICBM's will 
be equipped with single warheads, will make it highly unlikely that 
Russia will consider launching an effective first strike to disarm 
United States ICBM's. According to the JCS analysis, under the warhead 
calculus of this treaty, to achieve the levels of confidence needed to 
disarm this one leg of the United States triad would require such a 
high proportion of Russia's overall warheads that this course would 
leave the attacker at a serious disadvantage. By any rational 
calculation, the costs would greatly outweigh any potential gains. The 
second leg of the U.S. triad will consist of SLBM's, which have long 
been, and will remain the most secure and survivable part of the U.S. 
nuclear force. The third leg will be manned bombers, which have the 
inherent advantage that they can be recalled up to the last minute. The 
JCS concluded that in combination, these systems provide a redundant 
mix of mutually supporting capabilities--in short, a viable, effective 
triad that provides stability during a crisis. This improved crisis 
stability, even as the United States maintains an effective deterrent 
that is militarily sufficient, is the hallmark of the START II Treaty--
it is, in fact, an even more noteworthy goal than the warhead 
reductions themselves.


               Verification and Methods of Restructuring

  The third element of the treaty that the JCS analyzed is compliance 
verification. The JCS analyzed the verification procedures from two 
standpoints: do the verification procedures offer the United States 
confidence that it can effectively verify compliance and detect 
significant violations of the treaty; and do the verification 
procedures provide adequate safeguards for protecting U.S. national 
security against unnecessary or unwarranted intrusion.
  START II builds upon the interlocking and mutually reinforcing 
verification provisions established in START I. Unless otherwise 
specified, the counting rules, notifications, verification, conversion, 
and elimination procedures from START I are used for START II. The 
breakup of the former Soviet Union has not undermined the confidence of 
the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in these procedures. In fact, 
the increased openness of Russian society, and the capabilities of 
America's own national technical means [NTM] are additional factors 
that add to JCS confidence in the United States ability to effectively 
verify. The JCS believe that the verification procedures are adequate 
to ensure that the United States will be able to detect any significant 
violations. Conversely, the JCS also believes that the verification 
provisions are sufficiently restrictive to protect the United States 
against unnecessary intrusion.


                    Reductions through Restructuring

  One notable aspect of the treaty is that it breaks new ground by 
permitting both Russia and the United States to achieve the stipulated 
nuclear reductions by restructuring their current forces. This is an 
improvement over START I because it allows the parties to reduce their 
forces more cost effectively and quickly through a combination of 
hardware elimination, conversions, and downloading. The key to making 
this restructuring possible is the inclusion of some specially designed 
verification procedures that will allow the United States to monitor 
and check compliance.


                              Downloading

  The START II Treaty differs from START I in its provisions for 
reducing nuclear warheads by downloading. In START I, either side could 
remove up to four warheads from a missile, but could only get credit 
for the reduced warhead number if the warhead mounting platform was 
destroyed and replaced--an expensive option. There was also a limit on 
the aggregate number of downloaded warheads permitted for each party. 
START II encourages each side to take greater advantage of downloading. 
For economic reasons, and at United States insistence the warhead 
mounting platforms do not have to be destroyed under START II. The 
advantage for the United States is that this permits Trident sea-based 
missiles to be downloaded cost effectively without the need to replace 
all of their mounting platforms. The treaty also goes beyond the START 
I limit of only crediting the downloading of up to 4 warheads per 
missile, as it permits the downloading of 5 warheads from each of 105 
Russian SS-19 ICBM's as these missiles are converted to a single 
warhead configuration. When both parties are done downloading, all 
remaining missiles will have a single warhead. However, these 
downloading procedures will not be applied to Russia's SS-18 force 
because all SS-18's will be completely eliminated under START II.
  United States confidence in the actual warhead numbers deployed on 
future ICBM's will be based on existing provisions for reentry vehicle 
onsite inspections [RVOSI], coupled with national technical means 
[NTM]. The JCS is confident that the combination of RVOSI and United 
States NTM will provide the means to detect any significant violations 
should the Russians at some time in the future attempt to return their 
missiles to a MIRVed configuration.


