[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 203 (Monday, December 18, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18796-S18800]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996--CONFERENCE 
                                 REPORT

  The Senate continued with consideration of the conference report.


                  ``no'' vote on defense authorization

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will reluctantly be voting against the 
Defense authorization bill--reluctant, because I know of the hard work 
which many Members, particularly the majority side, put in on this 
bill, the fact that this is the first Defense bill under the leadership 
and the guidance of our chairman, Senator Strom Thurmond.
  I will vote against the bill for reasons which I will set forth this 
afternoon. A few months ago when I voted against the Senate version of 
the bill, I said that the bill was out of step with our real security 
requirements. The conference report is even worse in that regard, and 
it is worse in a number of ways which I will illuminate in the next few 
minutes.
  It is not a good-government bill. It is not a responsible bill. It is 
not arrived at in the bipartisan fashion that has long characterized 
legislation in this area. The Senate should reject it, and if it goes 
to the President he should veto it. As a matter of fact, I have been 
informed that he will veto it.
  The conference report is out of step with the priorities of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and I believe 
the Nation. It is as fiscally irresponsible as the Senate bill was, and 
the conference made 

[[Page S18797]]
it worse, authorizing more weapons not requested by the Pentagon and 
adding provisions that I believe are bad-government provisions.
  The Senate version of this bill, at least, did not contain funding 
for more B-2 bombers; it did not contain funding for F-16's and F-15 
fighters because the Pentagon did not request them, does not need them, 
and cannot afford them, but the conference report funds these three 
items alone for a total of more than $1 billion. There is no plan to 
pay for the bow wave that these programs would create in future years, 
and there is no money to pay for them. That does not even count the 
over $2 billion added for just two ships not requested by the Defense 
Department, nor does it include numerous other examples of excessive 
and unrequested spending.
  One area I will highlight a little later is ballistic missile 
defense. This was the most contentious effort in the conference and one 
which I believe has the most profound security consequences for our 
Nation. I am sorry that this conference report contains an outcome that 
is unwarranted, unwise, and unacceptable. It would require, if adopted 
and if it became law, the United States to deploy a national defense 
system--I emphasize the word ``deploy''--by the year 2003, without 
consideration of the threat, without consideration of what the military 
effectiveness of such a system would be after it is developed, without 
consideration of what it might cost after its development, without 
consideration of what its impact might be on United States-Russian 
relations at the time of a deployment decision.
  This conference report requires us, now, to commit ourselves to 
deploy an ABM system. Now, that decision is going to jeopardize our 
relationship with Russia. It is going to jeopardize the nuclear weapons 
reductions which are required in the START II Treaty.
  First, however, let me spend a few minutes on the B-2 bomber. The 
original Senate position, which was based on a strong bipartisan vote, 
was to provide no additional funds for more B-2 bombers. There were no 
additional funds for the B-2's, and the appropriations bills in the 
Senate had no additional authorization for the B-2's.

