[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 198 (Wednesday, December 13, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18449-S18469]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLANNED 
                 DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, H.R. 2606 will 
now be laid aside and the Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] will be 
recognized to submit a Senate concurrent resolution. The able Senator 
from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I send a resolution to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 35) expressing the 
     opposition of the Congress to President Clinton's planned 
     deployment of United States ground forces to Bosnia.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the concurrent resolution.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this is a very simple resolution. It 
is the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution that says, very simply, we oppose 
President Clinton's decision to deploy American troops into Bosnia.
  The second part is also very simple. It says we support the troops of 
our country 100 percent.
  Congress must exercise its responsibility under the Constitution. We 
must say ``no'' when there is a bad decision that will cost American 
lives. Congress has not been consulted. Congress has not authorized 
this deployment. It is not an emergency.
  The President is talking about a year. Congress should not authorize 
any deployment of troops that will put them in harm's way for a 1-year 
period.
  This is not within the parameters of the NATO agreement. I have a 
copy of the NATO agreement here with me. If any Member of the U.S. 
Senate can show me the provision in this agreement that somehow makes 
it our responsibility to send troops into a civil war in a country that 
is not a NATO country, I invite them to come to the floor and do that.
  Mr. President, it is not there. The NATO treaty is a mutual defense 
pact among nations that were trying to make sure that we would have the 
ability to repel a large and onerous foreign invader. There is no such 
potential foreign invader for our NATO countries and, therefore, rather 
than run around the world and react to crisis upon crisis where there 
is not a U.S. security threat, it is time for us to look at NATO and 
our agreement and make it strong by planning ahead, by having a 
strategic vision about what is needed now to make Europe stable.
  America wants to be part of making Europe stable, but, Mr. President, 
going into a civil war in Bosnia is not the way to make Europe stable. 
The way to make Europe stable is to help the people of Bosnia by making 
sure there is parity, by making sure that the people are able to defend 
themselves, but not to put United States troops on the ground.
  I am just going to end this morning by quoting from a letter that I 
got from one of my constituents, and I think it really sums it up:

       I remain to be convinced that we have a greater moral 
     obligation to the Bosnians than we do to our own soldiers and 
     their families.

  Mr. President, this is a bad decision, and it is the responsibility 
of Congress to fulfill our constitutional duty to say, ``No, Mr. 
President. Come to us. Let's discuss it before you deploy American 
troops. Sending them to Haiti without our authorization, expanding the 
mission in Somalia without our authorization has not worked, and 
sending our troops to Bosnia without our authorization will not work.''
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina. 
  
[[Page S18450]]

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the concurrent 
resolution offered by the distinguished Senator from Texas, Senator 
Hutchison, myself, and others.
  For the past couple of months, I have made statements on the floor 
and in hearings conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
expressing my grave concerns over the commitment that President Clinton 
made to the Presidents of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia to deploy United 
States military ground forces to implement and enforce a peace 
agreement to end the fighting in Bosnia.
  I continue to have those concerns. To date, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee has conducted eight hearings on the situation in Bosnia and 
the use of United States military forces to enforce the Bosnia peace 
agreement. In testimony before the committee, administration witnesses 
and experts in the area of national security, foreign policy, and 
intelligence have stated that it is in the vital national interests of 
the United States to deploy ground forces in Bosnia to avert a wide-
scale war in Europe to save NATO and maintain United States leadership 
in NATO and to preserve the good word of the United States.
  Mr. President, as I have stated before, as a superpower, I believe it 
is important for the United States to show leadership in matters of 
national security and foreign policy. I also support NATO and do not 
want to endanger NATO as a security organization which was largely 
successful in bringing the cold war to an end.
  I also believe that it is important to follow through with 
commitments. However, I will not rubberstamp a decision by the 
President, just because he has the constitutional authority to deploy 
military forces. The administration has testified that the President 
would proceed with the deployment of United States forces to Bosnia, 
regardless of the concerns expressed by Congress.
  Despite this testimony, I believe Congress has a constitutional 
responsibility to review decisions of this magnitude. In the conduct of 
that review, I have yet to be convinced by the President, the Secretary 
of Defense and the Secretary of State, that there are vital national 
security interests that warrant the deployment of United States 
military forces to Bosnia; or that our national security is threatened.
  I am not convinced that the mission is clear, that the objectives of 
the mission are achievable, or that there is a clear exit strategy.
  I have great confidence in NATO's ability, under the operational and 
tactical control of the U.S. military, to manage the operation--more 
confidence than I ever had in the United Nations. However, there will 
be a number of non-NATO nations participating in the implementation 
force, a great number of them deployed in the United States sector. 
While they will be under the operational control of the United States 
military commanders, I have concerns about their perception or 
interpretation of actions by the people for whom they are supposed to 
be securing peace, and the paramilitary forces in the area who may not 
support the peace effort.
  This operation is supposed to be a peacekeeping action, and at the 
same time, a peace enforcement action, as necessary. I am concerned 
that there is great potential for disaster, despite robust rules of 
engagement, if there is not a clear understanding among all the parties 
in the sector, as to interpretation of military action, and what 
constitutes the use of force.
  Further, I am not convinced that United States military forces 
participating in the Bosnia peace implementation force will not get 
bogged down with nonmilitary activities such as providing assistance to 
international organizations. From reading the I-For mission statement, 
it is quite clear to me that the mission statement is ambiguous and 
unclear. Specifically, it states that I-For will not conduct election 
security, provide humanitarian assistance or conduct mine or obstacle 
clearing activities. At the same time, though, it says that members of 
I-For will assist international organizations in these activities, if 
requested.
  Mr. President, I supported lifting the arms embargo so that the 
Bosnian Moslems could protect themselves, and so the United States 
could avoid sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. The President and the 
international community repeatedly rejected the bipartisan effort to 
lift the embargo.
  I still support the idea that a stable military balance is necessary 
to enable Bosnia to defend itself. However, now that United States 
troops will be deployed in Bosnia, I have concerns for their safety, if 
the United States becomes directly involved in providing equipment, 
arms, training, and the logistics to the Bosnian Moslems.
  Mr. President, regardless of the outcome of this debate, I want to 
strongly emphasize my support for the U.S. military forces who have 
already been deployed to Bosnia and Croatia, and who may shortly be 
deployed to Bosnia to participate in the implementation force. I will 
be monitoring very closely the situation in Bosnia, so that we can 
ensure that our military forces can return to their families as soon as 
possible.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the concurrent 
resolution offered by Senator Hutchison, myself, and others.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, after a great deal of reflection, and with 
some reservations, I have decided to support the President's decision 
to send United States troops to Bosnia to help enforce a peace 
settlement. When the peace agreement was initialed in Dayton 3 weeks 
ago, I wholeheartedly welcomed the peace, congratulated the 
peacemakers, but expressed my skepticism about the need for U.S. ground 
troops to enforce that peace.
  When President Clinton first suggested almost 2 years ago that United 
States troops might become involved in Bosnia, I outlined my strong 
concerns about such a course of action in a letter to the President. I 
noted two minimum conditions that I thought should be met before we 
even considered committing troops to Bosnia. I said that the mission 
should be a multinational one, conducted either under U.N. or NATO 
auspices, and that the United States should provide less than a 
majority of troops to that effort. Both of those conditions have, of 
course, been met, but for me, that is only a starting point.
  My qualms about sending United States troops to Bosnia stem from my 
fear that we will become stuck in a Balkans quagmire. To my mind, 
throughout history, the Balkans have been a place of war and strife, 
and I worry about involving United States troops in conflicts that are 
centuries old.
  But I also have said that it was up to the President to make the case 
for sending troops, and that I would listen with an open mind. During 
the past 3 weeks, the President and other members of the administration 
have put forth their case to me in private and in public, and I have 
been listening. I found President Clinton's address to the Nation to be 
particularly compelling. I believe the President did an excellent job 
of laying out exactly what is at stake in Bosnia. I agree that the 
Dayton Agreement, which was brokered by very talented U.S. diplomats, 
offers us the chance, as the President said ``to build a peace and stop 
the suffering'' in the heart of Europe, which is of course very 
important to U.S. national security interests.
  In that speech and in subsequent presentations, the President and 
other members of the administration have defined the limited 
peacekeeping role our troops will be asked to play. They have been 
appropriately reassuring to the families of the young men and women who 
will be sent to Bosnia. Our troops know already that they are the 
world's best equipped and trained fighting force. The President, in a 
clear statement to any would-be troublemakers, has stated flatly that 
our troops will be well trained, heavily armed, and ready to retaliate 
against any threat to their own safety.
  While our troops will have broad discretion to respond to any 
challenges or threats, there also will be limits on their role and 
mission in Bosnia. In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on December 1, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and 
General Shalikashvili testified that there are limits to what our 
troops will be asked to do. The fact that there will be limits has gone 
a 

[[Page S18451]]
long way in convincing me to support our President's decision. Our 
troops are not going to fight a war, but rather to help implement a 
peace to which the parties themselves have agreed. Their objective is 
to achieve a concrete set of military goals outlined in the Military 
Annex to the Dayton agreement. They are not, I have been reassured, 
going to get dragged into the conflict itself. I have also been assured 
that our military will not be engaged in rebuilding Bosnia. That is a 
responsibility of the parties themselves, with such civilian assistance 
from the international community as the Dayton Agreement provides.
  Mr. President, I do continue to have some questions about the 
implementation of the peace plan. While these concerns will not cause 
me to withdraw my support of the President's decision, they are 
serious.
  First, I would like to see a more precise rendering of the 
circumstances under which the implementation force will carry out or 
provide direct support for such civilian tasks as creating secure 
conditions for elections, assisting humanitarian missions, preventing 
interference with the movement of civilians, and mine clearing. General 
Shalikashvili and Secretary Christopher told the Foreign Relations 
Committee that the implementation force--or I-For--has the authority to 
engage in such activities but that this authority would be used rarely 
and at the discretion of local I-For commanders. I would hope that 
before the main body of troops are sent to Bosnia, we will have a 
better sense of the specific guidelines being given to local commanders 
about involving I-For in these activities. Otherwise, I fear that there 
may be an uneven enforcement of the peace plan, and more importantly, 
that we may see mission creep develop.
  Related to this issue is my concern that there be a strong and 
effective civilian program that will ensure that free and fair 
elections are held, refugees are resettled, and that reconstruction 
begins. Moreover, I hope that there will be tight coordination between 
the civilian and military aspects of the implementation program. 
Although I do not want to see I-For involved in the civilian aspects of 
the peace implementation, I do, after all, want to ensure that we 
achieve the maximum progress possible on the civilian side. Without 
such progress, the exit strategy for our troops becomes much more murky 
and problematic. If sufficient progress is not made on elections, 
refugees, reconstruction, and related matters by the time I-For does 
withdraw in a year's time, I fear that there will be backsliding on the 
military side and that United States troops will have done nothing more 
than preside over a year long cease fire.
  Finally, I hope that the administration will define more clearly how 
it hopes to achieve a military balance in Bosnia once I-For leaves. I 
do not think anyone would quibble with the goal of achieving a balance, 
but we need more details about how that is to come about, consistent 
with the Dayton Accords and U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
  To me, it is unfathomable that we would want to see more arms in that 
part of the world. Moreover, I am uneasy about any U.S. plans to arm 
and train one side--the Federation--while participating in an 
Implementation force which is supposed to be even-handed. One need only 
remember the ill-fated U.S. military involvement in Lebanon to be 
reminded of the danger of taking sides in such a situation. While it 
might ultimately make sense for the United States to coordinate such an 
effort, for U.S. citizens--be they military personnel or private 
contractors--to actually engage in arming and training may make our 
troops particular targets. To this end, I welcome President Clinton's 
assurance that providing arms and training to Federation forces will 
not be done by either I-For or U.S. military forces. Before our troops 
are sent to Bosnia, we should know definitively how we plan to proceed 
on this issue.
  Mr. President, Balkan history has been a source of my skepticism 
about sending troops to Bosnia. I have spent long years of service in 
Europe: first as a Coast Guard lieutenant based in Sicily during World 
War II, then as a Foreign Service officer in Prague, Bratislava, and 
Genoa as the Iron Curtain was drawn between East and West, and as an 
official with the International Rescue Committee working in Vienna with 
refugees fleeing Hungary's Communist regime. Because of my experience, 
I am deeply and personally conscious of how important Europe's freedom 
and stability is to the United States. I am also acutely aware of how 
fragile the current peace engulfing most of Europe is. If left 
unchecked, the Bosnian war could threaten the peace on the rest of the 
continent.
  The people of Bosnia have suffered untold misery and horrors. To 
them, the Dayton Agreement is long-awaited and good news. For us, the 
agreement offers an historic opportunity to end Europe's worst conflict 
since World War Two. We all hope it presages a lasting peace.
  That is why I believe we must support the President's call to 
participate, with our NATO allies, in an effort to stem the tide of war 
in Bosnia.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to rise today as a cosponsor and 
strong supporter of the Hutchison resolution. I want to commend Senator 
Hutchison, Senator Inhofe, and other Senators whose outspoken and 
persuasive leadership has given us this opportunity to send a clear 
message to the President on the Bosnia issue.
  Like my 28 colleagues who have cosponsored this resolution, I believe 
the Senate must express its opposition to President Clinton's planned 
deployment of United States ground forces to Bosnia.
  I encourage all of my colleagues who have strong reservations about 
the President's actions to vote for the Hutchison resolution.
  As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am convinced that 
this resolution is the only way to send a clear, unambiguous message to 
the President without hurting American troops who are already on the 
ground or who will be arriving imminently in Bosnia.
  The President has failed to convince the American public of his basic 
premise--that such vital national security interests are at stake in 
Bosnia that we should risk the lives of United States soldiers to 
enforce a fragile peace there. Letters and calls from my home State of 
Minnesota continue to oppose sending troops 3 to 1.
  Unfortunately, I hold out little hope that the Hutchison resolution, 
even if it passes, will prevent United States troops from being 
deployed to Bosnia.
  If the President is willing to begin the Bosnia operation despite 
strong and sustained public opposition, it is difficult to imagine that 
one more vote in Congress will change his mind.
  We all understand the President has the constitutional power to 
commit troops without congressional approval, but a far more worrisome 
question is whether he should sustain this dubious military operation 
without a solid base of public support.
  In 1993, during the height of the civil war in Bosnia, President 
Clinton made a regrettable mistake: He pledged to commit 25,000 United 
States ground troops to enforce any future peace agreement between the 
warring parties in the Balkans.
  The President made this promise without knowing the exact terms of 
the peace agreement that would emerge, without conducting a thorough 
review of the operation's dangers and without consulting Congress.
  Now, he has essentially dared Congress to break his ill-considered 
commitment of U.S. forces and thereby, he says, risk undermining the 
peace agreement, our international credibility and our relations with 
NATO allies.
  In doing so, the President has effectively painted the American 
soldier and Congress into an uncomfortable corner. As a result, United 
States troops are already on the ground in the Balkans as part of 
NATO's advance force, and thousands more American soldiers will find 
themselves in Bosnia for Christmas.
  Moreover, the President has repeatedly blocked efforts by Congress to 
end the unjust arms embargo on the Bosnians. This embargo has prevented 
the Bosnians from defending themselves and has encouraged continued 
Serbian aggression against their outnumbered foes.
  Even the Clinton administration is admitting that a military balance 
between warring factions is the key to stability in Bosnia and the 
eventual withdrawal of United States troops. 

[[Page S18452]]

  How tragically ironic it is that the necessary outcome of NATO's 
operation in Bosnia could have been achieved without shedding American 
blood if the President had only allowed the Bosnians to arm themselves.
  Congress should not rubber-stamp the President's premature decision. 
We must not compound this Presidential blunder by abdicating our 
congressional responsibility.
  First, Congress should continue to express specific concerns about 
the scope of the NATO mission in Bosnia. While administration officials 
have made claims to the contrary, most Americans realize there is real 
potential for this operation to become increasingly open-ended and 
dangerous.
  During hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of 
State Christopher said that the NATO implementation force's only 
obligation was to carry out military objectives--namely, the separation 
of Bosnia's warring parties.
  But he also said that the peace agreement ``authorizes'' NATO forces 
``to take additional [civilian] actions if the local commander desires 
to do so.''
  Well, undoubtedly, giving NATO forces this discretionary power to 
support nation-building activities will put our troops at greater risk. 
So far, there have been many reports about the lack of coordination 
among international organizations charged with achieving civilian 
provisions in the peace agreement. If progress is not made on these 
civilian missions, the temptation for NATO forces to advance civilian 
goals--such as refugee resettlement--will only increase.

