[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 204 (Tuesday, December 19, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2404-E2406]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    TIMELY INTELLIGENCE: IMPORTANT AS EVER IN THE POST-COLD-WAR ERA

                                 ______


                           HON. HENRY J. HYDE

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, December 19, 1995

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, as we continue to reduce the size of our 
military forces and their 

[[Page E2405]]
presence overseas, it is imperative that intelligence--this Nation's 
early warning system--is better than ever in this post-cold-war era. As 
a combat veteran of World War II, I vividly remember how an 
intelligence failure contributed to the tragedy at Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941. Within the Roosevelt administration there were scattered 
bits of information as to what the Japanese might be contemplating. 
But, there was no one pulling together and analyzing them as part of a 
coordinated effort to furnish the President with an intelligence 
estimate of Japan's intentions.
  Indeed, it was the painful lesson of Pearl Harbor that prompted then 
President Truman to establish after World War II a centralized 
intelligence organization. We must, therefore, resist efforts to 
dismantle or cripple U.S. intelligence. U.S. intelligence capabilities 
are critical instruments of our national power and an integral part of 
our national security. With that historical background, I would like to 
offer some observations and recommendations.


                       the downside of downsizing

  I have been told that the downsizing of the intelligence community's 
work force has been especially injurious in key areas. In some 
agencies, these reductions have allegedly exceeded 80 percent. For 
example, most of the seasoned Russian military analysts, including 
those performing highly complex analyses on strategic missile systems, 
are reportedly moving on or taking early retirement while the remaining 
talented young analysts are looking for other job opportunities that 
promise more advancement. Meanwhile, the intelligence community is 
being tasked to address a wider range of threats and policy needs, 
especially in the areas of proliferation, economic competitiveness, 
environment, drugs, terrorism, and humanitarian relief. Currently, 
warning of potential regional crises and providing support to NATO and 
U.N. forces in the Balkans are absorbing major resources. These rapidly 
increasing demands do not include the day-to-day crises that consume 
additional collection and research resources.
  The upshot is a growing concern that intelligence is being stretched 
to the breaking point. This could have serious implications downstream. 
For example, if another Russian crisis were to occur--such as Yeltsin's 
attack on Parliament in 1993--the intelligence community today would be 
less able to warn of military mobilization. Informed sources claim, 
until recently, analysis and collection on the deception and denial 
activities of potential adversaries had dropped to dangerously low 
levels. Purportedly, remedial action is underway. This should be a high 
priority, as interpreting warnings of attack will become more difficult 
as adversaries improve their denial and deception techniques. We must 
remember that U.S. intelligence's highest mission is to support U.S. 
policymakers in identifying and forestalling threats to U.S. interests 
worldwide. How to do this in an era of shrinking resources poses real 
risks and challenges.

  The idea that intelligence can stay abreast of new technology, add 
new missions and still downsize its personnel at a rate of 3 to 5 
percent per year is fantasy. Experienced intelligence hands say 
downsizing must be slowed overall and halted for high priority needs. 
At a minimum intelligence programs should be reinvigorated in three 
broad areas to minimize risks to U.S. forces and insure our ability to 
maintain the capability to act effectively in a major crisis. First, 
new investment should be dedicated to increasing access to high 
priority targets including Russia, China, North Korea and the rogue 
states of the Middle East. We must not forget that Russia and China 
possess strategic nuclear forces and that their long-term political 
orientation could turn against the United States if hostile leaders 
were to gain power again in these megastates. Second, a robust 
investment program to counter denial and deception should be built to 
embrace satellite, air, and ground base collection. Such a program must 
include dedicated analysis of, and attention to denial and deception, 
especially in areas of highest concern. Third, programmatic and 
personnel policies must be formed to ensure the brightest talent, with 
linguistic and cultural expertise, is devoted to the most vital issues 
that affect U.S. security in the long run, not just to issues of the 
moment.


