[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 204 (Tuesday, December 19, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18835-S18856]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996--CONFERENCE 
                                 REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senate will now 
resume consideration of the conference report accompanying H.R. 1530, 
on which there shall be 3 hours debate, equally divided.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A conference report to accompany H.R. 1530, an act to 
     authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for military 
     activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe 
     military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1996, and for 
     other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the conference report.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I know there are speakers who will be here 
this morning, but at the moment let me suggest the absence of a quorum; 
the time will be equally divided under the previous agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the current order of the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the conference report 
on H.R. 1530, the Defense authorization.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as we debate the conference report on the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996, I again want 
to express my admiration for the hard work, determination, and 
commitment of Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the committee. 
Regardless of our individual and differing views on the specifics of 
this conference report, I believe everyone knows that Senator Thurmond 
worked with diligence and dedication to reach an agreement with the 
House.
  I also want to express my appreciation for the hard work of the 
majority staff director, Dick Reynard; deputy staff director, George 
Lauffer, who is 

[[Page S18836]]
here on the floor; general counsel, Don Deline; and all the majority 
staff. They put in many late nights and 7-day weeks over the course of 
this conference, which has provided them with far too little time to 
spend with their own families.
  The same applies to Arnold Punaro, Andy Effron, and many others on my 
staff who have worked with equal diligence and dedication.
  This bill was in conference for over 3 months. The chairman, Senator 
Thurmond, has shown great patience and endurance through long and 
difficult negotiations with the House. Out of respect for Senator 
Thurmond, particularly in his first year as chairman--although he has 
been on the committee for many years--I signed the conference report, 
and I voted for the motion to proceed, thereby providing the Senate 
with the opportunity to consider this report.
  I do not support the legislation, for reasons I will explain. I feel 
it is essential that the Senate at least make a determination and vote 
on this conference report.
  The conference report contains important legislative authorities, 
which I strongly support. I want to point out the important military 
pay and allowances provisions, including a 2.4-percent pay raise for 
the troops and a 5.2-percent increase in the basic allowance for 
quarters. Without this bill, the pay raise under permanent law will be 
2 percent, or 0.4 percent less. The basic allowance for quarters 
increase would be 2 percent, instead of the current 5.2 percent, if 
this bill passes.
  If we do not have this bill enacted into law, I intend to join others 
in doing everything possible to see that this key legislation for pay 
raises and for basic allowance for quarters be inserted in another bill 
before we leave this session.
  Second, approval of Secretary Perry's family and troop housing 
initiative, which would provide new authorities--including shared 
public and private sector funding--to finance needed construction and 
improvements in military housing.
  Third, detailed acquisition reform legislation that complements last 
year's landmark Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. Key provisions 
would:
  Use simplified procedures to streamline the process of procuring 
commercial products and services while preserving the requirement for 
full and open competition.
  Reduce the barriers that inhibit acquisition of commercial products 
by eliminating the requirement for certified cost and pricing data for 
commercial products.
  Streamline the bid protest process by eliminating the separate bid 
protest authority of the General Services Board of Contract Appeals and 
providing for all bid protests to be determined by the General 
Accounting Office.
  Consolidate and clarify the standards of conduct for Federal 
officials in the acquisition process to ensure consistent treatment of 
such personnel on a governmentwide basis.
  Fourth, establishment of a defense modernization account. This 
provision will encourage the Department of Defense and give them a 
strong incentive to achieve savings in procurement, research and 
development, and operations and maintenance by allowing the Department 
to place the savings in a new account, the defense modernization 
account. Funds in the account would be available for the services to 
spend on the most pressing long-term needs of our military--that is 
modernization of our military forces and equipment and procurement. The 
Department could use amounts in the account to address funding 
shortfalls in the modernization of vital weapons systems.
  Mr. President, I would like to see these provisions enacted into law, 
but I cannot support the conference report in its present form. This 
will be the first time, in my 23 years in the Senate, that I will vote 
against a Defense authorization conference report. I have supported 
every previous Defense authorization conference report during my Senate 
career, including 6 years in which I served in the minority under two 
Republican chairmen.
  In the past, when we had a Democratic Congress and a Republican 
President, we routinely faced a House bill that was unacceptable and a 
Senate bill that was acceptable to the Republican President. In those 
years most of the compromising had to come from the House if we were 
going to get a bill signed into law. We knew that when we saw the shape 
of the two bills coming out of the House and Senate.
  We faced the same situation in reverse this year with a Republican 
Congress in the House and Senate and with a Democratic President. This 
year, we have a generally acceptable Senate bill and a generally 
unacceptable House bill in terms of Presidential signature. This is 
just the opposite of what we have had year after year with Republican 
Presidents and Democratic Congresses. Unfortunately, this year, the 
House was unwilling to make the compromises necessary to get a bill 
that is likely to be approved by the Clinton administration. Instead of 
compromising more toward the Senate bill, which could have received 
Clinton administration support, most important compromises strongly 
titled toward the House position.
  The conference report before us contains fundamental flaws that I 
believe are contrary to the best interests of the taxpayers and sound 
management of our national defense activities. On balance, I have 
concluded that this bill's bad policy outweighs its good policies in 
its current form.
  Mr. President, I will discuss again, as I did last week, the missile 
defense part of this conference report at a later point in my 
presentation. I would like to turn to other elements of the conference 
that give me great concern.


 repeal of the requirement for an independent director of operational 
                          test and evaluation

  When the House drafted its version of this year's bill, they 
developed a DOD reorganization proposal which included a provision 
abolishing the position of the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation. That position was created in 1983 at the initiative of 
Senators Roth, Grassley, and Pryor, to ensure that testing of major 
weapons systems would be evaluated by an office independent of the 
responsibility for program and contract management.
  During the Senate debate on this bill, we adopted without dissent a 
bipartisan amendment--sponsored by Senators Roth and Pryor--reaffirming 
congressional support for the Office of the Director of Test and 
Evaluation [OTE]. That was the Senate position.
  In that amendment, we noted that the OTE position was ``created by 
Congress to provide an independent validation and verification on the 
suitability and effectiveness of new weapons, and to ensure that the * 
* * military departments acquire weapons that are proven in a 
operational environment before they are produced and used in combat.''
  In summary, Mr. President, Operational Test and Evaluation has as its 
main purpose objective--evaluation of weapons systems before they are 
purchased. There has been a whole history to indicate the need for this 
kind of office because program managers inevitably get wedded to 
programs. If they are responsible not only to develop the programs, 
present them, sell them, and market them on Capitol Hill but also to 
test them, there is an inherent inability for the kind of objectivity 
that is needed in making sure the weapons work before we buy them.
  The conference agreement is contrary to the Senate position--in fact, 
just the opposite of the Senate provision--and would repeal the 
legislation requiring that there be an independent Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation.
  Mr. President, it is important to differentiate the provisions 
affecting the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from other 
aspects of the DOD reorganization provisions proposed by the House and 
adopted in conference which reduce the number of positions in DOD 
requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation.
  With the exception of the language affecting the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation and the language affecting the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations--which I shall 
address later in my remarks--I have no objection to some of the other 
DOD reorganization provisions proposed in the conference agreement 
which largely came from the House. The unobjectionable elements of the 
conference agreement merely repeal 

[[Page S18837]]
the statutory designation of certain positions and the requirement for 
Senate confirmation.
  The Operational Test and Evaluation proposal goes further. It would 
repeal section 139 of title 10, which contains a number of key 
protections for the Director of OTE. Under current law:
  The Director can only be removed by the President, and the President 
must report his reasons to Congress.
  The Director is guaranteed statutory independence from the Under 
Secretary for Acquisition.
  The Director may communicate directly with the Secretary without 
obtaining the concurrence or approval of any other official.
  The Director has specific authority over all test and evaluation 
activities of DOD.
  Mr. President, those are key provisions. That is the only way you can 
have an objective official in terms of ensuring that he is not subject 
to the normal bureaucratic pressures of the Pentagon.
  Under the conference agreement, effective January 31, 1997, there 
would no longer be an independent Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation. The Secretary of Defense would be free to subordinate the 
operational test and evaluation function under any Under or Assistant 
Secretary--including those with direct responsibility for the 
management of major weapons systems programs--or even relegate it to 
the military departments.
  Congress specifically created this position in light of major 
acquisition problems of the late seventies and early eighties so that 
realistic and independent operational test and evaluation functions 
would be conducted without direct interference by acquisition 
officials. Congress wanted to make sure that those who were being 
tested were not also grading their own tests. DOD has never fully 
embraced this position and its independence. Under the House approach, 
now incorporated in this conference, the key concept of ``Fly before 
you buy'' will be significantly weakened because this office is in 
effect terminated.
  This is an ill-considered proposal with no foundation or 
justification. Congress should not be put in the position of having to 
refight and reinstate this legislation next year. This is an example of 
``Ready, fire, aim'' that I think is destructive to the overall 
furtherance of our national security. We should not support legislation 
that cripples this vital organization.


  repeal of the statutory requirement for the assistant secretary for 
             special operations and low-intensity conflict

  There is another aspect of the House's DOD reorganization language 
which was adopted in conference to which I have similar objections. My 
concerns relate to the provision that would abolish the requirement to 
designate one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense to be responsible 
for special operations and low-intensity conflict.
  Mr. President, in 1986, Congress created the statutory position of 
Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and low-Intensity Conflict as 
part of comprehensive legislation concerning the organization and 
management of special operations forces.
  The 1986 legislation also established a unified combatant command for 
special operations.
  The CINC was given unique authorities--possessed by no other CINC--
for administration, acquisition, and budgeting--authorities that are 
more akin to the powers of a civilian Service Secretary than a military 
CINC.
  We specified in law that there be an Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations in order to ensure adequate civilian control 
over the CINC.
  The statute specifically makes the Assistant Secretary responsible 
for ``the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and 
resources) of special operations * * * and low-intensity conflict 
activities of the Department of Defense.''
  Senator Cohen, a Republican from Maine, a member of our committee and 
leader for many years, is an expert on this subject of special 
operations. He and I drafted this legislation which was based on the 
determination that the subject of special operations was receiving 
inadequate attention by the Office of Secretary of Defense and the 
military departments.
  Mr. President, this is one of the least expensive parts of our 
overall military forces, but the one that is most likely to be used, 
whether it is on the cutting edge of a major operation. The special 
operations forces are the best trained military forces we have. They 
are required to operate with great secrecy and great care, and they 
need civilian supervision. This conference report eliminates that 
civilian supervision as we had envisioned.
  The conference report would repeal this requirement to have an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict, effective January 31, 1997. The Office of the Assistant 
Secretary has provided valuable oversight and supervision of an 
activity that still receives to little attention within the Pentagon. 
The circumstances that required creation of the position are largely 
unchanged. The Department, again, has not fully embraced the special 
operations reforms and this repeal will energize the enemies of special 
operations.

  When Congress created this position, we were not simply trying to 
give visibility to an Assistant Secretary. There are significant 
substantive differences between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and each of the other Assistant Secretaries. The 
position of Assistant Secretary for Special Operations is tied directly 
to a unique combatant command that exercises management powers similar 
to those of a civilian Service Secretary. The conference report would 
repeal that statute, effective January 31, 1997, and remove that direct 
civilian oversight of the CINC. This, again, was done without 
foundation and without substantive consideration.


     requirement to sell the naval petroleum reserve within 1 year

  Mr. President, earlier this year, the Budget Committee provided 
reconciliation instructions to the Armed Services Committee to achieve 
savings through sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve at Elk Hills within 
1 year. That was because they wanted to raise money for the deficit. 
Faced with that requirement, the committee developed legislation with a 
number of safeguards, including provisions that would enable the 
Secretary of Energy to suspend the sale, and to require a subsequent 
vote by the Congress upon a determination that the sale was not 
proceeding in the taxpayer's best interest.
  The Congressional Budget Office, however, refused to score the 
provision in the DOD authorization bill as achieving any savings 
because CBO believed there was a significant chance that the sale would 
be suspended and that subsequent legislation would be required. As a 
result, when the Armed Services Committee submitted its reconciliation 
legislation to the Budget Committee, the Armed Services Committee, on 
an 11-to-10 vote, recommended to the Budget Committee that the 
reconciliation bill include a different version of the provision 
without a number of key safeguards. Those of us who opposed this 
recommendation expressed great concern about the potential for a huge 
loss to the taxpayers by a rushed sale without sufficient safeguards.
  Subsequently, CBO estimated that the up-front proceeds from the sale 
would be $1.5 billion, but the net revenue foregone would be $2.5 
billion over the next 7 years--leading to a $1 billion loss. As a 
result, the requirement to sell the naval petroleum reserve was dropped 
from the Senate reconciliation legislation and was not included in the 
reconciliation conference report.
  We are no longer under a mandate from the Budget Committees on the 
reconciliation process to raise this $1.5 billion. They wisely dropped 
the provision when the Congressional Budget Office said it could cost 
us money. It could cost us $1 billion. What do we do? The conference 
report before us today continues to mandate the sale with a year with 
the option for the Secretary to suspend the sale. It is now out of step 
with reconciliation and out of step with common sense.
  Mr. President, because of the budget pressure, there will be 
tremendous incentive for this administration or a subsequent 
administration at the end of next year, if we have a change of 
administrations, to sell Elk Hills quickly to meet the deadlines of the 
overall budget and fiscal picture. A 1-year timeframe, I believe, is 
unwise. Right now, there is one company with the potential inside 
track. Chevron is a part owner and manager of Elk Hills. There 

[[Page S18838]]
is concern, I think legitimate concern, that a requirement to sell Elk 
Hills within 1 year will give that company a tremendous advantage, an 
advantage that could be reduced by giving other potential bidders 
sufficient time and information to develop competitive bids.
  Mr. President, since the leadership of the Budget Committee has 
already decided to drop the sale of Elk Hills from the reconciliation 
bill there is absolutely no need to present with the Secretary of 
Energy with the choice of either making the sale or losing the 
authority to sell the NPR. Contrary to the assertions we have heard on 
the floor, the administration has not recommended a forced sale within 
1 year. The President's budget for fiscal year 1996 clearly states, on 
page 148 that ``The administration proposes to privatize the Elk Hills, 
CA oil and gas fields in 1997 * * *.'' Mr. President, that date is 
1997, not 1996. Likewise, the administration's balanced budget 
proposal, submitted on December 7, 1995, provides for disposition of 
Elk Hills ``not later than September 30, 1997.'' Again, an extra year 
so we ensure that we taxpayers get their money's worth out of this 
sale.
  Mr. President, because the current contractor and co-owner, Chevron, 
has a potential advantage in terms of the information needed to submit 
a realistic bid, it will not be easy to establish a competitive bidding 
and evaluation process that will get the best deal for the taxpayers. 
There are serious questions about whether the 1-year period is 
sufficient to ensure that the taxpayers get the maximum value through 
knowledgeable competitive bidding. This provision is a loser--
potentially a $1 billion loser.
  I find it strange that the same Congressional Budget Office, which 
our Republican majority is insisting we use for its numbers for the 
budget deal we are talking about, basically says we are possibly or 
even probably going to lose about $1.5 billion on this, but we have it 
in the conference report anyway. I think it is a mistake.