                            Silo Conversion

  The treaty also permits the Russians to convert 90 of their SS-18 
silo launchers into launchers for SS-25 single warhead ICBM's. The 
Russians agreed to convert the silos under procedures that preclude 
their later use for SS-18's. The procedures for conversion are 
specifically designed to be both time consuming and difficult to 
reverse. Once the conversions are completed, any attempt to reconvert 
the silos back to a configuration capable of housing heavy ICBM's would 
be readily detected by visual inspections and U.S. NTM. To verify these 
silo conversions, the Russians agreed to more extensive verification 
procedures that the START I Treaty allowed. Additionally, they agreed 
to destroy the SS-18's themselves, including those in Kazakhstan as 
they are returned to Russia. U.S. inspectors will get to observe both 
the silo conversion procedures and the missile eliminations.


                              Heavy Bomber

  The third provision for restructuring is delineated in the details 
for heavy bomber counting and conversion. Under the terms of the 
treaty, the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers with nuclear 
roles, including those equipped with long-range nuclear air-launched 
cruise missiles [ALCMs], will be determined by totaling the number of 
nuclear weapons with which each type of bomber can be 

[[Page S19192]]

equipped. To make this counting determination, each side will have to 
demonstrate to the other side the nuclear weapons configuration of each 
type of bomber that is designated to retain a nuclear mission. In 
addition, the United States obtained Russian agreement that up to 100 
heavy bombers never attributed with long-range nuclear ALCM's may be 
reoriented to conventional missions without having to undergo the 
conversion procedures that applied under START I. These reoriented 
heavy bombers will not be counted under the warhead limits of the START 
II Treaty nor will they be deemed part of the United States nuclear 
force under START II and can be used for nonnuclear, conventional 
missions only. As defined by the treaty, the reoriented bombers will 
have to be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles; they 
will be used only for nonnuclear missions; they will not be used in 
exercises for nuclear missions; and their aircrews will not train or 
exercise for nuclear missions. Currently, the United States plans to 
reorient its B-1's to a conventional role using these START II 
procedures.


                      Force Structure Implications

  START II will require the United States to eliminate its Peacekeeper-
MX MIRVed ICBM force. However, the treaty will not require the United 
States to eliminate any Minuteman MIRVed ICBM's, because they may be 
downloaded from three warheads to one warhead in accordance with 
article III. Similarly, the United States will not have to eliminate 
any Trident submarines or SLBM's that could have been deployed under 
START I. Once again, reduction of SLBM warheads may be accomplished by 
downloading. On the other hand, START II will cause substantial changes 
in the U.S. heavy bomber force. The executive branch concluded in its 
recent nuclear posture review that all B-1B's would be reoriented to a 
conventional role. In addition, B-52 bombers may be equipped with 
either 8 or 12 air-launched cruise missiles, rather than the current 20 
cruise missiles.
  Russian strategic forces will be dramatically affected under the 
START II Treaty. Russia will have to eliminate approximately 250 
strategic ballistic missiles carrying 2,500 warheads. Much of these 
reductions will be achieved by the total elimination of the SS-18 
MIRVed heavy ICBM force--the most potent hard-target kill-capable force 
in the Russian strategic arsenal. Furthermore, because of the MIRV ban 
and the limitations on downloading, Russia will also have to eliminate 
its capable and mobile SS-24 ICBM force--the Russian equivalent of the 
MX.
  The JCS has testified that the START II Treaty offers a significant 
contribution to U.S. national security. Under its provisions, the 
United States achieves the longstanding goal of eliminating both heavy 
ICBM's and the practice of MIRVing ICBM's, thereby significantly 
reducing the incentive for a first strike.
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully assessed the adequacy of 
U.S. strategic forces under START II, and have testified that, with the 
balanced triad of 3,500 warheads that will remain once this treaty is 
implemented, the size and mix of the remaining U.S. nuclear forces will 
support the deterrent and targeting requirements against any known 
adversary and under the worst assumptions. Both American and Russian 
strategic nuclear forces will be suspended at levels of rough 
equivalence; a balance with greatly reduced incentive for a first 
strike. The JCS stated that, by every military measure, START II is a 
sound agreement that will make our Nation more secure. Under its terms, 
U.S. forces will remain militarily sufficient, crisis stability will be 
greatly improved, and the United States can be confident in the ability 
to effectively verify its implementation. This treaty is clearly in the 
best interests of the United States.