  In addition, without an effective exit strategy, the Bosnia 
operation's supposed 1-year time limit could evaporate. As I mentioned 
earlier, the key to an exit strategy for United States troops is the 
establishment of a military equilibrium among the warring parties.
  If the United States does not take a leading role in the arming and 
training of the Bosnians, it is very doubtful that it will be done to 
our satisfaction.
  Opponents who claim that a strong American role in arming the 
Bosnians will jeopardize the neutrality of United States troops are 
simply deluding themselves. The Serbs never have and never will 
consider the United States a neutral power in this arrangement. Have we 
forgotten that only months ago United States planes were bombing Serb 
positions? For the Serbs, an indirect American role in arming the 
Bosnians will hardly be more reassuring than a direct one.
  Indeed, one of my strongest concerns about the United States role in 
this operation is that we are mistakenly assuming we will be perceived 
as neutral by all parties in Bosnia. In 1983, a similar tragic 
miscalculation failed to prevent the deaths of 241 United States 
marines in Lebanon.
  Without question, the scope of the Bosnia mission must be narrowed 
and an effective exit strategy developed. For this reason, I appreciate 
what the majority leader and Senator McCain are trying to accomplish in 
their resolution and I know they are acting solely with the safety and 
well-being of our troops in mind.
  However, I cannot vote for the Dole resolution, which authorizes the 
President's deployment of United States troops to Bosnia. Given the 
manner in which the President has chosen to pledge our soldiers' lives 
for this peace agreement, I cannot vote to give him Congress' seal of 
approval. The President's strategy simply does not deserve it.
  Yet, while I am not willing to acquiesce to the President's plan, I 
also will not support cutting off funding for our troops while they are 
already on the ground. Although this action is within the 
constitutional powers of Congress, it would potentially endanger the 
men and women in our Armed Forces even further.
  We must learn from our past mistakes. We should not repeat the 1993 
debacle in Somalia where United States troops were actually denied the 
equipment and weapons their commanders had requested. Soon afterwards, 
18 American soldiers were killed when they were trapped during a tragic 
firefight.
  Therefore, the Senate's vote today on the President's plan to deploy 
troops in Bosnia is only the beginning of Congress' obligation to our 
men and women who serve and defend this Nation. We will closely monitor 
the Bosnia operation to ensure that it is fully funded, that our troops 
are adequately supplied and that the mission remains strictly focused.
  Mr. President, we owe our soldiers, their friends and family, and the 
American people nothing less.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, first, I want to commend my colleague, 
Senator Hutchison, from Texas, for the initiative she has taken, 
addressing what I think is one of the most critical and important 
issues the Senate will face in a long, long time. It is appropriate we 
give proper deliberation to this issue. There really is no more 
serious, wrenching decision than one similar to what we face today, 
because it not only has consequences for America's role in the world, 
but consequences for the lives of young men and women, poised at this 
very moment for deployment in Bosnia.
  We have two burdens in this debate. One is to exercise American 
leadership and the second is to justify American sacrifice.
  Let me state at the beginning, I firmly believe in American 
leadership. Our active engagement in the world is an expression of our 
interest and our values. But in exercising this leadership, I think it 
is important that we understand that justifying American sacrifice is 
the higher and the harder and the heavier responsibility that we face 
because it demands not just plausible goals, but compelling reasons.
  It is not enough to say that a questionable promise has been made, or 
that an alliance needs to be politically repaired, or that we feel 
guilty or somehow compromised and helpless. These are factors that may 
contribute to a case for intervention, but I do not believe they are 
determinative factors in terms of deciding whether or not we intervene. 
Because, in the end, I think we have to be able to say certain things 
with confidence, that there is no other, more viable option consistent 
with our interests and that there is no honorable alternative to the 
risk of American lives. This is a decision that has to be made 
deliberately, not by default.
  Like many of my colleagues here, I faced these questions before. I 
voted to send United States marines to Lebanon to be a presence in a 
land that was factionalized and fractionalized like Bosnia, and I will 
always regret that decision and that vote which resulted in the deaths 
of 241 marines who saluted smartly when ordered to what clearly, in 
retrospect, was an ill-defined mission.
  I also voted to send American troops to the gulf to fight aggression. 
When America's interests are clear, as I believe they were in the gulf, 
even great sacrifice can be justified, but when America's interests and 
goals are vague and murky and unobtainable, the loss of one life is too 
much.
  In the administration's proposed police action in the Balkans, there 
are a number of operational questions, some of which I will briefly 
raise, but I want to begin by stepping back and asking some fundamental 
questions of philosophy and strategy.

  Why Bosnia? Why this region? Why this moment? It is said we have a 
moral responsibility to end the bloodshed. But I think that goal is too 
broad to be useful. Bosnia, unfortunately, is not unique when it comes 
to undeserved suffering. Bloody civil wars rage today in Rwanda, Sudan, 
Liberia, and other places of the world. There were far more civilians 
killed in a year in Kabul than there were in Sarajevo.
  So, how do we choose where American troops are used to end the 
world's civil wars? Is that a decision made by TV news, determining 
which country has the most telegenic suffering? Clearly, this alone 
cannot be a sufficient basis for intervention.
  It is said the Bosnia conflict is a direct threat to the security of 
Europe, an area where American interests are implicated. It has been 
repeatedly stated by the administration that intervention is necessary 
to prevent the spread of the Bosnia conflict to other nations, 
including Hungary, Albania, even Greece, and that failure to intervene 
now will inevitably lead to a broader conflict and a greater 
involvement at greater sacrifice of American troops. 

[[Page S18453]]
But I believe this to be a serious exaggeration.
  Europe today is not the Europe of 1914, deeply factionalized and 
arming for a broader war. In fact, the Balkan war has not been 
expanding, but contracted. It is a serious crisis, but it is not an 
expanding crisis. No European leaders are seriously convinced that the 
dominoes of France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and the rest are about to 
fall, pushed by Balkan violence.
  It is said that our vital national interests are challenged by a 
Balkan civil war, but this is simply not credible. What resources are 
threatened? What trade route is interrupted? What strategic military 
threat to the United States has developed? What American citizens are 
being placed in danger? The term ``national interests'' cannot be 
stretched indefinitely. It must mean something or it means nothing.
  So, it seems that we are left with one reason, one explanation why 
20,000 American troops are headed for the Balkan winter: Because the 
President gave his word, and we cannot go back on it. Is this what the 
administration means by credibility? National interest is not found in 
the Balkans themselves but found in closing a credibility gap that 
the administration itself has opened.

  Henry Kissinger summarizes this point as follows: ``The paradox of 
the decision before Congress is that while we have no inherent national 
interest to justify the sending of troops, a vital national interest 
has been created by the administration's policies: If other nations,'' 
Kissinger says, ``cease to believe our assurances, our capacity to 
shape events to protect American security and values will be 
jeopardized.''
  I do not want to minimize this concern. Many scholars and experts 
that I deeply respect believe that this reason alone is sufficient to 
justify American intervention. But, if that is the case, I have two 
questions that have yet to be answered in this regard.
  First, how do we come to this place? Why should the world's only 
superpower, fresh off the success of Desert Storm, need to prove its 
credibility in a Balkan civil war? Have we so squandered American 
leadership and credibility that now it needs to be bought back with the 
presence of American troops and the risk of American blood?
  This brings me to my second question: Will this intervention actually 
rebuild American credibility?
  It is possible, but only under one circumstance: The mission must be 
an obvious success. Credibility is not determined by the promises we 
keep but by the outcome we achieve. An outcome similar to Somalia or 
Lebanon would be difficult to calculate. the important questions are: 
Is this Bosnian mission likely to add to American credibility? And what 
is the prospect of success?
  These are questions I asked in the hearing process. In several key 
areas, and I have yet to find adequate answers.
  How can the United States remain neutral and build up the Bosnian 
Army? Is not this logically contradictory, and inherently dangerous?
  Though it is not entirely clear what form these arms and training 
will take, does anyone believe that the Serbs will stand by while their 
military advantage is reduced as the Bosnians arm and train with the 
best quality arms to the best extent possible? The Dole resolution 
portion of that--and I commend Senator Dole, Senator McCain, Senator 
Lieberman, and others for a well-intentioned and serious effort at 
outlining the conditions of American involvement--and much of this 
resolution contains language I can enthusiastically support, but a 
portion of it is deeply disturbing to me, particularly section (2)(b)3 
which says the United States will ``lead an immediate international 
effort to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics 
assistance of the highest possible quality to ensure that the 
federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina provide for its own defense, 
including, as necessary, existing military drawdown authority.'' And on 
it goes.
  America, in effect, will be acting as a shield while one faction in a 
civil war aggressively arms. Taking sides in previous peacekeeping 
efforts have brought tragedy--not success. Clearly, the implementation 
agreement to an implementation of this section (2)(b)3 of the Dole-
McCain resolution could lead to both a mission impossible to achieve 
and potentially disastrous consequences.
  A second question is, How certain are we that a Bosnian Moslem-Croat 
federation is politically sustainable?
  The Dayton agreement presupposes the survival of this fragile 
alliance--an alliance that is not even 2 years old. It was not even in 
existence when the Bosnian conflict began. It was the Bosnian Moslems 
and the Croats that were the warring factions--the Croats on the same 
side as the Serbs, each trying to carve up Bosnia for its own benefit.
  What we have today is a marriage of convenience between some very 
reluctant partners. Are we going to stake American credibility on the 
assumption that eventually these uncomfortable allies will continue to 
enjoy each other's company? Henry Kissinger has cautioned that, ``It is 
naive to expect the Croat-Moslem marriage of convenience to last 
indefinitely.'' He argues that the relationship is more of a time bomb 
than a permanent political identity.
  A third question: What exactly is our mission, and how will we define 
success?
  The President believes our mission is to supervise the separation of 
the forces and to give the parties confidence that each side will live 
up to their agreements. He wants the U.S. military to serve in this 
capacity for 1 year in order to ``break the cycle of violence.''

  The most clear portion of the proposed mission is keeping the warring 
factions separated. That will not be easy. But at least its 
effectiveness can be measured, and I think it can be accomplished. I 
argue, however, that it is a mission that should not be necessary if, 
in fact, there is a real peace agreement reached.
  But the second component of the President's mission statement, that 
of ``giving the parties the confidence that each side will live up to 
their agreements,'' is dangerously unclear. These confidence-building 
measures include establishing the foundation for economic, social, and 
political reconstruction in the region. But, as I just previously 
stated, it is the explicitly stated but not agreed to by the parties to 
this agreement, it is that explicitly stated mission of arming and 
training one side in what I believe to be a civil war that is most 
disturbing to me.
  I have struggled to understand this. I have struggled to find answers 
to these questions. I have struggled to find agreement with this so 
that I could support the Dole-McCain resolution. But I cannot resolve 
in my mind what I believe to be an inherent contradiction between a 
stated, written, agreed-to-by-all-parties portion of this Dayton peace 
agreement that calls for disarming of the parties, an achievement of a 
military balance, and the contradictory goal of immediately leading an 
effort to ensure arms and training to one faction of the three warring 
parties.
  This militarization--not demilitarization--inevitably will lead to an 
arms race and, I believe, will inevitably lead to a failure of mission. 
And that failure of mission then squanders the last opportunity to 
establish or regain American credibility.
  I ask the question I asked before. Have we since the gulf war so 
squandered American leadership and credibility that now we must regain 
it by engaging in a civil war in the Balkans at great risk of loss of 
American lives and at great risk of squandering future American 
credibility?
  All these problems conspire to create a very difficult situation. We 
have staked our credibility on one outcome in the Balkans--peace. But 
that is the outcome that is the least likely of the many possibilities. 
On the one side, we have the evidence of 600 years of bitter conflict 
and, more recently, 34 broken cease-fires. On the other, we have the 
desperate hope that all the participants will show good will and good 
sense. I trust and pray that they will. That would be contradictory 
to 600 years of history.

  The problem here is simple. Our credibility is at sake, but we do not 
control the outcome. Our success or failure will be determined by the 
parties and factions that have demonstrated that they cannot control 
themselves.
  If, at the end of 12 months, there is chaos in the Balkans, the 
pressure on American credibility will be even 

[[Page S18454]]
greater than it is today. We will have invested American lives, 
American resources, and American leadership. So then how can we walk 
away at that moment with our leadership enhanced? Will there not be 
inevitable pressure to expand our efforts, to extend them?
  Jeanne Kirkpatrick has commented that ``failure to provide ground 
troops might do superficial damage to America's credibility, but 
committing troops and failing to achieve our goal would do major damage 
to America's credibility--really major damage. It is not possible to 
contemplate the damage to America's credibility that would result,'' 
she said.
  Mr. President, I am convinced that this Bosnian crisis is a symptom 
of a deeper foreign policy crisis, the evidence of a basic 
misunderstanding of what it means to be a superpower. The will to 
intervene, to spend lives and money, is a limited resource of any 
nation. It must be carefully preserved for essential missions that 
concern our vital interests and maintains stability in the world.
  Endless and pointless interventions squander that limited resource of 
national will. It is precisely because we cannot be isolationists that 
we must be deliberate and realistic in our actions. It is because 
intervention must remain an option of American policy that our 
interventions must be wise. In Bosnia, discretion is wisdom.

  This does not mean America should be and can be indifferent about 
situations like the Balkans, but it does mean we should consider other 
options--alternatives to ground forces--in conflicts where our 
interests are not directly engaged. One of those options available to a 
superpower is to lead our allies instead of following them. 
Unfortunately, that course has not been taken.
  Gen. John Shalikashvili has conceded that ``from a purely military 
standpoint'' the West Europeans could undertake the Bosnian mission on 
their own. They have chosen not to do so. Rather, they have insisted 
that America make a symbolic commitment--not so symbolic when you 
consider it is 20,000 troops--to the extension of an unwise NATO policy 
of peace enforcement among ancient enemies. It is not the kind of 
mission for which American troops are trained or suited. It is a 
mission much closer to the British in Belfast than the Americans in the 
gulf war, and it is clearly not a mission to be achieved in 12 months. 
I am deeply troubled that American lives should be sacrificed to prove 
loyalty to an organization--NATO--that America should be leading, not 
following it into mistakes that can be reliably predicted by our 
experience in Lebanon and Somalia.
  Once these troops are placed in the field--and they are being placed 
now--I will do everything in my power to assure that they succeed. But 
I cannot accept the responsibility of voting to place them there in the 
first place simply for the purpose of preserving U.S. credibility. It 
will do nothing in the long run for American credibility to follow our 
allies into this misguided deployment.
  I will reluctantly be opposing the Dole resolution for reasons that I 
have stated and supporting the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution that we will 
be voting on shortly today.
  Again, I thank Senator Hutchison, Senator Inhofe, and others for 
their efforts in attempting to address what I think is an 
extraordinarily difficult situation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HEFLIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, throughout the Bosnian conflict, I have 
had grave reservations about the involvement of American ground troops 
in that troubled region. After the President made his speech on 
November 27, 1995, I continued to have serious concerns, because I felt 
that U.S. ground troops should not be involved in such a violent area 
that should be, primarily, a European responsibility.
  Following his speech, I expressed these concerns in view of the 
fragility of the tentative Dayton peace agreement and the prospects for 
similarities to our peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon. I recalled the 
changes of attitude on the part of Congress and the public when the 
disastrous consequences in Beirut and Somalia unfolded on the nightly 
news.
  Over the last several days, I have immersed myself in a study and 
evaluation of our present posture regarding the situation in Bosnia. I 
have listened and talked to military, political and foreign policy 
leaders, Members of Congress, and individuals in other related fields 
as well.
  First, let me say that I hope during this debate over our role in 
Bosnia, we will rethink America's role as the sole remaining superpower 
and its participation in foreign disputes. We must recognize that other 
countries will want to use our military and financial resources to 
solve problems that basically they should remedy themselves. In my 
opinion, there should be less military involvement by the United 
States, as well as reduced foreign financial assistance, unless there 
is a vital U.S. interest involved. Furthermore, this need for 
rethinking is augmented by the movement to achieve a balanced budget.
  Having said that, I want to share some of the thoughts that have 
entered my mind after reflection and discussions.
  Like most Americans, I am thankful that a cease-fire and hopefully an 
effective Bosnia peace agreement has been reached between all of the 
warring factions in this long-standing conflict. I pray that the cease-
fire holds, that the agreement succeeds, and that the Bosnians can live 
in peace. We have watched for nearly 5 years as these neighbors have 
cruelly and methodically torn each other apart.
  On the surface at least, the Dayton agreement does hold promise for 
peace. It allows the thousands of refugees, theoretically at least, to 
return to their homes; it removes the foreign ``holy warriors'' from 
Bosnia; it withdraws heavy weapons; it preserves the October 5 cease-
fire; and hopefully, it will stop the genocide and other atrocities 
that have plagued that part of Europe for far too long.
  My primary concern with the agreement and the NATO mission it calls 
for is the requirement of having to send American ground forces to 
implement its provisions. This should be, essentially, a European 
mission. The use of air power on the part of the United States was very 
effective. That was, I believe, the extent to which most Americans 
expected U.S. forces to be involved. Perhaps this was then and is now 
the appropriate extent of our involvement.
  NATO is probably the only military force that can be counted upon to 
do the job of peace implementation in Bosnia. The NATO air strikes, 
which were largely responsible for forcing the warring parties to the 
negotiating table in Dayton, were proof positive of their 
effectiveness. The strikes also proved that the Serbs do respond to the 
power of military might. Still, the mission in Bosnia seems to go 
beyond the defensive purpose for which the alliance was established 
nearly 50 years ago, and might set a dangerous precedent for NATO. If 
NATO's role is to be different from its treaty responsibilities, it 
should be tailored on an ad hoc basis to limit U.S. participation in 
what are primarily European internal problems.
  Throughout this debate the question arises, ``Is it in the vital 
national interest of the United States to become involved in Bosnia?'' 
The term ``vital national interest,'' however, seems to mean different 
things to different people. I would therefore like to take a moment to 
reflect on my idea of a vital national interest and how it differs from 
other interests our Nation may have.
  A vital national interest is one that a country considers to be 
crucial to its national security. These are issues that are so 
important they are not open to compromise or negotiation. A country has 
no choice but to risk war to protect a vital national interest. With a 
major interest, on the other hand, the country is not at immediate 
risk. Instead, a decision must be made as to whether the use of force 
is justified. The use of the military is a question of risks, benefits, 
capabilities, and, in this case in particular, conscience.
  Applying these definitions, it is questionable whether participation 
in Bosnia is a vital national interest of the United States. Some have 
stated their belief that the Bosnian conflict could spill across 
national boundaries and engulf Europe in bloodshed. They 