                        Buy American provisions

  Mr. President, one of the strongest elements of our export economy is 
the sale of overseas military equipment. This is an area in which the 
value of our sales overseas far exceeds the amount we buy from other 
countries. This is one of the areas where we have a favorable trade 
balance. The overall trade balance is unfavorable, but the trade 
balance in military equipment is favorable. The conference report 
before us would expand and impose Buy American restrictions that are 
not justified by industrial based or arms control considerations. This 
says that you have to buy these items in America, even if the sales 
from our allies abroad or from others are substantially cheaper.
  This means that when foreign companies cannot bid on American 
contracts, foreign countries are likely to retaliate by imposing their 
own restrictions on American products, thereby damaging the export 
sector of the United States that currently has a very strong trade 
surplus and advantage.
  Section 806 of the conference report contains a buy American 
provision for components of naval vessels which is, derived from the 
House passed bill. The Senate bill, under Senator Thurmond's 
leadership, did not have these buy American provisions. The conference 
report comes back, and it is absolutely loaded with them.
  Mr. President, there is ample existing authority for DOD to exclude 
foreign companies from competing on a contract when there is a valid 
industrial base requirement for domestic producers. That is already the 
law. The Department of Defense has not requested any additional 
legislative authority to impose specific buy American requirements on 
the components listed in the conference report.
  There has been no showing of a critical industrial base need that 
would justify singling out these vessel components, among the hundreds 
of thousands of items procured by the Department of Defense, as 
warranting protection from competition.
  The existing buy-American list in title X covers only five items. 
This is after years and years of struggling. Every year we have had 
buy-American provisions in the House bill under a Democratic House. 
This year, nothing has changed under a Republican House as they loaded 
up the report with buy-American provisions. Every year we have held 
firm. We have said, ``No, it's bad government, it's bad for the 
taxpayers, and it's a bad deal for the military.''
  We are going to spend more money, get less national security, and 
hurt our exporters. This is particularly true with the aerospace 
industry, because they are indeed the best in the world.
  We have five items in title X: buses; a chemical weapons antidote; 
air circuit breakers for vessels; specified valves and machine tools; 
and ball bearings and roller bearings, which may be affected.
  I am not here to debate those items. They are in there. They were put 
in the report at one time or another.
  The conference agreement, without any justification that I can see 
and in contradiction to bipartisan opposition to similar positions in 
past conferences, would add the following items:
  First, ``welded shipboard anchor and mooring chain with a diameter of 
4 inches or less.''
  Second, ``vessel propellers with a diameter of 6 feet or more.''
  You cannot buy those anywhere except in America and, in some cases, 
there is only one contractor in America. Only one. What you are doing, 
in some cases--not all--is locking in sole-source procurement by law 
and eliminating competition.
  Third, the following vessel components having unique marine 
applications: gyrocompasses; electronic navigation chart systems; 
steering controls; pumps; propulsion and machinery control systems; and 
totally enclosed life boats.
  All of those are going to have no competition from abroad.
  In addition, the proposal would not only extend the expiring buy-
American requirements for ball bearings and roller bearings, but would 
expand it to cover all purchases, even those below the $100,000 
simplified acquisition threshold. That directly undermines one of the 
key goals of last year's Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act: removal 
of special interest protection and paperwork for all purchases of 
$100,000 or less.
  Mr. President, I find it a supreme irony that a Republican majority 
in the House and Senate, which committed at least rhetorically to free 
trade and market competition, would inject the most sweeping buy-
American provisions we have ever placed in a defense authorization bill 
since I have been in the Senate. This will damage the U.S. defense 
industry, it will damage our trade position, and it will damage the 
American taxpayers.
  Sure, it will benefit a few companies. They will do well because they 
will not have any competition. Some people in the House, I suppose, 
will be able to go back and say in their districts, ``Look what we've 
done for you. You're going to get these Government contracts.'' Our 
responsibility is beyond one company in one district. It is the overall 
good of America and our national security. In this case, this 
conference report flunks that test.
  I recognize the Secretary currently has authority to waive 
buy American requirements under a number of conditions, such as when 
there would be unreasonable costs or delays or there would be an 
adverse effect on national security. The conference agreement would 
slightly expand that authority by allowing the Secretary to use it to 
avoid retaliatory trade actions by a foreign nation. However, the 
waiver authority is very difficult for the Secretary of Defense to 
exercise.

  I think it is irresponsible to place a Secretary in the position of 
mediating between political pressures to impose restrictions on the one 
hand and a combination of foreign and domestic pressures to promote 
free trade on the other hand. We are the board of directors. We should 
not put the executive in charge of the Department of Defense in that 
position. The waiver authority puts the Secretary in an extremely 
difficult position, because there is substantial pressure not to use 
the waiver from the very same sources that insisted on putting the 
provisions in law in the first place.
  Moreover, the retaliatory action from a foreign nation may well come 
after a buy-American provision is imposed rather than beforehand, and 
the Secretary's waiver authority, in terms of retaliatory trade, would 
be useless 

[[Page S18839]]
in this case. That is the way it would normally happen. The waiver 
authority has to be anticipatory.
  For example, we may impose a buy-American provision on a vessel 
component only to find later that a foreign government has imposed a 
domestic-source requirement that hurts our aircraft exports. In the 
absence of a compelling case to impose the costs and burdens of 
restricting competition, we should avoid adding new items to the buy-
American restrictions list.
  A more onerous buy-American provision is set forth in the bill's 
authority to use sealift funds to purchase vessels for the National 
Defense Reserve Fleet. Unlike the buy-American provision that applies 
to components which I previously discussed, the position governing 
National Defense Reserve Fleets has no waiver authority. As a result, 
DOD will be precluded, under this conference report, from purchasing 
foreign vessels for the five additional roll-on/roll-off ships called 
for in the mobility requirement study, despite the fact that there 
would be major savings to the U.S. taxpayers.
  Mr. President, the Maritime Administration has been purchasing 
foreign-built ships and upgrading them in U.S. shipyards. It is not 
like we are not getting a good portion of the work. We are.
  The cost to purchase and upgrade this type of ship is about $30 
million each. This means we could obtain the five additional ships for 
about $150 million. Building new U.S. ships will cost $200 million to 
$250 million each, for a total cost of $1 billion to $1.5 billion for 
five ships. I think the Senate ought to recognize this is basically 
taking taxpayers' money and simply giving it to certain defense 
industries in this country. If you want to do that, that is fine, but 
everybody ought to acknowledge that is what is happening. That means 
the taxpayers could be paying an additional $1 billion or more without 
any increase in Navy capability. This provision is, simply put, a 
sweetheart deal for certain domestic shipbuilders.
  Alternatively, the cost could be so high that the Navy may forego 
purchasing enough ships to meet the mobility requirements. Either we 
are going to cost the taxpayers about $1 billion here or we are going 
to buy less ships and not have the mobility requirements for our own 
military forces. That is bad for the taxpayers and bad for our national 
defense.
  (Mr. FRIST assumed the chair.)


                               Earmarking

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the next area I am concerned about relates 
to earmarking. I have been one of the leaders, and the Senator from 
Arizona, Senator McCain, has also been a real leader, in trying to 
prevent earmarking. Usually it has been in the appropriations bill. 
Time after time after time, we have come to the floor and opposed these 
items in appropriations bills. One time, I even voted against the 
entire appropriations bill, as the Senator from West Virginia may 
recall, because it was full of earmarks.
  We in the authorization committee have not been perfect, but we have 
strived not to have earmarks in these bills. That has been a long 
practice of our Armed Services Committee. We provide appropriate 
guidance under development and procurement of major weapons systems and 
leave to the executive branch the process of awarding contracts. We do 
not get into micro- management. We try not to micromanage. This bill is 
crammed full of micromanagement, and I find this supremely ironic, 
having seen Secretary Cheney, Secretary Carlucci, and Secretary 
Weinberger, those Secretaries under Republican administrations, 
complain over and over again about congressional micromanagement of the 
Defense Department.
  This bill goes further in micromanagement than any bill I have seen. 
We have done this to ensure, in terms of our practices, that the 
Government achieves the best price and quality based upon bids and 
proposals reviewed under merit-based criteria. We have endeavored to 
avoid legislation and conference report language which earmarks 
specific contracts to specific contractors.
  We have avoided earmarking because there is too great a danger that 
awards under such a system will be based on political and parochial 
considerations rather than the best interest of national defense and 
the taxpayers.
  I am very concerned about the shipbuilding provisions of the 
conference report which could lead to substantial unnecessary 
expenditure for the procurement of naval vessels. The conference report 
has translated, I think, an innovative Senate concept, which makes 
sense under very unique circumstances. The concept would provide more 
ships within the same cost projections that was developed by Senators 
Lott, Cohen, and others--into something that was not what they 
envisioned when they started; that is, a shipbuilding grab bag with 
something for everyone.
  Section 1013 of the bill has the effect of directing the procurement 
of two additional large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, known as 
LMSR vessels, at specific shipyards. Likewise, section 135 has the 
effect of directing procurement of six destroyers to specific 
shipyards. In the absence of a clear industrial base requirement--and I 
have seen no such showing--these sole-source-directed procurement 
situations undermine the cost-saving potential of competition. Again, I 
regret to say, these are sweetheart deals for certain shipyards.
  Mr. President, at a time when we are striving to get the taxpayers' 
fiscal budget under control and the national budget under control, I 
find it very, very paradoxical that we are setting up this competition 
with earmarks with sole-source-directed procurement going to certain 
shipyards and making certain these companies are happy at the expense 
of both taxpayers and national security.
  Mr. President, I am also concerned that section 1016 of the bill has 
the effect of earmarking a ship maintenance contract for a specific 
shipyard. Once we start down this route, other shipyards, as well as 
repair and maintenance contractors for aircraft and vehicles, will 
certainly want their share of these directed, noncompetitive contracts. 
The Competition in Contracting Act is designed to save money through 
effective competition. From time to time, there are exceptions which 
can be justified on the merits, in terms of industrial base 
considerations. Those decisions should be made on the basis of sound 
analysis and thorough consideration of executive branch views, not on 
the basis of a conference with legislated earmarks. This earmark is not 
meritorious and, again, I can only describe it as a sweetheart deal for 
a certain shipyard.
  Mr. President, I am also concerned about title 31 of the bill, which 
covers the Department of Energy defense programs. Section 3133, 3135, 
3137, 3140, and 3142 and the associated statement of managers language 
provide funds--many not requested by the administration--for 
development of technologies and other programs at specify Department of 
Energy sites instead of allowing the Department to determine which 
site, on the merits, would be the best location for conduct of the 
program. Hundreds of millions of dollars are so allocated in the DOE 
section of this bill.
  In summary, Mr. President, the numerous earmarks in this bill far 
exceed the tolerance level of anything justified in the ``give and 
take'' of a conference. It sets the authorizing committee on a bad 
policy path that we have studiously avoided and that we should not 
start now. We have objected when the Appropriations Committee has done 
this over and over. I spent literally hours out here at night, late in 
a session, objecting to earmarks in appropriations bills under 
Democratic control of the Congress. Now, I find that we do it over and 
over again in our own authorization bill.
  Mr. President, aside from shipbuilding earmarks, I am troubled by the 
submarine research and development language. Section 132 of the bill 
requires the Secretary of Defense to design, develop, and procure four 
nuclear attack submarines using ``new technologies that will result in 
each successive submarine * * * being a more capable and more 
affordable submarine than the submarine that preceded it.'' There is no 
recognition in the language of the costs and risks of transforming the 
submarine procurement program into a research and development prototype 
endeavor.
  No one argues with the goal of having military equipment that is both 


[[Page S18840]]
more capable and more affordable. Experience demonstrates that when 
dealing with complicated systems and advanced technology, it is quite 
difficult to obtain greater capability at less cost. The Russians, for 
example, tried to increase the capability while cutting costs of their 
submarines, and several of the products of that effort, along with 
their crews, lay at the bottom of the ocean.
  New attack submarines are among the most complex and sophisticated 
systems procured by the Department of Defense. It is one thing to 
establish a goal--there is no problem with a goal--it is something very 
different to require the Navy to structure its program to make new 
submarines both better and cheaper without any concern for the 
difficulty of trying to achieve greater capability at less cost and 
without any consideration of the risk involved. I believe it is 
important that the language of the submarine research provision be 
reviewed and revised to ensure greater consideration of the tradeoff 
between cost and risk.
  Mr. President, I am also concerned that the conference contains a 
spending ``floor,'' which mandates that $50 million of the funds in the 
National Defense Sealift Fund can be used only for advanced submarine 
technology activities of the Advanced Procurement Projects Agency. Mr. 
President, for a long time, this authorizing committee has strenuously 
avoided putting floors in bills. We always felt we were the ceiling; 
appropriators should not go over our ceiling. Neither should we say 
they cannot spend less than a certain amount, because that basically 
undercuts the appropriations process. It says to the appropriators that 
you cannot spend less than a certain amount. We would object to the 
appropriators going over our ceiling and have tried to avoid having 
floors in our bill. In this case, we have a floor of $50 million. In 
fairness, because of my past work with Senator Byrd, the Senator from 
West Virginia, and my pledge to him that we would try to avoid these 
items, I feel I need to point out the floors that is in this conference 
report.
  Mr. President, on National Guard and Reserve procurement, the 
conference report provides $777 million for Guard and Reserve 
procurement, allocating all funding to specific line items. This is an 
unfortunate reversion to the way we added funds for the Guard and 
Reserve years ago. This is not a breakthrough. It has been done before, 
and it was a mistake. Now, we are repeating that mistake. In recent 
years, we have gotten away from specific earmarks, and we have 
authorized various portions of the Guard and Reserve procurement 
account in a ``miscellaneous equipment'' category. This served two 
purposes. First, it provided the Defense Department with the 
flexibility to allocate the funds to DOD's highest-priority 
requirements without going through a lengthy reprogramming process. 
Two, it avoided placing Congress in the position of picking literally 
hundreds of ``winners and losers'' from a long list of items that have 
not been subjected to any merit-based review within the Department of 
Defense. In other words, this is an added package for the National 
Guard and Reserve. These items have not gone through the procurement 
process or any review by the Department of Defense, but we are picking 
the items in this report in great detail. I think that is a mistake.
  In this conference report, nothing is provided for the generic 
``miscellaneous'' account. As a result, the conference treatment of 
Guard and Reserve procurement is, I believe, worse than either of the 
two original bills.
  I note again that this earmarking of every dime in the Guard and 
Reserve procurement fund departs from the policy followed in recent 
authorizations and appropriations acts. In fact, the fiscal year 1996 
Defense Appropriation Act provides $777 million for Guard and Reserve 
procurement, with $377 million--about half of it--provided for 
miscellaneous procurement. In this area, the appropriation bill has a 
far better ``good Government'' approach than does the authorization 
conference report before us today. I say this as one who has been on 
the Senate floor many times criticizing the appropriations bill. In 
fairness, I have to point out that we are doing now what we have 
accused others of doing in the past.
  Although I and a number of other Senators voted for Senator Levin's 
amendment to the Senate bill that would have restored the generic 
nature of the funding, this amendment failed. I accept the fact that 
the Senate decided to use a different approach, but I note that even 
under the Senate-passed bill, $65 million was allocated for 
miscellaneous procurement. Because there is not a single dollar left in 
a miscellaneous category in this bill, the Department will have 
absolutely no flexibility to determine the priorities for purchasing 
additional equipment for the Guard and Reserve--even though the 
appropriators provided that flexibility.
  Mr. President, in closing my remarks, there are several items of 
particular concern to the Clinton administration that I think Members 
would at least like to know about.
  The conference report contains permanent restrictions on access of 
servicewomen and dependents overseas to privately-funded abortions and 
restrictions on service by HIV-positive service members, both of which 
are objectionable to the administration. The administration has written 
letters on these points.
  The administration also objects to use of the power of the purse to 
limit the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to place 
U.S. forces under U.N. command and control. In addition, the 
administration objects to the portion of the contingency funding 
provision that would require the President to submit a supplemental 
appropriations request to replenish funds used for contingency 
operations.
   Mr. President, I regret that I cannot support this conference 
report. I know it means a great deal to Senator Thurmond and the other 
members of the committee and I understand their feeling. I know 
firsthand the feeling. There are many provisions in the bill which 
should be enacted into law. But there are many, many more which should 
not. If this legislation is vetoed by the President as has been 
recommended by his senior advisers, we will have an opportunity to 
correct the many flaws in the bill and produce an authorization bill 
that can be signed into law. I believe it is important for us to do so. 
I pledge to continue to work toward passage of a subsequent bill if the 
legislation in this conference report is not enacted into law.
  Mr. President, could I be informed how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. BYRD. I have 15 minutes which will be more than I need and I am 
happy to yield some to the distinguished Senator.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from West Virginia but I will wait.
  Mr. BYRD. How much time do I have, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. I yield myself such time as I shall 
require for the time under my control. It will not be 14\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. President, this Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Conference 
Report contains many needed and worthwhile provisions. A pay raise and 
raise in the Basic Allowance for Quarters for our active duty military 
personnel, and new authorities for more competitive and efficient 
housing renewal programs to improve the often poor quality of living 
for military personnel and their families, are among the highlights of 
this bill.
  Like the able Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], I believe that this 
bill is going to be vetoed. As a matter of fact, it is a virtual 
certainty. I am concerned that the pay raise and the key time-sensitive 
authorities for raises and other benefits contained in the bill that 
must be passed by January 1, 1996, be passed on another vehicle this 
week such as a continuing resolution. We cannot very well be endorsing 
the deployment of troops to Bosnia and then follow-up by denying them 
their pay raise.
  I am also glad that the contingency force of SR-71 reconnaissance 
aircraft is authorized for another year, and is fully appropriated in a 
bill that the President has already signed. I hope that our military 
commanders in Bosnia will put the SR-71 to work thus providing 
intelligence to our forces there as soon as possible. But on balance, I 
believe, this bill contains more problematical and wasteful provisions 
than it should. 

