[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 198 (Wednesday, December 13, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18549-S18552]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send my resolution to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 44) concerning the deployment 
     of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate 
consideration of the joint resolution?
  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint 
resolution.
  Mr. DOLE. That resolution will be the second vote. The first vote 
will be on the Hutchison resolution.
  Mr. President, let me indicate at 10:05 p.m. our time, and 4:05 in 
the morning in Bosnia, where many Americans are now and where hundreds 
and thousands more will be on the way, I think we have to understand 
what we are about to vote on here. We are not voting on a decision to 
send American troops to Bosnia. That decision has been made. It was 
made 2 years ago by the President of the United States. Without 
consulting Congress, the President of the United States made that 
decision.
  So we say to those soldiers who may be on early duty there at 4 a.m. 
in the morning, in the bitter cold--from those of us in the warmth of 
the U.S. Senate, free from any danger--we are about to cast a vote. We 
are about to cast a vote, Sergeant Jones or Private Smith, whoever it 
is, to indicate that we support your efforts there. They may have some 
misgivings about why they are there, and we may have some doubts. I 
listened to the eloquent statement of Senator McCain, and I listened 
last evening to the final speaker of the evening, Senator Cohen from 
Maine, but this is not about politics. This is not about a Democratic 
President and a Republican majority in the U.S. Senate. This is about a 
lot of frightened young Americans who are in Bosnia, or on their way to 
Bosnia. I assume they may not have thought of it directly, but I 
believe they will think of it one of these days; they are going to be 
looking back to see if they had the support of those who represented 
them in the Congress of the United States. They may not be thinking of 
that at 4:10 a.m.

  So this is a very difficult debate for Members of Congress. It is a 
difficult debate because Congress was not part of the decisionmaking 
with respect to sending troops. Congress was not consulted. Congress 
was told of the President's commitment to send troops after the 
commitment was made. And then we were faced with the dilemma of 
undermining that commitment or acquiescing in a military mission with 
serious flaws. And make no mistake about it, the President has said he 
made this decision and he takes responsibility. It was his decision to 
send troops and his decision alone.
  A lot of Members of Congress, some on both sides of the aisle--in 
fact, 69 of us voted the last time to lift the arms embargo to give the 
Bosnians an opportunity to defend themselves--which is precisely the 
reason we are here tonight--so that we would not be sending American 
troops or making that decision. But the President rejected that. That 
was bipartisan in the House and 