                      VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

  The bottom line of the intelligence community's assessment about the 
prospects for monitoring the START II Treaty is that they will be able 
to monitor many--and the most significant--provisions of START II with 
high confidence. In some areas, though, they will have some 
uncertainty.
  The intelligence community was deeply involved in the senior-level 
interagency process that led to the development of U.S. positions 
during the START II negotiations. The intelligence community helped 
design specific Treaty provisions that were included in the treaty to 
complement U.S. monitoring capabilities and thereby inhibit cheating. 
Information resulting from these provisions interacts synergistically 
with data from U.S. national intelligence means to enhance monitoring 
capabilities. For instance, the procedures for converting SS-18 silos 
for use by smaller, single warhead missiles make undetected 
reconversion to SS-18 launchers virtually impossible. The process would 
be time consuming, difficult, expensive, and easily observed. Moreover, 
onsite inspections permit the United States to visit a sample of silos 
of its choosing.


                    Ratification and Implementation

  The steps Russia has taken toward implementing the deep reductions of 
the START I Treaty are significant. Since the Senate last considered 
the START II Treaty in 1993, Russia and Ukraine have largely been able 
to bridge their differences over the control and ultimate disposition 
of the strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Moreover, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have ratified START I and acceded to the 
nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear states, setting the stage for 
START I entry into force on December 5, 1994. Russia is well on the way 
to meeting the reductions of START I and significant progress has been 
made in deactivating missiles in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and 
consolidating strategic nuclear weapons on Russian territory. Russia 
also has completed the destruction of substantial numbers of launchers 
for older missiles, well in advance of the reduction required by START 
I.


                 Monitoring Tasks: General Conclusions

  Under START II the intelligence community will be expected to monitor 
the activities associated with the reduction of Russian strategic 
offensive nuclear forces through January 1, 2003, as well as Russia's 
subsequent adherence to the numerical limits in the treaty. These tasks 
will be in addition to the requirements to monitor activities relative 
to qualitative restrictions on the technical characteristics and 
capabilities of the weapon systems involved, and location restrictions 
contained in the START I Treaty. Finally, the intelligence community is 
charged to detect and correctly interpret any activities that are 
prohibited by either treaty.

  Specific new monitoring tasks under START II include the requirements 
to:
  Monitor warhead reductions to between 3,000 and 3,500, including a 
1,700 and 1,750 sublimit on SLBM warheads.
  Monitor the ban on production, flight-testing, acquisition, and 
deployment of MIRVed ICBM's after January 1, 2003.
  Monitor the conversion of up to 90 SS-18 silos for smaller, SS-25-
type single-warhead ICBM's.
  Monitor the elimination of the remaining SS-18 heavy ICBM silos, and 
of all SS-18 missiles and canisters.
  Monitor up to 105 SS-19 ICBM's that are downloaded to carry only a 
single warhead.
  Monitor the number of nuclear weapons with which Russian heavy 
bombers are actually equipped.
  Determine that heavy bombers reoriented for conventional roles do not 
carry nuclear weapons or train for nuclear missions.