  Does that mean there was overwhelming House support for adding B-2 
bombers? Not really. The House barely had a majority in separate votes 
for more money for the B-2's, but there it is in the conference 
report--more money for B-2 bombers.
  The $500 million in the conference report for additional B-2 money is 
just the downpayment on a program which will eventually cost more than 
$30 billion. That money will have to come out of other programs that 
are of a higher priority to our Defense Department. Both Secretary 
Perry and General Shalikashvili have been very clear on that point.
  The ill-advised conference item on the B-2's is in spite of the fact 
that the Pentagon issued two separate and comprehensive reports, both 
of which demonstrated that we do not need more than 20 B-2's, and our 
limited funds would be more wisely spent on precision-guided munitions 
for our planned fleet of bombers and our tactical aircraft.
  The industrial base study made it clear that even if we stop 
producing B-2's now, we would be able to produce them again in the 
future if it were deemed necessary at some future time, but that is 
deemed unlikely. There is no need to keep a production line warm. We 
can reinstate production in the future, we were told by the study, 
should the need arise. We put a downpayment of $500 million on a $30 
billion program that the Pentagon has not asked for, does not need, and 
cannot afford.
  In the area of ships and submarines, the conference report actions in 
those areas are also objectionable. For reasons that are unknown to any 
Democrats, as far as I know, on the Armed Services Committee, the 
majority decided to create a special congressional panel just to 
consider submarine issues. That strikes me as being unwise and almost 
bizarre.
  The Armed Services Committee already considers all areas of the 
defense budget, weapon systems, including submarines, in its normal 
oversight process. There is no need to establish a new congressional 
panel to look at submarines. If we can work on a bipartisan and 
cooperative manner, we will get the job done in the Armed Services 
Committee. We have done it in the past, and there is no reason we 
cannot do it on submarines. We do not need a new panel to take a look 
just at submarines the way the conference report provides.
  The conference report earmarks the shipbuilding and ship maintenance 
work in a totally unacceptable way. We are throwing out standards of 
competition, cost effectiveness, and good government when we do this 
kind of earmarking. We will be wasting taxpayers' money because we 
dispense with standard safeguards for fiscal responsibility and 
procurement. There is no excuse for us to do that other than it is 
politically easier to do that, to divide it up here, but in terms of 
the competition which gets us the better price, what we have done is 
bypassed the usual procurement rules and earmarked money in this area.

  The conference report also represents a setback when it earmarked the 
National Guard and Reserve equipment procurement money. This year, in 
marked contrast to previous years, the conference report specified 
exactly what equipment the Guard and the Reserve shall buy. This was 
the opposite of what the committee originally voted to do, but it 
reversed itself during the committee deliberations.
  Our committee led a good-government initiative over the last several 
years to move away from the earmarking of Guard and Reserve equipment 
by using generic categories of equipment that would ensure that the 
Pentagon and the Guard could buy the items that best fit their 
priorities and requirements rather than having to accept the equipment 
shown, often on the basis of home State interest of the Members of 
Congress.
  Last year, our Armed Services Committee was totally generic when it 
came to buying equipment for the Reserve and the Guard. This year, we 
marked the equipment. Now, in the past this was an area of tension 
between the authorization committee, which was trying to stay generic, 
and the Appropriations Committee, which was specifying its preferences. 
This year the roles were reversed. The Appropriations Committee did the 
right thing this year, used generic categories, while the authorizer, 
our committee, reverted to earmarking equipment.
  I hope the Armed Services Committee will reconsider this approach and 
be persuaded to return to the good-government approach, which is the 
generic approach, which will avoid the temptation which we all face of 
earmarking these purchases in ways that benefit our own home state 
Guard and Reserve or our home State industrial base.
  Now, it was a curious issue in our committee deliberations because a 
bipartisan majority of the committee Members originally favored going 
the generic route, and we voted to do so. But on a party-line vote, the 
majority decided to choose specific equipment items, and that was done 
despite the fact that the National Guard bureau made it clear that it 
prefers the generic approach so it can meet its most pressing needs.
  I met with General Baca, chief of the National Guard Bureau, to make 
sure that I was clear on this point, and he reinforced the point that 
their preference is to have these authorizations and appropriations 
made on a generic basis.
  I offered an amendment on the floor that we stay with the generic 
approach of the last few years, and I think that before the vote came 
up, we were very close to a bipartisan agreement that we do this on a 
generic basis. But, at the last minute, that approach was not adopted. 
I hope the Armed Services Committee does return to the generic 
approach, despite the temptations of doing earmarking which, again, I 
think all of us--or most of us--can understand.
  Now, on ballistic missile defense, I want to focus on these 
provisions just a little longer because they are so significant to our 
security and because the provisions in the conference report are such a 
departure from what the Senate has already adopted by a wide margin. 
The ballistic missile defense provisions alone warrant a veto, and the 
President has said that he will veto this bill, in part because of the 
ballistic missile defense provisions. The conference report before us 
contains the 