[[Page S18841]]

  Most importantly, this bill is almost $7 billion over the President's 
request. In addition, this bill authorizes almost $500 million for 
additional spending on the B-2 bomber program. The Senate had stripped 
out funding for additional spending on B-2 bombers from its version of 
the Defense authorization bill, but like Dracula, the B-2 bomber shows 
an uncanny ability to rise night after night from the coffin. This $500 
million was not requested by the Department of Defense. If the B-2 
production line is to be reopened, as some appear determined to make 
happen, then many more billions will be needed in future budgets. These 
funds will have to be carved out of other procurement programs, 
programs that carry a much higher priority with the officials in the 
Department of Defense.
  This conference report also contains incremental funding for a number 
of expensive ships that were not requested by the Department of Defense 
in this bill, and were not scheduled to be constructed until years in 
the future. So, we will put down payments on ships we do not yet need, 
and worry about how to complete the payments for the rest of the ship 
later. The attitude here seems to be taken directly from Scarlett 
O'Hara: ``I'll worry about that tomorrow.'' Furthermore, the 
shipbuilding provisions in this bill direct work to specific shipyards 
without a clear industrial base requirement, which undermines the cost-
saving potential of competition.
  The ballistic missile defense provisions in the conference report 
also go well beyond the Senate-passed compromise on this issue. That 
compromise, which was still farther-reaching that I and other Senators 
would have preferred, would have moderated the rush to build and field 
untested ballistic missile defenses on an accelerated schedule that 
could undermine ongoing efforts to further reduce Russian nuclear 
weapons reduction efforts. The conference report language again raises 
concerns that far more cost-effective defensive measures, which reduce 
the threat by reducing numbers of weapons, have been undermined, 
thereby increasing the threat by possibly igniting a new arms race. 
There is no current need that warrants accelerated spending on 
ballistic missile programs.
  This bill also provides $30 million to restart the anti-satellite 
[ASAT] program, a program that had been terminated even during the cold 
war. Mr. President, we should not be renewing efforts to restart an 
arms race in space. The United States, which is so dependent on 
satellite-transmitted communications for civilian and military 
operations, should be an arms control leader in the space arena.
  Mr. President, because of these and other policy issues contained in 
the conference report, I cannot support it. I understand that the 
Secretary of Defense has recommended that the President consider 
vetoing it, and I concur in that recommendation, although I regret the 
delay in implementing the many good provisions contained in this bill. 
I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Armed Services 
Committee on next year's bill. I hope we can craft a bill next year 
that enjoys broad support, and that does not continue on a path to 
greater defense build-ups during a time when all other spending 
continues to decline.
  Like Senator Nunn, I believe this bill is going to be vetoed. It is a 
virtual certainty. I am concerned that the pay raise and key time 
sensitive authorities for raises and other benefits contained in this 
bill, which must be passed by January 1, 1996, be passed on another 
vehicle this week, such as a continuing resolution. We cannot very well 
be endorsing the deployment of troops to Bosnia and follow up by 
denying them their pay raise.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as we consider the conference report to 
accompany the fiscal year 1996 national defense authorization bill, it 
is imperative to put aside recent partisan criticism of the bill and 
remember that this legislation contains a significant number of 
provisions that will benefit our men and women in uniform, many of whom 
are being sent to Bosnia by our President. In view of the dangers our 
forces will meet in Bosnia and the hardships their families will endure 
during the holiday season, it is incredible to believe that many would 
put politics above the interest of the Nation.
  I point out just a few of the provisions beneficial to the Members of 
our Armed Forces and their families. This is not all of them, this is 
just a few I am going to mention.
  The full military pay raise, if you kill this bill, they will not get 
the pay raise; increase in quarters allowance, that is badly needed; 
authority to pay a family separation allowance to geographically 
separated families. This is important; authority to pay enlisted airmen 
hazardous duty incentive pay; authority to pay dislocation allowance to 
those forced to move as a result of base closure; increase specialty 
pay for recruiters; automatic maximum coverage under the Servicemen's 
Group Life Insurance; cost of living COLA equity for military retirees;
  Reserve components initiatives: Authorized a reserve component dental 
insurance program; and established an income insurance program for 
reservists who are involuntarily mobilized.
  Mr. President, all of these are good things. These are things the 
servicemen want. These are things the soldiers want. You kill this 
bill, you will destroy all this. During the Senate-House conference 
that considered the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization bill, we 
conducted bipartisan negotiations with members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, the House of Representatives Committee on National 
Security, and included representatives of the Department of Defense and 
White House staff in an effort to craft a bill that would be acceptable 
to all.

  We conferred with all these people. We did the very best we could to 
get a bill that would be acceptable to everybody concerned here.
  Mr. President, I hope that we can pass this conference report in the 
same bipartisan manner. I urge Members to come to the floor, debate the 
issues, and then give this conference report the strong support it 
deserves.


                        Naval Petroleum Reserves

  Mr. President, while I am on the floor, I observe that my good 
friend, Senator Nunn referred to the naval petroleum reserves and 
indicated the Government would not be protected properly under this 
bill. That is incorrect.
  I want to say this.
  The conference agreement on the sale of Naval Petroleum Reserves 
contains a number of safeguards to ensure that the Federal Government 
receives full value. Among these safeguards are the following two 
clauses which clearly spell out the conferees' intent that the reserves 
can be sold only if this will result in the highest return to the 
American taxpayer.
  The first is the mandated minimum acceptable price. This price will 
be established by five independent experts who shall consider: all 
equipment and facilities to be included in the sale, the estimated 
quantity of petroleum and natural gas in the reserve, and the net 
present value of the anticipated revenue stream that the Treasury would 
receive from the reserve if the reserve were not sold. The Secretary 
may not set the minimum acceptable price below the higher of the 
average of the five assessments; and the average of three assessments 
after excluding the high and low assessments.
  This requirement ensures that the minimum acceptable price has to be 
at least as high as what the Government would receive for these 
reserves if any other course of action is taken including the 
establishment of a Government corporation, the leasing of the reserves, 
or the continuation of the current operation of the field.
  The second key clause is the authority to suspend the sale. This 
clause gives the Secretary the authority to suspend the sale of NPR-1 
if the Secretary and the Director of OMB jointly determine that the 
sale is proceeding in a manner inconsistent with achievement of a sale 
price that reflects the full value of the reserve; or a course of 
action other than the immediate sale of the reserve to be in the best 
interests of the United States.
  Mr. President, these two clauses essentially mean that NPR-1 cannot 
be sold unless the Government gets a price for the field that exceeds 
the value that would be achieved by any other option, and that the 
entire sale proceed in a manner that is in the best interests of the 
United States. 

[[Page S18842]]

  The sale will provide an estimated $1.5 to $2.5 billion to the 
Federal Treasury. This does not include the several hundred million 
dollars that the Government will receive in increased tax revenues. 
What is more, the Government will save about $1 billion in operating 
costs over the next 7 years.
  Mr. President, the sale of these reserves was initiated--and I want 
to remind my friends on the Democratic side of this--by the 
administration, and, in fact, the administration has come out in 
support of this provision. We have worked in a very bipartisan manner 
to draft this provision so as to incorporate the maximum safeguards 
possible. I hope that we can continue this bipartisanship and vote to 
approve the conference agreement which includes this provision.
  So, our Government is thoroughly protected under this bill in the 
matter of the petroleum reserves.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and I reserve the remainder of my 
time.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 30 minutes.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I require.
  I rise today to offer some remarks concerning the Department of 
Defense conference report now being considered by the Senate.
  I join Senator Nunn in his comments earlier today on the Senate floor 
here, in complimenting our committee chairman, Senator Thurmond, the 
staffs, and those who have worked a long time on this bill.
  I do not like to see charges of partisanship leaking into this year's 
debate because I have been a Member of the Senate for some 21 years, a 
member of the Armed Services Committee since 1985, and I have not 
always agreed with every line-item spending decision or every word of 
legislation included in past defense authorization and appropriations 
bills during my tenure here. Mr. President, I have supported those 
measures without regard to who controlled the Senate or who controlled 
the White House. I can say that without any qualms of conscience 
whatsoever. What I have worked for here is what is best for the United 
States of America and what is best for the security of the United 
States of America and our interests all around the world.
  I understood in the past that I would not agree with every item, but 
overall these bills have included, on balance, more positive aspects, 
so I could go ahead and vote for them.
  Much has been made of the fact that this bill does have some very, 
very good things in it with regard to pay, with regard to housing, with 
regard to aviation retention pay and some things like that. I support 
those items fully. I think we can still get those passed, even if this 
bill were not approved on the floor. I am already a cosponsor of an 
amendment to the continuing resolution that is being proposed to 
provide for those things, whether they are in this bill or not. So that 
will take care of some of those concerns.
  But, having said that, it is with much regret--it really is with 
regret--I find I must oppose this year's authorization conference 
report. I never before in all the time I have been in the Senate have 
opposed authorization and appropriations bills for defense and I very 
much regret that I had to this year. I voted against the Senate version 
of this bill and gave my reasons here on the floor and had hoped the 
bill could be improved in conference. Unfortunately, I do not believe 
that is the case. I believe the bill is not as good as the Senate bill 
that we sent to conference. So, for the first time in over 2 decades, I 
will vote against a defense authorization conference report. Let me 
just enumerate some of the reasons why.
  One of the top items in my estimation is that the carefully-crafted 
ABM language in the Senate bill, which we worked on very hard, and was 
only marginally supportable for many of us in the first place, has been 
made unacceptable. That is a very, very important item. This involves 
our balance of missiles around the world, and the conference report at 
the very least gives the appearance that the United States intends to 
unilaterally violate the ABM Treaty.
  On August 2, 1995, I discussed at some length my concerns over the 
version of the fiscal 1996 defense bill that was voted out of the Armed 
Services Committee. In that statement I described several problems with 
the bill's language on ballistic missile defense. Because the bill 
before the Senate today, I very much regret to say, does nothing to 
alleviate my concerns on this crucial issue--and I do term this a 
crucial issue--I must rise to speak, once again, against this ill-
advised language.
  March 5 of this year marked the 25th anniversary of the entry into 
force of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, better 
known as the NPT. Thanks to some good diplomatic work by the Clinton 
administration, a task made all the easier by the good basic sense of 
the diplomatic objective, the United States succeeded in achieving its 
longstanding goal of securing unconditionally the unlimited extension 
of this treaty. No more of the 5-year things, where the NPT review had 
to meet every 5 years and decide whether we are going to go ahead with 
something like a nonproliferation treaty. This year the United States 
took the lead in pushing for, and was successful in getting 
unconditionally, the unlimited extension of this treaty. That was a 
major step.
  So, the primary purpose of that treaty is to curb the global spread 
of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the treaty commits the United States 
and other parties to make good-faith efforts relating to what the 
treaty calls the ``cessation of the nuclear arms race,'' something I 
have fought for ever since I have been in the Senate, some 21 years. It 
started clear back in 1978, with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act that 
I was the author of.
  Fortunately, here, too, the administration deserves some credit for 
its efforts on behalf of the START II treaty which the Senate should 
vote to ratify very soon. The START II treaty will substantially reduce 
the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia, and will 
eliminate altogether not just the last of Russia's heavy nuclear 
ICBM's, the SS-18, but will also eliminate the most destabilizing 
weapons, land-based ICBM's with MIRV's, the multiple independently 
targeted nuclear warheads. These are known as MIRV's.
  In achieving these goals, America will take a long step in fulfilling 
its key arms control obligation under the NPT. Yet, START II does not 
deserve to be ratified just because it is consistent with America's 
clear international obligations under the NPT.
  The real reason all Americans should support the START II treaty is 
the most basic one. It serves the national security interests of our 
country. It serves our interests.
  Amid all of this progress on the NPT and START II fronts the new 
majorities of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House 
National Security Committee have inserted language into the current 
defense bill that will put America on a path, as I view it, out of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This treaty prevents both the United 
States and Russia from deploying a national missile defense against 
strategic nuclear attack, and in doing so the treaty has helped to lay 
the foundation for these deep cuts in the nuclear stockpiles. 
Furthermore, the treaty itself is holding down the enormous costs of 
maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The lack of a Russian defense 
against strategic United States nuclear missiles means that we can 
accomplish much more with less. If Russia is permitted to deploy a 
defense against such missiles, as it would if the ABM Treaty should 
collapse, we will end up having to spend a whole lot more for a whole 
lot less security.
  I have no doubt that Russia's political, military, and parliamentary 
leadership will view the language in this bill as an assault on the ABM 
Treaty. It is an action which would only create new incentives for 
Russia to reassess, or even abandon, its arms reduction obligations 
under START II. How the Congress could be seriously considering pulling 
America out of the ABM Treaty given the likely reaction such a step 
would trigger in Russia is a mystery to me. It is a recipe for 
rekindling a strategic nuclear arms race. Surely, the gains to U.S. 
security by retaining a strong U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty 
override any gain from the costly and dubious missile defense scheme 
offered in this bill. 

[[Page S18843]]

  Specifically, the bill requires deployment of a national missile 
defense system by a fixed date. I repeat that. It requires the 
deployment of a national missile defense system by a fixed date. Let me 
tell you how ludicrous that is just on the surface. The system has not 
been invented yet. Yet, we require that these scientific breakthroughs 
that would let us even put up a missile defense system that would be 
halfway capable have not even been invented yet, and, yet, we are 
requiring a date certain for it to be deployed.
  It requires the deployment of ABM systems that are not permissible 
under the current treaty. It includes a unilateral definition of ABM 
systems that can be developed in a treaty. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili has warned that such a 
statutory definition could jeopardize the prospects for early 
ratification of the START II treaty in Russia and negatively impact our 
broader security relationships with Russia.
  The missile defense language in this bill will lead not only to 
massive expenditures on missile defense systems that will never prove 
to be 100 percent effective but will eventually lead to even more 
massive expenditures--not just of public funds, but also of diplomatic 
capital, I might add--on offensive nuclear weapon capabilities. We will 
need to deal with a Russian strategic missile defense system. Whether 
one looks at the budgetary, or the strategic implications of this 
language, the results of such an examination I just think can only be 
termed ``foolishness.''
  I would like to work with the new majority on the Armed Services 
Committee to address missile threats in a way that does not destroy the 
ABM Treaty. But I see little indication on this bill, or elsewhere, 
that the majority is interested in investing in prevention of missile 
proliferation. Instead, they want to pour out pounds or megatons of 
fallacious cures. What the majority should be proposing are new 
measures to prevent missile proliferation from occurring in the first 
place as opposed to shelling out tax dollars on sophisticated hardware 
and software to deal with--or, more accurately, pretend to deal with--
the problem after the fact. As I see it, this is a solution out looking 
for a problem because we do not have all the threats from abroad that 
we used to have. I will go into that in just a few moments.
  Congress's new majority is proposing nothing, for example, to ensure 
that U.S. missile proliferation sanctions are strengthened and 
implemented in a manner that serves as an effective deterrent to 
proliferation. I see nothing to indicate a new effort to strengthen 
export controls--for example, something I have long advocated and put 
in legislation and had passed--or to encourage measures to strengthen 
the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime.
  Meanwhile, in this--what I view as a meat-ax approach to budget 
reduction--the State Department funds are being chopped back so that 
even fewer resources will be available for the pursuit of diplomatic 
measures aimed at halting nuclear and missile proliferation. Many in 
this new majority continue to seek the elimination of ACDA, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, which has worked hard over the years to 
strengthen U.S. policies in just these areas.
  In their zeal to inveigle our country out of the ABM Treaty, the new 
majority continues to tout an alleged missile threat from what they 
call rogue nations out there lurking somewhere in anticipation of 
launching ICBM's against targets in the United States. This whole rogue 
nation argument is simply an old-fashioned red herring. It a 
distraction from actions that are really needed to strengthen our 
national defense. Indeed, rogue nations may pose less of a threat to us 
than rogue defense bills like some of the provisions in this one that 
we have here today.
  I have noted several times the testimony before the Select Committee 
on Intelligence, of which I am a member, of the former director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James Clapper, on this 
missile threat. He stated last January that ``We see no interest in or 
capability of any new country reaching the continental United States 
with a long-range missile for at least the next decade.''
  In correspondence dated December 1, 1995, the CIA informed Senators 
Levin and Bumpers that the missile threat as identified in this bill 
was overstated. Though I fully agree with the CIA assessment, the 
agency could well have gone further by noting that, contrary to a 
popular belief, missiles are not proliferating in the world today. 
Indeed, in some important respects there has been a decline in certain 
types of missile proliferation threats. Over the years, we have seen 
the elimination of long-range missile programs in Brazil, Argentina, 
and South Africa. The Iraqi missile program has been destroyed. Egypt's 
efforts to build a long-range missile program has been terminated, and 
nobody seriously believes that Libya will have an ICBM capability any 
time soon. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to 
eliminate a whole class of missiles, and the START treaties have cut 
back substantially the numbers of nuclear ICBMs. When looking at 
missile programs that remain in the Middle East, South Asia, and East 
Asia, it is obvious that there is a global missile proliferation threat 
that must be addressed. Indeed, we could soon be witnessing robust 
missile races in at least two of these theaters, if they are not 
underway already.
  But do these developments justify a U.S. walkout from the ABM Treaty? 
Of course, not. On the contrary, we should ask the following: Do these 
developments justify an increased U.S. effort to enhance its 
intelligence capabilities, both analysis and collection; to strengthen 
export controls, both licensing and enforcement; to implement 
sanctions, both to punish and to deter; to ensure that our diplomats 
have the resources they need to roll back these programs; and, to 
ensure the readiness of U.S. forces that are deployed abroad to defend 
themselves against tactical missile attacks? Yes to every one of the 
above, especially the last.
  I want to see our defenses for our frontline troops, and those who 
may be in a combat's way, protected against the tactical missile 
attacks.
  But, nevertheless, I remain an optimist. I am hopeful that the new 
majority will someday come around to the view that Star Wars is not the 
panacea to proliferation. Indeed, a Star Wars we have yet to invent 
cannot be placed in place by a certain time because we have not 
invented all of it yet. We know from our star wars experience before 
that it is a bigger problem than anybody thought it was going to be 
back in those days.