                          Monitoring Judgments

  The intelligence community's monitoring judgments are based on three 
decades of experience collecting against and analyzing Soviet strategic 
forces as well as in monitoring other arms control agreements. More 
specifically, the monitoring judgments are based on:
  Analyses of testing, production, deployment, and operational 
practices as well as engineering assessments of strategic weapon 
systems characteristics.
  The strengths and weaknesses of current and programmed collection 
systems.
  The potential contribution of verification measures contained in the 
two START treaties.
  With regard to monitoring specific limitations in the START II 
Treaty, the intelligence community's confidence will be highest when 
monitoring the mandated restrictions, including the elimination of SS-
18 ICBM's, as well as accounting for the number of deployed strategic 
weapons systems--single-warhead ICBM's, submarine- 

[[Page S19193]]

launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers--that remain in the 
force.
  As all MIRVed ICBM systems are eliminated, the intelligence community 
expects the single-warhead SS-25 road-mobile force to expand and a 
silo-based variant of this missile to be deployed. With the help of 
notification requirements, the intelligence community believes it will 
be able to track the growth of this force.
  The intelligence community will be able to monitor the ban on MIRVed 
ICBM's after 2003 both by tracking the elimination of launchers for 
MIRVed ICBM's and by analyzing the data from flight tests of new 
missiles.
  Since the START I Treaty was signed, Russia and the United States 
have demonstrated telemetry tapes, as called for by the treaty, and 
installed telemetry playback equipment on each other's territory. With 
START I entry into force, the intelligence community is now receiving 
telemetry tapes and associated interpretive data as required under 
treaty provisions.
  Based on the information and equipment provided by Russia, 
intelligence community experts have high confidence that the agreed 
procedures will enable them to process, interpret, and analyze data 
contained in the Russian tapes.
  For some START II monitoring tasks the intelligence community's 
uncertainties will be greater. As it stated in 1992, during the START I 
ratification hearings, monitoring missile production activity is more 
difficult than monitoring reductions and deployed forces.
  At facilities where continuous portal perimeter monitoring is 
conducted, the uncertainties in monitoring future production will be 
low.
  Estimates of missile production at facilities not subject to 
continuous monitoring or onsite inspection, however, will continue to 
be more uncertain.
  An outgrowth of the historical difficulty in monitoring missile 
production is that estimates of the nondeployed missile inventory are 
less certain. Nevertheless, the intelligence community stands by the 
judgment it made in 1992: It does not believe the Russians have 
maintained a large-scale program to store several hundred or more 
undeclared, nondeployed strategic ballistic missiles. It acknowledges, 
however, that it is possible that some undeclared missiles have been 
stored at unidentified facilities.


                       The Potential for Cheating

  With regard to detecting and correctly interpreting prohibited 
activity, the intelligence community examined nearly 40 cheating 
scenarios in 1991 when analyzing their ability to monitor START I. In 
light of START II limitations and bans, they examined additional 
scenarios. In both cases the intelligence community sought to devise 
scenarios that theoretically would be the most feasible and potentially 
interesting to the Russians as well as most challenging to United 
States intelligence capabilities. They consulted with the Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and other experts to make certain that they had 
included those scenarios that would have the most military significance 
to our strategic military planners.
  The cheating scenarios that continue to be the most potentially 
troublesome are those that would involve the covert production and 
storage of mobile missiles and their launchers. START II has neither 
increased nor reduced these concerns.

  The intelligence community continues to doubt that Russia will be 
able to initiate and successfully execute a significant cheating 
program. This confidence is due to United States national technical 
means, verification provisions in the treaty, and to some extent, the 
increased difficulty of keeping Russian Government activities secret.
  Although an effort to hide a small number of weapon systems would be 
almost impossible to detect, the intelligence community judges that it 
would also be of little interest or value to Russia.


                Treaty Provisions to Enhance Monitoring

  Although open-source information is now more abundant and relevant 
than in the past and the intelligence community has an impressive array 
of technical collection systems, it was clear during the negotiations 
of both START treaties that they would encounter significant 
uncertainties in monitoring some provisions if they had to rely only on 
national intelligence means. All START I provisions designed to enhance 
verification, including those that guarantee access to telemetry data 
from ballistic missile flight tests, will continue to apply under START 
II. In addition, START II provides for supplementary onsite inspections 
that will aid United States ability to monitor its unique provisions.
  The value of these treaty provisions for monitoring varies, depending 
on the task. In some cases provisions--particularly those for onsite 
inspections--provide unique opportunities for directly monitoring 
treaty-required activities. In other cases the Russians provide 
detailed information on their forces so that the intelligence community 
need only find an individual discrepancy to identify an ambiguous, or 
perhaps illegal situation. In any case, onsite inspections, 
notifications, and regular data exchanges will facilitate our ability 
to optimize the employment of intelligence collection systems.
  In addition to the START I Treaty's 13 types of inspections, START 
II's new onsite inspection provisions would assist in monitoring 
specific activities:

