[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 204 (Tuesday, December 19, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18856-S18902]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996--CONFERENCE 
                                 REPORT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the conference report.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I believe 15 minutes of time has been 
allotted to the Senator from Nebraska under the unanimous-consent 
request. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. EXON. I will take that time at this moment.
  Mr. President, if the average American was to read the 1996 Defense 
Authorization Act conference report now before the Senate, he or she 
might believe that there was a mistake in the printing of the bill's 
title. The content of the conference agreement, the rhetoric in the 
report, and the pork add-ons contained in the legislation are more in 
keeping with the cold war environment of 1986, not the post-cold-war 
world of 1996.
  I voted against the Senate version of the authorization bill earlier 
this year based on my belief that the $7 billion increase in spending 
authority contained in the bill was extravagant and that the bill's 
spending priorities and legislative restrictions were harmful, yes 
harmful, to our national security interests. I am dismayed to report 
that the conference report is even more objectionable on these counts 
than the Senate-passed version. As a result, I will vote against the 
National Defense authorization conference report for the first time in 
my 17 years as a U.S. Senator, a decision I do not come to lightly.
  With very little participation solicited from the minority, the 
majority in the Senate and House have finally reached an agreement on a 
bill that will be greeted with cheers from the multibillion-dollar 
defense corporations in America. At a time when much of the Federal 
Government has run out of money and is shut down, at a time when the 
Congress is cutting domestic programs to the bone and the majority 
party is trying to push through an unwise $245 billion tax cut, we are 
considering a bill that adds $7.1 billion to the defense budget that 
the President did not ask for and our military leaders do not want.
  This bill writes checks for unneeded weapons systems that will have 
defense corporations popping champagne corks around the country. 
Christmas has indeed come early for these multibillion-dollar 
corporations, and their gifts are beyond their wildest hopes. I implore 
every American that is asked to do with less this coming year due to 
the Republican budget-cutting ax to keep in mind the 
following glittering, gilded ornaments hung with care by the majority 
on the defense corporate tree:

  $700 million in unrequested funds for an accelerated star wars 
program, a mere down payment on a system which has already cost the 
American taxpayers $35 billion and will likely cost another $48 billion 
to build;
  $493 million in unrequested funds to restart the B-2 bomber program 
beyond the 20 planes already bought, again a mere down payment on a $30 
billion procurement plan;
  $23 million in unrequested funds for 4 additional medium range army 
aircraft;
  $76 million in unrequested funds for Longbow helicopter 
modifications;
  $140 million in unrequested funds for Kiowa helicopter modifications;
  $32 million in unrequested funds for ground support avionics;
  $37 million in unrequested funds to buy 750 additional Hellfire 
missiles;
  $36 million in unrequested funds to buy 450 additional Javelin 
missiles;
  $43 million in unrequested funds to buy 1,500 additional MLRS 
missiles;
  $50 million in unrequested funds to buy MLRS launchers;
  $18 million in unrequested funds to buy 29 additional Army tactical 
missiles;

[[Page S18857]]

  $14 million in unrequested funds to buy Army tracked vehicles;
  $82 million in unrequested funds to buy Howitzers;
  $34 million in unrequested funds for improved Army recovery vehicles
  $110 million in unrequested funds for M-1 modifications;
  $44 million in unrequested funds for Army regional maintenance 
training sites;
  $29 million in unrequested funds to buy 10,000 additional machine 
guns;
  $33 million in unrequested funds to buy 2,100 additional grenade 
launchers;
  $14 million in unrequested funds to buy 28,000 additional M-16 
rifles;
  $50 million in unrequested funds for small caliber ammunition;
  $47 million in unrequested funds for mortar ammunition;
  $80 million in unrequested funds for tank ammunition;
  $33 million in unrequested funds for artillery ammunition;
  $30 million in unrequested funds for mines;
  $49 million in unrequested funds for ammunition production support;
  $327 million in unrequested funds to buy Army trucks;
  $136 million in unrequested funds for Army communications;
  $81 million in unrequested funds to buy 4 additional AV-8 Harrier 
planes;
  $213 million in unrequested funds to buy 6 additional F-18 planes;
  $65 million in unrequested funds to buy 6 additional Sea Cobra 
helicopters;
  $45 million in unrequested funds to buy 17 additional T-39 trainer 
aircraft;
  $165 million in unrequested funds for EA-6 modifications;
  $42 million in unrequested funds for F-14 modifications;
  $32 million in unrequested funds for P-3 modifications;
  $30 million in unrequested funds for ECM modifications;
  $40 million in unrequested funds to buy 45 additional Harpoon 
missiles;
  $49 million in unrequested funds for Tomahawk missile modifications;
  $30 million in unrequested funds for Navy support equipment;
  $1.4 billion in unrequested funds to buy a LHD-1 assault ship;
  $974 million in unrequested funds to buy a LPD-17 amphibious ship;
  $430 million in unrequested funds for Navy ammunition;
  $15 million in unrequested funds for C-3 countermeasures;
  $14 million in unrequested funds for Satcom ship terminals;
  $17 million in unrequested funds for sonobuoys;
  $30 million in unrequested funds for intelligence support equipment;

  $34 million in unrequested for Marine Corps training devices;
  $361 million in unrequested funds for F-15 Advance procurement and 
modifications;
  $159 million in unrequested funds for F-16 procurement;
  $133 million in unrequested funds to buy 3 WC-130 aircraft;
  $96 million in unrequested funds for C-135 modifications;
  $63 million in unrequested funds for Air Force aircraft 
modifications;
  $40 million in unrequested funds to buy 100 additional GBU-15 
missiles;
  $38 million in unrequested funds to buy 54 additional Have Nap 
missiles;
  $15 million in unrequested funds to 100 additional cruise missiles;
  $344 million in unrequested funds for Air Force ammunition;
  $20 million in unrequested funds for Cyclone class ships;
  $17 million in unrequested funds for 2 additional special operations 
craft;
  $777 million in unrequested National Guard and Reserve equipment 
specifically ear-marked for weapons systems such as 10 new C-139 
aircraft and 2 new C-26 operational aircraft.
  The list I have just recited is a lengthy one indeed, but it only 
scratches the surface; there are dozens of other programs where the 
majority has increased the administration's request and provided money 
for programs the Pentagon has said they do not need while cutting 
programs it says it does need.
  The decorations that the majority have hung on the corporate tree are 
numerous and expensive. Defense lobbyists have had a banner year to be 
sure. In addition to the $7 billion in unjustified spending, this 
conference report contains a number of provisions which will make for a 
profitable 1996 for some of the biggest American corporations, 
including:
  A taxpayer-financed loan program to export weapons to the third 
world;
  An earmarked noncompetitive ship maintenance contract for a specific 
shipyard;
  Numerous earmarked Energy Department projects and programs;
  Authorization allowing a waiver of research and development funds 
owed the Government by defense contractors; and
  Costly buy-American requirements which will drive up the cost to 
taxpayers of future procurements.
  As I said at the beginning of my speech, this Defense authorization 
is not forward looking, it is backward looking. If the Senate had to 
meet truth-in-advertising requirements, the clerk would be obliged to 
change the year ``1996''on the cover of this report to ``1986.'' 
However, the cold war flavor of this bill goes beyond the inflated, 
parochial spending I have discussed up to this point. The legislative 
requirements of the conference report are equally extreme. The most 
troublesome is the missile defense language that commits our Nation to 
deploying a national missile defense system within the next 8 years at 
a likely cost of $48 billion against a threat that does not and will 
not exist. The son of star wars system mandated in this bill would be 
ineffective against terrorist threats, abrogate the ABM Treaty and 
likely take with it Russian implementation of START I and START II, not 
to mention endangering prospects of ratifying next year the chemical 
weapons convention and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
  With logic right out of Lewis Carroll's ``Alice in Wonderland,'' the 
majority wants the American taxpayer to spend $48 billion to defend 
against a threat which does not exist, the very course of action which 
will prompt the Russians to renege on their commitment to destroy two-
thirds of their nuclear weapons, thereby reviving the threat that never 
would have existed had we not pursued the system in the first place. As 
that famous cartoon Bayou Alligator might have said: ``We have met the 
enemy and he is us.''
  In closing, Mr. President, I would just like to offer at this time 
for printing at the conclusion of my remarks an article that appeared 
in the Sunday Washington Post of December 17.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. EXON. I would just comment briefly on the fact that this starts 
out ``Off to a bad Start II. In both the United States and Russia, 
Hopes for Strategic Arms Pact Are Fading.'' It goes on to describe the 
delays that we have caused. The concern of the Russians that we are 
about to break the ABM Treaty was one of the causes I suggest for the 
return of the Communist Party to a measure of strength in the elections 
over the last week, because they are feeding on the situation that we 
do not care and we are going to break out of the ABM Treaty.
  In conclusion then, Mr. President, the Clinton administration has 
said that it would veto this bill if it reaches his desk. I support the 
President in this decision and believe that the Senate should save him 
the trouble by defeating this conference report.
  The American taxpayer cannot afford this expensive gilded Christmas 
tree of unneeded weapons and corporate earmarks. Likewise, the American 
national security interests can ill-afford this self-defeating policy 
embodied in this bill, forcing us back to the chill of the cold war.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back any time remaining 
assigned to this Senator.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995]

                         Off to a Bad START II

               (By Rodney W. Jones and Yuri K. Nazarkin)

       After months of delay, the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee moved last week to bring the START II treaty up for 
     a vote on the Senate floor. The pact would reduce U.S. and 
     Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 70 percent of Cold War 
     levels and also eliminate land-based multiple-warhead 
     missiles, the most threatening of Russia's weapons. 
     Unfortunately, while a favorable Senate vote on the treaty is 
     virtually assured, ratification of the pact by Russia has 
     become increasingly uncertain in recent months. As Russians 
     go to the polls today, many will be voting for politicians 
     who question whether START II is still in Russia's best 
     interest.
       The prime cause of Russian second thoughts, according to 
     parliamentarians and 

[[Page S18858]]
     defense experts in Moscow, is the Republican-led effort that began this 
     summer to mandate the deployment of a multi-site strategic 
     anti-ballistic missile, or ABM, system by the year 2003. This 
     system was called for originally in the Senate version of the 
     defense authorization bill and endorsed last week by a House-
     Senate conference committee. Yet it would violate the 1972 
     ABM Treaty, which for more than two decades has helped 
     curtail a costly buildup of defensive nuclear weapons and 
     countervailing offensive weapons.
       It first became clear that START II was in serious trouble 
     last month when parliamentary leaders in Moscow who had 
     supported START II hearings in July concluded that a 
     ratification vote in the waning months of 1995 would fail. To 
     avoid a foreign policy crisis over a negative vote, they 
     postponed further action on the treaty.
       Regrettably, the prospect for unconditional Russian 
     ratification of START II next year is no more promising. 
     Following today's election, the State Duma, Russia's lower 
     house of parliament, is expected to be even more critical of 
     START II and of the United States than its predecessor. 
     Russian political parties and factions opposed to the treaty 
     will probably gain seats at the expense of the reformist and 
     democratic parties that generally support it. President Boris 
     Yeltsin's poor health and the growth of assertive nationalism 
     in Russia further clouds START II's chances.
       Even the Russian military leadership, which had steadfastly 
     supported START II, shows signs of cooling toward the treaty 
     in the wake of U.S. congressional action threatening the ABM 
     Treaty. The Russian military fears the United States' real 
     intent is to gain strategic superiority over Russia. The 
     Russian military dismisses as preposterous U.S. assertions 
     that the legislation is aimed at protecting American soil 
     from the threat of a handful of long-range missiles from 
     North Korea and other small countries. In effect, Russian 
     military leaders argue, the United States would be deploying 
     new defense missiles just as Russian was completing the 
     reduction of its offensive missiles under START II's 
     requirements. Russian would be more vulnerable and the United 
     States less so.
       Ivan Rybkin, the Duma speaker, expressed the growing 
     disenchantment with START II in the newspaper Nezavissimaya 
     Gazeta on Nov. 5: ``We cannot be bothered any longer, given 
     this situation that propels plans for NATO enlargement and 
     reveals our U.S. congressional colleagues' intentions to 
     begin a process that threatens the ABM Treaty--the 
     cornerstone of the existing arms control regime.''
       Russian misgivings about START II haven't come overnight. 
     Initially Yeltsin and the Russian military leadership firmly 
     believed that START II was in Russia's interest. They 
     recognized benefits for Russia--the fact that START II's deep 
     reductions would enhance stability, reduce future defense 
     costs, ensure formal strategic parity with the United States 
     and contribute to long-term cooperation between the two 
     powers. The Clinton administration also worked to alleviate 
     Russian uneasiness over U.S. national missile defense 
     activities. But the ABM developments of late have changed 
     Russian feelings toward START II.
       If Clinton vetoes the defense authorization bill as he has 
     promised, a direct conflict over the ABM Treaty will be 
     avoided. Congressional direction of the U.S. military might 
     then be provided exclusively in the defense appropraitons 
     bill. That legislation, which the president approved earlier 
     this month, says nothing about deploying an ABM system.
       This silence, however, is unlikely to assuage Russian 
     concerns, since Russian must worry that the ABM issue will 
     return in the next congressional session. Moreover, the 
     appropriations bill mandates completion of the Navy's ``Upper 
     Tier'' system, a defense initiative to produce shorter-range 
     missiles that Russia also finds objectionable because of its 
     potential for use against long-range weapons.
       Russian arms control experts are also troubled by the 
     thinking of some U.S. lawmakers who believe that the AMB 
     Treaty is an obsolete Cold War measure. The Russians point 
     out that if the ABM Treaty is to be revised in light of the 
     post-Cold War situation, they see it as equally reasonable to 
     amend and adapt the START treaties. After all, they argue, 
     the cumbersome and intrusive START verification provisions 
     were elaborated in a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust 
     and were based on worst-case scenarios about the other side's 
     intentions.
       These Russian critics suggest that Moscow's obligations 
     under START II are largely irrelevant to current realities. 
     The Russians are required by the treaty to alter the 
     structure of their strategic triad by 2003. This will entail 
     sizable expenditures both to eliminate all multiple-warhead 
     land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and to 
     replace them with single warhead missiles. Given the current 
     U.S.-Russian partnership, Russian START II critics argue, 
     such measures are not essential to the strategic security of 
     both nations and should be open to revision.
       The Russians are completely uninterested in negotiating 
     amendments to fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty. This 
     apparently was well understood by those pushing the 
     antiballistic missile initiative in Congress, for they also 
     included the possible alternative of U.S. withdrawal from the 
     ABM Treaty. Russia might consider changes to the ABM Treaty--
     but only along with parallel changes in START II.
       Would this be acceptable to U.S. officials, legislators and 
     1996 Republican presidential candidates? Renegotiating 
     current nuclear treaties with the purpose of adapting them to 
     new realities--as instruments for regulating the nuclear 
     forces of both nations--would mean embarking on a long and 
     formidable process.
       If the United States is not prepared to enter such a 
     process, yet withdraws from the ABM Treaty or takes steps in 
     that direction, if would mean the end of START II--the end of 
     real, dramatic reductions in the numbers of the world's most 
     destructive weapons.
       Is it still possible to resuscitate START II in Russia? 
     Right now, it seems unlikely. If Clinton vetoes the defense 
     authorization, with its ABM mandate, the prospects for saving 
     START II would improve, but only slightly.
       Russian opponents of START II may now insist on delaying 
     Russian ratification until the results of the 1996 U.S. 
     presidential (and congressional) elections can be evaluated. 
     Repairing the growing damage to U.S.-Russian relations and 
     U.S. interests in nuclear threat reduction will become 
     steadily more difficult unless Congress revives the tradition 
     of bipartisan statesmanship on nuclear weapons issues that 
     has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator from Maine yield for a question?
  Mr. COHEN. Certainly.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand under the prior UC that the 
Senator from Vermont at some appropriate time--not now, the Senator 
from Maine has the floor--but the Senator from Vermont would be 
recognized for not to exceed 20 minutes on the landmines issue. I 
wonder if it would be appropriate--I see the distinguished chairman on 
the floor--that I ask unanimous consent that upon completion of the 
comments of the Senator from Maine that I be recognized for my time? If 
there is somebody else who wants it, I am perfectly willing to do a 
different time. I wonder if that would be satisfactory.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
  Mr. LEAHY. I so ask unanimous consent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COHEN. Can I inquire as to whether my 20 minutes starts now?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Maine?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 20 
minutes.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, we just heard a standard display of 
Democratic rhetoric from our colleague from Nebraska. According to my 
colleague from Nebraska, whatever the Pentagon sends up here, Congress 
is duty bound to oblige. If they send up a bill requesting certain 
systems, we either have to accept them or reject them, but no 
discretion is left for us to exercise, I gather from the statement of 
my colleague from Nebraska.
  Mr. President, I recall when they were in the majority. Whenever the 
President sent a bill up here, it was standard Democratic rhetoric: 
``Whatever the President proposes, forget about it, Congress disposes. 
It's the congressional responsibility to formulate a budget, not the 
President's. He submits it, but we dispose of it.''
  So now that they are in the minority, they are complaining that this 
exceeds the President's request. They did not have that particular 
concern when they were in the majority. So I think it is incumbent to 
point out, for example, that there was a certain land transfer, called 
the Corn Husker Army Ammunition Plant. It was not in the President's 
request. It was added somehow. So it has been historically the case 
that the Congress has the power and responsibility to decide which land 
transfers should be included and which should not, which systems should 
be built and which should not. When the Pentagon makes a request, it 
does not mean the Congress simply rolls over and either accepts it or 
eliminates it.
  What my colleague failed to point out is that, as I believe Secretary 
Perry has noted, procurement has been cut back rather significantly, 
about 72 percent since the height of Ronald Reagan's defense budgets. A 
72-percent cut in procurement, and Secretary Perry 

[[Page S18859]]
said if there was going to be an increase over the President's request, 
as we provided, it should be put into procurement.
  So that whole long litany of systems cited by my friend from Nebraska 
really ignores the fact that the Defense Department itself said if we 
had more money, we would spend it on procurement, and that is precisely 
what we have done.
  I want to talk a little bit about the national missile defense 
system. I was really struck by the statement that the Communists are 
coming back into power because we are debating whether we are going to 
have a national missile defense system. I never heard anything so 
absurd in my life.
  Whether the Communists come back into power has little to do with our 
debate right here. It has everything to do with what is taking place in 
Russia right now in terms of their troubled efforts in trying to 
democratize their country, to move to a capitalist system, to a 
democratic capitalist system.
  I think it ironic they come to the floor and suggest that because we 
want a system to protect the American people, this is going to require 
the Russians to return to their old Communist ways.
  A great deal has been said about the national missile defense system, 
but not a lot has been said about the immediate threat to our troops 
overseas as well as our allies, which are theater missiles. This bill 
makes great strides toward protecting our allies and our servicemen and 
women who are abroad from these kinds of theater missiles that can be 
targeted at them.

  Did we not learn anything during the Persian Gulf war? Do we want our 
troops to again be in the situation they faced in Saudi Arabia and that 
Israel faced? A situation in which we had to depend upon Patriots to 
take down those Scud missiles?
  The TMD programs accelerated by this bill are designed to protect our 
service men and women abroad and also our allies. It is something the 
administration also supports, by the way. This bill is a strong 
endorsement of the TMD systems.
  With regard to national missile defense, a number of statements have 
been made about the conference report, that somehow it endangers the 
ABM Treaty. And, again, I found this somewhat ironic. It makes very 
little sense to me. We passed language by a vote of 84 to 15 that had 
been negotiated by Senator Warner, myself, Senator Nunn and Senator 
Levin. And this Senate compromise language that was endorsed by an 
overwhelming vote was actually watered down in conference. That is what 
strikes me as being so ironic about this.
  The Senate compromise we negotiated, for example, called for the 
development of a national missile defense system with multiple sites. 
Since the ABM Treaty, as amended, only allows one site, the Senate 
compromise language that we negotiated actually envisioned either 
amending the treaty or indicating we would withdraw from it, as the 
treaty permits.
  In fact, the compromise called for negotiations to amend the treaty 
and stated that if we could not successfully negotiate amendments, we 
would actually consider withdrawing from it. It seems to me the 
language we have before us is actually much weaker than that. The 
Senate compromise language that we passed 84 to 15 called for a system 
that would actually go beyond the bounds of the ABM Treaty, but the 
conference report does not. The conference report does not even mention 
a multiple-site system. There is no mention at all of a multiple-site 
system. It does not say we cannot develop one, but there is no 
requirement that we do develop one.
  The major change on national missile defense in this language is that 
under the Senate-passed compromise, we would ``develop for deployment'' 
in the future, and that language has been changed to ``deploy'' in the 
future. But we have actually written it in a way that would allow us to 
deploy a system consistent with the ABM Treaty. That is the irony 
involved, because you could have one site, theoretically, providing 
defense for the United States. That would be consistent with the ABM 
Treaty.
  By the way, I want to point out, the Russians already have an ABM 
system. They have their one site. So we could, in fact, be consistent 
with the ABM Treaty developing one site that could, theoretically 
speaking, potentially protect all of the United States.
  So I find it ironic that they are now saying this particular language 
is going to destroy the ABM Treaty; this language is causing the 
Russians to rethink their role in the world with respect to the United 
States; this conference report is going to cause them to turn to 
communism once again. That is clearly the most excessive rhetoric that 
I have heard to date.
  The fact of the matter is that the administration is opposed to the 
deployment of a system of any kind to defend the American people. And 
during the conference negotiations, White House officials made it clear 
they would oppose any legislation that altered in any way the 
administration's so-called National Missile Defense Technology 
Readiness Program, what they call a rolling hedge, but I think is more 
accurately described as simply spinning our wheels. In other words, 
they threaten to veto any defense authorization bill that did anything 
other than rubber-stamp their National Missile Defense Program.
  Mr. President, we are the ones who control the power of the purse. We 
cannot accept the administration telling us: You cannot change under 
any circumstances the formulation of a program. They have the right to 
veto it, but we should not in any manner forego our power to try to 
define what we believe to be in the best interest of the American 
people.
  So what this debate over missile defense is really all about, it is 
not about whether the conference report somehow endangers the ABM 
Treaty, because it clearly does not, but whether we are going to 
proceed toward the deployment of a national missile defense system as 
permitted by the ABM Treaty even today.
  Frankly, I think it is unfortunate that some of the Members on the 
other side come forward to declare that this conference report 
constitutes an ``anticipatory breach'' of the ABM Treaty and warn the 
Russian Duma might kill the ABM Treaty in response.
  There is nothing in this report that would cause the Russians to 
react in a negative manner, but the Russian Duma might be incited to 
react by, I think, careless remarks being made by some Members in this 
Chamber.
  I was disturbed last weekend to read an opinion article in the 
Washington Post, coauthored by a Russian arms negotiator that followed 
this false line of reasoning.
  The quote was, ``The prime cause of Russian second thoughts'' about 
the START II treaty, according to Yuri Nazarkin, ``is the Republican-
led effort that began this summer to mandate the deployment of a 
multisite strategic antiballistic missile, or ABM, system by the year 
2003. This system,'' Nazarkin writes, ``was called for originally in 
the Senate version of the defense authorization bill and endorsed last 
week by a House-Senate conference committee. Yet, it would violate the 
1972 ABM Treaty,'' Nazarkin concludes.
  That is simply not accurate.
  The conference report, as written, does not violate the treaty. The 
fact is that we could deploy an ABM system, if necessary, from a single 
site, which would be consistent with the treaty. For those Members to 
come on to the floor and say this is an anticipatory breach is wrong. 
It sends precisely the wrong signal. If other Members are worried about 
the Russian Duma reacting negatively, they have their own words to 
point to in terms of why this is taking place.
  We have to ask why is a Russian arms negotiator, who carries weight 
in Moscow, making erroneous statements? He is repeating the erroneous 
statements being made right here on the Senate floor. I urge my 
colleagues to read, very carefully, the language in this report.
  Mr. President, I want to spend a few moments in talking about the B-2 
bomber. My colleague from Nebraska mentioned that this is a system 
which the Defense Department did not call for, and I agree. In fact, 
for many years I led the effort to terminate the B-2 program here on 
the floor with the Senator from Vermont, Senator Leahy, and in the 
committee this year I led the successful effort to strike funding for 
the B-2. There were some Members 

[[Page S18860]]
on the other side who support the B-2, and some on our side support it. 
It is not that I do not support the B-2 bomber; it is a fine aircraft. 
The fact of the matter is that I do not think we can afford to start 
building 20 new B-2 bombers, which is what Members of the House would 
like to do.
  The conference report did provide $493 million above the 
administration's request for the B-2. But, again, contrary to what some 
have said, it in no way endorsed the production of additional B-2 
bombers or bringing back the B-2 bomber production base. All of these 
funds, I point out, have been fenced until March 31. Hopefully, the 
administration will send up a rescission bill to take the funds out for 
the B-2 bomber.
  The only statement in the conference report regarding this $493 
million is the Senate conferees' statement that the funds can be 
spent--I want to emphasize these words--``only for procurement of B-2 
components, upgrades, and modifications'' for the existing B-2 fleet. 
The House conferees have remained silent on this issue. They were 
insisting that they could put language in the manager's statement that 
would allow for the opening of a brand new production line, and we 
successfully resisted that. Our language is that it should be used for 
spare parts, upgrades and modifications of the existing fleet, and not 
to open a brand new line.
  Second, because of our concern over the cost of the B-2, we called on 
the Secretary of Defense to explore what new technologies might be 
developed in the coming years for a new type of bomber that, hopefully, 
would be less expensive than the B-2.
  Make this very clear, Mr. President. We are opposed to opening up a 
brandnew line of the production of B-2 bombers. Now, some of our 
Members want that. But, frankly, the conferees on the Senate side 
believe that that was simply not affordable, and the conference report 
reflects that view.
  Mr. President, we asked the Secretary of Defense to make an 
examination of exactly what he would cut out if Congress were to direct 
him in the future to buy more B-2's. The Secretary of Defense has to 
come back and identify for us which programs he would cut because, 
clearly, it would exceed the President's budget and the 5-year defense 
plan. Because if any decision were ever made to buy more B-2's, we 
would have to then, at that time, start picking and choosing which 
systems would have to be deleted or defunded. That is something every 
Member ought to understand as to what we were able to achieve.
  To recap, Mr. President, there is not a single word in the conference 
report about buying components for new B-2's or bringing back the B-2 
production facilities that were closed. Everything in this conference 
report is focused on the high cost of the B-2 and the unacceptable 
trade-offs of other defense programs that would be required by any 
future decision to buy more B-2's. What the conference does talk about 
is using the authorized funds for supporting the existing B-2 fleet, 
not to open up a new B-2 line.
  Mr. President, I will conclude by telling you what I think is going 
on here. The President's political advisers would like the President to 
veto this bill, so he could score points with certain constituencies by 
arguing that we are spending too much on defense. They wanted him to 
veto the DOD appropriations bill for the same reason, but he could not 
do so because he wanted to win over some of the Members of this body on 
the Bosnia resolution. Now they are saying that while we lost that 
particular battle--he signed the bill even though he did not want to 
and the funds have been appropriated--so let us please certain 
constituents by urging him to veto this measure.
  But the President faces a real dilemma on this. He has deployed 
American troops to a war zone in Bosnia. Congress has adopted 
legislation supporting the troops in the field. If the President vetoes 
this conference report, he is going to be perceived by many soldiers 
and their families as withholding support for them--at the very time 
that he has dispatched them on a very dangerous mission.
  If he vetoes this, he will be vetoing a pay raise for the troops in 
Bosnia and all of our troops. He will be vetoing an increase in the 
housing allowance that supports their families back in Germany, here in 
the United States, and around the world. He will be vetoing a new 
program to allow DOD to use the private sector to improve military 
housing, which is a program DOD desperately wants and our soldiers and 
their families desperately need.
  In short, the President faces a dilemma. If he vetoes this bill, he 
will score some political points, but it will harm our troops and their 
families, including those now putting their lives on the line in 
Bosnia.
  So the members of his party in the Senate are trying to save him from 
this dilemma by defeating this conference report on the Senate floor. 
That is what this debate is really all about. All this discussion about 
the ABM Treaty and the various programs and the add-ons is really a 
cover for this issue.
  American troops are in the field. Their worried families are back in 
Germany and elsewhere, living in woefully substandard housing. We 
should be thinking about them and not the 1996 election season.
  I urge my colleagues to look beyond the litany of excuses offered on 
the other side for opposing this bill and do the right thing and pass 
the conference report. If the President chooses to veto it, let that be 
his choice, not ours.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to 
commend the able Senator from Maine on the excellent remarks he just 
made. He is a staunch member of the Armed Services Committee, and we 
are very proud of what he does for the defense of our Nation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). The Senator from Vermont is 
recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased that the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and the ranking Democratic 
member, Senator Nunn, and I have reached an agreement that permits this 
bill to be voted on today and sent to the President. I intend to vote 
against the bill for a number of reasons--arms control and others. But 
I do not want to hold up any further action on it.
  I am not going to take the Senate's time to repeat the contents of 
the agreement. It speaks for itself. It is of critical importance, 
because the provision that will be deleted from the bill, or reversed 
in the next Defense authorization bill, would have the effect of 
undermining an amendment that passed the Senate by a vote of 67-27. It 
is an amendment that has been agreed to by the House in the fiscal year 
1996 foreign operations conference report.
  I think this is only the first or second time in my 21 years here 
when I felt compelled to delay action on a piece of legislation. I did 
it in this instance because it is an issue I feel very, very strongly 
about.
  For the past 3 years, I have been trying to get the U.S. Government, 
and other governments, to act to stop the proliferation and use of 
antipersonnel landmines. There has been remarkable progress. In the 
past 9 months, several NATO countries took steps far exceeding those 
called for in the Leahy amendment. Nineteen countries have urged an 
immediate, total ban on these weapons. This was unheard of, even 
unthought of, 10 years ago.
  The Leahy amendment falls short of that, but it would be a step 
toward that goal, a goal I support and, in fact, a goal that President 
Clinton declared at the United Nations 1 year ago.
  I want to respond briefly to something the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee said yesterday. He said my amendment would ``impose 
a moratorium on the defensive use of antipersonnel landmines by U.S. 
Armed Forces,'' and that it would ``require the removal of minefields 
emplaced in demilitarized zones.'' I know some in the Pentagon who 
lobbied against my amendment may have said that, but that is not 
correct.
  My amendment would impose a 1-year moratorium on the use of 
antipersonnel mines except along international borders and except in 
demilitarized zones, where, I stress, their use is obviously defensive. 
I included that exception after discussions with officials in the 
administration, including 

[[Page S18861]]
the Pentagon, and with foreign governments. I concluded that in these 
limited instances--in fixed minefields along internationally recognized 
borders and in demilitarized zones where everyone knows where the mines 
are and where civilians can be effectively excluded and compliance 
monitored, an exception was warranted. I am talking about places like 
the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, or the border 
between Finland and Russia. Again, my amendment does not require the 
removal of these landmines.
  I do want to concur with the distinguished chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee when he said yesterday that the bill contains $20 
million for humanitarian demining activities--to remove these mines. I 
am glad he agrees with me about the compelling need for these funds, 
something I have urged in the past, in the Appropriations Committee as 
well as the Armed Services Committee. These are funds used to train and 
equip foreign personnel to remove landmines, in countries that do not 
have the expertise or capability to do it themselves.
  There are 100 million--100 million--unexploded landmines. They are in 
over 60 countries. If not one landmine was ever put down in the future, 
there would still be 100 million in 60 countries, waiting to explode. 
Bosnia has a small percentage of them, but that is 4 to 6 million 
landmines. The Defense Department has done an excellent job in getting 
the humanitarian demining program started. The regional CINCS have all 
expressed very strong support for it.
  Mr. President, I was prepared to speak for as long as necessary if we 
had not been able to reach an agreement to delete this provision. I am 
very grateful to Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn, for their 
willingness to do this. I also want to thank Senator Warner, who I know 
cares a great deal about the landmine problem.
  As we watch our troops land in Bosnia, the horror of landmines, and 
the serious impediment they pose to our forces, have become obvious to 
everyone. Look at this map. I ask my colleagues to take a moment to 
look at this map. Half of the former Yugoslavia is a minefield.
  In many areas, our troops will have to crawl on their knees, probing 
every single inch of the ground, to be sure it is free of mines before 
they move on. Any step could be their last. It could be a landmine that 
was put there randomly, weeks, months or even years ago, and now lying 
hidden beneath mud or snow.
  This is not an isolated problem. It is a plague that has infested 
almost every continent--Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Central America--
everywhere our troops are sent, either in combat or as peacekeepers, 
they will face landmines, millions and millions of them.
  But the overwhelming majority of the victims are innocent civilians. 
In Bosnia, like so many countries, many of the mines are plastic. They 
are impossible to detect with metal detectors. They are the size of a 
can of shoe polish. Most are strewn randomly. What maps exist are 
unreliable.
  In Bosnia already, 24 United Nations soldiers have been killed by 
mines, and 204 have been injured. Thousands of civilians have suffered 
similar fates. Mr. President, it is such a common occurrence that in 
Tuzla there is a place where you can buy one shoe--not a pair of 
shoes--but one shoe. Because so many people have lost a leg or a foot 
from the landmines.
  I mention this not to add to the anxiety of the families of our 
troops. They will be as prepared as any can be to avoid the threat of 
landmines. But there is no way to totally eliminate that threat.
  Last week, a United States sergeant in Bosnia was quoted as saying he 
wanted to be sure all the mines are gone before he led his men into an 
area. If my son was there I would want him under the command of a 
sergeant like that. The fact of the matter is that nobody can guarantee 
it. Even after our soldiers leave, the civilians and the refugees will 
go back to their land. When that time comes, the landmines will be 
there. Most countries that are littered with landmines, Bosnia 
included, cannot begin to afford the cost of clearing them. As one 
person told me from one of those countries, ``We clear the landmines an 
arm and a leg at a time.''
  Last week, UNICEF called for a ban on these weapons because of the 
carnage they are causing among children, and they called for an 
international boycott of any company that manufactures them. The 
American Red Cross has called for a ban. The U.S. State Department 
estimates that every 22 minutes someone is killed or maimed by a 
landmine. In the time I am speaking here now at least one person 
somewhere will be killed or horribly crippled for life by a landmine.
  We can debate all day about whether landmines have a military use. Of 
course they do. What weapon does not have some military use? But do 
they save lives? I challenge anyone in the Pentagon to prove that 
landmines save lives. One-third of our casualties--one-third--in 
Vietnam were from mines, including American mines. Our troops were 
casualties of their own minefields. That is up from 10 percent of what 
they were in World War II. A quarter of the Americans killed in the 
gulf war were from mines. Twenty-six percent of American casualties in 
Somalia were from mines. These are the Army's own statistics. It will 
be a miracle if Americans do not lose their limbs or lives from mines 
in Bosnia.
  In October, an American nurse lost both legs and part of her face 
from a mine in Rwanda. In June, two Americans died from a mine while 
they were on their honeymoon in the Red Sea area. Another lost a leg 
and part of another foot on a humanitarian mission in Somalia. He 
considers himself lucky because he survived, unlike so many mine 
victims in that country.
  These are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. We have a lot 
more to gain if we declare their use a war crime.
  Since August 4 when my amendment passed the Senate, over 10,000 
people have been killed or horribly maimed by these tiny explosives 
that are triggered by the pressure of a footstep. Think of that. In 
just the past 5 months.
  My amendment is modeled after our 1992 law to halt U.S. exports of 
antipersonnel mines. Since we passed that law, 29 governments have 
stopped all or most of the exports, and others, including France, 
Belgium, Austria, and the Philippines have taken steps to ban their 
production or use of antipersonnel mines and even to destroy their 
stockpiles.
  It is also totally consistent with what the President called for at 
the United Nations a year ago, when he declared the goal of the 
eventual elimination of antipersonnel landmines. Every day, 72 more 
people die or are mutilated by landmines. We need to stop talking about 
what we are going to do ``eventually,'' and start doing it today.
  My amendment is a step toward that goal. I thank the 67 Senators, 
Republicans and Democrats alike, who voted for it.
  The Pentagon says it did not create this problem and that halting our 
use of these weapons would not solve it. That kind of defeatist 
attitude does not belong in the Pentagon or anywhere else. Lest anyone 
forget, the moratorium in my amendment does not cover antitank mines or 
command detonated claymore mines that are used to guard a perimeter. It 
would not take effect for 3 years.
  The purpose of delaying its implementation is to give us time to go 
to other governments and say ``we are prepared to stop this, and we 
want you to join us.'' It gives us the moral authority, and it shifts 
the responsibility to them. If the United States shows leadership, 
strong leadership, if we halt our use of these indiscriminate weapons 
even temporarily, it will give a tremendous boost to the global effort 
to ban them.
  The certification in this bill, which was never debated or approved 
by either body, sounded innocent enough. But its effect would have been 
to prevent the moratorium from ever taking effect. It would have given 
the Pentagon a veto. Some have asked why wouldn't I want to know if the 
moratorium would endanger the lives of United States Armed Forces. Of 
course I am interested in the Pentagon's opinion. The conference report 
already asks for it. Even after the certification provision is deleted, 
per our agreement, the conference report will still contain a 
requirement that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit a 
report to the congressional defense committees 

