[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 198 (Wednesday, December 13, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18515-S18549]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page S18515]]


   EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLANNED 
                 DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

                              (Continued)


              WHY I OPPOSE SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, in recent weeks I have spent a great deal 
of time thinking about Bosnia. I have been to hearings and briefings. I 
have consulted with experts. I have had many discussions with my 
colleagues and my constituents. One month ago, I even went to Sarajevo 
and Tuzla myself to see the conditions our soldiers would face there.
  Since my return, I have taken to the floor of the Senate many times, 
and used every public opportunity, to state my opposition to the 
President's imminent deployment of ground troops to Bosnia. In the days 
since the conclusion of the Proximity Peace Talks in Dayton, I have 
also spoken out against any conditional support of this deployment 
coming from the Congress. The decision to intervene on the ground in 
Bosnia is a bad idea, Mr. President, and while I will always support 
our soldiers wherever they are sent, I want no part of this decision.
  My conviction that the administration's intention to put troops in 
harm's way in Bosnia is a huge mistake rests on three broad arguments. 
First, and above all, the conflict in Bosnia poses no real threat to 
vital American interests--simply put, there is nothing in Bosnia that 
Americans should die for. Second, the Dayton talks have produced a 
false peace that is inherently unstable and politically doomed. 
Finally, the implementation force [I-For] plan is self-contradictory 
and hopelessly optimistic, and will expose our soldiers to unreasonable 
risks even as they diligently pursue its unrealistic objectives.


                     What interests are threatened?

  The administration has repeatedly argued that two vital interests are 
at stake in the conflict in Bosnia. If we don't intervene now, they 
say, the war will widen to a point where it threatens all of Europe. If 
the U.S. does not lead NATO in intervention, they say, both the NATO 
alliance and U.S. leadership of it will be at risk.
  The President is correct when he says that preserving security in 
Europe, and maintaining American leadership of NATO, are vital American 
interests. But it is one thing to refer to vital interests, and another 
to claim that they are really threatened by the conflict in Bosnia. I 
do not think they are. The administration asserts that the war in 
Bosnia will spread throughout Central Europe. But where is the evidence 
that this conflict threatens Bosnia's neighbors? Local countries like 
Italy, Hungary, and Austria do not seem concerned.
  The President has often referred to previous European wars in this 
century. But comparing this war to either of the world wars--and 
likening those of us who oppose United States involvement in Bosnia to 
1930's-style isolationists--is absurd. It shows a profound 
misunderstanding of history, and of the roots of those conflicts. World 
War I began in the Balkans because the world powers took sides in a 
Balkan war, not because they kept at a safe distance. What the Clinton 
administration is doing looks a lot more like taking sides. As for 
World War II, neither Serbia, Bosnia, nor Croatia are anything like 
Nazi Germany, in terms of ambition, population, industrial strength, 
military power, or anything else. They are focused on each other, not 
on external aggression.
  The Balkan war has not spread in the past 4 years, and it shows no 
signs of spreading. So when the President states that stability in 
Europe is a vital American interest, he is right. But when he says that 
European security is threatened in Bosnia, he is wrong.
  The only other vital interest the administration refers to is that of 
preserving our leadership of the NATO alliance. Mr. President, I 
believe in NATO. It has served us well, and because there are still 
potential threats to European security, we must enhance and even expand 
it. But right now, the American people are divided on the question of 
NATO's importance. Many wonder if the alliance has outlived its 
usefulness. How does the administration expect Americans to feel about 
NATO when we get bogged down in a NATO mission in Bosnia? They will 
view every body bag as one more reason to get out of the alliance once 
and for all. They will ask: ``This is why we are a part of NATO?'' And 
they will be much less willing to act when a real threat to Europe 
comes along. There are still real threats to Europe out there, Mr. 
President.
  Dragging--or being dragged by--the alliance into a conflict for which 
it was not designed and for which it is not suited is not leadership. 
NATO still has a viable mission, but not one of intervening in a nasty 
Balkan civil war that poses no demonstrable threat to European 
security. Why should we risk the inevitable conflicts with our NATO 
partners that will result when we all start taking casualties in a 
place where no one really wanted to be in the first place?
  And why, if this is so important to NATO, should Russia--whose 
unpredictable future is one of the principal reasons for NATO's 
continued existence--be included so completely? Why would we go out of 
our way to include Russian forces with our own, when their natural 
sympathies lie with the Serbs that we will be trying to disarm, the 
Serbs we were bombing just a few weeks ago? We have been told by the 

[[Page S18516]]
administration that we would be evenhanded in our actions in Bosnia, 
but I was told by an administration official not long ago that the 
Bosnians were our first priority. But Russia's first priority will 
certainly be the Serbs.
  Not only will this forced alliance with Russia bring Russian troops 
into Central Europe for the first time since World War II; it will 
create the potential for misunderstandings and conflict with Russian 
forces that we have not seen since the Berlin Wall came down--all in 
the name of preserving European security.
  Mr. President, I repeat--I support NATO. If and when this conflict 
truly threatens Greece and Turkey, or any of our other NATO allies, I 
will support action to contain it. But the administration proposes not 
to contain the conflict, but to jump right into the middle of it. If 
NATO is to become a rationale for America intervening in civil wars in 
states that are not even members of the alliance, then I say we should 
disband the alliance tomorrow.


           What kind of ``peace'' are we trying to implement?

  Mr. President, in all the discussion of the implementation force, 
many people have lost sight of how shaky the agreement reached in 
Dayton is itself. Regardless of our interests in Bosnia, or our concern 
for the victims of the war there, the NATO force is being sent to 
Bosnia to implement what I believe is a fatally flawed agreement, one 
not likely to survive without the continued presence of large numbers 
of NATO troops. Let me quote at length from a study by John Hillen of 
The Heritage Foundation, dated November 30, 1995, and titled 
``Questioning The Bosnia Peace Plan'':

       Is a bifurcated Bosnian state a realistic and sustainable 
     political entity? The Bosnian peace accord proposes a Bosnia-
     Herzegovina that has the appearance of a single state, but is 
     in fact based on two very separate political entities--The 
     Bosnian Muslim/Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb 
     Republic. In order for the central organs of Bosnia to 
     actually function as intended, the two separate entities of 
     Bosnia will have to show the most extraordinary goodwill and 
     cooperation towards each other, qualities that have never 
     before been in evidence in Bosnia.
       Many experienced diplomats have expressed skepticism about 
     the political viability of this Bosnian state and the 
     realistic chances of its survival as a centrally governed and 
     coherent nation. * * * Stephen Cambone of the Center for 
     Strategic and International Studies noted that ``any 
     agreement reached in 20 days over issues that have been 
     fiercely fought over for more than four years is fraught with 
     compromises and internal flaws.'' Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the 
     Brookings Institution noted that the accord has ``a lot of 
     loose ends'' and ``many ways in which it could unravel.'' In 
     short, the accord is diplomatically enchanting but 
     realistically impractical.
       Much of this skepticism over the accord is rooted in the 
     fact that the accord does not address fundamental issues of 
     sovereignty and ethnic self-determination. Instead, it 
     freezes those unresolved issues in place and offers up an 
     elaborate power sharing agreement for a Bosnian central 
     government. However, it will be difficult for a contrived 
     central government to replace the bonds of loyalty, 
     authority, and legitimacy that currently exist between 
     Bosnian Croats and Croatia and Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. 
     Those existing bonds are rooted in centuries of political, 
     ethnic, and cultural identity and are sure to prove stronger 
     than bonds to a hastily fabricated central government. * * *
       If history is any guide, this agreement does not stand much 
     chance of lasting. In Cyprus in 1964, international 
     negotiators reached a similar agreement between Turkish and 
     Greek Cypriots. Much like the Bosnian agreement, the doomed 
     Cyprus accord attempted to replace bonds to the ``parent 
     entities'' for both sides (Greece and Turkey) with an 
     unworkable central executive and ethnically aligned 
     parliamentary blocs. This ensured continued intractability 
     except in the event of the most extraordinary goodwill. This 
     structure never worked because it never addressed the 
     fundamental fears and aspirations of the warring factions and 
     was completely predicated on a diplomatic fantasy: the hopes 
     for a degree of cooperation that had never been present in 
     Cyprus. After 10 years of sporadic fighting and instability 
     under this makeshift arrangement, Turkey invaded the island, 
     partitioned Cyprus, and put an end to the ephemeral peace; an 
     imposed peace that was never locally supported. UN 
     peacekeepers have been in Cyprus for over 30 years.
       The same pattern can be expected in Bosnia. How can an 
     imposed peace that does not reflect political realities or 
     the basic concerns of the warring factions hope to survive 
     except by the continued enforcement of thousands of NATO and 
     American troops? The hastily concluded Bosnian peace accord 
     is, by necessity, a weak plan. The weakness is inherent 
     because the accord does not address the fundamental issues 
     that caused the parties to go to war in the first place. It 
     is, at best, a cease-fire that can only work under the 
     continued stewardship of 60,000 heavily armed NATO combat 
     troops.

  Mr. President, it is my view that, in addition to finding threats to 
vital interests in the Balkans where there are none, the President is 
putting U.S. prestige on the line to implement a peace plan that has 
very little chance of succeeding in the long run even if everything 
goes well for a year.


                   The real risks to American troops

  Maybe the most troubling thing about the Administration's approach to 
the Balkans is its confidence that it will be able to control the 
conflict after it jumps in with both feet. The President speaks of a 
``limited, focused'' mission; he tells us that we are ``not fighting a 
war.'' Then why are we sending more than 60,000 troops, reinforced with 
tanks, artillery, and airpower? What of this talk of ``overwhelming 
force'' and ``robust rules of engagement?'' Just what is ``overwhelming 
force'' when you are fighting against landmines? What are ``robust 
rules of engagement'' when you are fighting snipers --an airstrike on 
the village where you think the shot came from? Mr. President, I remind 
my colleagues that we had robust rules of engagement and overwhelming 
force in Vietnam, and they did not work in the end. I think that it is 
utter nonsense to apply these concepts to Bosnia.
  Regardless of any paper agreement signed in Dayton, there are those 
in Bosnia for whom continued fighting is a better deal. There are those 
who are profiting from the war as bandits or on the black market. There 
are those who are used to getting their way with guns; for them this 
war is about money, not ethnicity; one NATO commander told me that they 
had found cases where Serbs were selling black market ammunition to 
Muslims! What about those who will be displaced from their homes by the 
Dayton agreement, who will not willingly leave? What about those who 
have been displaced--there are up to three million refugees in Bosnia-
Herzegovina--for whom peace means ``going home,'' but who will not be 
allowed to return as the result of the agreement? What about fighters 
who are demobilized as a result of the treaty, but cannot find jobs 
because the economy has been ruined? And those who just miss the power 
of a rifle? While I was in Tuzla last month, the commanding general of 
UN Sector Northeast, General Haukland, told me that there will be 
criminality and gangsterism when troops are demobilized. Mr. President, 
what about those who have a score to settle after four years of brutal 
war? One thing is certain, Mr. President--there are a lot of people in 
Bosnia who may be tempted to shoot at Americans, regardless of our 
``overwhelming force'' and ``robust rules of engagement.''


                         A long-term commitment

  On October 17, 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry told the Senate Armed 
Services Committee: ``The U.S. has vital political, economic, and 
security interests in Europe. The war in Bosnia threatens those 
interests, and the U.S. vital security interest is served by stopping 
this war.'' At the same hearing, Secretary Perry states the 
administration's commitment to bringing our troops home in 
approximately one year.
  But the Administration cannot have it both ways. President Clinton 
cannot say that our vital interests are threatened in Bosnia, and at 
the same time pledge that we will be out of Bosnia in about a year. If 
two vital interests--European security and the NATO alliance--are truly 
threatened in Bosnia, how can there be a one-year statute of 
limitations on our response? Since when are American vital interests 
only worth one year's commitment?
  The Administration has also said that United States troops will leave 
Bosnia if the peace agreement is violated and conflict resumes. In 
short, their plan claims to be defending a vital interest, but promises 
that we will leave if enough people shoot at us, or when the 12-month 
clock runs out. But if conflict in Bosnia really threatens a vital U.S. 
interest, are they not committed to ending that conflict no matter what 
it takes, or how long it takes? Is that not what ``vital interest'' 
means? Mr. President, if the administration can tell us that IFOR will 
leave in about a year, no matter what, then there must not be much of a 


[[Page S18517]]
threat or much of a vital interest. If there are vital interests at 
stake, the Administration should be honest and tell the American people 
that we are committed to Bosnia for the long haul.
  If I were sending one of my sons to Bosnia, I would want to know that 
his life was being put on the line to accomplish something important, 
something worth doing at any cost, and something that the American 
people stood firmly behind. But at best, the Dayton plan and IFOR will 
bring a few months' respite to the people of Bosnia. When the war 
resumes after we leave, or if ``systemic violations'' force us out, 
then the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans who died trying to 
impose a token peace in an artificial country will truly have been 
wasted.
  Vital interests are the only thing we should ask our soldiers to die 
for. When U.S. vital interests at stake, the American people and our 
troops alike will tolerate things going badly for a while. They will 
stay the course. If there were vital interests at stake in Bosnia, the 
President would not be giving us all of these details about rules of 
engagement, exit strategies, and time limits--he would not have to.
  Mr. President, administration officials in Washington seem to be the 
only people who think we can finish this operation in a year. Not one 
military or diplomatic person I spoke with on my trip, not a single 
U.S., NATO, or U.N. commander, thought that peace in Bosnia could be 
achieved in anything close to 12 months. Given the forbidding 
geography, harsh winter climate, and wholesale destruction in Bosnia, 
it will be months before even modest degree of stability could be 
restored, even if everyone cooperates fully. The UN commander in Tuzla, 
General Haukland of Norway, described a one-year presence as a hand in 
water--when you take it out, nothing has changed. In Balkan history, a 
year is no time at all.
  The simple truth, Mr. President, is that the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is about to become America's pet country. The United States 
of America is going to own Bosnia and all of her problems just as soon 
as the 1st Armored Division sets up in Tuzla. Does anyone really 
believe that we will leave Bosnia in a year if the threat to her 
stability remains? Does anyone really believe, after arming, training, 
and equipping the Bosnian Army for a year, that we will stand by and 
watch if our pet army is on the verge of defeat? Of course not; if 
Bosnia is as important as the Administration says it is, we will stay 
in Bosnia as long as we have to. We have already employed airstrikes 
against the Serbs; we will do so again if Bosnia is threatened again. I 
say to my colleagues--we are on the verge of what may be a very long 
commitment.
  So Mr. President, I have said that I will resist this plan with all 
of my power, and I will do so down to the wire. I think the peace is 
false, the plan is naive, and the risk to our troops unrealistically 
high. There is only one way to express these conclusions: I urge my 
colleagues to oppose the Dole-McCain Resolution of conditional support, 
and to support the Hutchison-Inhofe Resolution opposing the deployment 
of ground troops to Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I want to make a couple of observations about the 
debate that is taking place tonight. There seems to be a lot of people 
who are going to vote, perhaps, for the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, 
then turn around and vote also for the Dole-McCain resolution. I 
suggest, Mr. President, that would be a little inconsistent.
  After looking at a final copy--and we only received a copy of the 
Dole-McCain resolution a matter of a couple of hours ago in its final 
version--I cannot see that it narrows the mission at all. It starts off 
by saying, ``Before acting, pursuant to the resolution, the President 
shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination. . .''--and 
then they cover a number of things that they want the President to 
certify. For example, the Dole-McCain resolution says: ``The mission 
will be limited to the implementation of the military provisions of the 
Dayton agreement.''
  But the administration has already, in effect, certified this: 
Secretary Christopher said, on December 1: ``Let me assure you that 
IFOR's mission is well-defined and limited. Our troops will enforce the 
military aspects of the agreement. They will not be asked to guarantee 
the success of democracy or reconstruction.''
  Secretary Perry said the same thing: ``The mission of IFOR is to 
oversee and enforce the implementation of the military aspects of the 
peace agreement.'' That is exactly the same as we find in the Dole-
McCain amendment.
  Second, Dole-McCain says: ``An integral part of the successful 
accomplishment of the objective is the establishment of military 
balance.'' This is what the administration has been saying all along. 
For example, Secretary Christopher has said: ``We are committed to 
achieve the stable military balance with Bosnia and among the states of 
the former Yugoslavia.''
  In another part of the Dole-McCain resolution, it says: ``The United 
States will lead an immediate international effort to provide 
equipment, arms, training, and related logistics assistance of the 
highest possible quality to ensure that the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can provide for its own defense.''
  Again, on December 1, Secretary Christopher said: ``The Armed Forces 
in the Federation will need to obtain some equipment and training in 
order to establish an effective self-defense capability. As for our 
part, the United States will ensure that the Federation Armed Forces 
receive the necessary assistance.''
  What I am saying, Mr. President, is I think it is inconsistent for 
someone to vote for Hutchison-Inhofe and turn around and vote for Dole-
McCain. Dole-McCain simply requires the President to say what he has 
been saying all along. Is that supposed to narrow the mission? Is that 
supposed to reassure us?
  Second, Mr. President, I was listening very attentively to the very 
knowledgeable and scholarly Senator from West Virginia, Senator Byrd, 
talking about the constitutional rights of the President and the 
responsibilities of the President and also the constitutional rights of 
Congress. I thought, all the way through, that he was coming to the 
conclusion that the President cannot do what he has already done. At 
least that is what I was inferring from his remarks. But I gather he 
will support the President by voting for Dole-McCain.
  I did hear several other valuable arguments during the course of the 
day. Senator Feingold came out with some very strong constitutional 
arguments that would lead one to believe that the President has indeed 
overstepped his powers. He referred to an article by Louis Fisher, 
which I later made a part of this Record. He says: ``The framers knew 
that the British King could use military force against other countries 
without legislative involvement. They gave to Congress the 
responsibility for deciding matters of war and peace. The President, as 
Commander in Chief, was left with the power to repel sudden attacks.''
  So that qualifies what the President is able to do within his 
constitutional rights. We made that a part of the Record. In sitting 
and listening to the debate today--and I stayed in the Chamber the 
entire day, as I feel this is the most critical vote we will have, 
probably, at least in the last year or 2, and I wanted to hear 
everyone's viewpoint. I think the distinguished Senator from Alabama, 
Senator Heflin, talked at some length about how this should be a 
European mission. I have said over and over again that maybe we have a 
responsibility--and I am not going to debate that because everybody is 
assuming that we have a responsibility to protect the integrity of 
NATO, to respond in some way to the atrocities that have taken place. I 
have suggested that there are atrocities taking place all over the 
world. Where do you draw the line? Do you draw it here? Or are we, in 
fact, doing this because the President, in February 1993, made a 
statement that he was going to send ground troops in?
  But the Senator from Alabama, Senator Heflin, talked about the fact 
that this should be a European mission. Nobody will deny that it is 
more a responsibility of Europe than it is the United States. Yet, we 
talk about the contribution that our NATO partners are making to this. 

[[Page S18518]]

  Germany, who is in the backyard of the Balkans, is sending a total of 
4,000 troops, and they debated it in their legislative body before 
agreeing to do that. We did not have time to debate it before we did 
it. Yet, we are talking about sending five times the troops that 
Germany is sending.
  I listened very carefully while several people on the floor made 
points. I want to briefly respond to a couple of them. First of all, as 
far as our troops being supported, I think we all have made it 
abundantly clear that we in this body, as well as the other body, are 
supporting our troops, not just here, but all around the world. What 
greater support could there be for our troops than by not sending them 
into this hostile area to start with? That is real support of the 
troops.
  That is what we are trying to do with the Hutchison-Inhofe 
resolution--make it abundantly clear that our troops should not have to 
be over there. When they are over there--if, in fact, they end up in a 
mass deployment--yes, we will support our troops all the way. I think 
that has been said over and over again. I do not think anybody is going 
to deny that.
  The Senator from New Mexico, Senator Domenici, made a very good 
point. What we are trying to do is state our opposition to this before 
it gets started.
  You see, the troops are not deployed yet. Yes, there are some there. 
We will support those. Those are the advance troops, logistic troops, 
but the mass deployment that the President has promised immediately 
after the signing of this agreement in Paris has not yet taken place. 
So this debate is taking place now, before the mass deployment has 
taken place.
  The junior Senator from California commented in her remarks that this 
deployment was acceptable ``as long as it remains a peacekeeping 
mission.'' I suggest to the junior Senator from California it is not a 
peacekeeping mission now. We keep hearing about peacekeeping as if 
there is currently peace to keep. There is a cease-fire in effect. But 
I have been in parts of Bosnia during this cease-fire when the gunfire 
was going off; in some parts of the northeast sector, near Tuzla, they 
do not even know there is a cease-fire. The title that we are giving 
ourselves now, giving to I-FoR, is ``peace implementation.'' There is a 
big difference between peacekeeping and peace implementation. Peace 
implementation means we do not have peace now but we will implement it. 
That is a totally different mission.
  Mission creep has already crept into this, Mr. President. The exit 
strategy seems to be to keep peace for a year, and then leave. As the 
junior Senator from California said, all we have to do is keep peace 
for a year and we are out of there. She is saying exactly what 
Secretary Christopher said, exactly what General Shalikashvili said as 
recently as last week before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
saying it is inconceivable we will not be out of there in a year.
  During my visit with the Norwegian general who commands the U.N.'s 
northeast sector, in the Tuzla area, I mentioned ``12 months,'' he 
smiled and said, ``You mean 12 years.'' And when we talked about 12 
months he said, ``Apparently the American people do not understand the 
way the people in that region think, the Serbs, the Croats, and the 
Moslems. Their conception of time is totally different.'' He used an 
analogy I have used on the floor. It is like putting your hand in water 
for 12 months, you look and take your hand out and nothing has 
happened. When we leave the war will start again. If they know we will 
be gone in a year, which we have said we will be--the President has 
reaffirmed that as recently as last week, and it was reaffirmed a week 
ago by Secretary of Defense Perry--what will they do? Lay low for a 
year and then come back out swinging. By the way, Mr. President, the 
combatants in this conflict have a habit of laying low every winter.
  I do not think I have ever in my life--and I did serve in the Armed 
Forces--I do not ever remember a time in our Nation's history or in the 
history of warfare where we went into a hostile area and then our exit 
strategy was geared to time, instead of being geared to events. But 
that is exactly what we are proposing to do here.
  The senior Senator from California was talking about ``A far greater 
risk in doing nothing than in sending our troops.'' I suggest that it 
is not quite that easy. It would be easy if we were able to pass the 
Hutchison-Inhofe resolution and the President would look at this and 
say clearly we do not have Congress behind sending ground troops in but 
we have a responsibility to NATO, we have a responsibility to Bosnia. 
If he felt that way he could do it and we could do it through air 
power. We have already been there with airstrikes. We know that works. 
We could lift the arms embargo.
  Sure, our European partners do not want us to do that. They want us 
on the ground there. People talk about how well received our President 
was over in Europe. I think if I lived in Europe I would be receiving 
him well, too. He is coming over and proposing that we fight their 
battle for them. I suggest that there are other alternatives.
  Senator Ashcroft from Missouri was talking about the speech that the 
President made in 1993 and suggested something I had not thought about. 
Maybe the President made the commitment of United States ground troops 
back in February 1993 without having been really apprised of the 
situation in Bosnia, the deep hostility, the history of that area, the 
history of World War I, World War II, the 500-year-old civil war, and 
what has been going on over there for many years.
  The Senator from Delaware, Senator Biden, was articulate and 
outspoken when he talked about the different parties there. I think he 
referred to Milosevic as someone who was perhaps a war criminal, and 
certainly he talked about the others who had actually been indicted for 
war crimes. Lastly, it was Senator Kohl who said that we either support 
peace or we do not. I think there are many ways where we can offer our 
support without doing it on the ground. I will mention one other thing 
that the Senator from North Carolina mentioned when he talked about the 
fact that the bridges and the roads in that sector--from Hungary down 
south through Tuzla, down toward Sarajevo, in the area that goes from 
the Posavina corridor down to Tuzla--that the roads would not 
accommodate an M-1 tank. We found out when we were over there that 
there is only one bridge in that entire area that they say can handle 
it structurally. The Americans will have to come in and rebuild the 
bridges, rebuild the roads, and if they do not they will start a civil 
war because the people are upset for us coming in and messing up the 
existing roads with our tanks. This came from the people now in 
command, the U.N. people in the northeast sector.
  The most profound thing I have heard on the floor of the Senate today 
came from the very distinguished Senator from Indiana, Senator Coats. 
He asked the question, ``Have we so squandered American leadership that 
we must buy it back with American lives?'' I think this puts it in 
perspective. If we are wanting to prove to someone that we have this 
leadership, that we must lead and whatever NATO decides to do is in the 
best interest of the allies and that we must blindly go along with 
them, do we do this at the risk of lives?
  On October 17 we asked the question of Secretary Christopher and 
Secretary Perry. This was after Gen. Michael Rose made the statement if 
the Americans get into this war they will sustain more losses than they 
did during the Persian Gulf war, where we lost a total of 390 lives.
  I asked the question, is your mission here worth 400 or more lives? 
Secretary Christopher said yes; Secretary Perry said yes; General 
Shalikashvili said yes. I think that is a defining difference between 
the administration's view and my own.
  I think that we need to at least acknowledge this body is already on 
record opposing what President Clinton is about to do. So it is not a 
matter of waiting until the last minute, until the last hour. Over a 
month ago we passed a sense-of-the-Congress amendment in both the House 
and Senate, attached to the Defense appropriations bill by Senator 
Gregg: ``It is the sense of Congress that none of the funds available 
for the Department of Defense should be obligated or exploited for the 
deployment or participation of the United States Armed Forces in any 
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina * * *.'' 

[[Page S18519]]

  This opposition is not something we are coming up with today for the 
first time. The Senate is already on record.
  Lastly, let me go over some of the things that were talked about on 
the floor today in terms of danger. I think we are kind of trying to 
soften this thing, trying to gloss over the dangers. Some say we will 
go over and everyone will be kissing the American flag and everyone 
will love us because we brought peace into the Balkans. If you stop and 
look, and this came out of the Defense News, of the various elements 
over there, the Croats have 80,000 soldiers; the Croatian Serbs 50,000; 
Serbia, 125,000; Bosnia, 110,000; Bosnian Serbs, 80,000; Bosnian 
Croats, 50,000. That is not even talking about the rogue elements, and 
there are some nine rogue elements that are over there.
  It is so convoluted it reminds me of the letter that came back from 
one of our warriors who lost his life in Somalia. It was the son of 
Captain James Smith, who read me the letter of his son. His son was 
Cpl. Jim Smith who lost his life. Capt. Jim Smith lost his leg in 
Vietnam and his son lost his life in Somalia. His was one of those 
corpses dragged through the street in Mogadishu. His last letter said: 
Dad, we cannot tell who our friends are and who they are not. We cannot 
tell the difference.

