[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 206 (Thursday, December 21, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S19135-S19137]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996--CONFERENCE REPORT

  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the conference report accompanying H.R. 1655, the 
intelligence authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
     1655) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States Government, the Community Management Account, 
     and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
     System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and 
     free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to 
     their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of 
     the conferees.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to 
the consideration of the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of December 20, 1995.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am pleased today to present to the 
Senate the conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1996. This legislation addresses a number of critical 
issues identified through the oversight process and lays the groundwork 
for legislation the committee plans to introduce early next year to 
ensure the intelligence community is organized to effectively address 
the Nation's critical intelligence needs today and in to the future.
  Getting this authorization bill to this point in the process has not 
been easy, but it would have been impossible were it not for the 
unflagging efforts and cooperation of the vice chairman, Senator Robert 
Kerrey. It has been a pleasure working with the Senator from Nebraska 
over the past year and I look forward to a productive year ahead. In 
addition, I want to commend our colleagues on the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, particularly Chairman Larry Combest 
and the ranking minority member, Norman Dicks, for their cooperation 
and willingness to work with us to produce this bill. We had some tough 
issues to address and their good faith and determination to seek areas 
of agreement were critical to the success of our efforts. Finally, I 
want to recognize the other members of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, some of whom have served on this committee for quite some 
time over the years and whose expertise, interest, and insights have 
served the committee and its chairman well.
  The conference report and statement of managers you have before you 
today contains a number of significant provisions. Several of the 
sections address counterintelligence issues highlighted by the Aldrich 
Ames case. For example, the bill closes a loophole that allowed an 
employee convicted of espionage to receive money the U.S. Government 
contributed to his or her thrift savings plan, even though the money 
contributed to the plan by the employee was forfeited. Similarly, the 
bill allows a spouse who fully cooperates in an espionage investigation 
to receive spousal pension benefits, thus removing a disincentive 
provided by current law. Perhaps most significant in this regard is the 
provision that will allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to obtain 
certain limited information from credit bureaus as part of a duly 
authorized counterintelligence or international terrorism 
investigation. Following the money trail is a critical part of these 
kinds of investigations. The FBI has the authority under current law to 
look at bank account information of individuals who are part of such an 
investigation. In order to use this authority, however, the FBI must 
identify the banks at which the individual maintains accounts. This is 
often done today through the intrusive and laborious process of going 
through that individual's trash. This provision allows the FBI to get 
that information, along with basic identifying information, from a 
consumer credit report if it meets certain specified requirements. 
Access to the entire consumer credit report still will require a court 
order.

  This conference report also contains a number of provisions that 
reflect the changes wrought by the end of the cold war and the 
reexamination of the role and mission of the intelligence community 
[IC]. One of the key issues in this context is personnel. The committee 
has been concerned for some time now that the IC has not done an 
adequate job of removing poor performers, creating headroom for those 
who excel, and ensuring that the community has the right mix of skills 
to accomplish its current and future missions. It is particularly 
critical that the IC carefully manage the significant downsizing it is 
currently experiencing. This report calls on the DCI to develop 
personnel procedures for the committee to consider that include 
elements for termination based on relative performance and on tie in 
class.
  Another trend in the IC in the post-cold-war environment is the 
declassification of secrets about which there are no longer national 
security concerns. The conference report contains significantly greater 
flexibility for the DCI and we have been assured that the funds now 
authorized for this activity are adequate to ensure that 
declassification will proceed expeditiously without sacrificing the 
care needed to weed out the true secrets.
  The conference report also contains the provision from the Senate 
bill requiring a report on the financial management of the National 
Reconnaissance Organization. Like so much of the IC budget--about 85 
percent, in fact--the NRO budget is under the Department of Defense 
rather than the Director of Central Intelligence. From what we have 
learned to date about the problems with NRO accounting practices and 
management, this bifurcated chain of authority contributed to a 
situation in which no one adequately supervised the use, for example, 
of prior year, or carry forward, funds. This committee will continue to 
monitor NRO's financial management situation until it is satisfied that 
controls are in place and there is full accountability.
  The budget for the IC remains classified, but I can tell you that the 
funding authorized in the conference report, which incorporates a 
classified annex, is slightly below last year's level and the 
administration's request. This is the sixth straight year the budget 
has been reduced, for a cumulative reduction of 17 percent. The 
conference did recommend a reallocation of funding to emphasize areas 
of critical importance. For example, notwithstanding the rhetorical 
priority placed on critical intelligence topics such as proliferation, 
terrorism, and counternarcotics, the committee identified areas where 
insufficient funds have been programmed for new capabilities, or where 
activities are funded in the name of high-priority targets which make 
little or no contribution to the issue. In the classified annex 
accompanying the report, 

[[Page S19136]]
the conferees recommend a number of initiatives to enhance U.S. 
capabilities in the areas of proliferation, terrorism, and 
counternarcotics. Similarly, the IC's capabilities for processing 
information have lagged behind the collection capabilities and the 
conference report attempts to address that by shifting funds.