[[Page S18862]]
containing his responses to seven questions concerning a moratorium on 
the use of landmines. I have discussed this with Senator Thurmond, and 
he agrees that he will join with me in submitting some additional 
questions I have to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for inclusion in 
that same report.
  Mr. President, the Pentagon wants an exception for mines that 
automatically self-deactivate. I wish that were the solution, but it is 
not. Those mines are just as indiscriminate. There is no way to limit 
how many can be used. There is no way to get governments or rebel 
groups that have millions of the $2 variety, which do not self-
deactivate, to destroy them so they can replace them with more 
expensive, modern mines. The only way is to ban all indiscriminate, 
antipersonnel landmines.
  Mr. President, we have seen photographs of our soldiers crawling on 
their stomachs, with sticks in their hands, trying to find where the 
landmines are, never knowing when they put their hand out just to brace 
themselves whether their arm will be blown off. That is terrible 
enough. But this picture is what you see in most countries. That is not 
a combatant. This is the typical landmine victim, a young girl with one 
leg gone. Her life changed forever.
  Mr. President, during the Civil War, General Sherman--no great 
humanitarian, called landmines ``a violation of civilized warfare.'' If 
President Clinton can restrain the Pentagon and my amendment becomes 
law, the United States will be able to show strong, moral leadership to 
rally others to put an end to this hideous, global curse. It will not 
be in time to prevent casualties of Americans or others in Bosnia, but 
it will save countless lives in the future.
  Mr. President, I know of no Member of the Senate, Republican or 
Democrat, who feels any affection for landmines. Certainly those who 
served in combat know how terrifying it is to know that there may be 
landmines under foot. Where we diverge, some of us, is how to get rid 
of them.
  I believe that as the greatest military power, we must set an 
example. There were negotiations in Vienna in September on proposals to 
deal with the landmine problem. It ended without agreement, partly 
because the United States did not exercise as strong leadership as it 
should have, and could have, on this issue, but also because of 
resistance by the armed forces of other countries. We did not push for 
what the President of the United States called for at the United 
Nations, the eventual elimination of landmines.
  I have been to Vienna. It is a beautiful city with luxurious 
accommodations. I could not help but think, if those same diplomats 
were to meet in a field in Cambodia and were pointed to a table several 
hundred yards out in the field, and told to walk out to that table--
``Work your way out. We will give you a probe to search for mines. Work 
your way out through that mine-infested field and negotiate an 
agreement on these perfidious weapons. And when you are done, work your 
way back.
  ``If you have not reached agreement on the first day, the table will 
be in a different field on the second day. And in a different one on 
the third day.''
  Mr. President, I think we probably would have an international ban on 
the use of indiscriminate antipersonnel landmines very, very quickly.
  I am not so naive to think that there would not be some pariahs who 
would continue to use them. But, like chemical weapons and nerve gas 
and anthrax and dum dum bullets and so on, those who use them are so 
much the exception to the rule that they would be branded international 
pariahs and war criminals.
  Maybe then a child like this can walk in a field without losing her 
leg. Maybe people could put their country back together after a war. 
Maybe American men and women who go on humanitarian or peacekeeping 
missions would go with one less danger.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a letter to me 
from Senator Thurmond, describing our agreement, be printed in the 
Record, along with a newspaper article from the Washington Post, dated 
December 17, 1995.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                Washington, DC, December 18, 1995.
     Senator Patrick J. Leahy,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Leahy: Pursuant to our discussion on the floor 
     this morning concerning consideration of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, I would like to recap 
     our agreement.
       We have agreed that:
       1. You will control 20 minutes of debate on the landmine 
     provision and I will control the same mount of time;
       2. You will not filibuster the defense authorization 
     conference report and will not object to a unanimous consent 
     for a time certain to vote on the defense authorization 
     conference report and;
       3. If the current version of the FY 96 Defense 
     Authorization bill does not become law, I will do everything 
     in my power to ensure that section 1402(b) (concerning a 
     certification in relation to the moratorium on landmine use) 
     is deleted from any subsequent version of the bill. If the 
     current version of the FY 96 Defense Authorization bill is 
     signed into law, I will do everything in my power to ensure 
     that section 1402(b) is reversed in the next Defense 
     Authorization bill.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995]

                       The Pentagon's Mine Games

                           (By Mary McGrory)

       It's ``PEACE on earth'' time. But peace in earth is of more 
     concern. The Pentagon is worried sick about the death buried 
     under the mud and snow of Bosnia, where thousands of U.S. 
     troops will be spending Christmas.
       Every day, we hear about the hidden threat that is more 
     dreaded than the weather, more feared than the snipers and 
     the hatred that infect the area. The number of land mines is 
     estimated at between 4 and 6 million. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-
     Vt.) calls these $2 weapons ``the Saturday Night special of 
     civil wars.'' There are an appalling 100 million of them 
     scattered around the world, many of them planted in countries 
     to which our troops may be sent. The prospects make the heart 
     sink. One-third of our Vietnam casualties were caused by land 
     mines, although the majority of land mine victims are 
     civilians.
       The Pentagon, while wringing its hands and beefing up anti-
     mine training, is pressing its campaign against the anti-land 
     mine legislation introduced by Leahy. The chief lobbyist for 
     keeping the world safe for land mines is none other than the 
     chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John 
     Shalikashvili. He says we need land mines to ``protect our 
     troops,'' an ironic formulation in view of the clear and 
     present danger they present in Bosnia.
       ``While I wholeheartedly support U.S. leadership in the 
     long-term goal of anti-personnel land mine elimination,'' he 
     wrote in a letter to one congressman, ``unilateral actions 
     which needlessly place our forces at risk now will not induce 
     good behavior from irresponsible combatants.''
       The Pentagon is pushing a high-tech solution: a land mine 
     that expires within a given period of time. The hope would be 
     that the 60 countries that have planted the cheap mines will 
     dig them up and replace them with the more expensive version. 
     Translation, according to Leahy: The Pentagon will decide 
     what weapons to get rid of--no civilian on Capitol Hill is 
     going to tell them.
       The commander-in-chief generally makes such decisions. Bill 
     Clinton is an instinctive opponent of an indiscriminate 
     killer like the land mine. A year ago, he told the United 
     Nations General Assembly that the U.S. goal is the ``eventual 
     elimination of anti-personnel land mines.'' Since then, 
     however, he has fallen silent. He seems to have retreated in 
     the face of pentagon opposition. Lately, he has been somewhat 
     more assertive in his role of chief of the armed forces, but 
     he still tends to defer to the chairman of the joint Chiefs. 
     The rest of the administration is deeply divided.
       Leahy has been the leader of the opposition to land mines 
     since 1989. He was haunted by the sight of a handsome 10-year 
     old boy at the Nicaraguan-Honduran border who was limping 
     around on a home-made crutch. A land mine had taken one leg 
     and had ``ruined his life.'' Leahy established a $5 million 
     annual fund to help victims. Three years later he got a one-
     year moratorium on the U.S. export of land mines. Legislation 
     banning land mine use passed the Senate by a two-thirds vote 
     this fall and the House by a voice vote. It is currently 
     stuck in conference.
       Leahy knows his colleagues sigh and roll their eyes when he 
     gets up for yet another land mine speech and shows 
     photographs of the hideous consequences to the causalities, 
     who, incidentally, are often children. On the coffee table of 
     his office, he keeps a small round green object made of 
     plastic and rubber that looks like a shoe-polish container. 
     It is the mine of choice for most of the countries whose land 
     is sown with them. He says that if U.N. negotiators were 
     required to sit around a table in the middle of a field in 
     Cambodia--now ``a land of amputees,'' in Leahy's words--they 
     would agree on a ban in a matter of two days at the most.
       The cheap plastic mines of Bosnia are difficult to detect, 
     Leahy notes. An aide gets 

[[Page S18863]]
     down on his knees to show how soldiers must pass a hand-held detector 
     inch by inch over a suspect area. The Leahy ban would do 
     nothing in Bosnia. But the Army's dilemma has spotlighted the 
     issue, which Leahy says stirs the same powerful reaction in 
     audiences of all persuasions--the VFW, NRA and the League of 
     Women Voters. Nineteen countries are for the ban.
       But in the Senate Armed Services Committee, men like Strom 
     Thurmond, Sam Nunn and John Warner, inveterate defenders of 
     the Defense Department, support the Pentagon's attempts to 
     gut Leahy's bill, even though it wouldn't take effect for 
     three years and permits mining of border and demilitarized 
     areas.
       Only the president can lead the way out of the world's mine 
     fields.

  Mr. LEAHY. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I do not believe that I will use the 20 
minutes allotted for me to respond to Senator Leahy, as I spoke about 
my concerns with his landmine provision yesterday. I will, however, 
reiterate a number of concerns expressed by myself, and other members 
of the committee, as well as the Department of Defense, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Justice, with regard 
to the landmine provision which is no longer in the defense 
authorization bill, and the reporting and certification provision.
  The Senator from Vermont has been a strong proponent of legislation 
that would eliminate anti-personnel landmines. I applaud the Senator 
for his efforts to make the world safer for innocent women and children 
who fall victim to these weapons of war used in many civil wars in the 
Third World.
  I cannot, however, support legislative efforts that would needlessly 
place U.S. Armed Forces at risk. In my view, and the view of a number 
of my colleagues on the committee, that would be the effect of the 
provision that was incorporated in Senator Leahy's landmine 
moratorium--which I emphasize is not in the Defense authorization 
conference report, pursuant to Senator Leahy's request, but is in fact 
in the Fiscal Year 1996 Foreign Appropriations Conference Report.
  Mr. President, the provision currently in the Defense authorization 
conference report would require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to submit a report to the congressional defense committees each 
April 30 for 3 years, that would include the following information:
  The extent to which the defensive use of anti-personnel landmines by 
U.S. Armed Forces adheres to international law;
  The effects that a landmine moratorium on the defensive use of the 
current U.S. inventory of remotely delivered, self-destructing antitank 
systems, antipersonnel landmines, and antitank mines;
  The reliability of self-destructing antipersonnel and antitank mines 
in the U.S. inventory;
  The cost of clearing the antipersonnel currently protecting our naval 
station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and other United States installations;
  The cost of replacing those antipersonnel mines with substitutes and 
the level of protection provided by the substitutes;
  The extent to which the defensive use of antipersonnel and antitank 
landmines are a source of civilian casualties around the world and the 
extent to which the United States and the Department of Defense have 
contributed to alleviating the illegal and indiscriminate use of these 
munitions;
  The impact or effect of the moratorium on U.S. Armed Forces during 
operations other than war.
  Last, the provision would require the Secretary of Defense to certify 
that a legislated moratorium would not adversely affect U.S. Armed 
Forces defensive capabilities and that they have adequate substitutes.
  The Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Department of Justice have raised objections to the Senator's 
provision, and particularly to the implementation of a moratorium on 
the use of antipersonnel landmines by the U.S. Armed Forces for 
defensive purposes because of its detrimental impact on the ability of 
the military forces to protect themselves. The Department of Justice 
also believes that the provision would seriously infringe on the 
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief on how 
weapons are to be used in military operations.
  Mr. President, as I stated yesterday, I do not understand why the 
Senator from Vermont would not want this information.
  Certainly, he would want to know that the moratorium would not 
seriously risk or endanger the lives the U.S. Armed Forces who are to 
be sent out in to situations where their very lives are at stake, with 
the necessary munitions and weapons to defend themselves.
  Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Alaska, 
Senator Stevens.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, earlier this year I joined a bipartisan 
majority that voted in favor of the Senate version of the 1996 National 
Defense Authorization Act. I had hoped to be able to provide 
unqualified support for this conference report. I want the Senate to 
know I will vote for this bill, but I do have some serious reservations 
that I have voiced to my good friend from South Carolina, the chairman 
of the committee. I really have the expectation that we may have the 
opportunity to reconsider some of the elements of this legislation in 
the future.
  But I do want to say the bill sets the right course on the 
development of key national and theater missile defense systems. These 
projects were fully funded earlier this year in the Defense 
appropriations bill, which became the Defense Appropriations Act when 
signed by the President.
  Under the leadership of Senator Thurmond, this bill provides many 
critically needed increases for the quality of life for the military. 
Military pay, benefits, and allowances were again fully funded in the 
Defense appropriations bill. These initiatives reflect not only the 
Appropriations Committee's priorities but also those of Senator 
Thurmond and the Armed Services Committee members, their longstanding 
efforts. We have joined together to provide for the needs of the men 
and women who served in the Armed Forces and their families.
  I want to, once again, commend Senator Thurmond for sustaining these 
quality of life items in the bill he has now presented to the Senate as 
a conference report. These priorities enable me to support the bill 
generally while, as I said, I do find it flawed in instances compared 
to the same bill as it passed the Senate in September.
  There are initiatives that are not supported by the Department of 
Defense, not funded in the defense appropriations bill, and in some 
instances they directly conflict with provisions of legislation that 
has already been enacted by this Congress and approved by the President 
after bipartisan support in the House and the Senate.
  I do regret this dispute. We do have disputes from time to time 
between the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee. 
I hope we can once again try, next year, and the years to come, to work 
together to better reconcile these two bills. The problem is, having 
given the Department a bill in September that--the Senate passed a bill 
in September--we funded that bill primarily in the Appropriations 
Committee bill that was brought to the floor and approved by the 
President. Now this bill takes a different approach, in many instances. 
It is that new approach that comes out of conference, which I know we 
all have problems in conference--but it is my feeling that we should 
express--at least on behalf of the Appropriations Committee I should 
express these reservations, with no lack of respect for my good friend 
from South Carolina, or the committee that he serves with. But I do so 
out of the belief that Congress should give the Department of Defense 
consistent guidance. They have literally been spending from this 1995 
decision, from the 1996 decision. I want to point out how this bill, 
now, changes the pattern that has already been put down in terms of our 
defense effort.
  We should seek to minimize the interference and micromanagement of 
the military by the conference. This conference report is nearly 1,000 
pages in length and poses significant and, in some instances, I think 
unfortunate restrictions on funds already made available for vital 
military programs.
  Let me say, for instance, that sections 224 and 225 of this bill 
restrict all spending for the $9.7 billion defense-

[[Page S18864]]
wide research and development account, the RDT&E account. That includes 
all missile defense funds until 14 days after a series of reports are 
provided to Congress. These two sections will result in massive 
disruption to hundreds of programs.
  These funds have already been appropriated, and based on the December 
1 approval and enactment of our appropriations bill, it makes no sense 
to suspend literally hundreds of contracts that are already now in 
existence based upon the December 1 approval until a series of reports 
are presented to Congress next year.
  Another section, 131 of the bill, mandates spending on four different 
submarines, with contracts and dollar levels allocated to specific 
contractors, notwithstanding the views of the Navy or the performance 
of those contractors on the boats. The provision further requires the 
President to include these submarines in future year budgets, whether 
the Navy wants them or not.
  I have to ask the question: Why should submarines now take priority 
over all Army, Air Force, and Marine requirements in the future? This 
provision I think is wrong. We should not tie the hands of future 
Presidents or those who make the budgets, or denigrate the needs of 
other services because of a commitment to one portion of one service.
  Even more difficult for me than that is the next section, 132, which 
takes $50 million out of funds we appropriated to redress the 
documented shortcomings of our military sealift and spends that $50 
million on even another new submarine development.
  I think there is a strong consensus in the Congress and the 
Department on the need for improved global lift. This is the transfer 
that I mentioned, this $50 million. It is not an authorization. It 
literally shifts the money already appropriated for sealift to another 
nonexistent, future, previously unauthorized development program. It 
was a new program to me.
  Additionally troubling to me are the provisions of the bill on 
readiness and the needs of the National Guard and Reserve. These 
provisions are in direct conflict with the provisions that were 
adopted, as I said, by Congress earlier this year when we brought forth 
the defense appropriations bill.

  This bill, this conference report, will reduce full-time military 
technician support for the Army and Air Guard. It phases out the 
National Guard Youth Challenge Program and does not authorize $100 
million in readiness and training funds appropriated for the National 
Guard and Reserve on December 1.
  At a time now, Mr. President, when thousands of Reserve and Guard 
personnel are being called to active duty and actually deployed to 
Bosnia, this bill I think sends the wrong message. The Guard and 
Reserve deserve our support right now, too, and I believe they should 
have our support, and I am troubled by those sections that decrease the 
support for the Guard and Reserve.
  The President's decision to commit United States troops to Bosnia, 
along with ongoing contingency operations in Haiti, Cuba, the Middle 
East, and Korea, puts enormous strain on the defense budget. To 
accommodate those requirements, the appropriations bill increased the 
DOD transfer authority to $2.4 billion. This bill reduces that limit to 
$2 billion. It will constrain the Department's ability to meet 
emergency requirements, and I think instead Congress still has to 
review and approve all such transfers. There is really no reason to 
lower the limit on reprograms at a time when we have myriad overseas 
operations ongoing.
  Another section, section 1006, prohibits the obligation of funds for 
specific programs appropriated not for the next year, 1996, the year we 
are in now, but for the last year, fiscal year 1995. I know of no basis 
for this conference report to restrict the availability of funds 
already obligated and committed to ongoing programs from the last 
fiscal year.
  A vital safety and lifesaving service in the United States, for 
instance, is the Civil Air Patrol. In my State, the Civil Air Patrol is 
fully integrated into the Department's search and rescue system, and 
the Civil Air Patrol makes a tremendous contribution across the Nation. 
Despite their record of achievement, this bill fails to fully authorize 
the appropriated levels of the Civil Air Patrol for 1996.
  Mr. President, I hope this is just an oversight because I know that 
the Armed Services Committee has in the past supported the Civil Air 
Patrol. I hope it is in error and not a statement of opposition because 
I think we need the Civil Air Patrol. The Civil Air Patrol is one of 
the ongoing functions to feed new pilots into the whole military 
system. It should not be denigrated at this time.
  Section 912 of the bill creates a new mechanism that funnels savings 
from operation and procurement programs into a new fund that is used 
for additional procurement. It, in effect, is a way to have an ongoing 
rolling appropriations, which bothers me. I believe modernization of 
the Department is underfunded, and I think the range of contingency 
operations we face for 1996 and 1997 will bring some changes. All 
savings will be channeled to meet these liabilities. The cost of Bosnia 
will be paid from within the current levels available for defense. Any 
savings must be utilized to preserve readiness and the quality of life 
before any additional allocation for procurement programs.
  This bill goes further than past bills to limit obligations of 
appropriated funds, rather than authorize programs.
  These ex post facto limitations create conflicts the Department of 
Defense must seek to resolve between two bills passed by Congress.
  The failure of the Armed Services Committee to complete this 
legislation before enactment of the appropriations bill is no reason 
for this bill to impose numerous restrictions on programs adopted by 
Congress just last month. I hope that in future consideration of this 
bill or other legislation we can resolve these differences.
  Mr. President, I hope that the committee will work with us on these 
matters. I now have to, however, go into another function as chairman 
of the Governmental Affairs Committee.
  On October 31, I wrote to the chairman to express our comments on the 
proposed changes in the retirement credit for employees of 
nonappropriated funds activities. Regretfully, the conference report 
includes section 1043, which establishes a new, complex, and unfunded 
liability for retirement funds of Federal employees.
  According to the Office of Personnel Management, this proposal 
creates new gaps in coverage, treats similar service differently, and 
creates new inequities. I do hope that the chairman of the committee 
will work with me, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Director 
of OPM to understand and clarify these new guidelines and protect the 
retirement benefits. I see no reason to give nonappropriated funds 
employees greater benefits than those who work fully for the taxpayers.
  I also have a comment about section 567. We have initiated a control 
over the HIV virus. This bill requires that the military expel from the 
military any person who contracts HIV. With our military people 
deployed to high-HIV-incident areas--Southeast Asia, Africa, and part 
of the Caribbean--I believe that we have to have a policy to handle 
those deployments.
  We started a program in the Department to deal with an effort to 
develop a vaccine to protect men and women in the military from the 
risk of infection from HIV. Unfortunately, that program is canceled, 
and the new concept of expelling from the military those who get HIV is 
in the bill.
  Despite including section 567, the conference report fails to 
authorize the funds provided in the appropriations bill to assist the 
Department to develop a vaccine--to protect the men and women of the 
military from the risk of infection. If the Armed Services Committee 
wants to expel victims of AIDS from the military, they should support 
efforts to combat this terrible disease.
  I want the Senator to know that I am not critical of what he is 
trying to do. I just do not believe this is the way to do it. I think 
that we ought to have some way to develop a policy that is consistent. 
We did have prophylactics dealing with venereal diseases. I do not know 
why we cannot press on and develop the vaccine that will prevent the 
transfer of HIV.
  Mr. President, I understand and appreciate the difficult 
circumstances a 

[[Page S18865]]
conference can impose, and the compromises necessary to achieve a bill. 
I have made this statement on the floor on my own behalf in previous 
years. But these provisions cannot be viewed as setting any precedents 
for future bills.
  At a time when personnel are en route to Bosnia, and deployed across 
the globe, we must do our job, and protect their pay and benefits. I 
hope all Members will support this effort.
  I hope again now that Senators will join with this committee to 
support our people who are en route to Bosnia, who are deployed around 
the globe. I think we must do our job and protect the pay and benefits 
of all these people who put their lives in harm's way to support our 
Nation.
  I wish to join the chairman and support this bill. I urge him and the 
members of the committee, however, to rethink some of these provisions. 
They take us off in the wrong direction as we are trying to conserve 
defense dollars, and I do believe that all Members of the Senate should 
join in to make certain that the dollars we put in for defense are 
spent for defense needed in the coming fiscal year and no more.
  I thank my friend. I know that he may be a little bit disturbed at my 
criticism. It is meant in good faith and with great respect for him and 
his service to the Nation and to the military people by his devotion to 
their needs. But I do think this bill is not the same bill that the 
Senator crafted in our Armed Services Committee. It is the changes that 
have come out of the conference that really disturb me and to which I 
directed my attention here on the floor. I thank him for his time.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the Senator for his 
remarks, and it will be a pleasure to work with him and the 
Governmental Affairs Committee in trying to correct anything here that 
should be corrected.
  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now yield 10 minutes to the able 
Senator from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank the Chair. And I thank the distinguished chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. President, notwithstanding my opposition to several specific 
provisions included in the conference report on Defense authorization, 
and concerns about how the conference itself was conducted, I will vote 
to approve the report on final passage. I do so reluctantly, knowing 
that the President has indicated he will veto the bill if it passes, 
and knowing that most Democrats--including the respected former 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and now ranking member, 
Senator Nunn--and some Republicans, will vote against it.
  In truth, I agree with most of the reservations expressed by the 
President, Secretary Perry, Senator Nunn, and many of my Democratic 
colleagues on the committee. But if we do not approve this conference 
report, I believe we run the very real risk of not getting a Defense 
authorization bill this year and I believe this bill even in its 
current form is better than no bill at all.
  Were it absolutely clear that the deficiencies in this legislation 
could be corrected and a new report passed very quickly, I might join 
my Democratic colleagues in opposing it. But because I am not as 
sanguine as others about that result, I want to show my support for the 
majority of the measures as they exist in the report and to ensure that 
it not be viewed in strictly partisan terms.
  Mr. President, we have learned repeatedly in this century that new 
enemies can arise on distant shores within a matter of years, and that 
the price of inadequate preparation--in places like Bataan or the 
Kasserine Pass in World War II, or Osan during the Korean War--can be 
very high.
  We now live in an era where the complexity of military systems 
mandates decades of development before those systems are fielded, 
meaning that we have to prepare now for the unexpected conflicts of 
tomorrow.
  Our national strategy calls for being prepared to fight two major 
regional conflicts simultaneously. My colleagues on the Armed Services 
Committee know that unless our major procurement accounts are 
strengthened we simply won't have enough airlift, ships, and smart 
munitions to fight and win decisively in two major regional conflicts.
  Yet despite the steady drone of critics attacking this strategy, no 
one has offered a more attractive alternative. Until a broadly 
supported alternative is adopted, I intend to provide more than just 
lip service in advocating a procurement program that supports our 
national strategy. The conference report attempts to address some of 
the major shortfalls in the procurement accounts.
  My Armed Services colleagues are also aware that funding for 
readiness cannot tolerate further reductions without serious erosion of 
troop morale and effectiveness. The conference report adequately funds 
readiness.
  And of course, we all know that we must maintain decisive U.S. 
superiority on the battlefield of the 21st century.
  This report authorizes adequate funding for the research and 
development that will provide our troops the communications, the 
intelligence, and the weaponry to defeat any enemy, anywhere, anytime.
  But there are areas of significant disagreement, as well. I have 
carefully reviewed the issues that concern the President and others, 
and I share many of their criticisms. In the case of ballistic missile 
defenses, while the conference report is much less onerous than the 
House version of the bill, it would nonetheless send a message to the 
Russians that our commitment to the ABM Treaty is tenuous.
  In committee, I offered an amendment to strike a measure from the 
Senate version of the bill that would restrict a servicewoman's access 
to privately funded abortions overseas. It was supported by a majority 
of committee members, including two Republicans. And I was very 
disappointed when the measure was restored in the conference report.
  The report includes provisions discharging HIV-positive service 
members on the pretext that they are nonworldwide deployable, when in 
reality no others who are permanently nonworldwide deployable are 
forced out under current law.
  Mr. President, the report includes roughly half a billion dollars to 
continue funding the B-2 bomber. This funding was removed by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee--with the support of four Republicans--but 
again restored in conference. This despite a detailed analysis by the 
Department of Defense which showed that the contribution of additional 
B-2's would be marginal in a theater campaign when compared to more 
cost-effective means of weapons delivery, such as precision-guided 
munitions. If we did not have such pressing fiscal constraints, more B-
2's would make sense--indeed I've supported those to date--but not when 
we are shutting down the Government because we can't agree on the 
really tough spending choices necessary to balance the budget in 7 
years.
  There are far too many earmarks in the report that will prove costly 
to the taxpayer. There are earmarks for unrequested Department of 
Energy weapons programs, Buy America designations, and National Guard 
and Reserve equipment. And there are earmarks for ships, including 
submarines which are vitally important to two shipbuilders, one of 
which is in my own State.
  Rather than designate particular submarines for particular 
shipbuilders, I had hoped that we would be able to authorize a winner-
take-all competition to save the taxpayers billions in procurement 
dollars.
  In the end, my senior Virginia colleague helped devise a compromise 
to designate the builders of the first two subs to minimize development 
risks, followed by competition on the third and subsequent subs. The 
conferees accepted this compromise, but also allowed for the option of 
building some additional prototype submarines, if the Navy concludes it 
can achieve a more affordable and more effective submarine by doing so. 
This is not a perfect solution, but it is better and less expensive 
than the alternative of eliminating any hope of eventual competition by 
designating a single submarine builder as was originally planned by the 
Navy.
  My biggest problem with the conference report is that it reflects too 
few tough choices. Too often the conferees resolved differences in 
procurement priorities between the Senate and 

[[Page S18866]]
House not by compromising but by agreeing to the requests of both. 
That's not cost-effective, but politics is defined as the art of the 
possible and the most cost-efficient approach would not have enjoyed 
majority support.
  Mr. President, some of my Democratic colleagues on the Armed Services 
Committee will vote against this report--at least in part--to protest 
their exclusion from the conference process. After a few pro forma 
panel meetings, the panels were dissolved with no full committee 
meetings called to reconcile differences. But while I share the 
frustrations of my colleagues about the congressional conference 
committee, chaired this year by the House--I believe the final report 
moves in the right direction in enough areas to justify my support.
  By passing this legislation, we make it clear that we are committed 
to ending the defense budget free fall. We send a firm and unambiguous 
message of support to our troops in Bosnia. We preserve the many 
provisions agreed upon through delicate compromises that could be very 
difficult to rebuild if the report is returned to conference. We may 
have to do that, if we cannot resolve the differences, quickly, but it 
would be a bad precedent, and would reduce incentives for the Armed 
Services Committees--or any committees for that matter--to work out the 
tough issues within a single coherent bill.
  Finally, we ensure the prompt implementation of the many fiscal year 
1996 defense programs, acquisitions, and operations that have been put 
on hold for weeks now by our delay.
  It has been suggested that particular provisions in the conference 
report, such as the pay raise and BAQ increase, be attached to other 
legislation if this report is vetoed to ensure their prompt enactment.
  If the conference report is defeated here on the floor or vetoed at 
the White House, I will work with the conferees and the President to 
resolve the veto issues as quickly as possible and I will urge my 
fellow conferees to stay focused on the specific concerns of the 
President to avoid unraveling the many fragile compromises contained in 
this report.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I yield back any 
time that I may have been allocated. And I thank the distinguished 
chairman of the committee.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from 
Virginia for the outstanding remarks that he has made on this bill.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the Office of Operational Test and 
Evaluation [OT & E] in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was 
established and strengthened by Congress in the early 1980's to ensure 
that weapons we provide our troops have been vigorously tested in an 
independent and realistic manner. The statutes behind this Office were 
one of the most important achievements of Congress' effort to reform 
the defense acquisition process. It is legislation that continues to 
save the tax-payers billions of dollars. Most importantly, these 
statutes continue to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform.
  It is, thus, surprising that the Defense authorization conference 
report would repeal these public laws that Congress passed with strong 
bipartisan support. Provisions in H.R. 1530 will repeal section 139 of 
title 10 that established and provides independent authority to the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Two weeks ago I, along 
with Senator David Pryor and Senator Charles Grassley, urged the 
conferees to remove these damaging provisions.
  We reminded our colleagues that last August this very chamber 
unanimously passed a resolution stating that the authorities and office 
of OT&E must be preserved. I am disappointed that the conferees appear 
to have disregarded our advice and, more importantly, the unanimous 
opinion of the Senate.
  What is at stake in the Defense authorization bill are the lives of 
our men and women in uniform. And, there is no one more concerned than 
I about the well-being of our troops.
  The Office of Operational Test and Evaluation was created 
specifically to ensure the safety of our troops. Section 139, the 
statute that the conference bill repeals, gives our troops confidence 
that the weapons they bring to the battlefield have been tested 
vigorously in an independent manner and in an operationally realistic 
environment. Over more than a decade of service, OT&E has ensured that 
the new weapons with which we equip our soldiers can be relied upon in 
combat.
  That is how OT&E saves lives.
  OT&E also saves the taxpayer billions of dollars. Its establishment 
institutionalized a very simple premise: That we should not spend 
billions of dollars on a new weapon unless we are sure that it works 
and will be effective on the battlefield. OT&E is the institutional 
core of the Pentagon's fly before you buy approach to new weapons and 
equipment.
  OT&E saves both lives and money because section 139 requires that the 
testing and evaluation of new weapons are directed by an official whose 
authorities are independent from the services and whose authorities are 
not vulnerable to pressures of the Pentagon's procurement bureaucracy.
  Some of us may recall the cancellation of the Sergeant York--DIVAD--
antiaircraft system. The problems of this faulty program were 
identified and highlighted by OT&E. The DIVAD was a billion dollar 
boondoggle which was terminated by OT&E's independent tests and 
evaluations despite protests from within the Pentagon. One can imagine 
what the risks would have been to our soldiers had this system been 
deployed.
  Another example of OT&E saving lives is the performance of the 
Bradley infantry fighting vehicle during the war against Iraq. The 
Bradley had never seen combat until Operation Desert Storm.
  The mission of the Bradley is to deliver troops safety to combat. 
Independent operational testing conducted by OT&E demonstrated that the 
Bradley's original design seriously jeopardized the lives of the troops 
it was meant to protect. Over the Army's objections, the Bradley's 
production schedule was extended so that design flaws were remedied.
  In one of the many studies conducted after Operation Desert Storm, 
Army Maj. Gen. Peter McVey testified on the performance of the Bradley. 
He stated that ``more lives of soldiers than we can count'' were saved 
by the combat-like testing to which the Bradley was subjected prior to 
its full production and deployment to the gulf.
  Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reiterated this conclusion 
when he stated that the vigorous independent testing oversight put into 
place by Congress saved more lives than perhaps any other single 
initiative.
  In addition to the Bradley and the Sergeant York, OT&E has 
contributed significantly to performance, capability and reliability of 
the equipment and weapons systems our Defense authorization and 
appropriations bill purchase for our taxpayers and, above all, of our 
soldiers. These include improvements to the C-17 cargo plane, the Aegis 
Cruiser, and there are numerous other examples.
  In each case OT&E ensured that each of these systems were subjected 
to vigorous independent testing. Their evaluations contributed to 
design changes that improved their capabilities and reliability. In 
other cases, wasteful programs were terminated.
  In this way, the legislation that established the office and 
authorities of the Director of OT&E simultaneously improved the safety 
of our soldiers and saved the taxpayer money. That alone makes section 
139 of title 10 one of the most important achievements in acquisition 
reform of the last decade. We should be protecting, if not 
strengthening, such statutes.
  What would be the bottom line if we repeal section 139? In the name 
of reducing the size of the Pentagon, we will have eliminated a tiny 
office whose work has proven essential to the very objectives of H.R. 
1530, providing a rational, accountable, and efficient system of 
management in the Pentagon.
  To eliminate this office as we are sending our troops to Bosnia seems 
to be all the more incredulous. These troops, many of whom are 
embarking through Dover Air Force Base in my State of Delaware, will be 
deploying with an array of new equipment that has never been tested in 
combat. Can we imagine sending our troops to battle with equipment we 
have not made the fullest effort to subject to operationally realistic 
testing? 

[[Page S18867]]

  If we are really concerned about our troops, we should be vehemently 
opposed to the provisions that would eliminate the independence and 
authorities of the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation. We cannot 
accept these provisions and claim that we are doing our utmost to 
ensure the safety and welfare of our men and women in uniform.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the conference report 
on the defense authorization bill and to urge my colleagues to vote 
against it.
  Earlier this year I voted against the authorization bill in committee 
and on the Senate floor. In each case I was doing so for the first time 
in my 13 years in the Senate during all of which I have served on the 
Armed Services Committee. On September 6 when the Senate passed this 
bill I warned my colleagues that we were going to conference with a bad 
Senate bill and an even worse House bill and that it was hard to 
imagine a conference result many of us could support. My only hope was 
that having seen thirty-four Senators vote against the bill on 
September 6, including the ranking Democrat on every Armed Services 
Subcommittee, the majority would reach out to try to deal with the 
concerns of these members. Many of those who voted against the bill on 
September 6 were, like me, casting the first vote in their Senate 
careers against a Defense authorization bill.
  Unfortunately, there was no reaching out in conference. With the sole 
exception of the ballistic missile defense provisions there was not a 
Member level meeting of the conference to which Democrats were invited 
in two months. We were simply informed through our staffs as to how 
issues had been resolved, in some cases after that information had 
already reached the press. Indeed, I found the press a very 
enlightening source over the past two months about Member level 
meetings occurring between House and Senate Republicans.
  This is not how conferences have previously worked in my 13 years on 
the committee under Chairmen Tower, Goldwater, and Nunn. Never were the 
views of the minority disregarded on so many items. Never was there no 
opportunity given the minority to at least have their views heard 
during the conference and to test the sentiment of members, not staff, 
by putting issues to votes.
  There has always been a big four process where the full committee 
chairmen and ranking members would meet to try to resolve the truly 
difficult issues the solution to which had eluded the subcommittee 
chairmen and ranking members. But never before did that process start 
2\1/2\ months before the end of the conference when almost no issues 
had been resolved at the panel level and never before were the results 
of that process, especially controversial results, not briefed to 
members for their discussion and approval at member-level meetings of 
Senate conferees.
  Mr. President, I believe that, unless corrected, what has happened 
this year on this bill in terms of process alone portends a very bleak 
future for the Armed Services Committee and the Defense authorization 
process. The majority may be dooming a committee that has always 
strived for bipartisanship, and therefore relevance, to becoming a 
highly partisan debating society with all the real decisions being left 
to the Appropriations Committee. When the Armed Services Committee 
works on a bipartisan basis, as Senator Smith and Senator Cohen did on 
the good acquisition reform provisions in this bill, it can make real 
contributions to providing this Nation an effective defense at the 
lowest cost to the taxpayers. But that was not the norm in this 
conference.
  I have spoken thus far about a broken process. Let me now, Mr. 
President, list some of the problems I see in this bill. I will use two 
baselines for comparison purposes, the defense authorization bill 
passed by the Senate on September 6 by a 64 to 34 margin and the 
Defense appropriations conference report which passed the Senate on 
November 16 by a 59 to 39 margin.
  This bill is significantly worse than both those measures. It not 
only authorizes a net $7 billion in additional spending for 
unrequested, often unneeded and unsustainable projects which were 
included in the appropriations conference report, it breaks new ground 
in making bad public policy in a whole series of areas not previously 
put before the Senate.
  I will not go through them all in any detail for that would take too 
much of the Senate's time on a doomed conference report. But let me 
cite some of the examples: provisions on ballistic missile defense 
which would clearly undermine the ABM Treaty and revive the cold war, a 
mandate to discharge people who are HIV-positive from the military even 
if they can carry out their responsibilities, a mandate to terminate 
the independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, an office 
that previously enjoyed strong bipartisan support, a series of 
shipbuilding provisions that represent the sum of all parochial 
interests, but fail to meet the national interest, a series of 
protectionist special-interest buy America provisions that go beyond 
anything I have previously seen in a Defense authorization conference 
report, provisions on funding of contingency operations and on command 
and control of U.S. Forces that raise constitutional issues, the total 
undermining of the land mine moratorium provision which this body 
passed 67 to 27 on August 4 and which we passed again as part of the 
foreign operations appropriations bill, and on and on.
  I am only going to go into detail on one relatively minor issue, the 
sale of the Federal interest in Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1 at Elk 
Hills, CA, a field that is currently jointly owned with Chevron Corp. 
This field is one of the 10 largest oil fields in the United States 
with some estimates of recoverable reserves running well over a billion 
barrels of oil equivalent. The taxpayers own approximately 78 percent 
of the field and Chevron owns the rest.
  This issue of the sale of Elk Hills was the subject of some 
considerable discussion last Friday. The point was made by the senior 
Senator from Virginia that the administration had proposed the sale of 
Elk Hills. That is true. But it is also true that the administration, 
as recently as 2 weeks ago, continued to ask for 2 years to complete 
the transaction--through September 30, 1997--and it is also true that 
the administration asked for the fallback option of authority to create 
a government-owned corporation to manage the reserves if it could not 
get an adequate price for its interest in Elk Hills. If the 
administration proposal were in this bill, particularly with regard to 
timing, this Senator would not be raising any concern about this 
provision. Unfortunately, it is not what is in the bill.
  Let me review the history as I understand it. Democrats on the Armed 
Services Committee have been concerned about insuring against a fire 
sale of this valuable asset since this issue was thrust upon us by the 
budget resolution in June. That resolution effectively mandated the 
sale of all the naval petroleum reserves in 1 year. We had held no 
hearings on this subject this year, and in the one hearing where this 
issue had been brought up in 1994, there had been criticism from the 
Republican side of DOE s plans to sell Elk Hills.
  Nevertheless, since the majority felt that it must respond to the 
budget resolution mandate, I and other Democrats sought as best we 
could without the benefit of hearings to add safeguards against a fire 
sale during committee deliberations in June and in a floor amendment in 
July. The most important safeguard was one cited by the senior Senator 
from Virginia on Friday; namely, that the Secretary of Energy and the 
Director of OMB could bring the sales process to a halt if they felt 
they were not going to get an adequate price or if they felt another 
course of action was more in the national interest. This safeguard is 
similar in effect to the administration safeguard that they be allowed 
to form a government-owned corporation as a fallback if they are not 
getting an adequate price. This is the course recommended by the 
National Academy of Public Administration.
  Unfortunately, all safeguards, both those in the Senate-passed 
authorization bill provision and those in the administration proposal, 
ran afoul of Congressional Budget Office [CBO] scoring. It was the view 
of CBO that the safeguards were likely to be utilized and that 
therefore a second bill would be needed to sell the Elk Hills 

[[Page S18868]]
reserve. So for purposes of the reconciliation bill, the committee, 
over Democratic opposition, recommended dropping the safeguard 
provision.
  As many Members know, thanks to the same CBO scoring, this provision 
became subject to the Byrd rule in the reconciliation process and was 
dropped from that legislation on a point of order. CBO effectively 
found that sale of the Elk Hills would not contribute to deficit 
reduction in fiscal years 1996 to 2002, and most importantly from the 
point of view of the Byrd rule, would make deficits worse for decades 
after that.
  CBO projected that the sale of Elk Hills would only generate $1.5 
billion for the taxpayers. In my view, and luckily in the view of 
senior administration officials, if that's all the taxpayers are 
offered, this sale should not happen. CBO got this low number through 
the combination of a very conservative estimate of recoverable reserves 
and the use of a very high discount rate for future revenues, far above 
Government discount rates.
  Once this issue was taken out of the budget process, where it never 
should have been in the first place, I and other Democrats thought the 
best thing to do was put it off to next year so we could really 
understand it. That was the initial decision in the staff discussions 
in conference. But then the issue was reopened. To give the majority 
staff credit, they insisted on the key safeguard which the Senate had 
passed, namely, that the Secretary of Energy could stop the sale if the 
Government was not getting an adequate price or if another course of 
action better served our national interest. But when our minority staff 
recommended that we allow 2 years for the sale as the administration 
had proposed, my understanding is that the House majority staff 
refused. We regret that and regret that Democratic Members on our side 
were not given the chance to address the issue with Members from the 
other body.
  A rushed sale does not work in the taxpayers' interest, although it 
may well work to the advantage of private parties. Members on both 
sides know from experience that it often takes the executive branch in 
general, and the Department of Energy in particular, longer to do 
things than they predict. So the 2 years which the administration has 
requested may well be optimistic in terms of completing a one-of-a-kind 
transaction which the Department has never attempted before. The 
indications which my staff have heard are that the Department of Energy 
has been withholding information on the potential value of this field 
from interested private sector parties. At least one private sector 
entity seeking information in Government files about the field has been 
told it must use the Freedom of Information Act to get that 
information. That is obviously not the way to generate interest for 
potential buyers of this valuable asset which has produced a net $13 
billion in federal revenues over the past 20 years.