  When they do, I will be ready to work with them to get our 
nonproliferation and arms control policies back on track. Judging from 
the content of this bill before us today, that day has clearly not 
arrived. So I remain firmly and unalterably opposed to this misguided 
missile defense legislation. I urge all my colleagues to join me in 
pressing this opposition for as long as it takes to restore some sanity 
to this program.
  Mr. President, I note for my colleagues that in my view this language 
is reason enough alone to oppose passage of the conference report. 
There are other reasons as well. This bill had $7 billion added above 
and beyond what the administration requested--one of the main reasons 
why I voted against it going in, before it went to conference.
  If that money had gone to operation and maintenance accounts where it 
is needed, if it had gone to pay all of our bills from peacekeeping 
operations already passed, which is somewhere around $2 billion, if it 
had gone for programs like that and things that we really need, depot 
maintenance, things like that where we are behind and did not have 
adequate budget provided, then I would not have objected. I would have 
said fine, we needed that and the administration should have requested 
it to begin with. But that is not where the added $7 billion additional 
went.
  One-half a billion dollars is unrequested and unwelcome B-2 funding 
that can be used to start new production and was brought back from 
conference, and another one-half a billion dollars was added to the 
national missile defense account. These two funding decisions are 
merely downpayments on huge programs in the outyears. And they make a 
mockery of the desire to balance the budget and eliminate deficit 
spending. We have part of the Government shut down here arguing over 
the budget, 

[[Page S18844]]
whether we are going to be able to get a balanced budget. Then we have 
add-ons like this for things that were not needed at all, and they are 
downpayments on huge programs in the outyears.
  If these programs alone go forward, the funding contained in this 
conference report represents a commitment to many, many more billions 
out there in the future. I think just the national missile defense 
program in the outyears requires outlays by one estimate of at least 
$43 billion, if we carry it out as it has been spoken of. I cannot 
support wasting precious taxpayer dollars on the B-2, for instance, 
that is well over half a billion a copy. That is taking out even all of 
the sunk costs of the past. And we know that every time we have made an 
estimate in the past on the B-2 it has gone up. One of the estimates 
was above half a billion per copy. It is around $650 to $700 million 
right now, if you figure all the costs that have to go into hangars and 
things like that for each airplane that is produced.
  The plane is an aerodynamic wonder. It truly is. I had the pleasure 
of going out and flying it not long ago. It is one that has cleared the 
hurdles that we in the Armed Services Committee put in to make sure 
that this unique airplane would indeed pass all of its aerodynamic 
tests. It does not have a rudder up there. You never see a vertical 
surface on that airplane. It meets all the different aerodynamic 
requirements in how you control it, and it is an aerodynamic marvel, I 
can guarantee you that. It flies beautifully. But when you put between 
half a billion and $1 billion per plane, it just is too much.
  Once again, I would say what we have provided here is something that 
is not required, not necessary, and is another solution looking for a 
problem. We have bombers that the Air Force has said are adequate when 
we combine what we have with the B-2's already produced or provided for 
and the B-1's. Those give us enough bomber capability to meet any 
threat we see right now.
  Overall, the funding level in this conference report is too high and 
the bulk of the funds will be spent in the procurement accounts, not on 
items requested by the Pentagon, not on requirements of the President's 
request that he sent to us but on items built in members' home 
districts.
  Now, the conference report authorizes the purchase of items not 
requested such as purchase of F-15's. Well, who does that benefit? The 
purchase of F-16's. Who does that benefit? The purchase of extra F/A-
18's. Who does that benefit? The purchase of extra C-130's. The 
purchase of extra C-21's, Lear jets, not requested by the Pentagon. 
These were add-ons. At a cost of an additional $1.6 billion, the 
conference report also authorizes the procurement of the LPD-17, the 
LHD-7 and an additional DDG-51, all three not requested by the 
Pentagon, not requested by the administration, yet they are add-ons. 
Who benefits? Whose district? Whose States benefit? How did those get 
into this conference report when the administration did not want them, 
at least not in this year's budget plan of how we are going to spend 
our increasingly scarce defense dollars?
  Mr. President, I have supported add-ons where they make sense in the 
past, and I would have supported some of the add-ons in the conference 
report, but the magnitude of the add-ons, the magnitude of all of 
these--just one of them is not enough to sink this bill, but you put 
them altogether, the add-ons and the solely parochial rationale 
supporting some of them, it is impossible to support this conference 
report.
  The conference report does not stop at spending too much on programs 
that we either do not need now or do not need at all. This bill marks 
the return of widespread earmarking in the authorization process. That 
is where you have a requirement for a certain aircraft or a certain 
item being purchased but it also specifically words things in a way 
that it has to be spent exactly where they want it spent in a certain 
person's district or a certain person's State.
  The unpalatable earmarking of close to $800 million that was included 
in the Senate for reserve component equipment has been expanded and now 
the bill contains additional earmarking in the shipbuilding and ship 
repair accounts.
  Earmarking, Mr. President, is a practice that the Armed Services 
Committee has in the past worked tirelessly to weed out of its bills. 
And through the years I think we have been reasonably successful in 
getting some of that earmarking wiped out. In the end, those efforts 
even impacted the appropriations bills which a few years back stopped 
earmarking the reserve component equipment accounts. And ironically, 
the appropriators for the most part chose not to earmark their bill 
this year, and it is the authorizers now that have loaded up our bill 
with so much pork that I referred to it one day on the Senate floor as 
an ``agriculture bill'' because it has so much pork in it.
  Mr. President, another remarkable provision in the conference report 
requires the sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve. When this issue came 
up during consideration of the Senate bill, many of us disagreed with 
requiring the sale of this money-making asset, but we were bound to 
sell the reserve by reconciliation. In light of that reconciliation 
mandate, the committee worked to put safeguards in place in the 
authorization bill to make sure the American taxpayer got the best 
possible return on the sale of this asset. What is remarkable about the 
conference report with regard to the petroleum reserve also, it was 
dropped out of reconciliation. We would no longer be forced to sell the 
reserve but for the fact the authorization conference report now 
requires it to be sold. So it is dropped out of one report, the 
reconciliation bill, but kept in this authorization conference report 
and requiring that it be sold within 1 year. That is what made this 
thing really unacceptable: It required that it be sold within 1 year.
  The conference report undermines its own so-called safeguard by 
creating a buyer's market for the reserve, not an environment conducive 
to obtaining the best deal for the seller, the American taxpayer.
  At the same time, the conference report adds earmarked funding for 
programs of which there is a questionable requirement, the conference 
report takes a $450 million cut in the account that funds cleanup of 
our nuclear weapons complex, a requirement which I view as a moral as 
well as a legal obligation. That is one that I feel very strongly 
about. The cleanup is required because we started back about 1985 with 
a report that I got into, or asked the GAO to do on the Fernald part of 
the nuclear weapons complex, and at Fernald we found out there were 
lots of problems. I asked for studies of other places around the 
nuclear weapons complex and now have a stack of GAO reports probably 
3\1/2\, 4 feet high through the last 10 years that have outlined this 
problem, going from a nuclear cleanup cost estimate back in those days 
of $8 to $12 billion for everything to now up to around $200 to $300 
billion over a 20-year period, if we can figure out how to do it. Yet, 
we reduce funding for it in this year's bill.

  On what we might term social issues, this conference report, I 
believe, should be opposed. It prohibits service members and dependents 
from obtaining abortions paid for with private funds and just using 
military medical facilities, except in the cases of rape, incest, or 
where the life of the mother is in danger.
  If you are a female member of the armed services or a wife stationed 
somewhere overseas, you may not have the option of going to outside 
facilities as good as you would have if you were home in the United 
States. In the past, we have permitted cases of abortion where it was 
paid for with private funds but using the military medical facility. 
That is prohibited now with this legislation.
  The conference report also discriminates against HIV-infected service 
members by requiring their discharge.
  These are just some of the issues that have been attributed to my 
decision to vote against this conference report.
  I would like to comment for a moment on the process that led up to 
the conference report.
  Mr. President, this conference lasted for something close to 95 days. 
Conferees met at the panel level for 2 weeks--the panel level now, the 
subcommittee level--before being dissolved with outstanding issues 
still to be considered at the full conference level. 

[[Page S18845]]

  From the time the panels were dissolved, nearly 3 months ago, until 
the committee members were informed last week that agreement on all 
issues had been achieved, the conferees met one time--just one time--
and that was not for the usual purpose of conferees meeting. The 
purpose of that one meeting was to give the outside conferees the 
opportunity to express their views. The other committees that were 
involved in some way that were permitted the courtesy of coming in and 
giving their testimony to the conferees, and that was the purpose of 
the one meeting.
  So when the panels dissolved, many, many issues remained unresolved, 
and the Senate conferees were never convened to discuss strategy for 
retaining important Senate positions, like the ABM language or funding 
for the B-2, positions that were strongly supported by the Senate as a 
whole.
  In the case of the ABM language, we had an overwhelming vote on the 
floor of the Senate, and the Senate position on B-2 funding was the 
result of a rollcall vote taken in committee. Dialog at the conferee 
level may have changed the outcome on some of the items that were given 
up to the House.
  Before concluding my remarks, Mr. President, for the record, although 
I do not support and will not vote for the conference report, I 
certainly do support the acquisition reform provisions contained in 
this legislation and hope we can attach those to some other piece of 
legislation if this bill should fail.
  Should this legislation be enacted, at least acquisition reform 
provisions can help make a better and more effective Government. Should 
the conference report fail to be enacted, I hope we can find a way to 
enact these procurement reforms by some other vehicle.
  Mr. President, I would like to take a few minutes to speak about some 
of the better points of the conference report for the fiscal year 1996 
DOD authorization, specifically, divisions D and E on acquisition 
reform and information technology management, respectively.
  As you know, Mr. President, last year, the Congress passed the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, known as FASA, the first major 
piece of procurement reform legislation in a decade. Passage of FASA 
constituted a critical victory in the war against government 
inefficiency. It is a comprehensive government-wide procurement reform 
effort aimed at streamlining the acquisition process by reducing 
paperwork burdens through revision and consolidation of acquisition 
statutes to eliminate redundancy, provide consistency, and facilitate 
implementation.
  Now, I do not think anyone expected a second comprehensive round of 
reforms to follow so closely after FASA, especially while we were 
awaiting the new regulations, but with the dawn of the 104th Congress, 
we saw a proliferation of new and revitalized procurement proposals. I 
even introduced a bill myself on behalf of the administration, S. 669, 
the Federal Acquisition Improvement Act. Although I did not support 
every item in that bill, I am pleased to say that some of the better 
concepts have been included in this year's acquisition reform package.
  Before I talk about the substance of the bill, I want to say a word 
about the process that has been used to reach this end product. As with 
many bills, a vehicle is often sought for expedient passage. This year, 
the vehicle for government-wide acquisition reform is the DOD 
authorization bill. I want to be very clear when I say that I do not 
expect this to set a precedent for future acquisition reform 
discussions. Though most of these changes will also apply to the 
Defense Department, it was not my preference to enact government-wide 
changes on a DOD bill. Expediency in legislating does not always 
produce the best results.
  However, once the decision was made to go this route, we have worked 
hard to make the best of a less than favorable situation. A staff-level 
working group in the Senate spent several months scrutinizing each and 
every proposal to identify the most useful and most needed provisions. 
Even though the Senate had only two subcommittee hearings, we have done 
the best we could to consider opinions from interested parties however 
possible--by phone call, mail or meeting. And even without the formal 
medium of a hearing, we tried to consider as many viewpoints as 
possible, and I sincerely hope that no one feels excluded from this 
process.
  With that said, I am pleased to support, with one exception, the end 
product of what I consider an effort to build upon the acquisition 
reforms we initiated last year in FASA. The one exception is the 
proposed changes this bill makes to the recoupment laws which I do not 
consider to be part of acquisition reform. I cannot support this 
change.
  I would like to take a moment to highlight a few of the more 
significant changes being made to procurement law and explain my 
position on recoupment.
  In the area of competition, the Senate steadfastly refused to alter 
the current definition of full and open competition, found in the 
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 [CICA], despite a House proposal 
to the contrary. but to ease the burden on contractors, both large and 
small, who expend large amounts of money to compete for contracts which 
may never be awarded to them, we have instead authorized the use of two 
phase competitive procedures for certain construction contracts and 
allowed contracting officers to limit the competitive range of offerors 
to those who are judged to be best qualified.
  In the area of commercial items where a lot of work was begun last 
year with FASA, we have created a 3-year authorization for the use of 
streamlined procedures for the purchase of unmodified commercial items 
under $5 million. This should reduce the burden on contractors and 
shorten the deadlines and time it takes the government to acquire 
commercial items since less time is needed to prepare an offer. We also 
authorized the waiver of most statutory requirements for government 
contractors when we purchase off-the-shelf commercial items, because it 
is impractical and inappropriate to routinely apply government-unique 
requirements to ordinary commercial items that may be provided from a 
commercial assembly line or over the counter. We also define off-the-
shelf commercial items and refine the definition of commercial 
services.
  Procurement integrity was an issue which was left unresolved last 
year by FASA with an agreement to take it up this year. We have 
streamlined these provisions to prohibit the improper disclosure of 
inside information, and included a recusal provision which would 
provide a statutory basis and statutory enforcement for ethics 
regulations already in place, and a limited revolving door provision, 
which would prohibit certain agency officials from going to work for a 
contractor for 1 year after certain involvement with certain contracts.
  In the area of protests and dispute resolution, repeal of the 
infamous Brooks ADP Act consolidates administrative protests in the 
General Accounting Office [GAO]. I am very pleased with this solution.
  I recognize that a protest is intended to be an action brought on 
behalf of and in the best interest of both the government and the 
taxpayer, making sure that both get the best deal. However, it seems to 
have gotten to the point where agencies routinely build time for 
protests into major procurements from the start, because companies 
often proceed with a protest if they lose out on a contract, regardless 
of the government's explanation for their loss of that contract. 
Because every major procurement or program seems to generate its own 
flurry of protests, I strongly prefer the GAO as the administrative 
forum of choice where the process is less formal, less costly, and less 
judicialized.
  I also recognize that GAO does not have the authority to issue 
binding declaratory judgements and that its decisions are merely 
recommendatory. There are very few instances where the agency has not 
followed a GAO recommendation, however, and in those instances, the 
agency must account to Congress for its actions, preserving the 
Congressional oversight role.