  In conclusion, I want to acknowledge the work of the staff of the 
committee in putting this legislation together and in assisting the 
committee in its day-to-day oversight of this Nation's intelligence 
activities. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I join with the chairman in strongly 
recommending that the Senate adopt this conference report on the fiscal 
year 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act.
  This bill continues the efforts of this committee to ensure that the 
intelligence community is making the changes necessary to adapt to 
today's world. As our troops enter Bosnia for their peacekeeping 
mission and policymakers work to ensure there continues to be a peace 
to keep, we are reminded once again of the importance of a flexible, 
efficient, and effective intelligence capability to support both 
national and military needs. It is a very different world from that 
which challenged the intelligence community during most of its post 
World War II existence. This conference report reflects the changing 
role and mission of intelligence. To ensure we can meet the growing 
demand for timely, actionable intelligence, for example, this bill 
shifts greater resources into the processing of intelligence, which has 
failed to keep pace with the collection of information. Similarly, as 
the threats from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
international terrorism, organized crime, and international narcotics 
trafficking take on ever greater importance, the committee has included 
budgetary recommendations to increase funding in these areas.
  The conference report includes all of the provisions contained in the 
Senate bill, although several of the provisions reflect some changes. 
In addition, the conference report includes a provision specifying that 
the Director of Central Intelligence can use up to $25 million for 
declassifying records over 25 years old, pursuant to a recent Executive 
order. The House bill had imposed a much tighter limit on the 
availability of funds for this purpose. The conferees agreed to a 
revised provision that will allow the DCI to begin this process in a 
manner that is more likely to produce timely results without 
compromising national security.
  This year has seen great controversy concerning the intelligence 
community. Some of the problems we are all familiar with include the 
CIA's relationship with assets in Guatemala who may have participated 
in or covered up murders, the continuing damage caused by Aldrich Ames' 
treachery, CIA's withholding from its customers the full details of 
source information on Soviet and Russian reports, and the National 
Reconnaissance office's accumulation of funds in forward funding 
accounts vastly in excess of what they require. These failures and 
mistakes remind us all of the need for vigilant oversight of 
intelligence activities, a responsibility which Chairman Specter and I 
and our colleagues on the committee take very seriously.
  These controversies also remind us that intelligence is becoming less 
of a secret business; there is a conscious process of declassification 
now ongoing, which is healthy; the actions of our Government should be 
as transparent as possible, consistent with protecting the lives of the 
Nation and our people. But there is also a tendency to attack necessary 
secrecy by means of leaks as if, with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
the need to protect sources and methods has evaporated and the leaking 
and publication of classified information is therefore harmless. Mr. 
President, terrorism, the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons in the 
world, the Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, international crime and 
drug trafficking, the intentions of factions in Bosnia to attack our 
troops--these are not harmless threats, and it is most harmful to 
reveal the American intelligence sources and techniques employed 
against those threats. In our oversight tasks we walk a fine line 
between correcting problems and deficiencies and telling the public as 
much as we can about the, on the one hand, and protecting necessary 
secrets, on the other.
  This has been a challenging year for the intelligence community. In 
the midst of significant downsizing, questions about its mission, and 
what seemed at times to be daily revelations of scandals, the 
intelligence professionals continued to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate information to meet the needs of policymakers and the 
military. All of us can take pride in the quality and dedication of the 
Americans serving their country in the intelligence community, and I 
hope the headlines of the moment will not dissuade dedicated, talented 
young patriots from seeking careers in intelligence. In the coming 
months the committee will be making decisions about legislation to 
ensure that the intelligence community is structured to maximize the 
effectiveness of the efforts of these hard working men and women. The 
bill before you today is a significant step in that direction and I 
urge your support.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I want to take a moment prior to Senate 
enactment of the conference report to H.R. 1655, the Intelligence 
Authorization bill to express my views regarding several provisions 
that I fear could weaken U.S. sanctions laws and weapons non-
proliferation policy.
  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the leading 
security issue facing the United States and its allies. The President 
himself said so in a speech last year. There is a direct connection 
between the imposition of sanctions under U.S. and international laws 
and the volume of weapons trafficking. Strong enforcement of sanctions 
laws is a critical element of U.S. and international non-proliferation 
policy. The likelihood of punishment must be high. The commitment of 
our nation as the principle leader in international non-proliferation 
efforts must be taken seriously. Our resolve must be unquestioned. To 
do otherwise would send the worst signal, particularly to terrorist 
states and rogue groups. In that kind of environment, the very security 
of the United States may be in question.
  It is for that reason that I must express my concerns with H.R. 1655, 
and more to the point, section 303 of the bill, which would create a 
new Title IX in the National Security Act. This new title would give 
the President unprecedented authority to stay the imposition of 
sanctions related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
their delivery systems, as well as other advanced conventional, 
chemical or biological weapons. This waiver authority could be 
exercised if the President determines that the imposition of sanctions 
``would seriously risk the compromise of an ongoing criminal 
investigation directly related to the activities giving rise to the 
sanction or an intelligence source or method directly related to the 
activities giving rise to the sanction.''
  I am very concerned that with this provision, diplomatic and 
political pressure may make it impossible for the United States to do 
the right thing and sanction major offenders.
  For the last several years, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the delivery systems of such weapons appears to be 
intensifying. All this year, we have heard reports that the People's 
Republic of China has engaged in the proliferation of ballistic missile 
systems to Pakistan and possibly even Iran--activities that would be 
sanctionable under the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR. China 
also is reported to be actively involved in the expansion of Pakistan's 
nuclear program, as well as Iran's drive for nuclear technology.
  The fact that all of this reported activity can occur without as much 
as a threat of sanctions from the United States has led me to believe 
that we may need to make our sanctions laws tougher. In fact, I am the 
author of a law that gives the President presumptive authority to 
impose sanctions against parties that export questionable materials to 
terrorist countries. This law, which went into effect last year, was 
designed to give the President the ability to impose sanctions in cases 
where he simply had reason to believe that weapons of mass destruction 
or their means of delivery had fallen in the hands of terrorist 
countries. He need not wait for actual proof. If he 

