[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 205 (Wednesday, December 20, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2429-E2430]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROLF EKEUS OF UNSCOM

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, December 20, 1995

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, on November 1, 1995 I wrote to Mr. Rolf 
Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of the Office of the U.N. Special 
Commission [UNSCOM] in charge of weapons destruction and monitoring in 
Iraq. My basic question was: Why doesn't UNSCOM release the names of 
companies providing dual-use or military items to Iraq?
  Mr. Ekeus' basic answer is that UNSCOM cannot carry out its weapons 
dismantlement tasks without the help of sovereign governments, 
sovereign governments--often because of ongoing legal cases--want to 
control the release of information about companies, and releasing the 
names of companies without the approval of sovereign governments will 
undermine the ability of UNSCOM to carry out its important mission.
  I appreciate Mr. Ekeus' response, but I am still of the belief that 
sunshine is a powerful deterrent, and I will want to pursue this 
question further.
  The text of the correspondence follows:
                                                      Committee on


                                      International Relations,

                                 Washington, DC, November 1, 1995.
     Hon. Rolf Ekeus
     Chairman, U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, United Nations 
         Headquarters, New York, N.Y.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write with respect to the question of 
     companies that supplied or are supplying dual-use goods, 
     services or technology to Iraq, and the use of those dual-use 
     items in Iraq's programs to build weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       At the time of the creation of UNSCOM by UN Security 
     Council Resolution 687 in April, 1991, it had been my 
     impression, from both you and from U.S. officials, that the 
     names of companies supplying dual-use items to Iraq 
     eventually would be made public. Thus far, to my knowledge, 
     no such list has been made public.
       I continue to think that it is important to make a list of 
     all such companies public, on the theory that sunshine is the 
     best deterrent of such transfers of dual-use items in the 
     future.
       I would like to ask a number of questions:
       1. Why has a list of companies supplying dual-use items to 
     Iraq not been made public?
       When will a list of such companies be made public?
       2. What is the policy of UNSCOM on the publication of such 
     a list of companies?
       Does UNSCOM set policy on disclosure of names of companies 
     itself, or is it acting on instructions of the Security 
     Council or members of the Security Council?
       Is it the policy of UNSCOM to defer to individual 
     governments on the publication of such information? If so, 
     why?
       3. Do you agree that the publication of such a list of 
     companies would serve as an important deterrent on future 
     dealings with Iraq in dual-use items?
       What steps can be taken to bring about the publication of 
     such a list?
       What additional steps can be taken to deter future 
     transfers of dual-use items to Iraq?
       Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward 
     to your early reply.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Lee H. Hamilton,
     Ranking Democratic Member.
                                                                    ____