[[Page S18550]]
in the Senate. We opposed the arms embargo. As I said, we repeatedly 
voted to lift it. Some of my colleagues were concerned about that.
  We have two resolutions before us tonight. I understand that a number 
of Senators support the resolution offered by the Senator from Texas; 
the Senators from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe and Senator Nickles; and a 
number of others. That resolution emphasizes very clearly that we 
oppose the decision to deploy troops. No doubt about it. We disagree, 
we oppose. It is his decision, and he said as much as recently as, I 
think, Sunday on ``60 Minutes.''
  However, a vote on this resolution does not provide our troops, who 
are now in Bosnia at 4:08 in the morning, and the other thousands who 
will be there tomorrow, or next week, or next month--I think it makes a 
point, but it does not make a policy. It does not effect a policy. It 
does not make the job our forces have to do any safer or any easier, 
nor does it provide a plan to achieve a military balance in Bosnia or 
increase the chances for successful completion of our mission.
  I assume most of our colleagues will vote for that resolution. If 
they do, I wish they would follow up their signal to President Clinton 
by voting ``yes'' on the Dole-McCain-Nunn resolution. I want to be 
clear about what that resolution does and does not do. This resolution 
does not endorse the President's decision. It does not endorse the 
agreement reached in Dayton. It does support our men and women in 
uniform.
  It does limit the mission to military tasks only and requires a 
realistic exit strategy based on the goal of Bosnian self-reliance. To 
put it simply, President Clinton has a plan to get us into Bosnia; this 
resolution shows us a way out.
  It sets three conditions on the deployment of American forces: No. 1, 
it limits the mission to implementing military provisions of the 
accord. No Somalia-style nation building, for example. It insists on an 
exit strategy linked to military balance so Bosnia can defend itself. 
Somebody said that is bad policy because if they are armed and trained 
we may have to stay longer. I do not understand that argument. We have 
been debating on this floor for 2 years that we ought to arm and train 
the Bosnians and lift the arms embargo so they can defend themselves. 
That is precisely what we wish to do here. No. 3 also provides U.S. 
leadership on an immediate effort to provide Bosnia that means to 
defend itself. I think if these conditions are met they will help 
enhance the safety of our forces and assure that they can withdraw in a 
timely manner and without triggering a resumption of hostilities.
  Let us be clear, setting a date is not an exit strategy. In fact, 
many will argue that if we set a date nothing will happen until that 
date expires, and then hostilities will recur.
  I suggest that I think we have been able to perform a valuable 
service here for our colleagues regardless of their feelings about the 
decision. I did not agree with it. You do not agree with it--maybe some 
do agree with the decision. The decision has been made. The deployment 
started. Our goal should be a Bosnia that is self-reliant, able to 
defend itself without depending on the United States or any outside 
force.
  I want to emphasize just a few points on this critical issue. First, 
the word ``lead'' is essential. Without U.S. leadership, this will not 
happen. Leading does not mean going it alone but it does mean acting 
like the sole remaining superpower. Second, our language makes it clear 
that the efforts to arm and train will take place separate and apart 
from NATO, IFOR; no United States military forces in NATO operation 
will be involved enabling Bosnia to defend itself. Finally, this 
resolution states that the Bosnians should be provided with assistance 
of the highest possible quality--American where necessary--and that of 
other countries when sufficient.
  I also point out this resolution requires the President report 
extensively on his plan to enable Bosnia to provide for its own defense 
and on all aspects of the military and civilian aspects of the 
operation.
  I want to say a few words about Senator McCain and his leadership on 
national security issues. From his sacrifice during Vietnam--and I know 
I was not standing here; I was not in leadership, I was standing back 
there somewhere. I was wearing a John McCain bracelet, proudly--a POW 
bracelet--and arguing with my Democratic colleagues on the other side 
not to cut off funding in the Vietnam war. I led debate on this floor 
for 7 weeks in an effort to derail those who would cut off funding 
while John McCain was in a little box over there in prison and there 
were thousands like him and thousands and thousands of Americans.
  The theory was just cut off funding. The war will end. That is not 
the way it works.
  So John McCain came back, others came back, and others did not come 
back as Senator McCain said earlier. Then he became a freshman 
Congressman and opposed the deployment in Lebanon in 1983. It seems to 
me, not that I have any more insight than anybody else in this body, 
but there is something about a relationship that you build up in the 
service and you understand one thing: How important support is from 
America--whether it is your family, whether it is your little hometown, 
whether it is your State, whether it is the Congress of the United 
States.