  I suggest that is exactly the situation that we have here. Many 
people have talked about the fact that we are going to have just 20,000 
or 25,000 troops over there. I hope no one is kidding themselves, 
deluding themselves thinking that is all we are going to have.
  There was an article in the Defense News that gave a very persuasive 
argument that we would end up with a total NATO force of 240,000 
troops. Keeping our ratio, that would be 80,000 Americans who will be 
involved over there.
  Go back and read your history. British Prime Minister Disraeli, over 
100 years ago, who had been observing the battles over there, said, 
``It will take a half-million troops to bring peace to the Balkans.''
  I think, when we look at the timeframe of 12 months--that is 
fictitious. It is not going to happen. The 20,000 troops, that is not 
going to happen. The mission is peacekeeping--that already is not 
happening, it is now peace implementation. We are kidding ourselves.
  We have already had a vote on H.R. 2606. That was a very strong vote, 
even though there were just 22 who voted in favor of it. Those are the 
people who really feel the strongest about not sending troops into that 
area. But we are going to have another record vote. That record vote is 
going to take place this evening.
  We are going to have two record votes. When you have the first vote 
on the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, think very carefully. Because if 
you vote for that, as I said when I opened these remarks, you cannot 
turn around and vote for the Dole-McCain resolution because they are 
inconsistent with each other. This is the last opportunity that the 
Senators who are here and will be voting tonight will have to get on 
record. This is their last shot, the last chance they have to say no, 
we should not send ground troops into Bosnia.
  I do not think it is possible for anyone to understand the hostility 
of the area if he or she has not been up there to Tuzla where our 
troops will go. To the best of my knowledge, only two Members of 
Congress have been up there, Senator Hank Brown from Colorado and 
myself. When we had a meeting the other day in the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, I discovered that even Secretary Perry had not been 
up there, Secretary Christopher had not been up there, General 
Shalikashvili had not been up there, and certainly President Clinton 
has not been up there.
  I cannot imagine that they would be willing to take chances in a 
hostile area without going up and looking at it. I can tell you 
firsthand, and I went over much of that area in a helicopter not more 
than 100 feet off the treetops with Gen. Rupert Smith, a British 
general. We looked down and for the first time we could realize how 
Marshal Tito was able to hold off the very best that Hitler had on a 
ratio of 1 to 8, because of the unique environment, the very hostile 
and forbidding environment.
  Mr. President, this is going to be probably the most significant vote 
that many Members of this body will cast. It is going to be tonight. I 
would like to have them think long and hard. Because if you vote for--
if you vote against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution and vote for the 
Dole-McCain resolution, you are saying we agree with the basic policy 
of sending ground troops.
  You see, I think everybody knows now, we can support our troops and 
not support the policy. That is an easy thing to do. We all support our 
troops. The greatest support we could give our troops is to not to 
deploy them into that warring area.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senator from 
Minnesota is recognized for 7 minutes.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, 4 years of mass executions, mass rape, 
mass murders, brutal ethnic cleansing, sieges against civilians, terror 
campaigns, atrocities, and genocide not seen in Europe since the end of 
World War II--\1/4\-million people dead, 3 million people in the region 
refugees, and if we were to think about this in terms of our 
population, that would be the equivalent of 170 million American 
refugees.
  The people of Bosnia deserve relief from years of armed conflict, 
relief from displacement, relief from malnutrition and hunger, relief 
from winters without heat or electricity, relief from war crimes and, 
yes, relief from the indifference of the rest of the world.
  I traveled to the former Yugoslavia by myself 2 years ago. I went 
with my legislative assistant, Colin McGinnis. I visited with people in 
the refugee camps, and I saw enough pain and enough misery to last me 
for a lifetime. The Dayton agreement is the best and perhaps it is the 
last chance for peace in the region. That is why I intend to support 
it.
  While I am speaking on the floor, I would like to express my thanks 
and my love to the family of three American diplomats killed in Bosnia 
while serving the cause of peace.
  Our proper constitutional role as Senators and Representatives is to 
not give broad grants of authority to any President. I have talked to 
experts outside the Congress, had many briefings from people in the 
administration, met with people in the former Yugoslavia, and I have 
tried to the best of my ability to make the best decision for my 
country and for the world that I live in. I believe it is our 
responsibility to make sure the objectives are limited. I believe it is 
our responsibility to insist on as much clarity as possible.
  There are several reserve units going from Minnesota, and, as a 
Senator, I owe those families. It is my responsibility to make sure 
that everything is done that can be done to preserve their safety and 
the safety of all of our soldiers who are there--not to go to war, as I 
listen to the Senator from Oklahoma, but are there to secure a peace.
  Do I have concerns? You bet I have concerns. I do not think the arms 
control provisions of this agreement are very strong. I worry about the 
international police provisions; I think they are weak. I believe that 
there should have been, in the Dayton agreement, really a clear 
understanding--we keep talking about this 1-year time agreement--that 
the Europeans are a part of the transition and that they assume the 
responsibility for peacekeeping so that when we leave after a year or 
thereabouts, in fact the presence of NATO is there. Because it is not 
clear to me that we will be able to accomplish our objectives in that 
period of time.

  Do I worry? You bet I worry. I have been up at night trying to decide 
what the right decision would be. I worry about the landmines. I have 
had briefings from our military, and there are reasons for all of us to 
worry. Our soldiers are trained, they have been doing the training in 
Germany, but I worry about that. I worry about depending on Milosevic. 
I think Milosevic is a war criminal. And when I hear Milosevic has made 
this commitment and that commitment, it makes me nervous.
  I wonder what the meaning is when General Mladic says he has not 
agreed to this agreement. Does he go to the hills with his soldiers? I 
worry about that as well.
  This has been a difficult decision for me, but in the end I really 
believe that we are doing the right thing as a nation. In the end, I 
think the alternative 

[[Page S18520]]
to no peacekeeping force there--and there will be no peacekeeping force 
and there will be no agreement if we are not a part of that force--will 
be a living hell. The alternative, I say to my colleagues, will be a 
living hell: More genocide, more rape, more murder, more mass 
executions in Bosnia. And it could be a war that spreads to Central 
Europe.
  We are there to do the right thing. I believe that. I believe that 
for our children. I believe that for my children.
  In the end, I stand on the side of hope, hope for an end to this 
conflict, hope for an end to its attendant horrors, hope for a better 
world that we live in, hope for the peoples of that region, hope for an 
end to the bitter ethnic divisions, hope for an end to the religious 
hatred.
  I believe that we, therefore, in casting this vote in supporting our 
soldiers and in supporting this peacekeeping mission--I believe we cast 
the right vote. That is why I will vote for the Dole-McCain resolution, 
and that is why I am in opposition to the Inhofe-Hutchison resolution.
  Mr. President, on the day before the formal signing of the Paris 
Peace Agreement on Bosnia, we are gathered here for a historic debate. 
I want to share with my colleagues my views on the deployment of United 
States peacekeepers to Bosnia to participate in the NATO peacekeeping 
mission there.
  Designed to help put an end to the violence that has cost so many 
lives and so much suffering over the last 4 years, it offers real hope 
for peace. After much thought, I have come to a simple conclusion. With 
U.S. participation in the NATO peace effort, there is a real chance for 
a durable peace that could break the brutal cycle of violence there. 
Without our participation, we face an almost certain resumption of the 
fighting, and possibly a wider Balkan war.
  This war has taken a horrible toll, not only on the people of the 
region, but also on the conscience of people everywhere who have 
watched it unfold in all its horror on their TV screens, and struggled 
to figure out a way to help end it.
  For 4 years the people of Bosnia have suffered some of the worst 
atrocities in Europe: mass executions, mass rapes, brutal ethnic 
cleansing, sieges against innocent civilian populations, and terror 
campaigns. Atrocities we have not seen since the end of WW II.
  So far, the war there has left a quarter of a million dead, and 
nearly 3 million people from the region refugees, expelled from their 
homes and villages in brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing. Three 
million refugees. Think of that. If such a war were fought here in the 
United States, by population share that would be equal to about 170 
million American refugees.
  The people of Bosnia deserve immediate relief from the years of armed 
conflict, displacement, malnutrition and hunger, winters without heat 
or electricity, war crimes, and at times indifference by the rest of 
the world. The Dayton agreement offers a promise of such relief. I 
visited the Balkans 2 years ago. I met many people there, including 
many refugees who had been expelled from their homes, and who had lost 
loved ones and friends. I know the trials and horror they have 
experienced.
  Even in the face of these horrors, the President's decision to send 
United States troops to Bosnia is one of the most difficult foreign 
policy choices our country has confronted since the end of the cold 
war. The risks of the deployment, though I think they have been greatly 
reduced by the administration's careful planning, are real. From the 
millions of landmines left over from the war, to irregular forces, to 
weather, to other hazards, this mission is not without its dangers.
  But while many of us have had differing views about the proper United 
States role in Bosnia over the past 4 years, and some of us had pressed 
for tougher action against the Serbs for many months, there is one 
thing that is becoming more and more clear. The Dayton agreement is the 
best, and perhaps the last, chance for peace in the region. That's why 
I intend to support it.

  Full and effective implementation of this agreement offers the best 
hope to stop this brutal war, and to give the parties a chance to 
recover, and to rebuild their cities, to rebuild their nations. After 
months of fruitful negotiations led by the United States, and with the 
Europeans providing the bulk of peacekeeping forces to help monitor the 
agreement, I believe it would be a mistake for the U.S. Congress to 
sound an uncertain, quavering trumpet now regarding our commitment to 
peace in the region.
  Through tough-minded, tenacious diplomacy, President Clinton's envoy 
Richard Holbrooke worked for many months to help the warring parties 
craft an agreement that could bring an end to the bloodshed. He 
deserves our praise, and our thanks--as do those three American 
diplomats killed in Bosnia while serving the cause of peace.
  President Clinton observed in his recent speech that the United 
States can't be the world's policeman, but we can become involved in 
circumstances such as this, where we have a compelling national 
interest in maintaining the peace, where we have a chance to be 
effective, and where we have a clear duty to help.
  Over the course of the last few weeks, I have talked with the 
President and with his chief foreign policy advisors, including 
Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry, and 
pressed them to ensure our mission was clear, limited, and governed by 
strict rule of engagement that would allow our troops to protect 
themselves in any circumstances. The Dayton Agreement provides for 
sweeping NATO rules of engagement that will allow U.S. forces to use 
all appropriate force to protect themselves. In the last 2 weeks, I 
have been urging administration officials to clarify the limited, 
narrow goals of the mission; how they intend to measure progress toward 
those goals, and the limits they will impose on U.S. troop activity in 
the region. I believe they have made real progress in clarifying each 
of these areas.
  This is our proper role in Congress: to press administration 
officials to clarify key points of their plan, ensure that objectives 
are limited and attainable, that an exit strategy is clearly laid out, 
and that planning for a post-U.S. presence upon withdrawal, composed 
presumably of Europeans, is moving forward. I believe that we have done 
that, pressing those responsible in the administration to close some 
gaps in their thinking that will serve our troops well in the long run.
  I have thought long and hard about this deployment and, in addition 
to my discussions with the President and his senior advisors, have 
consulted extensively with those whom I represent in Minnesota, 
administration officials at the working level in the Pentagon, the 
State Department, and elsewhere. I have talked with outside regional 
experts, and others. I've talked with Minnesota military personnel who 
are being deployed to Europe. There are several reserve units from 
Minnesota whose members are being deployed to Europe, and I am aware of 
my direct and profound responsibilities to them and to their families--
and to the families of all our troops--to ensure that everything 
possible is done to preserve their safety.

  The Dayton Agreement, especially its key military annexes, were 
clearly designed with these concerns in mind. And it has garnered broad 
support. It has the support of the Russians, of the U.N. Security 
Council, NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, each of whom will play a key role in its 
implementation. It is truly a multilateral effort, of which the 
administration should be proud.
  But even though we played a key role in the development of this 
agreement among the parties, let us not forget one critical thing; this 
is their agreement, not ours. It was developed by the parties, not 
imposed by outsiders. They have asked other nations, including the 
United States, to help secure the future of that agreement.
  And they have assured us, NATO, and the U.N. Security Council that 
they will respect its terms, and take steps to protect our peacekeeping 
forces. Over 25 nations have responded to the call to help secure this 
peace. As the last remaining superpower, we have an obligation to join 
them. If the current ceasefire holds, and the peace agreement is signed 
tomorrow in Paris and begins to be implemented on schedule in the next 
few weeks, we have a duty, I believe, to help. 

[[Page S18521]]

  I think it would be irresponsible to sit aside and allow the horrors 
that have taken place in Bosnia to continue. Our great hope is that 
this peace agreement might finally secure a lasting peace; we must not 
abandon that hope now by cutting off funds for our troops, or by 
refusing to grant at least conditional support for the mission.
  I have decided to support this peacekeeping deployment, even though I 
am fully aware of the potential risks and problems with it. For 
example, I believe the arms control and international police provisions 
of the Dayton Agreement are weak, and must be strengthened. And they 
are being strengthened and fleshed out, by NATO planners and through 
proposals offered last weekend at the London Implementing Conference. 
In the end, how they are implemented will make the big difference, and 
we in Congress must monitor this carefully. The reporting requirements 
of the Dole-McCain resolution will help ensure that Congress is kept 
informed on a formal, timely basis of developments in key areas of the 
accord's implementation, in both its military and civilian aspects.
  Likewise, I remain somewhat concerned that the very broad NATO rules 
of engagement leave considerable room for interpretation on the part of 
NATO field commanders there about how to react when faced with violent 
civil disturbances, hostage situations, harassment by irregular forces, 
or other similar situations. I know they do so to provide flexibility 
to our commanders in the field, but this is another area which must be 
monitored carefully. Supervising the separation of forces, maintained 
by the parties, is one thing. But serving as local police forces is 
quite another. While I know the Dayton Agreement prohibits the latter, 
we must be careful to ensure that the potential for any mission creep 
is strictly limited.
  We have heard a lot of heartfelt debate today, and expressions of 
concern about the potential for an extended, open-ended deployment. To 
those who are worried that Bosnia could turn out to be a quagmire, I 
can only say I have consulted as broadly as I could, weighted the risks 
as responsibly as I could, and I do not believe that is going to 
happen. I believe the administration has built into its implementation 
plans sufficient safeguards to avoid this problem, including strict 
limits on the areas where our troops will be, and on their mission. If 
I did believe this was a real risk, I would fiercely oppose this 
deployment. Let there be no mistake. This will be a NATO operation, 
with clear lines of command and rules of engagement, run by an American 
general. The mission is not open-ended. Our troops will be heavily 
armed, with the power and authority to respond to any potential threats 
as forcefully as necessary.
  Of course, there are some concerns that can never be fully met. For 
example, I have doubts about the sincerity of Serb President Milosevic, 
and about his ability to deliver on his promises. I have even less 
confidence in the Bosnian Serbs. I am frankly alarmed that General 
Mladic has not been willing to support the agreement, that Serb 
civilians in the Sarajevo suburbs have been so vocal in opposing it, 
and that the Bosnians have resisted cutting their ties with radical 
states like Iran. But those doubts should not deter us from at least 
supporting this attempt at peace; they simply offer reasons for 
caution.
  I have raised some of these concerns explicitly with the President 
and his advisors. I have asked tough questions of administration 
officials about how they intend to make good on United States 
commitments to lead an effort to provide arms and training to the 
Bosnian Government while serving as neutral peacekeepers. While I have 
in the past supported lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians, I 
believe that with this agreement there is a real chance to stablize the 
situation through arms control, rather than primarily through building 
up the opposing armies.
  That's where our emphasis should be now. Demilitarization on all 
sides, not remilitarization, is the appropriate course to follow to 
estalish a military balance between the Serbs and the Moslem-Croat 
Federation. Once a full NATO balance-of-forces assessment is complete, 
the report required by the Dole resolution is submitted to Congress, 
and the arms build-down begins in earnest, I am hopeful that full 
compliance with the arms control provisions of the peace agreement will 
go a long way toward equalizing the forces. And if it does not complete 
the task, there will be plenty of moderate Moslem nations willing to 
help arm, equip, and train the Bosnians to better defend themselves, as 
necessary.
  I have also raised questions about the criteria that will be applied 
by NATO to measure progress toward its goals, and about the timetable 
for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. Administration officials 
have provided me with all the information they could on these 
questions. While many of us would like to know that our troops will 
come home by next Christmas, I do not think the administration can 
realistically provide firm assurances that that will happen, and I 
think that it would be foolish to demand them as a condition for our 
support, since it could place our troops in great jeopardy if they are 
pulled our prematurely.
  I do know the President intends to have us get in, complete our 
mission, and get out, as swiftly as possible, and that General 
Shalikashvili has indicated that 1 year is more than sufficient time to 
accomplish the limited military goals of the mission. Completing our 
mission should be our primary goal, not meeting some arbitrary 
timetable that may by driven more by domestic politics than by the 
situation on the ground in Bosnia.
  Whether 1 year is also sufficient time to secure other, broader 
goals, including return of refugees, free and fair elections, and 
rebuilding of war-torn Bosnia, is unlikely. I know of almost no one who 
believes it is possible in that timeframe. But at least this year-long 
respite can end the violence, and start them on the road toward peace. 
I hope that we will be able to work out an agreement with out allies 
that will provide for a much smaller, residual force that could stay 
there longer, if needed, to monitor compliance with the accord. 
Composed largely of NATO troops from Europe, this force could begin to 
shoulder primary responsibility for the mission after 9 to 10 months. I 
have urged the administration to explore this more vigorously, because 
I think it is key to our exit strategy in the region. I would have 
preferred that it be built into this resolution. But I am satisfied 
that the administration has taken seriously this concern, and will take 
steps to explore it with our allies.
  On these and many other questions, administration officials have been 
very forthcoming. Where they were unable to provide clear answers, for 
example on the planned composition of a follow-on force if such a force 
were necessary after U.S. withdrawal, they outlined for me the state of 
their current thinking. Frankly, there is still much work to be done by 
NATO, the U.N. Security Council, and others over the course of the next 
few weeks and months to nail down answers to some of these key 
questions. But overall, I am satisfied that this deployment has been 
carefully planned and will be executed ably by our military forces. It 
is the responsible thing to do, the right thing to do. And that's why I 
intend to support it.
  Many Americans remain skeptical of U.S. participation in this 
peacekeeping effort. I continue to believe it is critical that the 
President have the support of the American people and their 
representatives in Congress before moving forward. And I think that as 
this process has moved forward, and the President and his advisors have 
made clear the limited, narrow nature of the NATO mission, more 
Americans are being persuaded that this peacekeeping effort is the 
right thing to do.
  Whatever we decide today, the President has already started sending 
U.S. troops to serve as advance support for the U.S. mission there. We 
must support the troops, and their families here in the United States, 
in every way we can. This resolution expresses clearly our support for 
their efforts.
  Mr. President, this has been a difficult decision for me. But in the 
end I stand on the side of hope--hope for an end to the conflict and 
its attendant horrors, hope for a better future for the peoples of that 
region, hope for an end to the bitter ethnic and religious hatreds that 
have engulfed the region. It is a hope tempered by realism, though, 
about the road that lies ahead, and the potential pitfalls of this 
agreement.

[[Page S18522]]

  Finally, let me say this. Over the last few weeks, some have asked me 
why I would be willing to consider supporting this peacekeeping 
deployment, when I opposed our going to war in the Persian Gulf. There 
a host of major differences between the two situations, not least of 
which is that our troops were being sent to the Persian Gulf to go to 
war; in Bosnia, they are going to secure a peace. The have been invited 
by the parties in Bosnia to secure a peace agreement, under firm 
security assurances provided by the parties. I opposed the war in the 
gulf, among other reasons, because--like Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Colin Powell--I believed the tough U.N.-imposed sanctions 
ought to have been given more time to bite. In Bosnia, I do not believe 
that are realistic alternatives to this peacekeeping deployment that 
have gone untried.
  This may be the opportunity that is needed, Mr. President, to break 
the cycle of violence in the lands of the former Yugoslavia by helping 
to keep the sides apart for a year in order to give them some time to 
begin putting their lives back together. Hopefully a year of peace will 
bring about something more lasting. It is my hope for the future of the 
peoples of that region that has led to me to conclude that we should 
support the President's action. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
support of this resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
North Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the Hutchison-Inhofe 
resolution opposing President Clinton sending American troops to 
Bosnia, I am obliged to note that the administration's problem is that 
it lacks a coherent policy for resolving the war in the former 
Yugoslavia. That is it, pure and simple.
  A coherent policy must be based upon a clear-eyed assessment of the 
United States national interest in the Balkans. It must employ a means 
to address our national interest, calculated in direct proportion to 
the threat posed to the United States. Most of all, a coherent policy 
must have an end, a goal, a point at which we can define when the 
mission is accomplished.
  The administration's plan has none of these elements.
  The foundation of President Clinton's policy in Bosnia is not the 
national interest--it is desperation. This desperation to fill the 
vacuum of American leadership in Bosnia has led the President to make a 
disastrous decision. In a last, desperate act he is demanding that the 
U.S. military rescue his foreign policy.
  The American people should be prepared for the possibility that 
American lives will be lost any time our national interest is at stake. 
I am certain that if asked to go to war our brave men and women in 
uniform would, without hesitation, heed the President's call. I salute 
those who would serve the Nation so readily, but I cannot and will not 
support the President's decision to ask them to make this sacrifice. 
The risk to the lives of our troops far exceeds any national interest 
the United States could possibly have--particularly as defined by 
President Clinton--any national interest we could possibly have in the 
Balkans.
  The question will not go away: ``Mr. President, what precisely is 
your goal? What is your objective in Bosnia? Is it the creation of an 
inviolable Bosnian nation?'' If so, the Dayton Agreement assuredly does 
not accomplish that goal. The agreement--pure and simple--is the 
partitioning of a sovereign nation on ethnic lines.
  Is Mr. Clinton's goal to provide the people of Bosnia the means of 
defending themselves? If so, the President has so far shown no 
inclination to do so. Is it to save his own foreign policy and salvage 
his administration's standing on the world stage? If so, it is too 
late, and a disastrous military campaign in the Balkans can only do 
harm to the reputation and prestige of the United States far beyond 
what the 3 years of inaction by the administration already have.
  The Bosnian people do not deserve war. Americans do not deserve to 
die in support of a policy that will not bring peace to the Bosnians. 
What we can and must do is help the people of that nation help 
themselves. If we truly want to guarantee lasting peace in the Balkans, 
we need to give the Bosnian people the tools of peace: the means to 
defend themselves from renewed Serb aggression.
  Mr. President, more than 3 months ago I introduced legislation to 
provide the Bosnian people with American arms and training that they 
need to defend themselves. That legislation calls upon the 
administration to lead an international effort to coordinate 
contributions from those countries who wish to join in helping the 
Bosnians acquire the means of self-defense.
  I will do everything in my power to help the Bosnians acquire the 
means to defend themselves. But I cannot, I do not, and I will not 
support sending American soldiers to fight, and to die, in Bosnia for 
the sake of an agreement that offers no more than a brief pause while 
all sides prepare for the next round of Balkan wars.
  Mr. President, I thank you. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Washington is recognized for 9 minutes.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to express my qualified support 
for the deployment of United States military personnel as part of the 
NATO force to implement the Bosnia peace plan.
  The President has made a compelling case to the American people in 
support of U.S. participation in the NATO peacekeeping force. He has 
said that the NATO military mission will be clear, limited, and 
achievable; and that the risks to our troops will be minimized.
  Congress has had the opportunity to go over this plan carefully, 
through a series of extensive briefings and hearings, which have been 
held over the last few weeks by at least four committees. Through this 
process, we have gotten answers to many of our questions, but certainly 
not all of them.
  As the polls and phone calls reveal, the public is extremely wary 
about this operation. They know this is a mission with an uncertain 
outcome, where American sons and daughters may lose their lives. They 
are worried that our troops will be dragged into a civil conflict, 
despite our intentions to the contrary.
  I have set aside extra time over the last several weeks to meet with 
and hear from constituents on this issue, many of whom have sons, 
daughters, husbands and wives likely to be deployed in Bosnia. I have 
listened to their fears and reservations. They are understandably 
worried--about landmines, snipers, civil disorder, undisciplined local 
factions, hostage taking, and other risks inherent in this mission.
  And like most Americans, my constituents wonder aloud why the nations 
of Europe have not been able to solve this crisis on their own. Knowing 
how pressing the needs are here at home, they are weary of the constant 
need for American leadership abroad. Many resent the U.S. in the role 
of global policeman--again.
  I have also met with relief workers who have been working on the 
ground in Bosnia, to learn from their perspective how much rebuilding 
lies ahead for the people of this war-torn nation. This is an extremely 
important issue, because the success of NATO's military mission will be 
measured against the gains made in the civilian sector to reestablish a 
viable economic and political life throughout Bosnia.
  While it is important to point out that NATO's implementation force, 
or IFOR, will not be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian 
operations, the two operations will work to complement one another. But 
the IFOR will not be a police force, and it will not conduct nation-
building. Nor will the IFOR address the numerous issues surrounding the 
return of refugees. Rather, IFOR's mission is simple and 
straightforward --to keep the peace so that civilian and political 
leaders have an opportunity to rebuild Bosnian society.
  Our military leadership has repeatedly reassured Congress that the 
limited nature of this mission can be accomplished in 1 year's time, 
with most of the military tasks contained in the agreement accomplished 
in the first 6 months. After that, IFOR's role will be to maintain a 
climate of stability so that the civil tasks outlined in the peace 
agreement can take root. 

[[Page S18523]]

  In the words of Secretary Perry, the goal is to ``break the cycle of 
violence'' so that the civilian efforts--economic development, free 
elections, and the return of refugees--can have an opportunity to take 
hold. But regardless of what the situation looks like 1 year from now, 
the Secretary has said that ``we must not be drawn into a posture of 
indefinite garrison.''
  Mr. President, it is this very limited mission that I am agreeing to 
with my vote today. I want to be clear--my support for this mission is 
qualified. I will be following developments closely in the weeks and 
months ahead. While I believe it is in our national interests to 
participate in a limited way in this operation, I feel very strongly 
that once we have paved the way for the Bosnian people to make peace, 
our role will be over and we should leave.
  Yes, we can provide the opportunity for peace. But if, after a year's 
time, the Bosnian people themselves have not seized this chance, we 
should and must leave.
  Having said that, I do believe that what we are about to do is 
incredibly important. Certainly this deployment carries risks. But I 
believe those risks must be measured against the promise for peace this 
agreement contains. The conditions are right for peace in Bosnia. And 
like Secretary Perry, I have concluded that the risks to the United 
States of allowing the war to continue are greater than the risks of 
enforcing the peace.
  I agree with the President, our Secretaries of Defense and State, and 
our Nation's top military leaders. The United States has critical 
political, economic and security interests in Europe, and the war in 
Bosnia threatens those interests. The Dayton peace plan is the first 
opportunity we have had to end the war, and I believe we have to give 
it a chance.
  In implementing the peace agreement, NATO will be embarking on its 
first land operation in history. Every NATO country with the exception 
of Iceland will be committing troops to this operation. The United 
States will contribute one-third of the necessary troops for IFOR. The 
British will provide 13,000 troops, the French 8,000. In addition, more 
than a dozen non-NATO nations have indicated a willingness to 
participate.
  Our troops will be headquartered in Tuzla, where they will also have 
with them a Nordic brigade of close to 4,500 troops. 1,000 of those 
Nordic troops have been stationed in the Tuzla area for over a year, 
and will be able to provide our troops with important information on 
the region and its risks. Perhaps most astonishingly, there will be a 
Russian brigade that will be a part of the American division, numbering 
several thousand troops.
  The NATO mission, while carefully planned and trained for by our 
Nation's best military leaders, faces many uncertainties. We owe our 
troops no less than the finest training and equipment possible, and in 
this regard we can take great reassurance. We know that the troops we 
are sending to Bosnia are strong, capable and ready. They have 
undergone thorough and intensive training over the past several months. 
They have endured very rigorous and specific exercises, unique to the 
situation they will face in Bosnia, including mine training and basic 
combat proficiencies.
  American troops will be heavily armed, and will have the authority to 
respond with decisive force to any threat to their own safety. Our 
troops will take their orders from the American General who commands 
NATO, General George Joulwan. For his part, General Joulwan has 
insisted that the daily training scenarios that our troops are 
subjected to be increasingly demanding, so that, in his words, ``the 
scrimmage should be harder than the game''.
  Mr. President, one thing we do know for certain is that the nations 
of Europe have not been able to solve this crisis over the last 4 
years. In absence of any clear leadership, day after day the war 
deepened, becoming a festering wound in the center of Europe. A quarter 
of a million lives have been lost to war, ethnic cleansing, and 
genocide. A generation of children has been terrorized and traumatized. 
Thousands of elderly have been cast from their homes and turned into 
refugees with no place to go.
  It has been American leadership that finally made a difference. 
American leadership generated a cease fire. American leadership brought 
the parties to the peace table. And now it will take American 
leadership to ensure that NATO remains strong enough to prevent the 
peace from collapsing.
  Many Americans--including my own constituents--question the need for 
NATO as we approach the next century. The Soviet Union has collapsed. 
Why, they ask, should America pay the money and put our troops on the 
line in support of an alliance whose time--in the eyes of some--has 
passed.
  I believe we have a very direct national interest in ensuring that 
NATO remains an effective and credible security arrangement for the 
United States and our European allies. Ours is an alliance in support 
of democracy and freedom, and we are the leader of that alliance.
  Now is not the time in history for America to question our leadership 
role in the world. Continued American global leadership is in our 
national interest, not only in the matter before us regarding Bosnia, 
but more generally in this post-cold war era. Nations around the world 
are watching. If the aggression that has taken place in the Balkans 
over the past 4 years were to go without challenge, other nations will 
take a lesson.
  Congress gathered just yesterday to hear the moving speech of Israeli 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who faces the daunting task of keeping his 
Nation on the path toward peace in the wake of former Prime Minister 
Rabin's assassination.
  Mr. Peres reminded us gently of the role America has played in this 
century, and the responsibilities we carry into the next. He urged us 
to accept what history has laid on our national shoulders. He reminded 
us that there are some things that only America can do. America alone, 
he reminded us, can keep the world free.
  We do not know who will be in charge in Russia, China, or Iran 10 
years from now. Those nations may be moving closer to democracy, or 
they may be led by repressive regimes with nuclear capabilities. We 
simply do not know today.
  Because of the uncertainties we face in the world, we in the United 
States can not afford to fall back to the approach we took after World 
War I, when a weary nation said ``enough''. The vacuum was filled 
promptly, in that case with the most horrendous outcome.
  Mindful of such history, I would echo the sentiments of President 
Clinton when he says, ``My fellow Americans, in this new era there are 
still times when America and America alone can and should make the 
difference for peace.''
  To my own constituents, and to Americans across this great Nation of 
ours, I want to say: I know you are weary. But in my view, we do not 
have the luxury of wishing away the world and tending our own garden as 
if events around the world have no effect on us. We must continue to 
lead, and in doing so, we are most certainly serving our own national 
interests.
  But you are right. This will be a difficult mission to undertake. The 
climate in Bosnia at this time of year is brutal, the terrain 
difficult, and the risks many. Even if all goes extremely well, we must 
be prepared for casualties. This is an inevitable fact of life that 
accompanies every deployment. We should remember, for example, that 
during Desert Shield, the staging phase before the Persian Gulf war 
began, we lost 84 American troops before even a single shot was fired. 
And although the situation we are entering in Bosnia is vastly 
different, it is tragically unavoidable that accidents and mishaps will 
claim the lives of some of those deployed. And so we must prepare 
ourselves as a Nation for this consequence.
  But we must remember that throughout this ``American century'', as it 
has been called by some, the United States alone has set the standard 
to which so many nations now aspire. And in keeping with our vision as 
a people, since the end of the cold war we have led the international 
community in breaking new ground on behalf of democracy and the rule of 
law. In situations ranging from Cambodia to Haiti to Bosnia, we have 
helped to secure peace and freedom.
  I think we have to acknowledge up front that as we undertake these 
endeavors, we do not fully know yet what 

[[Page S18524]]
model works, and under what circumstances. And that is what makes votes 
like today's so difficult. But this is no excuse for this Nation or any 
other major world power to throw up our hands and walk away from the 
difficult problems and challenges we face in this post-cold war era.
  On this point, I think the observations of Lakhdar Brahimi, who heads 
the U.N. operation in Haiti, are relevant. When asked what we have 
learned in Haiti that may be relevant to Bosnia, he said:

       . . . With operations like these (in Bosnia and Haiti), he 
     said, the international community is embarking on something 
     completely new for itself, and for which it does not yet have 
     all the skills. It isn't even sure what it wants an certainly 
     doesn't have all the money it needs to do it. So we take a 
     country by the hand and accompany it a little bit, while it 
     tries to stand on its own two feet. We don't do it perfectly, 
     but it's still useful, even if it doesn't create paradise. 
     But no one should kid themselves. It's a constant uphill 
     struggle.