[[Page S18798]]
following provisions that are unacceptable. These are some of the 
unacceptable provisions.
  First, ``It is the policy of the United States * * * to deploy a 
National Missile Defense System.''
  Second, the conference report mandates that the national missile 
defense system ``shall achieve an initial operational capability by the 
end of 2003.''
  Those are the words in the conference report. So it would commit us 
to deploy a system and to do so by the year 2003, and both of those 
commitments are significantly different from what we decided to do in 
the Senate and what we did in the Senate on a very strong, bipartisan 
vote. In the Senate bill, which was the result of literally weeks of 
effort, discussions and negotiations, what we said we would do would be 
to develop, so that later on we could determine whether or not to 
deploy, a national missile defense system. We did not set the date for 
the initial operating capability, the IOC. What we said is that 
Congress would, prior to any decision to deploy, participate in the 
decision as to whether or not we would deploy that system.
  In the making the decision, we could take many things into 
consideration which we now do not know. What would be the cost of such 
a system? How militarily effective would it be? What would the threat 
be at that time? What would the impact be on United States-Russian 
relations, including the impact on the ABM Treaty? And what would the 
prospects be at the deployment decision point after this were developed 
for that purpose--what would the impact be on the antiballistic missile 
agreement?
  All those things, critical security issues involving relationships 
with the other country that has a larger number of nuclear weapons, 
including the military effectiveness, including what the cost would be, 
including what the threat would be, all of those critical items of 
information not now available would be available at the time a decision 
were made later whether or not to deploy the missile defense system.
  In order to put ourselves in a position where we could make that 
decision on an intelligent basis, we would develop a national missile 
defense system. What this conference report does is it makes it the 
policy of the United States to deploy and to deploy by a particular 
year, regardless of what the threat might be at the time when we are in 
a position to deploy, regardless of how much it costs us at that point, 
regardless what the impact is on United States-Russian relations, 
regardless of whether or not it destroys the START II agreement under 
which thousands of nuclear warheads are being dismantled.