       The intelligence community would have the right to observe 
     the elimination of all declared SS-18 missile airframes that 
     are not eliminated through launches, as well as all 
     associated launch canisters.
       The intelligence community would have the right to confirm 
     by direct measurement that 5 meters of concrete have been 
     poured into converted SS-18 silos, as well as to observe the 
     entire process of concrete pouring, and to measure the inner 
     diameter of the restrictive ring installed in the upper 
     portion of each silo.
       The intelligence community would have the right to conduct 
     four additional RV inspections per year at converted SS-18 
     silos to confirm the single-RV load of the SS-25-type 
     missile, observe the upper portion of its canister for 
     identification purposes, and confirm the continued presence 
     of the restrictive ring.
       During special heavy bomber exhibitions and all short-
     notice inspections of heavy bombers after the START I 
     baseline period, the intelligence community would have the 
     right to inspect the interiors of weapons bays and external 
     weapons attachment points.

  As the intelligence community stated during the START I hearings, for 
some monitoring tasks it will continue to rely most heavily on 
information acquired from their independent technical sensors. For 
example, neither START treaty requires the exchange of telemetry tapes 
from the flight tests of bombers and cruise missiles, nor do they 
prohibit the encryption of such test data. Moreover, START provisions 
will provide little assistance in detecting prohibited activity at 
locations the Russians do not declare.


  Verification Concepts, Capabilities, and Concerns for Major Treaty 
                                Elements

  Verification of START II will be based largely upon the capabilities 
and provisions designed to verify START I, and generally reflect the 
same assumptions and considerations. The two central elements of START 
II are the elimination of MIRVed ICBM's--including all heavy ICBM's--by 
the year 2003, and deeper reductions in the same basic categories of 
strategic offensive arms as START I. Accordingly, the conceptual basis 
for verification of START II is the same as that for START I. The same 
capabilities and measures that provide for effective verification of 
START I limits on launchers, missiles, and attributable warheads will 
be effective in verifying the lower aggregate limits in START II.


           THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING FOR START II

  The START I Treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994. The 
Department of Defense was ready for entry into force and has been able 
to implement and comply with the extensive START I Treaty. The Military 
Services and Defense Agencies which must implement START II are getting 
invaluable experience right now in implementing the even more complex 
START I Treaty.
  Planning for START II Treaty implementation within the Department of 
Defense began prior to the signature of the treaty in order to ensure 
that the United States will be in compliance at entry into force. In 
November 1992, the USD(A&T) issued DOD guidance which directed all 
Military Services and Defense Agencies to begin planning for START II 
and assigned specific START II implementation guidance with DOD's 
overall approach to implementation planning--centralized oversight and 
decentralized execution--which 

[[Page S19194]]

proved so successful and cost effective during implementation of the 
INF Treaty. The Department of Defense is in the process of updating 
this guidance to the Military Services and Defense Agencies.
  Because of the inherent relationships between START I and START II, 
the DOD START I implementation working group [SIWG] will be used to 
address implementation issues for START II. The SIWG consists of 
representatives of the Military Services and Defense Agencies. The 
SIWG, which first met in August of 1991, meets monthly to review the 
status of preparations within each Military Service and Defense Agency 
to issue planning guidance, assign additional responsibilities, conduct 
reviews, and resolve questions which may arise during planning for, and 
actual implementation of, START I and START II. To date, no major 
issues for START II have been identified which would impact United 
States ability to successfully implement the treaty.
  In addition, the mechanisms for ensuring long-term compliance within 
the Department of Defense will be similar to those used to ensure DOD 
compliance with other arms control treaties. Specifically, the START I 
DOD compliance review group [CRG] will also be the forum for resolving 
any START II DOD compliance issues. The CRG is composed of 
representatives of the USD(A&T), the Under Secretary for Policy 
[USD(P)], the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] and the DOD General Counsel. 
The CRG meets as required to ensure DOD compliance with START I and, 
pending entry into force, START II Treaty compliance.