  And so we should sober our expectations, but not dampen our resolve. 
For the sake of our own national interests and those of our allies, we 
have to move forward--with prayer and conviction.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Utah is recognized.
  Mr. HATCH. I thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, this body now debates again whether we support the 
deployment of U.S. military forces into a European theater of war. We 
have debated this proposition twice before in this century.
  In World War I, we sent our troops to engage in ``the war to end all 
wars.'' After the slaughter, after the victory, America withdrew from 
the European stage; and, before the century reached mid-point, we found 
ourselves again debating whether it was the U.S. role to engage in 
European wars.
  The world was transformed by our historic decision to enter that war. 
The world was transformed by our decision after the victory to remain 
engaged; and, for most of the rest of the century, this country stood 
for the expansion of freedom and the containment of tyranny.
  Perhaps some of us forgot that one of the reasons we were so 
motivated after World War II was because this nation had been horrified 
by the scenes of depravity under the Third Reich and the Japanese 
empire. When we saw the horrors of the concentration camps, we 
declared, with commitment, ``never again.''
  Generations of Americans raised after that great allied victory truly 
believed that never again would we tolerate genocide in Europe. The 
very notion of civilization was redefined to include this idea--until 
the war broke out in Bosnia.
  For almost 4 years, we have witnessed the horrors of ``ethnic 
cleansing'' in central Europe. Up until a few months ago, we regularly 
saw massacres of innocents, most often Muslims. ``Never again,'' came 
back to haunt us. ``Never again,'' became the hollow cry at the end of 
a century, taunting us that we could never assume progress from 
barbarity.
  Many of us in this body believed we had to act. While we accepted 
that we could not make a persuasive case that U.S. troops needed to 
enforce or protect a vital interest, we believed that the world's 
remaining superpower had the power, the means, and the moral 
responsibility, to act.
  We voted, again and again, to lift the immoral arms embargo on the 
young Bosnian state, which was largely unarmed, and was the target of 
the barbarians of ``ethnic cleansing.''
  This summer, we passed legislation, with a strong bipartisan 69 
votes, to lift the embargo.
  The Administration, proclaiming concern for the Bosnians, argued that 
lifting the arms embargo would cause the Serbs to attack the eastern 
enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica. For this grotesquely false reason--a 
reason bloodily refuted by the massacres in Srebrenica that occurred 
anyway--the Administration argued that we could not let the victims 
defend themselves. The Administration argued--again and again--that 
lifting the embargo would spread the war and would require the use of 
thousands of U.S. forces to extract the U.N. and allied forces. And so, 
the Administration argued that lifting the embargo was not an 
acceptable course of action.
  Now, less than a month after the signing of the Dayton Accord, the 
Administration is deploying United States troops to Bosnia to implement 
the military annex of that accord.
  There is a temporary truce in Bosnia. The killing has mostly stopped. 
The ethnic cleansing has not. And, the administration believes, most 
sincerely, that the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force, now 
known as IFOR, will, in the words of President Clinton, ``help create a 
secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can return to their 
homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives.'' The 
administration expects this to take approximately 1 year.
  Mr. President, I respect the President's prerogative in foreign 
policy. I believe this is a principle we must respect if we are to 
convey the proper influence and power of this great Nation overseas. I 
supported this principle under previous Presidents, and I strongly 
objected when the Members of the opposing party in this body sought to 
frustrate Presidents Reagan and Bush.
  I was disappointed when this body passed the resolution supporting 
President Bush's decision to deploy to Iraq by merely 52 votes. We had 
a clear vital interest at stake then. And, had we waited, we now know 
that our troops would have been subject to the weapons of mass 
destruction Saddam Hussein was on the verge of using.
  Mr. President, I respect the principle of the President's prerogative 
in making foreign policy, but I have grave reservations--grave 
reservations--about the Bosnia policy on which the President is 
embarking.
  But, I wish to make one point exceedingly clear: I believe that the 
Congress must show our support for the U.S. military. This Senator will 
always support American troops abroad.
  I have recently learned that a Utah reserve unit will be among those 
troops deployed to this region, and several other Utah reservists have 
been put on alert. There is no way that this Senator will not do 
anything and everything to make sure that those troops have the backing 
they need in terms of equipment and materiel and moral support for what 
they do to serve our country's objectives.
  But, appreciation and support for how well our troops carry out our 
policy does not mean we cannot question the policy itself as well as 
engage in some retrospective about U.S. policy.
  I wish the President had taken a different approach on Bosnia 3 years 
ago. Candidate Clinton said he would lift the arms embargo. As I have 
said, I believe it was immoral to maintain an arms embargo against 
Bosnia while it was subjected to slaughter by a heavily armed 
Yugoslavia. I must say that, with his record, there is a credibility 
question when the President asserts it is the ``right'' thing to now 
send troops to Bosnia.
  I believe that the Atlantic alliance is the most successful military 
alliance in the history of the world. The major democracies of the 
world held together throughout the cold war, and Europe remained 
secure. The world is still a dangerous place after the cold war, and I 
believe that NATO must remain relevant. I support the enlargement of 
the alliance, because I believe the alliance promotes political values 
as well as enforces security, and I wish to support the democracies 
of central Europe.

  But NATO's credibility has suffered greatly during the Bosnia 
debacle. Tied by the dual key with the United Nations, the greatest 
military alliance was ineffective while genocide occurred. NATO stood 
by while cities and towns were shelled, while humanitarian convoys were 
turned back, while helicopters violated a no-fly zone. A NATO F-16 was 
shot out of the sky this summer by Serbs using Russian military 
hardware.
  The Administration argues that NATO credibility is at stake. But I 
must ask: What happens if the I-For goes to Bosnia, and, after 1 year 
and the departure of I-For, the parties return to war? Will NATO be 
more credible for having gone to Bosnia with great fanfare, but having 
returned without success, or worse, with casualties we cannot justify?
  This administration proclaims that this is a chance for peace in 
Bosnia. I 

[[Page S18525]]
do not doubt the President's sincerity. And I do not doubt that the 
administration is motivated by noble notions. I fear, however, that its 
ideals are immature.
  Peace is not the absence of conflict, Mr. President. We will always 
have conflict. Peace, I believe, is the management of conflict, the 
management of conflict so that it does not escalate into violence and 
war.
  And, when I look at the Dayton Accord, Mr. President, and the record 
of this administration, I fear that many issues about managing the 
conflict remain unaddressed.
  The administration has spoken about a clear exit strategy, partly 
because we in the Congress have demanded it. But if we do not have a 
vision of how to manage the conflict after our mission expires, I see 
very little reason to go in at all. We need a post-exit strategy, Mr. 
President, and I've heard very little of one.
  A post-exit strategy--and the success of the I-For mission--depends 
on a number of factors. I believe these include, but are not limited 
to: First, ensuring that the Bosnian Serbs do not pursue territorial 
gains beyond those they have won in this ignominious partition known as 
the Dayton Accord; second, completing the agreement between Croatia and 
Serbia over Eastern Slavonia; third, building and maintaining a 
cooperative relationship between the Bosnians and the Croatians; and, 
most importantly, fourth, maintaining the political and military 
viability of the Bosnian state.

  Elements within the Bosnian Serbs have been proclaiming against the 
Dayton Accord since the day they were signed. Demonstrations have been 
staged almost every day. Are we to proceed while these rogue elements 
threaten, with arms, to ignore the accord?
  The administration tells us that it will rely on President Milosevic 
of Serbia to control these elements. President Milosevic has been very 
cooperative and effective, we are told.
  President Milosevic, I recall, was the instigator of the war against 
Bosnia and has reneged on his promises on numerous occasions over the 
past 4 years. Perhaps Milosevic has converted--and I believe in 
conversion--but I have doubts about the sincerity of those who convert 
after a mild NATO bombing campaign.
  Mr. President, I still do not know what the administration intends to 
do if our U.S. forces are subject to mortar attacks from rogue 
elements.
  For example, if we're attacked from a populated area by rogue 
elements that move freely within it, how will we respond? With a phone 
call to Belgrade? How does President Clinton plan to hold President 
Milosevic accountable for keeping the Bosnian Serbs in line with the 
accord?
  I am also greatly concerned about the agreement between Croatia and 
Serbia over eastern Slavonia. We should recall the brutal occupation of 
that Croatian territory. We should recall the pictures of the city of 
Vukovar, left a smoking rubble by the Serbs, complete with mass graves.
  Since then the Serbian Army has occupied the area, cleansed it, and 
extracted its natural resources. The Croats and Serbs signed an 
agreement just before the Dayton Accord to return eastern Slavonia to 
Croatia. The agreement allows for 1 year to revert the territory to 
Croatia, but it has a 1 year extension clause, to be exercised by 
either party.
  The implementation of the international force to monitor the 
territory is already stalling. I predict here that the Serbs will ask 
for that 1 year extension; and, 1 year from now, Eastern Slavonia will 
still be occupied by the forces of Belgrade.
  It is a powder keg. If we do not ensure the peaceful transfer of that 
occupied territory, there will be a war within 2 years, and that war 
will spread to Bosnia, and the I-For mission, with its casualties, will 
have been for naught.
  Mr. President, I am deeply concerned that the administration has not 
focused on this issue.
  Mr. President, we need to do more to strengthen the ties begun with 
the Washington Agreement last year to build the Croat-Muslim 
relationship.
  I have little expectation that the Serbian entity will ever 
participate in the unitary government of Bosnia-Hercegovina. But 
without the Croats and Muslims cooperating, Mr. President, we may end 
up participating in a three-way partition conducted by ethnic 
cleansing.
  Since the beginning of this war, I have argued for a policy of lift-
and-strike. Lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Croatia, and allow them 
to defend themselves against Serbian aggression. Use air power to 
dissuade the aggressors while the victims arm themselves.
  We saw a version of lift-and-strike this summer, when the Croatian 
Army, strong again, recaptured the Krajina and coordinated with the 
Bosnians to deliver military defeats to the Serbs. Our NATO forces went 
into the skies in August and September to force the Serbs to accept a 
choice: more military defeats or a negotiated settlement. Lift-and-
strike worked, Mr. President, as we said it would.
  Lift-and-strike was posited on the premise that a balance of power on 
the ground would effect a real peace, a peace based on the cessation of 
violence through deterrence.
  Now that the President has decided to deploy the I-For, I believe 
that it is essential that we ensure that Bosnia is able to defend 
itself. That, Mr. President, is the only way that we can guarantee that 
the Bosnians shall not be subject to more ethnic cleansing, to more 
deadly attacks--unless we plan to keep I-For there forever.
  Mr. President, if we are not absolutely dedicated to arming the 
Bosnian Government, we should be realistic enough to know that the war 
will reignite shortly after IFOR departs. And then, Mr. President, 
we'll ask, what was the point? For what did NATO expend its 
credibility? For what did America risk its sons and daughters? A decent 
interval to another war is not an acceptable answer, Mr. President.
  So 5 years before the end of this bloody century, we debate again 
sending our troops to Europe. We didn't need to come to this point. The 
Dayton Accord is abstract, the realities on the ground brutal and 
complicated. We didn't need to come to this point.
  But America has given its word, and credibility of that word, we are 
told, is at stake. Let me preface my final comments by saying that I am 
equally concerned about America's standing abroad and about maintaining 
our leadership in NATO.
  But, our credibility is more threatened, I believe, by pursuing a 
mission with guaranteed casualties and uncertain goals, than it is by 
telling our allies now that we do not support this policy, this 
deployment, and that we will arm the Bosnians until they can defend 
themselves.
  But if this policy will be implemented--and already our troops are 
arriving in Bosnia--we must try to improve it. If we are to effect any 
positive influence here, Mr. President, we must insist that we arm the 
Bosnian government so that when we leave, we are not a few steps ahead 
of the next conflagration.
  Therefore, Mr. President, I support the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution 
opposing the President's decision to deploy, but strongly support the 
Dole-McCain resolution commending U.S. troops and setting conditions 
for the deployment which, I hope, will increase the possibility that 
this mission will not have been a waste of blood, treasure, and, yes, 
credibility.
  Mr. President, I commend the majority leader for his statesmanship in 
recognizing that President Clinton is our President, that he does have 
a right to put these troops there, a constitutional right, and once 
they are there, we have an obligation, as patriots, to stand with them 
and to help them.
  So I will support the Dole-McCain resolution, but I also support the 
Hutchison-Inhofe resolution as well.
  Mr. President, this is a serious thing. I have been over that land. I 
have been over that territory. I have met with people on all sides of 
these issues. I have read the histories of the last 600 years of that 
area. And I have to tell you, I think putting our young people there is 
a tragic mistake. But once they are there, I am going to do everything 
in my power to support them.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Vermont is recognized for 7 minutes.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the debate over whether the United States 
should contribute its troops to a NATO 

[[Page S18526]]
peacekeeping force in Bosnia will be the focus of many speeches on this 
floor in the coming days. It is a subject all of us have anticipated 
and pondered and wrestled with for some months now, and it is one of 
those decisions that no one likes to make. It is fraught with 
uncertainties and the undeniable likelihood that Americans will be 
injured or killed.
  There will be many chances to speak on this, but having thought about 
it for some time and discussed it with the President and Secretary of 
Defense and others over the past weeks, and after listening to the 
President's speech last night and the responses of some of those who 
oppose sending troops, I want to say a few words as the debate begins.
  Mr. President, even before the peace agreement was signed at Dayton 
the House of Representatives passed legislation to prevent the 
President from deploying United States troops to enforce a peace 
agreement without the consent of Congress. I believe the President 
should seek the approval of Congress before sending troops to Bosnia, 
although I do not believe the Constitution requires it in this instance 
where the parties have signed a peace agreement. I felt it was both 
unhelpful and unnecessary for the House to pass legislation in the 
midst of the negotiations and before a peace agreement was signed.
  But just as President Bush sought congressional approval for sending 
United States troops to the Persian Gulf--although half a million were 
there before approval was given--President Clinton has sought 
congressional approval, and there will be ample time to debate it 
before the formal signing of the agreement.
  The decision to send Americans into harms way is the most difficult 
and dangerous that any President has to make. It should be done only 
when a compelling national interest is at stake, and when there is no 
other alternative.
  Like many or perhaps even most Senators, the majority of my 
constituents, at least of those Vermonters who have contacted me, do 
not believe that it is in our national interest to send Americans to 
Bosnia. They genuinely fear another costly, drawn out quagmire like 
Vietnam. Some of them fought in that war, or had family members who 
died there. Others fear a debacle like Somalia, where in a matter of 
days a well-intentioned humanitarian mission became a poorly-thought 
out, ill-prepared peacemaking mission that ended in tragedy.
  It is the President's job to convince the American people that Bosnia 
is not Vietnam, it is not Somalia, and that our national interests 
compel us to take part. He made a good start last night. There are 
still important questions that need answers--the President said as much 
himself--but I am convinced that the case for sending Americans to 
Bosnia can be made, and I intend to help the President make it.
  Mr. President, in the past 4 years, a quarter of a million people, 
the vast majority defenseless civilians, have lost their lives in the 
former Yugoslavia. We have all read the blood curdling reports of 
hundreds and even thousands of people being rounded up at gun point and 
systematically executed or even buried alive.

  Countless others have had their throats cut after being horribly 
tortured. Some have been made to eat the flesh and drink the blood of 
their countrymen. Thousands of women have been raped. Men have been 
forced to watch their wives and daughters raped and killed before their 
eyes. All simply because of their ethnicity, or because they lived on 
land others wanted for themselves.
  The war has produced two million refugees, victims of ethnic 
cleansing. Hundreds of thousands more have lived in squalor for years 
in the rubble of what remains of their homes, without electricity, heat 
or running water.
  There are many, including myself, who believe that NATO should have 
acted much earlier and with far greater force to stop the genocide in 
Bosnia. I opposed the use of American ground troops to try to win the 
war, but we gave too much deference to those who said that airpower 
would never compel the Serbs to negotiate peace. NATO should have been 
given the authority to use unrelenting force when UN resolutions were 
violated time and again with impunity.
  Our greatest collective failure was to put the United Nations in 
charge of a peacekeeping mission where there was no peace to keep, and 
when it was unwilling or unable to back up its own threats. These 
failures, which caused grievous damage to NATO's credibility, will 
haunt us for years to come.
  But the situation has changed dramatically since then. Sustained NATO 
bombing, coupled with gains by the Moslem and Croat forces on the 
battlefield, have shown the Serbs that they cannot win what they set 
out to achieve. The exhaustion of the warring factions, coupled with a 
period of extraordinarily forceful American diplomacy, has created an 
unprecedented opportunity to end one of the most brutal wars the world 
has seen in half a century.
  There should be no mistake. The credibility of the United States 
Government is deeply invested in the success of the peace agreement, 
and success of the agreement depends absolutely on NATO's enforcement 
of it. The parties signed with that understanding. At the same time, 
NATO's own credibility and effectiveness depend on US leadership. 
Indeed, without US participation, there will be no NATO force, and the 
peace agreement will almost certainly collapse.
  Mr. President, since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the cold war, NATO's future has been uncertain. Some have suggested 
that NATO has outlived its usefulness. Others say that since the 
rationale for NATO--deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe--is gone, 
NATO should become a political alliance. Still others want to quickly 
expand NATO to include all or most of Eastern Europe, and perhaps even 
some of the former Soviet republics.
  I mention this because NATO's future is one of the most compelling 
reasons why it is essential for the United States to participate in a 
NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia.
  I have been among the strongest supporters of assistance to Russia 
and the other former Soviet States. A democratic Russia is obviously a 
major foreign policy priority for the United States. Despite many 
setbacks, there has been remarkable progress in Russia, Ukraine and 
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. But who can predict the next 
decade? Who can say that the fervent nationalism that remains strong 
there will not increase to a point when it becomes threatening? It is 
simply too soon to say what lies beyond this transitional period. I 
have been reluctant to support the rapid expansion of NATO without a 
thorough discussion of the implications, for fear that it could fuel 
the very nationalism in Russia that we seek to discourage.
  But neither am I among those who see no role for NATO today. On the 
contrary, the United States has an enormous stake in preserving NATO's 
strength. While NATO's focus will undoubtedly shift over time, the 
future holds too many uncertainties, and there are too many areas of 
potential conflict around the world where important interests of the 
United States and our allies are at stake, to allow NATO's strength to 
erode.
  There is no other alliance that comes close to NATO, in power, in 
readiness, and in importance to the United States. NATO may not have 
sought the role of peacekeeper in Bosnia, but neither can it avoid it.
  Mr. President, I cannot say whether this peace agreement will survive 
the test of time. Perhaps no one can. There is ample reason to be 
pessimistic, given the history of broken promises and ethnic hatred in 
the former Yugoslavia. Since the agreement was signed, it has become 
clear than no party is completely satisfied, and some have expressed 
grave misgivings with some aspects of it. If the agreement unravels, 
NATO Forces may be forced to withdraw, rather than be drawn into the 
fighting. Even withdrawal would be risky.
  But virtually everyone knowledgeable about the situation there agrees 
that this is by far the best chance for peace since the war began 4 
years ago. We and our European allies have an immense interest in 
preventing the continuation of a destabilizing war in Europe, and I 
believe we must take this chance.
  The President has taken a courageous step, a step that reflects the 
best of this country. Every American should 

[[Page S18527]]
consider the alternative. More mass murder. More towns shelled and 
burned. More starving children. More orphans. More horrifying 
atrocities that are reminiscent of the dark ages. If this does not 
compel us to help enforce an agreement we brokered to end this 
calamity, what further amount of inhuman brutality would it take? 
Should we wait for the slaughter of another hundred thousand, or two 
hundred thousand?
  The President is right. We have a moral responsibility to take part. 
The Europeans were unable to end the war themselves. United States 
leadership was not the only factor, but without it there would be no 
peace agreement, and the war would go on indefinitely. We should be 
proud of it, and stand behind it.
  Some have suggested that we can lead without sending troops. I 
disagree. We cannot maintain our credibility as the leader of NATO if 
we are not prepared to assume some of the risk. We should remember that 
two thirds of the NATO Force will be troops from our NATO allies and 
others.
  Mr. President, our troops are the best trained in the world, but we 
cannot eliminate the risks. There are 2 million landmines in Bosnia 
alone, hidden under mud and snow. Each one cost only a few dollars, but 
one false step could mean the loss of any American soldier's legs or 
life. The Pentagon says that landmines are among the most serious 
threats our troops will face there.
  This is ironic, since the Pentagon has been actively lobbying against 
my efforts to show leadership by halting the use of antipersonnel 
landmines, which claim hundreds of innocent lives each week. Two-thirds 
of the Senate voted for it, but the Pentagon refuses. In the past few 
months, several of our European allies have stopped their use and 
production of these indiscriminate weapons, but the Pentagon refuses.
  A quarter of the Americans killed in the Persian Gulf died from 
landmines. A quarter of American casualties in Vietnam were from mines. 
I can only wonder how many more Americans will needlessly lose their 
legs or their lives from landmines before the Pentagon gets the 
message.
  We cannot eliminate the risks, but President Clinton has established 
the right conditions before U.S. troops can be deployed. If the mission 
is limited in time, clear in scope and achievable, as the President has 
insisted, we should support it. Our troops must be backed by broad 
rules of engagement that enable them to defend themselves with whatever 
amount of preemptive force is needed in any circumstance. That does not 
mean waiting to shoot until they are shot at.
  Mr. President, I expect to speak again as the debate on this unfolds. 
I intend to support the President, and I expect there will be Senators 
I deeply respect who are on the other side. But at the end of the day, 
if Americans are sent to Bosnia as I believe they will be, I have no 
doubt that we all will support them, and we will all be proud of them.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McConnell). The Senator from Kansas is 
recognized.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, there have been many eloquent speeches 
given today and last night. I am not sure that much new can be said. 
Over the last several years, we have debated the pros and cons of what 
to do about Bosnia, and I have begun to feel like Hamlet. If I could 
just review some of my thinking at this point, I would like to.
  The tragedy in former Yugoslavia is truly momentous. Nobody will deny 
that who has watched this occur over the last several years. We have 
witnessed, in the past several years, atrocities in Europe that we 
vowed would never again be allowed. We have stood by while our most 
important and fundamental military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, that is a fundamental part of our Nation's security, 
tottered on the brink of disaster, its members squabbling and 
indecisive while war waged on Europe's doorstep. And we have struggled 
to understand the nuances of a conflict fueled by both ancient 
animosities and a contemporary hunger for power, by both the collapse 
of communism and the friction of ethnic and religious hatred.
  For most Americans, this is a distant war in an obscure land about 
issues that do not directly affect our interests. All that may be true. 
And, yet, we could not ignore it. For the past 4 years, we have feared, 
above all, that it would spread and embroil the great powers, 
particularly the United States and Russia, on opposite sides of a war 
neither of us wanted. We have felt deep compassion and remorse as this 
war, like all wars, took its greatest toll on the innocents: in 
refugees driven from their lands, in homes and towns and villages 
destroyed, in a generation of children, Mr. President, whose lives have 
been shattered.
  We have tried to avoid involvement because our direct national 
interests were not at stake. This, we said, was a European problem. 
And, yet, because we understood that important national interests could 
be put at risk if the fighting continued, we could not simply wash our 
hands of the matter.
  So America and our European allies took a series of halting steps and 
tentative measures that over 4 years tarnished our image and called 
into question our resolve. We imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and 
later came to regret it. We established safe havens and then failed to 
protect them against assault. We promised to deliver food and 
humanitarian supplies to refugees and displaced persons but then failed 
to use the force necessary to deliver.
  Those efforts all failed. As a consequence of those failures, we had 
become involved in Bosnia. American credibility, prestige, and 
leadership, the intangibles that are so important to our national 
security around the world, all were damaged. We found ourselves in the 
worst of situations. America put itself on the line in Bosnia, but we 
had made no commitment to shaping the outcome.
  Now we are at a crossroads. The issue before us is whether America 
should help bring this war to a close. We should, and through our good 
offices and diplomatic leadership we have done so. I share President 
Clinton's view that the United States should be a leader for peace. 
However, I also share the deep reservations of many and that have been 
spoken of many times today about sending American forces into the 
Balkans. In my mind, the key to the success of the NATO operation is 
not the achievement of a military objective, but rather the commitment 
of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian leaders and their people to 
peace. Absent that strong commitment by the parties to make the Dayton 
accord work over the long term, no number of international troops will 
achieve peace. Mr. President, I am not convinced that the three parties 
to the Dayton accord will stand by their commitments and sustain the 
peace. We certainly would all pray for that result.
  All three parties have incentives to sign now, but they do not have 
the same incentive to keep the peace come spring or after our troops 
depart. By setting an arbitrary 1-year timetable for the departure of 
our forces, we invite the parties to wait us out. The Dayton accord is 
full of ambiguities with empty guarantees of peace, and that probably 
would not have been possible.
  Yet the reality is that our troops are going. They are already, many 
of them, there. Thousands more will follow in the coming days. Whether 
we like it or not, the President's decision to deploy is behind us. The 
United States has made a commitment to this operation. Having made that 
commitment, America must not cut and run. To do so would send a message 
of weakness around the world that would damage our national interests 
in a way that the Yugoslavian war itself never could. The reality is 
that we are involved in Bosnia, and all Americans must do what we can 
to see this operation through to a successful conclusion.