  This conference report, in that regard, it seems to me, not only 
jeopardizes our security but violates some basic common sense.
  The Foreign Relations Committee just reported out by a unanimous vote 
a strong resolution on ratification of the START II agreement. That 
START II agreement, which we are going to be voting on in the Senate in 
the next few days, can achieve the reduction of thousands of nuclear 
warheads that otherwise do provide a horrific threat to the United 
States. It is clearly in our security interests to secure those 
reductions in nuclear weapons which for decades threatened our 
security. It is clearly in our interest to eliminate some of the most 
dangerous nuclear systems from the cold war era.
  About 4,000 Russian nuclear warheads would be eliminated so they will 
never become a threat to us again. Then, we will not have to rely on a 
ballistic missile defense system to shoot down that number of Russian 
warheads in flight, but, rather, those warheads would be eliminated, 
removed from their weapons systems, dismantled, and the nuclear 
material disposed of. They will never be part of an arsenal which can 
threaten us. That is a security guarantee that no ballistic missile 
defense system could ever achieve at any cost.
  So, eliminating nuclear weapons, thousands of nuclear warheads under 
arms control treaties like START II is cost effective, it is certain, 
it guarantees an enhancement to our security, unlike the effort to 
build a defensive shield against those missiles, particularly if the 
commitment to build such a defense would violate a treaty that is 
essential for the passage of the START II Treaty in Russia.
  We have been told directly by Russian parliamentarians, we have been 
told by the Russian Government, that if we jeopardize the ABM Treaty, 
if we threaten to deploy a system in violation of an agreement which 
has provided security to both sides and which they feel is significant 
to them, that it is unlikely they will ratify the START II agreement in 
their legislative body, their Duma.
  We have been told that. We read about it, but we also have been told 
personally by Russian parliamentarians that if we jeopardize the ABM 
Treaty, we cannot expect them to ratify the START II agreement which 
will reduce the number of nuclear weapons if they are going to have to 
face defenses, if they ever were in a position where they were attacked 
and felt they had to use these weapons. That is what the ABM Treaty is 
all about. Whether you like the ABM Treaty or you do not like the ABM 
Treaty, or whether we should modify it through negotiations or not 
modify it through negotiations in order to permit the deployment of a 
defensive system, what seems very likely--and I will say factual, or 
almost certainly factual--is that that Russian Duma is not going to 
reduce the number of their weapons and not ratify START II if we commit 
ourselves to deploy a defensive system.
  We have been trying to get the START II Treaty voted on in this body 
prior to the time the Senate adjourns for the year. Many of us have 
actively sought to get the START II Treaty on the floor of this Senate 
for a vote this week. I think we are going to succeed. The majority 
leader has made a commitment that we will vote on the ratification of 
START II. I believe that commitment is that he will bring that 
agreement, that treaty to the floor this week, prior to adjournment, if 
my memory serves me correctly.
  This was after a long delay where the treaty languished in the 
Foreign Relations Committee for a number of unrelated reasons. This is 
a Christmas gift to this Nation, if we can ratify START II.
  We could reduce by thousands the weapons in the inventory of each 
side if we could just get START II ratified here and if we can get it 
ratified there. I am confident that the Senate is going to give its 
advice and consent to ratify the START II Treaty because it is so 
clearly in our national interest to do so. But if we ratify here and 
the Russians do not ratify it because at the same time we are ratifying 
START II, we are threatening the ABM Treaty's existence through this 
conference report language which says we will deploy--and it is the 
policy of the United States to deploy--a system which violates the 
treaty which they believe is essential in order for them to reduce the 
number of weapons in their inventory, we are doing two inconsistent 
things in the same week: We would be ratifying START II here but 
jeopardizing the ratification of START II over in Russia.
  As Senator Nunn has pointed out, the provisions on the National 
Missile Defense that are in this conference report were beyond the 
scope of any legislation that was passed by the House or the Senate. 
Both the House and the Senate in their defense authorization bill 
passed language which contains ballistic missile defense provisions, 
but they are not the provisions in the conference report.
  The Senate bill had provisions that were carefully crafted after a 
great deal of hard work by a bipartisan group of negotiators. Again, 
the Senate bill said that we would develop a system--we would develop a 
system with emphasis on the word ``develop''--for deployment and that 
Congress would have a chance to review the program prior to a decision 
to deploy it--emphasis on the words ``prior to'' and ``decision to 
deploy.''
  In that review by Congress, we would look at cost, operational 
effectiveness, the threat on the implications of the ABM Treaty and on 
United States-Russian relations. Our Senate bill also said that the 
program should be conducted in conformance with the ABM Treaty. That 
package was accepted by the Senate by a vote of 85 to 13. Only one 
Republican voted against it. The majority leader voted for it. The 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee voted for it. Every Republican 
but one, the senior Senator from New Hampshire, voted for that 
conference report. We 