                                                    United Nations


                                           Special Commission,

                                                December 14, 1995.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on International 
         Relations; House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Hamilton: Thank you for your letter of 1 
     November 1995. I appreciate your letting me know of your 
     concerns and inviting me to give my response. I regret the 
     delay in this letter, but I was away from the United States 
     much of November, principally in the Gulf region.
       Your personal attention to our mission is highly 
     appreciated and important as Iraq's insistent efforts in 
     retaining and reacquiring weapons of mass destruction is and 
     should remain of public concern.
       Given the importance of foreign acquisition for Iraq's WMD 
     programmes, the Special Commission gives priority to the task 
     of securing as much information as possible on foreign 
     suppliers to Iraq. It is especially important to map out 
     Iraq's supplier network. In this respect, UNSCOM has so far 
     been quite successful, thanks very much to the support from 
     governments of those States from which supplier companies 
     have been operating. Each case of export to Iraq of 
     prohibited or dual-use items has to be carefully explored and 
     investigated. Access to the companies concerned is crucial 
     for the in-depth investigation. To get such access, UNSCOM 
     has in practice to get the approval of the government 
     concerned. Otherwise, governments would, no doubt, be upset 
     were UNSCOM to initiate investigations without consent on 
     their national territory. Our experience is that governments 
     are cautious in providing access, and that without government 
     support to the Commission's investigations, companies are at 
     liberty to refuse talking to our experts. Over time, the 
     Special Commission has learnt that a primary concern of 
     governments appears to be the question of confidentiality. 
     This requirement is applied almost on a universal basis. It 
     means that if data like the name and identity of a company, 
     and of the country of a supplier could be suspected to be 
     published, the government would refuse access for 
     investigation of the company concerned. Without government 
     pressure, the supplier company would tend to be even more 
     uncooperative. Thus, publication of data on supplier 
     companies would have a devastating effect on the continuous 
     and future efforts by the Special Commission to effectively 
     block Iraq from retaining or reacquiring proscribed weapons.
       These explanations should serve to set the background to 
     the answer to your first question, namely that at the 
     present, it is not advisable for the Special Commission to 
     make public the names of foreign suppliers.
       Concerning the policy of the Special Commission on the 
     publication of names of suppliers, I can state that the data 
     on suppliers are kept safely within the Headquarters in New 
     York. Information concerning a supplier is, as a matter of 
     policy, shared with the government of the supplier-country, 
     with requests for further information (through interviews 
     with visits and/or interrogation) of the company concerned.
       This policy was originally formulated by the Special 
     Commission and presented in briefings to the Security 
     Council. A strong and vigorous support for the policy so 
     defined has been the answer to these briefings.
       I agree that the publication of a list on the names of 
     supplier companies could serve as a deterrent on future 
     dealings with Iraq in dual-use items. But such a publication 
     would at the same time bring an end to practically all 
     efforts of the Special Commission to get indispensable 
     support and intelligence from the governments and information 
     from the named companies. That would seriously compromise the 
     task of the Special Commission to identify and eliminate all 
     proscribed weapons in Iraq.
       When our policy was originated, it was considered that 
     publication of a list of names of companies could lead to 
     certain presumptions which might very well be unjustified. 
     Prior to the Gulf War, there was no ban on many of the dual-
     use items and chemicals exported to Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq 
     frequently used agents and front companies to purchase items 
     which were banned or controlled under certain multilateral 
     export control systems, and resorted to false declarations as 
     to destination and end-user. The supplier company, in such 
     circumstances, could have been completely ignorant of the 
     ultimate destination of the items concerned. It is because of 
     these difficulties that the Special Commission reports the 
     name of a company, which it identifies as the source of now 
     proscribed items or materials in Iraq, only to the government 
     in which that company is established. The government then, in 
     most cases, assists in the investigation of the 
     circumstances, of the export concerned and, where those 
     circumstances so justify, undertakes prosecution of the 
     offender. The Special Commission can support such prosecution 
     through the supply of evidence in its possession and, in 
     certain circumstances, through the provision of expert 
     witnesses. Prosecution of a company, which is necessarily 
     public, is surely the most powerful deterrent in convincing 
     other companies not to engage in illegal trade. The Special 
     Commission has every reason to believe that its policy has 
     led to its gaining a much wider 

[[Page E2430]]
     knowledge of Iraq's procurement networks, and the names of many more 
     suppliers, than would otherwise have been the case. The 
     cooperation with governments which has been obtained, and 
     national prosecutions which have or are taking place, testify 
     to the effectiveness of the policy. A complete understanding 
     of Iraq's supplier networks is the most potent instrument in 
     preventing the reactivation of these networks. The Special 
     Commission already has evidence of certain attempts by Iraq 
     to do so and has been able to prevent the export or to 
     interdict the items concerned on their way to, or upon their 
     arrival in Iraq.
       In addition to measures already taken, especially those 
     under the plans approved by the Security Council, the most 
     effective step to deter future transfers to Iraq of dual-use 
     items would be the early adoption by the Security Council of 
     a resolution approving the mechanism for export/import 
     control of Iraq designed by UNSCOM and the IAEA. Under the 
     mechanism, all states would be obliged to notify UNSCOM and 
     the IAEA of intended exports (including transshipment) to 
     Iraq of such items. The proposed mechanism has just been 
     transmitted to the Security Council where we hope for very 
     early action.
       I would be happy to meet with you on one of my visits to 
     Washington to explain this matter further to you if you 
     consider this would be useful. One of your staff could 
     telephone my office at (212) 963-3018 to make arrangements.
           Yours sincerely,

                                                   Rolf Ekeus,

                                               Executive Chairman,
     Office of the Special Commission.

                          ____________________