[[Page S18455]]
use our vital national interest of a stable Europe to justify action in 
Bosnia. We have, however, effectively managed to prevent the spread of 
this conflict for nearly 5 years without committing ground troops to 
the region.
  We must also remember the peace keeping mission in Beirut, Lebanon. 
Many argued back in 1983 that if we did not end the fighting in 
Lebanon, it would soon spill across the borders and the entire Middle 
East would be at war. However, our national interest was in a stable 
Middle East, not necessarily a stable Lebanon. After we pulled out our 
marines, we rightly redoubled our efforts on preventing the war from 
spreading across the borders to Israel and Syria.
  Another problem we faced in Lebanon and may face in Bosnia is our 
apparent lack of neutrality. It is essential that peacekeepers 
enforcing an agreement or cease-fire not take sides. Yet in Beirut, we 
bombed and shelled the Syrian-backed forces in support of the Lebanese 
Army and Christian militia. This lack of neutrality made our men 
targets and led to the fatal bombing of the Marine compound.

  In the present situation, United States planes have bombed numerous 
targets in Bosnia and killed hundreds of Serbs. Do we believe the 
friends, comrades, and commanders of these dead men view the Americans 
as neutral? And if we begin to arm the Moslems to achieve military 
balance among the three parties, will any Serbs view us as neutral? If 
any of the warring parties become convinced that the Americans are 
their enemy, it could mean real trouble, not the least of which could 
come in the form of terrorist attacks similar to Beirut in 1983.
  There are other problems to consider as well, such as the divided 
feelings among the Serbs themselves about the Dayton agreement; 
divisions among the Croats and Moslems; the remaining residuals of the 
presence of foreign ``holy warriors''; the millions of land mines; 
probably unfriendly or hostile police forces; and the lifting of the 
arms embargo after 6 months.
  Having outlined some of my reservations about this operation, we have 
to be realistic. Some of our troops are already in Bosnia. The 
remainder of the 20,000 have been committed and will soon be there. 
Furthermore, the constitutionally-suspect War Powers Act allows the 
President to deploy troops for 60 days without congressional approval. 
It is also highly unlikely that Congress will vote to cut off funding 
at any time during the mission.
  There is no Member of this body who does not support our troops when 
they are put in harm's way. While we might disagree over strategy or 
whether or not to support the peace plan itself, on the matter of 
supporting our troops, we do not differ. Since their deployment to 
Bosnia is a matter-of-fact, our task as Members of Congress, then, is 
to see that they have every possible means to succeed from weaponry to 
intelligence.
  Another point to be raised is whether a failure to support the 
mission at this point will in some ways undermine the forces sent to 
Bosnia. This is a real possibility, since those rogue elements who may 
not believe that we are united on this issue, or that we are looking 
for an excuse to withdraw, could cause much greater danger to our 
troops.
  While the impact of our vote on our troops is of paramount 
importance, there are a number of other issues that we must take into 
account as well. For instance, we must consider the constitutional role 
of the Commander in Chief and the War Powers Act; the respect we have 
for the military professionals; the constitutional roles of both 
Congress and the Executive; and the credibility of the United States.
  Our decision must take into account the constitutional role of the 
Commander in Chief. Even strong opponents of the mission concede that 
the President has the power to deploy troops with or without the 
consent of Congress. The War Powers Act allows him to deploy troops for 
60 days without congressional authorization. No President, however, has 
ever acknowledged the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, and it 
has never been invoked by Congress. Since it is constitutionally 
suspect, in all reality, the only way for Congress to stop the 
deployment is to stop funding. Otherwise, a constitutional crisis could 
be precipitated, with Congress invoking the act and the two branches 
ending up in court while troops are in the field.
  Our decision should also take into account the great professionalism 
of the military. In my discussions with military leaders, I have been 
reassured of the fact that we do have the most highly skilled, 
educated, and trained military in our history. I am confident that if 
we give them every means necessary to succeed, they will succeed. While 
mistakes and unforeseen circumstances may arise, there is no reason to 
doubt their bravery, dedication, or professionalism in carrying out 
their task.
  The respective constitutional roles of both the Congress and the 
executive branch should also influence our thinking here. The President 
is the Commander in Chief and head of state. The Congress has the power 
of the purse, the power to declare war, and the role of approving 
treaties and ambassadors. But we must be realistic. The President is 
supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, the CIA and other 
related security agencies, and the State Department. He therefore has, 
at least in terms of numbers and experience, superior resources than 
the Congress in deciding the feasibility of committing military forces. 
This reality must be taken into account. However, this is not to say 
that Congress does not have independent, knowledgeable resources and a 
role to play in such a decision.
  I also believe that the credibility of the United States is on the 
line in this situation, and we should carefully consider what would 
happen if we do not live up to the commitments made by the head of 
state, even if we disagree with those commitments. We only have one 
President, who is also the head of state, and he speaks for the country 
on matters of foreign policy. I fear that our credibility will be 
seriously damaged if we fail to support the mission. Such a vote will 
not prevent a deployment, but it will, however, send a message to the 
factions in Bosnia and to our allies and enemies as well. Without 
abdicating the role of the Congress, it is crucial that we give the 
President some degree of flexibility in conducting foreign affairs.
  Finally, there is certainly a moral dimension to this issue. During 
our history, whether we were facing fascism or communism, we fought 
knowing our cause was just and that America was in the right. Our 
conviction that we were right was strong because we were certain that 
fascism and communism were wrong.
  Mr. President, we all know that ethnic cleansing is wrong. We all 
know rape is wrong. We all know that murder is wrong. And without a 
doubt we all know that genocide is wrong and a great evil. It is a 
wrong so great that it shocks our humanity and lets our conscience know 
that it is right to take action.
  The intense debate and congressional action regarding the Persian 
Gulf War was proof that even a deeply divided Nation and Senate will 
rally around a cause once a decision has been made. The vote to 
authorize the use of military force was 52 in favor and 47 against.
  Yet, 5 days later, on January 17, 1991, the Senate voted 98 to 0 in 
favor of a resolution which commended and supported the efforts and 
leadership of the President as Commander in Chief in the Persian Gulf 
hostilities and expressed unequivocal support of the men and women of 
the United States Armed Forces. I remember many Senators who had voted 
against the authorization of force saying before that vote in which we 
supported our Commander in Chief, that no one should doubt that the 
Senate and the Nation would be united once the authorization had been 
approved. I hope the same will be true once the votes have been cast 
with regard to the Bosnian troop deployment.
  For the reasons I have stated and to demonstrate United States 
resolve and, most importantly, to give our American troops every means 
of success, I will support the deployment of America's military might 
to Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I rise to oppose sending American troops to 
Bosnia. The Dole resolution asks us to agree to, support, and expand 
the mission that the President has subscribed to in Bosnia. I intend to 
oppose that 

[[Page S18456]]
resolution because I think that the President's mission is deeply 
flawed. I think we are making a mistake, and I intend to make it very 
clear that I oppose the policy we have undertaken with respect to 
Bosnia.
  What we are being asked to support is the sending of American troops 
into the line of fire as a buffer force between two warring factions 
which have broken every cease-fire and violated every treaty over the 
past 500 years.
  Historically, in our country, we have set high standards for sending 
Americans into harm's way. Each of us has set standards a little 
differently, but in general, we have all tried to ask ourselves, ``Do 
we have a vital national security interest?''
  Our President has, for 3 years, tried to make the case that we have a 
vital national security interest in Bosnia. I submit that the President 
has failed, not because he is not a great salesman, but because he has 
no product to sell.
  What is happening in Bosnia is terrible. Many Members of the Senate 
have been to the Bosnian region. Every American has seen on television 
what is happening there and we are all outraged about it. But when you 
get down to the bottom line, whether we have a vital national security 
interest in Bosnia, the answer is clearly no.
  It seems to me the second question we have to ask ourselves is, 
``Will our intervention be decisive in promoting the objectives we 
seek?''
  It is one thing to have good intentions and pure motives, but it is 
another thing to have a plan that would allow you to put those good 
intentions and pure motives into force.
  I see no evidence, whatsoever, to substantiate the claim that our 
intervention, as a buffer force between warring factions in Bosnia, is 
going to be decisive in promoting the objective we seek. I have always 
tried to apply a third test in committing Americans to combat and 
harm's way, a test which has come about in my own mind because I 
represent a large State of over 18 million people. Texas has a lot of 
people in uniform; many people born in other parts of the country have 
been stationed in Texas at one time or another, and, for myriad 
reasons, have become citizens of my State.
  So when Americans died in the Persian Gulf and when Americans died in 
Somalia, Texans died. I was called upon to console the parents and 
spouses of Texans who had made the supreme sacrifice for our country. 
As a result of this experience, I have concluded that there is one 
additional question that I need to ask myself before committing 
Americans to combat and before putting Americans in harm's way. This 
test goes beyond whether or not we have a vital national interest and 
it goes beyond the question ``Will our intervention be decisive in 
promoting our interest?'' This test concerns my two college-aged sons 
and it asks ``Am I so convinced that we have a vital national security 
interest in Bosnia, and do I have strong enough belief that our 
intervention will be decisive in promoting those interests that I would 
be willing to send one of my own sons?''
  Until I can answer that question with a very decisive yes, I cannot 
feel comfortable in sending someone else's son and someone else's 
daughter.
  We are told by the President that if we do not send troops to Bosnia, 
that we are going to undermine NATO. I submit, Mr. President, that this 
is an absurd notion. NATO is a defensive alliance. NATO was established 
in Western Europe to keep Ivan back from the gate, to keep the Soviet 
empire out of Western Europe. NATO has been one of the most successful 
alliances in history, but never, ever--not when NATO was established, 
and not to this point in its functioning--have we viewed NATO as an 
alliance which should intervene in civil wars. I submit that this is a 
change in the mission of NATO. To claim that a defensive security 
alliance will be undercut if the United States of America does not 
intervene in a civil war, simply has no merit and no justification. I 
am also very concerned about the Dole resolution. I am concerned about 
the fact that in the initial presentation, the President argued that we 
would be part of a NATO force that, on a neutral basis, would be a 
buffer between warring factions. My concern, under these initial 
circumstances, was that the cease-fire would not hold--every other 
cease-fire in recent history has not held--or that the peace agreement 
would be broken, something which has happened consistently for over 500 
years.
  The Dole resolution only increases my concerns by injecting a new 
element into the mix. Since the President has no exit strategy, and 
since the President's plan is very specific as to how we get into 
Bosnia but not very specific as to how we get out, the Dole resolution 
imposes an exit strategy by having the United States of America take 
sides in this conflict, by having us arm and train one of the warring 
factions. I submit, Mr. President, that if we take sides in this 
conflict, any protection in neutrality that our troops might have had 
will be lost. If there were to be any security in neutrality for our 
troops, then agreeing to take sides in the conflict, by arming and 
training one side, can only serve to further endanger American lives.
  Paradoxically, if we were debating not to intervene in Bosnia in a 
peacekeeping role, but rather to be part of an effort to try to bring a 
balance in military power by lifting the arms embargo, by bringing the 
leadership of the Bosnian army to Germany to be trained by Americans, 
and to have an international effort to supply arms, in all probability 
I would be supportive of that proposal. But when we take on the role of 
a neutral peacekeeper, by the very nature of that role, we eliminate 
our capacity to take sides in the conflict, to be a source of weapons, 
or to be a source of training. I understand the desire to find an exit 
strategy, but, quite frankly, I believe the Dole resolution takes a 
flawed policy and goes one step further by making it more flawed. I 
intend to vote against the Dole resolution.
  Let me raise a concern that I have thought about now since Somalia, 
and I raise it because, by going back to Somalia, I can divorce this 
issue from partisanship since it was President Bush who sent troops to 
Somalia. We could get into an argument about how he sent them there in 
one role and President Clinton used them in another role, but that is a 
subtle argument that I am not interested in.
  I am very concerned about the fact that we are setting American 
foreign policy by channel surfing. I am very concerned about the fact 
that we went to Somalia for one, and only one, reason, and that was 
because the suffering and misery in Somalia was on television. Similar 
pictures could have been shown from a dozen other spots on the planet, 
but when one network decided to highlight Somalia, and when the public 
saw these pictures politicians in Washington responded by establishing 
a policy to intervene.
  I submit that you cannot, and should not, run our Nation's foreign 
policy as if it were social work. You cannot always be looking for some 
good to do around the world. We, even as powerful as we are, and even 
as the greatest and most powerful nation in the history of the world, 
cannot fix everything that is broken. We cannot right every wrong. We 
cannot take unto ourselves the mission of seeking out all human 
suffering or all injustice on the planet, with the goal that we, 
through our power, should solve these problems. Quite frankly, we have 
a lot of problems of our own; we have a lot of human suffering in our 
own country. But I believe that we made a mistake in Somalia, and I 
believe that we are making a mistake in Bosnia.
  I think in conducting foreign policy, you have to define your vital 
national security interests first. Then when something in the world 
threatens those predefined national security interests, you can 
determine whether or not, given your abilities, you can be decisive in 
protecting these interests. I think in the Persian Gulf the answer was, 
yes; our vital national interests were threatened. We had a military 
dictator who was developing, as we now know and have convincing 
evidence of, both chemical and nuclear weapons. His invasion of a 
neighboring country threatened the whole Middle East, it threatened 
Saudi Arabia, and threatened our ally, Israel. We had a vital national 
security interest in the Persian Gulf, and we had the capacity, through 
our intervention, to be decisive in promoting that interest. This, 
however, is not the case in Bosnia. 