  My view is that the controversy over this relatively minor provision 
in this huge bill is an example of where bipartisan member meetings 
might well have resulted in a different and better outcome. As I said 
earlier, there are far more important and numerous reasons to oppose 
this bill. But this provision is an example of the breakdown in the 
conference process which I referred to at the outset of my remarks and 
which I very much regret.
  Mr. President, it is not with any pleasure that I am going to cast my 
first vote against a Defense authorization conference report in my 
thirteen years in the Senate. I am sure that is true for the many 
Members who will be casting such a vote for the first time in their 
careers, some of which are far longer than mine. But I am absolutely 
sure that it is the right vote. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
opposing the bill and sending it back to conference for more work. If 
it is passed, I will urge the President to carry out his threat to veto 
it. I hope the majority will then respond to the President's request to 
provide for the January 1 military pay raise on separate legislation 
prior to adjourning this year and that next year we can work on a 
bipartisan basis on a Defense authorization bill that can become law.


                         Competition Provisions

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I, along with other 
Members, spent a great deal of time on the competition provisions of 
the conference report. We have prepared a joint statement on these 
provisions that I ask be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the joint statement was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

    Joint Statement of Senators Cohen and Levin on the Competition 
        Provisions in the Fiscal Year 1996 DOD Authorization Act

       Several contractor organizations have expressed concern 
     that the acquisition provisions in the conference report on 
     H.R. 1530, the DOD Authorization Act, could undermine the 
     principle of full and open competition, which assures all 
     responsible sources the right to bid on government contracts. 
     As the Senate authors of the Competition in Contracting Act 
     (CICA), which establishes the requirement of full and open 
     competition, we are confident that this is not the case. The 
     conference report does not contain any provision that would 
     undermine full and open competition and we would not agree to 
     any provision that would do so.
       Unlike the free-standing acquisition bill passed by the 
     House (H.R. 1670), the conference report on H.R. 1530 would 
     not change either the definition of full and open competition 
     or the existing exceptions from the requirement to use full 
     and open competition. Consequently, all responsible sources 
     must be offered an opportunity to bid on government contracts 
     (except where a specific exception to that requirement is 
     already available under CICA). We intend to monitor the 
     implementation of the bill closely to ensure that the 
     executive branch does not misinterpret its language to 
     undermine full and open competition or deny responsible 
     offerors an opportunity to compete for government contracts.


                 A. Title XLI of the Conference Report

       Title XLI of the conference report contains provisions 
     which would address competition requirements as follows:
       Section 4101 would require that the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation implement the unchanged CICA provisions in a 
     manner that is consistent with the need to efficiently 
     fulfill the government's requirements;
       Section 4102 would raise the dollar thresholds for approval 
     of sole-source purchases to streamline procedures for smaller 
     procurements; and
       Section 4103 would authorize contracting officers to use 
     so-called ``competitive range'' determinations more 
     effectively to narrow the initial field of offerors under 
     consideration to those who are best qualified.
       None of these provisions may be used to exclude responsible 
     offerors from participating in a procurement.
       1. Regulatory Implementation of CICA. The policy stated in 
     Section 4101 would require the regulation writers to consider 
     more efficient procedures for implementing the requirement 
     for full and open competition. Such procedures could include, 
     for example: the authority to submit proposals in electronic 
     form; the use of electronic bulletin boards to quickly 
     disseminate procurement information (such as solicitation 
     amendments and offeror questions and answers); the 
     establishment of matrices of evaluation criteria to which 
     offerors may respond directly to ease the comparison of 
     proposals; and the simplification of specifications.
       This provision does not change either the CICA provisions 
     requiring full and open competition or the existing 
     definition of full and open competition. These unchanged 
     provisions would, by their terms, require agencies to permit 
     ``all responsible sources'' to participate in a procurement. 
     Consequently, the requirement that CICA be implemented in a 
     manner that is consistent with the need to efficiently 
     fulfill the government's requirements could not be used to 
     exclude responsible sources from bidding on a contract.
       2. Thresholds for Justification and Approval. Section 4102 
     would raise the threshold for high-level sign-off on sole-
     source procedures from $100,000 to $500,000 to reduce 
     paperwork on smaller procurements. This is the first 
     adjustment to this threshold since the enactment of the 
     Competition in Contracting Act in 1984, and would bring the 
     competition threshold back into conformity with the threshold 
     in the Truth in Negotiations Act (which was raised from 
     $100,000 to $500,000 last year). The provision would not 
     create any new exceptions to the requirement for full and 
     open competition and would not affect the requirement that 
     contracting officers justify in writing the decision to use 
     non-competitive procedures in any procurement, regardless of 
     dollar value.
       3. Competitive Range Determinations. Section 4103 would 
     expressly authorize the use of competitive range 
     determinations to narrow the field of offerors and exclude 
     those who do not have a realistic chance of winning the 
     procurement. Competitive range determinations have always 
     been permitted under CICA, but some agencies have been 
     reluctant to use this tool out of a fear of bid protests.
       Section 4103 specifies that the competitive range should 
     include the greatest number of offerors consistent with 
     conducting an efficient procurement. This provision does not 
     permit agencies to deny offerors the opportunity to bid on 
     government contracts. It does not authorize agencies to 
     narrow the field of competitors on any basis other than the 
     evaluation criteria specified in the solicitation and it is 
     not intended to authorize 

[[Page S18869]]
     the exclusion from the competitive range any offeror whose proposal is 
     not significantly inferior to the proposals that will be 
     considered.


                      B. Other Competition Issues

       In addition to the provisions described above, Division D 
     contains provisions authorizing the use of simplified 
     procedures for the acquisition of certain commercial items 
     and authorizing the waiver of certain laws in procurements of 
     commercially-available off-the-shelf items. Neither of these 
     provisions would undermine full and open competition or deny 
     responsible offerors an opportunity to compete for government 
     contracts.
       1. Simplified Procedures. Section 4202 would authorize the 
     use of simplified procedures for the acquisition of 
     commercial items in contracts with a value of $5 million or 
     less. Special simplified procedures could include, for 
     example: shortened notice time frames; streamlined 
     solicitations; expanded use of electronic commerce; and the 
     use of alternative evaluation procedures. This provision 
     would expire after three years, unless reauthorized by the 
     Congress.
       The simplified procedures authorized by this section would 
     be available to agencies in addition to streamlined 
     acquisition techniques already available to agencies and 
     widely used for the purchase of commercial items under 
     existing law. These techniques include the use of GSA's 
     multiple award schedules; multiple award task order 
     contracts; ``prime vendor'' contracts; indefinite delivery 
     indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts; and requirements 
     contracts.
       While Section 4202 authorizes the use of simplified 
     procedures, it would not permit limitations on competition or 
     the exclusion of responsible sources from bidding on 
     contracts. In fact, the provision expressly requires the 
     publication of a notice inviting all potential sources to 
     submit offers and committing the agency to consider such 
     offers. In other words, agencies must evaluate all offers 
     received, in accordance with the simplified procedures, and 
     select the best one for contract award.
       Agencies would be permitted to conduct sole-source 
     procurements only if justified in writing pursuant to the 
     existing CICA exceptions.
       2. Waiver of Laws. Section 4203 would authorize the waiver 
     of certain laws in purchases of commercially-available off-
     the-shelf items. This provision would alleviate burdens on 
     contractors, not on the government. It is intended to enable 
     commercial companies to sell off-the-shelf items to the 
     government on the same terms and conditions they use in the 
     private sector sales.
       The laws that are authorized to be waived under section 
     include only government-unique policies, procedures, 
     requirements and restrictions that are imposed ``on persons 
     who have been awarded contracts'' by the Federal government. 
     This provision does not authorize the waiver of laws--such as 
     CICA and the Procurement Integrity statute--which apply in 
     the period prior to the award of a contract. And it does not 
     authorize the waiver of laws--such as CICA, the Prompt 
     Payment Act, and the Contract Disputes Act--which impose 
     policies, procedures, requirements and restrictions on 
     federal agencies and federal officials, rather than on 
     contractors. For these reasons, Section 4203 would neither 
     authorize the waiver of CICA nor permit any limitation on 
     competition for federal contracts.
       3. ``Two-Step'' Procurements. Earlier this year, the 
     Administration requested authority for a ``two-step'' 
     procurement process--similar to a provision passed by the 
     Senate as a part of last year's Federal Acquisition 
     Streamlining Act--under which an agency may narrow the field 
     of offerors to those who are best qualified and offer the 
     best overall technical approach to a problem, and only then 
     require the submission of detailed price and technical 
     proposals.
       Two-step authority is not included in the conference 
     report, due to concerns raised by both the Administration and 
     the business community about the proposed language. The 
     conference report does, however, contain a pilot program for 
     ``solutions based contracting'', in which contractor 
     selection would be based on contractors' qualifications, past 
     performance, and proposed conceptual approach to the 
     procurement.
       We remain open to the possibility of granting broader two-
     step authority at some time in the future, assuming that the 
     problems can be worked out in a manner that is consistent 
     with full and open competition and the principle that all 
     responsible offerors must be provided a fair opportunity to 
     compete for government contracts.


        Procurement and Information Technology Management Reform

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, the procurement and information technology 
management reforms in the DOD Authorization Conference Report will 
result in billions of dollars in savings to the taxpayer. Some 
observers have suggested that perhaps as much as $60 billion is wasted 
each year from inefficiencies in the Federal contracting process. The 
rewards to the taxpayer from the Government finding more efficient ways 
to purchase goods and services are indeed great--potentially equivalent 
to a third of the budget deficit and more than what we will spend on 
new weapons this year.
  The reforms contained in this bill are needed if we are to seriously 
address the inefficiencies in the procurement process. Although last 
year's Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act was a good first step, many 
problems continue to exist which result in great inefficiencies, 
cumbersome and unnecessary delays, and an overly bureaucratic process. 
The provisions in this legislation complement our past streamlining 
efforts and will allow the government to pay less of a bureaucratic 
premium on the price of goods and services it buys.
  The need to continue procurement reform is widely recognized. Both 
Houses of Congress and the Administration have worked together on a 
bipartisan basis to develop these provisions. The procurement reform 
package that the conferees agreed to includes two major provisions: the 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act and the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act. These two Acts will go a long way to putting an 
end to many of the inefficiencies of the current system.
  The savings that can be achieved from procurement reform are 
significant. By passing the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act last 
year, we will realize $12 billion in savings over the next 5 years. The 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act in the DOD conference report can be 
expected to save additional billions through eliminating unnecessary 
paperwork burdens, streamlining the process for buying commercial 
items, clarifying procurement ethics laws, and improving the process 
for contracting for large construction projects.
  Billions more will be saved in this bill as a result of the 
Information Technology Management Reform Act, legislation which Senator 
Levin and I introduced earlier this year, which emphasizes the use of 
technology to achieve more efficient and cost-effective government. 
Agencies will be required to conduct a systematic re-examination of how 
they do business before investing in information technology. This 
review will identify areas for improvement and result in significant 
savings through the re-design or ``re-engineering'' of existing 
government business activity. According to the Administration, efforts 
to re-engineer government through information technology as mandated in 
this legislation will save at least $4.3 billion over the next 5 years.
  The systematic use of information technology to re-engineer 
government will be a lasting contribution of this bill. Not only will 
we save billions of dollars through these efforts, but we will improve 
the delivery of services to the taxpayer by effectively applying modern 
information technology to government processes.
  The need to reform how the Federal Government approaches and 
purchases information technology is well documented. My report of 
October 1994 entitled ``Computer Chaos,'' outlined the problems 
affecting the $27 billion we spend each year on information technology.
  Much of this money is wasted buying new systems that agencies have 
not adequately planned for or managed. In other words, government has 
not done a very good job deciding what it needs before spending 
millions, or in some cases, billions of dollars on information systems. 
Consequently new systems, especially high dollars systems, rarely work 
as intended and do little to improve agency performance.
  In addition, a large portion of the $200 billion spent on information 
technology over the last decade has been spent maintaining old 
technology that no longer performs as needed. Agencies thus spend 
billions of dollars each year to keep old, inefficient computer systems 
running, and continue to buy new computer systems that are poorly 
planned and, once operational, do not meet their needs.
  Agencies trying to replace these old ``legacy'' systems have also 
been plagued by the constraints of the current procurement system. Over 
the last three decades, the process for buying federal computers has 
become too bureaucratic and cumbersome. It has spawned thousands of 
pages of regulations and caused agencies to be primarily concerned with 
conformity to a paperwork process. What the process fails to address 
are the results--more efficient and less expensive government and, most 
importantly, fairness to the taxpayers. 

[[Page S18870]]


  In addition, an adversarial culture has developed between government 
and business. Many companies believe government contracting officers 
and bureaucrats won't give them a fair shake. Federal employees are 
suspicious of companies because of a fear of being second guessed and 
having the procurement protested.
  In short, it is a culture of little trust, less communication and no 
incentives to use information technology to improve the way government 
does business and achieve the savings that we so desperately need.
  The Information Technology Management Reform Act is designed to 
create positive management incentives, increase communication and get 
business and government working together to meet the technology needs 
of the federal government. In addition to helping agencies buy 
technology faster and cheaper, the bill would ensure that a responsible 
management approach is taken to maximize the taxpayer's return on the 
government's investment in information technology.
  Among other provisions, this legislation will repeal the Brooks 
Automatic Data Processing Equipment Act, authorize commercial-like 
buying procedures, and emphasize achieving results rather than 
conformity to the process. While we cannot legislate good management we 
can establish a framework for effective management to take place. This 
is what this legislation sets out to do.
  Once enacted, agencies will be required to emphasize up-front 
planning and establish clear performance goals designed to improve 
agency operations. Once the up-front planning is complete and 
performance goals are established, other reforms would make it simpler 
and faster for agencies to purchase the technology to help them achieve 
their goals.
  The Information Technology Management Reform Act will also discourage 
the so-called ``megasystem'' buys. Following the private sector model, 
agencies will be encouraged to take an incremental approach to buying 
information technology that is more manageable and less risky. Agencies 
now combine or ``bundle'' many of their information technology 
requirements into large ``systems'' buys primarily because the existing 
procurement process takes so long to complete. Reducing the amount of 
time it takes to conduct a procurement and simplifying the process will 
take away the incentive to bundle requirements and will result in 
smaller contracts.
  Encouraging the use of smaller contracts will enhance competition. 
Many of the most dynamic technology companies in the nation, most of 
which would be classified as small businesses, choose not to even bid 
on federal contracts because of the size and red-tape involved. 
Meanwhile, some of those who benefit from the complexities of the 
existing federal contracting process continue to promote a more 
complicated, legalistic system in order to discourage new entrants into 
the federal marketplace.
  By replacing the current system with one that is less bureaucratic 
and process driven, agencies will be able to buy technology faster and 
for less money by taking advantage of the dynamic marketplace in 
information technology. More importantly, a system will be in place to 
ensure that before investing a dollar in technology, government 
agencies will have carefully planned and justified their expenditures 
in terms of benefits accrued to the taxpayer.
  We stand at the culmination of years of effort in acquisition and 
management reform that started with the Hoover Commission and continued 
with the Ash Council, the Grace Commission, the Packard Commission and, 
most recently, the Section 800 panel. Failure to act now will cost 
taxpayers billions of dollars in continued inefficiency and waste. By 
passing this conference report, we can take a significant step toward 
transforming the way the government does business and eventually regain 
the confidence of taxpayers in their government.
  In concluding I want to both commend and express my appreciation to 
Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and 
Senator Glenn, the Ranking member as well as Senator Roth who served as 
Chairman earlier this year and Senators Smith and Thurmond. It is 
through these Senators leadership that we have been able to craft 
legislation that will save billions of taxpayer dollars. I also want to 
thank Representatives Clinger and Spence. Without their foresight and 
perseverance we would not be voting on procurement reform legislation 
this year.
  I would also like to thank my friend and colleague Senator Levin who 
I have worked closely with for over 15 years on the Oversight 
Subcommittee. I very much appreciate his counsel and support on efforts 
to reform the procurement system and improve government through the 
effective use of information technology.


                    Manufacturing Technology Program

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I would like to engage the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee in a brief discussion 
regarding the impact of the Conference Report to H.R. 1530 regarding 
the Manufacturing Technology Program.
  The bill requires a two-to-one cost share from private sources for at 
least 25 percent of the MANTECH Program expenditures. Specifically, I 
am concerned that the statement that awards be made on a case-by-case 
basis may result in overall inefficiencies. Would the chairman wish to 
comment on that concern and offer an interpretation that would not 
preclude the incorporation of a range of projects in a given program 
area that may involve a number of participants, but still gains at 
least a two-for-one total cost sharing from non-Federal sources?
  Mr. THURMOND. I understand my colleague's concerns regarding the 
project distribution under the MANTECH Program, but it is the 
Conferees' intention this program be administered on a project-by-
project basis, especially with regards to the cost-sharing provisions. 
However, in implementing this provision, the committee would be willing 
to look at alternative methods of accounting that the Department of 
Defense may propose, such as bundling similar projects for fulfilling 
the cost-sharing requirements, on a case-by-case basis.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Senator for that clarification, and wish to 
follow-up as to what constitutes a non-Federal funding source. Given 
that non-Federal expenses are often reimbursed by the Federal 
Government through other programs or accounts, would the chairman wish 
to comment on what exactly constitutes the cost-sharing funds?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, please let me make it clear we did not 
intend for Government funds to fulfill the non-Federal cost-sharing 
requirements of this provision. I believe this interpretation will 
maximize our leverage of federal resources. This issue is already 
addressed in the regulations implementing cost-sharing in dual-use 
technology programs.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, if the Senator would be so kind, I would 
just like to wrap up with one more question. Section 276 of the bill 
provides a waiver authority for the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology to obligate any remaining funds that could 
not be obligated under the cost-sharing requirements by July 15 of a 
fiscal year. In my opinion, to waive this requirement without making 
every effort to find suitable projects that meet the cost-sharing 
requirement would be contrary to the intent of this legislation. If he 
would like to comment, what safeguards did the chairman envision in 
drafting this waiver authority against this waiver being the rule 
instead of the exception?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to assure my colleague from 
Michigan that this waiver is only expected to be implemented after 
every good faith effort is made to find suitable and sufficient 
projects to obligate all these funds. This waiver authority is intended 
as a last alternative, and every other conceivable effort should be 
made to follow these requirements, including bringing new and current 
potential participants into the competitive process. Finally, I will 
assure my colleague that the Armed Services Committee will scrutinize 
DOD reports prior to their implementing such a waiver.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I wish to thank the chairman of the 
committee for that explanation and for the kind assistance he has 
provided me and my staff in resolving this issue.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  
[[Page S18871]]

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to take a moment to commend 
Chairman Thurmond for his success, at long last, in achieving a 
conference agreement on the fiscal year 1996 national defense 
authorization bill. I have the utmost respect and admiration for 
Chairman Thurmond, whose tireless efforts over the past 4 months have 
resulted in agreement on a number of very difficult issues. I commend 
the long hours and hard work of the chairman and the committee staff 
that went into resolving the many difficult disagreements with the 
House.
  Mr. President, as many of my colleagues know, I do not support many 
of the provisions in this bill. I think my past statements, letters, 
and votes on the bill have made my position quite clear.
  Prior to our committee markup, I wrote to Chairman Thurmond and the 
five subcommittee chairmen to advise them of my views on a number of 
specific defense programs and policies and to enlist their support for 
reflecting those views in the authorization bill. I greatly appreciate 
the consideration given to my views by all of my colleagues on the 
committee, although many of my greatest concerns were not adequately 
addressed in the bill. My additional views filed with the bill reflect 
those concerns.
  I voted with Chairman Thurmond to report the bill from the committee, 
to allow the Senate the opportunity to consider the legislation. But 
when the debate ended, I voted against its passage in the Senate. After 
casting my vote against the bill in the Senate, I wrote to Chairman 
Thurmond to advise him of the specific reasons for my opposition to the 
bill and to clearly state that I would have difficulty supporting a 
conference agreement which did not rectify some of these problems.
  Unfortunately, the conference agreement has not removed the problems 
in the Senate-passed legislation. Instead, many objectionable 
provisions remain in the bill, and indeed, some of the problems in the 
Senate bill have even been exacerbated. In addition, a number of other 
objectionable provisions have been added in this conference report.
  I have served as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
since I came to the Senate in 1987. This committee has always been at 
the forefront of the debate on national security policy and defense 
programs. I believe very strongly that the authorization committee is 
an essential element of the Congress' role in the formulation of our 
national security policies and programs.
  Because of my respect for the chairman, as well as my strong belief 
in the importance of the authorization process, I signed the conference 
report. However, I want to make it very clear that I do not support 
many of the provisions in this legislation.

  Mr. President, I would be remiss if I did not note that there are 
many very worthy and important legislative initiatives in this bill.
  The bill authorizes an additional $7 billion in defense funding, as 
provided in the congressional budget resolution.
  The bill adds funding for high-priority readiness requirements while 
eliminating or reducing defense funding for nondefense programs, such 
as peacekeeping assessments, humanitarian assistance, international 
disaster relief, and homeless assistance.
  Much of the added funding is authorized for modernization of our 
forces, including additional tactical aircraft and tank upgrades, and 
strategic lift programs.
  The bill establishes a new missile defense policy and provides 
funding for programs which will ensure the deployment of effective 
theater and national systems in an efficient and effective manner.
  The bill authorizes a military pay raise and restores equity for 
retired pay cost-of-living adjustments.
  The bill establishes a new process of public/private cost-sharing for 
construction of new military housing, which will reduce the burden on 
the taxpayer and hasten the process of replacing aging military 
housing.
  The bill provides funding for ongoing operations in Iraq, and 
establishes a mechanism to ensure that military readiness is not 
adversely affected by the conduct of peacekeeping and other unexpected 
contingency operations.
  Let me take just a moment to comment on this last provision, which 
the ranking member on the committee has stated the administration 
believes is unconstitutional.
  I think it is important for my colleagues to understand what this 
particular provision, included as section 1003 of the conference 
agreement, actually does. It requires the Secretary of Defense to 
report to Congress outlining, among other things, the objectives of the 
operation and the exit strategy--similar to the requirements in the 
Dole-McCain resolution on deployment of troops to Bosnia. The provision 
restricts the availability of certain training and operations funding 
as sources for funding these operations. It then requires the President 
to submit a supplemental appropriations request--either emergency or 
offset with rescissions--for these operations in a timely fashion.
  The genesis of this provision was a desire to ensure that military 
readiness is not adversely impacted by the costs of conducting 
peacekeeping and other contingency operations. In the past few years, 
the military services have expressed concerns about the impact of 
diverted funding on their ability to conduct necessary training in the 
third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. The administration has 
submitted emergency supplemental appropriations requests, late in the 
fiscal year, forcing the Congress to act hastily and with little 
oversight in accepting the supplemental, faced with no other option but 
to shut down military training. The provision in this conference 
agreement will allow Congress to have the facts, during the early 
stages of any commitment to a peacekeeping or contingency operation, 
about the cost and justification for these operations.
  During negotiations on this provision, the minority staff did not 
object to the need for a provision to protect readiness and properly 
fund ongoing and future operations. The only concern they raised was 
with respect to the constitutionality of requiring the President to 
submit a supplemental appropriations request to Congress.
  Because of these concerns, my staff checked with experts at the 
American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service. According 
to a memorandum dated October 18, 1995, the provision ``appear[s] to be 
within Congress' constitutional authority.'' The memorandum cited 
article I, section 9, of the Constitution as the basis for this 
judgment. This section states that ``No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. * * *''--
which gives Congress broad authority to place conditions on the use of 
taxpayer funds.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this CRS memorandum be 
printed in the Record in its entirety.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                   Congressional Research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                 Washington, DC, October 18, 1995.
     To: Senate Committee on Armed Services, Attention: Cord 
         Sterling.
     From: American Law Division.
     Subject: Constitutionality of Sec. Sec. 1003 and 1201 of the 
         House-passed version of H.R. 1530, the defense 
         authorization bill for fiscal 1996.
       This is in response to your request for a brief summary of 
     our phone conversation regarding the constitutionality of 
     Sec. Sec. 1003 and 1201 of H.R. 1530, as passed by the House.
       As we discussed, both sections appear to be within 
     Congress' constitutional authority. Section 1003 provides 
     authority to transfer funds from designated accounts to 
     support armed forces operations for which funds have not been 
     provided in advance and requires the President to seek a 
     supplemental appropriation to replenish any fund or account 
     from which funds have been so transferred. Section 1201, in 
     turn, would bar the use of any funds appropriated to the 
     Department of Defense for the participation of U.S. armed 
     forces in a United Nations operation unless (1) the President 
     certifies to Congress that the command and control 
     arrangements meet certain requirements and reports to 
     Congress about the nature of the venture and the U.S. role, 
     (2) Congress specifically authorizes U.S. participation, or 
     (3) the operation is conducted by NATO.
       Both sections can find constitutional justification in 
     Article I, Sec. 9, of the Constitution, which provides that 
     ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
     Consequence of Appropriations made by Law * * *'' Pursuant to 
     that provision Congress has broad authority over 
     appropriations, including the authority to place conditions 
     on the use of funds. In addition, Sec. 1201 can find 
     constitutional support in the various provisions of Article 
     I, Sec. 8, of the Constitution 

[[Page S18872]]
     that authorize Congress ``To * * * provide for the common Defence * * 
     *''; ``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 
     and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water''; ``To 
     raise and support Armies * * *''; ``To provide and maintain a 
     Navy''; ``To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
     the land and naval Forces''; and ``To make all Laws which 
     shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
     foregoing Powers * * *.'' Those powers give Congress ample 
     authority to specify some of the conditions under which U.S. 
     armed forces may participate in UN operations.
       I hope the foregoing is responsive to your request. 
     Enclosed, in addition, are a number of CRS reports pertinent 
     to your request. If we may be of additional assistance, 
     please call on us.
                                                David M. Ackerman,
                                             Legislative Attorney.

  Mr. McCain. It seems to me that requiring the President to submit a 
supplemental budget request is akin to requiring the President to 
submit a Federal budget request each year. This provision simply 
requires the President to submit a budget for an operation which was 
not included in his annual budget request.
  In addition, the provision retains the flexibility of the President 
to submit either an emergency supplemental appropriations request or a 
request that is offset by rescissions of other appropriations for 
defense or other agencies. It simply requires that the President get 
congressional approval to use funds for a purpose which has not 
previously been approved by Congress.
  Mr. President, I believe the military services sorely need to have 
such a provision in place. I do not accept the administration's 
position that there is anything unconstitutional about requiring the 
President to submit for congressional approval a budget for an 
operation requiring the deployment of U.S. military personnel. As my 
colleague from Arkansas, Senator Bumpers, stated on the floor last 
week, ``[T]he President has a right to be wrong just like everyone 
else.''
  Mr. President, as I stated earlier, there are many laudable 
provisions in this bill. In the event this bill fails to pass the 
Senate or is vetoed by the President, I would support separate 
legislation which would include these provisions. However, in my view, 
the good in this bill does not offset the bad.
  Let me take a moment to discuss just a few of the problems in this 
bill on the funding side.
  I am very distressed that the 4 months required to complete this 
conference, extending well beyond the beginning of the fiscal year, 
made it necessary to enact the fiscal year 1996 defense appropriations 
bill prior to the defense authorization bill. As a result, many of my 
objections to this authorization bill are the same as the objections I 
raised to the defense appropriations bill, because the authorizers in 
many cases simply accepted the decisions reached earlier by the 
appropriators.
  This conference bill contains an authorization for the third Seawolf 
submarine, as well as language which sets out a plan to earmark two 
future submarine contracts for each of our submarine-building 
shipyards. I have stated many times my opposition to wasting any more 
of our scarce defense resources on more Seawolf submarines--a program 
costing $12.9 billion for three submarines. And I will vehemently 
oppose any proposal in future years to earmark future submarine 
building programs for a particular shipyard without the benefits to the 
taxpayer of open and honest competition for the best program at the 
lowest price.
  The bill also authorizes $493 million for the B-2 bomber program--
which was not included in the Senate-passed bill. I must say that it 
puzzles me somewhat that the conference agreement essentially leaves 
unresolved exactly how these funds will be used within the B-2 program. 
The purported agreement allows the Senate to insist that these funds 
only be used for spares and support for the existing fleet of 20 
bombers, but it also leaves unrefuted the House's position in its 
report that the funds should be used for long-lead acquisition for 
additional bombers. This is a classic political compromise, which 
leaves a very important issue unresolved and abdicates our 
responsibility on the issue of the future of the B-2 program.
  Mr. President, I know of no identified military requirement to spend 
an additional half-billion dollars to support our existing fleet, and 
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have made 
it clear that here is no military requirement for additional B-2 
bombers. Like the Seawolf, the B-2 has now become a jobs program for 
defense contractors and their supplies and subcontractors, which are 
conveniently spread all over the United States.
  Both the Seawolf and the B-2 are relics of the cold war, and neither 
weapons system is needed today to meet the likely national security 
threats of the future. In my view, the 1.2 billion authorized for these 
two programs could have been better used for programs which would help 
ensure our forces' readiness in this post-cold war world.
  The bill also contains authorizations for $700 million in low-
priority military construction projects which were not requested by the 
military services. In my view, this funding could be better used to 
ensure that the readiness of our forces can be maintained in light of 
the deployment of troops to Bosnia, or to provide for the future 
modernization of our forces.
  Again this year, the bill authorizes more funding for Guard and 
Reserve equipment which was not requested by the services. The amount--
$777 million--is identical to that provided in the appropriations bill. 
But unlike the appropriators, the authorizers chose to earmark every 
dollar for specific items, including 6 more C-130H aircraft. By doing 
so, this bill eliminates the ability of the National Guard and Reserve 
components to ensure that these extra dollars are used to procures the 
highest priority items needed to carry out their missions.
  Finally, Mr. President, I am disappointed and discouraged that the 
statement of managers language accompanying this conference agreement 
contains earmarks for a number of programs which were not included in 
either bill. Not surprisingly, many of these earmarks are identical to 
language included in the Defense appropriations bill which was enacted 
last month.
  There is $1 million for TCM testing--in which I should note there is 
apparently an Arizona constituent interest; $6 million for precision 
guided mortar munitions; $1 million for electro rheological fluid 
recoil research; $15 million for curved plate technology; $5 million 
for Instrumented Factor for Gears; $1 million for blood storage 
research; $3 million for Naval Biodynamics Laboratory infrastructure 
transfer activities; $2 million for advanced bulk manufacturing of 
mercury cadmium telluride [MCT]; $1.25 million for firefighting 
clothing; $950,000 for Navy/Air Force flight demonstration of a weapons 
impact assessment system using video sensor transmitters with precision 
guided munitions; $1 million for SAR detection of MRBMs in boost phase; 
$5 million for a program called Crown Royal; $2.5 million for deep 
ocean relocation research; $7.5 million for seamless high off-chip 
connectivity research.
  It amazes me, Mr. President, that the authorization conference 
agreement would contain this type of earmarking language. Maybe this is 
some sort of gratuitous bow to the appropriators' long-standing 
practice of earmarking funds for special interest items. Certainly, the 
earmarks in the appropriations bill should be sufficient to ensure that 
these millions of taxpayer dollars go to the institutions or 
individuals to which they had been promised; an authorization earmark 
is no even necessary. Unfortunately, the inclusion of these earmarks 
puts the Senate Armed Service Committee imprimatur on a practice that 
ensures defense dollars flow to hometown projects, rather than military 
priorities.
  Mr. President, I don't know which members of the conference agreed to 
earmark these programs, or which members even discussed these earmarks 
or were aware that they had been added to the authorization bill. I 
certainly hope that this is not the beginning of a dangerous trend in 
the authorization process.
  On the policy side, I will cite just two objectionable provisions.
  First, the bill adds several new buy-America limitations. The list of 
new domestic source limitations is significantly whittled down from the 
lengthy list contained in the House bill, but these types of set-asides 
are, in my view, overly protectionist and potentially harmful to 
favorable trade relationships with our long-time allies.

[[Page S18873]]

  Second, and most egregious, is the inclusion of unworkable, 
unnecessary, and counter-productive provisions related to missing 
service personnel.
  When the Armed Services Committee completed work on this bill in mid-
summer, I stated my belief that the committee had gone as far as 
Congress should in reforming procedures for accounting for missing 
servicemen. I continue to believe that the language passed by the House 
in this regard was unwise and unworkable. I regret to say that the 
Senate receded in principle on the worst of these provisions.
  The language in the conference report prohibits the review boards it 
establishes from making a finding that a serviceman has been killed in 
action if there is ``credible evidence that suggests that the person is 
alive.'' It defines logic that, even if so much time has passed that it 
is physically impossible for a particular unaccounted-for servicemen to 
be alive, the board still cannot declare him dead if ``credible 
evidence'' is offered that he is still alive.