  The decision now before us, to my mind, should involve how best to 
build the prospects for success. I believe Congress has little choice 
but to support our forces and the operation, because to do otherwise 
would be to diminish our chances for success, and success is the task 
at hand. Today we are considering three approaches to the matter. Each 
is troubling, I suggest. One has already been rejected. I do not 
believe we should cut off funding with our troops already on the 
ground. Provoking a constitutional crisis at this point would not serve 
either our troops or our national interests. I also do not believe 
expressing support for our troops 

[[Page S18528]]
but opposing the President's decision to send them enhances the 
mission's prospect for success. That would send an unequivocal message 
that America's support for this operation is shallow; a message that 
would be heard, I think, loud and clear by the parties in former 
Yugoslavia.
  That leaves us with the approach of the Dole-McCain resolution. I 
commend the authors of that resolution, who have struggled with the 
very basic but difficult question left unanswered by the Dayton 
accords: How will we know when our mission is completed? Or put another 
way, how did we plan to accomplish a lasting peace in the region after 
our troops have gone?
  I have serious reservations about the dual policy the Dole-McCain 
resolution advocates as a solution to this difficult question. On the 
one hand, American troops would participate in ostensibly neutral 
peacekeeping operation to separate the warring parties. On the other 
hand, America would lead an effort to arm and train one of the parties, 
the Bosnian Moslems. I have had reservations about this policy 
articulated by the administration, and I have deeper reservations about 
endorsing or even expanding that commitment in a congressional 
resolution. An American-led effort to arm and train, to put our troops 
in Bosnia at greater risk, could undermine provisions of the Dayton 
accord that obligate all parties to reduce their armed forces and could 
lay the foundation for an arms race in the Balkans. Any American effort 
to arm and train the Bosnian Federation also must recognize and deal 
with the delicate and contradictory nature of the new Moslem-Croat 
alliance.
  Finally, our European allies have serious reservations about a United 
States-led effort to arm the Bosnian Federation. While many of my 
colleagues have decried European leadership on Bosnia, I believe that 
as a member of NATO we have an obligation to coordinate our policies 
closely with our allies. But despite these concerns, the Dole-McCain 
resolution is, to my mind, the only real option now before the Senate. 
I do support it because I firmly believe that Congress must go on 
record in support of this operation which already is underway.
  The President has made clear that the operation will proceed with or 
without congressional support, but I am not sure it can succeed without 
congressional support. With our troops at risk I believe success must 
be our highest priority. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the very 
important question of whether or not to authorize the deployment of 
United States ground troops to Bosnia. let me start with where I have 
been on this issue and continue with where I am today.
  Mr. President, I have long believed that Bosnia itself is not a 
strategic interest of the United States. I have agreed more with 
Bismarck who said that the Balkans were ``not worth the loss of one 
Pomeranian grenadier'' than I have with those European politicians who 
have seen it as the contested terrain necessary to extend their 
countries' reach to the middle East. In essence, the Bosnian conflict 
represents the conflict of Western Christendom, Orthodox Christendom 
and Islam and it flows from grievances passed on from grandparent to 
grandchild over centuries.
  While the United States has long had a vital interest in the security 
of Europe in general, there has been no indication over the past 4 
years that the conflict in Bosnia would spread in any significant 
destablilizing way, notwithstanding the legitimate worries about 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. Further, while the United States 
has humanitarian interests related to countering ethnic cleansing and 
other barbaric conduct, I do not think that it is possible for the 
United States to intervene and to stop every ethnic conflict in the 
world. Why Bosnia and not Rwanda has never been answered by the 
architects of our current policy.
  The most striking thing about the Bosnian war is that virtually no 
one, from the beginning, championed pluralism. Instead, we accepted the 
premises of the warring parties and lost the high ground.
  I also believe that thee have been a lot of missed opportunities to 
curtail the horrors during the four years of this conflict. Because we 
did not seize them, we have been left with a much more difficult 
situation. For example, in the Bush administration, the United States, 
fresh from the triumph in the Gulf, could have threatened massive air 
power to deter the Serbian President Milosevic from pursuing by force 
his ambition to create a greater Serbia. We failed to do so and the 
conflict expanded exponentially into war.
  Similarly, in the first 6 to 12 months of the Clinton administration, 
I believe that there was another opportunity for the United States to 
warn Milosevic and then to act directly against him if he persisted. 
The United States could have sent a high level emissary to apply 
diplomatic pressure and to threaten air attacks to deter Serb 
aggression. But the United States failed to act in any meaningful way 
and the war has continued for a period longer than the Korean war.
  In the absence of U.S. action, I have supported equalizing the 
military imbalance in the region. While certainly not a solution to the 
underlying conflict, military parity is crucial to any last peace 
between the Gosnian Moslems, the Croats, and the Serbs. As a result, I 
voted repeatedly for lifting the arms embargo. But once again, we 
missed an opportunity and the embargo and military imbalance have 
persisted.
  That is where I have been on this issue.
  Mr. President, I recognize that some things have changed. We have a 
peace agreement initialed by Moslems, Croats, and Serbs. We have the 
commitment of NATO to secure the military aspects of this agreement and 
we have the commitment of President Clinton to deploy 20,000 United 
States ground troops to Bosnia and another 5,000 troops to Croatia, as 
part of this agreement. Where Europe failed to get agreement, America 
succeeded but the results put us in the middle of Europe's most 
volatile region as not only a coguarantor, but the broker of the 
agreement.
  Mr. President, I recognize also that several things have not changed. 
The ethnic enmity between the parties continues. The Moslem-Croat 
Federation remains fragile and divisions persist among the leadership 
of the various parties to the agreement.
  As importantly, I still do not believe that Bosnia itself is a 
strategic interest of the United States. Indeed, if there were no 
counterbalancing factors, it would be my position that the United 
States should not deploy United States ground forces to Bosnia.
  One of the primary problems that we are facing is that we are left to 
make this decision in a conceptual vacuum. Although the cold war has 
ended, no one has provided a coherent vision of the post-cold war 
world. Rather, ad hocism tends to rule the day.
  This void is particularly pertinent for the United States. The United 
States is the most powerful country in the world. With that power, 
however, comes certain responsibilities. There comes the leadership 
responsibility to formulate a coherent vision of the world. Yet, no 
one, including the administration and its predecessor, has defined the 
role of the United States or NATO or their respective strategic 
interests since the days of the cold war. But those days have ended. 
Time after time since 1990, we have looked in the rearview mirror 
instead of ahead to the horizon of a new world. The retreat to a 
strategy of ``cold war lite'' is reflected in bloated defense budgets, 
confused priorities and a gradual erosion of American influence abroad.
  I believe an administration's highest foreign policy priority is to 
develop a new conceptual framework and I believe a President's role is 
to first see that it is done and second, to articulate it often enough 
and persuasively enough so that the American people and the rest of the 
world know where we are going in foreign policy and why.
  The administration's proposal for United States troop deployment in 
Bosnia is a prime example of the reigning ad hocism. And it brings with 
it, several grave problems:
  To begin, how do we define success? The administration has not 
clearly stated how it will evaluate the success of the mission. 
Focusing only on the military mission, the administration has left 
great ambiguity, if not confusion, regarding the issues of refugees and 
disarmament. The result is very dangerous because you cannot really 
have an exit strategy unless you know 

[[Page S18529]]
what it is you are supposed to achieve. For an exit strategy is not a 
deadline, it is a process for continuously evaluation means against 
goals.
  By stating that the mission will not extend beyond a year, the 
administration also invites delayed violations. As a mechanism of 
control, a time limit leads to loss of control. A stated 1 year 
termination of our involvement is a temptation for the contending 
parties simply to delay a showdown for a year.
  In hoping for a limited mission that could simultaneously solve the 
deeper conflicts, there has been an incomplete disclosure of where this 
action will lead. In a year from now, will United States troops be 
withdrawn only to allow the Croats and Serbs to carve up Moslem Bosnia? 
Will we feel any better just because our military objectives have been 
ostensibly achieved? Will the United States' leadership role be 
maintained and NATO's role restored if Bosnia falls into renewed 
conflict upon the withdrawal of NATO? Unfortunately, I think the answer 
is no. Do the Croats yearn so much for economic ties to Europe and the 
Serbs fear so much the resumption of sanctions that they will restrain 
themselves from conquering the Moslem enclaves once United States 
troops leave? Again, I fear the answer is no. Once we are down the road 
and involved, the most likely outcome is for this mission to continue--
for NATO, with United States troops, to engage in the protection of 
Bosnia enclaves for the indefinite future.
  A related, but distinct problem is the disconnect between the defined 
mission and our objectives. If the administration is to be believed, 
our mission is only military and can be completed in 1 year. 
Nevertheless, to justify the deployment of U.S. troops in this case, 
the administration has defined certain humanitarian interests--to 
prevent ethic cleansing, to prevent a renewed conflict between the 
parties, and to create one federated Bosnian state. Neither the limited 
military mission that the administration has laid out, nor the hoped 
for year of ``breathing space'' will be able to accomplish those 
objectives. The administration is taking the rhetorical high ground, 
but its plan falls far short of delivering on the rhetoric.
  No one is saying now that the Moslem enclaves are going to be the 
Berlins of the last years of the twentieth century with NATO forces 
placing a tripwire around them and protecting them in a dangerous 
world. Instead, the administration trumpets the brevity of the mission 
as if American forces 6 months on the ground is an inoculation against 
the deep hatreds that caused the ethic cleansing in the first place. 
Such an attitude, from my perspective, is naive and wrong. I think the 
time has come for the administration to level with the American people 
about the logical end result of this mission. Only a lasting peace will 
avert us from being faced by Christmas 1996 with the choice of a longer 
commitment or failure.
  In addition, there has yet to be any sufficiently comprehensive 
definition of either the rules of engagement or contingency plans. What 
will U.S. troops do in the case of cross-border conflicts, if the Serbs 
attack the Croats or the Croats attack the Serbs? What will United 
States troops do if the French troops in Saragevo are directly attacked 
with the resulting loss of many French lives? Under what if any 
circumstances will U.S. forces be withdrawn prior to the completion of 
the military mission. These are very important issues, but there still 
are no precise answers as there were not when the Bosnian Serbs took 
UNPROFOR hostage following NATO bombing.
  Lacking a coherent vision, there also appears to be little 
recognition of the implications of this 1 year decision and its 
potential outcome for our strategic interests throughout the world. If 
we withdraw our troops and Serbs or Croats subjugate the Moslem 
enclaves, there will be, for example, significant repercussions in the 
Islamic world, in the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere. Again the 1 year 
time horizon could put our withdrawal at a time of maximum uncertainty 
or danger in the Islamic world--a time when the old, well-known voices 
could be replaced by more strident fundamentalists--who regard renewed 
Bosnian horrors as a rallying cry and the United States as the villain 
who promised and then reneged. Whether such repercussions are worth the 
interests we are ostensibly saving have not, as far as I know, been 
addressed.
  It is worth remembering the example of Ronald Reagan's Lebanon 
intervention. The Marines arrived, departed, returned after the Sabra 
and Shatila massacres and then spent over a year just hunkering down 
with tragic results.

  Finally, those who say that there is no alternative are posing a 
false choice and ignoring the last 4 years. One might choose deployment 
as the best of two bad choices. But that does not mean that there were 
no more choices. A policy of strength that proceeded from a new 
strategic framework and was pursued from the beginning of the breakup 
of Yugoslavia was the alternative that no one talks about because it 
was not developed.
  Despite these and other problems with this ad hoc approach, I 
recognize that there are counterbalancing concerns. Most notably, the 
President has pledged U.S. participation and the deployment of U.S. 
ground troops. I have said twice that the United States has not 
strategic interest in Bosnia itself. Paradoxically, because the 
deployment decision proceeded ad hoc, it places more emphasis on the 
downside of undercutting the solemn commitment of our President and of 
undermining the United States role in Europe where we do have strategic 
interests. As a result, we in Congress have a new level of 
responsibility. With all said, I believe that the word of the United 
States and the ability of the President to lead and to make decisions 
as leader and Commander-in-Chief, are important elements of the United 
States' world position. The decision to deploy, however poorly thought 
out, if carried through and maintained over time, will send a strong 
message worldwide. It will, for example, show the Chinese that the 
American concern for human rights does not single them out, but is part 
of our worldview. It will say to the Japanese and other parties in 
Northeast Asia that an American President can deliver on his word. It 
will say to the Islamic world that, as with the gulf war, a non-treaty 
commitment made by the United States can extend to Islamic territory as 
well as to Israel, and it will say to all of Europe that the United 
States remains a European power.
  Further, while not of major significance, there are benefits from 
United States and Russian forces working together in the same field. By 
engaging in a joint military mission that has very limited objective, I 
believe that we will be helping Russia to take positive steps in its 
post-cold war development and once again, it will have geopolitical 
value in Asia by showing that the United States and Russia are building 
a new spirit of cooperation and friendship.
  There are also potential benefits for NATO, although as I noted 
before, potential dangers as well. NATO has been searching for a 
defining role since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This, the first actual 
NATO deployment, not just a patrol or reconnaissance mission, marks 
NATO's departure into peacekeeping. This mission will include troops 
from the new European democracies, thereby providing a more useful 
bridge into the West than the ill-conceived drive for immediate NATO 
expansion. In addition, this mission has brought the French back into 
the NATO command structure, making NATO a more complete European force. 
One hopes, however, that the ambiguities in the agreement will not lead 
to alliance bickering and disagreements, even though the seeds have 
already been planted--with disagreements already arising over refugees, 
disarmament and the arming and training of the Bosnian Moslems.
  Having weighed all of these considerations, I have reluctantly 
decided that it is in the best interests of the United States to 
support the deployment of U.S. troops at this time. I believe, however, 
that, contrary to administration rhetoric, this will be a very 
difficult and long mission. I urge the administration to level with the 
American people now and to do all within its power to improve the 
circumstances under which U.S. troops are deployed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New Jersey has 
expired.
  Under the unanimous-consent agreement, I would recognize a 
Republican. 

[[Page S18530]]

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois has been 
waiting. We will yield him time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I thank you and I thank my colleague from 
Texas for her courtesy.
  There are some basic questions. Why have an Armed Forces for the 
United States? Why have a Chicago Police Department? Or a Louisville 
Police Department? One reason is to have stability, in a community and 
in the world community. And here, let me add that the great threat to 
the world today, unlike 10 years ago, is instability. Ten years ago it 
was nuclear annihilation.
  The second reason for having an armed force and for having a police 
department is to save lives. Are there risks? Yes. If there is a 
problem in one part of the city of Chicago you may send in the police 
department. And, if there are problems around the world, the United 
States, along with the community of nations, may have to use the armed 
force that we had. There are, however, for the Chicago Police 
Department and the U.S. Armed Forces, greater risks in not maintaining 
stability here.
  Let me add, while I support the President in this endeavor, the one 
thing that does concern me is the talk about getting out in 1 year. I 
hope that can happen. I hope we can be out in 6 months. I think the 
probability is, if our mission is to succeed--and it is important that 
it succeed--that we are likely to have to be there 2 or 3 years; maybe 
not with 20,000 soldiers, but with a substantial armed force.
  I was critical of George Bush for not moving early, when problems 
erupted. And I cheered, in August 1992, when Bill Clinton made a 
campaign speech criticizing George Bush for not acting.
  Then when Bill Clinton came in, I was critical of him for not acting. 
But I think what he is doing now is right. It is right for stability 
because of the danger of the spread of war.
  If we do not follow through on this peace--and it is a peace, tenuous 
as it is--if we do not follow through, this is inevitably going to 
spread to Macedonia and Albania. Macedonia has more ethnic Turks than 
any other country, and Turkey has made clear, if there are problems in 
Macedonia, Turkey is going to move in. Our friends in Greece have made 
clear, if Turkey moves in, they are going to move if--and this thing 
will escalate very, very quickly. You will have hundreds of thousands 
of Americans--Armed Forces people--involved in a war, not 20,000 
maintaining a peace.
  The second thing we should remember, there are not too many clear 
lessons in history, but one of the clear lessons of history is 
religious wars spread very easily. What we have in Bosnia--nothing is 
completely clean there--but you have primarily a Moslem force, a Roman 
Catholic force, and an Orthodox Christian force. If anyone thinks that 
when Moslem forces in Bosnia are under attack that Moslems in Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, and elsewhere are going to pay no 
attention to that, you are dreaming. Religious wars spread very, very 
easily.
  In terms of saving lives, it is very clear we should act. We have the 
agreement reached in Dayton, to the credit of this administration, the 
State Department, and others who were participants. Bosnia is half the 
size of Ohio. Bosnia has seen 250,000 people killed, 2 million people 
displaced.
  We went into Desert Storm, invaded a country after a short time, and 
I do not know whether history is going to judge my vote against acting 
that quickly, though I said I was for using economic sanctions first 
and then acting. But I feared, if we acted, we would simply perpetuate 
Saddam Hussein in power. But make no mistake about it: One of the 
reasons we acted was oil.
  Are we willing to act to save oil but not save lives? I do not think 
that is what America stands for.
  I have heard on this floor reference to Somalia as a great disaster. 
Let me tell you. Somalia was George Bush's finest hour. Hundreds of 
thousands of lives were saved. The mistake was made, and I was at the 
White House when we worked out the compromise that we would have to 
leave before too long. And I see I am being signaled for time. I ask 
unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Somalia saved lives. The mistake was in 
pulling out precipitously. I fear we may make the same mistake in 
Bosnia.
  Finally, we have made a commitment to NATO. We have to live up--or we 
should live up--to that commitment.
  Then I would add one other point. That is a word of gratitude to 
Senator Bob Dole for being a statesman on this issue. He is not gaining 
any votes in Republican primaries in terms of the Republican 
nomination, but he is doing what a U.S. Senator ought to do, and that 
is look toward what is best for our country. What is best for our 
country right now is to back President Clinton.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask for 5 minutes. If I could be 
notified after 4 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, others have recounted mistakes and missed 
opportunities that have led us to this moment, a moment when 20,000 
U.S. troops are either on their way or will shortly be on their way to 
Bosnia.
  I will not take the time of the Senate this evening to recount these 
facts. They have been talked about in great detail already today.
  The fact is, Mr. President, we are where we are. As we debate, and we 
have debated three different resolutions today, the essential facts are 
as follows:
  Fact No. 1: In 1993, the President made a commitment to deploy ground 
troops in support of a Bosnia peacekeeping mission.
  Fact 2: This guarantee was a condition or underlying understanding of 
the entire Dayton peace agreement.
  Fact 3: The President has now ordered these troops to Bosnia. Some 
have already arrived.
  Mr. President, the troops are going to Bosnia. They are going to 
Bosnia no matter what this Congress does. They are going to Bosnia no 
matter which resolution is approved or not approved. That is a fact.
  Fact 4: There are clearly not sufficient votes in Congress to 
override the President's veto of a bill that would prohibit funding of 
the troops. In fact, earlier today, there were only 22 votes on this 
floor--22 votes--to in fact cut off these funds.
  Mr. President, with these facts in mind, what then should our 
objectives be today as we debate these resolutions? What do we want to 
accomplish? What can we reasonably expect to accomplish?

  Mr. President, the question before us today is I believe a rather 
narrow one. Which resolution will be the most valuable in achieving our 
objectives? What can Congress try to accomplish this evening?
  Mr. President, I would suggest that we have three goals.
  First, the most important, unconditionally support our troops.
  Second, to enhance the odds of them leaving as scheduled within 1 
year.
  And, third, to increase the chances of this mission being successful.
  I believe the Dole resolution--Dole-McCain resolution--can help shape 
and help influence our Bosnia policy and can improve it. It does this 
in part by ensuring the training and arming of the Federation of 
Bosnia, so that they can provide for their own defense after the NATO 
troops leave.
  Mr. President, the Dole resolution gives more support than any of 
other resolutions to our troops. The Dole resolution supports their 
mission and does so in clear terms. It ensures that America speaks with 
a clearer voice.
  Mr. President, for the above reasons, it is my intention this evening 
to vote in favor of the Dole-McCain resolution.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, just 3 weeks ago, the warring parties in 
Bosnia initialed a peace agreement in Dayton, OH. That announcement 
marked the first real hope for an end to the tragic conflict in the 
Balkans which has left hundreds of thousands dead or injured and 
produced over a million refugees. It was only with the dedication and 
persistence of U.S. negotiators present in Dayton that this accord was 
brought to fruition. 

[[Page S18531]]

  While everyone seems to agree that the administration deserves a 
great deal of credit for the success at the bargaining table, some 
question whether the United States should send troops to monitor and 
implement the agreement. This is obviously a very serious question, and 
we have an obligation in this Chamber to think through the implications 
of that decision.
  The question arises, what are the United States national interests 
that are at stake in Bosnia? The President addressed that issue in his 
speech to the Nation on November 27. At that time, he made the case as 
to why this agreement serves America's interests, reflects American 
values, and requires American leadership.
  There are many arguments that can be made about the ways that this 
agreement serves U.S. interests. For instance, that it will prevent the 
war from spreading in a way that might lead to a much more costly and 
dangerous American involvement; that it will return peace and stability 
to a continent that is key to our economic and military security; and 
that it reflects the United States moral and humanitarian interest in 
seeing an end to the bloodshed and violence.
  All of these are very important considerations which should be 
weighed heavily.
  Furthermore, choices are not always a matter of what is the best 
theoretical option but what are the courses of action available to us 
at any particular moment in time. Right now, we have to decide between 
backing the peace agreement, which we were instrumental in developing 
with the undertaking of a U.S. military presence, or not taking part in 
the NATO endeavor, which would mean no NATO endeavor and the breakdown 
of the peace agreement.
  Viewing it from that perspective, I come to the conclusion that the 
risks of missing this opportunity for peace are greater, significantly 
greater than the risks of implementing it, although that course 
certainly has its dangers. Let me discuss briefly the potential 
consequences of not carrying through on the peace agreement.
  First, I think the administration is correct in the view that without 
a commitment of American troops as part of a NATO force, the peace 
agreement will not stand. Having helped the parties to reach this 
point, the United States would completely undermine their confidence in 
the agreement and their commitment to implement it if we do not 
participate. Should this happen, United States troops might well be 
called upon to evacuate United Nations protection forces in Bosnia, 
under much more dangerous circumstances than our troops will face under 
this agreement.
  Second, it could seriously erode America's diplomatic strength. Our 
success at conflict resolution is due not just to the skill and 
determination of our negotiators but also to the perception that the 
United States has the ability and the will to back up the agreements it 
makes. This is not to say that the U.S. must contribute forces to every 
peace agreement it helps to negotiate. But in this instance, the U.S. 
undertaking was a major reason the agreement was reached.
  Our decision on Bosnia, therefore, could have long-lasting 
implications for the future of American leadership. It would be a major 
blow to U.S. world leadership if our failure to participate in this 
instance undermined our ability to move the world in a peaceful 
direction in other crises that might arise.
  Third, it is imperative that a very clear distinction be made between 
this operation and Operation Desert Storm, to which analogies have been 
drawn. Let us remember that in the Iraqi situation the question was 
whether to go to war--whether to undertake a military operation to 
drive the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Here we are talking about helping 
to implement a peace at the invitation of all the parties to the 
conflict. That is not to say there are no dangers involved, nor that 
the mission will be easy. But there is a major difference between going 
in to fight a war and going in to implement a peace.
  Finally, Mr. President, the choices before us are difficult ones. We 
have no assurances that, even with the participation of U.S. troops, 
the peace in Bosnia will be successful in the long run. But it is clear 
now that without our participation there will be no peace. The parties 
to the peace accord have made it plain that their confidence in a fair 
and evenhanded implementation of the agreement depends largely on 
American leadership and on American participation in the peacekeeping 
force.
  Mr. President, consistent with our values and interests, we should 
exercise our leadership by supporting this opportunity for peace.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to be notified when I 
have reached 6 minutes, if I reach that point.
  Mr. President, I was not a Member of the Senate when the debate 
occurred on Desert Storm, but I was nevertheless glued to the 
television watching every single person, back and forth across the 
aisle, talking about their vote of conscience. I thought it was the 
Senate's finest hour. Now I find myself in the position of making a 
similar vote. Although we are not going to an actual war, we are 
nevertheless voting whether to send our troops into hostilities where 
the President says we can expect casualties.
  I feel so strongly, Mr. President, that this is the wrong decision. I 
feel that it is the wrong decision and that the price that we might 
have to pay for the mistake is too high. The cost of an American life 
is too high a price to support an erroneous decision.
  I do not like not supporting the President in a foreign policy 
matter. I think we should bend over backward to do that. But I look at 
two things. I look at my responsibility as a Member of Congress not to 
rubberstamp the President in the matter of going to war, and I cannot 
do what I think is wrong when I also believe that we could have a small 
loss of face now to save a bigger disaster in the future.
  We may lose a little face because we do something different from the 
actual commitment the President made. The President committed to 20,000 
troops on the ground for this peace agreement.
  There were other things the President could have offered to help the 
people of Bosnia keep a peace agreement. Arming and training the 
Moslems is the right thing to do. Although I cannot support the Dole-
McCain amendment, I do think they are right in insisting that the 
arming and training of the Moslems happen; that it is consistent with 
this Senate's vote time after time after time over the last 2 years to 
lift the arms embargo, because anyone who has been there, as I have 
been, believes that there will not be stability in that part of the 
world until the three warring parties have some parity. That is what 
will keep the factions from going after each other in the future.
  So arming and training the Moslems could have been done without our 
having troops on the ground. That would have been a fair division with 
our allies, and it would have fulfilled the responsibilities of the 
United States. But that is not what the President did. The President 
said we will have troops on the ground. He raised the expectations, and 
now we are voting whether to support that decision.
  I wish to refer to an article that was written last month by James 
Webb, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the former 
administration, the Bush administration. And he talks about the need 
for strategic thinking, to determine exactly what our treaty 
commitments are as we go into the post-cold-war era.
  And he says: ``It is time that the United States had a global 
strategy before it puts out any more fires.''
  That really sums it up. We are running around the world putting out 
fires at the cost of billions of defense dollars and possibly hurting 
our long-term readiness for the future.
  What he said we should be doing is absolutely correct. We should have 
a set of principles from which we react to crises.
  ``President Nixon,'' he quotes, ``was the last President that set out 
a military policy, and it was fairly simple: Honor all treaty 
commitments in responding to those who invade the lands of our 
allies.''
  We have a NATO Treaty. If one of the NATO countries is invaded, we 
would be obligated under that treaty to respond. 