   competitive analysis--a cardinal principle that must be preserved

  In this era of restructuring, the temptation may be irresistible to 
eliminate perceived redundancies within the intelligence community. 
That may be necessary in the hardware and collection areas. But, some 
competitive analysis must be preserved in the analytical realm, 
especially in areas like strategic nuclear force analysis where threats 
to the United States are potentially the gravest. I know I always want 
a second, and in some instances even a third opinion, when it comes to 
questions of my health. The Nation's well being often pivots around 
national security issues. Thus, the President and his key advisors must 
have a variety of assessments presented to them before they make 
critical, life and death decisions. Moreover, there should be an 
established procedure and available resources for pursuing 
comprehensive challenges to mainstream opinion in any analytical area 
significant to national security.


                       communications technology

  The explosive pace of communication technology is posing new 
challenges for the intelligence community. Data is moving around the 
world in greater volumes and at faster speeds than ever before. 
Maintaining our advantage in understanding secret foreign 
communications will hinge upon preserving a strong and robust 
cryptological capability in the face of rapid technological advances. I 
am concerned, however, about assertions from reliable sources that 
adequate resources are not being committed to sustaining this 
capability.


          directorate of operations (DO)/Counter-Intelligence

  The incessant battering the CIA, and the DO in particular, is 
receiving in the wake of the Ames case has caused morale in the DO to 
plummet to an all-time low. Much of the criticism is deserved. 
Nevertheless, there is a real need to be sensitive to this debilitating 
morale problem as Congress helps the DO remedy the problems cited in 
the IG's report on the Ames case. I was struck by the serious lack of 
managerial accountability with respect to the Ames case. Thus, it is 
very important for the congressional intelligence committees to engage 
in intensive oversight of what is being done in the counterintelligence 
area. As far back as 1988, I can recall Dick Cheney joining me in 
questioning the then DCI, Judge Webster, and others on why the Soviet, 
Chinese, and Cuba sections of the Operations Directorate were exempted 
from the Counterintelligence Center scrutiny applied to other areas of 
the world. In retrospect, it appears that this exemption may have 
contributed to Ames' going undetected so long. Reportedly, this 
inexplicable anomaly has now been remedied.
  Until recently, there did not appear to be a coordinated 
counterintelligence mission for the Government as a whole. 
Consequently, no one determined what priorities and resources should be 
given to each agency. I understand a national counterintelligence 
strategy has now been developed. If so, it should include the 
following: First, a system for identifying which secrets are truly 
critical to the national security, second, assessing those secrets' 
vulnerability to intelligence threats, third, mandatory 
cunterintelligence training for all intelligence officers, and fourth, 
establishing professional counterintelligence services within all 
appropriate agencies and departments.
  It is my understanding that the DO is withdrawing to a large extent 
from certain parts of the world. Budgetary constraints may make this 
necessary, but it should be very carefully watched. We do not want to 
repeat the mistake of the late 1970's when the CIA withdrew its 
presence from key areas of the world only to find shortly thereafter 
that it had to be reinstated. Therefore, the DO must maintain a surge 
capability to ensure it can rapidly respond to unexpected emergencies. 
And for this to be possible, a core network of agents must be sustained 
in those places deemed momentarily quiescent and unimportant to U.S. 
security interests.
  Recently, there have been disturbing press accounts indicating the 
CIA is considering new screening criteria for recruiting foreign 
agents. The general impression conveyed is that henceforth future 
foreign assets must have the pedigree of Mother Teresa or St. Francis 
of Assisi. Hopefully, these are exaggerated stories. To expect someone 
with the moral purity of a saint to penetrate the Cali Cartel is wholly 
unrealistic. Unfortunately, the harsh reality is that the only way to 
infiltrate the tightly controlled Colombian drug networks is to recruit 
someone who has ties to them. The same holds true for terrorist cells. 
We live in an imperfect world, and we sometimes must join forces with 
individuals with less than pristine personal histories. After all, 
during World War II, we allied ourselves with Joe Stalin, one of 
history's all-time mass murderers, to defeat Hitler.
  In an experiment that bears watching, the DI, Directorate of 
Intelligence, and the DO have begun to colocate their personnel. In 
other words, the operators and the analysts are working side by side. 
Given the historical antipathy between these two sharply contrasting 
cultures, everyone is watching to see if they can work together 
congenially. If they can, the overall intelligence effort should 
benefit immeasurably, especially in the area of counterintelligence 
where--as spy scandals in recent years have demonstrated--there has 
been a crying need for better analysis. In this partnership, it is 
crucial that the DI maintain rigorous objectivity to preclude charges 
that intelligence analysis is being politicized. This problem can only 
be avoided through strong agency management.