  In my view, this is a very broad and undefined standard. It would 
effectively prevent, in many cases, a determination of death, leading 
the families of missing persons with unfounded hopes that their loved 
ones are alive and unwarranted fears for their safety and health. This 
is something that we clearly rejected in the original Senate bill and 
should not have agreed to in conference.
  I would point out to my colleagues that there are roughly 78,000 
servicemen missing from World War II. And this is an example of a war 
where we walked the battlefield. It might be of interest to note as 
well that at the conclusion of the battle of Lexington and Concord, 
there were five missing minutemen. Missing servicemen are 
unfortunately--and very tragically--a fact of war--as much as death is 
a fact of war.
  For an idea of the sort of problems this restriction on a finding of 
death will create in the future, I commend to my colleagues an article 
which appeared in the Washington Post on December 10, 1995, entitled, 
``Mystery of the Last Flight of Baron 52 Solved.'' In this case, the 
POW/MIA lobby insisted for 20 years that there was ``credible 
evidence'' that a B-52 crew survived their shootdown over Laos in 1973. 
Despite credible evidence to the contrary, absurdly enough, they 
claimed four of the crew were transported to the Soviet Union. Finally, 
with the discovery and identification of the remains of the crew 
members, the so-called evidence of their survival and imprisonment has 
been irrefutably disproved, and they have been declared dead and their 
cases have been closed.
  Because of the provisions in this bill, these sorts of claims will no 
longer be the bizarre ratings of MIA hobbyists; they will be a part of 
the official government process. As long as a shred of evidence is 
offered--and believe me, the evidence will be abundant--the families of 
future Baron 52 crews will languish in uncertainty.
  The bill contains several other similarly unworkable and unnecessary 
provisions. Among these are: a requirement that the Secretary appoint a 
board of review for every serviceman determined to be missing in action 
and subsequent review boards every 3 years for 30 years; a requirement 
that counsel be appointed for the missing; a requirement to subject 
final determinations of the Services to judicial review; the 
establishment of reporting requirements on commanders in the field at 
the very time their principal responsibility should be fighting and 
winning a war; and the reopening of cases from previous conflicts.
  Let me be very clear that I fully support any productive efforts to 
fully account for each and every missing service person. The POW/MIA 
Select Committee exhaustively reviewed all aspects of this issue, and I 
believe the resources and procedures currently utilized by the Defense 
POW/MIA Office are fully adequate to accomplish the objective of 
determining the fate of all of our missing people. In my view, the 
provisions in this bill would require the creation of a costly and 
burdensome bureaucracy, with no added value to the process and perhaps 
a significant degradation in the ability of the POW/MIA Office to carry 
out its responsibilities.
  The provisions in this conference bill related to missing servicemen 
were strongly opposed by the Department of Defense, the CINCs, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When we revisit this issue--and 
we will have to revisit it in order to avoid the creation of a 
massively burdensome bureaucracy--I hope we will pay due attention to 
their concerns. They are, after all, the people who will have to 
implement the new procedures.
  In closing, Mr. President, I am troubled by the vote facing me on 
this bill. My respect and admiration for Chairman Thurmond, and my 
concern for the future of the authorization process, make it very 
difficult for me to vote against this legislation. I am concerned, too, 
about the potential effect on the moral of our troops deploying to 
Bosnia if the pay and other personnel provisions in this bill are not 
enacted in a timely fashion. If this bill does not become law, I commit 
to doing everything in my power to ensure that the Congress and the 
administration agree to separate legislation containing these important 
personnel provisions.
  However, as I have said, I have serious concerns about several 
provisions in the bill. I will continue to listen to the comments of my 
colleagues and to evaluate the bill in its entirety, and therefore, I 
will withhold, for now, making a final judgment on this bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post article to which I 
referred earlier and a letter from General Shalikashvili, be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1995]

             Mystery of the Last Flight of Baron 52 Solved

                         (By Thomas W. Lippman)

       A terse announcement from the Pentagon late last month 
     finally ended the unhappy story of the fatal last flight of a 
     Air Force plane known as ``Baron 52'' and resolved one of the 
     last mysteries about the fate of servicemen missing from the 
     Vietnam War.
       The remains of the seven men killed when the reconnaissance 
     aircraft was shot down over Laos in 1973 have been identified 
     and will be interred in a group burial on Jan. 8, the 
     Pentagon said.
       If all seven crew members died when the plane went down, 
     then four of them could not have survived and been taken as 
     captives to the Soviet Union. The belief that four of the men 
     were ``Moscow bound'' has long been held by some prisoner of 
     war activists and members of the MIA lobby, who cited the 
     fate of Baron 52's crew as evidence that Vietnam and its 
     communist allies have still not revealed the truth about 
     Americans who vanished in the war.
       The belief was based largely on testimony by former Air 
     Force intelligence sergeant Jerry Mooney that intercepted 
     North Vietnamese radio communications indicated four 
     Americans captured in the region were being transported to 
     the Soviet Union.
       The Pentagon has insisted that no one could have survived 
     the shootdown of the plane and that the intercepted 
     conversations were not about the Baron 52 crew. But in the 
     absence of seven sets of remains, Mooney's version of events 
     could not be entirely refuted.
       Some members of the victims' families quarreled with the 
     Pentagon for years, arguing that military authorities told 
     them some crew members might have been able to parachute 
     safely from the aircraft. They said the Defense Department 
     was reluctant to tell what it knew because of the sensitive 
     nature of the flight.
       Baron 52 was the code name for an EC-47Q plane that was 
     flying a night spying mission over Laos when it was shot down 
     on Feb. 4, 1973.
       That was shortly after the Paris Peace Agreement supposedly 
     ended U.S. participation in the war, at a time when North 
     Vietnam was preparing to release the 591 American captives it 
     acknowledged holding.
       According to Mark Sauter and Jim Sanders, authors of ``The 
     Men We Left Behind,'' a 1993 book alleging a POW-MIA 
     cover-up, ``the men weren't dead'' and the Pentagon knew 
     it.
       U.S. officials removed the names of the four presumed 
     survivors from a list of prisoners they expected North 
     Vietnam to hand over because the flight was illegal under the 
     Paris agreement, Sauter and Sanders wrote.
       ``The names were scratched from the list because they were 
     an inconvenience that would have complicated Henry 
     Kissinger's life,'' their book said. Kissinger, then 
     secretary of state, had negotiated the Paris Agreements and 
     was responsible for fulfilling President Richard M. Nixon's 
     promise that all U.S. prisoners would be coming home.
       Mooney, long retired and living in Montana, repeated his 
     story to a U.S. Senate committee that investigated the fate 
     of the missing Americans in 1992.
       But the committee also heard from Pentagon officials who 
     had finally viewed the crash site that no one aboard could 
     have survived. The committee concluded that ``there is no 
     firm evidence that links the Baron 52 

[[Page S18874]]
     crew to the single enemy report upon which Mooney apparently based his 
     analysis.''
       A joint U.S.-Laotian field excavation team recovered the 
     remains from the crash site in 1993.
       It took two years of work at the Army's forensic laboratory 
     in Hawaii to identify the victims, the Pentagon announcement 
     said. All members of the Air Force, they were Sgts, Dale 
     Brandenburg, of Capitol Heights; Peter R. Cressman, of Glen 
     Ridge, N.J.; Joseph A. Matejov, of East Meadow, N.Y., and 
     Todd M. Melton, of Milwaukee; 1st Lt. Severo J. Primm III, of 
     New Orleans; Capt. George R. Spitz, of Asheville, N.C.; and 
     Capt. Arthur Bollinger, of Greenville, Ill.
       With their identification, the list of servicemen still 
     officially missing from the war stands at 2,162. The vast 
     majority are known to have died and real doubt remains about 
     only a handful of cases.
       The Pentagon announced last month after a year-long review 
     that 567 of the open cases have ``virtually no possibility 
     that they will ever be resolved'' through the finding of 
     remains or other evidence because they were lost at sea or 
     explosions destroyed their remains.
                                                                    ____

                                                     The Chairman,


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                               Washington, DC, September 27, 1995.
     Senator John McCain,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McCain: Thank you for taking time to meet with 
     me last week and sharing your insights on some very important 
     Defense issues we face now and in the coming years.
       One of the issues your staff has contacted us on is the 
     POW/MIA legislative initiative contained in the House and 
     Senate versions of the FY96 Defense Authorization Bill now in 
     conference committee. I'm aware that you've already heard 
     from the regional CINCs expressing their concerns about 
     compliance with certain difficult provisions contained in the 
     House version.
       No doubt we all agree the POW/MIA issue is of paramount 
     importance to all Service members, and especially to all 
     commanders. Nothing impacts a unit's fighting capability more 
     than uncertainty over whether members will be listed as 
     missing or forgotten if taken prisoner. This country has an 
     unbreakable commitment to our men and women in uniform that 
     such will not be the case. However, language in the House-
     passed version would create a bureaucracy requiring CINCs to 
     divert precious manpower to this issue. In the middle of a 
     conflict, without relieving the anxiety of our men and women.
       The CINCs have addressed the details, but let me add my 
     strong support to the Senate-passed version of the 
     legislation that clearly advanced the POW/MIA issue. Such 
     legislation will go a long way toward addressing the concerns 
     of the Congress, the American people, and our military 
     without unintended impacts we believe would be detrimental to 
     our warfighting capability.
       Again, thanks for our meeting and I hope to talk to you 
     again soon.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
                            Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, there have been objections raised to the 
shipbuilding agreement negotiated during conference. They assert that 
it directs the procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards 
without a clear industrial base requirement and will produce increased 
cost. This is simply not the case.
  Let me focus first on one of the principal shipbuilding accounts, the 
Arleigh Burke class destroyers program. The Senate conferees were 
confronted with diverse factors concerning these ships that we 
attempted to resolve as cost effectively as possible.
  Let me summarize these factors.
  The Navy has repeatedly told Congress that the minimum annual 
procurement of Arleigh Burke class destroyers needed to maintain an 
adequate industrial base is three. Testimony by Department of Defense 
witnesses has confirmed this assessment, as did a Congressional 
Research Service study completed last year.
  The Navy gave high priority to including three of these ships in its 
fiscal year 1996 budget and did so.
  As a last minute measure to generate additional funds for the Army's 
fiscal year 1996 budget, the Department of Defense reduced the number 
of Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the President's Budget from three 
to two.
  During the period between submission of the President's Budget and 
our conference, numerous Navy and DOD officials have emphasized the 
importance of including the original three destroyers to the budget.
  The original appropriations conference funded two destroyers in 
fiscal year 1996, but also directed the Navy to negotiate for and 
execute contracts for two more on the first day of fiscal year 1997. 
This language was subsequently modified in the final DOD appropriations 
conference report to call for three destroyers in fiscal year 1996. But 
its original form was a marker that influenced our conference for most 
of its duration.
  In fiscal year 1994, and again in fiscal year 1995, the Navy 
concluded that cutthroat bidding in the destroyer program was leading 
to cost growth and the need for additional funding to resolve it.
  The Arleigh Burke class has been in procurement for some time. Its 
construction costs at both building yards are well understood.
  A Navy industrial base study, completed earlier this year, concluded 
that the best acquisition strategy for the Arleigh Burke class would be 
to retain two building yards and award contracts based on an allocation 
method that emphasized cost reduction.
  Numerous DOD and industry officials have pointed out that the best 
way to achieve efficiency and reduce costs in the shipbuilding industry 
is to provide a stable construction program, something that the 
President's Budget as submitted would clearly not accomplish.
  The Senate defense bill's provision dealing with acquisition of 
Arleigh Burke class destroyers, while a meritorious approach, could not 
prevail in conference because of opposition to it by the other defense 
committees.
  In distilling these diverse factors into a conference position, the 
Senate conferees concluded that it was appropriate to explicitly 
endorse the results of the Navy's industrial base study, which resulted 
in the Navy's allocation method for awarding Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers.
  In short, Mr. President, the conferees endorsed the Navy's industrial 
base analysis and the Navy's allocation method that resulted from its 
industrial base study.
  Assertions to the contrary are simply erroneous.
  There are other conference outcomes that were important to the House, 
but whose justification in my opinion is less clear. I would remind my 
colleagues, however, that this was a long and difficult conference with 
compromise necessary on both sides. We successfully rejected many 
provisions sought by the House. But, as occurs in every conference, we 
eventually accepted a few things that were important to House Members. 
In doing so, however, we worked to ensure that the language adopted is 
sufficiently permissive that the Department of Defense retains adequate 
discretion in developing its course of action.
  Mr. President, I would also like to address some assertions that have 
been made today on the nature of the conference agreement on nuclear 
attack submarines.
  In his remarks this morning Senator Nunn implied that the conference 
agreement would commit the Navy and the Defense Department to a program 
of advanced technology development for submarines that is too costly 
and would risk the lives of Navy personnel. In my opinion Senator Nunn 
did not correctly characterize the actual conference agreement.
  Let me summarize the conference outcome on nuclear attack submarines 
as I see it:
  The House and Senate had divergent goals. Believing the Navy's New 
Attack Submarine inadequate to its mission, the House conferees sought 
a program for the incorporation of advanced technology into a series of 
four developmental submarines before beginning series production. The 
Senate conferees sought authorization for the final Seawolf submarine, 
SSN-23, and competition for series production of the Navy's next class, 
the New Attack Submarine.
  The Senate conferees did not share the House's conclusions about the 
inadequacy of the New Attack Submarine to deal with future threats.
  After a period of lengthy negotiations that included active 
participation by the Navy and the Department of Defense, a compromise 
was reached.
  In its barest essentials this compromise provides that: the Senate 
position on authorization of SSN-23 and competition for future 
submarine procurement would be preserved; and the 

[[Page S18875]]
House would gain a provision that directs the Department of Defense to 
prepare a plan that could lead to the insertion of technology through 
the construction of a series of prototype submarines, each of which 
would be cheaper and more capable.
  I emphasize that the conference agreement accepts a requirement for a 
DOD plan. It does not commit the Senate to a program.
  Do I think this issue will remain contentious? Yes, I do. In press 
release and interview the House is declaring that the conference 
accepted the House program.
  Assertions to the contrary, the House is not correct. I urge my 
colleagues to read the Conference Report. Any decision to pursue an 
advanced submarine technology program that might emerge from the plan 
that it mandates will be the subject of future debate and legislative 
action by Congress. This conference report commits no procurement funds 
to it. Further, the Senate has not endorsed the House's concept as the 
best course of action to pursue for acquisition of submarines with the 
necessary mission capabilities.
  I agree with Senator Nunn that the twin objectives of lower cost but 
more capable have proven elusive in the past--often sought but seldom, 
if ever, achieved.
  I also agree with Senator Nunn that the language of the submarine 
provision in the conference report could have spoken more directly to 
the costs and risks associated with the House's technology thrust. I 
have never said the provision could not be improved. What I have said 
is that it was the best compromise that could be achieved in this 
conference. Next year will be another matter.
  I want to assure my colleagues that I would never, ever, endorse a 
speculative and unproven program that would put the lives of American 
sailors needlessly at risk. This conference agreement does not do that, 
and I will never subscribe to a conference agreement that does.
  Mr. President, another question has been raised concerning a 
conference outcome that would create a bipartisan congressional panel 
on submarines. I want to address this question.
  The House, in its conference position, was focused on ensuring the 
rapid incorporation of advanced technology into future submarines. The 
House's objective was ensure that sufficient technology would be 
inserted into submarine designs before beginning series construction of 
a new class to ensure the United States retains a comfortable edge of 
technical superiority over any conceivable threat. Aware of potential 
opposition from DOD, the House's negotiating posture during conference 
was based on the premise that extraordinary measures would need to be 
taken to prevent bureaucratic or passive resistance from overcoming the 
technical thrust that it considered essential.
  The Senate conferees' objective during conference was to preserve the 
centerpiece of the Senate's submarine provision: competition based on 
price. Consequently, the goals of the House and Senate were divergent.
  After a period of lengthy negotiations, an agreement was reached that 
was satisfactory to both House and Senate. One aspect of this 
agreement, an outcome strongly sought by the House conferees, was the 
creation of a panel that will focus on the incorporation of advanced 
technology into future submarines. The House believed such a panel 
necessary because it was not confident that could count on unbiased and 
objective input by the Department of Defense.
  In the original form proposed by the House, this panel would have 
been at Presidential level. Its membership would have included a cross-
section of experts appointed by the President, the House, and the 
Senate. Its oversight responsibilities and authority would have been 
quite broad.
  The final form of the panel, as defined in the conference agreement, 
is much different. It will be composed of three members of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and three members of the House National 
Security Committee. The members will be appointed by the chairmen of 
the two committees. The panel will receive reports annually from the 
Secretary of the Navy on the status of submarine modernization and 
research and development. It will in turn report annually to the House 
National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
the Navy's progress in developing a less expensive, more capable 
submarine.
  While this panel will, by its nature, focus greater attention on 
submarines than other ships, all decisions regarding submarine programs 
will of course continue to rest with two Armed Services committees.
  Mr. President, some Senators also have objected to the inclusion of 
spending floors in the conference report.
  The Senate conferees were opposed to inclusion of this language and 
resisted it during conference. We reluctantly accepted a version of the 
House-proposed language after concluding that acceptance was necessary 
in order to have a conference report. But we did so only after we made 
sure that both the Armed Services Committee's minority members and the 
members of the Appropriations Committee were fully informed of its 
nature and our assessment that this was necessary to reach a conference 
agreement.
  The conference report is part of a larger process that eventually 
leads to the obligation of funds for various purposes. There will be 
future opportunities for either the Appropriations Committee or the 
Department of Defense to register objection and prevent expenditures 
should they desire to do so.
  In summary, Mr. President, the Senate conferees won sufficient 
latitude in the language so that DOD or the Appropriations Committee 
would not be forced to spend funds or carry out actions to which they 
objected.


                            USUHS Provision

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, buried in the conference report on the 
Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1996 is a provision relating 
to the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, the 
Pentagon's medical school, that did not appear in either the version of 
the bill that passed the House or the version that passed the Senate.
  Though it has no force of law, the provision clearly was inserted by 
supporters of the university at this stage of the Defense authorization 
legislation in order to create the impression of support for the 
medical school.
  Mr. President, no one reading the record of this measure should be 
misled by the sense-of-the-Congress provision in Section 1071(c) of 
this bill. This language has been included at a stage of the 
legislative process when, barring re-referral of the entire bill, the 
provision effectively is untouchable.
  Mr. President, some may wonder why the supporters of the university 
felt it necessary to engage in this action.
  The answer, for those who have followed this issue, is undoubtedly to 
anticipate reaction to a recent report of the General Accounting Office 
reviewing the cost-effectiveness of the university and alternative 
sources of military physicians.
  That GAO report reaffirmed what other studies have found, namely that 
the university is the single most costly source of physicians for the 
military.
  The findings of the GAO, released after the Senate could amend the 
fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, confirm previous analyses 
of the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the Department of Defense itself, and are a powerful 
argument for the Pentagon to close the university, or dramatically 
change its mission.
  Last session, in assessing the 5-year budget impact of a plan to 
phase down the school, the Office of Management and Budget estimated 
$286.5 million in savings, including offsetting increases in the 
military's physician scholarship program--a less costly mechanism for 
obtaining military physicians. After the university is fully closed, 
the annual savings would be in excess of $80 million.
  Mr. President, as GAO has confirmed, the university is the single 
most expensive source of physicians for the military.
  As a practical matter, though, the military does not rely primarily 
on the university for its doctors.
  The Pentagon's medical school provides only about 1 of every 10 of 
the physicians for our military, while nearly three-fourths come from 
the scholarship program.
  Nor, evidently, has relying primarily on these other sources 
compromised 

[[Page S18876]]
the ability of military physicians to meet the needs of the Pentagon.
  According to the Office of Management and Budget, of the 
approximately 2,000 physicians serving in Desert Storm, only 103, about 
5 percent, were USUHS trained.
  More generally, testimony by the Department of Defense before the 
Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel suggested that, based 
upon a 1989 study, it needed to maintain a 10 percent of retention rate 
of physicians beyond 12 years, and that alternative sources like the 
scholarship program may already be meeting the retention needs of the 
services.
  Even if military planners decide this level of retention is 
insufficient, as the GAO report proposed, changes could be made to the 
scholarship program to address any perceived need for higher retention 
rates.
  The GAO report specifically cited a possible enrichment component for 
the scholarship program which would require a longer payback obligation 
for selected students in return for additional benefits, training, and 
military career opportunities.
  The GAO report also suggested that additional readiness training 
could be provided through a postgraduate period specifically designed 
to enhance the physician's preparation for the special needs of 
military medicine.
  Mr. President, this latest GAO report joins work done by the CBO, the 
Vice President's National Performance Review, the Grace Commission, and 
the Department of Defense itself in questioning whether the cost of 
maintaining an entire medical school for the Pentagon is justified.
  The sense-of-the-Congress provision slipped into this conference 
report cannot change these fundamental judgments.
  The overall DOD authorization bill is defective in many ways, 
especially in its failure to shoulder the kind of significant share of 
deficit reduction necessary to balance the Federal budget in 7 years.
  The sense-of-the-Congress provision relating to the Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences is emblematic of that flaw, 
and I urge the President to veto this measure when it is presented to 
him, and push Congress to craft a more fiscally responsible measure.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I oppose the Department of Defense 
Authorization Conference Report on a number of grounds. There are some 
positive provisions, such as those concerning pay, family and troop 
housing, and other issues. But the conference report remains wholly 
unacceptable, indeed worse in some key ways than the Senate bill. If it 
passes today, I earnestly hope the President will veto the bill so that 
we can begin a more genuine effort to pass a bipartisan defense bill.
  I am all for a strong national defense, and I too want to ensure that 
our troops in Bosnia have everything they need to defend themselves. 
But that operation in its entirety is scheduled to cost about $1.5-2 
billion; this bill provides over $260 billion in Defense spending 
overall--over $7 billion more than the President's request. I had urged 
the President to veto the DOD appropriations bill, and I also hope he 
will veto this one.
  The conference report moves in exactly the wrong direction concerning 
America's real priorities during extremely difficult fiscal times. At 
the very moment that Republicans are forcing a shut-down of parts of 
the Government over our disagreement about how much to cut from vital 
programs that benefit the country's working middle class, as well as 
those which serve the Americans, including the elderly and children, 
who are most in need of Government services, this bill substantially 
increases funding for weapons programs which are not needed.
  Let me offer just a few examples. The bill adds $493 million for new 
B-2 bombers, and it adds $925 million for ballistic and cruise missile 
defense initiatives. A number of weapons program earmarks and other 
pork projects have been included which do not represent rational 
defense policy and spending. Many were also included in the Senate 
bill. The bill also establishes an arms sales loan-guaranty program, 
further subsidizing militarization in other countries, flying in the 
face of U.S. arms control efforts around the world.
  It includes $50 million for unnecessary, even counterproductive, 
hydronuclear tests. In fact, the bill adds $7 billion overall to the 
Defense Department's own request for funding for the fiscal year. Over 
$7 billion more than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the President requested. That is astonishing, especially 
in this budget climate. How can we consider cutting food stamps, low-
income heating assistance, Medicare and Medicaid before we even begin 
to tighten the military's belt in areas where the Department itself has 
said it can save?
  The bill would undermine major arms control treaties against nuclear 
proliferation. Through its requirement of deployment of a national 
missile defense system, beginning by 2003, many are concerned that the 
bill signals an intention on the part of this country unilaterally to 
violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty. I share that concern, 
as well as the concern that provisions of this bill could negatively 
affect Russian consideration of the START II Treaty. I have spoken on 
the floor regarding these topics in the past, and a number of my 
colleagues have done so today. Undermining these treaties would 
represent an historic error, and set us back many years in our arms 
control efforts. They have received bipartisan support in this body and 
were negotiated and approved by administrations of both parties. They 
should be strictly observed, not abrogated. And negotiations on the 
next phase should be pressed ahead quickly.
  Mr. President, I also would like to raise an issue about which a 
number of colleagues and I have communicated to the chairman and the 
ranking member of the committee. That is the issue of procurement. As a 
member of the Small Business Committee, I have attempted to follow 
closely issues that affect small businesses in the area of procurement, 
and this bill, as many of my colleagues know, has become contentious 
due to its actions in this area of policy. Provisions were added to the 
bill in conference in the name of acquisition reform which have 
generated some alarm in the small business community and among some who 
have worked carefully on Governmentwide procurement reform in recent 
years. In the very short time that has been available to study the 
provisions of the report, it has been difficult to assess all of its 
likely effects on procurement. But an initial reading indicates to me 
that there are areas of legitimate concern.
  On December 4, along with Senators Bumpers, Kerry and Moseley-Braun, 
I wrote to Chairman Thurmond of the Armed Services Committee and to 
Senator Nunn, who is the committee's ranking member. We expressed 
concern that provisions relating to acquisition, not only by the 
Department of Defense, but Governmentwide, were being included in the 
conference report: provisions that were not contained in the bill as 
originally passed by either the Senate or the House. Some of the 
provisions were derived from H.R. 1670, a House-passed bill, and some 
were derived from a Senate bill, S. 946. The provisions, as it turns 
out, underwent some modification before being added to this bill during 
the conference. But substantial changes to Governmentwide procurement 
policy are indeed contained here. The concern which my colleagues and I 
expressed in our letter, that such changes might undercut important 
procurement reforms undertaken by Congress in recent years, especially 
by weakening the practice, if not the principle, of full and open 
competition, remain. I therefore hope that following a veto of this 
bill by the President, the issue can be reexamined.
  I share these concerns not only with my Senate colleagues with whom I 
have worked on this issue in recent weeks. I also would like to point 
out the important work done on the House side by Small Business 
Committee Chair Jan Meyers of Kansas. Mrs. Meyers has championed small 
business interests during this process, and has reached similar 
judgments to those which I am setting out here. We both question the 
wisdom of undertaking significant Governmentwide procurement 
legislation, even in the name of ``streamlining,'' in the very 
restricted process of passing a Defense authorization conference 
report. And we both believe that the objections raised by a 

[[Page S18877]]
number of small business organizations to the provisions themselves 
have some merit.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the 
Washington Post dated November 17, 1995, be printed in the Record. And 
I point out that the Small Business Legislative Council, National Small 
Business United, the National Association of Women Business Owners, the 
National Association for the Self-Employed and others all have 
expressed serious reservations about the procurement provisions. I hope 
we will have a chance to revisit the issue.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1995]

                        Uncle Sam's Buying Power

                           (By Kathleen Day)

       A quiet storm has erupted in Congress over efforts to 
     reform how the government spends $200 billion a year to by 
     items ranging from paper clips and computers to jet fighters 
     and tanks.
       Supporters of the proposal, led by Rep. William F. Clinger 
     Jr. (R-Pa.) and the Clinton administration, say pending 
     legislation would save taxpayers millions of dollars by 
     reducing bureaucracy, giving procurement officers by reducing 
     bureaucracy, giving procurement officers throughout 
     government more flexibility to buy items as they see fit and 
     allowing the government to pay the same competitive prices as 
     private businesses.
       ``We think on balance it would be a good set of additional 
     reforms,'' said Leroy Haugh of the Aerospace Industries 
     Association, which represents defense giants such as General 
     Dynamics Corp. and Lockheed Martin Corp.
       But others, including Rep. Jan Meyers (R-Kan.), AT&T Corp. 
     and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, say the proposed changes 
     will return the federal government to the days when the 
     Pentagon paid $7,400 for a coffeepot and $640 for a toilet 
     seat. They contend the proposed changes would cut competition 
     by letting the government limit the number of companies 
     making bids and allowing the White House to waive purchasing 
     rules at will.
       They say the result would be a system that shuts out many 
     small companies and enables a few large players to dominate 
     federal contracting, making it tougher for others to win 
     government business. Worst of all, they say, the proposals 
     are being crafted behind closed doors, without the benefit of 
     public scrutiny.
       ``This would fundamentally change public procurement,'' 
     said Edward J. Black, president of the Computer and 
     Communications Industry Association, whose members include 
     Amdahl Corp., AT&T, Bell Atlantic Corp. and Oracle Corp. 
     ``For that to be done in some secret room without everyone 
     being able to see what's going on is a problem.''
       ``I wouldn't characterize it as a secret, but as a 
     proposal that's followed an unusual legislative path,'' 
     said the Aerospace Industry Association's Haugh.
       The changes are being considered by House and Senate 
     conferees who are working on legislation setting the Defense 
     Department's budget for fiscal 1996. That, critics say, is 
     part of the problem: A proposal to change purchasing rules 
     for all federal agencies, not just the Pentagon, should not 
     be considered as an amendment to a military funding bill, but 
     in separate legislation.
       Lawmakers in the conference could finish their work on the 
     DOD funding bill as early as today, congressional aides said.
       The effort comes just a year after Congress approved 
     legislation changing procurement procedures, and a decade 
     after it passed a law requiring more competition in 
     government contracting. About the only thing that both sides 
     agree on is that the controversy over purchasing rules 
     highlights the difficulty of cutting government red tape 
     while preserving safeguards that ensure taxpayer funds are 
     spent wisely.
       Legislation being discussed would:
       Give government buyers more leeway in eliminating companies 
     early in the bidding procedure. The goal is to save the time 
     and money the government spends in considering companies that 
     clearly are not qualified to win a contract.
       Encourage the government to purchase, whenever possible, 
     off-the-shelf items available to the general public, instead 
     of paying to create goods or services from scratch. (The 
     storied $7,400 ``hot brewing machine,'' better known as a 
     coffee-pot, was so costly because it was built from scratch 
     for the Air Force.)
       Simplify how the government makes requests for goods and 
     services, with the goal of curtailing waste of time and money 
     writing needlessly detailed specifications.
       Change the system that allows losing companies to challenge 
     contract awards. The goal is to eliminate frivolous protests.
       Allow agencies to spell out contracting rules through 
     regulation, rather than laying down those rules by law. One 
     proposal would give the White House appointee in charge of 
     federal procurement policy power to waive rules governing a 
     particular contract--rules specifying, for example, how many 
     companies need to bid or what the bidding deadline is.
       ``What comes out of this conference could be a very 
     positive approach,'' said Steven Kelman, head of the White 
     House's Office of Federal Procurement Policy. The assertions 
     that changes could bring back high-priced coffeepots ``are 
     scare tactics,'' he said.
       Kelman said more companies would compete for government 
     business if there were less red tape. The legislation also 
     would reduce the time it takes the government to award 
     contracts, sending a signal to companies that the government 
     will no longer tolerate sloppy work and delays, supporters 
     say.
       Others disagree. ``The decision to bid on a government 
     contract is a business decision that should not be wrested 
     away by faceless government bureaucrats,'' said Jody Olmer of 
     the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents 215,000 
     companies--96 percent with 100 or fewer employees.
       ``If the rules regarding who can do business with the 
     government are changed in the manner under consideration,'' 
     she said, ``it could lead to higher prices, less competition. 
     It could eliminate a number of smaller businesses from the 
     process.''
       ``The government has an obligation to play fair so that all 
     citizens have a chance to bid for contracts involving 
     taxpayers' dollars,'' Black said.
       He and others say that last year's reform law, which is 
     supported by both sides in this year's debate, didn't take 
     effect until last month and therefore hasn't had enough time 
     to work before being tampered with.

  (At the request of Mr. Daschle, the following statement was ordered 
to be printed in the Record.)
 Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I have divided feelings about the 
conference report on the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense 
authorization bill. I am very pleased that the conferees have retained 
my amendment prohibiting members of the Armed Forces convicted of 
serious crimes from receiving their pay. However, I am strongly opposed 
to a number of policy provisions and spending requirements in the bill. 
However, on balance, I believe that this conference agreement would 
move our national defense strategy into a new and unwise direction.
  Early this year, I was shocked to discover that the Pentagon 
continued to keep violent military criminals on the payroll even after 
their conviction by courts martial. Each month, about $1 million is 
paid to incarcerated murders, rapists, child molesters, and other 
convicted criminals.
  When I learned of this outrageous practice, I immediately began 
working with Pentagon and Armed Services Committee leaders to craft a 
legislative solution to this outrageous abuse. Working together, we 
were able to craft a successful fix, which was approved by the Senate 
by an overwhelming vote. I wish to thank the ranking member of the 
committee, Senator Nunn, and the Personnel Subcommittee chairman, 
Senator Coats, for their thoughtful cooperation and helpful suggestions 
in addressing this problem.
  While I am pleased that my military convicts amendment was retained 
in conference, I believe that on balance, this bill takes our national 
defense strategy in the wrong direction.
  This bill spends $7 billion more than the Pentagon's military 
planners believe they need to meet our national security needs. Much of 
this $76 billion bonus is earmarked for special interest pork-barrel 
programs that our military planners neither need nor want. This kind of 
wasteful spending should not be permitted.
  The bill undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty requiring the 
deployment of a national missile defense system by 2003. It more than 
doubles the administration's funding request for the National Ballistic 
Missile Defense Program. This return to the Reagan-era ``star wars'' 
program is a clear waste of tax dollars.
  The conference report virtually eliminates the Office of the Director 
of Test and Evaluation. This office is the cornerstone of our ``fly 
before you buy'' policy, which was created as a remedy for the 
notorious procurement abuses of the late 1970's and early 1980's. I was 
a member of the House Armed Services Committee when the OT&E office was 
created in 1983 and played an active role in crafting the legislation 
establishing the office. In my view, the OT&E has saved billions of 
taxpayer dollars and has ensured that the weapons our troops in the 
field receive will function properly. To abandon the OT&E in the name 
of procurement streamlining will waste billions of dollars and put our 
troops at needless risk.
  This conference report contains a pair of irrational personnel 
provisions that are unfair to our troops and will 

[[Page S18878]]
undermine morale and degrade readiness. First, it denies the rights of 
military personnel and their dependents to terminate pregnancies in 
military hospitals. I believe it is fundamentally wrong to deny 
constitutionally protected rights to our troops and their families 
simply because they are stationed overseas.
  Second, the conferees accepted an outrageous House provision 
requiring the discharge of military personnel who test positive for the 
HIV virus. There is no rational basis whatsoever for this provision. 
The current Pentagon policy on this issue is wholly adequate.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and 
ask that it be divided equally, charged to each side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator 
from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for 
yielding, and I rise in support of the Defense authorization conference 
report.
  At the outset, Mr. President, I want to congratulate Senator Thurmond 
for his strong and determined leadership and tireless efforts on behalf 
of this legislation. It is a very, very difficult process to get this 
bill to the floor, but Senator Thurmond never gave up, and he has spent 
an awful lot of time talking to Members trying to work out agreements 
to get us here.
  It was a difficult conference with the House. While we experienced 
some growing pains in the process, I think the product, even though we 
do not all agree with it, is something we can be proud of. We do not 
agree with everything in it, but it is something we can be proud of.
  The Senator from South Carolina deserves a great deal of credit for 
his leadership and, more importantly, for his commitment to the men and 
women who wear the uniform of the United States of America.
  We are always grateful to the distinguished Senator from South 
Carolina for that strong leadership.
  The legislation before us authorizes approximately $264 billion for 
national defense. This funding level is about $7 billion more than the 
President's request, but it is consistent with the concurrent budget 
resolution adopted by Congress earlier this year.
  Some have questioned this level, and I want to emphasize that even 
with the increased funds, the bill provides 2.3 percent less than last 
year's defense bill in real terms. The truth is that real defense 
spending has declined every year since 1985. Of course, you do not hear 
about that much in the news, but for the last 11 straight years, 
defense spending, in terms of a percentage of the entire U.S. budget, 
has gone down.

  For the benefit of my colleagues, I want to briefly summarize some of 
the highlights of the bill before us.
  There is a 2.4-percent pay raise for our troops and a 5.2-percent 
increase in the basic allowance for quarters. I find it somewhat ironic 
that the President, who sends the troops to Bosnia, now may veto this 
bill which provides them with a 2.4-percent pay raise. Some of these 
troops may even be eligible for food stamps, and we are putting them in 
harm's way in Bosnia. I think it would be immoral for the President to 
veto this legislation.
  It includes an adjustment to equalize the schedule for military 
retiree COLA's to be sure they are provided the same schedules as 
Federal civilian COLA's and also includes a variety of acquisition 
policies urgently needed to maintain the pace of procurement reform 
begun last year. These are items under my subcommittee, and they are 
going to significantly increase the ability of Federal agencies to buy 
state-of-the-art technology from the commercial sector and reduce 
barriers for companies, both large and small, who want to sell their 
goods and services to the Government.
  All of these provisions are fully consistent with the existing 
requirements for full and open competition.
  In the area of relieving burdens on contractors, we provided a total 
exemption for the suppliers of commercial items from the requirement to 
provide certified cost and pricing data under the Truth in Negotiations 
Act. We also provided extensive relief from requirements for special 
certification of compliance of laws applicable to Government 
contractors and eased the requirements governing acquisition of 
commercially off-the-shelf products.
  In addition to these changes, we have included a series of 
initiatives which are intended to streamline acquisition. For instance, 
we have included a provision allowing agencies to use streamline 
solicitations and flexible notice deadlines in the procurement of 
commercial items under the amount of $5 million.
  This is a 3-year test program that does not alter the requirements 
for notice or the requirements for full and open competition in these 
procurements.
  Finally, under acquisition, we have included a major reform in the 
manner Federal agencies purchase information technology. This has been 
spearheaded, for the most part, by my colleague and friend from Maine, 
Senator Cohen. We have eliminated the jurisdiction of the General 
Services Administration over Federal agency information technology 
procurements, including the role of the General Services Board of 
Contract Appeals in bid protests.
  So the acquisition reform provisions were developed in a bipartisan 
manner, with the involvement and cooperation of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee and the participation of representatives from the 
Small Business Committee staff.
  These changes have been the subject of hearings, numerous hearings, 
over the past years. They are issues thoroughly researched and 
considered prior to inclusion in this bill.
  Let me talk about a few other things in the bill, Mr. President. 
There is a $480 million increase in military construction funding 
which, although it takes great criticism from some here, it enhances 
the life of our troops and their families. They have to be able to live 
in a decent place. In some cases, prisoners who serve in penitentiaries 
in the United States of America have better quarters than our armed 
services.

  This Senator is not going to stand out here on the floor and watch 
other Senators demagog the whole issue of military construction when, 
in fact, it is necessary. It is not all pork. There is some pork, and 
we tried to get that pork out. Did we get it all? Probably not, but we 
got a lot of it. But building good housing and having decent places for 
military to work and live in is not pork.
  There is $300 million to continue the so-called Nunn-Lugar 
cooperative threat reduction program with the states of the former 
Soviet Union. You can see what is happening now in the Soviet Union. 
That is taking on more importance. There is an increase of over $1 
billion in operation and maintenance accounts to enhance readiness. And 
most importantly, perhaps, from this Senator's point of view, is the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995, which establishes policies on 
development and deployment of missile defenses, and this includes an 
increase of $604 million to accelerate promising theater missile 
defense programs.
  Not everyone is going to like every provision in this bill. I 
certainly do not. But it is the nature of the legislative process that 
a good bill reflect the philosophies and priorities of all of us as 
much as possible.
  For this reason, Mr. President, to be very candid, it troubles me 
very much that the administration has announced its intent to veto, 
even before we adopt it, this conference report. As the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, I worked very hard, 
frankly, to accommodate the interests and priorities of the 
administration in my areas, sometimes taking on some of my own party to 
do it. I am not happy about the fact that one of the veto message items 
in this bill deals with areas that were under my jurisdiction, 
specifically the Technology Reinvestment Program.
  Frankly, I was specifically assured by Under Secretary Paul Kaminski 
for 

[[Page S18879]]
Acquisition that the administration appreciated the support and would 
accept our funding level, and now I find that it is one of the reasons 
for being vetoed. I was surprised and offended to see the TRP issue 
listed as a reason for the President's threat to veto the bill. I have 
dealt in good faith with the administration on this issue. If this is 
the reward for being open and accommodating, I can assure my friends in 
the administration, I may not be so open and accommodating the next 
time around. I do not appreciate it, and I want everybody to understand 
that. I deal in good faith with people, and I expect reciprocal 
treatment.

  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has approximately 6 minutes.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I am also troubled by the statements of the 
distinguished ranking member, whom I respect immensely and he knows 
that, Senator Nunn, regarding the ballistic missile defense provisions 
of the bill. We have met a number of times with Senator Nunn, many of 
us who worked on this negotiation.
  The bill before us accommodates virtually every single concern 
Senator Nunn raised, as far as I am aware. It retains the compromise 
language on demarcation that was included in the Senate bill, and it 
eliminates the requirement to deploy a multiple-site national missile 
defense, much to my consternation. In addition, it retains program 
guidance from the Senate-passed bill.
  These were big concessions to the minority, huge concessions to the 
administration, and, quite honestly, we had a tough time swallowing 
them, but we did it to get a bill here that would move us in the right 
direction, even though it was not as far as we wanted to go on missile 
defense, and we did it in good faith, and now we find the rug is pulled 
out from under us.
  It is clear that there was not a good-faith negotiation on the part 
of the administration on this issue. The administration has told us 
what the veto debate was, and we moved away from that, and still we 
have that action hanging over us. I do not want to be on that side of 
one--if the administration wants to be there, that is fine--that takes 
the position that the administration now has no intention of ever 
protecting the American people from ballistic missile attack. If they 
want to be on that side of the issue, that is fine. I do not want to be 
on that side of the issue. In its statement of policy, the 
administration specifically calls national missile defense ``unwanted 
and unnecessary.'' Let me repeat that. The administration calls 
national missile defense unwanted and unnecessary.
  With all due respect, who is it that defines protecting all Americans 
in all 50 States to be unwanted and unnecessary? I have not heard 
anybody say that. I find it difficult to believe that there are people 
out there who would not want to be protected from a missile. That is 
what has been said.
  So it is President Clinton--let us be very clear about it--that is 
the problem. The United States currently has no defense against 
ballistic missile attacks. Zero. We are totally vulnerable. If a 
missile is fired at us, we cannot stop it. Believe that or not. The 
administration does not intend to correct that. We fought hard to get 
these provisions in there.
  So the administration does not intend to ever deploy national missile 
defenses. And now, when Congress takes action to correct this 
vulnerability, as we have done in this bill, we get the veto threat.
  The truth is that nothing in this bill violates the ABM Treaty. It 
only calls for deployment, by 2003, of a ground-based national missile 
defense. There is no requirement that it be a multiple-site system. I 
wish it was, but it is not. We went as far as we could go to get the 
support of the minority, and the minority pulls out the rug. I find it 
unbelievable that this President, and some here in the Senate, with 
troops in the field in Bosnia--we heard a lot of speeches about how we 
have to support the men and women in Bosnia. That is why we should send 
them there, because we have to support them. The President wants them 
to go there. I disagreed with all that. I believe in supporting the 
troops once they are there, and the best way to do that is voting for 
this bill. If you do not, you are not supporting the troops, you are 
not giving them a pay raise, better housing, better weapons. If you do 
not vote for this, you are not. Let us not hear about any of this 
conversation and discussion out here about how you are supporting the 
troops in the field because you are not doing it.
  The Russians have taken full advantage of this single-site ground-
based system and ABM deployment talk, and they have deployed a national 
missile defense system near Moscow. There is no breach of the ABM 
Treaty and no anticipatory breach of the treaty in this bill, period. 
Yet, that is what we are being told on the floor.
  How is the President going to explain this to the American people? He 
is going to veto a bill--to put it another way, he sends troops to 
Bosnia and will veto the bill that provides a pay raise and improves 
quality of life for their families, provides ammunition and the spare 
parts and equipment they need to do their jobs. That is what is 
happening, and this should be exposed on the floor of the Senate. This 
is an authorization bill, and it gets a little dry in the discussion. 
But let us call it what it is. That is what it is.