[[Page S18457]]

  I am very alarmed about this new approach--which is the foundation of 
foreign policy in the Clinton administration--of viewing foreign policy 
as simply an extension of social work.
  One final point on this subject. The cold war is over. We are 
debating the powers of the President to use American military power 
around the world. Virtually everyone in this body has served in the 
Congress during a period where we were in a life or death struggle. 
Some of our Members served, not here, but in the service of the 
country, when that enemy was fascism. Every Member, except the newest 
Members here, has served in the Congress when we were in a life-and-
death twilight struggle with world communism. While that struggle was 
underway, either against fascism or communism, American intervention 
around the world as a way of promoting our national interests was the 
most successful policy of this century--it won the cold war. Under 
those circumstances, when Ivan was literally at the gate, it made sense 
to give the President the benefit of the doubt. As a result, we have 
all conditioned our foreign policy thinking in terms like 
``partisanship ends at the water's edge.''
  I submit that this conditioning of our thoughts comes from an era 
that no longer exists. It was from an era when there was a worldwide 
struggle for survival underway. I submit that this sort of logic does 
not apply in this case. Why should the President have more benefit of 
the doubt while engaging in police activity in Bosnia than he has while 
engaging in police activity in Cleveland, OH?
  I submit that there is no reason to give the President this 
additional benefit of the doubt. But even if one did, there is no 
evidence to substantiate the belief that we have a vital national 
interest at stake nor that our intervention can be decisive in 
promoting this interest. I am very concerned that, unless we are very 
lucky, the outcome of this intervention might simply be to add American 
names to a casualty list, but not to end the tragedy that we all want 
to see ended.
  I am going to vote against the Dole resolution. I am going to vote 
for the Hutchison resolution, and I am going to vote for the resolution 
denying funds for the deployment of troops to Bosnia. I believe that we 
must take the strongest stand possible. I believe that the current plan 
is a mistake and that it is not a logical way to promote American 
interests. I do not want to send troops to Bosnia. I know they are 
going and I understand that the votes are here to assure that the 
President is going to not only be able to send troops to Bosnia, but 
also is going to be able to cloak himself in congressional support.
  But I want to make it very clear. I do not support this policy. Since 
stopping funding is the only way to prevent the troops from being sent, 
I will vote to stop funding. There are those who will say, ``Well, 
then, are you not supporting the troops?'' The answer to this is that I 
am not concerned about the troops doing their job--I know they can and 
will do what they are ordered to do. I am concerned about the U.S. 
Congress doing its job. I know that our warriors will do their duty and 
I know they will serve proudly. I know that if this mission can be made 
to work then they will make it work. I know that every Member of the 
Senate and every Member of the House will be supportive of our troops, 
and I know we will give them the supplies, the weapons, and the support 
they need. But knowing all of this does not mean that this is not a bad 
decision which should not be undertaken. I oppose the deployment, and I 
intend to vote against it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the legislation before us concerns one of 
the most important issues the Senate ever considers--whether to send 
American servicemen and women into danger. The decision to send 
American troops on this military peace operation is a huge 
responsibility, and we must weigh it with the greatest care and 
caution.
  President Clinton has demonstrated impressive leadership in achieving 
the Bosnian peace agreement, to be signed tomorrow in Paris. The United 
States troops being sent to Bosnia are going there to help implement 
that peace plan. Because of U.S. leadership so far, they are not going 
there to fight a war--there is no longer a war to fight. And with U.S. 
leadership in the year ahead, there is a good chance the war will never 
resume.
  Everything depends on the parties' own commitment to peace. We have 
given that question very careful consideration in our Armed Services 
Committee hearings in recent weeks, as well as in consultations with 
Secretary of Defense Perry, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Shalikashvili, and Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke.
  Secretary Perry and Ambassador Holbrooke made very clear that the 
parties initialed the Dayton peace agreement and will sign the Paris 
peace agreement because they are tired of war, not because the United 
States or anyone else imposed it upon them. The parties met 
painstakingly for 21 days and nights in Dayton and reached a landmark 
accord to end the 4-year-long war that has plagued all of Bosnia and 
destroyed much of that country.
  President Clinton is now sending United States troops to Bosnia to 
help all sides implement the peace agreement. Without American 
leadership, there would have been no agreement, and without American 
troops to implement the agreement, there will be no peace.
  The role of United States forces in Bosnia serves American interests 
in several ways. Most important, this mission is the only real chance 
to achieve peace in Bosnia. That peace is essential to prevent a wider 
war in Europe; a wider war would inevitably involve the United States 
and with vastly greater risk of casualties. Twice in this century, tens 
of thousands of Americans have lost their lives in world wars that 
destroyed much of Europe. Containing such wars before they spiral out 
of control will save future American lives.
  Sending United States troops to Bosnia will also serve the American 
goal of ending the massacres, ending the ethnic cleansing, and ending 
all the other atrocities that have claimed a quarter million lives in 
this war and driven 2 million more people from their homes.
  The United States cannot be the world's policeman, and this 
deployment does not make us one. But our country was founded on respect 
for human rights, and on a responsibility to help those in need where 
we can. In this case, we can stand up for those principles by ending a 
war and helping a war-ravaged nation heal itself.
  It is also in the U.S. national interest for NATO to succeed in this 
mission. This is a clear test-case for NATO. This alliance, created 
during the cold war to meet cold war threats, faces the massive 
challenge of reshaping itself to deal with security threats in the 
post-cold-war era. Meeting the challenge of Bosnia, using military 
forces to enforce a peace in a local conflict that threatens to 
escalate into a wider war, is the type of threat that NATO must be able 
to meet. If the alliance fails the test, it may well not survive. 
Surely, no one can deny that the vitality of NATO is in America's 
national interest.
  Many of us had hoped that the U.N. peacekeeping force could have 
dealt with this conflict and produced a lasting peace, but that was not 
possible. Cease-fires came and went--the only certainty was that the 
war always resumed.
  Now, the United States and NATO face this challenge. NATO air 
strikes, led by the United States, were the key factor in producing the 
most recent cease-fire, and NATO forces, led by the United States, will 
be the key factor in keeping that peace and giving it the chance it 
needs to take root in the hard, bitter, blood-stained fields of Bosnia.
  This is no Gulf of Tonkin resolution blank-check commitment. The 
military mission is limited and achievable. The United States and NATO 
are not assuming open-ended responsibility for peace in Bosnia. That is 
very important. The mission of the U.S. and NATO forces is to give the 
people of that divided nation new breathing room, not more breathing 
room to implement a specific peace plan. There is no commitment by the 
United States or NATO to nation building or to provide a long-run 
guarantee of peace. President Clinton has made clear that 

[[Page S18458]]
if the war resumes, he will withdraw our forces. He has also placed an 
approximate 12-month deadline on our troops' stay in Bosnia.
  The war in Bosnia went on too long. The United Nations, the United 
States and our allies in Europe made many mistakes along the way. The 
war claimed too many lives, and it often threatened to spread to other 
nations. But now that all sides in Bosnia have chosen peace themselves, 
the United States is in a position to lead NATO and over 25 nations 
from around the globe, including Russia, in an unprecedented effort 
that is also a limited but clearly needed effort to continue the peace 
and give it time to stick.
  We all recognize that the mission may fail to achieve a lasting 
peace. But the real failure would be not to try.
  I commend President Clinton for his leadership. I commend our brave 
men and women going to Bosnia to serve American interests and American 
ideals. We stand behind them, and we wish them a safe and successful 
mission.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I begin by thanking Senator Hutchison and others who are leading the 
effort on the amendment regarding the disapproval of the deployment of 
United States ground troops to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  Mr. President, on today's local NBC-TV news, it was just simply 
stated that there would be Senate debate today on Bosnia and that there 
would be a vote. But then the newscaster said, ``But the President does 
not need congressional approval. The troops are already committed.'' 
This statement was made as if it is a simple matter of fact. More 
accurately stated, as if it is an undisputed point of law rather than 
the subject of what I believe to be one of the oldest and most 
important debates in our country's history: The question of whether the 
President can deploy troops without congressional approval.
  I, and several other Members of the body, have said that we do not 
agree with this notion and that Congress must--must--approve such 
deployment, whether it be under article I of the Constitution's war-
making powers or under the War Powers Resolution or under a more 
general notion of the checks and balances between the Congress and 
Executive.
  In any event, Mr. President, it is obvious that this institution, 
this Senate, does not have the will to challenge decades of executive 
aggrandizement of congressional war powers. This is only the last and 
most recent chapter of that syndrome. It is certainly not only the act 
of President Clinton. It has been the act of Presidents of both parties 
ever since World War II.
  So it is with disappointment in, what I consider to be, the falseness 
of this process that I rise to support the only amendment that allows 
some semblance of what I believe to be Congress' role in this process, 
and that is to approve or disapprove the sending of tens of thousands 
of troops into what is indisputably harm's way.
  This notion that Congress has to approve a deployment is not 
something in my imagination or just a relic of America's past. It is 
one of the most important opinions that has been expressed throughout 
American history. I first ran into it as a high school student, when we 
were involved--in fact, trapped--in the Vietnam war. During my 
undergraduate years, I followed the debate and passage of the War 
Powers Act which was designed because of that crisis. I remember well, 
when I was a little younger, hearing about the very few Senators--a 
precious few Senators--who stood up and questioned the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution. Of course, it was that resolution which let us slip into 
the quagmire that became known as Vietnam.
  But my views on this are not just a throwback to Vietnam or the Gulf 
of Tonkin resolution, although I think appropriate parallels can be 
made between how we got into Vietnam and what is happening here with 
regard to Bosnia. There are several recent serious efforts to look at 
the role of Congress vis-a-vis the Executive in deploying troops. I am 
specifically thinking of two which were published this year. In his 
1995 book ``Presidential Power,'' Louis Fisher carefully documents the 
constitutional role of Congress. Mr. Fisher dedicates the book to the 
republican principle that warmaking is reserved for the legislature, 
and says ``this definition of Executive power''--meaning the prevailing 
view that seems to dominate our proceedings now--``this definition of 
Executive power, to send troops anywhere in the world whenever the 
President likes, would have astonished the framers of the 
Constitution.''
  ``It would have astonished the framers of the Constitution.'' Mr. 
President, it astonishes me today. I fear it is completely out of sync 
with our national interests, our international interests, and our 
capacity to make decisions as a nation in this post-cold-war world.
  In another book published just this year entitled ``A Culture of 
Difference; Congress' Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy'' by 
Stephen Weissman, it says: ``It is not too much to say that Congress 
has substantially ceded its fundamental constitutional role in foreign 
policy.''
  As a Senator and as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and as a believer in Congress' role in the constitutional 
system, it is painful to hear that kind of assessment in 1995. But even 
more painful is to see this acquiescence and timidity played out in the 
context of Bosnia.
  Late yesterday afternoon, the debate on various resolutions of 
support for and opposition to the deployment in Bosnia really began. 
Unfortunately, the resolution of authorization I would have hoped to 
have voted on will not be presented. In any case, the debate began 
yesterday afternoon and will conclude later today, with three votes, 
leaving essentially just 1 day of debate on a subject involving the 
sending of upward of 20,000 U.S. troops, or perhaps more, into harm's 
way.
  Earlier this year, we spent a month out here on the balanced budget 
amendment, and I think it was well worth the effort. But just 1 day or 
1\1/2\ day on the commitment of U.S. ground troops seems to me to be 
insufficient.
  I have listened to just about all of the statements that several 
Senators have made since last night, either here or on the television. 
When I was listening, I heard mostly Republican Senators speaking in 
opposition to the deployment. And, although I do not agree with the 
conclusions, I was especially interested and impressed with the remarks 
of the Senator from Maine, Senator Cohen. I appreciated several things 
he said.

  The first point he made is that President Clinton is not doing this 
for political reasons; that President Clinton is sincere in his 
motives. I believe that, too. I believe he is doing this, not to get 
votes, but because he believes it is the right thing to do. It is 
essential that we say that because there are those--including people 
who agree with me on this issue--who have suggested otherwise. I 
strongly believe the President, in his heart, believes this is the 
right thing to do, and that's why he's doing it.
  I also appreciate what the Senator from Maine said, in candor, about 
the importance of the debate about constitutional power. He said it is 
important to resolve the issue of what is the role of Congress and what 
is the role of the Executive in deploying troops overseas. But then he 
quickly conceded that it is not going to be resolved on this one.
  Do you know what, Mr. President? I have been here 3 years and we have 
already struggled with troop deployments in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and 
Bosnia. That is an awful lot of intervention in just a few years when 
we do not even have an enemy like the Soviet Union threatening us. Yet 
on each occasion I have heard Senators say, ``We have to do something 
about this, but it is not going to be resolved on this one.''
  To refer to Senator Cohen's statements again, I want to echo his 
observation that what is at stake here is not really just that the 
President has tried to assert warmaking powers. The fact is, Congress 
has not done its job of using our power either as an institution, as 
the U.S. Congress, to exert our war powers. In fact, Senator Cohen used 
the phrase from the law, ``possession is 90 percent of ownership,'' 
which, in effect, means you have to use the power or it goes away.
  I remember a scene from the television show ``Dallas,'' years ago, 
portraying a much more mundane expression of this same concept. It was 
the episode where the senior Ewing, Jock, 

[[Page S18459]]
was confronting his son, Bobby, who was complaining about his brother 
J.R. Ewing taking control of the oil company. Bobby said, ``Daddy, you 
gave me the oil company.'' But Jock said, ``Son, nobody can give you 
real power. You have to take it.''
  That is what Congress must do with regard to the war power: it must 
take the powers that the framers intended for it and use them. Here we 
have allowed the President of the United States to commit 20,000 or 
25,000 troops without even having a binding vote on it.
  What do the Members of the Senate who support the deployment say? 
They say, ``The President should not have done it, but it is too late. 
He is the President. War Powers Act does not work.'' Even more 
puzzling, I've heard, ``We have to get this thing done today because 
the peace treaty will be signed tomorrow.'' These are the excuses that 
are being used for not exercising our constitutional role of approving 
or disapproving this action.
  We have been presented a fait accompli, a done deal. As was said by 
several Republican members at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearing last week, this is really a situation where we are being asked 
to participate in what is a pseudo-decisionmaking process, where the 
decision was already made a long time ago in the back rooms of the 
White House and within NATO, and maybe even in some of the back rooms 
of this building. That does not take away from the sincerity of the 
people who came to such understandings, but it does represent an 
affront to Congress. In effect, the Senate, in its constitutional role, 
is being co-opted here. The fix has been in for a long time.
  Again, it is not really just the President's fault. It is Congress' 
failure to challenge and insist on a procedure whereby there is a true, 
organized debate, involving public participation, and culminating in a 
vote that the public will understand to mean that if we say it is a 
good thing to do, it will happen, and if we say it is not a good thing 
to do, at least there will be a serious consideration on the part of 
the Executive that it should not go forward.
  But that is not what we have here. Senator Cohen pointed out, the 
Executive should seek a real vote on this mission, if for no other 
reason than the President and all of us may need--down the road as this 
operation goes forward and the going gets tough--we may need that 
understanding and public support which cannot be generated in this 
context.
  That is why I introduced, on October 20, Senate Resolution 187. It 
simply says, ``It is the sense of the Senate that Congress should vote 
on a measure regarding deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part of the implementation force as part 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization prior to the United States 
entering into a commitment to carry out such deployment.'' That is the 
sort of resolution that I would have hoped would have gone through this 
body before the treaty was signed.
  Another step we should have taken was to lift the UN arms embargo 
against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was the first Member 
of the 103d Congress, as a new freshman Senator, to introduce a 
resolution calling for lifting the arms embargo. I am certainly not the 
only one who has advocated that, but I was involved early on, and was 
pleased to work with Senator Dole who played a great leadership role 
later on.
  But I must say, for the leader of this body to suggest that the 
President failed to lift the arms embargo and that Congress did 
everything it could do is false. We voted to lift the arms embargo, on 
S. 21, on July 26, by a vote of 69 to 29; theoretically veto proof. I 
know the President might have called a few of us and tried to get his 
numbers up, but where was the attempt to override this veto on the 
floor of the Senate?
  Where was Congress in saying we will exert our role and--although we 
must defer to the President on foreign policy, in many cases--where 
were we to say that this one was different? Instead, I feel some of the 
leadership is trying to have it both ways, saying we do not want to 
confront the President, and that we support him; saying we support the 
troops, but we did not support the deployment. This is a masterful way 
to try to have it all ways. I think Senator Brown had it right last 
night. The more truthful characterization of what is going on here is 
we are ducking our responsibility. I am very concerned about the 
process. Mr. President, assuming the vote today really was going to 
decide whether these troops are going to go or not, I'd like to address 
the merits, briefly, because I know many other Senators wish to speak. 
I believe that the United States has a very important interest in 
Europe--very important. But I am not convinced that we need United 
States ground troops in Bosnia to protect those interests for us or for 
Europe. I think the European countries certainly could provide all the 
ground troops in this case.
  The list of issues and concerns about this operation are a mile long, 
whether it be the commitment of troops for just 1 year, or the 
challenges of the terrain, or to tie in the rationality of this 
approach with the discrepancy between the arms of the different sides. 
They are all important issues that have been raised. But, to me, to 
just come on the floor of the Senate and hear people say it is all 
about U.S. leadership or European stability, really does not tell me 
anything. I am not sure what those terms mean in the post-cold-war era. 
Why cannot the U.S. leadership in this context be defined as air power, 
naval power, intelligence, resources? Why does the definition 
inherently have to include the deployment of ground troops? I do not 
think ground force is inherent in the term ``leadership,'' especially 
for a country that has shown such leadership already and will continue 
to show leadership throughout the world.
  In my mind, ground troops indicate an ultimate physical threat to the 
United States. What is the ultimate physical threat to the United 
States that requires the sacrifice of American lives in this case? Is 
it a threat to Europe? Is it refugees on our doorstep? Is it just the 
pictures on CNN? I will show you pictures from Liberia, Angola, and 
East Timor and they are the same or worse. There is a very strong 
justification to stop the horror in those places as well with American 
troops.
  When we look to our European allies in this case, I am not sure 
whether this is a question of whether we are leading. I am not so sure 
we are not just being led when it comes to being forced to put our 
ground troops in to the tune of a third of the I-FoR forces. As far as 
I understand, the possibility of not committing U.S. troops was not 
even seriously discussed during the negotiations in Dayton.
  Again, we have to be cautious about analogies. People ask me if this 
is like the Persian Gulf or Vietnam. I want to be careful, but I guess 
I would have to say it is a lot more like Vietnam than the Persian 
Gulf.
  Senator Smith spoke last night, as a Vietnam veteran, about the 
justification for the process of the Vietnamization in Vietnam, and 
made the parallel that much of the language and things being discussed 
for the Bosnia mission are not unlike the extremely unsuccessful effort 
with the Vietnamization of South Vietnam during the Vietnam war. We 
must learn the lessons of history. I think there are very serious 
lessons from that quagmire.
  Also, how does this effort fit in with our main goal of this Congress 
to balance the budget? We are having a terrible time trying to prevent 
severe damage to our important domestic programs and to balance the 
budget. Yet we have already had a $7 billion expense on the Bosnia 
deal--$7 billion, I say, because the President was determined to veto 
the defense appropriations increase of $7 billion until this proposal 
came down the road. I call that $7 billion the opening ante in Bosnia. 
I think it is going to cost a lot more.
  Mr. President, I also worry about whether or not this intervention 
would have so much support if we still had the draft. I have always 
believed that it was good to have a volunteer Army, but I remember the 
Vietnam era, and I remember the people from all classes of society and 
all backgrounds who started to question the war because everybody's kid 
could possibly go to Vietnam. That is not what is going on here.
  Have we thought about the economic status, the racial status, the 
ethnic 