  Among other things, we have also severed the linkages between the 
successful implementation of a Federal Acquisition Computer Network and 
the FASA-authorized simplified acquisition threshold and pilot 
programs; reduced the number of certifications required of contractors; 
delayed the implementation of FASA's cooperative 

[[Page S18846]]
purchasing program until after a GAO study has been completed and 
reviewed; required agencies to conduct cost-effective value engineering 
programs; established requirements for the civilian acquisition 
workforce; authorized a demonstration project for personnel management 
in the DOD acquisition workforce; and amended the OFPP Act to eliminate 
obsolete and unnecessary provisions.
  Division E of the DOD bill, originally Senators Cohen and Levin's 
information technology management reform bill, will reform the way the 
Government both buys and manages its information technology systems. 
This section of the bill will not only force agencies to take a more 
strategic view of their information assets and enhance up-front 
planning, it will give the Government the tools it needs to keep up 
with the rapid pace of technological change in the information arena. 
It will also add to the information resources management reforms of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, of which I am a co-author. Hopefully 
this will lead to a substantial reduction in the number of horror 
stories we hear every year about information systems that are late, 
over budget and do not work.
  Finally, as I stated earlier, there is one provision that has been 
included as acquisition reform, but which I exclude from this category. 
This provision--which I cannot support--would essentially eliminate the 
requirement to recoup R&D costs paid by the U.S. on foreign arms sales. 
Even though the Secretary of Defense will be given authority to waive 
the recoupment fees only under certain circumstances, I am just not 
convinced that these changes are necessary, narrow as they may be, even 
if corresponding reporting requirements were added. The U.S. is already 
very competitive in world arms markets; new incentives are unnecessary. 
In the past, I have opposed other initiatives to use government 
institutions or government funds to underwrite foreign arms sales. 
Given our current dominance of the market, further encouragement of 
foreign arms sales is neither necessary nor desirable.
  Mr. President, it is easy to see that even after FASA, we have 
continued to address more difficult and complex issues with this second 
round of acquisition reform. Although I do not support and will not 
vote in favor of the DOD conference report, I am glad that, if it 
passes, at least the acquisition reform provisions can help to make a 
better and more effective government. And if the conference report does 
not get enacted, I hope some way can be found to enact these 
procurement reforms in another context.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coats). The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, to summarize some of the President's budget 
request, there was an additional $5.2 billion added, basically, to the 
following accounts:
  Army aircraft, $336 million added;
  Missiles, $189 million added;
  Wheeled and tracked combat vehicles, $357 million added;
  Other procurement, $506 million added.
  In the Navy:
  Aircraft, $686 million added;
  Weapons, they subtracted $127 million on that one;
  Ships, added $1.6 billion in ships that were not requested;
  Ammunition, plus $430 million;
  Other procurement, $18.6 million.
  In the Air Force:
  Aircraft, added $1.2 billion;
  Missiles, cut $709 million;
  Ammunition, added $343 million;
  Other procurement, minus $536 million.
  National Guard had $777 million added, most of it earmarked.
  Specifically an additional $212 million for six more F/A-18's;
  An additional $1.4 billion for the LHD-7;
  An additional $974 million for the LPD-17;
  An authorization for 3 DDG-51's while only providing the money for 
two;
  An additional $493 million for B-2 with no limitation on how those 
funds can be spent, including new production, which could be the 
decision later on. That language was fought over in the conference, I 
understand.
  It also had an additional $311 million for F-15E's;
  And an additional $159 million for F-16's.
  So, Mr. President, I support some of the good things I think were in 
this legislation, such as the military pay raise, the additional basic 
allowance for quarters and aviation retention pay. I hope that we can 
put those on to other legislation. I am the cosponsor of legislation to 
do that.
  For all the above reasons and more, I regret for the first time I 
will not be able to vote for a conference report on this. I do regret 
it very much. I know how hard the chairman, Senator Thurmond, has 
worked on this and how much he wants this. I do wish very much that I 
could support this, but I find that I just cannot, for all the reasons 
given above.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as may be 
needed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Incidentally, the distinguished Senator from Ohio asked 
for 5 additional minutes. I ask unanimous consent that our side have 5 
additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I do not 
plan to object, I intended that the 5 minutes come out of our allotted 
time, not 5 minutes added on to the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the additional 5 minutes 
allocated to the Senator from Ohio will be deducted from the time on 
the minority side.
  Mr. THURMOND. If the additional 5 minutes he received is going to 
come out of that time, then I will not ask for 5 additional minutes. I 
just wanted to be sure each side had the same number of minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to address the central objection 
raised by certain Members and the administration against this 
conference report concerning ballistic missile defense.
  The administration has argued that we do not need and cannot afford a 
national missile defense system. This is a debatable point and everyone 
is entitled to their own view. But the administration has also claimed 
that the NMD system called for in this conference report would require 
the United States to unilaterally abrogate or violate the ABM Treaty. 
This assertion is simply false.
  Over the last several months, the majority conferees engaged the 
administration and the minority conferees in a detailed negotiation to 
ensure that all legitimate concerns having to do with the ABM Treaty, 
the START II Treaty, and the President's prerogatives in the area of 
arms control were addressed and resolved. This negotiation produced the 
ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference report.
  Unfortunately, once these concerns were addressed, the administration 
moved the goal line and changed its demands. At the last moment, the 
White House made it clear that even if we resolved all concerns having 
to do with the ABM Treaty they would oppose this conference report over 
a simple commitment to deploy a national missile defense system, even 
if that system were fully compliant with the ABM Treaty.
  Let us be clear about the administration's reasons for opposing this 
conference report. The administration opposes any National Missile 
System; they argue that there is no threat and that we cannot afford 
one anyway. Ironically, the administration is willing to spend hundreds 
of millions of dollars each year on a National Missile Defense 
Technology Program that is specifically designed never to lead to 
deployment. What we are saying is at that level of investment we ought 
to get something real in return--an actual deployed system.

[[Page S18847]]

  On the subject of the threat, there is no doubt that there is an 
existing and expanding threat to the United States from ballistic 
missiles. With Russian ICBM technology virtually up for sale and with 
North Korea developing a missile capable of reaching the United States, 
I do not see how one can argue that there is no threat in sight. This 
is just another excuse for doing nothing.
  To provide some context, I urge Senators to look back at the Missile 
Defense Act of 1991, which was a bipartisan effort. The 1991 act called 
on the Secretary of Defense to deploy a National Missile Defense System 
in 5 years, by 1996. In contrast, the conference report before the 
Senate today gives the Secretary of Defense 8 years to deploy a similar 
system.
  What has changed since passage of the Missile Defense Act of 1991 is 
that the administration no longer wants to deal with the problem. I 
regret this and I urge my colleagues to reject the artificial arguments 
regarding the ABM Treaty. There are many in the Senate who want to see 
us abrogate the ABM Treaty. This conference report, however, does not 
do it.
  Mr. President, I would like to respond to a couple of remarks made by 
the Senator from Ohio. The Senator from Ohio registered his support for 
administration success in securing the unconditional extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. He then went on to articulate his concerns 
with the ballistic missile defense language in the defense 
authorization conference and the potential detrimental impact on 
Russian ratification of START II. He also mentioned his concern about 
the lack of concern by the new majority with regard to export controls 
and other measures that would contribute to staunching the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Let me highlight provisions in the Defense authorization conference 
report which I believe the Senator would agree supports his concerns.
  With regard to START II, there are two provisions, one which 
expresses the Congress' support for ratification and implementation of 
START II, and another provision expressing the Congress' belief that 
the United States not take any action to unilaterally retire or 
dismantle systems until such time as START II is ratified and 
implemented by both parties. This is consistent with the testimony by 
the Under Secretary of Policy for the Department of Defense, Walt 
Slocombe, before the Senate Armed Services Committee during its START 
II hearing this year. Let me quote Mr. Slocombe's response to a concern 
that I raised about premature reductions to the U.S. strategic forces, 
Mr. Slocombe replied,

       . . . we will not begin the reductions necessary to reach 
     the START II levels until the Treaty has been ratified, and 
     we will ensure that the pace of our reductions are reasonably 
     related to the pace of Russian reductions.

  It seems ridiculous to me that the administration would oppose the 
Defense authorization conference report and cite provisions that 
articulate the administration's stated policy.
  With regard to export controls, the Defense authorization conference 
report includes a provision that expresses the concern of the Congress 
that it is in our national security interests to maintain effective 
export controls. Additionally, the conference report expresses its deep 
concern that the administration has lowered restrictions on a number of 
dual-use items and technologies with defense capabilities. The 
conference report would require them to evaluate licenses for the 
export of militarily critical items that should be controlled for 
national security reasons; requires the Department to review export 
licenses for biological pathogens; and requires a report on actions 
taken by the administration to ensure that it is maintaining an active 
role in review export licenses in a number of areas, such as space 
launch vehicles, supercomputers, biological pathogens, and high 
resolution imagery. The conference report also makes recommendations to 
strengthen proliferation regimes, such as the Missile Technology 
Control Regimes. The conference report also contains provisions to 
strengthen the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992.
  Last, the Senator from Ohio mentioned his concern that the Defense 
authorization conference report does not contain enough funds to pay 
our peacekeeping assessments to the United Nations.
  Mr. President, the Defense authorization conference report is not the 
appropriate legislation to pay peacekeeping assessments, the 
appropriate legislation is the foreign aid and foreign operations 
appropriations bills.
  The Defense conference report before the Senate contains funds to pay 
for contingency operations in Iraq, which Secretary of Defense Perry 
asked for, but was not included in the Defense budget request. It also 
includes $50 million for humanitarian assistance and $20 million for 
humanitarian demining activities. Items which quite frankly should be 
funded in the international affairs budget function, but which this 
committee has supported.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to inquire about the amount of 
time that I could have on this. Is the time under the control of the 
distinguished chairman?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield to the Senator as much time as he may desire.
  Mr. LOTT. I think 15 minutes should do it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for as much time as 
he desires.
  Mr. LOTT. First, Mr. President, I would like to commend and 
congratulate the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, for his excellent work on 
this legislation, his dedication, his perseverance. There have been 
many times during the process of the development of this bill--in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, on the floor of the Senate, in 
conference--when the hurdles looked like they were unachievable, that 
we just were not going to be able to move forward to the next issue or 
move the whole bill. But in each instance along the way, the Senator 
from South Carolina has insisted that we work together, between the 
members of the Armed Services Committee, across the aisle, between the 
Senate and the House, and between the Congress and the administration. 
It has not been easy. This is a big, important bill for the future 
defense of our country, and we would not be here without the leadership 
of our great Senator from South Carolina. I commend him and thank him 
for the opportunity of being involved in the process to move this 
legislation forward. Of course, I also want to thank the distinguished 
ranking member on the committee, the Senator from Georgia, Senator 
Nunn, for his cooperation and his being willing to point out where 
there were potential problems and to try to find solutions we could 
live with.
  Mr. President, when the Defense Authorization Committee began this 
conference in early September, Members from the House and Senate worked 
for swift resolutions to issues of dispute between the two bills. While 
most conferences include issues which are difficult to negotiate, this 
conference clearly was especially difficult in trying to work out an 
agreeable conference report. Once the conference discussions began, it 
was evident that huge differences existed between the House and Senate 
conferees and the administration. Chairman Thurmond, Chairman Spence, 
and countless other Members, worked vigorously to try and bridge the 
differences, and a substantial compromise was required to resolve these 
issues. In fact, they were achieved. We did reach a compromise, and 
that is why we have this conference agreement. That is the way all 
conferences work. You always have differences between Republicans on 
the Armed Services Committee--between Democrats and between Republicans 
and Democrats, and between the Congress and the administration. That is 
what happened here. After a lot of hard work, we were able to achieve 
this conference agreement.
  There were countless issues in this process that I felt strongly 
about. Several of them were resolved in a way that I do not 
particularly like. But the greater good is involved here. I think this 
is a conference report I can support, should support, and I also think 
the Senate should agree to. I understand that there are feelings in the 
minority that maybe they were not consulted enough as we went along. I 
do know that our staffs communicated 

[[Page S18848]]
and that as negotiations were underway, our staff really worked hard to 
keep the staff on the other side informed. I do know that Senator 
Thurmond worked with Chairman Spence, and I know he worked with Senator 
Nunn. I had repeated conferences myself with Senator Nunn. He was very 
tolerant in talking on the car phone late at night and early in the 
morning. I talked to Senator Exon about a variety of issues in the 
conference, and I know that other Senators of both parties talked back 
and forth.
  So while maybe it has not been a perfect process, we have learned 
from the process and we do have a result that I think we should be able 
to live with. I have listened carefully to the criticism on this final 
agreement. Some Members do not believe they were fully involved in the 
negotiations. Other Members just do not like some of the final results. 
I can remember, though, year in and year out when Senator Nunn and 
Chairman Aspin would convene the big four to resolve differences in the 
absence of the remaining members of the committees. There has been some 
complaint that there were not enough people involved in the loop. But I 
do have a memory of how, not very long ago, the big four finally got 
down to the big issues and met, and if the big four could not resolve 
the final problems, the chairmen met to make the final call--perhaps 
Chairman Nunn and Chairman Dellums. So there is nothing really 
different in the way we proceeded this time.
  So we need to distinguish between unhappiness over the process and 
disagreements over what the right answers are on the policy questions 
involved. I agree that the process can always be improved. But 
opposition should not be raised against this bill because of objections 
to the way the conference was conducted.
  This bill will serve as a roadmap for meeting America's national 
security needs in the future. This bill will guide the Department of 
Defense in its research and development, acquisition of weapons 
systems, personnel policy and force structure levels.
  Friday, some Members began listing items they regarded as 
unacceptable in this bill to the point of deciding to oppose the 
conference agreement. Items identified as being questionable or 
unacceptable include these among others: The missile defense language; 
removal of statutory requirements for Assistant Secretaries for Special 
Operations and the Director of the Office of Operational Test and 
Evaluation; reduction in the time required for sale of the naval 
petroleum reserve by 1 year. Now there is a reason to oppose this bill. 
Big deal. You are going to vote against the Defense authorization bill 
because of a 1-year difference in when we sell the naval petroleum 
reserve? I do not find that very defensible, frankly. We also had the 
directed procurement of some ships to specific shipyards. I did not 
particularly like the agreement reached in some of these areas, but it 
was a compromise. It was one where we had strong feelings on both sides 
of the aisle from the Senate that was different from what the House 
wanted. But we kept pushing and pushing, and we finally got agreement 
between Senators of both parties and House Members of both parties. I 
would prefer not to have gone with the agreement that came up on those 
ships. But that is the art of compromise. You give--sometimes a lot--
and you get a little and you come back another day and try again.
  There are those who say there are too many certifications and reports 
required by this bill. Should we not be getting certifications and 
reports from the Pentagon to the Congress? I thought the Congress in 
the past has felt very strongly that we need to be kept informed. I 
think we did not go too far there.
  There are some buy American requirements for certain components in 
this bill. We did not have it in the Senate bill. The House felt 
exceedingly strongly about it. We got them to make some changes, some 
modifications. I think that the requirements that are in here are 
livable. Would it be better if we did not have them? I guess, maybe so, 
although I think there are a lot of people in this country who wonder 
why we should not have some requirements that key components be bought 
in America. After all, these are U.S. tax dollars. Why should we not 
require some critical systems to be manufactured in America? I think it 
is dangerous to allow U.S. companies to go under--requiring us to buy 
critical components from sources outside this country. I also think it 
involves jobs in America. But, this is a very small requirement in this 
particular bill.
  Also, one objection I have heard is that they do not like the 
language on U.N. command and control. Now, I want the Senate to think 
about that. Are you really, really, comfortable with an arrangement 
that would put our troops under U.N. command and control? Would you not 
rather have some clear directions on how that would happen or if it 
would happen? If you want to vote down the defense authorization bill 
because of our command and control language with regard to the United 
Nations, have at it. I can tell you the American people will not be 
with you, and I do not think it is smart from a defense standpoint.
  Given so much is made of these various items, I want to review some 
of them so that the Members of the Senate will understand the substance 
of what is involved.
  With regard to the missile defense language, the conference report is 
balanced. It is moderate--arguably by some on this side of the aisle 
and in the House, too moderate. But that, again, is the nature of the 
conference. Nobody gets everything they want. The conferees made every 
effort to accommodate the legitimate concerns and objections made by 
the administration, and even some objections that I thought were not so 
legitimate. But we went the extra mile. The conference report resolves 
all concerns having to do with the ABM Treaty, the President's 
prerogatives in the area of arms control negotiations and Russian 
ratification of START II.
  Unfortunately, after all of this, the White House is still 
threatening a veto, and some of our colleagues are complaining as if we 
did not address the concerns. Let me mention a few of the more specific 
things that were, in fact, done to meet these objections that were 
raised.
  First and foremost, the conference report contains a provision that 
is virtually the same as the Senate-passed language on TMD demarcation, 
which was specifically identified by the administration as acceptable. 
Now, we had some problems in this area because I frankly had thought we 
could go ahead and go with the identical Senate-passed language on 
demarcation, and along the way it kept being changed to say, well, it 
is not identical but virtually the same and that the words mean the 
same. There was concern on the other side about that. The language we 
wound up with, the administration specifically identified it as 
acceptable and not a problem. So, I assume, then, there is no problem 
with the TMD demarcation. The House-passed demarcation language, on the 
other hand, has been singled out as veto bait. Thus, on the single most 
controversial BMD issue in conference, the administration got what it 
asked for.
  Equally important, the conference contains language on national 
missile defense that resolves concerns that we might have about setting 
up anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty by requiring deployment of a 
multiple-site NMD system by a date certain. The conference report does 
not contain the multiple-site requirement which was even in the Senate-
passed bill. After a lot of discussions with Senator Nunn and his 
communication with the administration, we did not want to leave any 
doubt. So a major concession was made there and, in fact, we have a 
couple of Senators on this side of the aisle who are seriously 
considering voting against the conference report because of that 
concession.
  There was a narrow little slither that we could get through. We tried 
to find that little, small, unmarked passage that we could pass 
through. I think we found it if, in fact, you want any missile defense 
at all. Frankly, I suspect there are some on the other side who do not 
want any missile defenses at all. That is why even though we keep 
making concessions and coming to agreements, it never seems to be 
enough.
  To ensure that there could be no misunderstanding regarding an 
anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty, we remove not only the specific 
requirement for a multiple-site system, but 