  I say to Senator McCain and many others who were prisoners of war in 
Vietnam, no one works any harder on the issues of war and peace. I did 
not agree with Senator McCain on normalizing relations with Vietnam, 
but he was there and I was not. No one takes his responsibility more 
seriously. We could not have reached this agreement without his almost 
minute-by-minute involvement.
  Let me say one other thing about leadership: It is not easy. The 
easiest vote is no, no, no. I recall being on the floor in this 
position in January 1991, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, when we had troops 
in the gulf. President Bush had decided to come to Congress and ask for 
support. I remember at the time we had a very good debate--3 days of 
it--Democrats and Republicans, and I do not question anybody's motives. 
The thing that struck me as I looked at it at the time and as I look 
back at it now, not a single member of the Democratic leadership in the 
House or the Senate would stand up on this floor or the House floor and 
support President Bush. They did not have to agree with President Bush. 
I do not agree with President Clinton. But the troops were there. I 
thought that was a tragic mistake. You pay a price for leadership. Some 
will have short-term political gain and some just truly feel we should 
not be doing anything and that the only vote is no.
  I ask my colleagues, it is now 17 after 4 o'clock a.m. in Bosnia, and 
Americans are there, so if we cut off funding this morning, I do not 
know what would have happened. If we pass the Hutchison resolution, I 
do not know what will happen. I hope if we pass the Dole-McCain-Nunn, 
et al., resolution that we will have provided an exit strategy, a way 
to extricate Americans by arming and training Bosnians, so that they 
can be an independent force and so we can go home, so that those 
Americans who are there today at 18 after 4 o'clock a.m. in the morning 
will not be there next Christmas.
  That is what this debate is all about. It is not easy. I have had a 
lot of mail, a lot of phone calls, from a lot of people, who I do not 
think understand the issue. The issue we are voting on tonight is not a 
decision to send American troops. Let me conclude with that. We can 
posture and complain about the President's decision. I do not like it. 
He knows I do not like it. I told him I do not like it. I said publicly 
I do not like it. If we had our way, we would have lifted the embargo 
and we would not be talking about sending troops. That is our argument. 
I think it would have been correct.
  I guess our decision is whether we are going to send a message to all 
the families in America, to all the troops who are on the way to 
Bosnia, plus all the other American forces who someday may be engaged 
in some conflict, because we do have a responsibility from time to 
time. They will ask themselves, do we have the support of the American 
people, of our families and of our representatives? I think that is 
what this debate is all about. I hope that is how it is received by the 
people who watch or listen or read the Record or listen to each other.
  I ask my colleagues to think very carefully. We are going to be 
debating this. I assume this is just the first debate. A month from 
now, 2 months 

[[Page S18551]]
from now, 3 months from now, 4 months from now, something happens, 
there will be other debates and other efforts made. But this is the 
important, this is the first step. This is a signal to the American 
forces that we support you. We support you, as we should.