  How is the President going to explain this? I do not know. How is he 
going to explain it? We have heard a lot of talk about the importance 
of supporting the troops in the past few days. Well, that is not 
happening today. If you vote against this bill, you are not supporting 
the troops. You are not supporting the necessary programs for them and 
their families.
  So we have a Commander in Chief here, who, by vetoing this bill or 
threatening to veto the bill, is abandoning his troops when they need 
him the most. He sends them all over the world--to Bosnia, Somalia, 
Haiti, Cuba, wherever he feels like sending them to do police work--
without the support of the American people in most cases. And he cannot 
sign a defense bill that provides a pay raise and gives them the 
equipment and facilities, maintenance, and materials they need. And 
another reason for not signing the bill and vetoing it is because he 
does not want to protect the United States of America from missile 
attack. That is the reason the President has given for vetoing this 
bill.
  I urge my colleagues to think very carefully about these comments 
when you vote. If the President is about to walk off a cliff when he 
vetoes this bill, do you want to be hanging onto his coattails when he 
goes? I hope not. If you vote against the defense bill, you are doing 
that.
  The troops and their families are watching, I can tell you. They know 
what the stakes are. They know what the stakes are. These are the 
families on food stamps out there, whose parents are headed to Bosnia. 
If you vote against this bill, you will be voting to deny them that 
raise, deny them housing upgrades, and deny the very basic subsistence 
they so badly need.
  Who is really abandoning our troops then? It will be very clear to 
the American public I assure you.
  In closing, I urge my colleagues to support the bill before us. The 
legislative initiatives and funding authorizations contained in the 
conference report are essential to keep faith with our men and women in 
uniform and to preserve our national security. Those troops, including 
the 20,000 who will be deploying to Bosnia, need us now more than ever.
  I urge each of you to send the strongest message possible that you 
support them and their families by supporting this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from 
New Hampshire for the excellent remarks he made on this bill. He is a 
valuable member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he renders 
this country a great service.
  I will yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Idaho, Senator 
Kempthorne, and after that, I will yield 10 minutes to the able Senator 
from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, then 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Virginia, Senator Warner, and then 10 minutes to myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I would like to pick up on the theme 
that the Senator from New Hampshire 

[[Page S18880]]
was referencing--that is, the troops. When I go out and visit the 
troops, wherever they may be, throughout the world, whether it was in 
Somalia, or Bosnia, or what have you, and I discuss their thoughts with 
them and ask them, ``What is on your mind? What are your top 
concerns?'' they bring up the whole question of the benefits.
  Remember, we have volunteer armed services. They want to know what 
Congress and the President is really doing with regard to the benefits, 
such as their pay and their living conditions. It is a well-known fact 
that we can be very effective at recruiting these very, very talented 
young men and women into the military. But whether or not we retain 
them is based upon whether we really are serious and whether we deliver 
when we say that we are going to take care of the best fighting forces 
in the world.
  Now, in this particular legislation that is before us, this Defense 
authorization bill, if in fact we support the troops, then this is the 
bill that we must vote for. Only by voting for this bill do we give to 
the military the full military pay raise. How in the world do you 
explain to those troops that we have sent to Bosnia for Christmas that, 
by golly, we support you with everything we have here, with the 
exception that I did vote against the Department of Defense 
authorization bill, and I denied you the full pay increase that you are 
due? I do not think that squares. I think it is pretty easy to stand in 
the luxury of this facility and say how much we support them, but then 
cast a negative vote against a pay increase; or how about the increase 
in the quarters allowance, so that we can retain them, because you are 
going to have to do things for the families of our military if you are 
going to retain them. The Secretary of Defense's military housing 
program--it is estimated that it will take us 30 years to upgrade the 
housing that we put the best fighting force in the world in as their 
living quarters. Or the cost-of-living allowance--in order to provide 
them equity with the civil Federal employees, you have to vote for this 
bill. If you do not vote for this bill, then you are denying the 
military of this Nation equity with the other Federal employees.

  There are many provisions in this bill, as has been pointed out in 
the debate that has taken place on the floor of this Senate. There are 
many provisions that Senators have come to my office and have said: We 
certainly ask you and urge you to vote with us regarding, for example, 
The Seawolf program, whether or not we ought to build this third 
Seawolf. There were discussions in my office. I support the 
construction of the third Seawolf. I think it is absolutely the right 
thing to do. I voted for it. Those Senators that came to my office 
urging me to vote for it, now I am told, are going to be voting against 
the conference report that does authorize the funds for the Seawolf. 
They are also the ones that, by casting that negative vote, are denying 
the military the full military pay increase. I do not think it squares. 
Does that mean that I like everything in this bill? Absolutely not.
  I think, for example, Mr. President, that the B-2 bomber is truly one 
of the most fantastic aircraft that will ever be designed. We are 
fortunate that we have in our arsenal B-2 bombers. I would love to see 
us have additional B-2 bombers.
  In this particular report, as we did in the Armed Services Committee, 
I had to ask the question, how is it that we only provide $493 million 
for the B-2 bomber program? Yes, we can come up with $493 million this 
year, but no one has been able to adequately tell me after this year 
how do you come up with $20 billion to provide for the additional B-2 
bombers. No one has been able to answer that question. It should be 
answered. This commits us to going down that road.
  I do not agree with that based on the rationale I just mentioned, 
based upon what I argued in the Armed Services Committee, but that does 
not mean I will walk away from my responsibility to support this 
conference report and what it means to the men and women that wear the 
uniforms of the armed services of the United States of America.
  This conference report has real cleanup at the Department of Energy 
sites throughout the United States. It expedites the environmental 
restoration at a variety of these sites--the environmental restoration. 
How is it that so many of our colleagues say they are out front on all 
the efforts toward environmental sensitivity cleanup, but on some of 
our own Federal sites they will walk away from that by voting against 
this conference report?
  This conference report also includes a landmark sense-of-the-Congress 
resolution describing and affirming the recent settlement between the 
State of Idaho, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Navy 
regarding the shipment and storage on an interim basis of spent nuclear 
fuel in the State of Idaho. The settlement between the State and the 
Federal Government will allow the Navy and Department of Energy to meet 
their national security requirements to the Nation over the next 40 
years. But the settlement also significantly assures the people of the 
State of Idaho that all spent nuclear fuel will leave the State by the 
year 2035. The agreement is the result of long and difficult 
negotiations between the Governor of Idaho, Phil Batt; the attorney 
general, Al Lance; the Assistant Secretary of Energy, Tom Grumbly; the 
DOE General Counsel, the Director of Nuclear Naval Propulsion and the 
Navy General Counsel.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I would like give my colleagues some 
background to explain the importance of the Sense of the Congress 
Resolution in the fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization conference 
report concerning the shipment and interim storage of spent nuclear 
fuel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
  Since the 1950's, the Navy sent its spent nuclear fuel to the Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory [INEL] for reprocessing at the Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant [ICPP], known as the Chem Plant, in eastern 
Idaho. At the Chem Plant, the uranium contained in the naval spent fuel 
was extracted and sent to Oak Ridge for use in the Nation's weapons 
complex. The resulting liquid waste was stored and later calcined into 
a dry substance. In 1992, the Nation stopped reprocessing spent nuclear 
fuel. After 1992, spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors came to INEL 
for interim storage at the Chem Plant.
  In the wake of the decision to end reprocessing, Idaho Governor Cecil 
Andrus went to court to block the shipment and storage of Department of 
Energy and Navy spent nuclear fuel to Idaho. On June 28, 1993, Judge 
Hal Ryan of the District Court of Idaho issued an injunction blocking 
the shipment of Navy and DOE spent nuclear fuel to Idaho until an 
environmental impact statement assessed the impact of storing this 
material in Idaho.
  The injunction against shipments to Idaho threatened to delay the 
Navy's ability to refuel and defuel nuclear powered ships because the 
Navy possessed limited storage space for this material at the shipyards 
that did this work. As the threat to the Navy's refueling and defueling 
schedule increased and the threat of job losses at the nuclear 
shipyards grew, supporters of the Navy's position sought to include a 
legislative exemption from the National Environmental Protection Act 
[NEPA] for the Navy's nuclear shipments to Idaho. In fact, the 
chairman's mark of the fiscal year 1994 Defense authorization bill 
considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee included such a 
waiver.
  During the markup of this bill, I argued strenuously against the 
legislative waiver. As I said at the time, it was inappropriate for the 
Senate to consider a waiver before we knew the facts about the impact 
of the court's injunction. At my urging, the legislative waiver was 
dropped from the bill approved by the Armed Services Committee. In lieu 
of a legislative waiver, the Armed Services Committee held a hearing on 
July 28, 1993, to assess the facts about the situation.
  At the July 28 hearing, Governor Andrus, Senator Craig, Congressman 
Crapo, Admiral DeMars, and Tom Grumbly and others outlined the issues 
facing the Navy, the Department of Energy, and the State of Idaho. In 
my opening statement, I urged Chairman Exon to lock the doors until the 
parties at the witness table reached an equitable agreement that 
protected the interests of the people of Idaho, the Navy, and the DOE. 
I also urged the witnesses and the members of the committee to 
establish a new partnership to implement long-term solutions. The 

[[Page S18881]]
hearing reaffirmed Governor Andrus' willingness to accept additional 
naval spent nuclear fuel shipments if the shipments were required for 
national security and work on the EIS continued.
  On August 9, 1993, Governor Andrus, the Navy, and the DOE announced 
agreement on an interim settlement which allowed a minimum number of 
shipments to Idaho while the Navy and the DOE completed the 
environmental impact statement. I strongly supported the agreement 
negotiated by Governor Andrus and the Federal Government because it 
protected Idaho's rights, it allowed the Navy to meet its national 
security requirements, and it avoided a legislative waiver of the NEPA 
law. On December 22, 1993, Judge Ryan accepted the settlement and 
modified the injunction to allow the shipments required for national 
security.
  On April 28, 1995, the Department of Energy released the final EIS on 
spent fuel management which recommended consolidating spent nuclear 
fuel at INEL, the Hanford reservation, and the Savannah River site. At 
that time, I called the Secretary's recommendation unfair and I urged 
her to reconsider this recommendation. A few weeks later, Governor Batt 
and the State of Idaho went to court to block the recommendations of 
the EIS. On May 19, 1995, Judge Edward Lodge agreed to Governor Batt's 
request to maintain the injunction on spent nuclear fuel shipments 
while the court assessed the adequacy of the final EIS.
  On June 1, 1995, Secretary O'Leary signed the record of decision 
which codified the administration's decision to send 1,940 additional 
shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the INEL. For the next 2 months, the 
Department of Justice and the Navy tried, but failed, in their appeal 
efforts to get Judge Lodge's injunction lifted.

  As the dispute lingered, Governor Batt announced three conditions for 
a settlement of this issue. In exchange for a binding commitment to: 
First, remove all spent nuclear fuel from Idaho by a date certain; 
second, accelerate clean up at the INEL; and third, provide new 
missions for the site, Governor Batt announced he would accept some 
additional shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the INEL for temporary 
storage and preparation for ultimate disposition. Once the Governor set 
out the parameters of a fair agreement, I expressed my support for his 
three conditions and urged the DOE and the Navy to meet his concerns. 
Throughout the months of negotiations that led to this agreement, I 
spoke with a variety of DOE, DOD, and Navy officials, including 
Secretary O'Leary, Deputy Secretary of Defense White, Navy Secretary 
Dalton, Tom Grumbly, Admiral DeMars, and Steve Honigman, urging a 
settlement along the terms outlined by Governor Batt. For example, at a 
July 20 meeting in Senator Warner's office, I told Admiral DeMars and 
the Navy general counsel that I would vigorously oppose any effort to 
seek a legislative waiver for nuclear shipments to Idaho. Instead of 
seeking a legislative quick fix, I urged the Navy and the DOE to 
intensify negotiations with Governor Batt.
  As the negotiations plodded along, Navy supporters once again sought 
a legislative waiver to allow Navy spent nuclear fuel shipments to 
Idaho to continue. In fact, the House passed DOD appropriations bill 
included a legislative waiver for Navy shipments. When the Senate 
considered the defense authorization bill, I worked with Senators 
Warner, Exon, Smith, Craig, Cohen, Thurmond, and others to include an 
amendment which urged a continuation of good faith negotiations between 
Idaho, DOE and the Navy. The defense authorization and appropriations 
bills considered and passed by the Senate did not include any waiver 
that prejudiced Idaho's interest during these negotiations.
  During the end game of the conference on the defense appropriations 
bill, Chairman Stevens called me at home one Friday evening to inform 
me that the House conferees insisted on their language allowing naval 
nuclear fuel shipments to Idaho despite the court's injunction. I 
thanked Senator Stevens for his heroic efforts on my behalf to delete 
the House provision. In light of the position of the House conferees', 
I informed the Senator from Alaska that I would use every option at my 
disposal to oppose the appropriations conference report if it included 
a legislative waiver. He said he understood my position.
  The final Department of Defense appropriations conference report 
included the House language exempting Navy shipments from the NEPA law 
and Senator Craig and I prepared to filibuster the bill. When it 
appeared that the Senate would take up the Defense appropriation 
conference report, Senator Craig and I went to see Senator Dole, the 
majority leader, expressing our strong opposition to the bill. Senator 
Craig and I asked the Majority Leader to delay consideration of the 
bill to give Governor Batt additional time to negotiate with the DOE 
and the Navy. Senator Dole agreed to our request and delayed Senate 
consideration of the bill. In the end, the House defeated the 
conference report on unrelated issues.
  On October 16, 1995, Governor Batt, the Navy, and the DOE reached an 
agreement to allow around 1,100 nuclear shipments to Idaho over the 
next 40 years in exchange for a court enforceable commitment to remove 
all spent nuclear fuel from Idaho by 2035 and expedite the clean up and 
waste management activities at the INEL. The agreement also included a 
provision to fund new missions at the INEL. I joined the rest of the 
Idaho congressional delegation in hailing this settlement as an 
historic agreement for the people of Idaho and the Nation. A day later, 
the court accepted this settlement and shipments of Navy nuclear fuel 
to Idaho safely resumed.
  Today, the Senate will consider the fiscal year 1996 defense 
authorization conference report which includes the sense-of-the-
Congress language on this agreement that I requested. The language 
reads: ``Congress recognizes the need to implement the terms, 
conditions, rights and obligations contained in the settlement 
agreement'' and ``funds requested by the President to carry out the 
settlement agreement and such consent order should be appropriated for 
that purpose.'' This sense-of-the-Congress resolution brings the 
legislature into this settlement agreement. Under the U.S. 
Constitution, the obligation to provide the funds to implement this 
agreement falls on the Congress and I am pleased by my colleagues' 
recognition of the importance of this accord.
  Today, the Senate will take a big step forward in recognizing that we 
must address the waste and spent nuclear fuel that has resulted, and 
will result, from our national security policies. Today, the Senate 
will state its intention to provide the funds to implement an agreement 
that allows the Department of Energy and the Navy to meet their 
national security requirements to the Nation.
  In the years ahead, I will work tirelessly with my colleagues to 
insure the Congress meets its responsibilities to implement this 
historic accord. I can assure my colleagues I will do everything I can 
to explain the importance of this agreement to every Senator. I want to 
thank my colleagues for their support for this sense-of-the-Congress 
resolution.
  Mr. President, in conclusion, let me say I have heard a lot in the 
last 10 days, the last week we cast some tough votes with regard to 
Bosnia. Everyone was making the points about supporting the troops. 
Here is your opportunity to support your troops by saying we will make 
sure that they have the full pay increase for them. It will assure that 
we have the acquisition streamlining so they do not have to wait for 
the moms, dads, husbands or wives to send equipment, as we did in 
Desert Storm, because it took too long to get it through the Federal 
program where you could buy things like a GPS system through Radio 
Shack. That is wrong. If you support the troops you vote for this.
  I conclude by saying I want to commend the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Strom Thurmond. What a remarkable man. He 
has been leading us on this conference report. He has been leading that 
committee with the same vigor, the same determination as when he rode a 
glider behind enemy lines in World War II. Just as at that time he was 
serving the country, again as the chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, he is serving the country. He is doing all that he can to 
make sure that we provide the necessary support for the men 

[[Page S18882]]
and women in the uniform of the armed services of this Nation. I am 
proud to serve on a committee that Strom Thurmond is a chairman of. I 
urge all of my colleagues to join in voting for this conference report. 
That is a signal you will send to the troops. It is the right signal. I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I come to the floor to oppose the 
conference report, and I regret doing that. I have great respect for 
the Senators who have worked on this. I have great respect for Senator 
Thurmond and others.
  It is interesting to me that we find ourselves during Christmas week 
talking about a balanced budget. We find ourselves in meetings all over 
the Capitol and at the White House trying to figure how do you struggle 
to cut spending to balance the budget, and we bring a defense 
authorization bill to the floor that follows an appropriations bill 
that said, ``By the way, Pentagon, one of the largest areas of public 
spending, you did not ask for enough money. We insist you spend more.''
  That is what this bill says. This bill says to the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marines, ``You do not know what you need. We demand you buy more 
trucks, more planes, more ships, more submarines because we do not 
think you ordered enough. We will plug in some more money for you.''
  We are debating all of these budget issues and appropriations bills, 
and we say we cannot quite afford the entire Head Start program so 
55,000 kids, all of whom have names, will no longer be in Head Start 
because we cannot quite afford it; 600,000 low-income inner-city 
disadvantaged kids will not get summer jobs because we cannot afford 
that; got to cut the Star Schools Program by 40 percent; we cannot 
afford energy assistance in the middle of winter for low-income folks 
who live in Minnesota and North Dakota and elsewhere in this country.
  But we say: By the way, there are some things we can afford. We can 
afford some things the Pentagon said it did not want. We can afford 
$493 million to start buying new B-2 bombers for a total bill of $31 
billion; we can afford $1.3 billion for an LHD-7 amphibious ship; $974 
million for a second amphibious ship; we can afford more money for 6 F-
15's that were not ordered; 6 F-16's that were not requested; 14 Kiowa 
Warrior helicopters that were not asked for.
  Of course, the hood ornament on all of this extravagance is the 
National Missile Defense Program. I know there is great disagreement 
about this, and others will stand up and forcefully defend national 
missile defense. I respect their views, and I will not in any way be 
cross about them personally, but only to say I think this is a terrible 
waste of the taxpayers' money. Maybe we could get some old newspapers 
to put on the desks to say that the Soviet Union is gone. There is not 
a Soviet Union any longer. The Republics are today, as I speak, 
destroying missiles and nuclear warheads per an arms agreement. They 
are destroying both delivery systems and warheads as a result of an 
arms agreement in which we reduce the number of weapons.
  But we are saying we want to spend $450 million more in this 
conference report than the administration asked for, for a national 
missile defense, better known as star wars. ``Star wars" because this 
says it ought to be a spaced-based component, ought to be multiple 
sites and we ought to deploy it immediately.
  Let us decide as a country if our priority is to build star wars. 
Does anybody think this makes sense--a 40 percent cut in Star Schools--
a tiny program to make American schools better, we cannot afford it, so 
we cut it 40 percent--but we decide what is really important is $493 
million added on for star wars? Someone somewhere is not thinking very 
clearly.
  It would be interesting to have had this bill brought to the floor at 
a different time. But it is brought to the floor in the middle of a 
wrenching debate about what we have money to spend on and what our 
priorities are, and we now say some of the most conservative Members of 
this body say, ``By the way, we are deficit hawks. We are for a 
balanced budget. We are for cutting Federal spending, except today, 
Tuesday.'' This bill we are going to do our way. And our way is to say 
to the Secretary of Defense: You do not know what you are talking 
about; to the Air Force, to the Navy, to the Army and to the Marines: 
You do not understand what you need. You order trucks? We insist you 
order more. You want submarines? We insist you buy more. Jet fighters? 
You did not buy enough.

  What on Earth is going on? I just do not understand it.
  I know it will be justified in the name of national defense, it is 
for national defense. If it is for national defense, stuff their 
pockets with money, the sky is the limit, we have no end, no limit on 
the American credit card when it comes to national defense. I tell you, 
there are at least some Americans, this one included, and I think a 
number of my constituents, who wonder why you would want to put on 
their credit card $493 million for B-2's or $48 billion to build a star 
wars program in December of 1995. That seems, in my judgment, 
completely out of step with the priorities this country ought to be 
seeking.
  They say, ``It is not star wars, it is national missile defense.'' 
One of the sites may well be in my State. In fact, it is likely one of 
the sites will be in northeastern North Dakota. Some people up there 
are sore at me because I will not support a program that may provide 
some jobs up there. Maybe so. I know what it will provide, a $48 
billion deficit to build a star wars program--$48 billion to build a 
star wars program, building an astrodome over America, as it were.
  This makes no sense at all. Again, I will end as I started. I have 
great respect for Senator Strom Thurmond. I said it before, I think he 
is one of the legends of this Senate. He has done wonderful work for 
this country, and I regret not being able to support this conference 
agreement. There are a number of things in it that are useful and 
important and make good investments in our armed services.
  It gives me heartbreak to see the priorities that are established in 
this Chamber. When it comes to helping people, helping kids, providing 
an entitlement for a school lunch for a poor kid in the middle of the 
day, or providing hope to a 4-year-old that he or she will be able to 
go to a Head Start program that we know works to improve their life--
when it comes to that, we say, ``I am sorry, we just can't afford it. 
We will just tighten our belts.'' When it comes to this, it is like 
shopping at Toys-R-Us with a credit card that has no limits.
  You want weapons programs? The Pentagon said you do not need 
amphibious ships, and we have to decide between two, one costs $1.2 
billion and the other is $900 billion. The Pentagon wants neither. What 
do we do? We buy both. Why limit ourselves? The conservative members of 
the Congress say, ``The sky is the limit. Buy everything. Buy it all.''
  I hope the next time we go around on this issue of establishing 
priorities for this country's spending, we will decide to do two 
things. We will decide that we want to invest in a strong defense in 
this country, but we will also decide that we are not going to add 
megabucks to the budgets that were requested by the people who head the 
armed services who ought to know what we need to defend our country, 
megabucks in terms of $7 billion this year, some $30 billion over the 
next 7 years, added, layered on, despite the fact it was not requested 
and is not needed.
  My hope is that in the coming couple of days, as we sort through 
these priorities about what we think really strengthens this country 
and what we think our spending priorities ought to be, we will be able 
to do far better than this.
  Mr. President, 100 years from now we will all be gone. None of us 
will be here 100 years from now. The only thing they will know about 
this group of people will be what we stood for, what our values were. 
They can take a look at how we spent the public's money, how we used 
the public's resources, what we thought was important, what we invested 
in.
  They can look at the Federal budget and see something about what our 
values were, and they can see this group, at least, decided its values 
were to try to get involved once again in another arms race by starting 
an ABM program. We decide we do not have any big programs started now, 
let us restart it. Let us figure out how we can create a $48 billion 
star wars program. Let us figure how we can add 20 B-2 bombers to the 
tune of $21 billion. 

[[Page S18883]]

  I hope maybe we can change those decisions when we go back around 
this next year, so those who study history and look at what we stood 
for, what we thought was important, will understand we promoted a kind 
of investment strategy in this country that recognized the importance 
of defense, that recognized a strong defense is important, but also 
recognized you do not get that by throwing money at defense. You do not 
get that by building every gold-plated weapons program that comes to 
mind. And you do not get it by shortchanging education and a whole 
range of other areas that make this country stronger as well.
  Mr. President, I ask how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator has 10 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me yield back the 10 seconds. I 
appreciate the Senator from South Carolina and his work on this 
legislation. Even though I am not intending to vote for it, let me hope 
we reach a different result next year.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I regret the able Senator is not voting 
for the bill, but I thank him for his kind comments.
  I now yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Oklahoma, Senator 
Inhofe. He is a valuable member of the Armed Services Committee, and we 
are very pleased to have him speak at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the very distinguished Senator 
from South Carolina, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, for yielding. I am proud to be serving with such a great 
American hero as Senator Strom Thurmond. It is such an honor to be in a 
position to be able to do that.
  The speaker just before me from North Dakota commented about our 
priorities and what has happened to our priorities in this country.
  I am very happy to stand here and announce that today--at least it is 
scheduled for today--should be the birth of a great American by the 
name of James Edward Rapert, who will be my third grandchild.
  When you stop and think about what we are looking for in this 
country, what we are planning for, and what this administration is 
trying to do with all of the social programs that were mentioned by the 
previous speaker from North Dakota, at the expense of building a strong 
national defense, I wonder what is in line for someone like James 
Edward Rapert, who is coming into this country with a defense budget 
that is much lower than it was last year, with a defense budget that 
has fallen more than 40 percent over the past 11 years.
  While I am rising in support of this conference report, I still say 
that it is inadequate to take care of this country's strategic 
interests. This bill does add $7 billion to the President's request. 
Congress is trying to fix what the President has been doing to our 
defense system. But it is still 2.3 percent less than we spent on 
defense last year.
  I think it is very significant to realize and to understand and to 
say on the floor of this Senate that the President of the United States 
does have a defense plan. It is called the Bottom-Up Review. It started 
in early 1993, when President Clinton became President. He started 
reviewing what we need to defend this Nation. Mr. President, his 
defense budgets are still ranging from $50 billion to $150 billion less 
than his own program requires.
  We have had more than 10 years, more than a decade of cuts in our 
Nation's security. In 1988, the Defense Department bought 438 combat 
aircraft. This year it will be 34--and the administration only wanted 
12.
  The citizens of Oklahoma sent me to Washington to try to restore 
America's defense and not to watch the budget continue to fall, over 
and over and over again. I intend to support this bill, but I am hoping 
next year we can do a better job.
  Let me cover a couple of things that were mentioned by the previous 
speaker.
  First of all, I am very proud that this bill has a little bit of 
money in there to sustain a program that was put together some time ago 
so that we would have a national missile defense system in place by the 
year 2000. The previous speaker used the term ``star wars.'' That is 
kind of a fun term to use because that makes people believe that this 
is kind of a Buck Rogers program --some kind of a science fiction 
program where you build this dome over the country against some type of 
attack. But we know that this is not science fiction, but a reality--we 
are $4 billion away from establishing a credible defense for the 
American people against ballistic missiles. I remind my friend from 
North Dakota: former CIA director Jim Woolsey has said: ``We know of 
between 20 and 25 nations that either have, or are building, weapons of 
mass destruction, either chemical, biological, or nuclear, and are 
working on the missile means of delivering these weapons.''
  Maybe I am a minority, but I am willing to believe that we can 
document a case where the threat to this country is greater today than 
it was during the cold war. During the cold war, we knew who the enemy 
was. It was the Soviet Union. So we could watch them. Now we know that 
while there is no longer a Soviet Union, there is a Russia, there is a 
China, and they have this missile technology. There is every reason to 
believe that they are selling missile technology to places like Iraq, 
Libya, Iran, and other places--North Korea is working on the Taepo Dong 
II missile right now. That missile--our intelligence sources tell us, 
it is not even classified--should be able to reach both Hawaii and 
Alaska by the year 2000 and the rest of the continental United States 
by the year 2002, and we do not have a national missile defense system 
in place.
  The previous Speaker keeps using the figure $48 billion. I have 
refuted that over and over and over again on the floor of the U.S. 
Senate because it is not $48 billion. We have a $38 billion investment 
already in the Aegis system that is already deployed. It is already out 
there; 22 Aegis ships with missile launch defense capability. With only 
approximately $4 billion more, we could take that Aegis system and give 
that the capability of knocking down missiles coming into the United 
States. It is not $48 billion. We are talking about $4 billion more, 
and we can do that just by protecting an investment that is already 
there of $38 billion. That was money well spent, but this bill puts us 
in the position where we are going to actually do something about 
protecting ourselves against missile attack.
  I wish there were more time to talk about that, but there is not, 
because this missile has too many other things that we need to talk 
about.
  The B-2 has taken a lot of hits. The very distinguished Senator from 
Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, characterized the B-2 as the ``most 
fantastic aircraft built.'' I agree with him. I think it is an 
incredible aircraft--and it is the only one that can carry out a 
mission that this country needs to be able to accomplish. This bill 
adds $493 million for continued B-2 production. The restrictions on the 
number of aircraft, and the restrictions on purchasing long lead items, 
have been lifted. That means that, while we are in a position prior to 
this particular bill, or this conference report, of cutting off 
production and being terminated at 20 aircraft, we can now go beyond 
20, if we determine that is in the best interest of the Nation's 
security. Right now we are working on the 16th B-2 bomber. When this 
rolls off, we still have four more that will be produced. But we have 
$125 million left in the previous program to take care of that. That 
money will, of course, be most likely used by March 31 when the moneys 
that we are talking about now would go into production. It will be a 
lot cheaper to keep a program going than to go through the very 
expensive restart program for the B-2.
  I agree in this case with the Secretary of Defense when he said, 
``Because potential regional adversaries may be able to mount military 
threats against their neighbors with little or no warning, American 
forces must be postured to project power rapidly to support the U.S. 
interests and allies.''
  The B-2 provides rapid, long-range precision strikes anywhere in the 
world on short notice and without refueling.
  I have often thought to ask those individuals who argue against the 
B-2--what happens if we cut it off? What 

[[Page S18884]]
happens if we just discontinue the program, as many would like to do, 
at 20 aircraft? The Pentagon's long-range bomber study suggested 
earlier this year that we can rely on the existing B-52 until the year 
2030. Mr. President, the B-52 would be 70 years old by that time. I 
think when you talk about cost effectiveness, two B-2 and four crewmen 
can do the job of 67 aircraft and 132 crewmen, and we can no longer 
rely on the B-52 for our future bomber needs.
  I am pleased that Congress has had the wisdom to continue to support 
the B-2 bomber program. And I look forward to providing it further 
support in the future.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I would like to ask for an additional 2 
minutes. I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes without it 
being charged against our time.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 2 
additional minutes be allowed to the Senator and that it not be charged 
to anybody.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, we have heard a lot about supporting the troops. There 
are those of us who spent hours on this Senate floor trying to get 
resolutions passed to stop the President from sending American troops 
into Bosnia. We will not give those arguments again. We lost that 
battle. The President won by a very narrow margin and, although it was 
without the full support of Congress, was able to deploy the troops.
  Now that the troops are there, we are going to support our troops. 
Those of us who argued and argued and attempted to pass a resolution of 
disapproval to stop the President from sending troops into Bosnia are 
now saying, now that the troops are there, we have to support our 
troops. For those Senators who really want to do it, this is the first 
opportunity you have to really support the troops.
  If we do not pass the bill, then the troops that we have sent over 
there would not receive the 2.4 percent pay increase, they would not be 
able to have the 5.2 percent increase in housing allowance, and all the 
huge quality-of-life increases that are in this particular conference 
report. There is $1 billion more for operation and maintenance so that 
the troops are better trained. There is new technology that is going to 
allow better equipment to protect their lives while they are over 
there.
  I suggest, Mr. President, that, if you oppose this bill, if you vote 
against this bill, it is a vote against our troops that are currently 
on the ground in Bosnia. If the President vetoes this, the President 
will have sent our troops into Bosnia and will have then turned around 
and said we are not going to send you the benefits, the technological 
advantages, and the equipment necessary to survive over there, or in 
any other conflict in the future.
  I would like to make a brief comment about the defense authorization 
conference action concerning the B-2 bomber program. I am a proponent 
of the B-2. I believe its capabilities represent a true revolution in 
military affairs that the DOD is only on the verge of fully integrating 
into defense planning. I believe long-range quick strike aircraft are 
an essential element of the U.S. Air Force and the B-2 is the only tool 
we have to ensure this capability. A force of more than 20 B-2's will 
be required to achieve this situation. The defense authorization 
conference provides the funds to continue this necessary B-2 
production.
  The conference report language, however, states that the Senate 
conferees believe that the new funds provided may only be spent on 
items related to the first 20 B-2 aircraft. I was a Senate conferee and 
I want to go on record that I do not believe this, I did not agree to 
this language, and I expect these funds to be used for long-lead items 
to continue the B-2 production. I know other conferees share this view.
  This is a vote to support our troops who are already in Bosnia.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from 
Oklahoma for his excellent remarks. He does a fine job as a member of 
the Armed Services Committee, and we are very pleased to work with him.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe that the UC allocates 10 minutes 
to the Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, regrettably I will vote against the defense 
authorization bill. As I said yesterday, I regret being in this 
position for many reasons, but particularly because of the strong 
effort that Senator Thurmond has made to get a bill passed this year. I 
wish that I could be able to vote for this bill for that reason alone. 
But there are just too many reasons that I am unable to vote for this 
bill.
  First, two brief points on some of the issues in the bill which 
trouble me. There have been comments that this bill needs to be passed 
in order to provide for pay and allowances for our service personnel. 
In light of the fact that the President has said he is going to veto 
this bill--and we know he is going to veto this bill because that has 
been made public--we should now be making preparations to attach those 
must-pass provisions to the next legislative train, which may be, 
indeed, the continuing resolution.
  That way we can provide the pay raise, cost of living allowance and 
the housing allowance that would otherwise not be available. As the 
White House statement of policy concludes, the President calls upon the 
Congress ``to provide for pay raises and cost of living adjustments for 
military personnel prior to the departure for the Christmas recess.''
  So the statement of administration policy makes it very clear the 
President is going to veto this bill, but the President is asking us, 
and I think those of us who are voting against this bill concur, to 
provide for pay raises and cost of living adjustments for military 
personnel prior to departure for the Christmas recess. We do not have 
to vote for this bill, which has so many flaws, in order to provide for 
those cost of living allowances and pay raises for our military 
personnel. I believe it would be wrong to approve this bill for many 
reasons which I went into yesterday, which Senator Nunn and others have 
gone into, but I think it also would be irresponsible for us to not 
pass the needed pay raise and cost of living adjustments, and we can do 
both. We can both reject this bill, which we should, and provide for 
the cost of living allowance which our military personnel, both those 
in Bosnia and here at home, so rightly deserve.
  Mr. President, the bill has many flaws and many of those were 
outlined yesterday. One of the biggest problems with this bill is that 
it puts us on a collision course with a treaty which we have lived 
under, which we negotiated, which we ratified with the then Soviet 
Union, which Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union has adhered 
to. And if we undermine that ABM Treaty, as the language in this 
conference report does, we will be undermining a treaty which has not 
only provided stability in a very dangerous world of nuclear weapons, 
but we will be undermining a treaty which has allowed the Soviet Union 
and now Russia to agree to dismantle thousands of nuclear weapons which 
otherwise would directly or could directly threaten us.
  Now, Russian parliamentarians have told us this. They have told us 
this directly: the START II treaty is in jeopardy of failing 
ratification. It is difficult enough in the Russian Duma, but that if 
we adopt language which says it is our policy to deploy a system which 
violates the ABM Treaty, it is not going to be possible for the Duma to 
ratify the START II treaty which provides for reductions in nuclear 
weapons because those reductions were based on the assumption that the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is going to be in effect. It is the 
absence of nationwide defenses which has allowed Russia to negotiate 
the reduction of offensive weapons. And they not only will not ratify 
START II, if they are threatened with a defensive system in violation 
of the ABM Treaty, they have also indicated that they would view this 
as such a major change of circumstance that they are no longer going to 
comply 

[[Page S18885]]
with START I because of change of circumstances that our breach, or our 
intention to breach the ABM Treaty would reflect.
  That is why General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, has stated so clearly to us from his military security 
perspective: do not adopt a policy which says that we are going to 
violate a treaty which then in turn is going to cause the Russians to 
refuse to ratify another treaty, called START II, which will reduce the 
number of offensive nuclear weapons that could threaten the United 
States.
  Is there a conflict? I cannot think of any clearer conflict that 
exists between the ABM Treaty, which says you cannot deploy a 
nationwide ABM system, and the language in this conference report, 
which says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national 
missile defense system. The ABM Treaty says you cannot deploy it on a 
nationwide basis; the conference report says it is our policy to deploy 
it--not only that but to deploy it by the year 2003.
  Now, that is a direct conflict in language. We avoided that conflict 
in the Senate bill. There was a bipartisan group of four who were 
selected by the majority leader and by the Democratic leader, and four 
of us spent day after day after day working out a bipartisan approach 
to this language, and we did work out that approach. The language which 
was worked over very carefully said that--and this is now the Senate 
bill--we are committed not to deploy the system but to develop such a 
system, leaving the deployment decision open for a later date. Now, 
that is a very critical difference, and I think all of us know it. Do 
we want to commit ourselves right now to deploy a system which violates 
a treaty, the treaty which has allowed Russia to agree to another 
treaty, START II, which is reducing by 4,000 the number of nuclear 
weapons in the Russian inventory? I do not think we want to do it. Far 
more important, our military has urged us not to adopt language which 
directly conflicts with the ABM Treaty.
  May we want to change the ABM Treaty through negotiations? Yes. Might 
we want to deploy a system after it is developed? Yes; if it is cost 
effective and operationally effective, if the threat is real. But do we 
now want to unilaterally declare it is the policy of the United States 
to deploy this system when it runs head on against the prohibition on 
such deployment in the ABM Treaty? Do we want to do so when General 
Shalikashvili is telling us something we ought to heed, which is that 
it would be foolish to trash the treaty unilaterally and thus to 
undermine the basis which has allowed the Russians to agree in START II 
to reduce 4,000 nuclear weapons in their inventory--weapons which can 
threaten this country so directly?
  Now, the statement of administration policy on this says that if this 
bill were presented to the President in its current form, this 
conference report, the President would veto the bill. And the language 
relative to this point is in the third paragraph on page 1 which says 
that:

       The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly 
     missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range 
     missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not 
     believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By 
     forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile 
     Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would 
     needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile 
     defense costs and force the Department of Defense prematurely 
     to lock into a specific technological option. In addition, by 
     directing that the NMD be ``operationally effective'' in 
     defending all 50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii), the 
     bill would likely require a multiple-site National Missile 
     Defense architecture that cannot be accommodated within the 
     terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. 
     policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill 
     puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I 
     Treaty and Russian ratification of START II.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that since I 
understand Senator Kennedy is not going to be utilizing his 5 minutes, 
2 minutes of his 5 minutes be allocated to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. To conclude, Mr. President, the statement from the 
administration:

       By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM 
     Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian 
     implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification 
     of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the 
     number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-
     thirds from cold war levels, thus significantly lowering the 
     threat to U.S. national security.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of 
administration policy, stating that the President will veto this 
conference report and the reasons why be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                          Office of the President,


                              Office of Management and Budget,

                                Washington, DC., December 15, 1995

                   Statement of Administration Policy

       (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the 
     concerned agencies.)
       H.R. 1530--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1996 Conference Report, Senators Thurmond (R) SC and 
     Nunn (D) GA.
       If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the 
     President in its current form, the President would veto the 
     bill.
       The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15, 
     1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry 
     out our national security objectives and implement key 
     Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise 
     serious constitutional issues by restricting the President's 
     powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy powers.
       The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly 
     missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range 
     missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not 
     believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By 
     forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile 
     Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would 
     needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile 
     defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD) 
     prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In 
     addition, by directing that the NMD be ``operationally 
     effective'' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and 
     Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD 
     architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of 
     the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a 
     collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk 
     continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and 
     Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together 
     will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear 
     warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly 
     lowering the threat to U.S. national security.
       The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's 
     ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential 
     to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to 
     commence a contingency operation and the requirement to 
     submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to 
     continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the 
     authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a 
     Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under 
     United Nations (UN) operational of tactical control, the bill 
     infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
       In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about 
     the following: onerous certification requirements for the use 
     of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as 
     subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding 
     for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the 
     Technology Reinvestment Program, restrictions on retirement 
     of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's 
     ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-
     to-military contact programs; directed procurement of 
     specific ships at specific shipyards, without a valid 
     industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge 
     of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on 
     the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD 
     effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
     Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; 
     and finally the Administration continues to object to the 
     restrictions on the ability of female service members or 
     dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. 
     military hospitals abroad.
       While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there 
     are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial 
     to the Department, including important changes in acquisition 
     law, new authorities to improve military housing, and 
     essential pay raises for military personnel. The 
     Administration calls on the Congress to correct the 
     unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial 
     provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on 
     the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of living 
     adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the 
     Christmas recess.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is a finding concerning the ballistic 
missile threat to the United States, which is cited in the bill as 
justification for deploying an NMD system, and doing so quickly. 
Section 232, paragraph (3) of the Senate-passed bill is the following 
finding:

       The intelligence community of the United States has 
     estimated that (A) the missile 

[[Page S18886]]
     proliferation trend is toward longer range and more sophisticated 
     missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental 
     ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 
     five years, and (C) although a new indigenously developed 
     ballistic missile threat to the United States is not forecast 
     within the next 10 years there is a danger that determined 
     countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in 
     the near future and with little warning by means other than 
     indigenous development.