[[Page S18460]]
status of the people who are more likely than others to die in Bosnia? 
It worries me. It worries me that we are not learning these lessons of 
history from that period either.
  Finally, Mr. President, I think we have to ask the question in the 
post-cold-war era: What are the limits of American power? We are the 
most powerful country in the world, and we certainly want to stay 
there. But there are limits.
  I remember the discussion years ago of the danger that we may try to 
create or enforce a Pax Americana, as Rome tried to do with a Pax 
Romana. Rome became overextended and ultimately could not withstand the 
strain on their own internal well-being.
  I think this action--which, to me, is the first step toward our 
attempting to police the world--threatens our own national security. We 
need a new foreign policy that reflects post-cold-war realities, 
including our vital interests and our domestic needs.
  Mr. President, I finish by simply saying that in addition to the fact 
that we are not following a constitutional procedure which could 
strengthen us in this kind of commitment, by not avoiding the 
deployment of ground troops we also run the risk of sapping America's 
strength from within.
  So, regretfully, I have to oppose the President on this, which means 
I will support the Hutchison amendment, and oppose the Dole resolution 
in support of the deployment.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, earlier this week we had a debate on 
what it means to support the flag. Now we are voting to stand behind 
that flag--and that means voting to support our troops.
  No American ever wants to send our troops into harms way. Certainly 
no one wants to do this days before Christmas.
  All over this country, and as our troops are doing abroad, families 
are planning for the happiest time of the year. They are visiting 
family, trimming trees, and singing Christmas carols.
  But instead, as for our troops in Germany, they are planning to spend 
a year away from loved ones. And they are preparing for the risks that 
are part of any military mission.
  After consultation with the President, the Vice President, the Vice 
President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and our 
ambassador to the United Nations. And after prayerful reflection--I am 
voting to do just that.
  Why? Because after 4 bloody years, the people of Bosnia have decided 
to give peace a chance. Only NATO can enforce this peace. But without 
the United States, NATO cannot and will not enforce the peace.
  The fighting will continue. The savagery could continue. Mass murders 
and rapes could continue, and ethnic cleansing will continue unless 
NATO and the United States involvement takes place. Older people and 
children will continue to be pushed from their homes, but lights will 
go out once again in Sarajevo, and the lights will go out for any 
peace, or any possibility of peace.
  But even as I say this, I want to speak directly, if I can, to the 
troops and to their families. I want them to know that I would not 
support this vote unless there was a specific, focused, and limited 
mission. Over and over again at every meeting I have spoken out for the 
fact that there must be clear criteria for going in and clear criteria 
for getting out.
  Those are the questions that I asked the President and the Vice 
President--not what will send our troops there, but what will bring 
them back home. They gave me these following answers, and I shared this 
with the military, with our troops, and I share this with the families 
all over the United States of America who are watching what I think is 
a debate of great stability.
  What we have been told--and I believe--is that the U.S. military, 
first of all, will only go if all sides agree to abide by the peace 
agreement. No peace agreement, no troops. No peace agreement, no 
troops. When our troops go, it is to create the climate for the 
Bosnians, all parties in Bosnia will take hold and make peace among 
themselves. We are to create the framework and the climate. If that 
dissolves, we are going to pull out.
  Our troops will have these criteria for leaving as soon as the 
following things are accomplished: The cessation of hostilities; 
creation of a zone of separation; and the return by the Bosnians of the 
Serbian-Croatian troops and weapons to their home bases.
  You, our men and women of the military, will be there to enforce the 
peace, not to rebuild Bosnia. But while you are enforcing the peace, 
the international community will provide humanitarian aid, resettle 
refugees, oversee elections, and also that there needs to be a military 
balance created between the Bosnians and the Serbs.
  I would not vote to send those troops unless I was assured that they 
had received excellent training, the best equipment in the world, the 
best technology to find landmines and the right to use every means 
possible to defend themselves, and also that they would serve under an 
American commander.
  To our troops, I want to say, you will not be alone. Over 25 nations 
will participate. They will be sharing the burden also of the risk as 
well as the financial one. Our oldest NATO allies, England and France, 
as well as new democracies like Poland, will be there-- the countries 
that you helped liberate by winning the cold war. The Congress must 
back you. I believe that Congress will back you. And I know as always 
the American people will support you.

  I would not vote to send you if your mission was not essential and 
honorable. Your mission is essential because without you, there will 
not be peace or stability in Europe. Without you, NATO, the world's 
strongest military alliance, would be destroyed. Without you, I am 
concerned the war in Europe might spread to Macedonia and Albania. It 
could bring Greece and Turkey into this situation.
  Your mission is honorable because you are crucial to stopping the 
bloodshed in Bosnia. The people of Bosnia have endured misery, 
suffering, and brutality; 250,000 people died in this war. Families and 
communities, cities have been ravaged. Children were killed as they 
played. Old people were killed as they shopped for food. Hospitals were 
attacked as they tried to care for the wounded. War crimes that remind 
us of the Second World War were committed. We are asking you not to do 
this for some abstraction like NATO or Bosnia. Actually, we are asking 
you to do this for the people of Bosnia, for families that are just 
like yours, for children just like yours, for a child that I met named 
Zlata, a 9-year-old girl who keeps a diary and speaks to the world. 
They call her the Anne Frank of Sarajevo. Because of you, she will have 
a far better fate than Anne Frank endured. She is a child who tried to 
tell the world the suffering the war has caused and a child we hope we 
keep in our mind as we go forth in this mission.
  So to you, the American troops, while you train for war, you will be 
there to enforce the peace. The American people greatly appreciate you 
and are grateful for your heroic sacrifice. We thank you for taking the 
risk so that others could have the opportunity to give peace a chance. 
We thank you for being there when you are needed. I say to you as we 
vote on this, may the grace of God be with you and protect you as you 
go forward to protect us.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, Congress will respond today to President 
Clinton's decision to deploy United States troops in the former 
Yugoslavia as part of the Bosnia peace accord that was negotiated and 
initialed in Dayton, OH, and which will soon be signed in Paris.
  President Clinton has articulated his policy to all of us, to the 
citizens of this country, and has now requested congressional support. 
Yet even as our troops are headed to Bosnia, the President has, in my 
opinion, failed to supply a defined goal or mission, strategy for 
achieving the goal, an exit strategy and/or the national and security 
interests of our country.
  The President has raised three concerns to justify U.S. participation 
in implementing the peace accord: The potential spread of conflict 
throughout Europe, our leadership in NATO and international 
communities, and the need to end the carnage in the Balkans.
  I do not question the concerns raised by our Commander in Chief. All 
of 

[[Page S18461]]
them have some degree of legitimacy. Mr. President, we would all like 
to respond to what we will refer to as the moral imperative President 
Clinton and others continue to emphasize as it relates to the 
devastation and the human suffering that has gone on in the Balkans and 
has left us all a tremendous feeling of frustration to which many 
Senators, including myself, have come to the floor of this Senate over 
the last 3 years to speak.
  These feelings are not new. Four years ago, I was contacted by a 
Croatian-American constituent of mine when the conflict first raged 
between the Serbs and Croatians. This gentleman is a friend who was 
concerned, maintaining contact with my office, and his fears and 
frustrations were all very real to me, as all of us have experienced 
that with some of our constituents.
  The moral imperative existed then. However, then, like now, our 
options for involvement, in my opinion, were very limited, and we still 
face the fundamental difficulty of trying to make the peace a greater 
victory than winning the war. While we all understand and agree with 
the moral imperative, we have yet to hear why this action would serve 
our national interests and our security needs.
  I have listened to the President's proposal as presented by his 
representatives, and I have listened to my fellow Idahoans. I have read 
and I have reviewed the agreement and the proposed deployment. My 
conclusion is this: the answers I have been seeking such as defined 
goal, exit strategy, national security interests, have not been 
satisfied--not just to this Senator but to the American people.

  Therefore, I am pleased to join my colleagues, Senator Hutchison, 
Senator Inhofe, and others, in offering an amendment to oppose this 
President's actions. Let me be clear, Mr. President, so that there is 
no effort to cloud what is being debated here. I oppose the President's 
decision to deploy our troops. I will, however, as I always have, 
support our troops if they are ordered by our Commander in Chief to 
implement a Bosnian peace agreement. I will not allow our brave men and 
women to become pawns in what I believe is rapidly becoming a high-
stakes political game.
  I find it ironic that as the Senate prepares to vote on United States 
ground forces in Bosnia, the Serbians there will be exercising their 
own voice as they have been in an unofficial referendum to vote on the 
peace agreement. I also find it ironic that we in the Senate conclude a 
historic vote on protecting the honor and the sanctity of our national 
symbol, the United States flag, while it is being trampled, torn and 
burned in the streets where our soldiers will be sent to make the 
peace. I think this Senate and this Congress has to explain to the 
American people why they cannot express a clear and strong opposition 
to our President.
  The debate on the President's plan to deploy U.S. troops as 
peacekeepers to Bosnia is not a new debate but the continuation of a 
long and ongoing one over the President's desire to deploy ground 
forces in the Balkans. The Congress has spoken in opposition to this 
idea in the past, and I hope we will speak clearly on this issue again 
today. That argument is one that must be clarified for the American 
people.
  I know of no other time when my constituents in Idaho have spoken 
more clearly to me.
  Last weekend as I walked across the Boise airport, a crowd gathered 
around me as one man reached out and grabbed hold of my arm and said, 
``Senator, I have to talk to you for a moment. You,'' he said, meaning 
me, ``cannot allow this President to put our young men and women at 
risk when there is no defined need to lose human life. We are not at 
risk nor is our security.''
  While this man and others in that crowd were clearly concerned about 
the loss of human life in the former Yugoslavia, they could not justify 
the spilling of American blood to stabilize that situation when this 
Congress stood on an arms embargo and tried to express our will, and 
this President refused; and we refused as a nation then to allow that 
kind of equity to exist.
  The more I review the information on the agreement in the proposed 
peace mission, the stronger my concerns have become. As part of this 
agreement, our President, our Commander in Chief, will be deploying 
U.S. troops into extremely rugged terrain during the middle of what 
appears to be a very severe winter. In addition to poor conditions and 
freezing temperatures, there is the problem of about 3 million land 
mines that exist within the sector assigned to the American forces.
  Mr. President, as my fellow Idahoans and I know, winter in the 
mountains can be demanding at best. The area where our troops will be 
is like an area in Idaho that we call Stanley. And I will tell you that 
in Stanley, ID, in December and January, if you are living in a tent, 
you are challenged as would be the most extremely capable survivalist. 
And that does not include the snipers, the civil disorder, or the land 
mines. I suggest that we are sending our troops into a most difficult 
situation.
  During the December 1 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, even the Secretary of Defense, William Perry, underlined the 
difficulties facing our troops. In addition to the snipers and the 
civil disorder, they include extreme elements of undisciplined militia 
and the hostiles that are there.
  The dissatisfaction of some Serbian factions should not be taken 
lightly. There is a strong likelihood that our troops will be 
challenged, even attacked, in carrying out their mission of peace. How 
in that effort can it be called peace other than engaging us in an 
ongoing war? Yet we are continually told that our men and women are not 
going to fight a war, they are simply going to keep a peace.
  In these conditions, Mr. President, the lines are so gray that they 
are no longer discernible. I believe this President cannot clarify 
them, nor can he define them. I have opposed the use of ground forces 
in Bosnia in the past. And I will continue to oppose that policy today.
  It is most frustrating that the use of American ground troops is not 
the only option at hand. I am frustrated that the President has refused 
to lift what I viewed was an illegal arms embargo on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. I have strongly supported the efforts of the majority 
leader and others in a very strong bipartisan voice on this floor to 
pursue the best policy options in a difficult situation. And one of the 
best policy options was to lift the illegal arms embargo on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It would not have caused us to take sides. It would have 
simply allowed fair play and the right of self-defense in those 
circumstances.
  The last vote on this issue occurred as recently as July of this 
year. At that time, Mr. President, I asked how many bills will be 
passed, how many U.N. resolutions presented, how many cease-fire 
agreements will be broken before the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
will be allowed to stand against their aggressors and defend 
themselves?
  Mr. President, there is ample reason to question the enforcement of 
the 1991 embargo against Bosnia in the first place. The embargo was not 
imposed on Bosnia, because Bosnia did not exist in 1991. Rather, it was 
imposed on Yugoslavia. In addition, enforcement of this embargo could 
arguably violate Bosnia's right to self-defense under article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter.
  Many Americans hoped that the passage of S. 21 would end the arms 
embargo and finally allow the Bosnian Moslems the right of self-
defense. With rough parity in this conflict that might have happened, a 
lasting peace agreement would be far more likely than the kind that we 
are stumbling into. Instead, we have a very unequal situation going 
into the implementation phase of a peace agreement that at best could 
erupt into major fighting with our forces being squarely in the middle 
of it all.
  Mr. President, I will just add, the United States did not need to do 
anything. Well, I think that is not true. We have done a great deal in 
the past 3 years. We have provided the support, the air cover, the 
naval logistics, all that we needed to do as a participating member of 
NATO.
  It is now time for us to define much more clearly our role in foreign 
policy around the world. I would suggest to this President that every 
time we are called upon or led into a skirmish, deployment of our 
ground troops are not necessarily a demonstration of leadership. To 
lead means to try to solve it 