[[Page S18532]]

  This mission has expanded far beyond the NATO Treaty into a civil war 
in a non-NATO country, and yet we are being told NATO will fall if we 
do not come through with troops on the ground. It does not hold water, 
and it does not adhere to that very good and sound principle.
  The second principle: Provide a nuclear umbrella to the world against 
the threats of other nuclear powers.
  Mr. President, you know that we have debated theater missile defense 
on this very floor within the last month, and it has been a bone of 
contention. I strongly favor the theater missile defense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used her 6 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, at the end of 4 minutes, I would like 
to be notified once again.
  We must provide the theater missile defense that gives us the 
umbrella to defend ourselves from the 16 countries that now have 
ballistic missile capabilities. But sending troops into Bosnia is going 
to take $5 billion from our defense readiness and from the capability 
to provide that kind of technology in the future.
  The third tenet set out is to provide weapons and technical 
assistance to other countries where warranted but do not commit 
American forces to local conflicts. And that is exactly what we are 
doing. These are principles of a superpower. These are principles that 
keep the United States strong and uses our force when it is really 
necessary to keep a threat to the security of our country from 
happening.
  Sending troops into Bosnia does not meet any of the tests of good, 
sound principles for our country, and we must make this President 
understand that there are many of us in Congress who do not believe he 
is within his power to go without consulting and asking the 
authorization of Congress to commit 20,000 troops on the ground. That 
is why we must a adopt the resolution or get a good vote. I do not know 
that it will be adopted. But I hope that there is a strong vote that 
tells the President that we need to sit down and have a strategy and 
there is a difference between a U.S. security interest in which we 
would put American troops in harm's way.
  We all want to help the Bosnian people, and we can do it in many 
ways. But troops on the ground, American lives at risk is not the right 
way.
  Mr. President, finally, it has been said several times on the floor 
that somehow it would not be supporting the troops to adopt the 
Hutchison-Inhofe resolution. It is very clear. The resolution is 
simple. Section 1 says:

       The Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy 
     United States military ground forces into Bosnia.

  The second section says:

       The Congress strongly supports the United States military 
     personnel who may be ordered by the President to implement 
     the peace framework.

  We are supporting the troops. I think every Member of the U.S. Senate 
intends to support the troops. We are going about it in different ways. 
I believe supporting the troops is narrowing the mission, is saying 
this is a mistake and, therefore, let us put a time limit on it, and if 
you would consider changing your mind, that would be the best of all 
worlds. This is a dangerous mission, and we hope the President will 
have every opportunity to reconsider this decision before it is too 
late.
  That is why we believe this resolution should be adopted to support 
the troops by protecting them. Others may legitimately differ in 
passing the Dole resolution. Either way, we must support the troops, 
and I hope that we will adopt the resolution that opposes the President 
so that he will bring those troops home before the mass deployment 
occurs.
  Thank you, Mr. President, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, once again, this body is discussing the 
difficult issue of U.S. policy toward Bosnia. I regret that we are 
still here wrestling with this issue. I regret that American troops are 
on their way to Bosnia. I regret that peace has yet to come to the 
former Yugoslavia.
  Americans have watched while some of the greatest atrocities since 
World War II have been committed in Europe. We have watched in despair 
as brutal strife has sundered families, neighborhoods, towns and 
cities, and the peoples of an entire region. We have recoiled in horror 
at the summary executions of draft-age-men, the rape and murder of 
women and children, and discoveries of mass graves. An inhumanity which 
we thought long behind us has resurfaced with a shattering savagery.
  It did not have to come to this. Ever since my first trip to the 
former Yugoslavia in August 1992, I have been convinced that the U.N. 
or NATO needed to take a more aggressive role in enforcing U.N. 
mandates, protecting U.N. personnel and at certain critical moments, 
reducing Serb military capabilities through selective aerial bombing. 
Yet, as we all know, international reluctance to take bold action, lack 
of consensus within NATO and the U.N. and political caution in Europe 
and the U.S. doomed any timely efforts to bring peace to the region.
  I have also advocated lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia for 
several years. to me it is unconscionable that we would prevent Bosnia 
from defending itself against a vastly superior force, while at the 
same time refusing to step in, or allowing others to step in, and stop 
ethnic cleansing and the perpetuation of horrible atrocities against 
the Bosnian people. This proved to be a disastrous policy with tragic 
consequences. The only viable option seemed to me to be to lift the 
arms embargo on Bosnia.
  Over the last year, we have watched the European community struggle 
once again to find a solution to this seemingly intractable problem. 
But, as with past efforts, they fell apart in spite of strong U.S. 
support. It became clear to all involved that the only hope of ending 
this tragedy was to have the U.S. take the lead in facilitating 
negotiations between the parties. A belated but herculean effort by the 
Clinton administration resulted in the Dayton discussions, and the 
personal commitment of both the President and Secretary Christopher 
helped bring the parties together at last. I applaud the 
administration's intense efforts and believe the Dayton agreement 
provides the proper framework for a viable peace if all parties to the 
agreement are committed to working for peace.
  I continue to be reluctant to see U.S. ground troops sent to Bosnia. 
Just as we took the lead in Haiti, I believe the Europeans should take 
the lead in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, particularly in 
providing ground troops. The U.S. has been providing air cover and 
surveillance for the past few years. And we provided much of the 
firepower when the U.N. decided it would allow aggressive action 
against certain targets. I approved of these actions and believe we 
should continue to play that role in the Dayton agreement 
implementation force. I do not think that U.S. leadership at the 
bargaining table required us to assume responsibility for providing 
one-third of all ground troops.
  But the President made this commitment, and the option now before 
Congress is to support him at this stage in the process or perhaps 
precipitate the collapse of the most promising chance for peace. Given 
circumstances that we now cannot change, I do not believe there is 
really a choice here. If we care about the moral principles on which 
this Nation is built, if we care about the stability of Europe, for 
which we gave so many lives in two world wars, and if we take seriously 
the full responsibility of world leadership, then we must act to 
support the President's commitment. He should have come to Congress 
earlier in the process. But he didn't, and this is not the time to 
debate that issue further.
  I am opposing the Hutchison resolution because I do not think 
anything productive comes from saying now that we oppose the commitment 
of U.S. troops. The time for such a statement has long passed. And 
stated in isolation from any constructive discussion about what our 
role should be, I feel this approach is not helpful to resolving the 
tragedy of Bosnia.
  I will support the Dole resolution, because I believe it moves us in 
the right direction. I do this with reluctance on one point, however. 
This resolution calls on the United States to lead an immediate 
international effort to provide equipment, arms and training to the 
Bosnian Government Forces. I appreciate that this is seen as a way of 

[[Page S18533]]
addressing the military imbalance that now exists between the parties. 
Obviously, rough military parity is a critical requirement for a 
successful NATO troop withdrawal. But I believe that balance ought to 
be achieved by bringing down the level and sophistication of arms in 
the region--not by raising it. Part of the problem in achieving peace 
and now enforcing it is that there are too many weapons in the region.
  I am very concerned that focusing our efforts on arming the Bosnian 
Government instead of working to disarm and curtail arms flows into the 
area will merely stoke the fires for another explosion in Bosnia after 
we leave. What good is rough parity if all it does is set the stage for 
a resumption of the conflict after the withdrawal of the international 
force?
  After speaking today with Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State, 
and Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am 
reassured that the administration is aware of the dangers of arming of 
the region and that every effort is being made to draw down the 
quantity of arms in the region, not to build them up. I also understand 
that General Shalikashvili is acutely aware of the potential danger to 
United States troops of direct United States involvement in arming, 
equipping, and training of the Bosnian Government Forces.
  Tomorrow the President will witness the formal signing in Paris of 
the Dayton agreement. It is crucial to American credibility that the 
U.S. Senate go on record supporting his efforts prior to that time. I 
have received assurances that one area that will receive intense 
scrutiny in the coming weeks is this critical question of military 
balance. The Dole resolution requests a plan from the administration in 
30 days. And it is critical to the safety of our troops that this issue 
be successfully resolved in that time frame. Therefore, I will cast my 
vote today to advance this process--to Paris and the signing of an 
accord--with the support of the U.S. Senate.
  Finally, let me say that none of this would be possible without the 
professionalism, dedication, and commitment of the U.S. Armed Forces. 
The men and women who voluntarily serve under the Commander in Chief 
and who are now leaving their homes and families for a dangerous 
mission just before the holidays are the ones who make it possible to 
bring this hope of peace to Bosnia. We owe them a tremendous debt of 
gratitude and our hearts are with them. For it is they who put a face 
on what America stands for, and who are willing to take risks to see 
that others who want to live by these ideals are given a chance.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the Hutchison-Inhofe 
resolution in opposition to the Clinton administration's decision to 
send troops to Bosnia as part of the NATO Implementation Force, known 
as IFOR. I commend the Senators from Texas and Oklahoma and the other 
cosponsors of this resolution for their efforts in bringing it to the 
Senate floor. The resolution is brief, simple and to the point. It 
states: ``Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy 
United States military ground forces into the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and its associated annexes.''
  Further, the resolution also states: ``Congress strongly supports the 
United States military personnel who may be ordered by the President to 
implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its associated annexes.''
  That is it. This resolution is the people's resolution, because it 
accurately reflects the views of the vast majority of the American 
people. Most Americans oppose sending our brave soldiers to Bosnia. And 
far more agree that, if the President insists on deployment, we must 
stand by our troops. Though we may disagree with our President, we must 
not do so in a way that would put the lives of American soldiers in 
Bosnia needlessly at risk.
  Mr. President, debate on the use of United States troops should not 
be put in terms of whether we support a peace agreement in Bosnia. We 
all want peace. No one disagrees with that. Few deserve the chance for 
peace and stability more than the families in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
What we have witnessed in the Balkans these past few years has been 
nothing less than tragic.
  To his credit, the President has tried to achieve a negotiated peace 
framework. However, I am afraid that this peace agreement is fatally 
flawed in several respects. First, a large number of those responsible 
for the atrocities--a level of mass slaughter unequaled since Hitler 
and Stalin--likely will go unpunished.
  Second, the agreement assumes continued cooperation between the 
Croatia and Bosnian Moslem leadership. That is a dangerous assumption. 
The fact is the Bosnian Moslems and the Croats often have been on 
opposing sides of this regional conflict. In fact, 2 years ago, Croat 
forces were launching attacks on Moslems in Mostar and the surrounding 
townships.
  This peace agreement and the President's plan to enforce it fly in 
the face of history that dates back far longer than the last few years. 
The recent atrocities we have witnessed are an intensification of a 
conflict that dates back at least five centuries. This is a regional 
civil war. This is a civil war rooted in ethnic and religious 
differences. This is a civil war older than our own country. And at no 
time in our history has this civil war represented a national security 
threat to the United States. It was not a national security threat 
then. It is not one now.
  Finally, Mr. President, this is a flawed agreement because it does 
not have the support of many in the affected regions. In the last few 
weeks, Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo have made it very clear they will not 
support this agreement and allow for Moslem control of Sarajevo. The 
resolve of the rank and file in Sarajevo to stand their ground brings 
images and lessons to mind--of Beirut, Lebanon; Mogadishu, Somalia; and 
from my personal experience, of countless towns and villages in 
Vietnam.
  Mr. President, our troops represent the finest, best trained military 
force on the planet. The fact is 20,000 of our finest soldiers cannot 
erase 500 years of hatred and bloodshed. Peace will not come from the 
resolve of American soldiers. Peace must come and must last from the 
resolve of the Bosnians, the Croats, and the Serbians to say and 
believe that more than five centuries of conflict is enough.
  In fact, the injection of foreign troops into a civil war would only 
work to prolong the conflict in the long term. Our own Civil War would 
have lasted far longer and been far more devastating had Europe 
intervened. That was why President Lincoln worked tirelessly to prevent 
Europe's involvement. Though we will never know for certain, I believe 
Lincoln's efforts and Europe's decision not to intervene ultimately 
saved lives--American and European. Similarly, in the long run, I 
believe we could save more lives--American and European--by pursuing 
other means to achieve a lasting peace other than the limited 
deployment of IFOR.
  Mr. President, I know what it is like to serve my country in a 
mission that did not have the clear support of the American people. I 
am a Vietnam veteran, a former second lieutenant in the United States 
Army. I am proud to have served my country in Vietnam. However, it was 
my hope that this Nation learned a few lessons--lessons that would make 
clear that sending troops to Bosnia is a serious mistake.
  It is my hope that the President will reconsider his decision to 
deploy United States troops to Bosnia. However, my fondest wishes and 
current reality are worlds apart. The President has demonstrated his 
resolve to defy the wishes of the American people and the clear history 
of the region and put our troops in harm's way. That being the case, 
and once the troops are deployed, it is my hope that we in Congress 
will not do anything to jeopardize the safety of our troops. However, 
that should not deter us from closely monitoring the situation in 
Bosnia, just as we did in Somalia, and just as we did in Haiti. I 
intend to do so. The people of South Dakota, especially the families of 
the soldiers who may be deployed there, deserve no less.
  Finally, my thoughts and prayers are with the brave young men and 
women who have been called to serve in or in support of the Bosnia 
mission, as well as their families and friends. I know this is a very 
difficult time. I know 

[[Page S18534]]
what it is like to tell family members that I will be serving my 
country in a conflict half a world away. And now I know what it is like 
to learn that a member of my own family has been called to serve. My 
nephew Steve Pressler, son of my brother Dan and his wife Marcia, has 
been called to duty as part of an eight-member South Dakota National 
Guard unit that has been put on alert. It truly brings the matter home, 
both for my family and the other families with members who have been 
called to duty.
  Again, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Hutchison 
resolution--the people's resolution. The President needs to understand 
that, as the people's representatives, we support the well-being of our 
troops, but we cannot support a policy that puts the lives of our 
troops on the line without a clear national security purpose. The 
policy is wrong. Our troops should not go.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise today to say to my colleagues that 
President Clinton's decision to send United States troops to monitor 
the peace in Bosnia should not be a partisan issue. The President has 
decided to send American troops on a NATO peacekeeping mission in 
Bosnia; as Commander in Chief, the Constitution empowers him to do so. 
President Reagan exercised this power to send troops to Lebanon and 
Grenada; President Bush used this power to send troops to Panama and 
the Persian Gulf. As a newly elected Member of the United States 
Senate, I supported President Bush in sending troops to Panama, and I 
was 1 of 11 Democrats to vote for a resolution in support of Operation 
Desert Storm. I intend to support President Clinton as well, 
notwithstanding any reservations I may have about sending troops to 
Bosnia.
  I do have serious misgivings about the deployment of American ground 
troops in the Balkan region; I wish that the President had not 
committed them. This is a high-risk mission, and the American people 
need to understand, as the President has stated, that casualties are 
almost inevitable. Some months ago I supported lifting the arms 
embargo, an embargo which prevented the Bosnian Moslems from securing 
the weapons necessary to defend themselves. Unfortunately, that embargo 
was never lifted. If it has been lifted, the Bosnian Moslems would have 
had the weapons they needed and American forces may never have been 
deployed.
  I have two primary apprehensions about the assignment of troops to 
Bosnia; I am concerned that the mission need to be adequately defined, 
and I am concerned about the details of the United States exit 
strategy. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have 
had the opportunity to question closely Secretary of Defense Perry and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili when they appeared 
before the committee. They have assured me that the mission is narrowly 
defined and is confined to (a) the marking of the cease-fire line, 
inter-entity boundary line, and zones of separation, and (b) the 
monitoring and enforcement of the withdrawal of forces to their 
respective territories within the agreed period. With this mission so 
narrowly defined, I believe that we can avoid problems with mission 
creep we have faced in the past where troops have been committed 
without careful thought to what the goals of the mission were. Somalia 
is a case in point. Both Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili are 
convinced that the Bosnia mission can be accomplished in 1 year. 
Furthermore, U.S. troops are not going to be responsible for nation-
building, refugee relocation, or other humanitarian activities. They 
have also assured me that the decision to leave the region will be up 
to the United States and the United States alone, and other NATO 
countries have pledged to follow our lead.
  I believe the United States has played a critical role in this peace 
process. Without U.S. diplomatic involvement, the peace talks in Dayton 
would never have come about. Without the United States, this bloody war 
may never have ended. We have brought the Balkan peace process along 
this far, it would be terribly disingenuous for us to bail out now. The 
President has encouraged our allies to support this mission and all 
NATO countries with troops have pledged their support. It would be a 
tragedy for the United States to let the NATO countries down now, 
especially since we have done so much to promote peace in Bosnia.
  The Congress has taken responsibility in this process as well. We 
sought to define the mission and a bipartisan congressional coalition 
has worked to insure that the mission is strongly defined and the exit 
strategy is clarified. We have an obligation to insure that the mission 
can be successfully executed. We know that the U.S. uniformed services 
are the best in the world, and we should stand proudly behind them.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose President Clinton's 
plan to send America's sons and daughters into Bosnia. On Monday 
evening, President Clinton asked Congress and the American people to 
support a policy that transforms the world's greatest fighting force 
into a band of peace enforcers and nation builders.
  Unfortunately, this President is a poor student of history. He has 
quickly forgotten the tragic lessons of Somalia and Beirut. I can 
assure you, Mr. President, the families of those killed in those 
faraway places are reminded every day and will not soon forget the 
consequences of this type of ill-conceived foreign policy.
  President Clinton wants us to support an undetermined scheme to 
enforce a precarious peace between factions that have been at war for 
almost 4 years and fighting each other for generations. He tells us it 
will take 20,000 American troops and less than a year. Mr. President, 
less than a year to bring peace to a place that has not known peace in 
recent memory?
  President Clinton tells us that our troops will be peacekeepers and 
not war fighters. They will be neutral brokers of an agreed upon 
settlement between warring parties. The problem with this, Mr. 
President, is that we are not a neutral party in this conflict. 
President Clinton himself admits that we chose sides.
  We imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and were an active 
participant in a sustained air assault on Bosnian Serb targets. To add 
insult to injury, the administration also proposes that we train the 
Bosnian Federation while we enforce the peace. Is there any doubt that 
the Serbs will view our presence as something less than neutral?
  Mr. President, why is this any different than Beirut or Somalia and 
can we really expect a different result?
  President Clinton said that we will send 20,000 of our troops. How 
did he determine that we would need 20,000 troops to enforce the peace?
  Earlier this year President Clinton imprudently promised to commit up 
to 25,000 U.S. ground forces long before there was peace, before there 
was a plan, before there was a mission, and before we had any idea 
whether it would be necessary to become involved at all. Recently, the 
President told us that he still has not seen the plan.
  As yet, there is no clearly defined mission, no attainable military 
goals and no way to measure success. However, President Clinton knows 
that we will send 20,000 of our troops to implement this unknown plan. 
Mr. President, without well-defined and achievable military goals, I 
fear that the world's finest fighting forces are about to be used as 
global hall-monitors, sitting ducks for disgruntled belligerents.
  Mr. President, I suggest that the administration has yet to establish 
any credible case for this deployment.
  President Clinton also tells us that the United States must lead when 
NATO is involved. Of course the United States must lead, but the 
President has equated leadership with American ground troops.
  American ground forces offer no tactical or operational advantage to 
a Bosnian peace force. They offer only political advantage for our 
reluctant European allies. The Balkans are historically a matter of 
concern to Western Europe. If they do not believe the problem is 
important enough to solve--then we certainly should not.
  President Clinton apparently believes that the United States must 
deploy troops in Bosnia to preserve NATO and that NATO is the proper 
vehicle for peace in Bosnia. Mr. President, by any measure this would 
greatly expand the alliance's mandate to include missions never even 
remotely contemplated by NATO's founders.

[[Page S18535]]

  NATO was intended to be a military alliance to deter a Soviet attack 
on Western Europe. There is no doubt that the United States has a vital 
interest in the continent's security. President Clinton proposes, 
however, that we transform the basic mission of NATO from an 
organization that guards Western Europe from attack, into an 
organization that intervenes in civil disputes and parochial conflicts 
of nonmember states.
  Mr. President, we should never seek to preserve an alliance unless 
that alliance serves the purposes for which it was crated. NATO was not 
created to be the arbiter of civil disputes nor should it seek to 
become one.
  What did President Clinton not tell us? He did not tell us how our 
troops will get out. He told us that it should last only 1 year, but as 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle testified before 
the Armed Services Committee, ``An exit date is not an exit strategy.'' 
To compound the problem, the administration will be under enormous 
pressure to succeed. Especially in an election year.
  Without clearly defined military missions and goals, mission creep is 
inevitable. As President Clinton expands the mission he will be 
compelled to escalate American military efforts to meet the 
requirements of new missions. This sounds very familiar, Mr. President.
  President Clinton also did not tell the American people how much this 
will cost them. Some estimates run as high as $2 billion and that is 
based on a best-case scenario. Mr. President, military planning must 
take into account the worst-case scenario. Our fighting forces must be 
prepared for any contingency.
  Again, I fear that this administration has not prepared for 
unexpected events which are inevitable in any military operation. This 
could be critical not only to the financial cost of the operation, but 
to the incalculable human cost as well.
  President Clinton asked the American people to choose peace. Mr. 
President, the American people do choose peace. We hope for a lasting 
end to the Bosnian civil war that has raged for so long. The American 
people and this body will support the President in his efforts to end 
the fighting, but we will not commit our fighting men and women when we 
have no vital national interest at stake. Just saying we have a vital 
interest, Mr. President, does not make it so. President Clinton has 
failed to make the case to the American people, and this body should 
not support a deployment of American troops to Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I have serious concerns about the 
deployment of American troops in Bosnia. I certainly have concerns 
about the stability of the peace accord reached in Dayton. I have 
concerns about the potential disruption that Bosnian Serbs and other 
antipeace factions of the various affected parties may create. And I 
have no illusions about the vulnerability of Americans--our Nation's 
men and women who will be part of the Peace Implementation Force in 
Bosnia--to innumerable dangers as a result of this deployment. But 
leadership is not risk-free, Mr. President.
  It is clear that even as we are debating this issue, United States 
troops are participating in the NATO effort to implement the Bosnia 
peace agreement. Every nation in Europe--in Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe, even Russia--is deploying troops as part of the peace accord. 
The achievements that were reached after painstaking negotiations 
between Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo 
Tudjman, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic with support and 
facilitation by United States representatives, particularly Secretary 
of State Christopher and Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Holbrooke, have generated the best chance yet of achieving a stable 
outcome for the Baltic region. It is clear that U.S. support of this 
NATO effort is essential if we are to maintain our leadership role in 
the world, and if the peace enforcement effort is to succeed.
  The November 21 peace agreement calls for the creation of a 60,000 
member implementation force [I-FOR], which will be comprised of 30 
countries. I-FOR's mission is not to side with the combatants, but is 
rather to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of 
the settlement. I have listened carefully to testimony from defense and 
foreign policy experts on the use of military forces to enforce a peace 
regime. None of them has identified this as an easy mission and all 
have concerns. While I feel there are many risks which may potentially 
disrupt NATO's efforts to secure peace in the region, I agree with 
former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that ``disaster is 
certain if the U.S. backs out of the situation now.''
  Mr. President, I do not support an open-ended time frame to 
maintaining peace indefinitely in the region. I think that the debates 
this Chamber has had, the testimony that has been provided to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, and the dialog that many here have had 
with the President and Secretary Perry have underscored the critical 
significance of limiting the scope of our mission in Bosnia. I am 
confident that the President is committed to the 1-year time frame and 
is committed to the limited objectives he has presented--namely, 
separating the parties and maintaining the cease-fire. And I have been 
assured that those who attack our forces or impede this process will be 
dealt with swiftly and decisively.
  Mr. President, our troops are on the ground today in Bosnia; we are 
there, and we need to support our men and women. Congress should not 
withhold funds that are needed to support our troops, and we should not 
tie the President's hands during this time when American leadership 
matters so very much. My vote is to approve of U.S. participation in 
the NATO initiative.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, what the Senate is faced with amounts 
to a shotgun wedding. The Congress and American troops find themselves 
confronting an unfortunate mistake, but one which we are now obliged to 
make the best of. Our decision--each Senator's choice--is whether we 
respond to the situation with a sense of honor and accountability or 
whether we abandon our principles and responsibility.
  I am not happy with our choice. I don't think any one of us welcomes 
the prospect of sending American soldiers into Bosnia. I share the 
Majority Leader's view that we would not have been presented with this 
decision if the administration had worked as methodically to lift the 
embargo on Bosnia as it did to advance the deal in Dayton. But, at this 
stage it matters less how we got here--it is of far graver consequence 
how we proceed.
  Why should we look forward and not back?
  Because we do not have the option or choice to change the course of 
events. The agreement has been signed, now we must decide what kind of 
mission we will carry out and how we will assure it succeeds.
  We are now presented with two unambiguous facts--the first being that 
the Dayton agreement would not have been reached without aggressive, 
rational U.S. leadership. This is not, after all the Tashkent Treaty. 
Leaders from many other nations have tried repeatedly to negotiate a 
settlement, but it was largely American diplomatic efforts which 
produced results.
  And, just as the U.S. role meant the difference between a settlement 
and continued blood shed, so too, the immediate parties to the 
agreement and our allies in Europe believe we have a unique authority 
and capability to guarantee the accord's successful implementation.
  But, the second fact is more important and that is that the President 
of the United States has made the commitment to deploy 20,000 Americans 
in support of a NATO Implementation Force to secure the accord. Whether 
we like it or not, those troops are going, indeed some are on the 
ground. To deny our support for Operation Joint Endeavor, flatly 
repudiates our long standing NATO security obligations and undermines 
our troops committed to the effort.
  The credibility of American leadership and American treaty 
commitments are the interests which are very much at stake if we now 
fail to fulfill the President's decision. Just after the President's 
Oval Office address, Henry Kissinger observed, ``if we do not honor the 
President's words, the threat to our security would be greater because 
nobody would believe we are capable of conducting serious foreign 
policy.'' 

[[Page S18536]]


  President Bush, who so capably led this country beyond deep anxieties 
about committing our Nation to war in the Persian Gulf echoed that 
sentiment. He pointed out, ``If it is seen that the President does not 
have the support of the Congress--our standing as leader of the free 
world and the standing of NATO would be dramatically diminished. That 
must not happen.''
  Now, we must make certain that our troops have the means to succeed. 
We must guarantee they are assured every conceivable operational 
advantage and the unqualified support of both the public and Congress.
  Mr. President, I do not believe this Nation is by nature indifferent 
to international concerns--there is no inherent isolationist point of 
view. But the public is clearly troubled by this decision--they now 
seem at best divided and at worst deeply opposed to the President's 
decision.
  I attribute the confusion to 3 years of flip flops, reversals, and 
irrational foreign policy inconsistent with our national interests. The 
public has little reason to believe that this time the administration 
will stay on track with a limited mission that protects our Nation's 
interests and our soldiers lives.
  That is why I think it is incumbent on Congress to assure absolute 
accountability regarding the scope of the mission, the costs and the 
strategy for withdrawing our forces. We have a clear and compelling 
responsibility to the troops we are deploying to guarantee they are 
well equipped and are carrying out limited, achievable goals.
  Unfortunately, there are already contradictions and uncertainties 
emerging which will only plague the administration's desire to 
strengthen public support. Last week, Secretary Perry testified before 
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that our financial burden would 
be limited to support for our troops. Within a matter of days, the 
Defense Department submitted a letter notifying Congress of the 
possibility of transferring $300 million in defense articles and 
services to nations participating in I-For. Apparently, DOD anticipates 
reimbursement for this support, but those of us who monitor the United 
Nations have serious reservations about the reliability of these 
promissory notes.
  The administration cannot afford to allow any ambiguity to creep into 
the public debate about the scope of our responsibilities. One of the 
reasons I support the resolution drafted by the leader is the 
requirement that the administration provide a full accounting of the 
mission, rules of engagement, command arrangements, goals, compliance 
with the agreements and all costs to all agencies involved in this 
endeavor. The leader's resolution is the best protection our troops 
have that their government will not fail them as they carry out their 
duties with skill and honor.