  Mr. President, this statement of threat sounded too dire to me and to 
Senator Bumpers, so we wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence to 
ask whether it was an accurate statement of the intelligence 
community's assessment. It is not.
  The CIA response to our letter said that ``the bill language 
overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.'' Here is 
what the intelligence community believes, which is rather different 
from the bill language I just read:

       Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet 
     regional security goals; however, most of these missiles 
     cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean 
     missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--
     but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of 
     it being operational within 5 years is very low.
       The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely 
     any nation with ICBM's will be willing to sell them, and we 
     are confident that our warning capability is sufficient to 
     provide notice many years in advance of indigenous 
     development.

  I bring this to the Senate's attention because it is clear evidence 
that the rationale given for moving ahead so rapidly with a deployment 
of a national missile defense system, what we used to call ABM, is 
significantly overstated. There is no imminent threat from ballistic 
missiles to the United States, and there isn't likely to be one anytime 
soon. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letters to and 
from the CIA be printed in the record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the U.S. currently has a policy of 
developing ballistic missile technologies to find which ones are most 
likely to work, and to have a capability to deploy a national missile 
defense system within about 4 years if necessary--well within the 
window of warning that the intelligence community estimates it will 
have for indigenous development of missiles that could threaten the 
United States. That is a rational, reasonable and prudent policy, and 
there is no need to replace it with a policy that would likely increase 
the threat to our Nation by committing up to breach the ABM Treaty and 
pushing the Russians to abandon START II, and possibly even cease 
implementing the START I reductions which are well ahead of schedule.
  Mr. President, I think our colleagues should be aware that the 
actions the Senate has already taken in considering proposals to 
abandon the ABM Treaty have already taken a toll on Russian confidence 
in our commitment to abide by our treaty obligations, as was clearly 
explained in an article in yesterday's Washington Post, and I ask 
unanimous consent that the article by Rodney Jones and Yuri Nazarkin be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Even though we have not decided to commit to deploy a 
treaty-busting ABM system, some Russian policy makers and 
parliamentarians have already concluded that we don't care much for the 
ABM Treaty, and that we wish to free ourselves of its constraints. This 
is putting in doubt the Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.
  It is important that we help make clear that the Senate, which gave 
its advice and consent to the ABM Treaty, and which has a unique 
constitutional responsibility to consider treaties for ratification, is 
firmly committed to the proposition that the United States will meet 
its obligations under the ABM Treaty and all treaties into which we 
solemnly enter. Let us leave no doubt that we understand our security 
is intertwined with Russia's security. We cannot simply act 
unilaterally and expect to be more secure.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject this Conference Report 
because of its missile defense provisions, if for no other reason. But 
there are many other reasons, and I know my colleagues will discuss 
some of them in detail. I might mention a few briefly now.


                      Civil-Military and STARBASE

  Mr. President, This conference report effectively would terminate the 
Pentagon's civil-military cooperation programs, including the drug 
demand reduction programs. These were deemed to be non-defense defense 
spending. While I acknowledge the need to carefully examine the defense 
budget for unneeded spending, I question the conclusion that these 
programs are not supportable. There are clearly many truly egregious 
examples of spending in the conference report, but some of these civil-
military programs are a defense and national security bargain.
  One program I know well is the Starbase program, a National Guard 
youth program that targets at risk youth and provides them with a very 
cost-effective program in math, science and technology and teaches them 
drug demand reduction, all with hands on activities on Guard bases. The 
conference report seeks to terminate this program after 18 months.
  Considering the high priority placed on recruiting, and considering 
that the military spends over $650 million each year on drug 
interdiction and counter-drug missions, one would think the Starbase 
program would be a winner at just $5 million per year. If an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure, we seem more than happy to pay for 
more than half a billion dollars of cure, while cutting off the 
prevention: drug demand reduction. I would also point out that the 
conference rejected a Senate-passed amendment by Senator Nunn to extend 
a pilot program on drug demand reduction. This is totally inconsistent 
with the emphasis and resources devoted to drug interdiction and 
counter-drug activities of the Department, which the conference 
supported.
  Besides providing a pool of potential recruits who have the requisite 
math and science skills, plus strong admiration for the military 
because of Starbase, the program is a great recruiting tool. The head 
of National Guard recruiting in Kansas, who was chosen as the top 
recruiter of the year, says that Starbase is his best recruiting tool 
because the community learns good things about the Guard Bureau through 
it. He told my office that he would gladly use his recruiting budget to 
pay for the Starbase program if he could, because it's such an 
effective tool.


                           Ongoing Operations

  This conference report does not fully authorize funds for continuing 
operations involving U.S. forces around the world, and it places 
onerous restrictions on funding future operations. Defense Secretary 
Perry told the committee in June that ``funding these ongoing 
operations is a high priority'' and he stressed ``the importance of 
avoiding any negative effect on readiness of U.S. forces'' by putting 
funds in this budget. The gap in this bill threatens the very readiness 
and training accounts that members of the Armed Services Committee have 
raised alarms about, because that is where funds will have to be 
borrowed to pay these costs we know we are incurring.
  Those who protested the most about shortfalls in readiness and 
training are now, by failing to fund ongoing operations in this bill, 
insuring that the Pentagon will have to cannibalize those readiness and 
training activities to pay for missions that U.S. combat forces are 
actually performing.


                            Abortion and HIV

  This conference report also contains two provisions affecting 
military personnel which I oppose. The Senate Armed Services Committee 
explicitly rejected a provision that would have prohibited women in the 
military stationed overseas from obtaining abortions in military 
hospitals, even with their own money. This conference report would 
establish such a restriction, which is contrary to the situation faced 
by servicewomen stationed stateside, not to mention the right of women 
outside the military to pay for abortions.
  And the Senate bill contained no provision regarding service 
personnel who test positive for the HIV virus, but this conference 
report would require those individuals to be separated from the 

[[Page S18887]]
service. That provision could actually hinder efforts to protect 
service personnel from HIV by creating an incentive for secrecy, and it 
presumes that those who test positive could not serve effectively and 
safely in some capacity within the armed forces.


                     Operational Test & Evaluation

  The conference report also makes a very unwise change in the DOD's 
Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation [OT&E] at the 
Pentagon, which would render this important office useless or eliminate 
it altogether. We created the office of OT&E 12 years ago in a 
bipartisan effort. It has saved lives, saved the taxpayers billions of 
dollars and prevented our soldiers from receiving poor or unsafe 
equipment. The Senate did not vote to undermine this crucial office, 
and the conferees should have rejected the House's proposal. Instead, 
the House prevailed and we will no longer have independent operational 
tests and evaluations of our critical combat equipment.
  Mr. President, section 903(g) of the bill would repeal section 139 of 
title 10--the provision that establishes an independent Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation [OT&E] in the Department of Defense. 
This repeal would not only undermine the confidence of taxpayers that 
they will get their money's worth for the billions of dollars that they 
spend on defense procurement, but could also place in question the 
safety of our troops in the field.
  The Director of OT&E is the DOD official who is responsible for 
ensuring that our servicemen personnel receive weapons that are tested 
in an independent manner and in an operationally realistic environment. 
Without strong and effective operational testing, we cannot be sure 
that the weapons our soldiers take into the field will be ready for 
combat, and without independent oversight we cannot be sure that we 
will have strong and effective operational testing.
  This is precisely why we established the independent Director of OT&E 
position 12 years ago. Because the Director is required ``to safeguard 
the integrity of operational testing and evaluation,'' the conference 
report on the FY 1984 DOD bill explained:

       The conferees also intend the Director to be independent of 
     other Department of Defense officials below the Secretary of 
     Defense. The Director should not be circumscribed in any way 
     by other officials in carrying out his duties.

  Above all, the independent Director of OT&E position was established 
to remove operational testing and evaluation from the influence of the 
DOD officials who are responsible for the acquisition of weapons 
systems. These DOD acquisition officials have already given a green 
light to a weapons purchase long before it reaches the operational test 
and evaluation stage and have too strong a stake in continuing the 
procurement, to serve as independent evaluators.
  Over the last decade, the actions of the independent Director of OT&E 
have caused the cancellation of some weapons programs and significant 
modifications to others, often over the objections of the military 
services. The result has been the purchase of weapons systems that have 
been safer and more reliable than ever before. Indeed, after the 
Persian Gulf war, Secretary Cheney credited the independent operational 
testing of the Bradley fighting vehicle with ``sav[ing] more lives'' in 
that war than perhaps any other single initiative.
  For these reasons, Secretary Perry has called the independent 
Director of OT&E ``the conscience of the acquisition process'' and 
declared his support for a strong and independent OT&E organization. 
For this reason, too, the Senate-passed version of this authorization 
bill contained a provision which expressly reaffirmed the importance of 
an independent Director of OT&E ``to provide an independent validation 
and verification of the suitability and effectiveness of new weapons, 
and to ensure that the United States military departments acquire 
weapons that are proven in an operational environment before they are 
produced or used in combat.''
  Yet the conference report would eliminate the independent Director of 
OT&E, allowing DOD to once again place operational testing in the hands 
of acquisition officials. This change would not eliminate the office or 
reduce its budget requirements--operational testing would still be 
performed and it would still cost just as much--but it would eliminate 
one key independent check that we have to ensure that weapons systems 
perform as they are supposed to.
  DOD's Deputy Inspector General, Derek Vander Schaaf, has criticized 
this provision in the strongest possible terms. In a December 14, 1995, 
letter, Mr. Vander Schaaf stated:

       I strongly disagree with the proposal to eliminate the 
     independence of the DOT&E and replace him with a designated 
     official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The 
     Office of the Director was created by Congress to provide 
     independent validation and verification on the suitability 
     and effectiveness of new weapon systems and to ensure that 
     the Military Departments acquire weapons that are proven in 
     an operational environment. I am strongly for acquisition 
     reform in the Department of Defense and have offered many 
     suggestions to improve the acquisition process. However, 
     this is not reform but a step backward in the direction of 
     deploying weapons and equipment that are later proven to 
     be ineffective or inefficient to operate and maintain.
       This proposal eliminates one of the independent checks in 
     our weapon systems acquisition process. An independent 
     Director is the conscience for contractors and project 
     managers and ensures they deliver usable weapon systems to 
     the military members. I have testified in the past against 
     proposals to weaken the authority of the Office of the 
     Director, and steadfastly believe the Director saves the 
     Department funds while ensuring Service members receive 
     operationally effective weapons.

  Mr. President, this provision is misguided, it is shortsighted, it 
could needlessly endanger our troops in the field, and it does not 
deserve the support of the Senate.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Mr. 
Vander Schaaf be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)


                           Acquisition Reform

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this bill represents a significant 
departure from the bipartisan tradition of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and from the way that we have handled DOD Authorization bills 
in the past.
  There was only one area of which I am aware in which the conferees 
were permitted to work to a bipartisan consensus in the way we have 
tried to do in the past--and this issue was not even a defense-specific 
issue. The bipartisan, cooperative way in which the conference handled 
government-wide acquisition provisions in the bill stands in stark 
contrast to the way in which the bulk of the bill was handled, and 
clearly shows the constructive results that can still be achieved when 
we work together across the aisle.
  This does not mean that I am completely satisfied with every element 
of these acquisition provisions. It is in the nature of a conference 
agreement--even one that is worked out on a bipartisan basis--that it 
represents a compromise, and a true compromise is completely 
satisfactory to no one.
  The acquisition provisions that trouble me include the following:
  Section 4301 establishes a congressional policy against the 
imposition of nonstatutory certification requirements on contractors. 
While some certifications may be burdensome and unnecessary, many have 
been imposed as a substitute for even more burdensome government audit 
and review requirements. If we now drop the certification requirements 
as well, we may in some cases be left with no means at all for 
enforcing important Federal policies.
  Section 4303 would give the Department of Defense broad authority to 
waive statutory recoupment requirements in foreign military sales, 
subject to the approval of legislation offsetting the costs of the 
waiver. I am concerned that this provision amounts to a giveaway to 
international arms merchants, which cannot be paid for without making 
substantial cuts elsewhere in an already extraordinarily tight budget.
  Section 4205 would make the cost accounting standards inapplicable to 
all contracts for the purchase of commercial items--even contracts in 
which cost reimbursement or progress payment provisions make clear 
accounting for contractor costs a vital priority. I am concerned that 
this provision could lead to a dangerous erosion in the accountability 
of contractors for costs incurred on cost-type contracts.
  Section 822 would establish a pilot program to test the use of 
commercial 

[[Page S18888]]
practices including the waiver of procurement laws for particular 
contractor facilities to be designated by the Department of Defense--
subject to the approval of Congress. I have been told that candidates 
for inclusion in this program could include facilities in which 
military aircraft are built. I know of no military aircraft that 
qualify as commercial items under the law as we have written it, or 
under any plausible definition of the term, and I continue to believe 
that tough quality, audit and oversight provisions are needed to 
protect the taxpayers' interest in the production of military-unique 
items.

  Despite these concerns, I believe that, on balance, we got the best 
agreement that was possible in a conference which the Senate and the 
House entered with diametrically opposing positions. I am particularly 
pleased that on the acquisition reform provisions of the bill, unlikely 
many other issues, the Senate was able to retain a constructive, 
bipartisan working relationship between members and staff of the Armed 
Services Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Small 
Business Committee.
  That constructive, bipartisan cooperation, which led to the enactment 
of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act in the last Congress, has 
yielded substantial dividends in this bill as well. For example:
  Division E of the bill contains the Cohen-Levin Information 
Technology Management Reform Act, which would substantially streamline 
the management and procurement of computer and communications systems 
by the Federal Government. These provisions would eliminate the process 
of delegations of procurement authority by the General Services 
Administration and consolidate bid protests in a single administrative 
forum, eliminating unneeded paperwork from our information technology 
purchasing systems.
  Section 5401 of the bill contains my proposal to reduce paperwork in 
the acquisition of off-the-shelf products by providing Government-wide, 
on-line computer access to GSA's multiple award schedules. The 
implementation of these provisions should bring effective competition 
to the multiple award schedules and make it possible to reduce or even 
eliminate the need for lengthy negotiations and burdensome paperwork 
requirements placed on vendors to ensure fair pricing.
  Section 4304 of the bill would clarify and substantially streamline 
the procurement ethics laws. While I would have preferred a broader 
revolving door provision than the conferees ultimately agreed to, I 
have been working for years to simplify these overly complex, 
inconsistent, and overlapping statutes. I believe that this change is 
long overdue.
  Finally, I would like to respond to the concerns that have been 
raised about the competition provisions in the bill. As one of the 
Senate authors, with Senator Cohen, of the Competition in Contracting 
Act, I am a strong believer in the importance of full and open 
competition. I was as astonished as were many others to see some of the 
proposals that were made on the House side to undermine this 
cornerstone of the Federal procurement system. I believe that these 
proposals would not only have been unfair to small businesses and other 
vendors, but could have cost the taxpayers billions of dollars in lost 
competition for Federal agency contracts.
  I want to assure my colleagues, however, that this conference 
agreement does not contain any of those changes. We did not and we 
would not agree to change the standard of full and open competition 
through the front door, through the back door, or in any other way. 
This was a fundamental issue in the conference not only for me, but for 
other Senate conferees as well. Senator Cohen and I have put together a 
joint statement explaining the competition provisions in the bill, 
which I believe Senator Cohen will be placing in the Record.
  Mr. President, I may not be pleased with every aspect of the 
acquisition reform package before us, but I am satisfied that on this 
matter, at least, we have continued to work on a bipartisan, consensus 
basis. I wish I could say the same for other provisions in the bill, 
but I cannot.


                               Conclusion

  Mr. President, on no set of issues is bipartisan cooperation more 
important than in the area of national security. We need not all agree 
on every issue, but we must strive to work together in a bipartisan 
spirit. We have a broad spectrum of views on the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees, but we have a long history of working together, 
across party lines to try to put together the best bill we can. 
Regrettably, the conference this year fell short of that objective both 
in process and in spirit. Too many of these contentious issues were 
left to only the majority staff of the two committees to hash out, and 
months passed without resolution. By that time, the defense, military 
construction and energy and water appropriations bills had been passed 
and enacted. I urge the leadership of both the House and Senate 
committees to reexamine what transpired and accelerate the learning 
process so that next year, and I stand ready to work with them to try 
to restore the tradition of cooperation on the Defense authorization 
bill.
  Mr. President, this conference report, in this regard alone, would 
have us threaten a very, very significant gain that we have made four 
our security. That gain is the actual reduction of nuclear weapons and 
the commitment to reduce thousands more nuclear weapons in the Russian 
inventory.
  We should not do this against the clear advice of our military. And 
there are many other reasons for rejecting this conference report.
  Again, I regret that I have reached this conclusion because of my 
affection for Senator Thurmond, but I feel, given the flaws in this 
report, that we should defeat this report, and I will vote against it.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, November 1, 1995.
     Hon. John Deutch,
     Director of Central Intelligence,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear John: When the Senate considers the Conference Report 
     on the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, we will again 
     debate the ballistic missile threat to the United States.
       Sec. 232 para. (3) of the Senate version of the FY 1996 
     Defense Authorization Bill states ``The intelligence 
     community of the United States has estimated that (A) the 
     missile proliferation trend is toward longer range and more 
     sophisticated missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an 
     intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska 
     or beyond within 5 years, and (C) although a new indigenously 
     developed ballistic missile threat to the United States is 
     not forecast within the next 10 years there is a danger that 
     determined countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles in the near future and with little warning by means 
     other than indigenous production.''
       We would appreciate your unclassified comments on whether 
     the above statement accurately reflects the present position 
     of the intelligence community. We would also appreciate your 
     assessment of the likelihood that countries will acquire 
     ``with little warning'' ICBMs either through indigenous 
     production or by other means.
       We would also welcome your providing us with any other 
     information that you feel is relevant to this issue. Thank 
     you for your attention.
           Sincerely,
     Dale Bumpers,
     Carl Levin.
                                                                    ____



                                  Central Intelligence Agency,

                                 Washington, DC, December 7, 1995.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: The DCI has asked me to respond on his 
     behalf to your letter of November 1, 1995, asking for the 
     Intelligence Community's comments on the Defense 
     Authorization Bill language that discusses the future 
     ballistic missile threat to the United States. In the past, 
     representatives of the Intelligence Community openly 
     portrayed the future ballistic missile threat to the US as 
     reflected in the statement from Sec 232, para (3) of the 
     Defense Authorization Bill. We wish to point out, however, 
     that the Intelligence Community continuously evaluates this 
     issue and the Bill language overstates what we currently 
     believe to be the future threat.
       Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet 
     regional security goals; however, most of these missiles 
     cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean 
     missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--
     but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of 
     it being operational within five years is very low.
       The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely 
     any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and we 
     are confident that our warning capability is sufficient to 
     provide notice many years in advance of indigenous 
     development. 
     
[[Page S18889]]

       An original of this letter is also being provided to 
     Senator Dale Bumpers. Similar letters are being provided to 
     Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Sam Nunn.
       Enclosed herewith is an unclassified publication on The 
     Weapons Proliferation Threat. We hope this information is 
     useful. Please call if I can be of further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Joanne O. Isham,
                                Director of Congressional Affairs.

                               Exhibit 2

               [From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995]

Off to a Bad START II--In Both the United States and Russia, Hopes for 
                   the Strategic Arms Pact Are Fading

               (By Rodney W. Jones and Yuri K. Nazarkin)

       After months of delay, the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee moved last week to bring the START II treaty up for 
     a vote on the Senate floor. The pact would reduce U.S. and 
     Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 70 percent of Cold War 
     levels and also eliminate land-based multiple-warhead 
     missiles, the most threatening of Russia's weapons. 
     Unfortunately, while a favorable Senate vote on the treaty is 
     virtually assured, ratification of the pact by Russia has 
     become increasingly uncertain in recent months. As Russians 
     go to the polls today, many will be voting for politicians 
     who question whether START II is still in Russia's best 
     interest.
       The prime cause of Russian second thoughts, according to 
     parliamentarians and defense experts in Moscow, is the 
     Republican-led effort that began this summer to mandate the 
     deployment of a multi-site strategic anti-ballistic missile, 
     or ABM, system by the year 2003. This system was called for 
     originally in the Senate version of the defense authorization 
     bill and endorsed last week by a House-Senate conference 
     committee. Yet it will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, which for 
     more than two decades has helped curtail a costly buildup of 
     defensive nuclear weapons and countervailing offensive 
     weapons.
       It first became clear that START II was in serious trouble 
     last month when parliamentary leaders in Moscow who had 
     supported START II hearings in July concluded that a 
     ratification vote in the waning months of 1995 would fail. To 
     avoid a foreign policy crisis over a negative vote, they 
     postponed further action on the treaty.
       Regrettably, the prospect for unconditional Russian 
     ratification of START II next year is no more promising. 
     Following today's election, the State Duma, Russia's lower 
     house of parliament, is expected to be even more critical of 
     START II and of the United States than its predecessor. 
     Russian political parties and factions opposed to the treaty 
     will probably gain seats at the expense of the reformist and 
     democratic parties that generally support it. President Boris 
     Yeltsin's poor health and the growth of assertive nationalism 
     in Russia further clouds START II's chances.
       Even the Russian military leadership, which had steadfastly 
     supported START II, shows signs of cooling toward the treaty 
     in the wake of U.S. congressional action threatening the ABM 
     Treaty. The Russian military fears the United States' real 
     intent is to gain strategic superiority over Russia. The 
     Russian military dismisses as preposterous U.S. assertions 
     that the legislation is aimed at protecting American soil 
     from the threat of a handful of long-range missiles from 
     North Korea and other small countries. In effect, Russian 
     military leaders argue, the United States would be deploying 
     new defensive missiles just as Russia was completing the 
     reduction of its offensive missiles under START II's 
     requirements. Russia would be more vulnerable and the United 
     States less so.
       Ivan Rybkin, the Duma speaker, expressed the growing 
     disenchantment with START II in the newspaper Nezavissimaya 
     Gazeta on Nov. 5: ``We cannot be bothered any longer, given 
     this situation that propels plans for NATO enlargement and 
     reveals our U.S. congressional colleagues' intentions to 
     begin a process that threatens the ABM Treaty--the 
     cornerstone of the existing arms control regime.''
       Russian misgivings about START II haven't come overnight. 
     Initially Yeltsin and the Russian military leadership firmly 
     believed that START II was in Russia's interest. They 
     recognized benefits for Russia--the fact that START II's deep 
     reductions would enhance stability, reduce future defense 
     costs, ensure formal strategic parity with the United States 
     and contribute to long-term cooperation between the two 
     powers. The Clinton administration also worked to alleviate 
     Russian uneasiness over U.S. national missile defense 
     activities. But the ABM developments of late have changed 
     Russian feelings toward START II.
       If Clinton vetoes the defense authorization bill as he has 
     promised, a direct conflict over the ABM Treaty will be 
     avoided. Congressional direction of the U.S. military might 
     then be provided exclusively in the defense appropriations 
     bill. That legislation, which the president approved earlier 
     this month, says nothing about deploying an ABM system.
       This silence, however, is unlikely to assuage Russian 
     concerns, since Russia must worry that the ABM issue will 
     return in the next congressional session. Moreover, the 
     appropriations bill mandates completion of the Navy's ``Upper 
     Tier'' system, a defense initiative to produce shorter-range 
     missiles that Russia also finds objectionable because of its 
     potential for use against long-range weapons.
       Russian arms control experts are also troubled by the 
     thinking of some U.S. lawmakers who believe that the ABM 
     Treaty is an obsolete Cold War measure. The Russians point 
     out that if the ABM Treaty is to be revised in light of the 
     post-Cold War situation, they see it as equally reasonable to 
     amend and adapt the START treaties. After all, they argue, 
     the cumbersome and intrusive START verification provisions 
     were elaborated in a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust 
     and were based on worst-case scenarios about the other side's 
     intentions.
       These Russian critics suggest that Moscow's obligations 
     under START II are largely irrelevant to current realities. 
     The Russians are required by the treaty to alter the 
     structure of their strategic triad by 2003. This will entail 
     sizable expenditures both to eliminate all multiple-warhead 
     land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and to 
     replace them with single warhead missiles. Given the current 
     U.S.-Russian partnership, Russian START II critics argue, 
     such measures are not essential to the strategic security of 
     both nations and should be open to revision.
       The Russians are completely uninterested in negotiating 
     amendments to fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty. This 
     apparently was well understood by those pushing the 
     antiballistic missile initiative in Congress, for they also 
     included the possible alternative of U.S. withdrawal from the 
     ABM Treaty. Russia might consider changes to the ABM Treaty--
     but only along with parallel changes in START II.
       Would this be acceptable to U.S. officials, legislators and 
     1996 Republican presidential candidates? Renegotiating 
     current nuclear treaties with the purpose of adapting them to 
     new realities--as instruments for regulating the nuclear 
     forces of both nations--would mean embarking on a long and 
     formidable process.
       If the United States is not prepared to enter such a 
     process, yet withdraws from the ABM Treaty or takes steps in 
     that direction it would mean the end of START II--the end of 
     real, dramatic reductions in the numbers of the world's most 
     destructive weapons.
       Is it still possible to resuscitate START II in Russia? 
     Right now, it seems unlikely. If Clinton vetoes the defense 
     authorization, with its ABM mandate, the prospects for saving 
     START II would improve, but only slightly.
       Russian opponents of START II may now insist on delaying 
     Russian ratification until the results of the 1996 U.S. 
     presidential (and congressional) elections can be evaluated. 
     Repairing the growing damage to U.S.-Russian relations and 
     U.S. interests in nuclear threat reduction will become 
     steadily more difficult unless Congress revives the tradition 
     of bipartisan statesmanship on nuclear weapons issues that 
     has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

                               Exhibit 3

                                                Inspector General,


                                        Department of Defense,

                                 Arlington, VA, December 14, 1995.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: This is in response to a request from 
     your staff concerning the position of the Office of the 
     Inspector General on Section 901(j), ``Conforming Amendments 
     Relating to Operational Test and Evaluation Authority,'' of 
     H.R. 1530. This section substantially diminishes the 
     independence, authority and responsibilities of the Director 
     of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and may lead to 
     the eventual elimination of the office and its functions. 
     This action is being taken ``under the cover'' of eliminating 
     from statute all of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 
     However, in the case of the DOT&E, the impact is 
     significantly different. For example, the importance and 
     input that the office can have in ensuring that weapons are 
     suitably for operational deployment is effectively restricted 
     by deleting the annual reports to Congress summarizing 
     operational test and evaluation activities and deleting the 
     duties of the office contained in Section 139 of title 10.
       I strongly disagree with the proposal to eliminate the 
     independence of the DOT&E and replace him with a designated 
     official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The 
     Office of the Director was created by Congress to provide 
     independent validation and verification on the suitability 
     and effectiveness of new weapon systems and to ensure that 
     the Military Departments acquire weapons that are proven in 
     an operational environment. I am strongly for acquisition 
     reform in the Department of Defense and have offered many 
     suggestions to improve the acquisition process. However, this 
     is not reform but a step backward in the direction of 
     deploying weapons and equipment that are later proven to be 
     ineffective or inefficient to operate and maintain.
       This proposal eliminates one of the independent checks in 
     our weapon systems acquisition process. An independent 
     Director is the conscience for contractors and project 
     managers and ensures they deliver usable weapon systems to 
     the military members. I have testified in the past against 
     proposals to weaken the authority of the Office of the 
     Director, and steadfastly believe the Director saves the 
     Department funds while ensuring service members receive 
     operationally effective weapons. 
     
[[Page S18890]]

       If we may be of further assistance, please contact me or 
     Mr. John R. Crane, Office of Congressional Liaison, at (703) 
     604-8324.
           Sincerely,
                                           Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
                                         Deputy Inspector General.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to correct several incorrect 
statements that have been made over the last several days regarding the 
ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference report. It has 
been asserted that this conference report requires the United States to 
deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system and even a 
space-based system. Both of these assertions are flat wrong.
  The conference report does require the Secretary of Defense to deploy 
a ground-based national missile defense system by the end of 2003. But 
nothing in the conference report requires the system to include 
multiple sites. I continue to believe that the United States should 
ultimately deploy a multiple-site system, but nothing in this 
conference report requires such a system. Nor does the conference 
report advocate, let alone require, a violation of the ABM Treaty. The 
language in the conference report urges the President to undertake 
negotiations with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for 
deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense system. This and 
other provisions in this conference report envision a cooperative 
process, not unilateral abrogation.
  It has been asserted that there is no way to defend the territory of 
the United States from a single site, and therefore this conference 
report indirectly requires a multiple-site system. While I believe that 
a multiple-site system should be our goal, I must point out that the 
Army has concluded that it can defend all 50 States, including Alaska 
and Hawaii, from a single, ABM, Treaty-compliant, site. I would also 
point out that the Army's report on this subject was prepared at the 
request of the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. 
I ask unanimous consent that the Army report, entitled ``Evolutionary 
Approach to National Missile Defense,'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

        Evolutionary Approach to National Missile Defense [NMD]

       1. The Army's Program Executive Office for Missile Defense 
     (PEO-MD) has made a proposal that would take advantage of the 
     significant investment that BMDO has made in ground-based 
     missile defense technology. Planning includes an evolutionary 
     deployment for defense against long range ballistic missiles, 
     initially focusing on unsophisticated intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The approach is to provide a cost 
     and operationally effective single-site system as the first 
     step in system deployment. This initial system will provide 
     defense of all 50 states against an unsophisticated ICBM 
     attack.
       2. The Army PEO's NMD approach is to take advantage of the 
     infrastructure at Grand Forks, North Dakota and deploy an 
     initial NMD system and then grow this system in response to 
     changes in the quantity and quality of the threat and in 
     accordance with the modifications negotiated in the treaty 
     over time. The initial capability can be expanded by adding 
     additional interceptors and by adding more sites. Space-based 
     sensors (Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS)) could be 
     added to provide increased battle space and dual 
     phenomenology tracking and discrimination to enhance defense 
     effectiveness against more advanced threats.
       3. The Army PEO has shown that the initial NMD system can 
     provide effective defense of the 48 continental United States 
     against limited threats (a few RVs with simple penetration 
     aids and/or jammers). Analysis indicates that, with certain 
     enhancements, the initial system can also provide an 
     effective defense for all states. These enhancements include 
     the following:
       a. Improved quality of Early Warning Radar (EWR) data 
     including additional advanced radars at Shemya (in the 
     Aleutian Islands of Alaska), in Hawaii, and on the east 
     coast.
       b. Increased interceptor booster velocity.
       c. Onboard target selection capability of the kill vehicle.
       4. Each of these improvements is discussed below:
       a. Improved EWR data is necessary to provide tracking 
     information of sufficient quality for the NMD battle 
     management/command, control, and communications (BM/C3) 
     system functions. The concept of using EWR data is not 
     different from the CONUS defense concept; however, to extend 
     this capability to Alaska and Hawaii requires upgrades to the 
     EWRs, adding advanced EWRs at Shemya, in Hawaii, and on the 
     east coast. The upgraded EWRs and additional EWRs would 
     provide early acquisition of the ballistic missile threat and 
     allow the interceptors sufficient time to intercept these 
     targets. The advanced EWRs would be based on the technology 
     the Army has developed with BMDO sponsorship.
       b. Another important change is an increase in the 
     interceptor velocity to reduce the fly-out time and increase 
     coverage. For CONUS defense, a velocity of about 6.5 km/sec 
     is sufficient; however, defending Alaska and Hawaii from a 
     single interceptor site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, 
     requires a velocity greater than 7.2 km/sec. The Army NMD 
     Program Office has identified commercial booster motors that 
     will provide a velocity greater than 8 km/sec and plans to 
     utilize this capability in the ground-based interceptor.
       c. The third characteristic required is the onboard 
     capability of the kill vehicle to select the lethal object 
     from a cluster of objects. The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 
     (EKV) was specifically designed to achieve this capability. 
     This capability allows the system to commit the interceptor 
     against a cluster of objects, designate, and intercept the 
     lethal object in a target complex.
       5. The Army PEO has proposed an accelerated, evolutionary 
     NMD development program which will meet requirements if 
     funded at the appropriate level. The proposed NMD Program 
     will develop a system for deployment that will provide an 
     effective defense of the entire United States against a 
     limited threat. The proposal begins with an initial 
     deployment of an NMD system of ground-based interceptors 
     (GBI), a ground-based radar (GBR), upgraded and advanced EWRs 
     (U/AEWR), and associated BM/C3. The proposal would initially 
     deploy about 20 Developmental or User Operational Evaluation 
     System (UOES) GBIs, an X-band NMD GBR, and associated BM/C3 
     in the Grand Forks, North Dakota, vicinity. This system would 
     be supported by existing space-based sensors. A/UEWRs, and 
     upgraded command and control (C2) to support USCINCSPACE in 
     the centralized control of the NMD mission. This initial 
     capability would be fully utilized in the continued 
     evolutionary development of the objective system.
       6. This proposed system could provide effective protection 
     of the entire United States in the 2000 time frame from a 
     limited ICBM attack of a few RVs for an acquisition cost of 
     about $5B. The initial NMD system could be augmented through 
     negotiations to deploy additional GBIs, additional ground-
     based sites, a space-based sensor system (SMTS), and/or a 
     space-based weapon system as required and permitted by treaty 
     obligations to address a larger and/or more sophisticated 
     threat.
       7. In summary, the initial system, using additional EWRs, 
     can provide costs and operationally effective defense of all 
     50 states against ballistic missile threats limited to a few 
     RVs and simple penetration aids. The ground-based radar being 
     developed will provide high quality track and discrimination. 
     On threats that require early commit of the interceptor, the 
     kill vehicle will have the capability to receive in-flight 
     updates including target object map data. The kill vehicle 
     will also have onboard target selection and designation 
     capability. By combining these capabilities and allowing for 
     multiple interceptor shots at each threatening object, a very 
     high probability of kill can be achieved. Additional 
     interceptor sites would provide increased defense robustness 
     as threat quantity and quality increase. Space-based sensors 
     would increase defense confidence against larger and more 
     stressing threats.
       8. This evolutionary deployment approach is a prudent, 
     affordable, and effective means of providing protection for 
     all 50 states against a limited ballistic missile attack. It 
     must be noted, however, that current budgetary constraints 
     preclude the Army and BMDO from substantially accelerating 
     NMD. This evolutionary program is executable only with strong 
     continued congressional support at the $1B per year level, 
     which must not come at the expense of other critical Army or 
     BMDO programs.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, unfortunately, despite all our efforts 
in conference to resolve concerns related to the ABM Treaty, we 
continue to hear the artificial argument that this conference report 
constitutes an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Since there is no 
requirement to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system 
in this conference report, there can be no anticipatory breach 
contained in it.
  But even if there were a multiple-site requirement, this would still 
not constitute an anticipatory breach. Since there are treaty-compliant 
ways to get to a multiple-site system, just having a policy that points 
us in that direction cannot constitute an anticipatory breach. To quote 
the senior Senator from Alabama, who was a distinguished judge prior to 
coming to the Senate, ``While there are legal methods to deploy 
multiple sites within the framework of the ABM Treaty, there can be no 
anticipatory breach.''
  It has also been argued that this conference report requires a space-
based defense. The conference report does call on the Department of 
Defense to preserve the option of deploying a layered defense in the 
future. But there is no requirement to deploy any specific 

[[Page S18891]]
space-based system or to structure an acquisition program that includes 
space-based weapons. The conference report does increase funding for 
the space-based laser program. But this increase is merely to keep a 
technology program alive. We have asked for a report to illustrate what 
a deployment program would look like, but this is hardly a mandate to 
deploy.
  We can certainly debate the merits of what this conference report 
requires. But let's be clear about what it actually contains. If 
Senators want to debate the need for deployment of a national missile 
defense system by 2003, that is a legitimate debate. But to argue, as 
several Senators have, that this conference report requires deployment 
of space-based weapons and mandates a violation of the ABM Treaty is 
simply an act of disinformation. Senators are entitled to their views, 
but they owe the American people an honest statement that distinguishes 
between fact and fiction.
  Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to proceed on the remaining time of Senator Kennedy, 5 
minutes from the time allocated to the minority leader, Senator 
Daschle, and 2 minutes to correspond to the 2 minutes given to Senator 
Inhofe.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee.
  Mr. President, it is an interesting paradox that I have noted since I 
have been here that the things that are really the most important and 
the most serious to our Nation and, indeed, to the world are the ones 
that seem to draw the least attention and are least understood.
  The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is one of those things. It was 
entered into in 1974 between Brezhnev and President Nixon. The really 
salient language of that treaty is found in article I. Here it is on 
this chart. As they say, the mother tongue is English, and this is as 
clear in English as you can get.
  Article I:

       Each party shall be limited at any one time to a single 
     area out of the two provided in Article III of the treaty for 
     deployment of antiballistic missile systems or their 
     components.