[[Page S18462]]
by alternative means. In this instance, I think the President has 
failed, and in failing, he risks now the loss of American life in a 
very tragic situation.
  So I hope that we could support a strong voice today. I think the 
American people expect us to lead on these issues. I think they expect 
us to speak out as strongly as we can. And I hope that we can oppose 
today, with our vote, the President's deployment of United States 
ground forces in the former Yugoslavia.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, later today the President of the United States will 
leave for Paris to participate in a historic event, the signing of an 
agreement which will open the door to peace in the Balkans. Think about 
it, Mr. President.
  The year 1995. Think about the conflict in the Balkans that marked 
the beginning of this century and how it was left to run wild, leading 
to World War I and in some ways leading to the imbalance and 
incompletion of that war that ultimately led to World War II.
  The year 1995. Conflict breaks out in the Balkans, and today the 
President of the United States is leaving for Paris to participate in 
the signing of an agreement which opens the door to peace in the 
Balkans, which implements, as my friend and colleague from New York, 
Senator Moynihan, has said and hopefully will say again, some basic 
tenets of international law.
  Mr. President, much has been said in the last month about the role 
the United States played, first, in bringing the parties to the 
negotiating table, and second, in hammering out a complicated agreement 
which all the warring parties would be willing to sign and, most 
importantly, would be willing to live with. Much has also been said 
about the role the United States must continue to play if this 
agreement is going to have a chance of bringing the benefits of peace 
to the people of Bosnia, stability to Europe, and increased security to 
the world.
  So, Mr. President, I would say that this is another one of those 
historic days in the life of the U.S. Senate. It is one of those 
defining moments in our history. Most of us in the Senate today faced a 
similar situation on January 12, 1991, when we stood to vote for or 
against authorizing President Bush to use American military forces in a 
war in the Persian Gulf. That situation in fact was very different from 
the situation we face today.
  There, on January 12, 1991, the President had already committed a 
half million American military personnel to the gulf region, within 
range of Iraqi Scuds. There the war the President was about to engage 
in would find American forces facing a dug-in, fortified Iraqi force, 
fighting a war. And casualty estimates stated on this floor and 
elsewhere went as high as the thousands.
  Here we are being asked to support, not a war, not to send our troops 
into war, but to send them on a mission of peace, to implement and 
monitor the peace that the parties to the war want as opposed to 
fighting as we did in the gulf war an untractable, unyielding enemy.
  And remember, though the forces that fought in Desert Storm were 
international, they were primarily American. Here, on this peacekeeping 
mission, two-thirds of the implementation force will be non-American; 
one-third will be American.
  Many of my colleagues believed that the best course of action in the 
early days of 1991 was to allow economic sanctions to continue to bite 
at Saddam and so did not vote for the authorizing resolution which 
Senator Warner and I offered.
  I understand the sincerity of that position. But the Senate did 
support President Bush on January 12 and voted 52 to 47 for Senate 
Joint Resolution 2 which stated, and I quote:

       The President is authorized . . . to use United States 
     Armed Forces. . . .

  While 47 Members of this body did not vote for that resolution, let 
us not forget that when the President exercised this authority and 
ordered Desert Storm to begin, every Senator, and I daresay every 
American, supported our troops and the President of the United States. 
And I hope and sincerely believe this will be the conclusion of our 
discussions and deliberations and votes this week with regard to the 
mission our troops are going to carry out in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, the debate we have heard over the past days and weeks 
has been a good one, a thorough one, a sincere one. We have had 
numerous opportunities, as Members of the Senate, to hear directly from 
the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
President's National Security Adviser, Ambassador Holbrooke who 
negotiated the agreement, and a variety of former Government officials, 
academics, and thinkers.
  The administration has, in my view, gone to extraordinary lengths 
throughout the negotiations and afterward to consult with Congress and 
to provide us ample opportunity to ask questions and to express our 
views. And so we find ourselves now, in the week when the Dayton 
agreement is to be signed by the warring parties. In the days following 
the signing, U.S. forces and those of our allies in NATO and 16 other 
non-NATO countries will move into the region to implement the peace 
which has been agreed to.
  These forces go not to impose a peace on unwilling participants, they 
go because the parties to the conflict asked them to go. They go 
because the world community, acting as a result of American leadership 
and through the mighty force of NATO, finally struck from the air to 
bring some pain to the aggressors, aided by an increasingly strong 
ground force of the federation of Bosnians and Croatians.
  Our troops will go because the parties to the conflict are fed up 
with the killing and slaughter, the deprivation and denial of their 
right to live in peace and civility, and they have asked us to come in 
and give them a chance to make this peace work.
  They have asked us to come in, in the case of the Serbs, because of 
the effectiveness of the economic sanctions the world community imposed 
on the government in Belgrade and on the former Yugoslavia, on Serbia 
and Montenegro. That is a point worth noting. People criticize economic 
sanctions and say they are irrelevant, they are useless, they are 
wrong. They worked here. That, as much as the failure, the increasing 
opposition that Serbian forces were facing in Bosnia certainly brought 
Mr. Milosevic to the peace table.
  Mr. President, we have been briefed on the missions which our 
military forces will perform. We have reviewed the rules of engagement 
which will be followed by our forces. We have seen the nature of the 
force which we will be sending to the region. And we can conclude with 
some confidence from all of this that the highly trained, heavily armed 
professional force of volunteer soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen 
we are sending will be able to do their assigned military missions 
within a reasonable time, and they will carry out this operation 
successfully.
  The operation is not without risk. No one in the administration has 
said otherwise. None of us who support the deployment of American 
troops to Bosnia to implement this peace has said otherwise. No one in 
this administration or this Congress is eager to send our forces to a 
place where some of these brave young men and women might be injured 
or, God forbid, killed. But I believe that with their training, the 
best in the world, their professionalism, the finest in the world, 
their sense of service and duty which impelled them to volunteer, their 
numbers and composition, the limited scope of their mission, the 
flexibility and robustness of their rules of engagement--which 
basically means that if these troops are threatened in any way, they 
will respond with overwhelming force.
  Remember what happened in Haiti when American troops there were 
challenged at that police station. They responded with overwhelming 
force and were essentially never challenged again in Haiti. All of this 
provides as much safety as one can hope for when a military force is 
deployed to what was, until recently, a combat zone.
  Of course, all Americans will be praying for the safety of our forces 
in the days and months ahead. All of us will understand and empathize 
with them and their families as they see Christmas, Hanukkah, and New 
Year's come 

[[Page S18463]]
and go separated from their loved ones and their friends. But these 
concerns, as real and deep as they are, are not sufficient reason to 
decide not to send our military to perform this important mission: To 
bring peace to Bosnia, to bring a greater level of assurance that there 
will be stability in Europe and in the former Soviet Union, to revive 
NATO, to reestablish at an ever higher level the strength and 
leadership of the United States of America.
  For the first time in nearly 4 years, the people of Bosnia--who have 
engaged the minds and hearts of every one of us in this Chamber as we 
watched their suffering, as we watched them be the victims of 
aggression and genocide--for the first time in nearly 4 years, these 
people in Bosnia can see a ray of hope for their future, they can 
picture a day without running from snipers or praying that mortar 
rounds do not land in the marketplace while they are shopping with 
their children, or land on the snowy hills where their children go to 
sled and to act like children rather than targets for the irresponsible 
cowards who have fired on them now for 3 or 4 years.
  Mr. President, we do not have the luxury of turning back the clock to 
a time when we might have done something other than sending our troops 
to serve on the ground as peacekeepers in Bosnia. As you know, in the 
past 4 years, I have spoken on the floor numerous times, joining with 
colleagues of both parties, in calling for a lifting of the arms 
embargo which was immoral, as the Senator from Idaho said before me. It 
was immoral, it was illegal, it was outrageous to deny a people the 
right they are given under the U.N. Charter, let alone and what might 
be referred to as natural law, to defend themselves and their families 
and their country.
  So I, and others here, finally a strong bipartisan majority, called 
for a lifting of the arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the conduct of airstrikes by NATO forces, to try to 
create some balance of force on the ground, to try to deter the 
aggressors, those who were committing genocide.
  Finally, this summer, thanks in large measure to American leadership 
after the fall of Srebrenica which led to a slaughter of thousands of 
men and boys buried in mass graves, finally NATO struck at the Bosnian 
Serb aggressors from the air.
  I will not go into all the what ifs which fill the minds of many of 
us.
  I wish we had followed a strategy of lift and strike long ago. Had we 
done so, there might well have been an end to the killing before now. 
But let me say, Mr. President, in supporting the lift and strike 
strategy, I never thought it was a substitute for an ultimate 
peacekeeping force. At its best, I believed that the lift and strike 
strategy would create that balance of force on the ground that would 
bring the parties to the peace table--exactly what has happened now. I 
believe if we had implemented that policy earlier, we would have 
brought them to the peace table earlier because we would have removed 
from the aggressors, particularly, the motivation to continue to fight. 
But I have always felt that when they got to the peace table, if they 
could agree on the peace, there would be a need for an international 
peacekeeping force. That is where we are now.
  Mr. President, it was important to many of us that on the day after 
the Dayton agreement was signed, the United Nations acted with the 
force of international law to lift the arms embargo--the goal so many 
of us in this Chamber had for so many years. In some ways, I regret 
that in the excitement over the Dayton agreement, and the questions 
raised about it, that extraordinary act did not receive sufficient 
attention and appreciation. The fact is that we have acted now. Thanks 
to American leadership, the parties came to the negotiating table and 
agreed to an extensive peace treaty; and tomorrow they will sign that 
treaty in Paris.
  We have brought the parties this far. It is American leadership, 
joined with our allies in NATO and Europe, and impelled by the will of 
the combatants in the field themselves that have brought us this far. 
We cannot abandon these people or the cause of peace now. Nor can we 
abandon our allies in NATO who are sending their forces in to implement 
this agreement.
  The President made it clear that he is prepared to send our forces, 
with or without the support of Congress, just as President Bush 
correctly made clear in 1990 and 1991 that he would send the United 
States' forces to the gulf war, even if Congress did not support his 
efforts. You come to a point where decisions and judgments of this kind 
cannot be made by 535 Members of Congress. That is what we elect 
Presidents for. In this case, I think President Clinton has 
demonstrated the leadership and courage we expect of our Presidents, 
just as President Bush before him did in the gulf war.
  When we speak of defining moments in history, post-cold war, this 
decision will stand alongside the decision in the gulf war, as a marker 
as to where we would go and the extent to which the forces of Western 
civilization--particularly regarding Europe--were joined together to 
stop conflict and deter war.
  Now it is this Senate's turn to demonstrate courage and leadership. 
Now it is this Senate's turn to support, in very clear terms, both the 
American troops, who will be on the ground, and the policy which has, 
at last, brought us to the point where the Bosnian Prime Minister Haris 
Silajdzic, could tell me last week when he was in Washington, ``We are 
an inch from peace. Do not abandon us now when we are this close.''
  So, Mr. President, we have three choices before us. First is the 
resolution that comes from the House, which would effectively cut off 
funding for any peacekeeping operation by American forces in Bosnia.
  Second, we have the amendment cosponsored by the Senator from Texas 
and the Senator from Oklahoma, which supports the troops but opposes 
the mission.
  Third, we have what is now described as the Dole-McCain resolution, 
offered by the distinguished majority leader and the Senator from 
Arizona--but I am sure it will be a bipartisan resolution when it comes 
to a vote--which offers support for the mission and the troops, the 
support contingent on terms that are stated in the resolution that the 
President has agreed to.
  Mr. President, I want to speak for a moment about the language of the 
resolution offered by Senator Hutchison and Senator Inhofe, which 
``opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy United States military 
ground forces.'' Yet, it says that ``the Congress strongly supports the 
United States military personnel who may be ordered by the President to 
implement the General Framework Agreement.''
  Mr. President, it is my sincere belief--and I say this with the 
greatest regard for my colleagues who are sponsoring this resolution--
that we cannot support the troops and oppose their mission. I remember 
the words from the Bible, ``For if the sound of the trumpet be 
uncertain, who will follow into battle?''
  Mr. President, the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, with all respect, 
sounds a very weak and uncertain trumpet. Of course, we support our 
troops. No one ever doubted that. But how can we claim to both support 
the troops and oppose the mission? How would we feel if we were in 
uniform, heading to Bosnia, and the Congress of the United States says, 
``Well, we are behind you, folks, but we do not support your mission"? 
I would not feel secure. I would not feel I had the support that I 
would want to have for my country going into a peacekeeping mission in 
a potentially dangerous zone, which the Commander in Chief has decided 
to send me into. I would want to see a closing of ranks in the same way 
that occurred at the time of the gulf war, to receive strong support, 
the kind of support that is involved and stated in the Dole-McCain 
resolution.
  The Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, in my opinion, sends a muddled 
message to every one of our troops, to their loved ones back home and, 
most worrisome, to those in Bosnia who would like to see this framework 
wrecked by keeping the United States and NATO forces out of Bosnia.
  To say that this Congress opposes the decision, the mission to deploy 
our forces, tells the war criminals in Pale and the rogues and 
terrorists in Bosnia who do not want peace and want the United States 
and the international implementation force out of Bosnia, that they can 
work their mischief 

[[Page S18464]]
against American forces, and because this Congress does not support the 
mission, this Congress may well pull the rug out from under the 
President and the troops and try to force him to withdraw those forces 
if damage is done to the troops by these rogue elements in Bosnia.
  I am very concerned about this possibility. I know it is not the 
intention of the sponsors of the resolution. But, frankly, I do not see 
how we can have it both ways. I do not see how we can support the 
troops and say we are supporting them if we so clearly oppose their 
mission.
  The Dole-McCain resolution offers a very thoughtful and credible 
alternative. It is not, to put it succinctly, a statement of 
unconditional support for the decision the President has made, but it 
is support for the mission. As one of the witnesses before our Senate 
Armed Services Committee said last week, the question now is not 
whether the commitment to send American forces to be part of this 
international implementation force should have been made--that is 
history and is done--the question now is whether we will honor that 
commitment, and that is what the Dole-McCain resolution offers us the 
opportunity to do. Many of my colleagues have come to the floor in 
recent weeks and spoken of their concerns about the danger associated 
with the terrorist, rogue, unreconciled Bosnian Serb groups and what 
harm they may do to our forces. But why, then, would we want to do 
anything which will give them hope that they can sabotage this peace 
effort of which American forces are so critical a part? This is a time 
to close ranks. This is a time to go back to the great moments in our 
history--obviously through the world wars, but then afterward as well.

  We associate the ultimate in this with the Truman-Vandenberg 
relationship, but it has happened throughout the cold war and continued 
through Operation Desert Storm. To close ranks, to honor the commitment 
that is made, understanding, as the Dole-McCain resolution says 
clearly, that it is in the interests of the United States to preserve 
American credibility, that it is, in the words of this resolution, a 
strategic interest.
  In that regard, I was very honored to receive yesterday a letter, 
which I suspect many of my other colleagues received, from retired Gen. 
Andrew Goodpaster, a former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 
respected soldier, statesman, and patriot. General Goodpaster signed 
the letter on behalf of five other retired general flag officers: Gen. 
Michael Davison, Gen. Walter Kerwin, Gen. William Smith, Adm. Harry 
Train, and Lt. General William McCaffrey.
  Here is a sentence from that letter from General Goodpaster and the 
others:

       As you consider our country's involvement in Bosnia, we 
     encourage you to send a message to our Soldiers, Sailors, 
     Airmen and Marines wherever they may be . . . [and to all 
     others as well] that our country is giving them its full 
     backing . . .

  But listen to the final words of this sentence. Not just full 
backing--

       . . . its full backing in the accomplishment of their 
     assigned mission. We believe it is time to close ranks, 
     support our troops in the field, and concentrate on helping 
     them do their job in the best possible way.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a copy of this letter be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, for all these reasons I will vote 
against the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution, and I urge my colleagues to do 
so as well. Frankly, if people oppose this mission I think the choice 
is really to step up to the plate and vote for the first resolution 
from the House to cut off funding. But to oppose the mission and 
support the troops I respectfully do not think works. I do not think it 
goes together.
  Again, the Dole resolution speaks in thoughtful and supportive terms. 
The Congress, it says, ``unequivocally supports the men and women of 
our Armed Forces who are carrying out their missions in support of 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.'' I am quoting from the latest draft 
of that Dole-McCain resolution. And I continue:

       . . . and [the Congress] believes they [the troops] must be 
     given all necessary resources and support to carry out their 
     mission and ensure their security.