[[Page S18799]]
got a product that was supported by a large majority of this body and 
by the President.
  I was one of the four negotiators. We reviewed every word in that 
negotiated product very, very carefully. It took, as I mentioned, 
weeks--offers, counter offers, debate, and exchanges of documents. We 
finally came up with a compromise. Eighty-five Senators voted for it.
  What happened in conference is that, first, the majority leader wrote 
a letter saying that he supported language which would require us to 
deploy. That certainly was, I think, almost unprecedented--that the 
majority leader who picked the negotiators, or, at least, if he did not 
pick each negotiator, was the one that urged we go down that road to 
negotiations, and then voted for the negotiated product, but then after 
the negotiated product was adopted by the Senate wrote a letter to the 
conferees saying, do not support the product of the U.S. Senate and 
instead require the deployment of a missile system.
  I was very disappointed, and not just about the authority view on the 
conferees in deciding that they were going to commit themselves to 
deploy, but I was frankly disappointed in our majority leader in 
writing that letter to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
stating that the conference must result in a commitment to deploy the 
ballistic missile defense system and to mandate a deployment of a 
multisite BMD system by the year 2003.
  Many times during these negotiations and discussions in conference, 
Senator Nunn urged that the best basis for reaching an agreement with 
the House would be to start with a Senate-passed bipartisan compromise, 
but those suggestions were not accepted.
  That is how we ended up where we are with this bill. It contains some 
provisions that are totally unacceptable to, I think, almost all of the 
Democrats and I believe also to some Republicans about the ballistic 
missile defense requiring deployment of a system of unknown cost, 
unknown impact on United States-Russian relations, unknown military 
effectiveness, and requiring deployment of that kind of a system by the 
year 2003 against the threat which our intelligence community does not 
even believe will materialize at least in this decade.
  Mr. President, I ask at this time that the full statement of 
administration policy dated December 15 be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                                   Washington, DC.
     Statement of Administration Policy.
       (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the 
     concerned agencies.) December 15, 1995 (Senate)
       H.R. 1530--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1996 Conference Report.
       Senators Thurmond (R) SC and Nunn (D) GA.
       If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the 
     President in its current form, the President would veto the 
     bill.
       The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15, 
     1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry 
     out our national security objectives and implement key 
     Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise 
     serious constitutional issues by restricting the President's 
     powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy powers.
       The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly 
     missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range 
     missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not 
     believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By 
     forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile 
     Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would 
     needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile 
     defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD) 
     prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In 
     addition, by directing that the NMD be ``operationally 
     effective'' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and 
     Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD 
     architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of 
     the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a 
     collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk 
     continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and 
     Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which 
     together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian 
     strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War 
     levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national 
     security.
       The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's 
     ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential 
     to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to 
     commence a contingency operations and the requirement to 
     submit a supplemental request within a certain time period to 
     continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the 
     authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a 
     Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under 
     United Nations (UN) operational or tactical control, the bill 
     infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
       In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about 
     the following: onerous certification requirements for the use 
     of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as 
     subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding 
     for the Defense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the 
     Technology Reinvestment Program; restrictions on retirement 
     of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's 
     ability to executive disaster relief, demining, and military-
     to-military contract programs; directed procurement of 
     specific ships at specific shipyards without a valid 
     industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge 
     of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on 
     the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD 
     effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
     Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; 
     and finally the Administration continues to object to the 
     restrictions on the ability of female service members or 
     dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. 
     military hospitals abroad.
       While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there 
     are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial 
     to the Department, including important changes in acquisition 
     law, new authorities to improve military housing, and 
     essential pay raises for military personnel. The 
     Administration calls on the Congress to correct the 
     unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial 
     provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on 
     the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of living 
     adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the 
     Christmas recess.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, a portion of that statement of 
administration policy says the following in opposition to the 
conference report:

       The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly 
     missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range 
     missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not 
     believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By 
     forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile 
     Defense deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly 
     incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs 
     and force the Department of Defense prematurely to lock into 
     a specific technological option. In addition, by directing 
     that the National Missile Defense be ``operationally 
     effective'' in defending all 50 States, the bill would likely 
     require a multi-site National Missile Defense architecture 
     that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM 
     Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a collision 
     course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued 
     Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian 
     ratification of START II, two treaties which together will 
     reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear 
     warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly 
     lowering the threat to U.S. national security.


                               conclusion

  Mr. President, on no set of issues is bipartisan cooperation more 
important than in the area of national security. We need not all agree 
on every issue, but we must strive to work together in a bipartisan 
spirit. We have a broad spectrum of views on the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees, but we have a long history of working together, 
across party lines to try to put together the best bill we can. 
Regrettably, the conference this year fell short of that objective both 
in process and in spirit. Too many of these contentious issues were 
left to only majority staff of the two committees to hash out, and 
months passed without resolution. By that time, the defense, military 
construction, and energy and water appropriations bills had been passed 
and enacted. I urge the leadership of both the House and Senate 
committees to reexamine what transpired and accelerate the learning 
process so that next year, and I stand ready to work with them to try 
to restore the tradition of cooperation on the Defense authorization 
bill.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted 

[[Page S18800]]
to speak for 15 minutes as if in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________