  But, the real key to success and the heart of my support for the 
Leadership resolution is the requirement that the United States lead an 
immediate effort to provide equipment, arms, training and related 
logistics to enable Bosnia to provide for its own defense.
  Mr. President, I do not think it is wise to establish an arbitrary 
date for the exit of American troops. That only guarantees a cooling 
off period before fighting resumes. We have seen the destructive 
consequences of just such an approach in Somalia. Knowing our departure 
was imminent, the warlords bided their time. Somalia today is 
indistinguishable from the chaos and anarchy which preceded our 
arrival.
  That must not happen in the Balkans.
  Our mission can only be deemed a success if we contribute to a 
durable solution, securing a lasting regional stability and peace. 
Stability and peace demand a military balance between the Serbs and the 
Bosnian-Croat Federation.
  I realize that there are members with major misgivings about the 
possible consequences of lifting the embargo and arming and training 
the Bosnians. They want to allow the so called arms build down process 
to have time to take affect. Unfortunately, there are far too many 
unanswered questions about the arms reduction program to risk Bosnia's 
freedom and long term prospects for stability.
  At this point it is entirely unclear who will assume the 
responsibility for enforcing arms control. As the Dayton agreement is 
constructed, the immediate reach of the disarmament regime is limited 
to the NATO patrolled cease-fire zones of separation. This makes 
obvious sense for the security of our soldiers, but offers no iron clad 
guarantees for the reduction of massive Serb stockpiles within the 
boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  Let me add one final historical observation on arming the Bosnians. I 
think a majority of members in this chamber would share the view that 
it was not SALT or START agreements which brought about the demise of 
the Soviet Union. Arms control initiatives may reduce risks, but any 
level headed assessment of the Cold War reaches the conclusion that it 
was the credibility of our military power which guaranteed our security 
and global stability. So too, in the Balkans--only a credible military 
balance will minimize the risk of the war reigniting.
  Mr. President, in 1990 the American public was ambivalent about the 
notion of sending Americans to war in the gulf. We all know just how 
close the vote was in the Senate.
  From a parochial perspective, 20,000 soldiers deployed from 
Kentucky--if my memory serves me it was the largest contingent from any 
State. George Bush faced formidable opposition from families in 
Kentucky, but he was able to overcome their concerns by exercising 
leadership. In the words of his Secretary of State, ``The U.S. had in 
George Bush a leader who was consistent, principled, decisive and 
strong.''
  Those have not been the words most of the members of this chamber 
would use to describe the President's record in foreign policy so far. 
I think it is worth noting very few Kentuckians have been called up for 
deployment in Bosnia--a handful compared to the gulf. Yet, there is 
more pronounced, stronger opposition to the President's decision to 
deploy U.S. troops to secure peace than there was to Bush's decision to 
wage war.
  President Clinton has made the decision to deploy American troops to 
end the suffering, stop the war from spreading, and to build a Europe 
at peace. He has argued that this can only be achieved if the United 
States continues to lead. I take this pledge seriously.
  Congress and American troops now stand at an altar--let us all hope 
and work to assure that it is not one which involves the unnecessary 
sacrifice of American lives. But as we proceed, let us share the 
understanding that there are crucial U.S. interests at stake. The lives 
of American soldiers and the credibility of American leadership and our 
security commitments to NATO now hang precariously in the balance. We 
must speak with one voice and honor the President's pledge.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, the role of the United States in the world 
is unique. America has played a historic role in opposing tyranny, and 
giving hope to people denied their freedom. Similarly, our military has 
played a central and unparalleled role in the world. Only the U.S. 
Armed Forces combine the ability to achieve enormous and complicated 
military objectives with the commitment to use this force in pursuit of 
the values that made our Nation great--freedom, justice, democracy, and 
the protection of basic human rights.
  Despite a great deal of theorizing about the so-called new world 
order, our role in the world should remain the same as it was 
throughout the cold war. Certainly, our interests remain the same. Even 
when not pitted against the Soviet Union and its Communist expansionism 
we can identify our interests clearly.
  In Bosnia, they were deterrence of aggression, support for the right 
of self defense, abhorrence of ethnic cleansing, and support for multi-
ethnic democracy. President Clinton's 1992 campaign emphasized all of 
these issues. His policy as President has reflected none of them.
  Since early on in the conflict, I supported lifting the embargo on 
the Bosnian Government and helping the Bosnian people to defend 
themselves. In my view this was required on moral grounds. It was also 
the strategically and militarily sound course. But most of all, it was 
based on the right of individuals and nations to defend their freedom.
  The embargo condemned the people of Bosnia to a slow death, carried 
out not only by military engagements but also by savage attacks on 
civilians.

[[Page S18537]]

  Serbia came to the war with a massive advantage in arms and 
throughout the war was able to acquire the arms it needed from other 
sources. The Bosnian Government's forces were at an extreme 
disadvantage. Aligning the United States with the embargo and the 
denial of Bosnia's right of self-defense was a disgrace. If this 
administration had pursued a policy of lifting the arms embargo and 
allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, negotiations would have 
been conducted from a position of strength and U.S. troops would not 
have been required.
  Instead, this administration favored negotiation, compromise, and 
concession even when it was painfully obvious that only the threat of 
force and the willingness to use it by the Bosnians would allow any 
hope of democracy and freedom in Bosnia.
  Ironically, the President now has found a use for force, not to 
promote freedom, but to try to enforce an unjust agreement. President 
Clinton has committed U.S. troops and credibility to implement an 
agreement which, as this resolution says, ``ratifies the results of 
ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression.''
  This agreement is the inevitable result of the administration's 
policy of refusing to allow the Bosnian Government to defend itself 
and--let's be frank--its sentences the people of Bosnia to a peace of 
subservience and domination.
  Peace has many forms. There is the so-called peace of the former 
Soviet bloc where the ever present threat of force subjugated the 
nations of Eastern and Central Europe. Bosnia and the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia were supposed to have escaped that domination. 
Instead, another venal and dangerous threat arose.
  In the former Yugoslavia, the threat was complicated by historical 
rivalries and ethnic and religious differences. The administration 
seized on the complexity of the situation and used it as an excuse to 
do nothing. ``There are no good guys,'' the administration said. Or 
``it's a civil war.''
  The peace being imposed on the people of Bosnia is the peace of 
domination and fear. Unless the Bosnian Government is given the means 
to defend itself now, we can expect that the war will continue.
  We should not be in this position. It was avoidable. However, the 
decision to commit U.S. troops and prestige has been made by the 
President in his constitutionally prescribed role as Commander-in-
Chief.
  The Congressional role in providing funds for military operations is 
also set forth in the Constitution. Congress could exercise its 
constitutional power to deny the funds to carry out this or any other 
military mission. The President would certainly veto such a measure. 
Without the votes to override, ultimately, he would prevail.
  Nothing would be served by undercutting the men and women of our 
Armed Forces at this late date. U.S. troops have already begun arriving 
and more are on the way. A strong vote against the deployment would 
demoralize our troops and embolden those who would like to see the 
Dayton settlement collapse.
  Congress must back our troops unconditionally and work to make 
certain they have everything they need to carry out their mission. If 
we learned anything from Somalia, it is that no corners can be cut 
where our troops are concerned. Their rules of engagement, their 
equipment, their training, everything about their mission, must be 
designed to remove all unnecessary risk. We can and we must achieve 
this for the young men and women serving their country.
  This resolution allows the President to fulfill his commitment to 
deploy U.S. forces to implement the General Framework Agreement so long 
as the mission of the United States forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
limited to enforcement of the military provisions of the Dayton 
Agreement, that the exit strategy includes establishment of a military 
balance enabling the government of Bosnia to defend itself, and that 
the U.S. will lead an immediate international effort to provide 
equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the 
highest possible quality to the Bosnian government.
  These determinations are essential. In the last few weeks, the 
administration has made contradictory statements about U.S. intentions 
to help equip and train the Bosnian Government. On the one hand, the 
administration said it will help train and equip the Bosnian side. On 
the other hand, officials have said arming the Bosnian Government 
forces would not be necessary because provisions in the Dayton 
Agreement call for negotiated arms limitation agreements.
  That sends exactly the wrong signal. This war was made possible by 
the inability of the Bosnian Government to defend itself. Late 
yesterday, the President made the commitment to lead the effort to arm 
and train the Bosnian Government forces. In light of the 
administration's recent ambivalence about arming and training the 
Bosnian Government forces, I expect that the administration will show, 
starting today, concrete steps toward fulfilling this commitment to the 
United States Congress and to the Bosnian Government, including getting 
a commitment of support from our allies. The Congress expects that 
commitment to be kept as a condition for passing the Dole-McCain 
resolution.
  There is very little satisfying about the peace agreement reached at 
Dayton. As President Izetbegovic of Bosnia said, ``this may not be a 
just agreement but it is more just than the continuation of war.'' That 
is little to go on for the people of Bosnia, but it will have to do.
  Our role in brokering this settlement makes it incumbent upon us to 
help enforce it. Our role in the world, and the unique role our 
military has played as a force for freedom requires that we work to 
establish a military balance which will protect Bosnia from future 
aggression. Therefore I support our troops as they endeavor to carry 
out the United States military mission in Bosnia.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as I rise to speak about American 
participation in enforcing the Bosnian peace agreement to be signed in 
Paris this week, I want to begin by making clear my firm belief that 
U.S. participation in this action is the wrong thing to do.
  I would note here a few of the many reasons for taking this position:
  The Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and others in the region have been 
fighting for hundreds of years, creating generational hatreds which no 
``piece of paper'' is going to stop.
  There are many elements in the region, not least the Bosnian Serbs--
the main belligerents--who are unhappy with this settlement and will do 
everything they can to upset it, including by attacking our forces.
  There is no clear national interest in our involvement in this 
endeavor other than, to some, the preservation of our leadership in 
NATO.
  However, the question then is: ``is this the issue upon which the 
future of NATO should be decided?'' I certainly hope not.
  U.S. troops will be in the middle of a situation fraught with 
antagonism and hatred. They will have to be arbiters, for example, of 
who lives where, who gets trained, who is ``right'' in the inevitable 
thousands of disputes which will arise.
  Inevitably, they'll become participants, and in that part of the 
world that means they'll be victims of the violence they are supposed 
to prevent.
  The map to which the parties have agreed is a disaster and creates 
ungovernable nations which the parties will, long after this incident 
is over, inevitably begin to fight about again.
  There is no realistic ``exit strategy'' because there is no 
likelihood that these incredibly difficult problems are going to be 
resolved in 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, or even 100 years.
  Mr. President, there are countless other reasons why this is the 
wrong thing to do. My colleagues will be discussing them at great 
length, so there is no reason for me to note them here.


                the issue of congressional authorization

  Rather I would like to discuss another aspect of this issue.
  Mr. President, eventually the constitutional issue of whether the 
President must have authorization from Congress to participate in such 
ventures will be decided in the Congress' favor.
  However, in the meantime, we have a reality, a sad reality: the 
President can make this deployment even without congressional 
authorization or support.
  He's going to do so without congressional authorization or even 
congressional support. In fact he's going to do it even if the Congress 
disapproves.

[[Page S18538]]

  This is unfortunate, and I think the President will regret acting in 
this way at a time when the Congress and, I believe, the overwhelming 
majority of the American people, have serious doubts about this policy.


                     We have to support our troops

  Mr. President, that is the reality.
  We in Congress have to deal as best we can with that reality--that 
our troops are going to Bosnia, to Croatia, to Hungary, and elsewhere 
in the Balkans--by doing everything in our power to support our 
military men and women.
  In short, our forces are going into a situation with many risks, with 
many dangers, with the potential for many of them to be injured or 
killed during their tour of duty. As they do so, we have to do several 
things: Make sure they have rules of engagement which allow them to 
defend themselves and deal with threats to themselves, including by 
force; make sure they have sufficient back up, including support forces 
in the region and air support to deal with threat; and, most 
importantly, make sure they know that no matter what the political 
differences at home, they have the 100 percent support of all 
Americans.
  In sum, Mr. President, no matter how much we oppose this policy, and 
no matter how the situation evolves in the Balkans, we have to be 
prepared to show our forces, in every way possible, that they have our 
full and unequivocal support.


                               The future

  Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that it is essential that 
the Congress, with its oversight responsibilities, watch very carefully 
how this situation evolves, how our forces are treated, and how this 
complex and convoluted peace agreement is implemented.
  As we do so, we must be prepared to take appropriate action if what I 
firmly believe are the overly optimistic predictions of the 
administration do not come true.
  That too is an absolutely essential part of our support for our 
troops as they face this risky, dangerous, unprecedented, and, in my 
view, unfortunate endeavor.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, the decision on Bosnia is extremely 
difficult. But I believe our responsibility is clear.
  The United States is being asked to participate in a peacekeeping 
mission by all the parties to the dispute in Bosnia. They say that 
without our participation, there will be no chance for peace.
  It is important to remember that we are being asked to enforce an 
agreed upon peace. We are not being asked to wage war.
  It is in our interest to help prevent the spread of this conflict to 
the rest of Europe. And it is morally right to help stop the slaughter 
and atrocities that have repeatedly occurred.
  However, I have always thought that Bosnia was primarily the 
European's responsibility. This conflict is in their backyard. It most 
directly affects their interests.
  I also have serious doubts whether peace can be secured in 1 year. 
The history of the region is one of strife and struggle. There has been 
conflict in the Balkans for hundreds of years. For 45 years after World 
War II, the differences were suppressed by Marshal Tito. But when he 
passed from the scene, the old enmities resumed as violently as before.
  Despite these serious doubts, I am persuaded we ought to help give 
the parties a chance to build the peace they say they want. They have 
said they are tired of war, and asked us and 25 other nations to give 
them the opportunity they need to try to craft a lasting peace.
  Most importantly, I believe we must send a strong message of support 
for our troops, who are helping to create an opportunity for peace in 
Bosnia. Anything less will add to the risks that the brave men and 
women of our Armed Forces will face.
  I have therefore decided to support the Dole-McCain resolution 
supporting our troops and limiting the mission they are expected to 
fulfill.
  I will continue to carefully monitor our involvement to ensure that 
this mission does not expand beyond the limited one being authorized 
tonight.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the 
Dole-McCain resolution regarding the deployment of United States troops 
in Bosnia.
  I would like to begin my remarks by commending the respected majority 
leader for his skill and leadership in this sensitive and vital area. I 
emphasize the word ``leader,'' because true leadership has been 
required here and has been much evident.
  There is, I believe it is fair to say, a great amount of shared rich 
feeling here in the Senate about this deployment. There is a palpable 
feeling of trepidation about this mission, on both sides of the aisle. 
Few in this body are certain that sending troops is the right thing to 
do, and for that reason, would not have voted to do it. At the same 
time, there is considerable sentiment here that we should do eveything 
possible to fully support our troops once they are there, and to avoid 
any appearance of undercutting our Commander in Chief. To undercut our 
command structure while American troops are in harm's way is something 
that most Senators earnestly wish to avoid.
  I believe that the Senate has plaintively wished to give voice 
simultaneously to these two conflicting impulses. The majority leader's 
initiative has made it possible for us to do so.
  Turning that shared feeling into a constructive statement of policy 
is a tremendously difficult task. It requires not only considerable 
political skill and courage, but a detailed recognition of the factors 
confronting our forces in Bosnia, and confronting our President.
  First, I do believe that there is broad agreement here about the 
President's constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief, to deploy 
U.S. forces to defend U.S. interests abroad. We in Congress do have the 
constitutional right and duty to be involved in fundamental decisions 
of war and peace. But the principal ways in which we do this are--
first, to declare war ourselves, a congressional prerogative, and 
second, to use our power over the purse to limit the military operation 
pursued by the President. We do retain that power. But otherwise, we 
recognize that it is the President, not the Congress, who has the 
authority to command the Armed forces, within the limits of what 
Congress is willing to fund.
  Earlier today, we voted as to whether to forbid the President to use 
DOD funds to support a deployment in Bosnia. Buy a 77 to 22 vote, we 
decided that we would not curtail such funding. Thus I believe that it 
is now incumbent upon the Congress to maximize the chances of success 
for the mission which the President has seen fit to initiate.
  The President's decision to deploy U.S. forces is associated with his 
committing the United States to do its share in upholding a peace 
negotiated between the warring parties. I have my own grave doubts 
about whether this peace will hold. It may indeed hold, but I do not 
believe that it will hold simply because United States, British, 
French, or other NATO forces are present. If the warring parties in 
Bosnia are not satisfied with the terms of the peace, they will take 
out their hostilities on whichever forces are in this way. I believe 
that the historical record in that regard is so very clear.
  It is possible that the peace will indeed hold, if an equilibrium has 
been reached there. If the various parties are satisfied with the 
territory over which they have been given jurisdiction, then there may 
indeed be peace. I would say, however, that there are troubling signs 
that this will not be the case in Bosnia. I am certain that my 
colleagues have read and heard about many instances of aggressive 
behavior in the last few days. One involved the touching of a town, by 
Bosnian Croats, which was slated to be turned over to the Serbs. Can we 
assume that these horrible actions will not meet with reprisals? Will 
the Serbs be satisfied that a town allotted to them under the terms of 
the peace agreement has been destroyed? Will vengeance not be sought at 
another time and place? I believe it would be highly naive to assume 
that these activities will cease the moment that United States troops 
take up their positions in Bosnia.
  So it should be clear that I am most troubled by the President's 
decision to send troops to Bosnia. However, I would also say that we do 
not add to the safety of our troops by withdrawing support from our 
President at this 

[[Page S18539]]
time. We know from our own tragic experience that no good comes from 
public disunity between the President and the Congress at such a time 
as this. To tell the world that America's commitment is soft, that it 
will be undone once the Congress can prevail over the President in such 
a matter, is to invite attacks upon our troops, and thereby upon our 
resolve. Certainly, any potential enemies will seek to test American 
resolve in Bosnia. ``We must not,'' I say to my colleagues, lay any of 
the groundwork for those detractors by making it harder for the 
President to stand by his decisions.

  The majority leader's resolution, I believe, recognizes that our 
desire to support our President does not mandate that we simply offer 
him a blank check to proceed in Bosnia in any which way. This 
resolution incorporates the insights of our able Majority Leader and 
others as to the reality that our troops can only safely and profitably 
be withdrawn once Bosnia can stand on its own without resort to the 
presence of American support. This requires the training and equipping 
of aviable Bosnian army. Much of the negotiations between the Congress 
and the President as to the substance of this resolution have turned on 
this point. I am pleased to see that we have received a commitment from 
the White House that America will assume a leading role in training the 
Bosnian army there.
  That is the factor which can make it possible for the President to 
claim this mission as a success upon its conclusion; otherwise we run 
the risk of simply delaying whatever bloodshed would otherwise occur 
until the United States withdraws. If we have simply a target date for 
the hostilities to resume, and we will have accomplished nothing. The 
work of the majority leader in this area could help to ensure that this 
mission is not in vain, and that a lasting peace in Bosnia is possible, 
without a sustained and indefinite American presence.
  So I commend the resolution offered by Senator Dole and the intrepid 
and courageous McCain and I urge my colleagues to support it. I trust 
that my colleagues will agree with me that the task before us--once 
such a mission is undertaken--is to ensure that it has the greatest 
possible chance for success. I believe that in this instance, we 
accomplish this by defining and limiting the nature of the mission in 
Bosnia, and by providing a strategy leading toward the orderly 
withdrawal of United States troops from this part of the world. The 
Dole-McCain resolution surely accomplishes this, and I urge the Senate 
to adopt it.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, before I begin my remarks on the 
resolutions related to Bosnia, I would like to express my unequivocal 
support for the men and women of the United States Armed Forces. I can 
think of no greater act of patriotism and devotion to this country than 
to enlist in the military and devote one's professional life to the 
defense of our Constitution. It is made even more profound by the 
realization that these brave men and women do not have a say in how, or 
where, they will be employed. They go where they are told to go, fight 
where they are told to fight, and do so better than any other military 
force in the world. Throughout their service they must spend months, 
sometimes even years, away from their home and family. Children are 
born and start growing up while their parent is away in the service of 
their country. Few of us in America today realize the tremendous 
sacrifice these men and women make so that we may enjoy the fruits of 
liberty. It is time we honor their sacrifice.
  But such sacrifice is not limited to our active duty forces. I have 
been informed that four Michigan National Guard and Army Reserve units 
will be deployed in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. To the 
officers, men and women of the 1776th Military Police Company, the 
210th Military Police Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, both 
from Taylor, MI, the 415th Civil Affairs Battalion in Kalamazoo, MI, 
and the 415th Military Intelligence Detachment in Ann Arbor, MI, I wish 
you God speed and a safe deployment. I have also been informed that one 
of my own staff, a Naval Reservist, may be recalled to active duty to 
support these military operations. May you all return quickly and 
safely. I commend your patriotism, your bravery, and your devotion to 
duty. You exemplify all that is worthy and noble in Michigan, in our 
military, and in the United States. I'm sure all my colleagues here in 
the Senate join me in saluting your valor.
  Now Mr. President, I would like to specifically address the issue of 
America's interest and involvement in Bosnia. This issue has 
implications for our foreign and defense policy that will reverberate 
long after this operation is completed.
  America has always been viewed as a light to all nations, guiding 
them to peace, freedom, and self-determination. We are a nation 
dedicated to certain principles and ideals, and we take those 
principles and ideals seriously enough that we include their very 
preservation and advancement as part of our national interest. But we 
must never lose sight of the fact that a nation's first responsibility 
is to its own people.
  We, in this body, must never develop a foreign policy that loses 
sight of that primary responsibility, and that the lives and safety of 
our troops, whether they be volunteers or conscripts, are just as much 
a vital national security interest as are the lives of our civilian 
citizens. In practice then, we should commit our forces only when, 
where, and to the extent appropriate, to meet our stated national goals 
and to protect our national interests.
  Therefore, Mr. President, the level of our commitment to a particular 
undertaking should be concomitant with the level of the threat to our 
national interests. Some situations threaten our very existence, while 
others only marginally affect us. Many will lie somewhere in the 
middle. Where such threats to our national security are significant and 
definite, like those we faced in World War II, we must respond 
decisively and with all available military force. But in those cases 
where our national interests lie somewhere between the extremes, as I 
believe is the case in the Balkans, it is not necessary to respond with 
the same level of absolute commitment and force that we would use 
against those definite threats to our vital national security 
interests.
  Mr. President, we must also examine not only what our chances of 
success will be in a particular undertaking, but also what will be the 
potential costs--in the lives of America's soldiers and in our national 
prestige. Just as the level of our interests will lie somewhere along a 
broad scale, so too will the potential benefits and costs. Every effort 
must be made to assess and decide whether the potential benefits in 
advancing our national interests justify the costs.
  Mr. President, in my view, the United States has an interest in long-
term stability and peace in the Balkans. The war has consumed the 
interests of Europe for the past 4 years and has increasingly become an 
item of disagreement and discord between the United States and our NATO 
allies, an alliance where continued U.S. leadership is vital to our 
interests. Former adversaries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, 
with whom we previously thought we were developing new and friendlier 
relations, are using this war as an opportunity to expand their 
influence and control. Our leadership in NATO, and with the emerging 
European democratic states, will be pivotal to what Europe will look 
like for generations to come. We must remain engaged with these states, 
and must accept that their problems, more or less are our problems too. 
Further, old divisions between East and West are exacerbated by this 
conflict because of the critical role the mixing of Eastern and Western 
religions play in the continued hatred and strife of the region. These 
conflicts undermine stability and therefore directly impact upon U.S. 
national interests.
  Finally, and certainly not least, the United States has a very real 
interest in putting an end to the atrocities and carnage that has 
shattered this region. At the end of World War II, we said we would 
never again allow another Holocaust. Where we have an opportunity to 
end mass and indiscriminate killing, which will live in our memories 
for generations to come, we must seize such opportunities where we 
legitimately believe we can succeed.
  Mr. President, while there is a definite U.S. interest to be advanced 
in this situation, it is only worth acting if 

[[Page S18540]]
we employ a strategy that both ensures the conditions for a genuine 
peace and which establishes a rational strategy for the eventual 
withdrawal of our troops. Therefore, I believe any strategy for peace 
and stability in the Balkans must, in part, be based upon addressing 
the fundamental military imbalance between the Serbs and the Muslim-
Croatian Federation. If we had previously lifted the arms embargo, we 
would not be debating this deployment today. Yes, the conflict would 
have probably intensified at first, but I believe the Muslim-Croatian 
Federation would have then been able to develop a credible military 
deterrent, and there would be no need for 60,000 troops to implement 
the peace. Now, again, a balance must exist or peace will evaporate as 
soon as the Implementation Force withdraws. The current administration 
policy fails to set in motion a plan to achieve this balance.
  It is also clear to me that any strategy based upon the deployment of 
United States ground troops to Bosnia must include a definition of what 
will be the conditions for declaring final success in this venture. A 
pitfall we must avoid in achieving that success is to utilize our 
troops in the inappropriate mission of nation-building. I understand 
suitable political structures must be in place to allow the ballot to 
replace the bullet as the agent of change, but the role of our troops 
must be strictly limited to establishing the necessary military 
stability so as to allow the civilians the opportunity to develop the 
necessary political institutions.
  When we have defined our criteria for success, we must also have in 
place a definite withdrawal plan that clearly establishes the 
conditions and terms for the termination of this mission. In my view, 
the current administration plan is based upon the faulty assumptions 
that our mere presence in Bosnia is the goal, and that peace under any 
terms is preferable to battling for a just victory.
  Mr. President, short of committing ground troops to Bosnia, I believe 
there are several roles which the United States can and should fill to 
advance the cause of a just and stable peace in the Balkans. Among 
those roles which I feel are appropriate for the United States include 
contributing significant air and naval forces to the NATO operation in 
the Balkans, providing a large part of the logistical and financial 
resources for this operation, and participating in efforts to provide 
military assistance and training to the Muslim-Croatian Federation.
  However, the President's decision to deploy United States ground 
troops directly into Bosnia and Herzegovina is, in my view, a grievous 
mistake. As I stated earlier, I believe it is in America's interests to 
advance the cause of peace, justice, and stability in the Balkans. But 
it is not such an absolute or vital national interest that it justifies 
the extremely high risk of deploying ground troops to the region.
  Mr. President, I believe U.S. troops are particularly ill-suited for 
peacekeeping missions of this type because they present such a ripe 
political target. Whether rightly or wrongly, a dead American soldier 
captured on TV cameras will be broadcast around the world. I doubt the 
same can be said for the soldiers from traditional peacekeeping 
contributors. And that is exactly what a belligerent wants; that 
intense media coverage and scrutiny that covers American troops. That 
is why our troops have rarely been used as peacekeepers. Look at what 
happened in Somalia. U.S. forces were specifically targeted, and 
subsequently drawn much further into the conflict than originally 
planned, because of the significant political position they occupy for 
no other reason than that they were American soldiers. Therefore, I 
believe peacekeeping is best conducted by smaller countries not 
perceived as having any vested interest in the outcome of a conflict, 
and therefore can undeniably claim to be neutral.
  The question of U.S. leadership does not rest on the end of an 
infantryman's rifle barrel. The United States can maintain, even 
advance, its international credibility, its preeminence in the NATO 
alliance, and its role as the world's sole superpower, without having 
to contribute a disproportionate share of the troops on the ground. 
Indeed, I believe it is imprudent to claim that the sole measure of 
United States leadership and commitment to peace in the Balkans can 
only be measured by the number of troops we commit to the 
Implementation Force.