[[Page S18849]]
two other pieces of language; first, a congressional finding that the 
entire United States could not be defended from a single site; and, 
second, a requirement that the ground-based interceptor be deployed in 
significant numbers and at a significant number of sites to defend the 
entire United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. I still think it is 
indefensible that we say we might have one site, but you folks who live 
in certain areas along the gulf coast or in Hawaii or in Alaska, gee, 
we may not be able to cover you. Sorry about that. But, we will get the 
other 48 or so.
  In place of this language, we inserted the exact language from the 
Senate compromise that the ground-based interceptors would be capable 
of being deployed at multiple sites. These changes were made at the 
request of the senior Senator from Georgia to resolve his concerns 
regarding anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty.
  Let me also point out this conference report urges the President to 
undertake negotiations with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for 
a multiple-site NMD system. I think it is in our best interest to do 
that. It does not just involve our relationship with Russia, but what 
other countries may be doing in this area. This provision makes it 
clear that we have no intention--no intention--of unilaterally 
violating the ABM Treaty. The language does state, if negotiations 
fail, we should consider withdrawing from the treaty, but this right is 
already provided for in article 14 of the treaty.
  These provisions and others I have not mentioned make it clear that 
we intend a cooperative approach with Russia in dealing with the ABM 
Treaty. Nowhere in the conference report is it suggested or required 
that we violate or unilaterally walk away from the ABM Treaty. In 
exchange for resolving this ABM Treaty concern, the conferees agreed to 
retain a requirement to deploy an NMD system by the end of 2003--but 
without the multiple-site requirement.
  Any remaining arguments about this ``anticipatory breach'' of the ABM 
Treaty or assertions that Russia may not ratify START II due to our NMD 
program are not based on fact or logic. Russia may not approve START 
II, but I think it may be because of the Communists and the 
nationalists that were just elected to their parliamentary body, not 
because of this missile defense language. I remind the Senate that the 
only operational ABM system in the world is, in fact, deployed around 
Moscow. It would be foolish to allow the Russians to blackmail us 
without regard to actions permitted by the ABM Treaty, as they have 
attempted to do on a variety of issues, including expansion of NATO and 
United States policy in Bosnia.
  Let us be clear about the administration's real objections with the 
ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference report. The 
administration and some of our colleagues here in the Senate do not 
want the United States to be defended at all against ballistic 
missiles. That is my fear, at any rate. The administration's NMD 
program is designed to perpetuate research and development while 
indefinitely delaying deployment of the most limited NMD system. How 
long can you go on with research and development? It is like some of 
the Corps of Engineer projects that I am familiar with. They study 
them, study them; they do analysis and study. If they put that money 
into the construction of the projects that they waste on years of 
studies, we would get our projects a lot quicker, we would not waste 
nearly as much money. If we are not actually going to do this, how long 
are we going to go forward with R&D?
  My staff was told directly by a senior White House official that the 
administration would object to any requirement to deploy an NMD system 
by a date certain, even if that system fully complied with the ABM 
Treaty. There you have it. That is the crux of the matter.
  In essence, they oppose any commitment to deploy a national defense 
missile system. By way of comparison, by the way, interestingly, in 
1991, a Democratically controlled Congress dramatically restructured 
the Bush administration's SDI program with the Missile Defense Act of 
1991, which was a bipartisan initiative, sponsored by the then chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee. The 1991 act called for deployment of 
an NMD system in 5 years, whereas the conference report before the 
Senate today calls for a similar deployment in 8 years. What is the big 
concern here?
  This 1991 bipartisan agreement, that was led by Senator Nunn, Senator 
Warner, Senator Cohen, and others, said it would be done in 5 years, by 
1996. Now this one says we will not even get it done until the year 
2003. If we get to 2002 and we do not have the capability, if we do not 
want to do it, we do not have to go forward. We can change it. But 
should we not have some goal that someday we will quit doing R&D and we 
actually deploy a defensive system? Should we not have a date in mind 
so this just does not go on forever?
  The 1991 act also mirrored this conference report in urging the 
President to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty to allow for a 
multiple-site NMD system. Think about that again. The 1991 act--
bipartisan--led by Senator Nunn of Georgia, said essentially the same 
thing we are saying here, that there should be an effort to negotiate 
amendments to the ABM Treaty to allow for these multiple sites. Many of 
the same Members who stood on this floor in 1991 speaking in favor of 
national missile defense deployment are now telling the American people 
not to worry, that we do not need to defend the United States against 
ballistic missiles.
  This defies, not only logic, but our responsibility to provide for 
the defense of the American homeland. I cannot help but conclude that 
on the subject of ballistic missile defense, the administration did not 
negotiate with us in full faith.
  For weeks during the conference we heard nothing about objections 
concerning the ABM Treaty. But even after addressing each one of these 
concerns, in most cases accepting specific proposals made by the 
administration or minority conferees, we still hear the same old 
arguments and are faced with a veto threat. So I am disappointed, 
although I must confess I am not too surprised right now.
  The next question involves the restructured Assistant Secretaries of 
Defense. Some Members have objected, on both sides of the aisle, to 
changes in law which impact two civilian offices within the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and the Director of the Office 
of Operational Test and Evaluation. These Members allege that these 
positions are being eliminated by this conference report. Now this is 
not completely accurate.
  The conference report simply removes the statutory requirement which 
dictates that these positions must be maintained. Why did the 
conference committee makes these changes? Frankly, primarily because 
the House felt so strongly about it. But, since the late 1980's the 
militarily services have shrunk by almost 25 percent. The military 
services have gone down in size by 25 percent. But, during the same 
period, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has increased in size by 
over 20 percent. This is since the late 1980's, so there have been 
Democrat and Republican administrations. But, while the military 
numbers are going down, the number of civilians in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense have gone up 20 percent. How does this make sense? 
It does not. If you do not remove the statutory requirement that 
requires the continuation of this imbalance of personnel, the Secretary 
of Defense is restricted from realigning his office. This conference 
report empowers the Secretary of Defense. It does not restrict him in 
this regard.
  Does anyone believe the Members of the House and Senate defense 
committees would eliminate or want to eliminate operational test and 
evaluation? Absolutely not. It is very important that we continue to 
emphasize the importance of operational tests and evaluation of new 
weapon systems. But maintaining our commitment to this function should 
not preclude our ability to allow the Office of Secretary of Defense to 
be restructured in order to reduce overhead and save money. After all, 
in the final analysis, the Office of the Secretary of Defense cannot 
fight a single battle. Military personnel have to do that. So we are 
getting fatter on the civilian side at OSD, while we are 

[[Page S18850]]
slimming down in the actual fighting people.
  The same is true of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations. We are not in favor of removing civilian oversight of 
special operations, absolutely not. But the Secretary of Defense should 
be unburdened from the countless statutory requirements, one of which 
is this Assistant Secretary of Defense.
  A lot of criticism has been made that this conference report mandates 
the Navy buy numerous component items in the United States only. While 
it is true the bill contains the requirement for the Navy to purchase 
certain components with 51 percent U.S. domestic content, it does not 
contain an absolute buy-American provision.
  The United States is out of step with other countries which get 
involved in the awarding of defense contracts. If a defense contractor 
wants to bid on a Dutch weapon system, for instance, they require U.S. 
firms to meet two different tests. First is the an offset requirement--
that is you have to bring some amount of money into the Netherlands to 
offset the amount of money going to the United States defense 
contractor. Second, the Netherlands requires a certain percentage of 
the United States defense contractor's work or product to be done in 
the Netherlands.
  Now, we like to do business with the Dutch. But they have 
requirements on us that we do not have for ourselves. Are we going to 
get in the position where all of our--or many of our key defense 
components are built overseas? There is danger there. Surely we see 
that.
  But that is not all the Dutch require. The Netherlands also leverages 
foreign defense firms by granting larger offsetting credits to United 
States contractors who increase the Dutch content of the component 
supplied by the United States contractor. For example, the Netherlands 
requires a 100 percent offset on all awards to foreign defense 
contractors, but they have structured an offset credit valuation system 
which awards more offset credit to foreign contractors who meet 85 
percent domestic levels or higher in their country. So, if a United 
States contractor wants to win a defense contract with the Dutch 
Government they have two choices: Either they come up with a 100 
percent offset for the total value of the contract award, or they have 
to manufacture 85 percent of that component or system in the 
Netherlands.
  That is not exactly what you would call an open and fair competition 
for U.S. defense firms. The United States in almost every area of our 
defense procurement welcomes all bidders without domestic content 
requirements or offset requirements. How is this fair? It is the same 
old deal. America says we want free trade but we do not even require 
that it be equal or fair, not only in this area but a lot of other 
areas.
  This bill simply identifies a list of specific key components and 
requires that 51 percent of those components be manufactured in the 
United States. It does not even come close to leveling the playing 
field in terms of applying the same set of rules on foreign contractors 
supplying our Defense Department as foreign countries apply to U.S. 
firms competing for defense contracts in their countries.
  Good old Uncle Sam gets to be Uncle Sap once again. We always seem to 
bend over backward to deal with the problems of our allies but we do 
not look after ourselves. We are not talking about only one or two 
countries applying for these domestic content and offset requirements. 
There is a long list: Australia, Norway, Canada, South Korea. The 
domestic content provision in this bill is needed. It makes sense. And 
it is fully warranted, given the practice of other countries requiring 
offsets by U.S. contractors.
  We probably should have done more in this area, not less. But, again, 
this was a case where the Senate was willing to say no, we are not 
going to have anything on this. Our House conferees were just 
absolutely adamant. And we ground it down and we made them give 
tremendous concessions. We came up with what is really a very small, 
and I think a reasonable, proposal.
  COLA's for military retirees are in this bill. Members need to 
understand, without passage of this bill military retirees will, once 
again, fail to receive a fair and equitable cost-of-living adjustment, 
equal and timely with civilian retirees.
  The Armed Services Committee members feel very strongly about this. 
Again, it is a question of fundamental fairness. I know there is some 
thinking going on around here, do not worry, we will put it on some 
train going through here in the next few days and we will take care of 
it.
  There may not be any trains going through here in the next few days. 
We may be here Christmas day. But the idea we are going to hitch it on 
to a continuing resolution is very dubious. In the process, our 
military retirees could get trapped.
  We have it in this bill. That is where it belongs. We need to make 
sure we understand, if we do not pass this authorization bill our 
military retirees' COLA could be lost. How are you going to explain to 
the military retirees in your State that you opposed a bill that would 
bring their COLA back into parity and alignment with civilian retirees? 
This bill provides important parity there.
  Some say this bill is not perfect. I have never voted on a perfect 
bill, I do not think. I have never voted on a perfect defense bill. I 
do not agree with all of the bill's provisions, but overall I think 
this is a good bill. Concerted efforts were made to address numerous 
administration concerns. As a result, substantial modifications were 
made in conference to address these concerns.
  In the missile defense area, as I pointed out, the cooperative threat 
reduction program, the so-called Nunn-Lugar program, we had some 
reservations about it. We worked hard on that with Senator Nunn and 
Senator Lugar. We made agreements. I think all the money was restored, 
with a certain amount of it fenced, but even that money could be spent 
in other countries. I think that was the final result. We support this 
program and we got it worked out.
  We made changes but we retained the U.N. command and control 
restrictions. We had contingency operations funding. I personally do 
not like that at all. I do not like this contingency operations 
funding. I do not like giving the Pentagon money and saying, ``by the 
way, use it because of commitments that had already been made in Haiti 
or Somalia or wherever they may be''--but giving the money in advance. 
I think they need to justify all of these continuing operations' 
funding. We will live up to providing the funds. We always have and we 
will. But I do not like this funding in advance.
  We had acquisition reform provisions. We had improvements in military 
housing. There is a long list of really good things in this bill.
  While the administration may not like all of them, I say again, we 
made tremendous efforts to work with the administration. I know Senator 
Nunn helped with that. I know our leader, the chairman of the 
committee, wanted to work with the administration. In fact, he insisted 
that we meet with Dr. Perry at breakfast meetings to hear his concerns. 
I remember Dr. Perry came over and said, ``We do not like the House-
passed bill, but we are pretty comfortable with the Senate-passed 
bill.''

  So we worked to try to address his concerns. We met with the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, Deputy White. He came in and said--I cannot 
remember the number--``There are six or seven areas we are really 
concerned about.'' Look at the bill and you will find in almost every 
one of those areas we either met their specific requirements, or 
request, or made substantial movements in that direction. So they have 
been able to get a lot of modifications.
  I think we have a good bill. I urge Members of the Senate to support 
this conference report. It is good for the men and women in uniform. 
That should be our principal goal. It improves the readiness of our 
forces. It begins to correct the modernization problems our military 
services face and provides policy guidance necessary to operate our 
defense efforts in a challenging and difficult time.
  Did we leave some issues on the table? Yes. But we will be back at 
work on the next authorization bill in about 6 weeks.
  Did we have some areas that we may change our mind on later? Yes. But 
we have an authorization bill every year. If some language needs to be 
revisited, we can do that. Let us pass this bill. 