[[Page S19137]]
waited, it may be too late. Equally important, the law compels the 
sanctioned country to come forward to demonstrate that no violation 
actually took place.
  This law, in short, broadens the President's authority to enforce 
non-proliferation policy. The conference report to H.R. 1655 goes in 
the opposite direction--it broadens the President's authority to weaken 
non-proliferation policy.
  Mr. President, I recognize that the trafficking of weapons of mass 
destruction and their related delivery systems takes place out of 
sight. I also very much respect that fact that intelligence sources and 
methods designed to monitor a nation's weapons activities are almost 
always, if not entirely, at risk of discovery. The consequences of such 
discovery certainly are life-threatening to say the least. Virtually 
all prosecutions and sanctions are developed from intelligence sources 
and methods. Therefore, I am very concerned that the conference report 
would provide the President with a very tempting waiver option--an 
option that would give the President the opportunity to make a 
political decision to forego prosecution or to avoid imposition of 
sanctions, but base it on ``sources and methods.'' In other words, the 
President would have the opportunity to place political expediency or 
other factors above our nation's non-proliferation laws. I believe that 
kind of discretion is a serious mistake.
  I raised these concerns to the distinguished Chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, Senator Specter. I know a number of my 
colleagues in the House and the Senate expressed similar views. Both 
the final bill language and the joint explanatory statement of the 
conference committee attempt to address these concerns. First, the 
conferees required that Title IX would be in effect for just one year. 
This limitation was placed to afford the Congress the opportunity to 
monitor closely the use of this new authority. Second, the conferees 
make clear that this authority is to be used for its stated purpose--to 
preserve sources and methods, as well as ongoing criminal 
investigations when seriously at risk--and ``not as a pretext for some 
other reason not to impose sanctions such as economic or foreign policy 
reasons.''
  I appreciate the effort made by the conferees to restrict the 
President's ability to exercise this waiver authority to the purposes 
stated in the legislation. I also appreciate the conferees' insistence 
that this provision only be in effect for one year. Despite these 
efforts, I still believe we are setting a dangerous precedent and 
opening a Pandora's box that could be difficult to close.
  Consider two facts: first, intelligence sources and methods are 
virtually the only means that allow a President to proceed with 
sanctions; and second, only the President is in the best position to 
determine whether or not a source or method is at risk if sanctions are 
imposed.
  These facts lead this senator to conclude that the new Title IX is 
based on a flawed premise--that Congress has the ability to ensure that 
the President will not abuse this new discretionary authority to waive 
sanctions. I say it is flawed because only the President is in a 
position to determine whether or not a source or method is at risk. 
This risk determination is subjective--a judgement call. And, again, 
given that the basis for sanctions comes from sources and methods, the 
President is given the latitude to consider numerous economic, 
political or foreign policy implications, but on paper base his 
conclusion on sources and methods. What methods and resources do we in 
Congress have to second guess the President should he make a ``sources 
and methods'' risk determination? Would the Congress even want to 
second guess the President, given the fact that doing so could be even 
more dangerous to that intelligence source or method?
  The fact is our sources and methods are almost always at risk, to say 
the least, but until today, our priority always has been the 
enforcement of our non-proliferation laws.
  I am hopeful that in the next year, Congress will closely monitor the 
President's use of this waiver authority. I urge my colleagues not just 
to consider the President's ability to comply with the conditions set 
by the conferees, but also our own ability to ensure that these 
conditions are in fact followed by the President.
  As the world's sole superpower, all nations concerned with the threat 
of nuclear proliferation look to the United States to lead by example. 
Vigorous U.S. enforcement of nuclear non-proliferation laws and 
agreements is crucial to the security of all people. I am very 
concerned that the conference report sets a bad precedent that could 
undermine vigorous enforcement in the year ahead, and even beyond if 
Congress allows the law to continue. I intend to follow this matter 
very closely in the year ahead. It is my hope that tough, consistent 
enforcement of our non-proliferation laws will not be sacrificed.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
conference report be deemed agreed to; that the motion to reconsider be 
laid on the table; and that a statement on behalf of Senator Specter be 
placed at the appropriate place in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  So the conference was deemed agreed to.

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