  Were a more vital United States interest at stake in the Balkans, and 
were not it clear that the United States can still participate 
significantly in implementing this peace accord without using its 
ground troops, my views may be different. But given the extreme risk to 
which I believe they will be subjected, and the clear availability of 
for other countries to provide these peacekeeping troops, I believe 
placing our forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
unjustified.
  In light of the foregoing analysis, I concluded that I could not 
support H.R. 2606, which would prohibit the expenditure of funds for 
the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia absent a specific 
Congressional appropriation. Limiting the expenditure of funds at this 
stage of the operation will unduly jeopardize our troops in the field 
just at the exact time that they most need Congressional support. I 
would also refer to the arguments made by the Majority Leader, himself 
a distinguished veteran, who related the incredible damage done to the 
morale of our troops serving in Vietnam when this Congress debated 
cutting off the funds for our troops involved in that war. We should 
not, in my judgment, place our troops in that position.
  Mr. President, as I stated earlier, our interests in the region are 
not so great that they warrant placing United States ground troops 
under the extraordinary risk they would face in Bosnia. Therefore, I 
wholeheartedly support the Hutchison-Inhofe-Craig-Nickles resolution 
opposing the deployment of U.S. ground troops. This Sense of the Senate 
Resolution expresses, on the record, our disagreement with the 
President's decision to deploy ground troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  Unfortunately the President is, in fact, deploying U.S. ground 
troops. Mr. President, this deployment is a fait accompli, initiated 
unilaterally by the President over the strongest and repeated 
objections of both Houses of Congress, and one which the President will 
continue no matter how strongly we protest. Thus, even though many of 
us oppose this deployment, I believe we have an opportunity, and an 
obligation, to clearly define the limits under which the President can 
carry out this imprudent deployment.
  It is in this light that I have decided to support the Dole-McCain 
resolution. I want to thank the sponsors for incorporating language 
that I had recommended making clear that the Congress is simply 
acquiescing to the fact that this deployment is a fait accompli. With 
this language, the resolution clearly states our misgivings, and I 
quote: ``Notwithstanding reservations expressed about President 
Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. . . The President may only fulfill his commitment [and I 
stress this is the President's commitment] to deploy United States 
Armed Forces. . . subject to the conditions'' of this resolution.
  Mr. President, I can't speak for others, but my vote for this 
resolution in no way constitutes an endorsement, authorization, or 
approval of the President's decision to send United States ground 
troops into Bosnia. In fact, the language I submitted distinctly helps 
separate this resolution from any endorsement of the President's 
actions by citing our reservations and placing the origin of this 
deployment clearly with the President.
  As I just quoted, this resolution further states that, in light of 
the President's decision to deploy U.S. troops, he may quote, ``only 
fulfill his commitment,'' unquote if he meets the conditions 
established to safeguard our troops and further the success of the 
mission. Mr. President, I believe that point needs to be repeated. This 
is the President's decision, a commitment the President made over our 
repeated objections. Therefore, under the Dole-McCain resolution, he 
may only, and I stress only, fulfill quote ``his'' unquote commitment, 
if meets the following conditions.
  First, the resolution recognizes the extreme danger in which U.S. 
troops will be placed, and establishes rational conditions for their 
safe withdrawal and limited military employment. The Dole-McCain 
resolution establishes 

[[Page S18541]]
clear and unequivocal language that requires the President to take all 
possible measures to protect our forces, and to periodically report to 
Congress the success of those specific measures.
  It also builds upon the recognition that the Muslim-Croatian 
Federation must be further armed, trained and strengthened if a 
credible and stable military balance is to be established in the 
region. We cannot simply accept the President's assurances that he will 
find some way to make this happen. If the United States forces withdraw 
only to see an out gunned Bosnian-Croatian Federation quickly overrun 
by a patient aggressor, our troops' sacrifice will be for naught. We 
have the power to give meaning to their sacrifice, and this resolution 
does just that.
  Last, the Dole-McCain resolution will strictly limit the operations 
of our forces to legitimately military tasks. We have repeatedly seen 
the inefficacy of using U.S. military forces for nation-building 
exercises. The General Framework Agreement is, in my opinion, fraught 
with pitfalls that will draw the Implementation Force fully into the 
tasks more clearly the purview of the civilian High Representative's 
authority. This body has the opportunity to protect our troops from 
being needlessly employed in such dangerous non-military tasks, and 
this resolution does so.
  This is, in my opinion, far from a perfect response to the situation 
the President has presented this Congress. I believe the President has 
acted hastily, and that his policy places our troops in the 
unnecessarily dangerous role of vulnerable peace implementors. However, 
when presented with the reality that our troops will go to Bosnia, 
regardless of our actions, I believe we must act where we can to 
constrain the imprudent strategy of the administration. The Dole-McCain 
resolution does not approve, endorse or authorize the President's 
policy. However, it clearly constrains the conduct of this operation so 
as to better protect our troops in Bosnia, and to better ensure 
mission's ultimate success.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the Dole-
McCain resolution.
  As each of us decides whether or not to support U.S. involvement in 
this military operation, we must consider that we are sending young 
soldiers overseas and that their lives are possibly on the line.
  As I evaluated our involvement in this effort, I reflected on my own 
situation during World War II. When I enlisted in the Army, my father 
was terminally ill and my mother was about to become a widow. I recall 
the letters that I wrote from Europe to my mother, who, like the 
parents of those soldiers being sent to Bosnia, prayed every day for my 
safe return. Those were not easy times. But I also recall the deep 
pride that I felt and the moral good that ultimately came from ending 
Hitler's fascist conquests.
  Mr. President, like many Americans, I have been troubled by the 
prospective costs in human lives of the war in Bosnia. With America's 
diplomatic support, the warring parties have negotiated a truce and are 
prepared to sign a peace agreement and are requesting the assistance of 
America's military to help monitor and enforce it.
  I do not agree with those who argue that our country has no national 
interest in helping to enforce a peace agreement. We must, if we 
possibly can, prevent the further spread of this tragic conflict, in 
part, because further conflict threatens the stability of, perhaps, the 
whole of Europe. If the war spreads, America runs the risk of being 
enveloped in a much larger conflict. By committing a small number of 
soldiers now, we may reduce the likelihood that more American troops 
could be required in Europe later on.
  As the architect of the peace agreement, and as the leader of NATO, 
only the United States can lead this effort and put an end to this 
senseless bloodshed that has taken 250,000 lives, torn that country 
apart, and displaced 2 million refugees.
  Mr. President, sending American troops seems to be the best option 
available to the United States to help guarantee peace in Europe. While 
the Dayton peace agreement is far from perfect, it is the only peace 
agreement that the parties in the conflict have agreed to implement. If 
successfully implemented and coupled with the arming and training of 
the Bosnian Moslems before IFOR departs, the agreement holds a promise, 
in the long run, of ending the violence that has terrorized the people 
of Bosnia. The alternative is unacceptable--to let the war resume. If 
the international community does not step in now, it is obvious that 
more lives will be lost and more refugees will be displaced, and there 
will be more bloodshed and carnage, and America's credibility as an 
international leader is also on the line. Our leadership brought the 
parties to the negotiating table, and our leadership was requested by 
those parties to help enforce the agreement.
  I understand the view that the Congress should have been consulted 
more closely before the decision to send troops was made. But forcing 
America to back away from the President's commitment is not the 
solution. To do so would undermine the morale of our fighting force. 
Even more, it would diminish our credibility in the international 
community and send a message to aggressors worldwide that they have 
nothing to fear from America.

  I know that U.S. participation in this endeavor is not risk-free. 
Passions run high in an area where weapons are plentiful. Millions of 
landmines lay just below the Earth's surface, and weather conditions 
are likely to be unfriendly. I am persuaded, however, that General 
Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry have assiduously worked to minimize 
the risks, and they believe that the risk level has been reduced to its 
barest minimum level, and that the mission has clear objectives, a 
sufficiently potent force, an effective command and control structure 
under American leadership, no-nonsense rules of engagement, a clear 
time limit, and the cooperation of the various factions.
  American troops will have well-defined rules of engagement. They 
will, as President Clinton said, fight fire with fire, and then some. 
Our troops will have a clearly defined military mission and will not 
participate in nation-building tasks. Once again, they will be under 
American command.
  Our soldiers will have the firepower, training, explicit 
instructions, and authorization necessary to defend themselves and 
others. They have been trained to deal with every major threat, 
including landmines, civil disorder, and snipers. I have been assured 
by General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that our troops have the 
appropriate level of training and are prepared and ready for this peace 
enforcement mission.
  Mr. President, though it is always painful to send American soldiers 
overseas, I believe the goals of this limited deployment are 
appropriate. While it is our solemn responsibility to make wise 
decisions about sending American troops abroad, I have been assured by 
our military leaders that the members of our All-Volunteer force are 
prepared for this mission.
  America can make a difference in securing the peace in Bosnia. We 
ought to remain engaged in that endeavor. I hope, Mr. President, that 
my colleagues will support the Dole-McCain resolution and our troops. I 
wish them well on this peace mission.
  Mr. President, I support America's troops as they head off to Bosnia 
to help enforce and implement the peace agreement.
  As each of us decides about whether or not to support U.S. 
involvement in this military operation, we need to be mindful of the 
fact that we are sending young soldiers overseas and that their lives 
are possibly on the line.
  As I evaluated America's involvement in the international effort to 
enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, I have reflected on my own 
situation during the Second World War. When I enlisted in the Army, my 
father was terminally ill, and my mother was about to become a widow.
  While she tended to my father's minute-to-minute needs and also to 
see that my 12-year-old sister met her 

[[Page S18542]]
school and personal commitments, I was in uniform.
  As I considered America's involvement in this military operation in 
Bosnia, I recalled the letters I wrote from Europe to my mother in New 
Jersey, who like the parents of those soldiers being sent to Bosnia, 
prayed every day for my safe return.
  I recalled the deep pride I felt serving my country, and have 
reflected on the values American soldiers fought for during that 
conflict and the moral good that came from bringing an end to Hitler's 
fascist conquests.
  Like many Americans, I have been deeply troubled by the cost--in 
injury and human life--of the war that raged on in Bosnia for the last 
3\1/2\ years. And I have been haunted by all-too-familiar photographs 
from the war in the Balkans.
  Terrified children left orphaned after slaughter. Moslem women raped 
by their Bosnian Serb captors. Innocents lying dead in the street. U.N. 
soldiers chained to poles as human shields. Reports of mass executions 
and graves.
  To their credit, the warring parties have agreed to end these 
atrocities and open a new chapter in their history.
  With America's diplomatic support,they have negotiated a peace 
agreement which holds the promise of ending the brutality that has 
inflicted so much pain on their people for so many years. Now that a 
peace agreement has been negotiated, the parties to the conflict are 
requesting the assistance of America's military to help monitor and 
enforce it.
  There are many reasons why I believe the Congress should support U.S. 
involvement in a NATO-led international peace enforcement operation.
  I do not agree, Mr. President, with those who argue that the United 
States has no national interest in intervening to enforce a peace 
agreement to end this conflict.
  The United States does have a national interest in supporting a 
peaceful end to the bloody conflict in Europe. We must prevent the 
further spread of this tragic conflict, not only because of its impact 
on the people of Bosnia, but because further conflict threatens the 
stability of Europe.
  If the war spreads and more countries are drawn into the conflict, 
America runs the risk of being enveloped in a much larger conflict. By 
committing 20,000 American soldiers to this international peace 
enforcement operation now, we may reduce the likelihood that more 
American troops could be required in Europe later.
  While I also understand the view of those who believe Bosnia is a 
European problem that the Europeans should enforce and monitor the 
peace agreement on their own, the reality is that without the 
leadership and direct participation of the United States in this 
international effort, the peace agreement would go nowhere. The 
Europeans, through NATO, will be engaged as our partner in this peace 
enforcement mission.
  But as the architect of the peace agreement and as the leader of 
NATO, only the United States can lead the effort to enforce the peace 
agreement and put an end to the senseless bloodshed and loss of 
innocent lives. Only our Nation can lead the way in enforcing the peace 
agreement which will stop the carnage that has taken 250,000 lives, 
torn the country apart, and displaced 2 million refugees.
  Sending American troops to help enforce and monitor this peace 
agreement is the best option available to the United States to help 
guarantee peace in Europe. While the Dayton peace agreement is far from 
perfect, it is the only peace agreement that the parties to the 
conflict have agreed to implement.
  It will not reunite Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it will, if given a 
chance to succeed, restore peace, calm, and civility to the region. It 
will not bring back the lives of those senselessly slaughtered by 
perpetrators of war crimes, but it will guard future atrocities and 
ensure that such perpetrators are prohibited from serving in 
government.
  If successfully implemented and coupled with the arming and training 
of the Bosnian Moslems before IFOR departs, it holds the promise, in 
the long run, of ending the bloodshed and violence that have terrorized 
the people of Bosnia for so long.
  Mr. President, the alternative to sending U.S. troops to help 
implement and enforce this peace agreement, is to let the war resume. 
If the international community does not step in now to enforce this 
peace agreement, more lives will be lost.
  More refugees will be displaced. More children will be orphaned. 
There will be more bloodshed and carnage. There will be a greater 
likelihood that the United States will need to intervene at a later 
time.
  America's credibility as an international leader is also on the line. 
Our leadership brought the parties to the negotiating table, and our 
leadership was requested by those parties to help enforce and monitor 
the peace agreement.
  I understand the view of many that the Congress should have been more 
closely consulted before the decision to send troops was made. But I do 
not believe that forcing America to back away from the President's 
commitment is the solution in this case. To do so would invite attacks 
on our troops by those opponents of peace who hope to force the 
international community out of the Balkans. It would undermine the 
morale of our troops.
  Even more, it would diminish our credibility in the International 
community. It would send a message to aggressors worldwide that they 
have little to fear from America. It could be perceived as a green 
light for the North Koreans to march south. It could be perceived as a 
green light for Sadaam Hussein to do the same.
  To be sure, it would also undermine America's role as NATO's leader.
  I know, Mr. President, that U.S. participation in this mission is not 
risk free.
  The parties to the conflict have been fighting for years, and 
passions run high in an area where weapons are plentiful. Millions of 
landmines lay just below the Earth's surface, and adverse weather 
conditions will, no doubt, create difficulties for our soldiers.
  But I do not believe these difficulties are insurmountable. Nor do I 
believe they should keep America from joining the international 
community in enforcing a peace agreement aimed at stopping the worst 
atrocities on European soil since the Second World War.
  I am persuaded that General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry have 
assiduously worked to minimize those risks. They believe the risk level 
has been minimized and that the mission has clear objectives, a 
sufficiently potent force, an effective command and control structure 
under American leadership, no-nonsense rules of engagement, a clear 
time limit, and the cooperation of the various factions.
  American troops participating in this international peace enforcement 
operation will have well defined rules of engagement. Unlike the 
lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers previously stationed in Bosnia, 
American soldiers will be permitted to use force--including deadly 
force--in cases of self-defense or to protect against a hostile act or 
hostile intent. They will, as President Clinton said, ``fight fire with 
fire, and then some.''
  Out troops will have a clearly defined military mission. They will 
monitor the cease-fire line, the zones of separation, and, when needed, 
enforce withdrawal from the zones of separation. They will not 
participate in nation-building tasks.
  They will be under American command.
  Our soldiers will have the firepower, training, explicit 
instructions, and authorization necessary to defend themselves and 
others. They have been trained to deal with every major threat, 
including landmine, civil disorder, and snipers.
  I have been assured by General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that 
our troops are well trained, prepared, and ready for this peace 
enforcement mission.
  Though it is never easy to send American soldiers overseas, I believe 
the goals of this limited deployment are meritorious. While it is our 
solemn responsibility to make wise decisions about sending American 
troops, I have been assured by our military leaders that the members of 
our all volunteer force are prepared for this mission.
  America can make a difference in securing the peace in Bosnia, and we 
ought to remain engaged in that endeavor. I hope my colleagues will 
support the Dole-McCain resolution and 

[[Page S18543]]
our troops. I wish them well on this peace mission.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I wonder if the Chair could outline 
the current situation in terms of time allocation so that I might speak 
for a few minutes if it is available.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 34 minutes remaining; the 
majority has 29 minutes. If there is no objection, the Senator is 
recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. President. I know the occupant of the 
chair is a very thoughtful Senator and reviews each situation that 
comes before him very carefully. We shared a trip to Croatia a couple 
years ago and had the opportunity to see just on the periphery what 
happens when the hatred and the venom is unleashed to deal with 
problems, as those who are there saw fit. We were shocked to learn 
about the murder of neighbors by other farm neighbors, using farm 
implements to do the killing and the maiming, and the story about the 
women locked in a gymnasium after they had been raped by then-renegade 
rogue Serbian soldiers and made to stay in that facility so they could 
not dispose of those pregnancies in any way but to deliver a child not 
of their choice, one that the enemy, their enemy, decided would be an 
appropriate way of fathering another race.
  It recalls for all of us a time just over 40 years ago when it was 
decided by another Fascist that there would be a super race put upon 
this Earth, and by artificial insemination, rape and coercion, women 
were made pregnant to carry members of that super race. It was 
intolerable. When we learned about it we were shocked and horrified. 
Now we saw similar things taking place. The world stood by--an 
unacceptable condition--in a world purportedly civilized, and thusly 
when we debate the issue here, Mr. President, about whether or not we 
have a national interest, we have a global interest, we have a human 
interest.
  Yes, it is true that America cannot be the police force around the 
world, and the questions are raised, why did we do it in this place and 
why did we not do it in that place? One of the reasons is we were not 
welcomed by anybody. We saw what happened when our young people were 
sent to Somalia with an indefinite engagement in front of them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Chair. I see my colleague from Florida is 
here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank my colleague, Senator Lautenberg.
  Mr. President, I recently received a letter from Catherine and Crosby 
Dawkins of Jacksonville, FL. The letter read in part:

       We cannot see any compelling reason for risking the lives 
     of United States servicemen in a centuries old dispute, even 
     though we grieve for the plight of the women and children. If 
     European countries believe the conflict will spread, they 
     should take action.

  Mr. President, like many of us, I have received hundreds, possibly 
thousands of communiques similar to this--deep felt concerns about the 
risk of American soldiers in Bosnia. These thoughtful letters deserve a 
response. I take this opportunity to address not only my colleagues in 
the Senate but also my fellow citizens of Florida who have been so 
generous and so thoughtful in their letters.

  Mr. President, this raises an issue of the United States military 
troops in Bosnia, a fundamental question of what are the options of the 
United States in this post-cold-war era? For half a century, the United 
States knew with clarity and with national unity what its objectives 
were. Its objectives were to suppress the totalitarianism of Nazism. 
The goal was to restrain the imperial impulses of the Soviet Union.
  Now the United States is charting a new course of action. We have 
essentially limited options. One of those options, Mr. President, in 
the post-cold-war era is to stand on the sideline, to essentially be an 
observer of the world, as we were for much of our Nation's history.
  The second option is to be the world's defender, to be prepared to 
intervene in every conflict.
  The third option is to carefully assess our interest and, when a 
situation begs our involvement, to work within our capabilities to 
build international coalitions to respond to the conflict. I strongly 
feel that that third option is the option which is most appropriate and 
most applicable to the situation that we face tonight in Bosnia.
  In assessing the question as to whether our interests in Bosnia are 
sufficient to beg our involvement, I suggest that our interests do 
require our involvement. This is not a complete list, but I believe a 
compelling list of those reasons. The United States has a deep interest 
in human rights. One of the things that distinguishes our country from 
those nations which preceded it is that we believe that the purpose of 
government is to protect and advance the rights of individuals. We 
found that not only to be a guiding principle in our domestic policy 
but also in our foreign policy.
  One of the great initial disputes in this Nation was over the 
question of whether the United States should become involved in the 
French Revolution. Many said that the United States should stand apart, 
that we were too small to be effective, and too distant to be 
effective.
  Thomas Jefferson said we meant those words in the Declaration of 
Independence not just to stand for Americans, or for English 
colonialists, but they were universal principles of human rights, and 
that we had not only been given by God certain inalienable rights but 
also by God, responsibilities to defend those rights wherever they were 
in jeopardy.
  That principle of America's special role in the world that from the 
very beginning of our Nation has so shaped our culture, is at risk 
tonight.
  We also have some more immediate interests. We have an interest in 
preserving the international coalition which we know as NATO, a 
coalition which has served us well in terms of deterring the Soviet 
Union and which, in all likelihood, will serve us well in the unknown, 
uncharted future into which we move in the post-cold-war era. If we 
were to retreat from our commitments to NATO on this, the eve of the 
signing of the peace agreements in Paris, I think that institution 
would be forever shattered.
  We also have the opportunity by acting tonight to avoid the potential 
of this horrendous strife, which has taken a quarter of a million 
lives, rendered 3 million people as refugees, from spreading--spreading 
first throughout the former Yugoslavia and then throughout the Balkans 
and then, as we have seen twice in this century, throughout Europe.
  We have a deep stake in avoiding having to do what this country has 
done twice in this century, and that is send American men and women, 
not as peacekeepers, but as combatants in a war in Europe.
  Finally, I think we have a strong interest in demonstrating to the 
people of the world that our concern for human rights is not limited to 
people who look like us, attend the same religious institutions as we 
do, have our same cultural background. There is today an emerging 
fundamentalism within the Islamic religion. That fundamentalism is 
receiving support and reassurance from what they see Western Europeans 
have done, including the United States of America, in Bosnia today.
  I believe it is important that we, by our actions now, indicate that 
we are prepared to stand for the cause of human rights, and protect 
them wherever our interests indicate that it is appropriate to do so; 
that we, by so doing, will send a signal that we are prepared to 
support the responsible elements of the Islamic religion and Islamic 
nations.
  Mr. President, I conclude by citing what we heard just a few hours 
ago in the House Chamber, the statement made by the Prime Minister of 
Israel, Shimon Peres.
  Mr. President, less than 24 hours ago, Shimon Peres addressed the 
Congress and the American people on the need 

[[Page S18544]]
for American leadership in the 21st century. He said:

       Even in this very day, as Bosnia reels in agony, you 
     offered a compass and a lamp to a confused situation like in 
     the Middle East. Nobody else was able or was ready to do it. 
     . .
       America, in my judgment, cannot escape what history has 
     laid on your shoulders . . . You cannot escape that which 
     America alone can do. America alone can keep the world free 
     and assist nations to assume the responsibility for their own 
     fate.

  Mr. President, that is what is at stake in the decision that we will 
make this evening.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, it is very difficult to make an 
important statement with a limited time, but I want to say that I 
support the President's peacemaking initiative and the Dayton accord 
and I support the NATO operation in Bosnia. I support the President 
because I believe that it is our patriotic duty and the right thing to 
do. I believe that we have an obligation to nurture the peace and to 
convince warring nations, whenever possible, that the United States 
will make an effort to help them resolve their conflicts.

  This decision was not made easily.
  I have, for a long time now, differed with the President on Bosnia 
policy. Specifically, I have favored the lifting of the arms embargo 
against the Bosnian Moslems--a policy change that would have assisted 
the Moslems in defending themselves.
  My decision was made only after meeting with the President and his 
military advisers, carefully considering their views, and deliberating 
the pros and cons of a U.S. peacekeeping role.
  It has been complicated by the fact that the State of Illinois has 
the largest number of reservists being called up to support our troop 
deployment to Bosnia. Moreover, I have an 18-year-old son whom I would 
not want to see put in harm's way should the situation in Bosnia take 
an untoward turn.
  Like most Americans, I am concerned about the risks involved in 
sending United States ground troops to Bosnia. I want to be sure that 
the Administration has thought through and addressed all the important 
questions before United States forces are committed to Bosnia. These 
questions include the rules of engagement, command structure, the 
length of our commitment, our exit strategy, and our contingency plans 
should the peace plan start to unravel, or the warring factions fail to 
make good on their promises.
  But the President has satisfactorily answered each of those concerns, 
and he has made a strong case on why Congress and the American people 
should support his decision to send United States peacekeeping forces 
to Bosnia.

  First, the NATO mission is clearly defined, limited, and achievable. 
It is to implement the military aspects of the peace accord to monitor 
the cease-fire, to control the airspace, and to patrol the exclusionary 
zone separating the former combatants. It does not involve ``nation 
building'' or acting as a police force. Moreover, it is not the kind of 
vague undefined ``presence'' that led to the United States tragedy in 
Lebanon. Most important, there is no danger of the kind of ``mission 
creep'' that occurred in Somalia.
  Second, U.S. troops will not be passive, lightly armed peacekeepers 
as the U.N. forces have been. They will be heavily armed and have the 
tanks, the artillery, and the air power necessary to respond forcefully 
to any threat or challenge.
  Third, the rules of engagement are clear, aggressive and unambiguous. 
They are designed to maximize the safety of our troops. Specifically, 
U.S. forces will have the authority to meet any threat or violation of 
the peace agreement with ``immediate and decisive force.''
  Fourth, our commitment is not open-ended. It is planned that United 
States forces will be deployed in Bosnia for about a year. Military 
experts suggest it may be less than that.
  Fifth, NATO peacekeepers will be under the command of Adm. Leighton 
W. Smith, Jr., and U.S. soldiers will only take orders from American 
commanders.
  Finally, I have been informed that an effective exit strategy and a 
carefully constructed contingency plan have been developed, should the 
peace accord begin to unravel.
  No one is underestimating, nor have we any illusions about the 
difficulties, dangers, and risks of this peacekeeping operation. 
Sending 20,000 of America's finest young men and women to Bosnia to 
implement the military provisions of the general framework for peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a risky proposition. The conflict there has 
been long-standing and brutal. The weather is inhospitable and the 
terrain is treacherous. There are more than 6 million land mines 
scattered throughout the country. Renegade bands have openly stated 
their opposition to provisions of the Dayton accord with which they 
disagree. Finally, all previous cease-fire agreements have ended in 
failure. Viewed separately, each of these factors imperils the safety 
of our soldiers; viewed as a whole, the possibility of American 
casualties is unfortunately very real.
  However, we also have to consider the consequences of a failure of 
United States leadership in Bosnia. If we retreat now on the commitment 
the President has made, the Dayton agreement would collapse. The war 
would likely reignite. The slaughter of innocents would begin anew.
  'Even if there were no Dayton agreement to go back on, however, 
failure to act would have the most serious kinds of consequences for 
the United States. A failure by the United States to lead now could 
well represent a turning point for the entire NATO alliance, and NATO 
is the cornerstone of United States national security policy abroad. 
The United States is NATO's leader. If we fail to lead on an issue of 
such great importance to NATO, we must expect that kind of failure to 
have serious consequences for the United States, both in Europe and 
elsewhere around the world.
  Moreover, a failure to act in Bosnia could well lead to broader 
conflict, one that could have far greater consequences for the United 
States down the road. If the current conflict is not at least 
contained, the losing side may well seek allies to redress its defeats 
on the battlefield. As more parties are drawn in, the conflict becomes 
ever more larger and ever more serious.
  We have already seen that in Bosnia. We have already seen this 
dynamic at work, the conflict became much larger in the last year, with 
more parties, and more forces involved, than were engaged 4 years ago. 
Simply letting the parties fight it out, and watching the conflict 
continue to grow, is therefore not an acceptable option.
  For all its weakness and risks--and the risks are substntial--the 
Dayton peace agreement still represents our best chance for a durable, 
lasting peace. It preserves Bosnia within its present borders, provides 
for free elections, and gives refugees a right to return to their 
homes.
  The Dayton accord calls on NATO to implement the provisions of the 
agreement. As the unquestioned leader of NATO, U.S. participation in 
the proposed NATO peacekeeping operation is essential. Without a 
strong, visible American participation, the hard won negotiated peace 
in Dayton will unravel and be lost.
  For these reasons I did not support H.R. 2206 and will not support 
the Hutchison-Inhofe resolutions. The Dole-McCain resolution at least 
acknowledges the leadership role of the United States in NATO and the 
necessity of our participation in the NATO peacekeeping operation. It 
also acknowledges many of the essential provisions of the Dayton 
accord. Finally, the Dole-McCain resolution unequivocally supports our 
men and women in the military. For these reasons, I will vote in favor 
of the Dole-McCain resolution and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. President, problems in Europe have twice led to world wars this 
century. Problems in Europe caused the United States to fundamentally 
change its foreign policy posture. Since the end of World War II, the 
United States has made a conscious decision to stay politically, 
economically, and strategically engaged in Europe. During the cold war 
we spent trillions of dollars and based hundreds of thousands of 
American troops in Europe to protect these interests. Clearly the 
peace, security, stability, freedom, and prosperity of Europe are still 
vital national interests for the United States, and the vehicle for 
achieving those interests is NATO.