  It goes further, as I suggested earlier, to offer support for the 
President's commitment, to offer support for the mission based on the 
fulfillment of certain conditions in carrying out that mission. Again I 
say, the President has accepted those conditions. The resolution 
particularly includes language which expresses the high priority that 
so many us in this Chamber, led by the distinguished majority leader, 
have given to the issue of equipping and training the forces of the 
Bosnian Federation.
  I am pleased the President has now sent the majority a letter on this 
subject, dated December 10, in which he said:

       We believe establishing a stable military balance within 
     Bosnia by the time the implementation force leaves is 
     important to preventing the war from resuming and to 
     facilitate IFOR's departure. We have made a commitment to the 
     Bosnian Federation that we will coordinate an international 
     effort to ensure that the Federation receives the assistance 
     necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR 
     leaves.

  Mr. President, I have raised this question of equipping and training 
the Bosnian Government with the President personally and with members 
of the administration on a number of occasions, as have other Members 
of the Senate and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
particularly, and the assurances we have received are strong and clear 
and unequivocal. This administration, in supporting the Dayton peace 
treaty which finally led to the lifting of the immoral, illegal arms 
embargo, is going one step further. This administration is committed to 
leading the coordination of the international effort to arm, equip and 
train the Bosnian forces so that they will be able to protect their 
families, their cities, and their nation, and deter aggression by a 
stronger neighbor, which, as Secretary Perry said in marvelous words, 
was ``a causative factor'' of the war in Bosnia. The imbalance of 
forces was ``a causative factor,'' Secretary Perry's words, in the 
outbreak of war in Bosnia. We want to eliminate that causative factor.
  So, between the assurances we have received from the administration 
orally and in writing, including the letter the President has sent us 
and the requirement stated in the Dole-McCain resolution, I am 
confident that the Bosnian forces will be equipped and trained to their 
satisfaction.
  In fact, when Prime Minister Silajdzic visited the Capitol a week 
ago, I asked him specifically if he was satisfied with the commitment 
that was made to him and the other leaders of Bosnia at Dayton before 
they signed the peace treaty, and he said yes. In fact, he made it very 
clear that he, frankly, did not care whether it was United States 
forces who did the equipping and training or it was third parties, so 
long as his people were provided the means to defend themselves if the 
need should arise after the implementation force leaves Bosnia. And he 
said, deeply, he was confident that that would be the case thanks to 
American leadership and support.
  So we come to the time of voting today. We, in the Senate, have an 
opportunity with our vote on these three pending resolutions to tell 
our men and women in uniform, to tell the governments which have signed 
the Dayton accords and all that might want to do harm to our forces 
once they arrive in Bosnia, that we will stand behind our military and 
behind our President as he executes his foreign policy responsibilities 
in Bosnia, whether or not we think the original commitment was wise.
  We have the opportunity to avoid instability in Europe which twice in 
this century has drawn us into dreadful wars. We have the opportunity 
to send a message loud and clear to all the other ethnic groups in the 
former Soviet Union and elsewhere who have begun or are prepared to 
seek advantage over one another by force of arms, and, yes, by 
genocide. We have the opportunity here to take this NATO alliance and 
make it so strong that it protects the security of the world and 
relieves us, the United States, of our solitary burden for maintaining 
the peace of the world.
  Some have said that NATO, by its charter, is a defensive institution 
meant to defend against Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It was, and 
it did that task magnificently. 

[[Page S18465]]

  We are at a different point in history now. For all of us who said on 
this floor that the United States cannot be the policeman of the world, 
NATO is the way for us to make sure that the United States is not the 
policeman of the world. Just as we turned to our allies in Europe to 
help us in Operation Desert Storm, and they responded by joining us 
heroically, today they turn to us to ask us to help them implement this 
peace in Bosnia. If we say no, what will they say to us the next time 
we turn to them and ask for help? But if we say yes, as we have, we 
will see NATO loom large in Europe and beyond as a force for stability 
and peace. It has already begun. For the first time in three decades 
the French are sitting in the same room at the same table, planning and 
implementing a NATO military operation.
  So, let us not let this opportunity slip from our fingers. Let us 
take the long view. Let us understand that sometimes we are called upon 
to make a decision that is not popular with our friends and neighbors 
at home. Let us understand that foreign policy cannot and should not be 
made on the basis of public opinion polls, but must be made on the 
basis of each of our sincere calculations of America's national 
interests and national security needs.
  Let us stand together to open ``the door of future to the Bosnian 
children'' as Zlata Filipovic, the young Bosnian girl whose diary of 
life in Sarajevo so moved the world. As Bette Bao Lord, chair of 
Freedom House has said in an open letter: ``As our youth and our 
compatriots embark on this mission of peace, let them hear but one 
voice--that of America, a country of conscience and constancy, a 
country whose most enduring export is hope.''
  I say to my colleagues, let us stand together and approve the Dole-
McCain resolution.

                               Exhibit 1


                                               Washington, DC,

                                                December 12, 1995.
     Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lieberman: As American military forces are 
     being prepared for commitment in Bosnia, we believe it is 
     essential that they go with a clear understanding that they 
     are supported by their country--that is, by the whole 
     American people--in their difficult and dangerous assignment.
       Our military forces serving in Bosnia will be under 
     American command, acting in concert with military forces from 
     NATO and other nations that participate in the military 
     implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. The mission 
     statement and the NATO chain of command make it clear that 
     the military forces are not to be drawn into mission-creep 
     nation-building but are to be used for tasks military in 
     nature, and will not be subjected to attempts at micro-
     management from afar, or to ``dual-key'' aberrations.
       As you consider our country's involvement in Bosnia, we 
     encourage you to send a message to our Soldiers, Sailors, 
     Airmen and Marines wherever they may be (and to all others as 
     well) that our country is giving them its full backing in the 
     accomplishment of their assigned mission. We believe it is 
     time to close ranks, support our troops in the field, and 
     concentrate on helping them do their job in the best possible 
     way.
       On behalf of the retired general and flag officers listed 
     below,
           Sincerely,
     Michael S. Davison,
       General, U.S. Army (Ret.).
     Andrew J. Goodpaster,
       General, U.S. Army (Ret.).
     Walter T. Kerwin,
       General, U.S. Army (Ret.).
     William J. McCaffrey,
       Lt. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.).
     William Y. Smith,
       General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.).
     Harry D. Train,
       Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.).

  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. ROTH. Yes. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, for a point of clarification, the Senator 
from Connecticut was accurate when he talked about the three 
resolutions, or votes that we will be having today. But he did not 
mention the order that they will be in. At 12:30 today we will be 
voting on H.R. 2606, which is the Hefley bill that was passed in the 
House of Representatives.
  I want to suggest that I have quite a lengthy statement that I wanted 
to make. But I will withhold that statement, and only make a comment on 
2606 which will be coming up in 40 minutes from now.
  I will read this very briefly. It merely says ``prohibits the use of 
Department of Defense funds for deployment on the grounds of United 
States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part 
of the peacekeeping operation.''
  So that is clearly what the Constitution gave the power to Congress 
to do.
  When the Senator from Connecticut characterized the resolution, I 
think it must be a little inaccurate to say how enthusiastic they are. 
I, finally, 2 minutes ago, received a copy of this. I did not have it 
before. It states ``notwithstanding reservations expressed about 
President Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.''
  That is kind of the preamble. So it is does not sound like to me what 
I would interpret as enthusiastic.
  Last, Senator Feingold so accurately described what our 
constitutional rights were in this body, and what the President's were. 
He quoted Louis Fisher, who I think we all consider to be a foremost 
authority on the Constitution, wherein he said:

       The framers knew that the British King could use military 
     force against other countries without legislative 
     involvement. They gave to Congress the responsibility for 
     deciding matters of war and peace. The President, as 
     Commander in Chief, was left with the power to ``repeal 
     sudden attack.''

  In fact, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this be printed 
in the Record, this article by Louis Fisher.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Dec. 2, 1995]

                       What Power to Send Troops?

                           (By Louis Fisher)

       Washington.--There seems to be an impression that President 
     Clinton has constitutional authority to send troops to the 
     Balkans without first obtaining approval or authority from 
     Congress. But the case for Presidential power is not so open 
     and shut.
       The Framers knew that the British king could use military 
     force against other countries without legislative 
     involvement. They gave to Congress the responsibility for 
     deciding matters of war and peace. The President, as 
     Commander in Chief, was left with the power to ``repel sudden 
     attacks.'' He has no general power to initiate military 
     action. This principle was an axiom of republican government.
       In 1787, James Wilson said the checks-and-balances system 
     ``will not hurry us into war'' and that ``it is calculated to 
     guard against it.'' He said: ``It will not be in the power of 
     a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such 
     distress.''
       The Framers deliberately separated the powers of the purse 
     and sword. To Madison, in 1793, those who were to ``conduct a 
     war'' could not be safe judges on whether to start one.
       NATO does not authorize offensive actions or general 
     peacekeeping activities. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 
     was a defensive pact, intended to contain the Soviet Union. 
     The treaty's parties were ``resolved to unite their efforts 
     for collective defense'' and ``resist armed attack.'' None of 
     these conditions exists in Bosnia.
       To argue that NATO authorizes Mr. Clinton to act as he 
     likes is to argue that the President and the Senate, through 
     the treaty process, can eliminate the House's war power. 
     Treaties do not amend the Constitution. One argument is that 
     Mr. Clinton sponsored the talks, put our prestige at risk and 
     thereby committed us to using force. Are constitutional and 
     legislative processes skirted so easily?
       In 1969, after the Vietnam buildup, the Senate passed a 
     resolution challenging the President's right to commit the 
     nation without first obtaining Congressional approval. Passed 
     with strong bipartisan backing, it states that whenever our 
     forces are used on foreign territory, or there is a promise 
     to assist a country by using our military, such commitments 
     result ``only from affirmative action taken by the executive 
     and legislative branches.'' This resolution has no legal 
     effect, but it articulates a constitutional principle 
     violated by President Lyndon B. Johnson and now threatened by 
     President Clinton.
       It might be argued that the ``war power'' is not involved 
     because Mr. Clinton will use American forces for peace, not 
     war. ``America's role will not be about fighting a war,'' he 
     said. He said he refused ``to send American troops to fight a 
     war in Bosnia,'' and ``I believe we must help to secure the 
     Bosnian peace.''
       Mr. Clinton has already authorized air strikes against the 
     Serbs. He now intends to send ground troops. By making an 
     ``overwhelming show of force,'' he says, ``American troops 
     will lessen the need to use 

[[Page S18466]]
     force.'' Note the word ``lessen.'' Anyone who takes on our troops, he 
     said, ``will suffer the consequences.''
       Whenever the President acts unilaterally in using military 
     force against another nation, the constitutional rights of 
     Congress and the people are undermined.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Connecticut 
that, if you really do in your heart oppose the deployment of troops 
over there in that hostile area, this is the strongest message that we 
can send; that is, voting in favor of H.R. 2606 at 12:30 today.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Frederic S. 
Baron, a Pearson Fellow, and Maureen Fino, an Industry Fellow, be 
permitted floor privileges for the duration of the debate on the 
resolution on Bosnia.
  I do that on behalf of my distinguished colleague from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, life can only be understood backward; but it 
must be lived forward. As such, we often find ourselves forced to 
respond to the consequences of decisions and even indecisions that were 
and were not made at the most appropriate moment in time.
  As a Nation, we have no oracle--only history--and the wisdom of God 
has given us to govern our affairs and to support our democratic ideal 
among sovereigns and allies.
  Often we overlook the majesty of our role--our responsibility--that 
is, until a man of Shimon Peres' standing reminds us that our Nation is 
``a commitment to values before an expression of might * * *'' That our 
strength has saved the world from ``Nazi tyranny, Japanese militarism, 
and the Communist challenge.'' That we have ``enabled many nations to 
save their democracies even as [we] strive now to assist many nations 
to free themselves from their nondemocratic past.''
  This, Mr. President, is our legacy. And I am grateful to Prime 
Minister Peres for reminding us of who we are and what--since our 
divinely-appointed founding--has been our mission: freedom for us and 
self-determination for our fellow man.
  Certainly, there are many ways to pursue this mission. We cannot be 
the world's policeman; nor should we. We must cherish the strength of 
America, and that means using it wisely, sparingly--certainly with some 
sacrifice--but never with imprudence, undue risk, and wanton disregard 
for our best interests.
  The territorial aggression and horrific atrocities in the Balkans 
bring us to the floor today. The death and crimes committed in the 
former Yugoslavia have bruised our collective spirit, especially as the 
international community has been unable to resolve the conflict and 
establish reconciliation and lasting peace.
  There was a time when, perhaps, America's resolved leadership could 
have minimized and even resolved the crisis by lifting the arms embargo 
against the Bosnians--by allowing them to defend themselves against the 
well-armed Serb aggressors.
  At the same time we could have provided tactical and strategic air 
support to the Bosnian forces.
  But President Clinton chose another road, one that brings us to the 
floor today. Life can only be understood backward; but it must be lived 
forward. Today we are forced to respond to the consequences of the 
President's decisions and indecisions, and history must be our guide.
  The outcome here will not only have an influence on the security and 
lives of thousands of young American men and women, but it will affect 
us as a society, our leadership among allies, and the future of 
Europe--particularly the war-torn region known as the Balkans.
  It is a difficult debate, one that must be entered thoughtfully, 
solemnly, and with the object of finding solutions rather than playing 
politics. It would be tempting to fill the air with ``what ifs'' and 
``if onlys,'' but we are beyond that point.
  President Clinton has committed U.S. ground forces. He has done this 
as part of a peace process whose success will largely depend upon how 
we, the Congress, react--upon our determination and demonstration of 
support for the young American men and women who are even now moving 
into that region.
  If we appear divided, we risk sending a message to those who would 
thwart the peace process that if they only hold out long enough support 
for our troops will weaken. This is not a risk that I am willing to 
take.
  Much of the support leaving our shores is leaving from Dover Air 
Force Base. I have met with many of these young men and women; I know 
their concerns; I know their courage. And I know that every individual 
being sent into the Balkans is just like them. And I will not trifle 
with their security, with their future, and with the future of their 
families, their children.
  When they wear our uniform in Bosnia I want them to know that they 
have my unqualified support.
  I want them to know that they are there for a reason, they are on a 
mission--a mission with a purpose that was outlined so eloquently by 
Prime Minister Peres, to help this war-torn land free itself from its 
undemocratic past.
  We cannot avoid our leadership, nor can we dismiss our legacy. 
Certainly, President Clinton could have embraced our earlier proposal 
and taken America down another road; but he did not. And the fact is, 
we do have an interest in seeing that peace is maintained in this 
region.
  To date, more than a quarter million men, women, and children have 
been killed--many in the most horrible and atrocious manner. Over 2 
million have been displaced and forced to flee. We have proof of mass 
executions, rapes, and other unspeakable crimes. Our legacy of support 
for human rights abhors these conditions.
  America has gone to Europe to advance our ideals in two world wars. 
We have spent untold resources and dedicated countless lives to winning 
the cold war for the same reason--to advance the principles of freedom, 
democracy and self-determination. Perhaps the time has come to finish 
the task, to take a step toward bolting down our successes and see that 
the foundation for a peaceful European future is strong and sure.
  This is not inconsistent with our responsibilities as a member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  In fact, this peace-keeping mission will be the largest NATO mission 
in its history and the first since the end of the cold war. An 
unwillingness on the part of America at this point could do irreparable 
damage to the Transatlantic Partnership and its central institution, 
the North Atlantic Alliance.
  Failure to follow-through on the commitment President Clinton has 
made would also undermine our position as a world leader. Our allies 
must know that they can depend on us.
  This is critically important, because if we fail to keep the peace in 
the Balkans it is possible that the conflict may well spill beyond the 
borders and into NATO territory. Under those circumstances we would not 
be sending our young men and women to strengthen the peace, but to 
prosecute a war. I would rather have them there to strengthen the 
peace.
  Mr. President, life can only be understood backward; but it must be 
lived forward. Perhaps President Clinton should have heeded our earlier 
counsel.
  I would rather see peace in the Balkans and negotiations based on 
parity of strength, rather than on the presence of our ground troops.
  I would rather see our involvement limited to strategic and tactical 
air and sea support. But those are not options, not anymore. When 
President Clinton picked up one end of the stick, he picked up the 
other. Now we must give the troops he has committed to the Balkans our 
full support.
  An absolute requirement for success is to have Congress and the 
Nation united over the mission now under way. We must have bipartisan 
support.
  This is why I have been so impressed by Senator Dole's and Senator 
McCain's role in the negotiations between Congress and the executive 
branch.
  Through their statesmanship, they have offered an approach that 
captures our commitment to protect and support American troops deployed 
to the Balkan and that defines the core requisites to the success of 
the peace process.