[[Page S18851]]
 Let us do the right thing for our country and for our military men and 
women.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from 
Mississippi for the excellent remarks he has made on this bill.
  He is the Republican whip in the Senate and does a great job there. 
He is also a valuable member of the Armed Services Committee and has 
made a great contribution to our country by sitting on that committee. 
Again, I want to thank him for all he has done to promote this bill.
  Mr. BRYAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise today to oppose the Department of Defense 
authorization conference report, and I do so with considerable regret. 
I, as a member of the committee, voted to support the original 
authorization bill because I think it did represent a very carefully 
balanced approach on some of the critical issues which I am going to 
comment on briefly.
  I acknowledge that there are parts of this bill that I think are 
quite good. The military pay provisions, the acquisition reforms are 
areas of particular interest to me. In my own State, money is provided 
for hydronuclear testing, some $30 million. Those and many other 
provisions I fully support.
  But the conference report now before us contains significant changes 
from the originally approved bill, particularly with respect to 
providing additional funding for the B-2 bomber, a position which the 
Senate opposed both in committee and on the floor.
  The report contains very dangerous language, in my opinion, with 
respect to the national missile defense provisions that, if enacted, 
would violate the U.S. agreement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 
The report contains a number of troubling ``special arrangements,'' 
such as a specific ship maintenance contract for a specific shipyard, 
which in my view would circumvent the competitive bidding process. The 
report also delineates line by line how the National Guard and Reserve 
may spend their allocated money for procurement, a position contrary to 
that taken by the National Guard and Reserve components. Moreover, Mr. 
President, I regret to say that the conference report does not have the 
full bipartisan support of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The 
minority members, the Democrats, were not even minimally notified or 
consulted with respect to major issues that were changed in the 
conference report.
  Last week, the Democratic conferees were asked to sign the conference 
report despite the fact that we had not been given the final language 
on a number of critical issues, most notably the language with respect 
to the B-2 bomber and the potentially explosive national missile 
defense language.
  I might note with specificity that when my office was notified that 
the final conference meeting would convene, we were provided about 30 
minutes advance notice. I was able to attend, but a good many of my 
colleagues, not having any prior notice of the conference meeting, were 
not able to attend. This meeting convened rather late in the afternoon 
at approximately 6 o'clock, with such late notice many of my colleagues 
were unable to rearrange their schedules to attend a very important 
meeting.
  So for those reasons, and others, I do not intend to support this 
conference report today and I would not agree to sign the conference 
report last week.
  It appears that this conference committee has never been terribly 
serious about conducting bipartisan negotiations. As a matter of fact, 
the conference committee was disbanded a few weeks after it was 
convened. Therefore, there could be no meaningful bipartisan discussion 
of the funding levels, or any of the other outstanding issues in the 
context of a conference discussion. In point of fact, Mr. President, 
the conference was disbanded before any real, substantive discussions 
even began among the conferees.
  Due to the early disbanding of the conference, negotiations have 
taken place primarily between House and Senate Republicans behind 
closed doors for the past 95 days. Because the conference was 
officially disbanded, negotiators were not bound to follow the open 
meeting rule, nor were they required to notify all conferees of 
negotiation sessions or conference meetings.
  I am a relatively new member to the committee, Mr. President. This 
will be my third authorization bill. But I must say, in my experience 
it is unprecedented that the committee has operated in this fashion. I 
am told by my colleagues who have considerably more tenure than I do on 
the committee that this is without precedent. I must say when I was 
appointed to this committee in 1993, I was enthusiastic about that 
appointment, and I continue to be. One aspect that I particularly 
enjoy--having had the opportunity to serve on, among other committees 
here in the Senate, the Senate Armed Services Committee--is that it has 
historically had the reputation, which I found to be the case, that it 
really was bipartisan. That is not to say that there were not 
legitimate differences that divided us. There were, and there continue 
to be. But there was a virtual absence of partisanship as we processed 
the various policy questions within the jurisdiction of that committee.
  I regret to say, and I hope that this is a temporary aberration, if 
you will, that this is not an auspicious beginning for us if this is 
the way the Defense authorization conference is going to be conducted 
in future years.
  There are Members on both sides of the political aisle who have 
served many, many years in the Senate. These individuals have gained 
considerable expertise in very discrete areas dealing with the funding 
of our national defense effort, and I think their expertise would have 
been extremely helpful in the negotiations with our colleagues in the 
other body.
  I note further, Mr. President, that there are major parts of the 
conference report that were discussed at this meeting which I have 
described--the one which provided our office with about 30 minutes 
notice--that were only verbally described to Senators literally minutes 
before the report was presented to us for signature. With respect to 
some of these provisions, they are extremely complicated. Language is 
very important.
  Specifically, I note the conference report language change with 
respect to the national missile defense provision. I must say that 
engaged colleagues on both sides of the aisle worked on the Senate-
passed compromise version of this language. In extraordinarily 
difficult and, I think, very instructive discussions, the Senate 
provisions were agreed to overwhelmingly when it was acted upon on the 
floor of the Senate. Unfortunately, this was not the experience with 
respect to the conference negotiation.
  The resulting conference language, in my view, is deeply flawed. It, 
indeed, may result in a violation of the ABM Treaty, and it seems to me 
that we send all the wrong signals to the Russians. In effect, by the 
deployment schedule specifically established in this bill at 2003, it 
seems to me, would make the Russians even more reluctant to negotiate 
any further nuclear arms reductions and give them considerable reason 
to believe that it is our intent to violate the ABM Treaty itself.
  Another of the issues that divided us is the additional funding of 
the B-2 bomber. It was defeated in the Senate Armed Services Committee 
this year, in a bipartisan vote, and not included in the Defense 
authorization bill which was passed in this Chamber. I find it 
particularly troubling that the provision itself that would increase 
funding to the B-2 bomber was not available at the time the conference 
report was presented to us and we were asked to approve. Again, this is 
one of the most difficult issues that the committee had to deal with, 
and I would submit that this is not the way in which we ought to be 
conducting conference negotiations.
  Moreover, this conference report imposes new restrictions on the 
President's ability to obtain contingency funding for military 
operations. This is in direct contravention of the President's 
constitutional role as our Commander in Chief. The report contains 
directed procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards without a 
clear 

[[Page S18852]]
requirement, undermining, in my opinion, the efficiency and cost-saving 
objectives which are of critical importance as we face very, very 
difficult budgets in the outyears.
  The conference report contains spending floors with respect to 
shipbuilding provisions. These are requirements to spend specified 
amounts on specified projects. Again, in the real world in which we 
live, where the budgets are going to be tighter next year and each of 
the outyears thereafter, I find this provision unfathomable.
  The conference report will create a special congressional panel on 
submarines. I must say that my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle have made a number of very constructive comments over the years 
when they talk about streamlining Government and reducing the number of 
committees. Adding another committee, it seems to me, is duplicative 
and creates unnecessary additional staff involvement and the 
possibility of additional funding that is just not warranted. The 
existing panel, in which submarines are included in the jurisdictional 
portfolio, does a proper job in my judgment and a new panel just for 
submarines is redundant, unnecessary and unwise.
  The conference report designates every single line of the National 
Guard and Reserve procurement funds, rather than providing generic 
categories of funds. This, Mr. President, is contrary to requests made 
by the National Guard and Reserve.
  The conference report dictates to the Department of Defense what 
their procurement priorities ought to be. It allows them to spend the 
money on nothing but those items deemed appropriate by the House and 
Senate. I recall in a different context a lot of criticism about 
Congress micromanaging the Pentagon. Let me suggest that I believe this 
is a case in which micromanagement has become the operative order of 
the day.
  I mentioned previously Pacer Coin, a program of particular interest 
in my State. The Nevada Air National Guard would receive two of those 
planes. The conference report contains language on the Air National 
Guard's Pacer Coin mission that is patently false. The report reads, 
and I quote, ``The conferees understand that the National Guard Bureau 
has requested that the Air Force terminate the Pacer Coin program.''
  This statement is not true. As a matter of fact, I have a letter 
dated December 8, 1995, from Maj. Gen. Donald Shepperd, Director of the 
Air National Guard. His letter states in part, ``The Air National Guard 
always has supported Pacer Coin and will continue to support the 
mission.'' General Shepperd's letter then goes on to say, ``It is our 
understanding that the Pacer Coin mission is a priority of the 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command.''
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of General 
Shepperd's letter of December 8, 1995, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         Departments of the Army and the Air Force; National Guard 
           Bureau,
                                 Washington, DC, December 8, 1995.
     Senator Richard Bryan,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Bryan: Thank you for your December 6, 1995 
     letter concerning the continuation of the Pacer Coin mission. 
     I assure you that the Air National Guard always has supported 
     Pacer Coin and will continue to support the mission as long 
     as there is a military requirement and the necessary 
     resources.
       Regarding the military requirement, it is our understanding 
     that the Pacer Coin mission is a priority of the Commander-
     in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command. In terms of necessary 
     resources, the program transferred to the Air National Guard 
     underfunded in fiscal years 96, 97, and 98. This shortfall 
     spurred budgetary exercises that may have been misconstrued 
     as a lack of support for the Pacer Coin program. My staff is 
     searching for alternatives to fund the shortfall for FY 96.
       Again, let me reiterate my support of the Pacer Coin 
     mission and assure you that the Air National Guard will 
     support this mission as long as there is a military 
     requirement and proper funding.
       Please don't hesitate to call if I can be of further 
     assistance.

                                           Donald W. Shepperd,

                                              Major General, USAF,
                                     Director, Air National Guard.

  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair. I also have a letter from Gen. Barry 
McCaffrey, commander in chief of U.S. Southern Command dated June 2, 
1995. His letter states, ``U.S. Southern Command supports retention of 
the Pacer Coin reconnaissance program in the Air National Guard and 
periodic deployments of the system in this theater.''
  And again, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text 
of General McCaffrey's letter dated June 26, 1995, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, Office of 
           the Commander in Chief,
                                    Washington, DC, June 26, 1995.
     Hon. Richard H. Bryan,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Bryan: Appreciate your concern over the 
     potential termination of the U.S. Air Force Pacer Coin 
     reconnaissance program and welcome the opportunity to share 
     the U.S. Southern Command's views on the value of this 
     important asset.
       The U.S. Southern Command and its ground, air, and naval 
     component forces rely heavily upon releasable, high quality 
     imagery. This requirement for extensive imagery is to support 
     operational planning, exercise deployments, humanitarian 
     assistance and disaster relief operations. We also provide 
     comprehensive imagery support to U.S. Country Teams and host 
     nations throughout the region that are involved in 
     counterdrug operations.
       As you know, however, fiscal constraints and force 
     structure reductions drove the transition of the Pacer Coin 
     program from the active force structure to the Air National 
     Guard. As a consequence, we have asked for periodic Air 
     National Guard deployments of Pacer Coin to satisfy the 
     continuing requirement for timely, high quality, broad area 
     imagery that we can release to our host nation allies in the 
     region. The U.S. Southern Command supports retention of the 
     Pacer Coin reconnaissance program in the Air National Guard 
     and periodic deployments of the system to this theater.
           Best wishes,

                                           Barry R. McCaffrey,

                                               General, U.S. Army,
                                               Commander in Chief.

  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair.
  I must say it has been difficult for me to understand, with two 
commanding generals who have in one instance a National Guard command 
authority and in the other instance an operational command of the 
Southern Command both expressing support for the program, how the 
conference report could question the viability of this program and 
conclude that this is a program that is not supported.
  I guess by way of general conclusion, Mr. President, I regret to say 
that this conference has not been conducted in its historical 
bipartisan manner. Democrats were cut out from any meaningful 
participation in the conference itself. And I must say the Secretary of 
Defense has indicated that he will recommend a veto of this conference 
report to the President. The National Security Council and the Pentagon 
find the national defense missile language in this report to be wholly 
unacceptable and quite dangerous.
  Finally, the President himself has sent a message to Congress saying 
that he will veto this bill in its present form. For these and the 
other reasons that I have referenced in my comments, I urge my 
colleagues to vote against the report.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and in the absence of any other 
colleague in the Chamber I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. COATS. May I inquire how much time is remaining on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 28 minutes 30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, first, I want to begin by commending the 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, for 
the work that he has done this year in leading the effort in putting 
this defense authorization conference report together.
  It has been a tough year, as we all know. It has been a long and 
difficult 

[[Page S18853]]
year with many, many complex and difficult questions. Senator Thurmond 
has provided extraordinary leadership in bringing us to this point. I 
want to commend him for his efforts in that regard.
  At the same time, I want to express my disappointment that, 
apparently, this conference report is going to be virtually unanimously 
opposed by our colleagues from across the aisle. I regret that, because 
we have always, at least in my tenure, moved forward on defense bills 
in a bipartisan fashion. It appears now that we will not be doing that 
this year. I think that is disappointing.
  Nevertheless, I hope that our colleagues will see fit to support this 
legislation in such a manner that it can pass the Senate, be sent to 
the President and then he will, obviously, have to make a choice as to 
whether or not he wants to accept the bill or veto the bill.
  We heard a lot of Members state reasons why they will not vote for 
the bill on the basis of what is included in the bill. What we have not 
heard is information relative to what is now in the bill that will be 
lost if it is not passed.
  Anybody can look at a bill this massive, covering this amount of 
spending, and find reasons why they do not like a particular part of 
the bill. I have never voted for a bill where I have agreed 100 percent 
from beginning to end with every provision in that bill. This is the 
art of political compromise that tries to balance the opinions of one 
House versus the other, the opinions of one party versus the other, the 
interests of particular Senators in putting more emphasis on one 
portion of the bill than the other. In the end, you put a package 
together. You trust the major thrust of that package is in the 
direction that you want to go.
  So to raise specific concerns about specific items in this bill as a 
basis for rejecting the whole bill, I think, is something that if we 
practice it on every bill that came forward, nothing would pass in this 
body.
  But as I said, Members have stated that there are items in the bill 
that they do not like and, therefore, they will not vote for the bill. 
I would like to list, as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, what 
will be lost if this bill is not passed. I think Members ought to 
consider some of this before they make a final determination on how 
they will vote.
  Do Senators understand that the full pay raise, which is only 2.4 
percent, but the full pay raise to our troops in uniform, including 
those on the way to Bosnia and those deployed in areas around the 
world, will not be granted if this bill is not passed? The 
authorization for the full pay raise is included in this legislation 
and that will not go forward unless this bill is passed.
  Reserve mobilization insurance will not be established. Several bonus 
authorities for enlistment and reenlistment will not be authorized. At 
a time when we have a shrinking defense force and we are trying to find 
the top quality people, the bonuses for enlistment and reenlistment 
that are incentives to attract the kind of people we need will not be 
available.
  A whole series of quality of life initiatives will be lost. We keep 
talking about our No. 1 priority for our troops is quality of life. We 
need to provide them with the best training and the best equipment and 
the best leadership, but we also need to provide them with a quality of 
life that will allow they and their families to make a career 
commitment to service in our military. A whole series of initiatives on 
quality of life will be lost.
  Let me just mention some of them. There will be no increased quarters 
allowance to close the gap of housing cost increases. This quarters 
allowance equals 5.2 percent in the bill. Without it, it will be 2 
percent. That means when a soldier and his or her family are stationed 
in particular areas of the country and sufficient base housing is not 
available for them, as is the case in most instances, they have to go 
out into the local market. When they go out into the local market, the 
allowance that they are given for their quarters does not begin to 
cover the cost of housing in that particular area. We give quarters 
allowance to cover that, but it has not kept pace with the increase in 
housing costs, and so soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines and 
their families will be put at a continued even greater disadvantage 
than they have been in the past.
  There will be no authority to pay quarters allowance for NCO's on 
ships or NCO's who currently live in inadequate quarters. These are 
people who are key to the successful functioning of our military, and 
they will not receive quarters allowance unless this bill is passed.
  There will be no authority to pay family separation allowances to 
certain single soldiers.
  There will be no authority to pay enlisted airmen hazardous duty 
incentive.
  There will be no authority to pay special duty pay to personnel 
assigned to tenders.
  There will be no authority to pay increased special duty pay to 
recruiters.
  There will be no authority to pay dislocation allowances to those 
forced to move as a result of the BRAC process.
  There will be no more automatic increase of servicemen's life 
insurance. At a time when we are deploying troops to Bosnia to 
undertake the risks that will be involved in this, there will be no 
automatic life insurance increase. That was included in our bill.
  There will be no COLA equity for military retirees, and I will 
discuss that in a moment.
  There are a number of service academy issues that will not be 
addressed.
  Two Navy P-3 squadrons will not be authorized.
  There will be no floor on military technicians, a critical request 
made by the service chiefs and others as they came before our 
committee. As the equipment becomes more sophisticated, we need people 
who have more technological capability to repair and deal with this 
equipment, and this is a very important part of the authorization bill 
authority, and that will not be provided.
  Dental/medical benefits, CHAMPUS benefits for certain members of the 
total force will not be included. These, just from the Personnel 
Subcommittee, are items that we will not have if this bill is defeated 
or if the President vetoes it.
  Let me discuss one other. There is a whole series of initiatives to 
provide new authorities for the provision of new housing, repaired 
housing, restored housing for our military personnel.
  Why is this important? Because over the last 30 years, while we have 
made some remarkable strides in providing our troops with training and 
equipment, we have ignored their living quarters, the repair, 
maintenance, and the construction of new quarters. Currently, on the 
military's own estimate on the basis of their own standards--and I 
suggest their standards are not the standards that are found generally 
in housing construction throughout this country; they are lower 
standards. Even by their standards, many of the housing units, most of 
which are over 30 years old, are in a state of disrepair. In fact, by 
Department of Defense standards, over 80 percent of the existing 
military housing is inadequate. Let me repeat that. Over 80 percent of 
the housing that we ask our military families and ask our single 
military personnel to live in is inadequate. It is substandard and it 
needs repair, maintenance, and some of it needs to be torn down. A lot 
of new units need to be built.
  Under the current rate of funding for this repair, maintenance, and 
construction, it will take 30 years to remedy the problem. Of course, 
in 30 years, the problem that is remedied this year and in succeeding 
years will then be inadequate. So we are getting nowhere. Under the 
direction of the Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, under the very able 
leadership of former Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, and an internal 
as well as external task force, a year's worth of effort has culminated 
in a plan to very substantially upgrade military housing on an 
accelerated basis. Because we are faced with a budget crunch that does 
not provide the immediate funds, new housing authorities are requested 
by the department, so that we can use methods that are used by the 
civilian housing authorities, which exist in virtually every one of our 
States, to leverage funds to begin to dramatically accelerate the 
rehabilitation and construction of new quarters for our personnel.
  We are asking individuals to commit a career, a lifetime, to the 
service, and that means that we are moving from 