[[Page S18545]]

  There is no more difficult--or unpopular--decision an American 
President can make than to put U.S. armed forces in harm's way. The 
President has exercised his constitutional prerogative as Commander in 
Chief, and American troops are being deployed to safeguard vital 
national interests. Our troops are well-trained for the challenges that 
await them, and they are prepared to do their duty. They are cognizant 
of the risks of their chosen profession and are more than willing to 
make the necessary sacrifices to bring peace and freedom to a war-torn 
land. All they ask is to know the parameters of their mission in 
advance, which the President has done, and that Congress and the 
American people stand behind them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, none of us in the U.S. Senate, as is clear 
from the quality of this debate, takes lightly the responsibility of 
sending American troops into the potential of harm's way. But as each 
of us decides whether or not to support the President's decision to 
deploy American troops in Bosnia, I think we need to keep two essential 
points in mind.
  The first is--and it must be reiterated again and again and again--
the President is not sending American troops, nor are we ratifying the 
sending of American troops to Bosnia for the purpose of fighting a war. 
On the face of it, that may seem like an obvious point. But as I talk 
to citizens in my home State and listen to people across the country, 
many Americans do not yet understand what the mission is about or how 
it may be performed.
  We are not sending--nor do I intend to send or want to send--American 
forces to Bosnia to fight a war. We are not sending American forces to 
Bosnia to crush enemy forces the way we did in World War II. We are not 
sending American soldiers to Bosnia to roll back communism the way we 
tried to in Vietnam, nor are we sending them there to repeal aggression 
as we did in the Persian Gulf.
  The President is asking us to approve sending American troops to 
Bosnia at the request of parties to a peace agreement, at the request 
of parties to a conflict who are asking us and other nations to join 
together to help them to implement a peace that they have stated they 
want.
  To be sure, war has raged in Bosnia for 4 years, but it is not raging 
now. A cease-fire has been in place since October, and the parties to 
the conflict have exhausted themselves. And, for the first time in 4 
years, they have opted for peace over war.
  This Senator contemplates only keeping troops in Bosnia for so long 
as the parties continue to opt for peace over war. It is their 
challenge now, not ours, to ensure that all of the elements under their 
control, under the control of each of them individually, are prepared 
to accept the peace.
  Recent events, such as the destruction by Bosnia and Croat troops of 
towns to be turned over to the Bosnian Serbs and the stated opposition 
of Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo to the peace accords, suggest that even 
after 4 years of fighting it will indeed take some time to convince 
those on the ground that this peace agreement is in their interest and 
that the risks for doing that are real. But that is precisely why this 
NATO force is needed and is so critical. And it is precisely why we 
must participate in that force, only if we are to try to give them the 
chance to make the peace they say they want. In no way should we 
contemplate making that peace ourselves.

  The second critical point we need to keep in mind, Mr. President, is, 
as I listen to the debate, some Members assert that there is no vital 
national interest in Bosnia, and I have heard throughout this debate 
sort of a standard of vital strategic interest, vital national 
interest. Mr. President, that is the wrong test to apply to Bosnia.
  Our vital national interests are our territorial integrity, our 
political system and ideology, our economic security, and our way of 
life. We have gone to war four times in this century with the belief 
that we were protecting them. But let us say clearly up front, in this 
conflict, in this effort, in this mission, they are not at stake. That 
is not what is at issue here, and no one pretends that is why we should 
be involved. That is not what we are doing. We are not going to war to 
protect a vital national security interest. We are not even sending 
troops for a vital national security interest.
  Whether vital national security interests are at stake is the right 
question to ask, Mr. President, if you are deciding whether or not to 
send troops to war, it is not the right question to ask when you are 
being asked to participate in a multilateral, internationally 
sanctioned effort to help keep a peace which parties have said they 
want. And we should remember that we are not being asked to do this 
alone. We are doing this in conjunction with perhaps 30 other 
countries.
  In many ways, Mr. President, Bosnia is the prototype of the kind of 
conflict the international community will face in the years ahead as 
forces, once held in check by superpower politics, are unleashed and, 
with them, the potential for conflicts all across the globe.
  I think it is vital for us to understand that the test is really 
whether or not there are interests, whether or not there are important 
interests, that outweigh the risks of our participation.
  Mr. President, I have heard colleagues talk about the issue of 
credibility. Some are going to suggest that the only reason they are 
prepared to vote to send these troops is to uphold the credibility of 
the country or the credibility of the President.
  Let me say, Mr. President, with searing memories of Vietnam, that is 
not a reason to send our young military people into harm's way. I 
remember the phrase, ``I will not be the first President to lose a 
war,'' and we lost tens of thousands of young people over the issue of 
pride, over the issue of unwillingness to do anything except to sustain 
somebody's credibility as people saw it. Credibility has to have an 
underlying notion. It is not an abstract concept which merits the 
taking of the life of a young American or the giving of a life of a 
young American. Credibility has to be based on some underlying interest 
which puts your credibility at stake.

  I believe, Mr. President, that that vote--the credibility--is a hedge 
against a willingness to commit to this President's vision of what 
credibility might be at stake here.
  I believe there are legitimate interests for taking the risk of 
trying to uphold the peace--not to fight a war, but to try to uphold a 
peace.
  First, how could we as a nation avoid the moral interest in ending 
the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II? Whoever thought that 
after World War II Europe would again be the site of human beings being 
raped as a policy of war, tortured, murdered, separated from families, 
or thrown out of their homes simply because of ethnic background?
  Who will forget quickly the stories recently that drove us to feel 
compelled to simply leave them to fight for themselves--headlines such 
as ``Bosnia's Orphans of Rape; Innocent Legacy of Hatred,'' ``Mass 
Graves Probed in Northwest Bosnia,'' ``Anybody Who Moved or Screamed 
Was Killed: Thousands Massacred on Bosnia Trek in July,'' ``Srebrenica: 
The Days of Slaughter''?
  Who can forget the imperative of the words that we memorialize in 
Washington and elsewhere in this country, ``Never again''?
  That is an interest, Mr. President.
  Twice in this century Europe was engulfed by war, and the United 
States fought to save it. We have already invested our blood in the 
stability and in the prospect of democracy and the future of Europe.
  That is an interest, Mr. President.
  The conflict in Bosnia has the potential for spillover--and could 
become a wider war--to areas where ethnic tensions are high: Kosovo, 
Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey.
  That is an interest, Mr. President.
  So we have an interest in ensuring that those things do not happen. 
We also have an interest in the risks to American forces and to NATO, 
and the cost of ensuring a peace in Bosnia now will inevitably be less 
than if we would have to respond to a wider conflict in the future.
  Finally, we do have an important interest in demonstrating leadership 
on an international community level that we have the capacity and the 
will to lead in the post-cold war world.
  For far too long American policy toward Bosnia was vague, vacillating 
and 

[[Page S18546]]
ineffective. Now, to the credit of this administration, to our country, 
we have changed that. And now we are trying to join together with our 
European allies in an effort to provide the strong response that 
stopped the Bosnian Serb attacks, that did try to provide a 
humanitarian corridor, that upheld the notion of international law, and 
that was willing to try to enforce the concept of safe areas.
  Having led the effort--an extraordinary effort by the President, 
Secretary Christopher, and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke--having led 
that effort, Mr. President, how do we not have an interest that goes 
beyond mere credibility in trying now to implement the settlement which 
we ourselves have instigated and helped put together?
  As President Clinton has said, if we do not participate in this 
operation, there will be no NATO force and the war in Bosnia will begin 
again. Our moral and political interests in Bosnia and our sense of 
responsibility demand that we not let that happen--and that we not be 
ultimately dragged in.
  So Mr. President, it is because credibility is based on real 
interests that I support the President's decision to send our forces to 
Bosnia but I believe just as firmly the President owes it to the 
American people and Congress to ensure that the operation is limited in 
terms of the mission, limited in terms of the goals we set for success, 
and limited in duration.
  As defined by the Dayton peace agreement, the mission of our troops 
and others participating in IFOR, the Bosnia Peace Implementation 
Force, is to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects 
of the peace agreement--that is, enforcing the cease-fire, supervising 
the withdrawal of forces to agreed lines, establishing a zone of 
separation between them, and returning troops and weapons to 
cantonments. Recognizing that they may need some help in making the 
transition from war to peace, the parties asked for a strong, NATO-led 
force. That is what they are getting and that is what they agreed to in 
the Dayton peace agreement.
  Our troops will take their orders only from the American general who 
commands NATO and they will have the authority to meet any threat to 
their safety or any violation of the peace agreement with immediate, 
decisive force.
  When American peacekeepers in Somalia embarked upon what turned out 
to be an ill-fated mission to apprehend warlord Mohammed Aideed, they 
lacked the equipment and other elements necessary to ensure success.

  From what our military officials have told us, this scenario will not 
be repeated in Bosnia. Our forces are going in well-trained, well-
equipped, heavily armed, and with robust rules of engagement.
  I still remain concerned about the potential for so-called mission 
creep. Under the terms of the peace agreement, I-For has the authority 
to ``help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other 
tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair 
elections;'' to ``assist the movement of organizations in the 
accomplishment of humanitarian missions;'' ``to assist the UNHCR and 
other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;'' to 
``observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian 
populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond 
appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person;'' and to 
``monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.''
  True, these are authorities not obligations as Secretary Christopher 
has pointed out. True, the mission is defined by the NATO plan and 
these elements are not in the NATO plan, as Secretary Perry told the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  Nevertheless, these authorities create the potential for expansion of 
the mission beyond the military tasks cited by administration officials 
and for increased risk to our troops and those of other nations 
participating in the operation.
  They also create an expectation on the part of the local populations 
and civilian organizations on the ground that I-For will protect and 
assist them.
  If refugees are being attacked, can our troops really stand by and 
watch? Would we want them to? If UNHCR ask I-For to help resettle 
refugees in a given area, will I-For feel compelled to assist? If 
Catholic Relief Services asks French troops in Sarajevo to protect a 
convoy of humanitarian aid going into the city, are they bound to 
assist?

  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] is 
responsible for organizing elections in Bosnia in the next year. What 
expectations does OSCE, or the parties for that matter, have about 
IFOR's role in this process?
  I remain concerned that IFOR's role in assisting the civilian 
operations that are to occur in the next year is still somewhat 
ambiguous. I understand that NATO military planners wanted IFOR to have 
these authorities to avoid the situation U.N. peacekeepers often found 
themselves in in Bosnia--that is, standing by and watching as terrible 
atrocities were committed against innocent civilians.
  I agree that our soldiers must act if civilians are under attack or 
directly threatened. However, the operative word in responding to any 
of these situations must be ``limited.''
  IFOR commanders from General Joulwan on down must understand that the 
American people and Congress will not support a broadened definition of 
the mission that has American forces serving as the constant protectors 
of civilian populations. That is not our job; the parties to the 
agreement must do this by fulfilling the commitments made in the 
agreement.
  Much concern has been expressed in this debate about the exit 
strategy for American troops. Any exit strategy must be composed of 
more than a date; it must include criteria to determine whether or not 
the mission has been successful. I believe that that criteria must be 
limited solely to the military tasks that IFOR has set out to 
accomplish.
  The civilian tasks that must be undertaken in the next year such as 
refugee repatriation and resettlement, elections, establishing 
governmental structures, monitoring human rights, apprehending alleged 
war criminals, are daunting. They must not become the criteria by which 
we determine success of the IFOR mission.

  The President has stated that the mission which we are asking our 
troops to undertake will be limited to a year. Undoubtedly during this 
year, there will be violations of the Dayton agreement.
  However, if there is a pattern of violations which indicates that the 
parties are not truly committed to this agreement, then American forces 
should be withdrawn. Our soldiers are there to keep the peace, not to 
fight a war or to prevent a war if the parties want to return once 
again to being combatants. If it becomes clear as the end of the year 
approaches, that the duration of the IFOR mission needs to be extended 
because success is within reach but not yet achieved, the burden of 
that mission must be shifted away from the United States and more to 
our European allies.
  We must make it clear that we do not intend to stay in Bosnia 
indefinitely. Bosnia is first and foremost a European problem. If the 
peace implementation operation must be extended beyond a year, the 
countries of Europe must be prepared to share more of the 
responsibility and to replace our forces with theirs as we transition 
out. In other words, our troops must be out within the limited 
timeframe the President has set out.
  The peace agreement provides for a build-down of the parties' 
military forces with the goal of achieving military parity by the end 
of the year, when IFOR is to withdraw. Administration officials have 
indicated that build-down may not be enough to ensured stability and 
that the United States will ensure that the Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are equipped and trained.
  While I agree that military imbalance at the end of a year could be a 
serious threat to peace, I am concerned about the risk that this 
process could pose for American forces on the ground. Even though 
American participants in I-For will not be arming or training 
Federation forces, they could be targets for Bosnian Serbs who object 
to the lack of neutrality on the part of the United States.

  Beyond the risk factor, it is not at all clear to me, at least, when 
and 

[[Page S18547]]
where build down ends and build up begins and who is going to do the 
building up.
  Notwithstanding these concerns, I believe our overall interests in 
Bosnia warrant the sending of American troops to help keep the peace. 
Certainly there are risks associated with this operation, but every 
effort has been made to minimize those risks by ensuring that our 
forces are well-trained and well-equipped, and that the rules of 
engagement are robust in order that they may defend themselves against 
any life-threatening situation.
  I recognize that many Americans and indeed some in this body do not 
believe that we should participate in this mission. As a Vietnam 
veteran, I know the pain and the difficulty of fighting without the 
political support of the American people and their representatives.
  We are not sending our soldiers to Bosnia to fight a war, but we are 
asking them to undertake a military mission in the name of peace that 
is not without risk. No matter what concerns we may have about this 
endeavor, we owe them our full support. We should demonstrate that 
support by endorsing the President's decision to send them to Bosnia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I believe we 
must support the President, but let me say that with caution. This must 
be limited, limited, limited. It must have a clear strategy that does 
exit us at the end of the year, and we must define success in the 
context not of the civilian political success but only in the military 
separation of the forces and the giving of them the opportunity to make 
a peace.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the remaining order under the 
unanimous-consent agreement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has up to 26 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Followed by?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority now has 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. McCAIN. And then the majority leader will speak after that. Is 
that the unanimous-consent agreement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no agreement to that effect, but that 
is the assumption.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, like all other Senators who have spoken today, I wish 
this debate were not necessary. I agree with those Senators who have 
said that they would not have undertaken the commitment made by the 
President of the United States to deploy American ground forces to 
Bosnia to implement the tenuous peace that now exists there. But that 
is no longer the central question of our deliberations this evening. 
The President did so commit and our obligation now goes beyond 
expressing our disagreement with that decision.
  Many of us did disagree, as is abundantly evident by the number of 
Senators who support the resolution offered by Senators Hutchison, 
Inhofe, Nickles, and others, yet we all recognize that the President 
has the authority to make that decision.
  The troops are going to Bosnia, and any prospect that Congress could 
prevent that deployment disappeared in the overwhelming vote in 
opposition to prohibiting funding for the deployment, the only 
constitutional means we have to reverse the President's decision.
  Our troops are going to Bosnia. Congress should do everything in our 
power to ensure that our mission is truly clear, limited, and 
achievable; that it has the greatest for success with the least risk to 
the lives of our young men and women. That is our responsibility, as 
much as the President's.
  The resolution that the majority leader and I have offered does not 
ask Senators to support the decision to deploy. It asks that you 
support the deployment after the decision had been made. It asks you 
further to condition your support on some important commitments by the 
President which I will discuss in a moment.
  I intend to give that support, and I commend the majority leader for 
exercising extraordinary leadership in trying to influence both the 
nature and security of our mission Bosnia as well as the outcome of the 
peace process there, to which we have made such a profound commitment. 
I believe Senator Dole has significantly helped to improve both the 
security of our forces and the likelihood that the cause they have been 
asked to serve--peace in Bosnia--will endure beyond the year our forces 
will be stationed in that troubled country.
  He has accomplished these important objectives by securing assurances 
from the administration that our soldiers will only be expected to 
perform those tasks for which they are trained, and will not be ill-
used in nation-building exercises. Moreover, he has secured the strong 
commitment from the President that the United States will lead efforts 
to establish a stable, military balance in Bosnia which is the only 
undertaking that can be realistically expected to secure a lasting 
cease-fire there. Those commitments were well worth our efforts, and, 
again, I am grateful to the distinguished majority leader for his 
honorable and effective statesmanship in this effort.
  Mr. President, what we should all strive to avoid is giving anyone--
anyone--in Bosnia the idea that the American people and their elected 
representatives are so opposed to this deployment that the least 
provocation--violent provocation--will force the President to withdraw 
our forces. I do not want a single terrorist, a single Majahidin or 
Bosnian Serb sniper to think that by killing an American, they can 
incite a political uproar in America that will compel the President to 
bring our troops home.
  That is my first reason for supporting this deployment. I want our 
enemies to know that America--not just the American force in Bosnia--
but all Americans are in deadly earnest about this deployment. Attacks 
on the safety of those troops should, and I believe will, be met with a 
disproportionate response. That response will not include abandoning 
the mission. We must begin now to impress upon all parties in Bosnia 
that any assault on the security of our soldiers would amount to 
nothing more than an act of folly on the part of the assailant.
  Mr. President, opponents of the President's decision often claim that 
there is no vital United States security interest in Bosnia that would 
justify the risk of American lives to defend. I have long agreed that 
there was no such interest. But there is now. There are the lives of 
20,000 Americans to defend. And anyone who thinks they can achieve 
their own political ends by threatening our troops should be forcefully 
disabused of that notion, and should not be encouraged in their action 
by the misperception that the American people and the U.S. Congress are 
not united in steadfast support of our troops, their safety, and the 
mission they are now obligated to undertake.
  There are other important American interests involved in this 
deployment. All the parties to the Dayton agreement have stated 
unequivocally that should the United States renege on its commitment, 
the peace will collapse and hostilities will resume. We will then watch 
Bosnians suffer again the mass murder and atrocities that have repulsed 
all people of decency and compassion.
  Moreover, Mr. President, abjuring our commitment now would do 
considerable damage to NATO, the most successful defensive alliance in 
history. Many Americans may wonder why we need to be concerned about 
NATO in the wake of the Soviet Unions's collapse. But, Mr. President, 
the world still holds many dangers for our security, and our enemies 
are far less predictable than they once were. We will need our friends 
in the future, as much as they need us now.
  Lastly, Mr. President, I want to talk about the relationship between 
the Nation's credibility and the credibility of its chief executive. In 
an earlier statement on this question, I asked my Republican colleagues 
to place as high a premium on this President's credibility abroad, as 
they would place on a Republican President's.
  I asked this because the reliability of the President's word is of 
enormous strategic value to the American people. The President's voice 
is the voice of America. When the world loses faith in the commitments 
of our President, all Americans are less safe--and somewhere down the 
line American vital interests and American lives will be lost. 

[[Page S18548]]
The credibility and authority of the President of the United States, 
and the security of American soldiers, compel our support of their 
deployment. They are vital interests worth defending whatever our 
current political differences may be with the President.
  Again, by supporting the deployment, I do not confer my approval of 
the decision to deploy. As I have already stated, I would not have 
committed American ground forces to this mission, had that decision 
been up to me. But the decision has been made, by the only American 
elected to make such decisions--the President of the United States. And 
I have construed my responsibility in these circumstances as requiring 
my support for efforts to maximize the prospects for success of the 
mission and minimize its obvious risks.
  My support, and the support I urge my colleagues to give this 
deployment by voting for the resolution before us, has been 
characterized by the media as grudging. Fair enough. But let me be 
clear, I do not want to feed the cynicism of the public--or any members 
of our free press who might succumb to cynicism from time to time--
should they conclude that by our resolution, and our votes preceding 
this one, that we are trying to avoid speaking clearly in support or 
opposition, and evade any responsibility for our own actions.
  I know what I am doing. I know that by supporting this deployment, if 
not the decision, I must share in the blame if it ends disastrously. I 
will accept that responsibility--not happily, but honestly, just as 
Senators who supported the prohibition on funding for the deployment 
would have had to accept the blame for the problems that would have 
occurred if they had been successful in preventing the deployment.
  The President will be accountable to the families of any American 
soldier who dies in service to his country in Bosnia. He will have to 
answer for their loss. But so will I. I fully accept that in my support 
of the deployment, and my efforts to influence its conduct and its 
termination, I incur this obligation.
  Beyond offering expressions of sorrow and regret, we will have to 
tell those families that they bear their terrible loss for the sake of 
the country. Nothing--absolutely nothing--is harder than that. Just 
contemplating such a responsibility makes me heartsick.
  This may be the hardest vote I have cast as a Member of Congress. It 
may be the hardest vote I will ever cast. To send young men and women 
into such evident danger is an awful responsibility. I don't envy the 
President. Nor do I envy the Senate.
  I was once on the other end of the relationship between the military 
and their civilian commanders. I served with brave men who were sent by 
our leaders into a calamity--a war we would not win. We were ill used 
by our political leaders then. We were ill used by many of our senior 
commanders. I saw good men lose their lives, lives that were just 
squandered for a lost cause that the dying believed in, but that many 
of the living did not. Their cause was honor, their own and their 
country's. And they found their honor in their answer, not their 
summons. I will never forget that. Never. Never.
  If I have any private oath that I have tried to abide by in my public 
service it is that I would never ask Americans to serve in missions 
where success was not defined, the commitment to achieve it uncertain, 
and its object of less value than its price.
  I pray today that I have kept my oath. I will pray so every night for 
as long as this mission lasts. I wish the people of Bosnia peace. I 
wish them peace because they deserve that blessing, but even more 
importantly because the lives of many fine young Americans have been 
ransomed to that peace. I know that these Americans will perform 
magnificently, under very difficult circumstances, to secure the 
objectives of their mission. They will reflect, as they always do, 
great credit on themselves and on the United States, as they seek again 
to secure the peace and security in which another people may secure 
their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
  Mr. President, I learned about duty, its costs and its honor, from 
friends who did not come home with me to the country we loved so 
dearly, and from friends who overcame adversity with far more courage 
and grace than I possessed. I have tried to see my duty in this 
question as they would have me see it.
  In the difficult decision--and it is difficult for reasons greater 
and more honorable than political advantage or disadvantage--our sense 
of duty may lead us to different conclusions. I respect all of my 
colleagues for seeking to discharge their solemn responsibilities in 
this matter after careful deliberation and with honest reasoning.
  But I want to make one last point to those Americans--and I do not 
include any of my colleagues in this category--who oppose this 
deployment and this resolution because they resent the costs of 
America's leadership in the world. The burdens that are imposed on the 
United States are greater than the burdens borne by any other nation. 
There is no use bemoaning that fact or vainly trying to avoid its 
reality. This reality will be so for as long as we remain the greatest 
nation on earth. When we arrive at the moment when less is expected 
from our leadership by the rest of the world, then we will have arrived 
at the moment of our decline. We should accept that burden with 
courage. We cannot withdraw from the world into our prosperity and 
comfort and hope to keep those blessings. We cannot leave the world 
alone. For the world will not leave us alone.
  So I will support this mission, with grave concern and more than a 
little sadness. I will support my President. I will, I believe, support 
my country and the men and women we have asked to defend us. I give my 
full support, whatever my concerns. And I accept, fully, the 
consequences of what I do her today. I ask my colleagues to do so as 
well.
  I ask all Senators to support the Dole resolution, irrespective of 
their views over the policy that brought our soldiers to Bosnia. I ask 
for your vote as an expression of support for the American soldiers 
who, summoned to duty in Bosnia, will find their honor and ours in 
their answer. I ask for your vote to help reduce the threats to their 
welfare, and increase the chances that the cause for which they risk so 
much may succeed, and endure long after they have come home to a 
grateful nation.
  And I ask God to bless the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who 
will render their Nation this great service; to bless the President; to 
bless the Congress; and to bless the United States. We are all in great 
need of His benevolence today.
   Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition? The minority leader is 
recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, this evening, President Clinton is 
traveling to Paris to sign the Bosnia peace agreement. The first of 
20,000 American troops are on their way to Bosnia to help implement 
that agreement. And we in the Senate are being asked to make a choice. 
A choice with profound--even life-and-death--consequences.
  Will we give our troops going to Bosnia our full and genuine support? 
Or will we burden them with the weight of conflicting messages?
  In the more than 3\1/2\ years since war broke out in the former 
Yugoslavia, more than a quarter of a million people --including tens of 
thousands of innocent children--have been killed.
  The Bosnian people are weary of war. They have negotiated a peace 
settlement. They are merely asking us to help them implement it.
  Some may ask: Why us? Why must the United States become involved in 
this ancient conflict? I believe there are three answers.
  First, it is in our national interest. Peace and stability in Europe 
are vital to the United States. Twice in this century, we have seen 
what horrors can occur when aggression in Europe is allowed to spread 
unchallenged and unchecked. Twice in this century, Americans have died 
to keep Europe free of such aggression. To turn our back on Bosnia now, 
especially after the President has committed American troops, would be 
to deny what we have learned, and what those earlier generations 
sacrificed. It would weaken American leadership in NATO. And it would 
undermine our credibility as a world leader. 

[[Page S18549]]

  Second, we have a moral obligation in Bosnia. For nearly 50 years, we 
believed that we would never again see concentration camps in Europe. 
We would never again see men and boys made to dig their own mass graves 
and then be machine-gunned into them. We were wrong. This is happening 
in Bosnia, and our national conscience demands that we take a strong 
stand against it.
  In 1948, 3 years after the end of World War II, the French writer and 
philosopher Albert Camus appealed to the monks of a French monastery to 
help the children who had been injured and orphaned in that war. 
``Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which 
children are tortured,'' Camus said. ``But we can reduce the number of 
children who are tortured. And if you don't help us, who else in the 
world can help us do it?''
  That brings me to the third reason we must help implement this 
agreement. The United States must help bring peace to Bosnia because no 
one else in the world can. The leaders of all three factions--Serbs, 
Croats, and Moslems--have made it clear that they will not participate 
in the peace process unless we are involved.
  I commend President Clinton and all the members of the negotiating 
team who worked so hard in Dayton to get us to this point. They 
accomplished what many said was impossible, and their leadership is 
already saving lives. Without the commitment of this President to peace 
in the Balkans, there would be no debate tonight, for we could not be 
on the verge of peace.
  I also want to commend the distinguished majority leader, Senator 
McCain, Senator Nunn, and all the senators in our Bosnia working group 
for the leadership they have shown in negotiating a resolution that 
says unequivocally to our troops, ``We support you.''
  That mission will give the Bosnian people an opportunity to build a 
democratic society. Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved as a single 
State with a unified capital of Sarajevo. The Bosnian people will be 
allowed to hold free elections, and those who have been driven from 
their homes through fighting and other forms of terrorism will be free 
to return.
  Our mission is clear, limited, and achievable. We are sending our 
troops to maintain a ceasefire. They will take their orders from an 
American general. And they will have full authority to respond to 
threats to their safety with immediate and overwhelming force.
  Again, the critical question is, are we going to give our troops our 
genuine support as they seek to carry out their mission? Or are we 
going to burden them with conflicting messages?
  Mr. President, I believe the Hutchison amendment is gravely misguided 
and even dangerous. It claims to support our troops, but, in fact, it 
undermines them. How can we support our troops if we condemn the 
mission for which they are risking their lives? Have we learned nothing 
from our own history?
  Sending such a contradictory message would badly undermine the morale 
of our troops and jeopardize their safety.
  It would also undermine U.S. credibility--our commitment to peace, 
and our commitment to our NATO allies.
  Finally, sending such a conflicting and wrong-headed message would 
undermine the peace agreement itself, and efforts to implement it.
  The responsible vote is a vote for the bipartisan resolution offered 
by the majority leader.
  This resolution supports our troops unequivocally. It commends them 
for their professionalism and patriotism and bravery. It assures that 
they will have all the resources and authority they need to protect the 
peace--and protect themselves.
  It recognizes the vital interests our Nation has in preventing the 
spread of the Bosnian conflict and ending the bloodshed. It preserves 
America's leadership within NATO, and it preserves our credibility with 
our allies.
  And it requires the President to certify two important conditions. 
First, that the NATO implementation force is limited to implementation 
of the peace agreement and protection of NATO troops. And second, that 
the United States objectives in Bosnia are to maintain the peace and 
establish a military balance that will allow the Bosnian Moslems to 
defend themselves when NATO withdraws.
  As the Senator from Oklahoma noted earlier tonight, the Hutchison/
Inhofe and Dole/McCain resolutions are contradictory. The Hutchison 
resolution, although it is non-binding, sends a dangerous and 
conflicting message that will undermine and endanger American troops.
  The Dole/McCain resolution is binding legislation that asserts 
Congressional authority and responsibility and sends a clear message 
that we support our troops and the cause for which they are risking 
their lives. It is the right thing to do.
  To echo the words of Camus, the United States cannot prevent all 
wars, everywhere. But we can reduce the number of children and adults 
killed in Bosnia. Our national security, and our national conscience, 
demand that we try.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Warner). The majority leader is 
recognized.

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