  Single means one. The ABM Treaty limits each party to one strategic 
anti-ballistic missile site. It was ratified in 1976, and it is a 
binding treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, now 
Russia.
  There is not any question that this bill intends to proceed with the 
deployment of a strategic antiballistic missile systems at multiple 
sites. The bill also says that we will decide whether a missile defense 
system is tactical or strategic; that is, whether it is designed to 
intercept tactical missiles or strategic missiles. The United States 
will decide. And if the Russians do not happen to like our decision, 
that is just tough, and we will abrogate the treaty.
  How does the bill justify these new policies? Here on this chart is 
what the 1995 Ballistic Missile Defense Act says. Here is the threat 
that is being used by those who want to deploy this National Missile 
Defense System. Here is what the Missile Defense Act says:

       North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic 
     missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years.

  Within 5 years, the bill says.
  Second:

       Determined countries--

  I do not know what a determined country is. I guess you have 
determined countries and undetermined countries.

       Determined countries can acquire intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles in the near future and with little warning by means 
     other than indigenous production.

  Senator Levin and I wondered where this information came from. So we 
took this language and wrote to John Deutch, the Director of the CIA, 
and said, ``What does the intelligence community have to say about this 
threat?''
  Here is what he wrote back to us a little over 2 weeks ago; this is 
what the CIA said:

       The bill language overstates what we currently believe to 
     be the future threat.

  The CIA goes on to say:

       A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching 
     portions of Alaska--but not beyond--may be in development, 
     but the likelihood of it being operational within 5 years is 
     very low.

  Third, the CIA says:

       The intelligence community--

  On whose information we are supposed to be relying around here when 
we spend money--

       The intelligence community believes it extremely unlikely 
     any nations with ICBM's will be willing to sell them, and we 
     are also confident that our warning capability is sufficient 
     to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous 
     development.

  So what is our response to the intelligence community? It is to spend 
$200 million more for the Navy's upper-tier system and $400 million 
more for the national missile defense system. So much for the $30 
billion or so per year that we spend on intelligence. What is the 
national missile defense system required to do in this bill? It is 
required to cover all 50 States, including Hawaii and Alaska. How will 
it do that? The only way it can be done, by deploying interceptors at 
multiple sites.
  What do you do when you deploy multiple sites? You say to Russia, 
``Adios, friend. If you don't like it, we'll pull out of the treaty,'' 
which we have a right to do.
  But the danger of abrogating the ABM Treaty and the Russians and the 
United States both having antimissile defense systems, strategic and to 
a lesser extent tactical, is the world becomes a much less safe place. 
Everyone knows that, if Russia and China think the United States has an 
ABM system that can shoot down their ICBM's, they will begin to deploy 
more ICBM's to compensate. Instead of arms cuts, we will have a new 
arms race.
  I do not know of a single person in the world, I do not know anybody 
who really studies this and keeps up with it who thinks what we are 
doing here is in our best interest. It is not.
  The bill says that the national missile defense system has to be 
deployed by the year 2003. That is 8 years from now. We may lock 
ourselves into a technology we do not even want.
  Do you know what the Russians have already said? ``We summarily 
reject this unilateral action you are taking.'' We summarily reject it, 
and if you do it, Russia will have no choice but to stop implementing 
the nuclear weapons cuts specified in the START Treaty.
  I do not have much time, so let me go on to a couple of other items.
  The bill repeals the prohibition on buying more B-2 bombers than the 
20 we have already agreed to procure. We put $493 million in there for 
B-2 procurement. It is not clear whether that $493 million is to 
correct some of the flaws in the present B-2 or whether it is to buy 
long-lead items for more B-2's.
  If it is the latter, it is terribly misguided. I defy anybody in this 
body, as I did yesterday, to read the report, read the conference 
report and tell me how the $493 million is to be spent.
  Even Senator Nunn, who favors the B-2, says he cannot decipher it.
  What else is in the bill? Yet a new method of financing arms exports. 
The United States now has between 50 and 55 percent of all the arms 
exports in the world, and the Defense Department said we are headed for 
60 percent of all the arms exports. In other words, we ship more arms 
in the international arms trafficking business than the rest of the 
world combined. We have four methods of financing arms right now, and 
this bill provides yet a fifth. Yes, we are the arms merchants of the 
world.
  What else does it do? I can remember back, I guess, in 1983, when 
some lobbyist downtown did not have anything better to do, so he came 
here and convinced the U.S. Congress to start bringing old battleships 
out of mothballs. I stood here and wailed like a banshee, saying this 
is an absolute abject, utter mistake. So what did we do? We did not 
bring one out; we brought four out. What did it cost? About $2 billion. 
What happened? After we did it, we put them back in mothballs. But some 
Navy contractors got a couple of billion dollars out of it.
  Now the Defense Department has removed the four battleships from the 
Naval Register. That means the Pentagon has no more use for the ships 
and it can dispose of them. So what does the bill do? It orders the 
Navy to return at least two of the battleships to 

[[Page S18892]]
Naval Register so they can be returned to duty someday. That does not 
cost anything, Mr. President. I am happy to report that is one thing in 
the bill that does not cost a thin dime--that is, to put two 
battleships back on the Naval Register. I only hope and pray that at 
some point we do not decide to start bringing those suckers out again. 
Because that will cost a small fortune.
  I remember the first one they brought out--I think it was the Iowa or 
the Missouri--I forget which--and it started firing those big 16-inch 
guns and found out that it totally threw all the new electronics on the 
ship off, and they had to go back through all the electronics and 
encompass them in rubber so the guns did not throw everything off. God 
forbid that those old battleships are ever put into service again. The 
good news is that the Appropriations Committee has already prohibited 
the Navy from spending any money for bringing out battleships. So while 
this bill would like to bring the battleships out again, there is no 
money appropriated for it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask that the time for the quorum call 
not be charged to either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have at this point?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 20 minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. I ask to be notified if I exceed 10 minutes.
  This morning during remarks on problems that I see in the conference 
report, I noted that I would have a separate statement addressing the 
missile defense provisions in the conference report.
  I had adressed this subject at the end of last week.
  After I spoke, Senator Lott made an eloquent, but occasionally 
inaccurate, statement in defense of the conference report. I want to 
briefly comment on and correct a few of the Senator's statements about 
missile defense, particularly regarding my role.
  The Senator from Mississippi suggested that, since I supported the 
deployment by a fixed date--1996--of a limited NMD system in the 1991 
Missile Defense Act, I was being inconsistent in opposing the 
deployment of an NMD system by 2003 in the conference report.
  I first observe that I was not a party who injected the 1996 date in 
that act. I thought it was unrealistic but I did not oppose it in 
theory, I opposed it in terms of practicality. But it did go into the 
report and I did not oppose the overall act. I supported the overall 
act, notwithstanding my feeling at that time that 1996 was not 
realistic.
  There are a couple of very, very significant differences between the 
1991 Missile Defense Act and the language in the conference report 
before us today.
  Let me begin by quoting exactly what the 1991 Missile Defense Act 
says about the NMD system:

       (2) Initial deployment.--The Secretary shall develop for 
     deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability 
     of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost-
     effective, operationally-effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant 
     anti-ballistic missile system at a single site as the initial 
     step toward deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system 
     designed to protect the United States against limited 
     ballistic missile threats, including accidental or 
     unauthorized launches or Third World attacks. The system to 
     be developed should include--
       (A) 100 ground-based interceptors . . .
       (B) Fixed, ground-based, anti-ballistic missile battle 
     management radars; and
       (C) optimum utilization of space-based sensors, including 
     sensors capable of cueing ground-based anti-ballistic missile 
     interceptors and providing initial targeting vectors, and 
     other sensor systems that also are not prohibited by the ABM 
     Treaty, such as a ground-based sub-orbital tracking system.

  Mr. President, it is clear from this paragraph that the NMD system 
specified in the 1991 act was to be developed to be fully compliant 
with the ABM Treaty as it then existed. A similar paragraph was 
included in the Senate compromise language passed last September, which 
stated that it is the policy of the United States to:

       (8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of 
     (this Act) through processes specified within, or consistent 
     with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides 
     the means for amendment to the Treaty.

  This language, which was dropped in conference, stands in sharp 
contrast to the language in the conference report, which merely states 
in a completely different section that the programs contained in the 
conference report, quote, ``can be accomplished'' in ways consistent 
with the ABM Treaty--it nowhere requires that the NMD Programs shall be 
carried out in compliant fashion.
  As a matter of fact, it implies very strongly just the opposite, 
which is the reason so many of us oppose it.
  The conference report also abandons other safeguards found in the 
Senate compromise. Gone is a requirement for a congressional review 
prior to a decision to deploy the system to determine whether the 
proposed deployment would be affordable and cost effective, whether the 
threat has developed as anticipated, and whether ABM Treaty 
considerations should affect the decision to deploy.
  In other words, Mr. President, all of these safeguards that we had in 
the Senate bill are omitted from the new conference report language. 
There is no requirement to determine prior to a decision to deploy 
whether the proposed system would be affordable, cost effective, 
whether the threat has developed as anticipated, and whether the ABM 
Treaty considerations should affect the decisions to deploy. In my 
view, all of those are absolutely essential preconditions to making an 
intelligent decision about whether to deploy a system and when to 
deploy a system.
  So, the conference report language, contrary to the assertion made 
earlier, does not have the same effect as the language in the 1991 
Missile Defense Act--not by a long, long shot. That act clearly calls 
for a ABM-compliant system--a system compliant with the ABM Treaty. In 
my view, the administration has rightly found the language in the 
conference report to be unacceptable because of these considerations.
  I repeat what I have said earlier. The last thing we want is to take 
an effort to mandate now certain language that the administration--and 
they are the ones negotiating this with the Russians--that the 
administration believes is likely to have the result of not having a 
ratification of START II, and perhaps not even a continuation of START 
I reductions.
  We have had two Republican Presidents do a very good job in 
negotiating both START I and START II. Those treaties, if they are 
complied with, will require a two-thirds reduction in the number of 
missiles aimed at the United States, including the missiles we have 
always felt were more likely to be launched early, perhaps by mistake, 
perhaps by the other military leaders making a mistake in terms of 
warning, because these are highly MIRV'd systems with a lot of warheads 
and the fear would be, by the other side, that they might be knocked 
out on a preemptive strike.
  We have always worried about those MIRV'd missiles. These two 
treaties are able, after lots of negotiations over more than 10 or 12 
years, to get rid of those systems that we have always considered to be 
highly destabilizing as applied in the cold war period. We finally 
achieved that. And to take language in this bill and to take a real 
risk that the results of those two treaties would be obviated is not 
only unwise but it is totally unnecessary.
  I repeat, also, what I have said earlier. The administration and 
those of us negotiating offered to take on the section of national 
missile defense language, we offered either the House version or the 
Senate version, on the national missile defense language. Why in 
conference you cannot solve the national missile defense language with 
either the House version, as passed by the House, or the Senate 
version, as passed by the Senate, when you offer the conferees either 
version, is beyond me. It is a real puzzle.
  Of course, what happened is that we made the compromise on the Senate 
floor--which Senator Levin, Senator 

[[Page S18893]]
Warner, Senator Cohen, and I worked out and which every Republican 
voted for except one, and the people who were opposed to it were mainly 
on the Democratic side, because they felt it went too far. We had an 
unusual 4- or 5-day intensive, word-by-word examination and we got, not 
only the agreement in this body, with every Republican but one voting 
for it, but we got the administration signing off on it, albeit 
reluctantly with some concerns. And then we went into conference and we 
offered either the Senate-passed language or the House language--not 
the entire language of the House on everything, but on the national 
missile defense part--and we could not satisfy people because they 
wanted to go much further than either the House version or the Senate 
version. To me that is just very puzzling.
  It is sad to see a bill jeopardized, in terms of becoming law, 
because of that.
  Mr. President, I will now address the negotiations as I saw them, 
from my point of view, and the possibilities that still exist in 
putting this bill together if it is vetoed, and if the veto is not 
overridden.


                       ballistic missile defense

  The administration strongly objects to the ballistic missile defense 
language adopted by the conferees, and I agree with the 
administration's assessment. Mr. President, the Congress has been 
dealing with difficult issues related to BMD since the star wars 
debates of the early 1980's. I have been part of putting together 
bipartisan agreements on BMD for over a decade, many years facing much 
more difficult challenges than this year. That is why I am puzzled that 
the Republican majorities--with two bipartisan paths open to approval 
by the President--chose a third path to certain opposition.
  As Members will recall, the issue of ballistic missile defense was 
one of the primary subjects of debate and difficulty when the Senate 
considered the National Defense Authorization bill during the summer. 
There was strong opposition on the floor to the BMD provision reported 
by the committee. During the debate, the bipartisan leadership 
designated a group of Senators to address this subject. Senator Dole 
designated Senators Warner and Cohen to represent the Republicans. 
Senator Daschle designated Senator Levin and myself to represent the 
Democrats.
  Mr. President, we dealt with that issue in the old-fashioned way, 
with Senators closely examining each word of the proposed amendment. 
Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I worked and reworked the amendment, 
line-by-line, to address the issues raised by the administration and 
our respective party caucuses.
  It was clear to all concerned that the administration had serious 
reservations even bout the bipartisan amendment we developed in the 
Senate. After expressing their concerns and examining every word and 
every phrase carefully, the administration reluctantly agreed to accept 
this final Senate compromise language.
  On August 11, 1995, Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I each 
provided detailed explanations of the bipartisan amendment in speeches 
to the Senate. We also placed extensive information in the 
Congressional Record, including the text of the bipartisan amendment, a 
detailed comparison to previous language, and related materials. As a 
result, detailed explanatory information was available to all Senators 
and the public for a thorough review for nearly a month before we 
actually voted on the amendment on September 6.
  The bipartisan amendment provided extensive guidance to ensure that 
the United States would develop a more focussed missile defense program 
than we had previously authorized, particularly in the area of national 
missile defense.
  The bipartisan amendment stated that it--

       . . . is the policy of the United States to . . . develop 
     for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense 
     system that: (i) is affordable and operationally effective 
     against limited, accidental, and unauthorized ballistic 
     missile attacks on the territory of the United States, and 
     (ii) can be augmented over time as the threat changes to 
     provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or 
     unauthorized ballistic missile threats.

  The bipartisan amendment required the Secretary of Defense to 
``develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile 
defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of attaining initial 
operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.''
  The bipartisan amendment also set forth the understanding of the 
Senate as to the demarcation between theater and ballistic missile 
defense systems, and established a prohibition against use of funds--

       . . . to implement an agreement with any of the independent 
     states of the former Soviet Union entered into after January 
     1, 1995 that would establish a demarcation between theater 
     missile defense systems and anti-ballistic missile systems 
     for purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the 
     performance, operation, or deployment of United States 
     theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent 
     provided in an Act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to 
     implement that portion of any such agreement that 
     implements the criteria in subsection (b)(1); or (3) to 
     implement any such agreement that is entered into pursuant 
     to the treaty making power of the President under the 
     Constitution.

  The amendment was approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 85-13, with 
only one Republican voting against the amendment. Without this 
bipartisan agreement and approval, it is doubtful the Senate would have 
passed the authorization bill.
  Although the conference on this bill was convened on September 7, 
there were no Member-level bipartisan House-Senate discussions on this 
subject by members of the conference for over 2 months. Eventually, we 
were able to reach agreement on the theater missile defense demarcation 
language, but could not reach a consensus on the national missile 
defense provisions. The failure to reach an agreement is puzzling to 
me, since the administration was prepared to accept either the House-
passed or Senate-passed versions of the national missile defense 
language.
  The Senate, as I noted earlier in my remarks, established a 
requirement to ``develop an affordable and operationally effective 
national missile defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or 
unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of 
attaining initial operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.'' 
The House established a requirement to ``develop for deployment at the 
earliest practical date an affordable, operationally effective national 
missile defense [NMD] system designed to protect the United States 
against limited ballistic missile attacks.''
  Either version of this language--approved overwhelmingly by each 
House--would have been acceptable to the administration, but neither 
was approved in conference. The main stumbling block was the insistence 
of some of the conferees that Congress go beyond language approved by 
either the Senate or the House and mandate a specific requirement to 
deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. This problem was 
compounded by an insistence that the conferees use a new baseline draft 
proposal in conference, rather than work off the carefully crafted 
bipartisan Senate language. As a result, the conference report lacks 
many of the carefully drafted provisions of Senate-passed bill.
  During attempts to forge a conference agreement acceptable to the 
administration, I emphasized that we could use national missile defense 
language that had received overwhelming Republican support this year. I 
believe that it is still possible to do so if this bill is not enacted. 
There are two primary options, each of which would use language 
approved by an overwhelming majority in the Senate or the House.
  The first option would simply use the bipartisan national missile 
defense and theater missile defense provisions which were approved by 
the Senate on September 6, 1995 by a vote of 85 to 13, with only one 
Republican Senator voting against that amendment.
  The second option would substitute the House-passed national missile 
defense language for the national missile defense portion of the 
bipartisan Senate-passed bill, using the Senate-passed bill for the 
remainder of the missile defense language. Either of these provisions 
would provide the basis for renewed focus in our National Missile 
Defense Program and an even stronger effort on theater missile 
defenses.
  Mr. President, if the national missile defense language in the Senate 
bill was strong enough to win virtually unanimous Republican support, 
it should 

[[Page S18894]]
have provided an adequate basis for our conference report.
  If the national missile defense language in the House bill was strong 
enough to win overwhelming Republican support in the House, it should 
have provided an adequate basis for a conference agreement.
  Either of these approaches could have represent a solid step forward 
on the important subject of national missile defense. The alternative 
ultimately chosen by the conferees was to use language that was in 
neither bill mandated a specific requirement to deploy a national 
missile defense system by 2003. That language is unacceptable to the 
administration, and is a major element of the administration's 
announced intention that this bill will be vetoed.

  The administration is very concerned that the national missile 
defense language in the conference report goes well beyond the mandates 
of both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills.
  The administration has expressed serious concerns about the impact of 
the conference report language on Russian consideration of the START II 
Treaty, which is designed to produce a second major reduction in United 
States and Russian nuclear weapons. The administration is also 
concerned that the language could lead the Russians to abandon other 
arms control agreements if they conclude that it is United States 
policy to take unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty. Russian 
spokesmen have made plain that Russia has neither the technology nor 
the defense resources to allow them to match United States missile 
defense efforts. Therefore, they state that their only available 
reaction to a large-scale U.S. national missile defense program would 
be to retain additional strategic missiles and nuclear warheads, which 
would require them to forego START II and perhaps even abrogate START I 
limitations. This is what is at risk. These are not small stakes.
  In a letter to Senator Daschle, dated December 15, Secretary of 
Defense Bill Perry stated:

       [B]y directing that the NMD [National Missile Defense] be 
     ``operationally effective'' in defending all 50 states 
     including Hawaii and Alaska, the bill would likely require a 
     multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated 
     within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting 
     U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the 
     bill puts at risk continued implementation of the START I 
     Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties 
     which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian 
     strategic warheads by two-thirds from cold war levels, 
     significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

  In my judgment, the administration's concerns are well-placed. 
Moreover, this struggle over language is, in my judgment, completely 
unnecessary. I believe we can achieve both START II ratification and 
progress toward the deployment of a highly-effective national missile 
defense system to protect against accidental, unauthorized, or limited 
third-world attacks. Since the late 1980's I have advocated development 
of a National missile defense system in the form of an accidental 
launch protection system [ALPs].
   Mr. President, it is important to understand the historical context 
for this concept. National missile defense proposals began with 
President Reagan's star wars proposal in 1983, designed to render 
ballistic missiles ``impotent and obsolete.'' This was followed in the 
mid-1980s by a slightly more modest proposal, called the ``Phase-I'' 
system, with the objective of defeating a full Soviet counterforce 
first-strike. This, in turn, was followed in the early 1990s by G-PALS, 
or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, which also turned out to 
be too ambitious.
  This progression was what led to the Missile Defense Act of 1991, 
which envisioned simply getting on with the development of a treaty-
compliant NMD system. And, when I say ``treaty-compliant,'' that means 
with the treaty as it currently exists, not as it might someday be 
modified.
  In my judgment, even if the ultimate answer to our requirements is a 
system requiring amendment to the ABM Treaty--such as a multiple-site 
NMD system with more than 100 interceptor missiles--there is no need to 
insist on a commitment to that today. Common sense tells us that even 
if a multi-site system is the end-objective, we will begin by deploying 
a small number of interceptors at a single site. At this stage, we do 
not know what the performance or cost of the various NMD system 
components under development will be, or whether such a system would be 
``affordable and cost-effective.''
  Also, Mr. President, the strategic environment is different today 
than it was in 1991. When the Missile Defense Act of 1991 was passed, 
we faced thousands of Soviet missiles and more than 10,000 warheads, 
all aimed on hair-trigger alert at the United States or its military 
forces. The consequences of even a small accidental launch would have 
been enormous, because of the likelihood of escalation. Today, START I 
has cut the inventory of weapons, and START II will cut levels further, 
once it enters into force. Moreover, the Soviet Union is gone, replaced 
by a less hostile Russia; United States and Russian missiles are now 
targeted on broad ocean areas, rather than on each others' territory. 
The policy of targeting broad ocean areas has reduced but not 
eliminated the consequences of an accidental launch.

  Finally, there is a future threat of missile attack on the United 
States by some rogue Third World power. This was recognized as a 
possible threat in the 1991 act, and in the Senate compromise. However, 
no such threat has yet materialized, and the latest from the 
intelligence community on the likelihood of such an event reads as 
follows:

       Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet 
     regional security goals; however, most of these missiles 
     cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean 
     missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--
     but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of 
     it being operational within five years is very low.
       The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely 
     that any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and 
     we are also confident that our warning capability is 
     sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of 
     indigenous development.

  That information was provided in a December 1, 1995 letter on behalf 
of CIA Director Deutch by Joanne Lsham, CIA Director of Congressional 
Affairs. The missile defense language in the conference report is 
misguided. There is no need for: First, strident language or second, 
ironclad commitments today to deploy by a date certain an NMD system 
that is clearly an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Enactment of 
this language is likely to prevent the START II Treaty from entering 
into force, which would compound the problem of developing affordable 
and cost-effective defenses. Without the START II reductions, missile 
defenses capable of dealing with potential accidental or unauthorized 
launches would likely have to be much more extensive. If the 5,000 or 
so warheads to be retired under START II remain in Russian inventories, 
this will greatly complicate our missile defense problem. Because of 
the magnitude of the threat, star wars and its successors were deemed 
too costly and of too limited effectiveness to be worth pursuing.
  In my judgment, we should be pursing first things first. First, the 
development of all the components of an NMD system, and a limited 
deployment of a strictly treaty-compliant system, so as to learn more 
about the cost and effectiveness of NMD systems. Then, depending on 
cost and effectiveness, depending on the evolution of the threat and 
the course of negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty, we can make further 
decisions on further deployments. But, let us not jeopardize the 
advantages of the START II Treaty by a headlog rush to deploy 
something.
  Mr. President, there are four fundamental aspects to an effective 
protection against nuclear weapons. The first is to reduce nuclear 
warheads by two-thirds as envisioned by START I and START II, thereby 
substantially decreasing the weapons that could be used against us 
deliberately or accidentally.
  The second is to vigorously pursue the Nunn-Lugar program for 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet 
Union.
  The third is to develop and deploy effective theater missile 
defenses. A strong majority in the Senate and the Congress fully 
support the development and deployment of highly effective theater 
missile defenses.
  The fourth is to develop for deployment an affordable and cost-
effective national missile defense program to address the potential for 
accidental, unauthorized, or limited strikes. 

[[Page S18895]]

  No one of these programs, by itself, is sufficient. Each one can have 
a significant impact on the other. The national missile defense 
program, in particular, could have either a positive or negative impact 
on the pace and likelihood of START I and START II reductions. 
Moreover, even in combination, these programs are not a guarantee 
against threats by other means, such as conventional delivery by a 
terrorist through a smaller aircraft or vessel. That threat will 
require additional counterproliferation and counterterrorist efforts.
  In summary, Mr. President, it is important to pursue the development 
of a national missile defense system, but we must do so in a manner 
that preserves and encourages the important reductions we can achieve 
through START I, START II, and Nunn-Lugar. Because the language in the 
conference agreement is likely to severely undermine these efforts in 
Russia, I cannot support the conference agreement in its current form.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now yield to the able Senator from 
Virginia, Senator Warner. Senator Warner has been on the Armed Services 
Committee a long time. He is a very effective, able member. We are very 
pleased to have him here to speak for this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman. It has 
been a real pleasure to have worked with him all these many, many years 
that I have been in the U.S. Senate. I can remember when I appeared 
before his committee, at that time for confirmation as Under Secretary, 
and then, again, as Secretary of the Navy, that he, frankly, Mr. 
President, coached me through that procedure--he and that fine Senator 
from Virginia known as Harry Byrd. I remember those days very well and 
always am appreciative.
  I am always appreciative too, to serve with my former chairman, the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia. Leadership was his hallmark on the 
committee through those many years, and I was pleased to serve with him 
as ranking member for some several years and to work with him on many 
pieces of legislation.
  Mr. President, earlier today I made reference to the portion of our 
bill which deals with the equipment added for the National Guard and 
Reserve components. I would like to include in the record a statement 
from the December 15th Congressional Record in which Congressman 
Montgomery, a senior Democratic Member of the House of Representatives, 
said the following: ``I have great respect for the gentleman from 
California--speaking of Mr. Dellums--my ranking member, but I strongly 
support this bill, and I believe that he will oppose it. One area that 
I have worked very hard in over the years, Mr. Speaker, is working to 
have a strong National Guard and Reserve.''
  And unquestionably he has done that, and indeed our distinguished 
chairman likewise has been a pillar of strength for the Guard and 
Reserve through these many years.
  Continuing, ``We now have the total force. We are using the Reserves 
for the first time, and it is paying off.''
  An example of that, of course, Mr. President, being the number of 
flights going into Sarajevo formerly, and now Tuzla and elsewhere. It 
will be interesting to note how many of those flights are being flown 
by Reserve units from all over the United States.
  Mr. Montgomery continued, ``As we move into Bosnia, the Guard and 
Reserve will be totally used. In this bill, we have a lot of things 
that will help the National Guard and Reserve and the different States 
around the country will benefit by this bill. I certainly hope that 
this conference report will be adopted. In the area that I have worked 
over the years, serving 27 years on the Armed Services Committee and 
Committee of National Security, the Guard and Reserve have the best 
package they have had in 10 years.''
  That is the package, Mr. President, in this report.
  Mr. President, I would like to also take an opportunity here to thank 
the members of the Senate Budget Committee for negotiating a budget 
resolution under the leadership of Senator Domenici, and, indeed, 
Senator Exon also--a resolution which provided for increases to Defense 
budgets in fiscal year 1996, and in future years as well.
  Notice that there are those who ask why, as we strive to reduce the 
deficit and move toward the balanced budget, we should increase the 
level of defense spending, especially when we are making reductions in 
almost every other area of the budget. Too often those who clamor for 
further Defense cuts fail--I think it is important, and I do this on 
each bill--to note that Defense has already paid more than its fair 
share, that in fact Defense has already been cut in my judgment, very 
deeply. Fiscal year 1996 represents the 11th consecutive year, Mr. 
President, of declining Defense budgets, the longest continuous decline 
since World War II. DOD spending, as a share of the Federal budget, has 
declined 42 percent--which it was in 1968--to 18 percent in 1994, and 
continues that decline.
  As a percentage of gross domestic product, defense spending has 
declined to its lowest level since 1940, the year before America ended 
the war.
  We should not lose sight of the fact that the end of the cold war did 
not usher in a new era of peace and stability in the world.
  According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, there are currently 60 
areas of conflict throughout the world, and as we are seeing today in 
Bosnia, the United States can be drawn militarily very quickly into 
these conflicts.
  In addition, the Communist resurgence in the recent elections in 
Russia should give rise for great concern. Russia remains the only 
country with the capability to inflict considerable damage on the 
United States of America. Hopefully, we will not witness a return to 
past policies with Russia. But we must be vigilant and maintain our 
defense capabilities in these times of uncertainty.
  In earlier remarks today, Mr. President, I singled out the very 
significant amount of money that Russia is investing in its submarine 
program and other strategic systems beneath the sea. That should bring 
to the attention of all Senators the need to keep the strongest 
research and development capability of this country addressing that 
area, and this conference report does just that, Mr. President.
  Further, as chairman of the Subcommittee or AirLand Forces, I have 
oversight over the research and development, R&D and procurement 
programs for the Army, the Air Force, and the tactical fighter aircraft 
for both the Navy and the Air Force.
  I thank at this moment, Col. Les Brownlee, my professional staff 
member who has been with me for 12 years working on various areas of 
the national security aspects of our committee, and I want to pay 
special recognition also to Mrs. Judy Ansley who is also on my staff 
and works in this area.
  The modernization accounts, R&D and procurement, have clearly been 
underfunded by the Clinton administration. The procurement accounts to 
provide for the future readiness of our military forces have been 
reduced by 44 percent since fiscal year 1992, the last defense budget 
from the Bush administration.
  In my subcommittee we address some of these deficiencies. In 1986 we 
bought over 400 tactical fighter aircraft for the Navy and the Air 
Force. I will repeat that--400. In the fiscal year 1996 defense budget 
the Clinton administration requested funds to buy a total of only 12--
400 compared to 12 such aircraft. We more than double that number with 
the additional funding provided by the Budget Committee here in the 
Senate.
  In the Army's truck program--that is always considered the last item 
in these programs. As our distinguished chairman, a former Army man 
knows, the Army may travel on its stomach but it cannot move without 
its trucks. In the Army truck program, the funding has ranged over the 
past 10 years from a high of $917 million per year to a low of $419 
million, with an average of $720 million per year over the last 10-year 
period. The administration's budget request for the Army's truck 
programs for the fiscal year 1996 was only $128 million. That is 
compared, Mr. President, I repeat to the average of $720 million. We 
recommended an increase of over $300 million to help alleviate this 
deficiency. The committee 

[[Page S18896]]
accepted it and it is included in this conference report.
  Clearly, without the additional funds provided by the Congress, the 
administration's shortcoming in the Defense spending would mortgage the 
future of our military capabilities. This administration has made 
readiness the keystone of the Defense program, and in fact has funded 
readiness at the expense of modernizing our military. Not only have the 
procurement and R&D accounts deteriorated but because the overall 
Defense budget is so severely underfunded, readiness has suffered as 
well, despite its high priority.
  In the State of the Union Address in 1994, President Clinton implored 
the Congress not to cut defense further. That defense had been cut 
enough. That was just in 1994. Then this year, in his budget request 
for fiscal year 1996, the President recommended $5.7 billion less than 
he recommended in the previous year. In real terms, this is over $13 
billion less than last year. Mr. President, that sounds like a cut to 
me.
  Mr. President, funds which the Budget Committees of this Congress 
have proposed to add over the next 7 years are in fact quite modest, 
and may not be enough. By any measure, this is not another Reagan 
buildup.
  I would like to dispell a notion which has appeared recently in 
various articles in the Washington press and is repeated frequently on 
the Senate floor--that the uniformed leaders of our military services 
do not want the weapons and equipment bought with the funds added by 
the Congress. Our military chiefs testified before our committee 
regarding the lack of funding were experiencing--specifically for 
modernization. Of course they want the equipment, and our military 
services desperately need it. It is difficult for our military to ask 
for resources that are not in the President's budget request, because 
they are bound to support the President's budget. But, there is plenty 
of evidence that these additional funds were very much needed by our 
military services and very much appreciated.
  The Armed Services Committee has used these funds wisely, in my view, 
to increase the capabilities of our military forces now and in the 
future. The committee has given priority to increasing the 
modernization accounts in order to buy the weapons and equipment needed 
to fight and win decisively with minimal risk to personnel. The 
committee utilized the following precepts in allocating congressional 
increases to the defense budget: buy basics; invest to achieve savings; 
and invest in the future.
  Because the procurement of basic weapons and items of equipment has 
been neglected during the decline in defense spending, the conference 
report includes increases in such basic items as new ships, trucks, 
small arms and upgrades to weapon systems and items of equipment 
already in the inventory.
  While the conference report adds a significant amount of the 
congressional increase for defense to the procurement accounts, we did 
so without initiating significant numbers of new programs to avoid 
creating ``bow-waves'' of funding that the military services could not 
afford in the out years. Instead, we recommend increases for weapons 
and items of equipment currently in production and the use of multiyear 
procurement contracts, where savings might be achieved. Buying more 
weapons and equipment currently in production at more efficient rates 
lowers overall costs to the Government. It also avoids overlapping 
procurement sequencing and reduces competition for procurement 
resources in the future.
  Mr. President, this conference agreement authorizes a much-needed 
$7.1 billion increase in the defense budget over the amount requested 
by President Clinton. This additional funding was used to improve the 
quality of life of our troops and their families, to revitalize the 
readiness of our Armed Forces, to fund a robust modernization program 
and to accelerate the development and deployment of missile defense 
systems.
  While the ultimate fate of this conference agreement may be in doubt, 
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation which contains many 
provisions which are of vital importance to the men and women of the 
Armed Forces. At the very time that we are deploying troops to Bosnia, 
all Members of Congress should support this conference agreement which 
goes a long way toward improving the quality of life of our service 
personnel and their families. All members who spoke so eloquently 
during the Bosnia debate about supporting our troops now have a real 
opportunity to show that support by voting to support this conference 
agreement.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the able Senator from 
Virginia for his able remarks he made on this bill. He is chairman of 
the Rules Committee but he is a prominent member of the Armed Services 
Committee and has rendered great service to his country. We all 
appreciate that very much.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman, and I 
thank the distinguished ranking member.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, a few moments ago I cast my vote in 
favor of the Defense authorization conference report for fiscal year 
1996. I did so with very mixed feelings. There are many provisions in 
the conference report which I worked hard to attain and I am delighted 
they are in this report. But there are other provisions that I have 
opposed for several years and, in fact, voted against during the markup 
of the bill in the Armed Services Committee--restrictions on abortion 
and additional B-2 funding to name just two. There is also a provision 
on how the military must treat HIV positive soldiers which I believe is 
wrong-headed and discriminatory. I regret that in order to complete 
this conference the majority felt it necessary to accept these sorts of 
provisions. My vote today for passage of this conference report does 
not alter my determination to see that these provisions are changed 
before they can have the adverse impact on our military men and women 
which I fear is likely. As I weighed the bad against the good in this 
conference report, I have concluded that the good is essential for our 
servicemen and women and their families as they serve our country in 
Bosnia or wherever they are serving around the world.
  Mr. President, one of the many reasons I sought to serve on the Armed 
Services Committee is that it operated on a bipartisan basis for the 
good of our national security and our men and women in uniform. The 
fact that Senator Nunn, the former chairman, during his time on the 
committee has voted for more than 20 authorization bills regardless of 
who was in the majority is an indicator of this bipartisan spirit. The 
fact that Senator Nunn did not vote for this report is an indicator 
that this spirit was eroded this year. I greatly regret that. This 
erosion occurred, I believe, in spite of the hard work and best efforts 
of the distinguished current chairman, Senator Thurmond. I hope that we 
can take a hard look at ourselves and that we will be able to make 
whatever changes might help us return to where this great committee 
used to be.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I intend to vote against the defense 
authorization conference report today with some regret. I did not care 
for the bill as it left the Senate, and I voted against it then. Now 
the conferees have contended at length and come back with I believe a 
more objectionable bill.
  I know that a number of the Senate minority conferees tried to return 
with a workable bill devoid of excesses, but, unfortunately, they did 
not prevail.
  I am particularly concerned by the provisions setting the stage for a 
national missile defense. This legislation requires that the United 
States build an ``operationally effective'' defense of all 50 States by 
the year 2003.
  Such a new system almost certainly would require deployments of 
ballistic missile defenses at multiple sites, since such a defense 
would likely be well beyond any capabilities we could put into our 
presently mothballed single ABM site at Grand Forks, ND. The cost could 
quickly mount into the tens of billions of dollars over the next 7 
years.
  An immediate problem with all of this is that it could send a message 
to the Russians that we do not intend to live up to the ABM Treaty. 
This could well undermine any prospects we might 