                             Covert Action

  Since the mid-1970's covert action has been seen as an atypical 
procedure for the conduct of foreign policy. It is imperative to 
rebuild the 

[[Page E2406]]
consensus within the United States that once saw covert action as a 
regular, legitimate means of bolstering the realization of foreign 
policy objectives. It must not be seen, nor used, as a last resort, 
panacea, or substitute for policy. Rather, covert action should be 
employed as a normal tool of U.S. statecraft, designed to work in 
support of and in conjunction with government's other diplomatic, 
military, and economic efforts both against traditional and 
nontraditional targets.


           Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities

  Congress obviously must play a very substantial role in any proposal 
to restructure and oversee the U.S. intelligence community. In this 
regard, I first introduced a joint intelligence committee bill in 1984 
and a congressional oath of secrecy proposal in 1987 that was inspired 
by a similar oath taken by Ben Franklin and four other members on the 
Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Second Continental Congress. 
The latter has now been adopted in the House, thanks to the efforts of 
one of my congressional colleagues, Porter Goss of Florida.
  What prompted these confidence building measures was a desire to make 
congressional oversight more secure and effective. That can only be 
accomplished if the membership of the congressional panels trust the 
intelligence agencies and vice versa. If they trust each other, then 
both sides can be candid with each other. As former advisor to 
President Eisenhower, Bryce Harlow, reportedly once said, ``Trust is 
the coin of the realm.'' Leaks destroy that trust and do great damage 
to the whole oversight process. Moreover, they can jeopardize lives, as 
well as vital relationships with foreign agents and friendly 
intelligence services.
  A joint intelligence committee, composed of a small number of key 
Members from both Chambers of Congress, would substantially reduce the 
risks of leaks. The fewer people in the loop, the less likelihood of 
damaging disclosures. Our forefathers clearly recognized this fact of 
life as they limited knowledge of Revolutionary War secrets to only 
five Members. Moreover, each of those individuals took his oath of 
secrecy very seriously. None other than Thomas Paine, the author of 
``Common Sense,'' was fired as a staffer of the Secret Correspondence 
Committee for leaking information concerning France's covert help to 
our Revolutionary War effort. We should not hesitate to emulate our 
forefathers and punish those who violate their secrecy pledges and 
betray the trust bestowed upon them.


                          intelligence purity

  Periodically during my tenure on the House Intelligence Committee, 
there were assertions that intelligence assessments were cooked to 
buttress certain foreign policy objectives. Immunizing the integrity of 
intelligence is of paramount importance. Thus, I am opposed to any 
measures that would even smack of tainting objective intelligence. In 
this connection, two things come to mind. First, is the proposal to 
abolish the CIA and fold its functions into the Department of State. 
That is a recipe for cooking intelligence if I ever saw one. 
Inevitably, there will come a time when the diplomats will pressure 
their intelligence colleagues down the hall to color an intelligence 
assessment to justify a foreign policy initiative. Moreover, the more 
controversial the policy, the greater the risk of politicized 
intelligence. Second, and related to the question of cooked 
intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] must not be 
viewed as essentially a political operative. Clearly, it is beneficial 
to the intelligence community if the DCI has the President's 
confidence, but he or she should not be a policy maker, as are Cabinet 
members. Rather, he or she should be the President's ultimate 
intelligence advisor. In short, there must be a firewall erected 
between intelligence and policy which often is driven by political 
considerations.