                POTENTIAL START II IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

  DOD has provided some preliminary estimates of the cost of START II 
implementation. The following assumptions were used in developing these 
estimated implementation costs: The United States will draw down to the 
aggregate limit of no more than 3,500 warheads by January 1, 2003. This 
reduction will include the elimination of all Peacekeeper launchers. 
The costs associated with reducing the number of SLBM warheads assumes 
that the United States will retain 14 Trident submarines but download 
each deployed SLBM to 5 reentry vehicles. The assumptions are based on 
the results of the nuclear posture review [NPR] and do not reflect NPR 
programmatic costs.
  These estimates also assume that the United States will exercise all 
of the START II onsite inspection rights, including those for the 
elimination of all SS-18 missiles and their launch canisters, the 
conversion of 90 SS-18 silos and the four additional reentry vehicle 
onsite inspections [RVSOI] allowed annually at converted SS-18 silos. 
Heavy bomber inspection and protection are included in these figures.
  A preliminary estimate for START II shows that the total costs could 
amount to approximately $201.9 million between 1995 and the end of the 
second treaty reduction phase in 2003. These costs break down as 
follows:

Elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.....................................    42.5
Reduction of deployed SLBM warheads.............................   110.0
ICBM launcher elimination.......................................    14.5
Bomber exhibitions..............................................     1.3
Data reporting..................................................     2.0
Bomber conversion...............................................    10.5
Verification of SS-18 silo conversion...........................    12.6
Verification of missile and launch canister elimination.........     2.8
Verification of rail-mobile ICBM launcher elimination...........     2.9
Additional reentry vehicle inspectors...........................     2.8
                                                                 -------
                                                                        
    Total.......................................................   201.9
                                                                        

  The figures show that the total estimated cost of United States 
compliance activities will be approximately $180.8 million with the 
majority of that--about 61 percent--to be dedicated to deployed SLBM 
warhead reductions. Total START II Treaty verification costs are 
approximately $21.1 million, with the verification of silo conversions 
representing about 60 percent of that total estimate.
  It is important to contrast these relatively small, 8-year costs for 
START II with the START I implementation costs for just fiscal year 
1994 and fiscal year 1995. For this period, the Department of Defense 
budgeted approximately $180 million for the implementation of the START 
I Treaty. This investment is paying off because START I preparations 
formed the basis for START II requirements and will allow the even 
deeper reductions at a relatively moderate cost.
  Two additional inspection and security issues are worthy of mention. 
First, START II does not add any new inspectable facilities in the 
United States--although the portion of Whiteman AFB where B-2s are 
being deployed will be subject to inspection under START II only. This 
will help minimize costs and security concerns. Second, U.S. heavy 
bombers, particularly the B-2, will be subject to more intrusive 
exhibitions and inspections than under the START I Treaty. The START II 
Treaty requires inspections to verify that heavy bombers are not 
actually equipped for more nuclear weapons than declared but also 
allows portions of the heavy bomber not related to making this 
determination to be shrouded, covered. The U.S. Air Force is developing 
an inspection implementation plan that will ensure protection of 
sensitive-classified information during the inspection-exhibition but 
which also will ensure that our treaty obligations are met. The 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I is responsible for providing 
security policy guidance to the DOD components.