[[Page S18897]]
have that they, in turn, will ratify and abide by the terms of the 
START II Treaty. That treaty has just been approved by the Committee on 
Foreign Relations in an 18 to 0 vote and is awaiting Senate action.
  Heretofore, both we and the Russians have been comfortable with 
mutually agreed steps to curb and reduce nuclear armaments secure in 
the knowledge that the ABM Treaty ensured that our deterrent worked and 
would work at lower levels. It would be very much against our interests 
if the train of reductions were to stop now. A renewed strategic arms 
buildup might even be in prospect.
  If all of that happened, the new National Missile Defense System 
would be woefully outmatched, since it would be designed to deal with 
accidental launches and new and emerging threats and not with a major 
continued Russian threat. One might ask why we need new defenses 
against accidental launches when we did not need them before.
  Mr. President, we should pause to think of these new threats. First, 
it is important to understand that there is no official intelligence 
analysis to indicate that we are likely to have any new missile threat 
over the next decade or so. Any nation thinking of moving in that 
direction would have a very hard time finding a supplier or suppliers. 
It is extremely difficult to develop missiles indigenously, and any 
nation doing so would certainly be caught at it.
  We should ask ourselves how we would react if some nation were trying 
to get a small fleet of missiles to attack us with. We and others could 
apply serious political and economic pressures to make that nation 
cease and desist. If we and others had to act militarily to end the 
threat, we could. That fact alone would add strength to our diplomatic 
efforts.
  The least reasonable response would be to spend billions of dollars 
deploying a last-ditch, Fortress America ballistic missile defense that 
would, at best, make little or no contribution to our national defenses 
and would, at worst, start a process under which strategic stability 
and the very fruitful process of arms control could be dealt a terrible 
blow.


                 shipments of spent nuclear fuel appear

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I would like to commend the Senate for 
including language in the Defense authorization bill that recognizes 
the need to implement the terms, conditions, right and obligations 
contained in the recently signed agreement between the Navy, Department 
of Energy, and the State of Idaho and the consent order of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Idaho that effectuates the 
settlement agreement. I am also pleased that it is the Senate's sense 
to appropriate funds called for by the President to carry out the 
agreement.
  It has been a pleasure to work with Governor Batt as he crafted a 
historic agreement between the State of Idaho, the U.S. Navy, and the 
Department of Energy. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel began 
accumulating at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory [INEL] when I 
was a child growing up in Midvale, ID, in 1949 and continue to this 
day. However, until Governor Batt signed an agreement in 1995, there 
was no provision to remove this material from Idaho. I am proud to have 
worked with him to help to craft the agreement that assures liquid 
wastes will be put into dry form to protect the Snake River aquifer and 
approximately 10,800 shipments of spent nuclear fuel and transuranic 
wastes will begin to be shipped from Idaho in 1999 and be completely 
removed by 2035.
  Mr. President, Idaho has had a long history with the nuclear Navy and 
nuclear reactor research. We are proud of that involvement with our 
Nation's defense. We are just as proud that Idaho, for the first time, 
has an agreement and timeline for the removal of spent fuel from our 
State. I am glad to have played a role in moving this agreement.
  I ask unanimous-consent that a time line that indicates the history 
of the Navy and DOE's involvement at the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                     Idaho's Nuclear Waste Timeline

       W.W.II, the area that is now the Idaho National Engineering 
     Laboratory is used by the Navy to test ship gun barrels and 
     by the Army Corps to train bombardier crews.
       1949, the ``National Testing Station'' is established in 
     Idaho--the forerunner of today's Idaho National Engineering 
     Laboratory.
       1950, the Navy begins work on their first nuclear reactor 
     in Idaho--the Submarine Thermal Reactor prototype (S1W 
     prototype).
       1951, a reactor at the National Reactor Testing Station 
     (now INEL) called ``Experimental Breeder Reactor-1'' (EBR-1) 
     becomes the first nuclear reactor in the world to produce 
     electricity.
       1952, the first shipment of spent nuclear fuel arrives from 
     Hanford, Washington.
       1954, the first shipment of transuranic wastes (items like 
     gloves, tools and pipes contaminated with plutonium) arrives 
     from Colorado.
       1955, the first nuclear powered U.S. Naval vessel, the 
     U.S.S. Nautilus submarine is launched.
       1957, the first shipment of spent Navy fuel comes to Idaho.
       From 1949 to 1995, there have been 627 Navy spent nuclear 
     fuel shipments and approximately 1,032 Department of Energy 
     shipments. In addition, there have been approximately 3,225 
     shipments of transuranic materials. All told, about 4,884 
     shipments have come to Idaho. Additional waste material is 
     also generated at INEL.
       From 1957 to 1970--Republicans Robert Smylie and Don 
     Samuelson were Governors of Idaho. During their 
     administrations, there were 140 Navy spent nuclear fuel 
     shipments, 50 foreign fuel shipments and about 1,550 
     transuranic waste shipments. The total number of shipments 
     that came into Idaho during the Smylie and Samuelson 
     administrations: approximately 1,740.
       From 1970 to 1994--Democrats Cecil Andrus and John Evans 
     were Governors of Idaho. During their administrations there 
     were 456 Navy spent nuclear fuel shipments, 532 commercial 
     spent nuclear fuel shipments, about 500 U.S. Department of 
     Energy/federal government shipments and 1,675 transuranic 
     shipments from Rocky Flats, Colorado. The total number of 
     shipments that came into Idaho during the Andrus and Evans 
     administrations: approximately 3,163.
       1970, Senator Frank Church received a letter from the head 
     of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (forerunner of the 
     current U.S. Department of Energy). The letter says that 
     transuranic nuclear waste would begin to be removed from 
     Idaho ``within the decade.''
       1973, Governor Cecil Andrus has said that he received 
     assurances that the nuclear wastes in Idaho would be removed 
     ``within 10 years.''
       1974, the National Reactor Testing Station is renamed the 
     Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to reflect its 
     changing mission.
       1975, the Energy Research and Development Administration 
     (forerunner of the current U.S. Department of Energy) chooses 
     a site in New Mexico for the disposal of transuranic wastes.
       1979, the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (later renamed the 
     Waste Isolation Pilot Plant--WIPP) in New Mexico is 
     authorized by Congress.
       In 1982, Congress passes the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 
     Spent nuclear fuel is to be shipped to two repositories--one 
     in the eastern U.S. and the other in west--and to an interim 
     facility for Monitored Retrievable Storage--by 1998.
       1987, Congress realizes that site characterization costs 
     have escalated from $100 million per site to $2 billion per 
     site. The law is amended and Yucca Mountain Nevada is 
     designated by Congress as the only spent nuclear fuel site to 
     be considered for characterization.
       1987, the office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator is established 
     by Congress. Former Idaho Attorney General Dave Leroy 
     (Republican) is named as the first administrator. He is 
     charged with finding a state, county, reservation or U.S. 
     territory that will accept a Monitored Retrievable Storage 
     facility for spent nuclear fuel.
       1988, WIPP does not open as scheduled. Governor Andrus 
     begins legal battles to stop shipments into Idaho.
       1993, Governor Andrus reaches an agreement with the federal 
     government that allows in 19 shipments of Navy spent nuclear 
     fuel, with as many as 45 more to come if deemed necessary for 
     national security. The Andrus agreement requires the federal 
     government to do an EIS, but places no limit on the number of 
     shipments into Idaho once the document is completed. The 
     agreement requires that some liquid radioactive wastes be 
     dried up in a process called ``calcination.'' Some spent 
     nuclear fuel will be moved from one wet storage facility to 
     another--newer--on-site wet storage facility. The agreement 
     does not require any nuclear waste to leave the state.
       January, 1995, Governor Batt takes office. As he is sworn 
     in there are already 261 metric tons of spent fuel in Idaho, 
     along with approximately 2 million gallons of liquid 
     radioactive wastes and over 120,000 cubic meters of 
     transuranic wastes in Idaho.
       That same month, the U.S. Navy notifies Governor Batt that 
     in accordance with the Andrus agreement, they need to make 8 
     more shipments of spent fuel. Governor Batt honors the 
     legally binding commitment Andrus made. Batt also learns for 
     the first time that under the Andrus agreement, Idaho is 
     likely to receive thousands of shipments of nuclear waste 
     with no requirement that the material ever leave the state.
     
[[Page S18898]]

       Feb. 1995, after finding no location in the United States 
     willing to accept a Monitored Retrivable Storage facility for 
     spent nuclear fuel, the Office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator is 
     abolished. Former Idaho Congressman Richard Stallings 
     (Democrat) is the program's second and last administrator.
       In March, Governor Batt establishes points to guide the 
     state on the nuclear issue:
       1. We will oppose the shipment of nuclear waste material to 
     Idaho until we receive an absolute assurance that the 
     material will ultimately be moved outside our state.
       2. We will insist on a proper clean-up of existing storage 
     problems.
       3. We will seek attractive projects that will create new 
     employment opportunities at INEL.
       In May, Governor Batt starts legal action to stop the 
     shipments.
       June 1, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary announces the 
     Record of Decision on the EIS. It targets 1,940 shipments 
     (165 metric tons) of spent nuclear fuel and 690 to 2,300 
     shipments (6,000-20,000 cubic meters) of transuranic waste to 
     be shipped to Idaho with no requirement that it ever leave.
       October 17, 1995. Governor Batt announces he has reached an 
     historic agreement to get nuclear waste out of the state. 
     U.S. District Judge Edward Lodge Incorporates the settlement 
     into a federal court order. Idaho becomes the only state in 
     the nation with a court order that requires the federal 
     government to remove nearly all nuclear wastes from a 
     specific state. Under the new legally binding agreement, all 
     liquid radioactive wastes will now be dried up and all spent 
     fuel removed from water storage into dry storage, enhancing 
     the protection of the aquifer. Shipments of spent fuel into 
     Idaho are reduced by 42 percent. Transuranic waste will only 
     be allowed in if it is treated and removed from Idaho within 
     six months. The Navy and DOE are limited to, on average, 20 
     shipments each per year into Idaho providing the state 
     leverage to ensure cleanup takes place. Total value of the 
     agreement is estimated at nearly $800 million over the next 
     ten years. Approximately 10,800 shipments of spent nuclear 
     fuel and transuranic wastes are now required by a federal 
     court order to leave Idaho. First shipments out of Idaho will 
     begin no later than 1999. The last shipments will leave Idaho 
     by 2035.

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I want to express my support for the hard 
work of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I believe that 
the bill makes significant strides in correcting glaring shortfalls of 
the administration's defense policies.
  Many of my colleagues on the other side have attacked both the 
Defense appropriations bill, crafted by my friends and colleagues on 
the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations chaired by the senior 
Senator from Alaska, and this bill on the grounds that they include 
items not requested by the Nation's military leaders in the President's 
request. Well, they are correct. But, why didn't they request these 
items? He wouldn't let them, because he artificially constrained their 
request by cutting their budget dramatically and some say recklessly, 
at the same time that he has increased their mission requirements. Left 
with increased responsibilities and fewer dollars to accomplish them, 
the military leaders were forced to make deep procurement cuts. They 
won't complain lest they be viewed as disloyal. They salute and do the 
best they can. Well, I for one do not believe that those who put their 
lives on the line must be forced to just make do.
  We in the Senate, have done much to insure that or marines, soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen will be provided the best equipment and in 
quantities which will provide them more than merely adequate 
protection. I fully agree with the senior Senator from Hawaii and take 
the liberty of paraphrasing him when I say, ``I never want our troops 
to be in a fair fight. They should always be overwhelmingly superior.''
  I have reservations about some of the provisions in this bill, and I 
wish it more closely reflected the Fiscal Year 1996 appropriations 
bill, but I will support it, for it is in the right direction.
  One other concern I have with this bill is a section that was not 
fully considered by the Senate which makes significant changes in the 
way the Federal Government procures goods and services. I had the 
opportunity to work with my colleagues on conference committee, and 
this new section on Federal acquisition reform has been modified and 
improved in many areas. In spite of changes, I am concerned about the 
impact these new provisions will have on small businesses seeking to do 
business with Federal agencies.
  I am pleased the Senate prevailed in its consideration of the House 
provision to amend the Competition in Contracting Act requirement for 
``full and open competition.'' This section was limited, at my urging, 
to a revision of the FAR to insure that competition is consistent with 
a need ``to efficiently fulfill the Government's requirements.'' The 
change in CICA was dropped.
  In addition, I supported a delay in the Cooperative Purchasing 
Program that was included in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
[FASA] which we adopted last year. The Cooperative Purchasing Program 
would allow State and local governments and certain nonprofit groups to 
purchase items carried on the Federal supply schedule. At the same time 
we passed FASA, we did not analyze the impact this new provision would 
have on small businesses. I successfully sought a moratorium of 18 
months on implementation of this program to allow GAO the opportunity 
to review the impact of the program.
  As this new law is being implemented, we cannot lose sight of the 
positive impact that full and open competition has had on our Federal 
procurement system. I am the first to agree with the premise that the 
current system is flawed and can be improved. As chairman of the 
Committee on Small Business I intend to monitor closely the impact this 
new law will have on the small business community, and make suggestions 
as to how their interests can be protected in the future.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, before making remarks about the pending 
conference report, I want to commend the chairman, Senator Thurmond, 
and the members of the Armed Services Committee for their efforts to 
hammer out this conference agreement. There were over 1,000 items in 
disagreement, which presented the conferees with a daunting task. 
Despite the obstacles, Senator Thurmond and our colleagues on the 
committee have crafted a strong bill.
  It is important that everyone understands the issue before us. This 
bill is a serious effort to ensure that the men and women of our Armed 
Forces remain the best-trained and best-equipped force in the world. 
This conference agreement contains a number of provisions which enhance 
the quality of life of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It ensures 
force readiness. And, to protect the readiness of tomorrow's forces, it 
begins to restore the procurement and research and development accounts 
that have suffered from years of cuts.
  Let me add, that with the ongoing deployment of U.S. forces to 
Bosnia, this bill takes on increased importance. The men and women who 
have been ordered to Bosnia are brave Americans who have volunteered to 
serve their country. They are answering their Nation's call. The least 
we can do for them is to support the initiatives in this bill that will 
directly impact them as they embark on this mission.
  There are a number of significant provisions in the bill which will 
improve the quality of life of the members of our Armed Forces. The 
legislation authorizes a 2.4-percent pay raise and a 5.2-percent 
increase in allowance for quarters. In addition, it authorizes an 
Income Insurance Program for involuntarily mobilized reservists and 
establishes a reserve component dental insurance program. These 
provisions will enhance the readiness of our Reserve component forces--
forces that also are mobilizing for deployment to Bosnia.
  Additionally, the bill authorizes a new military housing 
privatization initiative. This initiative, which was requested by the 
administration, will allow the Department of Defense to utilize new 
approaches to reduce the family housing backlog. To further enhance the 
quality of life of our troops, the agreement increases military 
construction funding by $480 million.
  In order to ensure the readiness of our forces, the conferees added 
over $1 billion to the operations and maintenance accounts. To further 
protect the readiness accounts, the conferees also provided $647 
million for ongoing operations in northern and southern Iraq.
  The conferees, understanding the importance of preserving long-term 
readiness, also authorized significant increases in the procurement and 
R&D accounts. They took steps to ensure that the United States 
maintains its technological edge over any potential enemy, and that our 
smaller force becomes a more capable force. The B-2 

[[Page S18899]]
bomber is just one example. The conferees repealed the previous 
restrictions on procurement of long-lead items for the B-2 program and 
the standing cap on the number of bombers produced. They also added 
$493 million for B-2 procurement. The B-2 represents this Congress' 
renewed effort to preserve a strong American defense.
  Finally, in an effort to assist communities affected by base 
closures, the conferees attempted to improve the process for disposal 
of property and included authorization for important projects such as 
the conversion of Joliet Arsenal to the Midewin National Tallgrass 
Prairie. Under the plan, this former Army facility will provide the 
Joliet community with the increased economic opportunity, while 
allowing for the establishment of a premier conservation and recreation 
area in the most populous region in the Midwest. I was pleased to 
assist in including this important provision and look forward to seeing 
its successful implementation.
  With this bill the Republican-led Congress has met its responsibility 
to provide our forces with the most modern equipment available, 
ensuring their overwhelming superiority on the battlefield. We have 
taken steps to ensure that our forces, though smaller, maintain the 
ability to project power around the world--quickly and decisively. We 
have taken the lead in protecting both our deployed forces and our home 
land against ballistic missile attack.
  The President and many of our colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle oppose this bill. But the choice is clear. A vote for this bill 
is a vote to restore our national defense, and a vote to support the 
American men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. A vote against 
it, is a vote to continue down the path to a hollow force.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 10 minutes, 36 seconds.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, who is a 
real defense expert, having been involved in defense appropriations for 
quite a while, made a point this morning that I had been making about 
this bill that I think bears repeating, and that is he said there are 
far too many reports and certifications. And one example he gave was a 
delay of all defensewide research funds until 14 days after a report is 
received. That includes even the BMD program which so many people here 
are concerned about.
  Mr. President, this report can be made, but it is a 14-day 
interruption. This is the kind of thing that drives defense management 
crazy because this interrupts ongoing defense research contracts. So 
this is just one example of what I call micromanagement that is all the 
way through this bill.
  Mr. President, as we close this debate, I wish to summarize the 
reasons why I am voting against the defense authorization conference 
report for the first time since I have been in the Senate, including 6 
years that I have served in the minority. While there are a number of 
provisions I support, and I enumerated those this morning, the 
conference report contains many fundamental flaws that are contrary to 
the best interests of sound management of our national defense 
activities as well as the U.S. taxpayers.
  On balance, Mr. President, this bill's bad policy outweighs its good 
policy. I am particularly troubled by the bill's numerous provisions 
which are simply what I would call bad government. These include 
elimination of the independent oversight position of Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation. This position was established in 1983 
under an initiative from Senator Roth, Senator Grassley, and Senator 
Pryor to ensure the testing of major weapons systems would be evaluated 
by an office independent of those developing and managing the weapons 
programs.
  Senator Pryor has spoken on this subject, and I had expected Senator 
Grassley and Senator Roth to speak on the subject, but I am sure this 
is of some concern to them.
  It not only abolishes the position, but it repeals key protections 
for the Director of the OTE.
  Second, elimination of the key civilian oversight position for 
special operations. This was part of a comprehensive effort in 1986 by 
Senators such as Senator Cohen and myself to improve our special 
operations forces. The military commander of those forces was given 
authority akin to a civilian service secretary, making the Assistant 
Secretary even more important to civilian control, and this position is 
eliminated in this bill.
  Third, the unseemly and I think unnecessary rush to sell the Naval 
Petroleum Reserve in 1 year, which the Congressional Budget Office 
estimates could cost the taxpayers up to $1 billion. Because of the CBO 
reservations, the reconciliation bill dropped this provision 
altogether, yet this conference report still mandates the sale within a 
year, and one company has a potential inside track, according to all 
the information I have received. This lessens the competitive climate 
and could cost the taxpayers a lot of money.
  Fourth, the inclusion of numerous ``buy American'' protectionism 
provisions where there is no showing of a critical domestic industrial 
base need. The conference agreement does not add just one ``buy 
American'' provision; it adds over eight. It also makes existing ``buy 
American'' provisions more onerous and undermines some of the key goals 
of last year's Acquisition Streamlining Act. And I repeat what I said 
this morning, Mr. President. Our advantage in defense exports is a 
significant part of our trade picture. We have an advantage here. It is 
very strange that we would be inserting ``buy American'' provisions in 
this bill in large number when that is likely, very likely to end up 
hurting our own export capabilities. I find it strange that the 
Republican majority of the House and Senate, committed to free trade 
and market competition, would inject the most sweeping ``buy American'' 
provisions we have had in a defense bill in many years.
  Fifth, a prohibition on purchasing foreign vessels to convert the 
remaining five sealift ships. All conversion is currently done in U.S. 
yards but this provision would mean an expenditure of $1 billion to 
$1.5 billion for new ships versus the $350 million for conversion of 
existing ships. This provision is a sweetheart deal for certain 
domestic shipbuilders.
  Sixth, nonmerit, noncompetitive earmarkings. Through the bill are 
numerous legislative and report language earmarkings for specific 
contracts to specific contractors.
  We worked very hard over the years in the authorization committee to 
avoid this approach because there is too great a danger that awards 
under such a system could be based on political and parochial 
considerations rather than the best interests of national defense. 
These earmarks are costly to the taxpayers because they freeze out 
competition, and they are bad for defense capabilities because they are 
not based on merit or quality.
  Seventh, the shipbuilding provisions contain numerous provisions that 
can only be labeled sweetheart deals for specific shipbuilders. A very 
innovative Senate concept developed by Senator Lott and Senator Cohen 
was broadened in conference into a shipbuilding grab bag with something 
for everyone. This includes directed procurement of roll-on/roll-off 
ships at specific shipyards, directed procurement of six destroyers at 
specific shipyards and directed use of a ship maintenance contract at a 
specific shipyard.
  Mr. President, while we are trying to reduce the budget, I find it 
very ironic and sad that we are restricting competition; we are 
basically making every effort in this bill to assign certain ships to 
certain places without competition, which is the most expensive 
possible way you can build these ships and repair the ships.
  Eighth the conference committee includes submarine research and 
development language that ignores the crucial tradeoff in very high 
technology, cutting-edge technology, which is what submarines really 
involve. The tradeoff, the critical tradeoff is between cost and risk. 
There simply is no accounting for risk in this provision.
  Ninth, the Guard and Reserve equipment. The bill that came out of 
conference in this area is worse than either one that went in. This is 
because all of the additional funds for Guard and Reserve equipment are 
designated for specific programs, thus eliminating any kind of real 
weighing or 

[[Page S18900]]
prioritization within the Department of Defense. The appropriations 
bill which took a generic approach and put the money in a broad account 
for the determination of the Secretary of Defense and others familiar 
with the procurement system is a much better approach.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my detailed listing of 
provisions here as well as information from the Secretary of Defense 
and the administration with their objections be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee, today released the following statement:
       I congratulate Senator Thurmond upon the completion of the 
     House-Senate conference on the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1996. Senator Thurmond has shown great 
     patience and endurance through a long and difficult 
     negotiation with the House.
       Out of respect for Senator Thurmond, particularly in his 
     first year as chairman, I have signed the conference report. 
     This will give the Senate the opportunity to consider the 
     report. I want to make it clear, however, that I have serious 
     reservations about the conference report, and I plan to vote 
     against the report when it is considered by the Senate.
       During the conference, the Administration raised a number 
     of important objections to the bill:
       The Administration identified constitutional problems with 
     the restrictions on the President's foreign policy and 
     Commander-in-Chief powers imposed by the provisions on 
     contingency funding and UN Command and Control.
       The Administration also raised serious objections to the 
     ballistic missile defense legislation, which contains 
     National Missile Defense language that goes well beyond the 
     mandates of both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills.
       The Administration has expressed serious concerns about the 
     impact of the proposed conference report language on Russian 
     consideration of the START II Treaty, which is designed to 
     produce a major reduction in Russian nuclear weapons.
       The Administration is also concerned that the language 
     could lead the Russians to abandon other arms control 
     agreements if they conclude that it is U.S. policy to take 
     unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty.
       I have serious reservations about these provisions and 
     numerous other provisions of the conference report, 
     including:
       Legislation that would abolish the statutory requirement 
     for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
     and Low Intensity Conflict, which could undermine civilian 
     oversight of special operations.
       Legislation that would abolish the statutory requirement 
     for an independent Director of Operational Test and 
     Evaluation, which could undermine unbiased testing of major 
     weapons systems.
       The Naval Petroleum Reserve Sale provision, which unwisely 
     establishes a one-year time frame for the sale, even through 
     the budget reconciliation bill no longer mandates sale within 
     a year. The one year period is insufficient to ensure that 
     the taxpayers get the maximum value though knowledgeable 
     competitive bidding.
       Directed procurement of specific ships at specific 
     shipyards without a clear industrial base requirement, which 
     undermines the cost-saving potential of competition.
       Buy American provisions for ships and naval equipment which 
     will result in enormous cost increases for naval vessels and 
     which could produce an unfavorable reaction against U.S. 
     military sales abroad--one of the strongest elements of our 
     export economy.
       Mandated spending ``floors'' in the shipbuilding language--
     requirements to spend specified amounts for particular 
     programs--which directly contravene the longstanding 
     agreement between the Armed Services and Appropriations 
     Committees to not place ``floors'' in the Authorization bill.
       An earmarked non-competitive ship maintenance contract for 
     a specific shipyard.
       Creation of a special congressional panel on submarines, 
     which needlessly duplicates the oversight role of the Armed 
     Services Committee.
       Failure to include Senate-passed provisions which should 
     have been non-controversial, such as U.S.-Israeli Strategic 
     Cooperation, the Defense Business Management University, and 
     a North Dakota land conveyance that meets all of the Senate's 
     objective criteria.
       Weakening the Senate-passed formula for equity in cost-of-
     living adjustments for military retirees.
       Designating every single line of National Guard and Reserve 
     procurement funds, rather than providing generic categories 
     that can be used by the Department of Defense to meet 
     priority Guard and Reserve requirements.
       Earmarking Department of Energy defense funds for numerous 
     unrequested projects and programs at designated sites.
       Restrictions on access of servicewomen and dependents 
     overseas to privately-funded abortions, and the imposition of 
     special discharge procedures for HIV-positive 
     servicemembers--a small fraction of our military population--
     which needlessly inject domestic political issues into 
     military manpower policies.
       I recognize that the Senate could not prevail on all 
     issues. There are many other compromises within the 
     conference report which I do not particularly support but 
     which I understand in the context of the give and take of 
     conference. The issues I have raised in this statement, 
     however, represent fundamental flaws in the conference 
     agreement.
       If the conference report is not approved by the Senate, or 
     if the legislation is vetoed by the President, we will have 
     an opportunity to correct these flaws. The conference report 
     contains important legislative authorities, such as:
       A variety of military pay and allowance provisions.
       Approval of Secretary Perry's family and troop housing 
     initiative.
       Detailed acquisition reform legislation that complements 
     last year's Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act.
       Senator Thurmond and the Committee worked long and hard to 
     develop these important provisions, and I pledge to work 
     towards their enactment in a subsequent bill if the 
     legislation in this conference report is not enacted into 
     law.
                                                                    ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                Washington, DC, December 15, 1995.
     Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
     Democratic Leader,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: I would like to convey my assessment of 
     the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1996 (H.R. 1530). The bill in its current form 
     continues to contain objectionable provisions that raise 
     serious constitutional issues and unduly restricts our 
     ability to execute our national security and foreign policy 
     responsibilities.
       The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly 
     missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range 
     missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not 
     believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By 
     forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary NMD deployment 
     decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of 
     billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the 
     Department of Defense prematurely to lock into a specific 
     technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD 
     be ``operationally effective'' in defending all 50 states 
     (including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require 
     a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated 
     within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting 
     U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the 
     bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the 
     START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two 
     treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and 
     Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold 
     War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. 
     national security.
       The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's 
     ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential 
     to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to 
     commence a contingency operation and the requirement to 
     submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to 
     continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the 
     authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a 
     Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under 
     United Nations (UN) operational or tactical control, the bill 
     infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
       In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about 
     the following: onerous certification requirements for the use 
     of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as 
     subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding 
     for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the 
     Technology Reinvestment Program; restrictions on retirement 
     of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on the 
     Department of Defense's ability to execute disaster relief, 
     demining, and military-to-military contact programs; directed 
     procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards without a 
     valid industrial base rationale; restrictions on my ability 
     to manage the Department of Defense effectively, including 
     the abolition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
     Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the 
     Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
       We will weigh heavily the actions of the Congress on these 
     matters in advising the President whether to veto the Defense 
     authorization bill that is ultimately presented to him. This 
     letter outlines many, but not all of the concerns with the 
     legislation. I continue to be willing to work with the 
     Congress to develop an acceptable bill. In its current form, 
     however, I would have no recourse but to recommend a veto.
           Sincerely,
     William J. Perry.
                                                                    ____


                   Statement of Administration Policy

       If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the 
     President in its current form, the President would veto the 
     bill.
       The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15, 
     1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry 
     out our national security objectives and implement key 
     Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise 
     serious constitutional issues 

[[Page S18901]]
     by restricting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign 
     policy powers.
       The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly 
     missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range 
     missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not 
     believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By 
     forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile 
     Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would 
     needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile 
     defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD) 
     prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In 
     addition, by directing that the NMD be ``operationally 
     effective'' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and 
     Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD 
     architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of 
     the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a 
     collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk 
     continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and 
     Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together 
     will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear 
     warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly 
     lowering the threat to U.S. national security.
       The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's 
     ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential 
     to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to 
     commence a contingency operation and the requirement to 
     submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to 
     continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the 
     authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a 
     Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under 
     United Nations (UN) operational or tactical control, the bill 
     infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
       In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about 
     the following: onerous certification requirements for the use 
     of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as 
     subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding 
     for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the 
     Technology Reinvestment Program, restrictions on retirement 
     of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's 
     ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-
     to-military contact programs; directed procurement of 
     specific ships at specific shipyards without a valid 
     industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge 
     of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on 
     the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD 
     effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
     Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; 
     and finally the Administration continues to object to the 
     restrictions on the ability of female service members or 
     dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. 
     military hospitals abroad.
       While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there 
     are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial 
     to the Department, including important changes in acquisition 
     law, new authorities to improve military housing, and 
     essential pay raises for military personnel. The 
     Administration calls on the Congress to correct the 
     unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial 
     provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on 
     the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of living 
     adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the 
     Christmas recess.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in closing, I understand the give and take 
of a conference and that no bill is perfect. I have never seen a 
perfect bill on this floor, and I do not have that as my standard. 
However, this conference report goes far beyond that which can be 
justified in that give and take context.
  I would further point out that a full defense appropriations bill 
including $7 billion more than the President requested has been signed 
into law. I supported that bill. I spoke for it. I urged that the 
President not veto it. I urged that he approve it. So the money is not 
the issue here with me.
  I favored increasing the defense budget. We are not debating the 
funding bill. We are debating an authorization bill and the issues of 
matters of policy, very important matters of policy, not matters of the 
level of appropriations. I cannot vote for the bad policy embedded in 
this conference report. If the bill is vetoed, as has been recommended 
by the Secretary of Defense, we will have an opportunity to correct the 
many flaws and produce a bill that can be signed into law. There are 
other provisions which I enumerated this morning which I strongly 
support, and I will work certainly with Senator Thurmond in retaining 
those and in making whatever corrections are required if this bill is 
vetoed by the President and if a veto is not overridden.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. This defense authorization bill is a sound bill and 
should be enacted into law. I wish to thank the Senators and the staff 
members on both sides who helped to prepare and support this bill for 
the great service they rendered to their country.
  Mr. President, I am pleased that Senators will now have the 
opportunity to express their support for our military men and women by 
voting to approve the conference agreement on the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996.
  As my colleagues prepare to vote on this agreement, I would ask them 
to make absolutely sure that they do so with the full knowledge that 
this is a period of high risk and exceptional danger for our military. 
The President has committed more than 30,000 uniformed men and women to 
a hazardous and lengthy operation in the former Yugoslavia. The 
Congress must make every effort to ensure that nothing--absolutely 
nothing--is done to jeopardize or impede them in any way.
  I find it impossible to understand how any Senator could vote against 
a defense authorization bill when the President is ordering troops into 
harm's way. This bill contains many essential authorities for programs, 
systems, acquisitions, administration, operations, and quality of life. 
I do not know how I could face my constituents if I voted against 
taking care of the troops, who are on their way to Bosnia, for any of 
the reasons I have heard offered by those who want to defeat this bill.
  Mr. President, the fine men and women who now serve in our military 
are being asked, once again, to put their lives at risk in a foreign 
land. They do not have the option to refuse to go if they disagree with 
some aspect of the operation. Many of us in the Senate continue to have 
serious doubts about this mission, yet, every member of the Senate has 
gone on record to support the troops unequivocally and to provide them 
with all the necessary resources and support to carry out their mission 
and ensure their security. The Senate resolution in support of the 
troops will ring hollow without the action to back them up. The 
authority necessary to translate those words into real, tangible 
support, is contained in the conference agreement now before the 
Senate.
  I am dismayed to see so many of my colleagues picking out some 
provision in the report, and then stand here on the floor of the Senate 
to say that they cannot vote for the bill because they disagree with 
the provision. There are 995 pages in the conference agreement this 
year. It reconciles two of the most complex bills produced by the 
Congress. I would suggest to my colleagues that no bill meets 
everyone's expectations completely. Only gridlock could result from 
such an approach.
  Mr. President, this is not the time to turn a defense bill into a 
political issue, as some have chosen to do. The only result of 
politicizing this bill will be to disadvantage the Department of 
Defense and our troops at a time when they are focused on a major 
international operation. The House recognized this and approved the 
conference agreement on a vote of 267 to 149. It is important that my 
colleagues and the administration clearly understand that every 
soldier, sailor, airman and Marine will feel the effects if this 
agreement is not adopted.
  We have heard objections from the minority that this bill adds $7 
billion that the President did not ask for. However, they have not 
mentioned that defense is now underfunded by at least $150 billion, 
according to the General Accounting Office. The Comptroller of the 
Department of Defense, John Hamre, testified before the Committee on 
Armed Services that defense is underfunded by at least $50 billion. Now 
we are engaged in a major deployment when the resources of the 
Department of Defense will be stretched even more. After having 
dramatically underfunded defense, reducing the Armed Forces, and at the 
same time requiring the military to perform at an operations tempo 
higher than during the Cold War for missions in Somalia and Haiti, the 
President is again deploying troops. How can there be any objection to 
additional funds?
  One of the most important parts of this agreement is a provision that 
adjusts the automatic level at which 

[[Page S18902]]
service members can enroll in the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance 
program to $200,000. Ironically, we need to make an adjustment to SGLI 
again as we are deploying U.S. Forces in harm's way; the last time we 
did this was prior to the Persian Gulf war. I sincerely hope that no 
family will lose a loved one and therefore need to receive this 
increased benefit. However, the President has told us to expect 
casualties in Bosnia, and this protection will not take effect unless 
this bill is enacted.
  The Committee on Armed Services concentrated on improving the quality 
of life for our military personnel and their families. We did not do 
this because our forces would deploy to Bosnia, but because there was a 
need. The list of initiatives in this area reflects a high degree of 
success. However, none of these improvements will occur unless this 
agreement is enacted.
  We authorized a 2.4-percent pay raise and a 5.2-percent increase in 
the basic allowance for quarters effective January 1, 1996. We also 
attempted to repair a breach of faith with our military retirees by 
restoring the military retirement COLA dates to the same schedule as 
Federal civilian retirees. If the authorization is not approved, 
military retirees will continue to be treated unfairly, and military 
personnel will be denied the full pay raise and increase in the 
quarters allowance.
  We included a provision that permits military families to use CHAMPUS 
for well-baby care, routine immunizations, and school physicals. The 
administration talks about doing this, but military families will 
continue to do without, or pay for these services out of pocket, unless 
this conference agreement is enacted.

  I cannot understand how any Senator or the President could ask our 
service members to go to Bosnia, leaving their families alone in 
Germany and other places far from their homes, while at the same time 
denying them the pay raise, insurance coverage, allowances, and other 
quality of life improvements they deserve.
  The bill contains the authority to reform the acquisition and 
procurement processes in accordance with the general effort to 
streamline Government. It also reforms the process for managing the 
procurement of information technology in order to provide our front-
line troops with the latest and best information about their situation. 
All the acquisition reform provisions contained in sections D and E of 
the bill will be lost if the conference agreement is not enacted.
  Procurement funding has declined by 44 percent since 1992 and 
procurement is at the lowest level as a percentage of the budget since 
the years prior to the Second World War. This agreement takes a step 
toward resolving that deficiency by authorizing items needed to fight 
and win decisively while minimizing the risk to our troops. It buys 
basics, invests to achieve savings, and focuses on the future.
  The conference agreement would also authorize funds for the 
counterproliferation support program. The nerve gas attacks in Japan 
and the bombing in Oklahoma this year show the need to protect not only 
our military personnel but also our citizens within the United States 
against the use of weapons of mass destruction. The conference report 
requires the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and other 
appropriate Government agencies to report to Congress on their military 
and civil defense preparedness to respond to such emergencies. The 
conference report also authorizes DOD to provide assistance in the form 
of training facilities, sensors, protective clothing, antidotes, and 
other materials and expertise to Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement agencies.
  The conference agreement authorizes funds for arms control to enable 
the United States to meet its treaty obligations to destroy or 
dismantle chemical and strategic nuclear weapons and material. It also 
provides $300 million for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program for the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons in the 
former Soviet Union.
  On the question of theater missile defense demarcation, the 
conference outcome is virtually identical to the Senate-passed 
provision. This should alleviate concerns about constraining the 
President's prerogatives in negotiations while fulfilling the 
constitutional responsibility of Congress to review the results of 
those negotiations. I believe we have addressed all the concerns of the 
administration and the minority conferees on this issue.
  I am very disturbed to hear that some are working to defeat or veto 
the conference agreement over the ballistic missile defense provisions. 
These provisions are balanced and fair. If this veto comes to pass, it 
will become clear that the administration's arguments over the ABM 
Treaty were merely attempts to block the deployment of any type of 
national missile defense system, to include one that complies with the 
ABM Treaty. I find it hard to believe that the President would veto 
this important bill simply to deny the American people a defense 
against ballistic missiles.
  Many aspects of this bill are important not only to military men and 
women but to all our citizens. The section on Department of Energy 
National Security Programs focuses resources on cleaning up the highest 
priority nuclear waste problems at the former nuclear materials 
production sites. It also funds the isolation and reduction of spent 
nuclear fuel rods, some of which are beginning to corrode. These 
problems cannot be addressed in fiscal year 1996 unless the 
authorization bill is enacted.
  The agreement establishes uniform national discharge standards for 
vessels of the Armed Forces and directs the clean up of DOD 
environmental problem sites. These and other environmental initiatives 
will be lost if the bill is not enacted.
  President Clinton has urged our citizens and the Congress to support 
his Bosnia intervention. I have listened to his arguments about world 
leadership and our role in the world. Our troops will bear the brunt of 
his decision and they deserve to be supported, but their support will 
be compromised without the defense authorization. I am dismayed that 
any Senator would consider voting against this legislation or attempt 
to use this bill for political purposes. Politics used to stop at the 
water's edge, especially when our forces were deployed to a hostile 
fire area. I urge my colleagues and the administration to work toward 
the enactment of this conference agreement and not to jeopardize, 
disadvantage, or impede our Armed Forces.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor. How much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7 minutes and 35 seconds left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest we take 20 minutes to wait for 
Senator Daschle to get here from the White House.
  In the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the Senate is waiting for our leaders to 
return from an important meeting with the President. I wish to address 
the Senate on another matter. I will be glad to yield to the managers 
at the time they want to request the vote on the defense authorization. 
I appreciate their courtesy.
  Mr. President, I ask to be able to proceed as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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