                intelligence support to law enforcement

  As chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, I am cognizant of the 
significant role intelligence plays in supporting law enforcement 
efforts. I am also very much aware of the tension that often develops 
between intelligence and law enforcement officials as to how and when 
intelligence can be used.
  Protecting sources and methods is the transcendent concern of every 
intelligence officer. Prosecutors, however, are looking for information 
that can be used at trial. If security reasons preclude the use of 
relevant intelligence, then the prosecutor is left with something that 
is, at best, of marginal utility. Moreover, constitutional standards of 
due process and the right to confront one's accusers further complicate 
the relationship between the intelligence community and law 
enforcement.
  Prosecutors are constitutionally bound, in a criminal trial, to 
provide all exculpatory evidence and any other evidence that might tend 
to diminish the government witnesses' credibility. Any information 
given to law enforcement by the intelligence community is subject to 
disclosure, for these very reasons. The Classified Information 
Procedures Act [CIPA] model works quite well for criminal cases 
countenancing the government's Hobson's choice between prosecution for 
criminal misdeeds and the protection of sources and methods of 
confidential national security information. In that context, the 
difficult choice is rightfully upon the government. But, in nonpunitive 
circumstances, such as with deportation of individuals shown through 
classified information to be a threat to the national security if they 
remain in the country, the same tension exists under current law.

  How to reconcile the competing needs and concerns in a deportation 
matter is a real challenge and one I have attempted to address in the 
``Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995'' (H.R. 1710). In that bill, 
we address the frustrating situation where the intelligence community 
has identified an alien as engaging in terrorist activities while in 
the United States, but because of the current deportation laws, we 
cannot expel the alien from the United States without disclosing 
sensitive information--which could jeopardize lives and the security of 
this Nation.
  In response to this dilemma, a procedure has been developed whereby 
the alien would get only a declassified summary of the classified 
evidence against him. All other non-classified evidence is, of course, 
discoverable.
  Unlike CIPA cases, when a situation exists where the provision of a 
summary to the alien would risk irreparable and significant harm to 
others, or to the United States, no summary is required and the 
deportation procedure of the terrorist alien can proceed. The 
classified evidence, without disclosure to the alien, can be utilized. 
Because this is not a criminal case, we allow the Government action to 
proceed without disclosure of the classified evidence. The liberty 
interests of the alien are significantly less than those of a criminal 
defendant, and the national security interests of the United States 
must be superior to the interests of any noncitizen.
  In criminal cases, the defendant stands to be punished--to lose 
either his life or his freedom for a period of time. The result of a 
deportation is simply explusion from the United States--to continue 
one's life freely and unencumbered, elsewhere. To Americans, life 
outside the United States may seem oppressive, or certainly less than 
optimal; but, it is not punishment.
  A greater tension exists, however, when the United States is faced 
with a classified allegation that a legal permanent resident alien is 
engaging in terrorist activities, and a declassified summary cannot be 
provided without creating larger risks of harm to others or to the 
United States. These aliens, as recognized by the Supreme Court, have a 
greater liberty interest in remaining in the United States than do 
other nonpermanent aliens. Thus, additional procedures to safeguard the 
accuracy of the outcome, and the fairness of the procedure, must be 
established. To that end, in our antiterrorism bill, we established a 
special panel of cleared attorneys who will be given access to the 
classified information supporting the terrorism allegation so that they 
can challenge the reliability of that evidence. This is done to help 
the court in its determination of whether it should ultimately order 
the alien's deportation based on the classified information. The 
cleared attorney would be subject to a 10-year prison term for 
disclosure of the classified information. Hopefully, this new 
procedure, when enacted, will facilitate greater sharing of classified 
information between our intelligence and law enforcement officials, 
without unduly risking disclosure of sensitive information.
  In summary, the world remains a treacherous place in this post-cold-
war era. The increasing threat of terrorism, especially against U.S. 
targets both home and abroad, is just one very important reason for 
maintaining a robust intelligence capability around the world. To do 
less ignores the lessons of Pearl Harbor, and all that implies for the 
security of this great nation.

                          ____________________