                               CONCLUSION

  In conclusion, the START II Treaty is the result of a bipartisan 
effort. Negotiated by a Republican administration and submitted by a 
democratic one. Three Secretaries of State and Defense have supported 
it. START II represents a substantial step forward in attempting to 
codify strategic stability at greatly reduced levels of armaments. 
Final reductions must be completed by January 1, 2003--namely, to 
levels of 3,000 to 3,500 total warheads, 1,750 of those based on 
submarines. It was the Joint Chiefs of Staff view, that with the 3,500 
warheads allowed under this treaty, the United States would remain 
capable of holding at risk a broad enough range of high value political 
and military targets to deter any rational adversary from launching a 
nuclear attack against the United States or against its allies. START 
II removes the most destabilizing segment of nuclear inventories, 
namely MIRV warheads and heavy ICBM's. Elimination also includes all 
deployed heavy ICBM silos and all test and training launchers. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the verification procedures are 
adequate to ensure that the United States will be able to detect any 
significant violations. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also 
believe that the verification provisions are sufficiently restrictive 
to protect the United States against unnecessary intrusion. It is my 
belief that on balance the START II Treaty is in the national security 
interests of the United States.
  I urge my colleagues to consent to its ratification, subject to the 
conditions and declaration contained in the modified resolution of 
ratification.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I support ratification of the START II 
Treaty because it will serve America's national security interests in 
at least three critical respects. First, when fully implemented, START 
II will ban the deployment of all intercontinental ballistic missiles 
with more than one warhead--traditionally these missiles have been the 
mainstay of Russia's nuclear forces. Second, this treaty rectifies a 
dangerous deficiency of the START I Treaty by completely eliminating 
all of Russia's heavy ICBM's. Third, START II creates a managed process 
for nuclear arms reductions. While no one will deny that much of 
Russia's motivation to engage in deeper cuts stems from its economic 
woes, I cannot in good conscience rely solely upon economic forces for 
reassurance that Russia's nuclear arms reductions will be undertaken in 
a sustained or stabilizing fashion.
  START II ensures that Russia will eliminate those weapons of greatest 
concern to the United States, leaving nothing to chance.
  Now of course, Mr. President, there is a quid pro quo for these 
benefits. The effect of the START II Treaty for the United States will 
be the elimination of our MX missile, significant reductions in our 
nuclear bomber fleet, and limits on the number of warheads we can 
deploy on submarine launched ballistic missiles. However, these changes 
do not fundamentally alter the deterrence value of our nuclear forces. 
In 

[[Page S19195]]