  Finally, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an 
exchange I have had with the President on his assurances that the 
Bosnians will be provided with arms and the training they need. I think 
the letters are very important. It is part of the legislative history, 
because the President has given his word that that training will be 
provided and arms will be furnished. And, again, that is very 
important. It may be lost on someone now, but it is going to be very 
important not a year from now, as the Senator from Maine said last 
night, 9 months from now, 9 months from now is when it starts. If they 
are not trained, and if we have to wait 6 months, it may be lost.
  So, it is up to us. If not now, when? This is the time to support 
American forces.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                               Washington, DC., December 10, 1995.
       Dear Mr. Leader: I want to set forth for you the 
     Administration's policy with respect to military 
     stabilization measures in Bosnia.
       The Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons relative to the 
     defense capability of the Bosnian Federation has been a major 
     reason for the fighting in Bosnia and remains a potential 
     source of instability. We believe that establishing a stable 
     military balance within Bosnia by the time IFOR leaves is 
     important to preventing the war from resuming and to 
     facilitate IFOR's departure.
       The Dayton Agreement has strong arms control provisions 
     which provide for a ``build-down'' of forces. We intend to 
     pursue these vigorously. An arms restraint regime obviously 
     can help contribute to a stable balance.
       Even with arms control, we anticipate there will be a 
     deficiency on the part of the Federation. Accordingly, we 
     have made a commitment to the Bosnian Federation that we will 
     coordinate an international effort to ensure that the 
     Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an 
     adequate military balance when IFOR leaves.
       Because we want to assure the impartiality of IFOR, 
     providing arms and training to Federation forces will not be 
     done by either IFOR or U.S. military fordes. The approach we 
     intend to pursue is for the U.S. to coordinate the efforts of 
     third countries.
       Our efforts in this connection already have begun. An 
     assessment team to evaluate the needs of the Federation has 
     just returned from Bosnia. We will proceed with this effort 
     in a manner that is consistent with the UN resolution lifting 
     the arms embargo and the relevant Dayton Agreement 
     provisions, which allow planning and training to proceed, but 
     restrict actual transfers during the initial six months, in 
     particular of all arms for 90 days, and heavy weapons for 180 
     days, after the Agreement enters into force.
           Sincerely,
     Bill Clinton.
                                                                    ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We are writing to seek clarification on 
     several critical issues raised in your December 10 letter 
     regarding your administration's policy on arming and training 
     Bosnian Federation forces. In our view, it is essential to 
     clarify these matters--which are integral to the U.S. exit 
     strategy--prior to moving forward with Senate consideration 
     of your administration's decision to send U.S. ground forces 
     to implement the Dayton agreement.
       You acknowledge the Bosnian Serb military advantage and the 
     need to establish a stable military balance within Bosnia by 
     the time the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) leaves. In your 
     address to the nation, you justified American participation 
     in IFOR by stating the need for American leadership. However, 
     your letter does not indicate that the United States will 
     lead in the critical effort of ensuring the Bosnians can 
     defend themselves. We are seeking your confirmation that the 
     United States will lead in coordinating and providing the 
     Bosnians with the means for self-defense. Without an 
     American-led effort to rapidly provide the Bosnians with the 
     best possible quality arms, equipment, and training, we 
     believe that the Bosnians will not be able to adequately 
     defend themselves within a year.
       Also in this regard, while we understand that the arming 
     and training program should be conducted separately from the 
     IFOR peacekeeping operation, to state that no U.S. military 
     forces will be involved--as your letter does--is a guarantee 
     that such a program will be wholly ineffective and may not 
     even occur. A strict prohibition on all U.S. military 
     involvement outside the territory of Bosnia would severely 
     cripple American efforts to ensure that the Bosnians are 
     provided with the weapons and training they need. Military 
     planning, coordination, information-sharing, or even Bosnian 
     participation in the International Military Education and 
     Training (IMET) could not occur under such a prohibition. It 
     seems that so severely limiting our flexibility would not be 
     in our national interest.
       Finally, we urge you to focus on what the United States can 
     do, rather than what we cannot do under the U.N. Security 
     Council resolution lifting the arms embargo. For example, 
     training can begin immediately--presumably outside of Bosnia. 
     Also, an array of defensive weapons could be provided to 
     Bosnian Federation forces on day 91 consistent with the U.N. 
     resolution--as could any weapon not classified as ``heavy'' 
     under the terms of the U.N. resolution.
       We hope that you will clarify these matters as soon as 
     possible so that we may proceed with consideration of the 
     Dole-McCain resolution.
           Sincerely,
     Bob Dole.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.
       Dear Mr. Leader: I am writing in response to your December 
     12 letter on equip and train. You raise several questions to 
     which I would like to respond.
       First of all, the United States will take a leadership role 
     in coordinating an international effort to ensure that the 
     Bosnian Federation receives the assistance necessary to 
     achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. As in 
     all things related to our effort to bringing peace to the 
     region, U.S. leadership has been critical.
       As I stated in my December 10 letter to you, I want to 
     assure the impartiality of IFOR. In the view of my military 
     advisors, this requires minimizing the involvement of U.S. 
     military personnel. But we expect that some individual 
     military officers, for example, working in OSD, DSAA or other 
     agencies, will be involved in planning this effort. We also 
     will offer the Bosnians participation in U.S. programs such 
     as IMET. I agree that maintaining flexibility is important to 
     the success of the effort to achieve a stable military 
     balance within Bosnia. But I will do nothing that I believe 
     will endanger the safety of American troops on the ground in 
     Bosnia. I am sure you will agree that is my primary 
     responsibility.
       I want to assure you that I am focusing on what the United 
     States can do. That is why I sent an assessment team to the 
     region to properly evaluate the needs of the Federation. 
     Training programs and provision of non-lethal assistance can 
     begin immediately after the peace agreement enters into 
     force; and provision of small arms can begin after three 
     months. We intend to move expeditiously.
       I have given you my word that we will make certain that the 
     Bosnian Federation will receive the assistance necessary to 
     achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. I 
     intend to keep it.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.
       EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S 
     PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IN BOSNIA
  The Senate continued with the consideration of the concurrent 
resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on agreeing to Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 35.
  The yeas and nays have not been ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced, yeas 47, nays 52, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 602 Leg.]

                                YEAS--47

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Pressler
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--52

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman 
     
[[Page S18552]]

     Lugar
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone
  So the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 35) was rejected.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

                          ____________________