[[Page S18467]]

  Supporting the Dole-McCain endeavor is the appropriate response to 
our responsibilities as a world leader and as member of NATO. The most 
useful contribution this body can make to the peace process is to help 
ensure that America's role in the peace process will be guided by 
clearly defined objectives and strategies. In doing so, we would be 
living up to our responsibilities to support the American men and women 
assigned to this mission of peace and to the interests of America in 
post-cold-war Europe.
  Mr. President, I yield back the floor.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, first may I congratulate the Senator 
from Delaware on a wonderfully cogent and compelling statement, with 
that marvelous phrase of Kierkegaard's that ``life can only be 
understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.'' I would like to 
use that as the theme for my remarks. We are responding today to what 
we have learned from the past. What we have learned about the 
importance of law and of collective security.
  It is for that reason, Mr. President, that I rise in support of the 
resolution developed by the majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, and 
Senator McCain. At the appropriate time I would ask, as I am sure many 
others will, to be a cosponsor.
  This morning's debate has been, as the Senator from Connecticut 
suggested, a defining day in the history of the Senate. I think not 
least because of the quality of remarks not just of the Senator from 
Delaware, but the Senator from Idaho, although he is, perhaps, on the 
opposite side of the issue. He spoke of the arms embargo imposed on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as being illegal, and indeed it was illegal, and 
it is illegal under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides for 
the inherent right of collective and individual self-defense. This is a 
provision Senator Vandenberg, at the San Francisco conference, insisted 
be in the U.N. Charter, so that there would not be a conflict with the 
Rio Treaty for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. But that is 
singularly an American provision.
  Then the Senator from Connecticut spoke of the way sanctions bit in 
Serbia. This has been the first ever successful use of sanctions in the 
course of enforcing international law after a century of advocacy of 
such measures by groups looking to a world of law, a world of 
international law, and consequently of a measure of order.
  The failure of sanctions after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, now 
Ethiopia, discredited the idea so severely it has rarely been 
attempted. It has worked somewhat in Iraq, let us grant, but it has not 
brought a regime to the peace table. Sanctions bit in Yugoslavia.
  We have before us a resolution which begins:

       Whereas beginning on February 24, 1993, President Clinton 
     committed the United States to participate in implementing a 
     peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina without prior 
     consultation with Congress;
       Whereas the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
     unjustly denied the means to defend itself through the 
     imposition of a United Nations arms embargo;

  And now the third clause. I do not know that there has been such a 
statement on this floor in half a century. Since, that is, 1945, when 
the U.N. Charter came to the Senate under bipartisan sponsorship. The 
clause reads:

       Whereas the United Nations Charter restates ``the inherent 
     right of individual and collective self-defense,'' a right 
     denied the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose 
     population has further suffered egregious violations of the 
     international law of war including ethnic cleansing by 
     Serbian aggressors, and the Convention on Prevention and 
     Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which the United 
     States Senate gave its advice and consent in 1986.

  This is a rousing statement of the centrality of law to the actions 
that the United States, the NATO alliance, and the extraordinary 
assembly of other countries, some 29 in all, are now undertaking.
  We sometimes forget how central international law has been to our 
understanding of what would follow World War II. The Genocide 
Convention, as it is called in shorthand, and which is specifically 
referred to in the Dole-McCain resolution, was in effect proposed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1948, when it 
declared that ``genocide is a crime under international law.''
  To make it a crime required a treaty. In time a treaty was drafted, 
and in time ratified by the United States. As a treaty it is the 
supreme law of the land. This land, Mr. President.
  The resolution also refers to the ``egregious violations of the 
international law of war.'' By that, sir, we refer to the Geneva 
Conventions, which were agreed to in the city of Geneva in 1949. A 
little history here. The Nuremberg tribunals, and the equivalent in 
Asia that followed World War II, were arguably extralegal, in that 
individuals arguably were not subjects of international law at that 
time for most of the issues that were involved in those trials. To 
resolve any question the Allied Powers determined to remove any shadow 
of doubt by adopting treaties to establish that the laws of war apply 
to individuals.
  Four treaties were drawn up concerning the treatment of particular 
classes of vulnerable persons during war. These nearly universally 
accepted treaties are known as the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 
conventions make it illegal to target civilians as the objects of 
military operations. Each of the four conventions has a common Article 
3, which states:

       In the case of armed conflict, not of an international 
     character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
     Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
     bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
       (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
     including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
     arms . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
     without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
     religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
     criteria.

  Note ``sex,'' Mr. President.

       To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
     prohibited at any time and any place whatsoever with respect 
     to the above-mentioned persons:
       In the case of armed conflict not of an international 
     character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
     Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
     bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
       (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
     including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
     arms. . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
     without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
     religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
     criteria.
       To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
     prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
     respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life 
     and person, in particular merder of all kinds, mutilation, 
     cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) 
     outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
     degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the 
     carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
     procounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
     the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
     by civilized peoples.

  It is under that common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions that the 
war crimes tribunal has been convened in the Hague and indictments have 
been handed down. The Dole-McCain resolution specifically provides that 
the President will regularly report to the Congress on the progress of 
the tribunal.
  Mr. President, the United States is in the process of assembling the 
most formidable and broadly-based collective effort to maintain 
international peace and security the world has ever known. This 
represents a triumph of an American position concerning the law of 
nations which goes back to the beginning of the Republic, a position 
that has defined American policy for much of this century, at least 
until mid-century. But which until this moment, with this resolution, a 
tradition that has been singularly absent from statements about the 
Dayton agreement by the President, the Secretary of State or the 
administration generally.
  They have spoken about moral imperatives, which no doubt exist, but 
there is nothing in the Constitution that speaks of moral imperatives. 
The Constitution says, ``The Congress shall have Power * * * To define 
and punish * * * Offenses against the Law of Nations.'' It says 
``Treaties * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land. And in a 
lifetime of searching through article II, I have never found any real 
duty assigned to the President of the United 

[[Page S18468]]
States other than that ``he shall take Care that the Laws are 
faithfully executed.'' We are now saying that he is doing this.
  This goes back a very long way. S. 1, the first bill introduced in 
the first session of the first Congress of the United States in 1789, 
written if I may say, by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, who in 1796 
would be appointed Chief Justice of the United States, was titled ``An 
Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States.'' It was the 
20th public law enacted. Among other things, the legislation provided 
that--

       . . . the district courts shall have . . . cognizance . . . 
     of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in 
     violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
     States.
       An alien can sue in U.S. court for a tort violation of the 
     law of nations or a treaty of the United States which 
     occurred outside our territory.

  That was 206 years ago. Eight weeks ago the U.S. Court of Appeals of 
the Second Circuit unanimously held that under that statute the leader 
of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic could indeed be sued in the 
Southern District of New York for offenses against the law of nations 
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The suit was brought before 
Karadzic was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. It is not likely that Mr. Karadzic 
will appear soon in Foley Square. Yet in the unanimous ruling, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, said, yes, indeed, our laws do 
provide for such actions.
  That spirit infused our early Republic. We thought of it as the basis 
of our legitimacy. When Chancellor Kent published his ``Commentaries on 
American Law,'' lectures given at Columbia University, his first 
lecture in his first volume was entitled ``Of the Law of Nations.'' 
That tradition goes back to the Constitution itself which gives 
Congress the power ``To define and punish Offenses against the Law of 
Nations.''
  At the beginning of this century, there was a strong movement, the 
peace movement so-called, consisting of those who hoped that law could 
be used as a device for preventing war altogether. George Kennan has 
described this as follows:

       At the outset of the present century, there emerged in the 
     United States, England and other parts of northern Europe, a 
     vigorous movement for the strengthening and consolidation of 
     world peace, primarily by the development of new legal codes 
     of international behavior.

  This is from an introduction by Ambassador Kennan to a reprinted 
volume of a report on the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 which was sponsored 
by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Elihu Root, then a 
U.S. Senator from New York, was, as I recall, chairman. I might say, 
when the Carnegie endowment was established in 1910, such was the 
degree of optimism in the world that the bequest provided the moneys be 
used for further objectives once ``the establishment of universal peace 
is attained.''
  Ambassador Kennan is, as always, generous. In retrospect, the peace 
movement, he writes, might seem ``unrealistic, naive, and pathetic. But 
they were * * * profoundly prophetic and well justified in the concerns 
they reflected.'' You had no more to see the First World War than to 
realize that.
  Then came Woodrow Wilson's effort to create an international 
organization, the League of Nations, and the failed effort on the 
Senate floor to enact it. A failure that was far more the President's 
fault than the Senate's fault. He could have had the Treaty of 
Versailles if he made a few concessions, which were not of any 
consequence. But it failed.
  We withdrew from the world. The world brought us back in with the 
Second World War. Then the U.N. Charter was signed and then the great 
effort began to see that law became the arbiter of relations between 
States.
  That was reflected not least in the Genocide Convention, and in the 
Geneva Conventions, reflecting such deep convictions and beliefs on our 
part.
  But there followed a time when, among many liberals, international 
law began to be seen as a set of doctrines that always got you into 
trouble, that said you had to do this, you had to do that in distant 
places of which, as the phrase goes, ``we know little.''
  Next, in a conservative period that followed, for quite different 
reasons, the same rejection of law occurred. International law in the 
eighties came to be seen as a system of negative restraint saying what 
cannot be done. So damn the treaty: Mine the harbors.
  Those are inadequate understandings both of what our laws are and 
what our interests are. We have a profound interest in a world with a 
measure of order, a measure of predictability, and a capacity to 
enforce it in some measure at least. As do others. Twenty-nine nations 
are going to join us in this effort, at last count. Forty-two nations 
met in London to discuss reestablishment of a civil society in the 
region.
  So, Mr. President, I know my colleague from Nebraska would like to 
say a word, and that a vote is scheduled at 12:30. May I simply welcome 
this resolution for its ringing reaffirmation of a central tradition in 
American statecraft, American diplomacy, American military operations: 
The centrality of law, the legality of what we are doing and the 
importance of the fact that we are doing it in a collective mode, 
anticipated by the U.N. Charter.
  I was once our Representative to the United Nations. I once 
represented the United States as the President of the Security Council. 
I did not know I would live to see such a hopeful hour as this.
  None of us knows how much resistance the implementation force will 
face. There will surely be losses. I made my way into Sarajevo 3 years 
ago this Thanksgiving and I saw the dangers the French, Egyptian, and 
Ukrainian forces faced, along with the air crews of a dozen nations. 
And that, in theory, was a peace-keeping exercise. This is much more. 
We have settled for the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however 
little we may like the term. With half the population of that state 
either dead or displaced in 4 years of war imposed on it from the 
outside, this is surely something.
  Peace may come, in the sense of the absence of war. But stability is 
surely a long way off. Even so we have at length recognized the 
necessity to address the legal obligations of the parties involved, 
which include all members of the United Nations by treaty definition. 
We will do what can be done, and do it according to law. That has the 
potential for rescuing us from the shame of having done so little until 
now.
  I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Nebraska has 
been waiting, and I am not going to take long because I want him to 
have his chance. But I do want to take this time to respond to the 
Senator from Connecticut who said he did not understand how someone can 
say they support the troops but do not support the mission. I just want 
to say, I think it is very easy to say you do support the troops but 
you do not support the mission. I think we have sent troops into harm's 
way in this country when we should not have done it.
  No one would ever not support the people who are giving their lives, 
putting their lives on the line to protect our freedom.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator from Texas yield? The two leaders are on 
the floor. I would like to, while they are here, find out, since 
Senator Exon and I have been waiting most of the morning, if the time 
can be extended to speak for a few minutes.
  Mrs. BOXER. If the Senator can add the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Texas yield?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I would like to finish my statement, unless the 
majority leader is seeking recognition.
  Mr. REID. I just ask, if the Senator will withhold for a second.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has the floor.
  Mr. REID. Can I direct a question to the majority leader?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Certainly.
  Mr. REID. The majority leader and minority leader are now on the 
floor. I know they have been to the service for Reverend Halverson. But 
we have been on the floor most of the morning, all four of us, waiting 
to speak, and I wonder if there is a way for a limited period of time. 
I only need a few minutes. Senator Exon said he needed a short 

[[Page S18469]]
time. I do not know how much time the Senator from California needs.

  Mrs. BOXER. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. DOLE. I do not have a problem with that, unless somebody has 
already made plans on voting at 12:30 and then doing something else off 
the Hill on either side.
  Mr. DASCHLE. If the majority leader will yield, does this pertain to 
the pending amendment, or is it to the larger issue of Bosnia?
  Mr. REID. I think, to be candid with the two leaders, I can speak 
later. It is inconvenient, but it is on the issue and I could speak 
later.
  Mr. DASCHLE. This may not work----
  Mr. DOLE. The vote is for 20 minutes.
  Mr. DASCHLE. We can get unanimous consent that those Senators who are 
here be recognized immediately following the vote, if that will 
accommodate our Senators. I think it would be better to try to keep the 
schedule, if we can.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Reserving the right to object, let me just say that 
Senator Frist also should be put in that group, and I will not object. 
He has been here all morning. He finally left. I told him that I would 
protect his rights. I have no objection to the people who have been 
waiting, but I think we should add Senator Frist and Senator Specter, 
who is also on his way in, for 15 minutes.
  Mr. DOLE. I do not know which order over here, but whatever the 
order----
  Mr. DASCHLE. Senator Exon, Senator Reid, Senator Boxer and then 
Senator Bob Kerrey I am told on our side were here. Senator Moynihan 
spoke.
  Mr. DOLE. And then Senator Specter.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. For 15 minutes and Senator Frist and Senator 
Domenici.
  Mr. DOLE. Senators Specter, Frist, and Domenici.
  Mr. EXON. If the majority leader will yield for a question to try and 
straighten this matter out. The vote is scheduled at 12:30. Is there a 
time scheduled for the second vote?
  Mr. DOLE. Not yet.
  Mr. EXON. Several of us have been waiting a long, long time. Maybe we 
can get some agreement so I can keep my schedule. Nobody can keep 
schedules these days because of what is going on. If I could be 
recognized following the vote for 12 minutes, I would be glad to 
cooperate.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the 
next vote the Senator from Nebraska be recognized first, the Senator 
from Tennessee next, the Senator from Nevada next, the Senator from 
Pennsylvania, and the Senator from California be recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. And we have two additional Senators. I would hope that 
we can alternate back and forth if we have additional Republicans. But 
our order would be as Senator Reid has suggested.
  Mr. REID. The Senator from Nebraska needs 15 minutes. I need 12 
minutes. Two Senators that are Republicans need 15 minutes each.
  Mr. DOLE. There are no time limits. We will just get a sequence. The 
only time limit is that the President would like to have us complete 
action on these by 6 or 7 o'clock so they can go to the House and they 
can be addressed there, if not tonight, tomorrow, shortly after they 
sign the peace treaty in Paris. So we are trying to accommodate the 
administration here.
  Mr. REID. I ask, Mr. President, that the unanimous-consent request be 
granted.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Reserving the right to object, I want to make sure it 
goes back and forth, a Republican and a Democrat.
  Mr. DOLE. Yes, it will.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair believes the following unanimous-
consent request has been made: After the vote, to recognize first, 
Senator Exon, the Senator from Nebraska; second, Senator Frist, the 
Senator from Tennessee; third, Senator Reid, the Senator from Nevada; 
fourth, Senator Specter, the Senator from Pennsylvania; fifth, Senator 
Boxer, the Senator from California; sixth, Senator Domenici, the 
Senator from New Mexico; seventh, Senator Kerrey, the Senator from 
Nebraska.
  Are there any additions?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest another Republican Senator and 
then Senator Robb on our side. So we would hold open the slot for a 
Republican Senator, to be announced at a later time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.

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