fact, reductions under START II will result in a more survivable U.S. 
force structure than what we would have with just the START I Treaty.
  Furthermore, START II preserves the triad of U.S. strategic offensive 
forces. We will continue to rely upon this combination of ICBM's, 
SLBM's, and heavy bombers to complicate any would-be aggressor's attack 
and to offer flexibility in any U.S. nuclear response. In fact, START 
II will improve the viability of the triad by eliminating those 
elements of the Russian force which directly threatened its integrity 
throughout the cod war--namely all of its SS-18 heavy ICBM's and its 
newer, mobile SS-24 ICBM's.
  We should recall that in 1983, the Scowcroft Commission declared: 
``The Soviets now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM 
numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all 
of the 1,047 U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM 
force.'' One of the problems with the START I Treaty was that it did 
little to alleviate this concern. Although it reduced the number of 
deployed SS-18's by one-half, it also reduced the number of U.S. silo-
based ICBM's by roughly half. Thus the ratio of SS-18 warheads to U.S. 
silos remained virtually unchanged. START II fixes this problem.
  Now I would be remiss not to mention several areas where I continue 
to have misgivings. For example, I am concerned that Russia--at some 
point--might upload warheads on its SS-19 missiles, and that they might 
deploy their bombers with more warheads than the treaty allows. I also 
am concerned over the inherent difficulty of tracking mobile missiles. 
Yet even in the most serious cheating scenarios, Russia would be hard-
pressed to achieve a military significant advantage over the United 
States.
  However, we should not enter into this arrangement starry eyed. To 
those who say Russian cheating is implausible, or that Russia lacks the 
motivation to engage in such activities, I only need ask: ``What arms 
control agreement have they not cheated on?'' If the Senate decides to 
ratify START II, we must demand that Russia break with its lackluster 
record of treaty compliance. We should not agree to a new arms control 
measure while at the same time tolerating Russia's ongoing biological 
weapons program, its refusal to implement the bilateral destruction 
agreement for its chemical weapons program, its failure to comply with 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or its persistent 
violation of the ABM Treaty. The burden of proof is upon Russia to 
demonstrate that it is capable of breaking with the arms control 
legacies of the cold war.
  We also must realize the limitations of this arms control treaty. 
START II is bilateral in nature, and does not address the growing 
strategic arsenals of other countries such as China. Neither have we 
heard hide nor hair from this administration regarding United States-
Russia cooperation on ballistic missile defenses as a stabilizing 
complement to the well-structured reductions under START II. I 
therefore will resist any further efforts to reduce U.S. strategic 
nuclear arms to the point where the equilibrium between our strategic 
capability and our targeting requirements is disrupted, or to the point 
where the coherency of any leg of the U.S. nuclear triad is threatened.
  Finally, I am concerned over the reckless abandon with which this 
administration raced to fully implement the START Treaty before it even 
had entered into force. That exuberance created a serious imbalance in 
the sizes of the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. Given the 
deep levels of reductions contemplated under START II, we must proceed 
very cautiously with implementation.
  That said, even with these concerns, START II will enhance 
significantly our national security. The resolution of ratification 
transmitted to the Senate from the Foreign Relations Committee contains 
six conditions and seven declarations that go to the heart of the 
issues I have mentioned here. And even in the event of serious Russian 
noncompliance, the United States will retain a mix of survivable 
nuclear forces more than sufficient to deter Russia. For all of these 
reasons, Mr. President, I reiterate my support for ratification of the 
START II Treaty.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might ask the distinguished 
acting chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee a question or two.
  As you know, the group working with Senator Stevens--and I am part of 
that group--has proposed certain amendments. I want to ask first, 
procedurally, at what time during the course of our deliberations does 
the Senate take up those amendments?
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to answer the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia that after the opening statements by the managers 
and others, then the resolution of ratification that came from the 
Foreign Relations Committee will be the pending business, and 
amendments will be in order at that point.
  Mr. WARNER. I see. I thank the distinguished Senator, Mr. President, 
because I have worked with Senator Stevens and others, and the acting 
chairman recounted those Senators who have been a part of that.
  I think it is very important that those amendments be included in 
this treaty, and, frankly, I think it is wise that we are trying to act 
today so that those amendments and the treaty itself may once again be 
the subject of public comment until such time as we have the 
opportunity to vote on final passage.
  I wish to, Mr. President, commend Senator Stevens for leading this 
group. I just inquired, I say to my colleague from Alaska, about the 
timing of his presentation which I anticipate.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his 
comments and his question. I simply indicate that I share his 
enthusiasm for the package of amendments.
  Senator Stevens has been our leader on the arms control observation 
group in which the distinguished Senator from Virginia and others have 
participated, and it will be my hope that in the event there is no 
controversy surrounding those amendments, they might all be adopted as 
a managers amendment. That would be the procedure that we hope to 
follow. But as soon as the resolution of ratification is before us, 
those amendments will be in order.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I observe the 
presence on the floor of the distinguished Senator from Alaska.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would be happy to yield in just a moment. 
I want to yield first to my distinguished colleague, Senator Pell, for 
his opening statement.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I simply wanted to add a comment to what the 
Senator was speaking of. I just came from the room in which the staff 
had put together the final language. Representatives of the 
administration had signed off on it as well as the representatives from 
Senator Levin's office, and I signed off on it as well.
  I anticipate that at the point when it is agreeable with all of the 
Senators, that it represents the final piece in the agreement. As far 
as I know, there has been agreement reached, in other words, on all of 
those provisions.
  I thank both Senator Lugar and Senator Stevens for their leadership 
in bringing this group together to allow the creation of these 
additional declarations and one addition to be added for the treaty.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank especially the Senator from Arizona 
who has had many concerns about the treaty and has expressed those in a 
very articulate, constructive way. And his views, I believe, are 
represented substantially in the amendments that will be offered.

                          ____________________