[[Page S18854]]
single enlisted people that formerly were brought into the service by 
the draft, as I entered, and now, instead of a 2, 3, or 4-year 
commitment, people are making a lifetime commitment. Most of those 
people are bringing their families with them--their spouses and 
children. For this country to ask individuals to put on the uniform and 
provide for our defense and not provide for adequate housing, I 
believe, is a disgrace. It is a disgrace to ask these people to live in 
the housing and the quarters that they currently live in.
  I have personally visited the family quarters and the bachelor 
quarters on a number of bases throughout this country and some 
overseas. I would not put my family in some of these living situations, 
and either would anybody else in this Senate. I would not begin to ask 
my family to live under some of the conditions that our service 
personnel live in, without complaint. The least we can do for these 
people who make this commitment to provide for our security and our 
freedom is give them adequate living quarters. Roofs are caving in, 
ceilings are caving in, water is running down the walls, broken 
plumbing, exterior windows cracked, cold air rushing through. You do 
not need air conditioning if you live in a cold climate because it 
comes right through the windows and the walls.
  I think one of the things that I will regret the most if this bill 
fails, either in the Senate vote or if it is vetoed by the President, 
is the loss of authority to do what Secretary Perry has asked us to 
provide--to accelerate the reconstruction and the maintenance and 
repairs of some of our housing that we provide for our military 
personnel. That is what we lose just from the personnel section of this 
bill. I do not have the time to go into other sections.
  There have been a number of allegations made here about some of the 
additional problems that exist. I would like to address one of those 
points, because it seems to be a major sticking point for several 
Members--that is, the statutory authority that exists providing for the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. What Members need to 
understand is that the conference report does not abolish this office. 
This is an important office, as is the Office for Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict. But what the committee is attempting to 
address is a situation where the Department wants the flexibility to 
review the way it is organized, to make determinations as to how it 
wants to be structured and then report to us as a committee by March 1 
of 1996. The repeal of the statutory authority, first of all, does not 
even take place until January 1, 1997. It is not prejudicial because we 
are asking the Secretary of Defense to report to us by March 1 of next 
year his recommendations as to how the Department can be reorganized so 
it can operate in the most efficient manner. They are feeling the 
budget squeeze. They know they need to make decisions relative to how 
they can better organize to achieve savings.
  All we are doing is repealing the requirement for specific positions 
on a statutory basis. It does not mean the position will be eliminated. 
We then, as a committee, will have the opportunity to review the 
report, question the Secretary, and look at and evaluate their 
reorganization plan, and we can decide that we want to retain these 
statutory provisions.
  There is no doubt that the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation is an important position. Senator Nunn, on this floor, very 
accurately described the nature of the position and the independence of 
the incumbent director. I fully expect that Secretary Perry will ask 
that this position be retained. The key factor is that he will make 
that recommendation on the merits, not because he was encumbered by a 
statutory protection. That is the goal of this legislation. Meritorious 
recommendations by the Secretary of Defense, not abolition of one 
position or another.
  The legislation is intentionally crafted to permit any repeal to be 
vitiated before it is implemented, if that is the appropriate outcome. 
There has been a lot of misinformation about this part of the bill, and 
if Senators will take the time to review the actual language and 
understand the intent, I am confident that they will see this as a 
workable solution. So I urge my colleagues who may be thinking of 
voting against the bill, on this provision alone, to look at the 
conference report and understand what it is we are attempting to do.
  Now, Mr. President, second, I want to take some remaining time here 
and just put this Defense authorization debate in the broader context 
of the budget debate, because it has been said on this floor on 
numerous occasions by numerous Members that if we were really serious 
about reducing the deficit, we would reduce defense spending. We would 
take this defense bill, which they say is sacrosanct from spending, and 
we would begin to take savings out of Defense. I do not know where 
those Members have been for the last 10 years. But as Senator Nunn said 
on this floor just about a year ago, ``Those who claim that Defense has 
not been substantially reduced since the end of the cold war are flat 
out wrong. The Defense Department, in the past few years, has carried 
more than its fair share of sacrifice for lowering the deficit. Indeed, 
the Defense Department seems to be the only part of the Federal 
Government that has carried its fair share.'' Let me repeat that one 
statement again. ``Those who claim that Defense has not been 
substantially reduced since the end of the cold war are flat out 
wrong.'' They ignore the facts.

  To say defense is the area that needs to be reduced so that we could 
prove our commitment to deficit reduction ignores reality. The fiscal 
year 1996 budget request for defense is at the 1975 spending level in 
constant dollars. The 1997 level is at the 1955 level. Since 1985, we 
have reduced defense procurement 71 percent. Research, development, 
testing, and evaluation funds have been reduced 57 percent. By 1999, 
defense spending as a share of the gross national product will have 
declined to 2.8 percent, the lowest since before World War II.
  We are now entering the 11th straight year of declining defense 
budgets. We have cut active duty personnel by 32 percent. That is the 
lowest level in 60 years. The Army will have 45 percent fewer 
divisions, the Navy 37 percent fewer battle force ships, and the Air 
Force 40 percent fewer attack and fighter aircraft.
  Now, defense spending, which has decreased--just in the 10-year 
decade, the decade of the 1990's, defense spending will decrease 35 
percent. What are we doing with the rest of the budget? Domestic 
discretionary spending, during that same time period, increases 12 
percent; welfare and mandatory spending will increase by 38 percent. 
Those that say defense has not done its share are ignoring the facts.
  If some of these other nondefense areas of the budget had done one-
tenth of what defense has done, we would not be debating the need for a 
balanced budget. We would have achieved a balanced budget. Name me one 
program in the Federal Government, outside of defense, that has even 
begun to reach the decrease in spending that defense has. Name me one 
program that has been reduced at all.
  The challenge is not to further reduce defense. The challenge is to 
look at the other programs that are driving our costs out of sight, 
that are squeezing our ability to provide for an adequate defense.
  At the same time that defense spending is reducing dramatically and 
the number of personnel are reducing dramatically, the requirements for 
deployments are increasing. We have shrunk our forces in Europe from 
314,000 prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. That number is now 
rapidly approaching 100,000. Yet those remaining forces have been 
deployed in more missions in the last 5 years than in the previous 45 
years combined. The average soldier now spends approximately 138 days 
each year away from home on extended short-notice deployments. This is 
combined with extensive training, away from home, in order to maintain 
the critical skills necessary. That is a tremendous strain on those 
personnel and particularly on their families.
  Our Navy surface ships are away from home at tempos in excess of 130 
days per year--that is away from home. That does not count the short-
term deployments to prepare them for the longer term deployment.
  The Marines currently have 24,000 people--pre-Bosnia--24,000 people 
deployed overseas carrying out a whole 

[[Page S18855]]
number of 911 fast-reaction assignments. The Air Force has had a 
fourfold increase in the deployment obligations over the last 7 years, 
while drawing down its overall end strength by a third.
  So we have troops deployed all over the world on all kinds of 
missions and yet we have fewer number of personnel to allocate to these 
deployments. What does that mean? Longer deployments, longer time away 
from home, more strain and stress on the force.
  We have a serious gap that is opening between our military mission 
and the level of funding we provide. The Armed Services Committee this 
year, under the very able leadership of our chairman, has done the very 
best that we can to take this limited budget and stretch it in a way 
that begins to meet the needs of our Armed Forces.
  To those who say, ``We have added $6.7 billion and the Pentagon 
didn't request it.'' If the Pentagon were calling the shots their 
budget requests would have been a lot higher than they were. They are 
not. They get a number from the President. The President's Office of 
Management and Budget says, ``Here is your number, now make it work.'' 
These people are trained to salute and say, ``Yes, sir.'' Ask any one 
of them, as we have in our hearings, do you need more, could you use 
more, would you like to have more? Their answers were ``Yes, we 
would.''
  There are a number of things we would like to deal with but we 
recognize we are constrained by this budget and therefore we have done 
the best we could. We are on the razor's edge of readiness. We are 
worried about procurement in the future. We are not updating our 
equipment. We are sacrificing quality of life, but we have to live 
within this budget number. We will do the best that we can. They do a 
terrific job. To say they do not want the additional resources, that 
this extra money that Republicans have provided, $6.7 billion, is 
wasted money is simply not the case.
  You can argue over how that ought to be allocated. It is not 
allocated 100 percent the way I would like to allocate. The defense 
budget has been declining now for 11 straight years. It is certainly 
not some Government program run amok without control, as so many others 
have.
  Mr. President, balancing our books is one of the most important 
duties of Government, but it is not the first duty of Government. The 
first duty of Government is the defense of this country, without 
needless risk to the men and women who serve. That means more than 
defending our borders. It means shaping a security environment that 
will be favorable to America in the future. It means providing our 
troops with the training they need, the equipment they require, the 
kind of leadership that provides for success, and the quality of life 
that gives them a stake in the future of this country, that provides 
for their families while they are away on deployment.
  We are asking fewer people to do more with less. As I speak, we are 
deploying 20,000 troops, and many more thousands of support troops, in 
this effort to Bosnia. They are fighting terrible weather, as we can 
see every day on CNN. They are fighting some of the world's worst 
terrain. They are engaging in a mission that many of us still are 
trying to figure out what the mission is. It is a mission that is 
fraught with risk.
  We are asking and have asked and will continue to ask a great deal of 
the men and women who wear the uniform of this country. The very least 
we can do with this type of budget constraint is to provide them with 
the best that we can. To reject this bill now, I believe, sends an 
absolutely wrong signal.
  We talked about sending signals on the floor last week. What kind of 
signal do we send, with all the authorities, the quality of life 
initiatives, and other items in this bill. What kind of signal do we 
send to the troops right now trying to fight fog, the weather, the 
snow, and the landings on a runway they cannot see, in a mountainous 
area of Bosnia? Deploying into terrible weather and terrible terrain on 
a mission they are not sure exactly what it is. What kind of signal do 
we send, that the Senate rejects the bill that takes care of their 
families while they are gone? The Senate rejects the bill that provides 
the authorities we need to have a successful military effort? That is a 
terrible signal to send.
  If Members want to talk about sending a signal; walk down here now 
and vote. Just because there is a piece of the bill that you do not 
like or because this is now partisan politics and we did not get in 
enough of the discussions about what the final bill should look like. 
Therefor in a fit of pique you register your displeasure with it, I 
think that is a terrible mistake. It is a terrible time for our troops, 
as we approach Christmas, as our troops are leaving their families and 
going into a very uncertain, risky situation in the world's worst 
terrain and climate--to now reject this bill would be a huge mistake.
  I urge my colleagues who may be having reservations, ask us what the 
facts are, look at what is in the bill, let us work with you to resolve 
differences next year, but do not tell our troops that we are not going 
to give them these authorities and we will not provide for their future 
as included in this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I want to commend the able Senator from 
Indiana for the excellent remarks he has made on this bill. He is a 
valuable member of our Armed Services Committee and made a fine 
contribution throughout this year to the work of that committee. We 
appreciate it very much, Senator, all that you do for your country.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Am I not correct 
that the Senate is due to stand in recess now until the hour of 2:15?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might 
proceed for 7 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to join the distinguished chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee in recognizing the valuable 
contributions consistently made by the Senator from Indiana and his 
very stirring and moving remarks of a few minutes ago. He is recognized 
on our committee as an expert in the area of personnel, and I am 
pleased to hear that, as he addressed our colleagues this morning, he 
made specific reference to the families of the men and women of the 
Armed Forces and of course his reference to those now being deployed to 
Bosnia.
  As the Senator well knows, there are some 100 ships on the high seas, 
all over the world today, and men and women of the Armed Forces 
stationed in many other countries. So this message not only relates to 
those that, perhaps, are foremost in our minds on the Bosnia 
deployment, but, indeed, to men and women on the high seas and in 
various posts in farflung parts of the world. I compliment my good 
friend for his remarks.
  Mr. President, it has been my great privilege to serve these 17 years 
on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I share the concerns of so 
many that, as we approach the vote on this bill, there remains in the 
minds of some, doubts about whether or not this bill meets their 
individual expectations.
  I have had those same doubts through these 16 previous years about 
other defense conference reports and, indeed, the bill itself, as it 
has left the Armed Services Committee. But each time, I have found a 
means by which to reconcile my differences and to join the other side 
of the aisle in support of the bill. This year, under the very able 
leadership of the distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina, a 
man who has a career associated with the armed services unparalleled in 
length to any Member of this Chamber, having joined the Armed Forces in 
the early stages of World War II, at the time when he was not even 
subject to the draft--he went out and volunteered. He resigned as a 
judge, and was proud to wear the uniform of his country, and he did so 
with great distinction, being the only Member of the U.S. Senate to 
have participated in the historic Normandy invasion in June 1944.
  So, I pay great respect to my chairman. Beginning in the early stages 
of World War II, he started his preparations to serve in this Chamber 
and serve as a true representative for the men and women of the Armed 
Forces. Shortly we will be voting on this conference report, which will 
be the first 

[[Page S18856]]
bill of the Senate Armed Services Committee which proudly bears his 
name as chairman.
  Let me address two specifics. I was concerned about references to the 
submarine panel. This was not an idea that originated in the Senate. 
Together with Senator Lieberman, Senator Robb, and Senator Cohen, I 
worked on the provisions relating to submarines in this bill and we 
recognize there was no need for this panel. But the House did. The 
House even wanted stronger measures.
  Negotiations related to submarines were perhaps one of the most 
difficult part of the negotiations with the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. Out of it came the concept to have a panel to consist 
of three members from each committee, appointed by their respective 
chairmen on a bipartisan basis and reporting back to their respective 
committees. I, therefore, do not believe there is any invasion of the 
authority of the two committees on the armed services in the two 
bodies. In fact, I view some positive aspects in this concept. Because, 
as one looks at the former Soviet Union today, and most particularly 
Russia, that is where a disproportionate amount of their annual 
investment in national security goes--right into research and 
development and production of first-line submarines, submarines that 
challenge our finest submarines in the seven seas of the world today.
  So I think every bit of intellect, every bit of wisdom that we can 
incorporate on behalf of our Nation into future submarine production is 
time and effort well spent. That, I think, will be a positive 
contribution. I hope I will be considered to be a part of this special 
panel on submarines, since in my State we are proud to have a shipyard 
which for many years has built some of the finest submarines, not only 
for our Navy, but anywhere in the world.
  Then, Mr. President, turning to a second item, the Guard and Reserve, 
this has been a debate through the years. The Senator from Michigan 
tried, I think, to convince our committee--subsequently tried to 
convince the floor--of his desire to have a different approach to the 
Guard and Reserve. He is a very valued member of our committee. He 
understands the subject of the Guard and Reserve. And, like so many of 
us, we express our best judgment and seek to try to be convincing among 
our colleagues. He did that on two occasions and the majority of the 
Senate in the committee and on the floor decided on a different means 
to address the Guard and Reserve. So the battle was fought. The battle 
was decided. We go on with our business.
  Of course, he has a perfect right to come and express such 
disappointment as may remain on this subject. But nevertheless, we have 
a solid provision in this bill for the Guard and Reserve and it 
reflects the majority views of the Armed Services Committee as well as 
the Senate as a whole.
  These are just two examples of where there are differences between 
Members on the other side of the aisle and Members on this side, but I 
plead with my colleagues to think, in the spirit of reconciliation, as 
we do so frequently in this Chamber, and particularly as it relates to 
the men and women of the Armed Forces and sending that message. When, 
from the Chair, that vote is announced, we want to send a positive 
message all across the world and on the high seas. I urge my colleagues 
to support this conference report.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I commend the able Senator from Virginia 
for the excellent remarks he has made on this bill. The Senator from 
Virginia was once Secretary of the Navy. He served in the Marines. He 
is a valuable member of the Armed Services Committee. He has rendered 
long service here and with great distinction to country and I want to 
commend him.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished senior colleague. 
My career both in the Senate and, indeed, in the uniform of the United 
States, falls far short of that of the senior Senator from South 
Carolina.

                          ____________________