[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 197 (Tuesday, December 12, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2337]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E2337]]


             DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

                                 ______


                           HON. NEWT GINGRICH

                               of georgia

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, December 12, 1995

  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, as we consider the President's decision to 
deploy United States military forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I hope 
that my colleagues take a moment to read the following editorials. Now 
is the time to ask some very hard questions about the President's 
policy, and I believe that these points of view are instructive in 
reminding us of the difficulty of this issue.

                [From the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1995]

                 Think Haiti and Be Realistic on Bosnia

                        (By Thomas L. Friedman)

       Washington.--Just a couple of months ago when you asked 
     Administration officials exactly how the Bosnia peacekeeping 
     operation would unfold, they would answer: ``Think Haiti''--
     we go in big, stablize the situation on the ground, bring in 
     civilian reconstruction teams, hold elections and we're out 
     of there in a year.
       Well think again, Haiti is no longer being touted as the 
     model for Bosnia, because the U.S.-led effort to restore 
     democracy in Haiti is deteriorating. As we go into Bosnia we 
     should still ``Think Haiti''--but as a cautionary tale about 
     the limits of American power to remake a country. The U.S. 
     military accomplished its objectives in Haiti--busting the 
     old regime and restoring basic security. But the political, 
     economic and police objectives, which accompanied that 
     military mission, are all in jeopardy today.
       American officials were convinced when they restored 
     Haiti's President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power that he 
     really had abandoned his populist, radical impluses. But 
     several weeks ago he suggested that he would not give up 
     power after elections for a new President on Dec. 17. Then he 
     told U.S. officials he would. Then he told his followers: If 
     you want three more years I will not turn my back on you.'' 
     Thursday, he said he really, really will step down. In the 
     meantime, though, the other candidates have been afraid to 
     campaign, because it seemed Mr. Aristide might stay on, and 
     the main opposition parties were already boycotting because 
     of complaints that the election process is not impartial.
       U.S. officials always said in Haiti that prosperity would 
     be the ultimate peacekeeper. But foreign investors have 
     been reluctant to come in and President Aristide has 
     hesitated to institute the privatization reforms demanded 
     by the I.M.F., so his Government has not received the $125 
     million in foreign aid for this fiscal year, which is half 
     its budget. The number of boat people fleeing Haiti for 
     Florida is again on the rise.
       The military plan in Haiti was for the U.S.-U.N. 
     peacekeepers to hand over control to a newly created, 
     uncorrupted Haitian police force on Feb. 29. Some of those 
     new police have been trained, and put through U.S. human 
     rights courses. Others have not. On Thanksgiving Day one of 
     these new policemen went on a shooting spree that triggered 
     massive rioting in Haiti's Cite Soleil slum. Few police have 
     dared venture there since.
       ``It is obvious that the Administration would like to 
     tiptoe away from Haiti, declaring it a success, but unless 
     our objectives in the areas of elections, police and 
     economics are more fully achieved, the effort of the 
     international community could easily unravel,'' said Robert 
     Pastor, President Carter's adviser on Haiti during Mr. 
     Carter's mediation there. ``Without a concerted effort to 
     bring the opposition into the presidential elections, the 
     outcome will not be stable or legitimate.''
       The ultimate lesson of Haiti is not that we should stay out 
     of Bosnia. President Clinton did the right thing in Haiti--
     trying to restore democracy. Haiti is a better, more secure 
     place today because of that. No, the real lesson of Haiti is 
     a humility. Haiti reminds us that with enough troops and 
     money, we can make some difference for the better. But even 
     that limited improvement is easily eroded or overwhelmed by 
     the habits of generations, unless some foreign peacekeepers, 
     international organizations and aid workers are prepared to 
     stay on the job for a long, long time. Bosnia will be no 
     different.
       I phoned Lakhdar Brahimi, who heads U.N. operations in 
     Haiti, and asked him what he's learned there that might be of 
     use in Bosnia. He captured neatly the humbling, ambiguous 
     reality of trying to rebuild failed states. He said: ``Look, 
     Haiti is a country with 200 years of horrible history. It 
     would be totally naive to think you can put it right with 
     20,000 troops in a year. With operations like Haiti [and 
     Bosnia], the international community is embarking on 
     something completely new for itself, and for which it does 
     not yet have all the skills. It isn't even sure what it wants 
     and certainly doesn't have all the money it needs to do it. 
     So we take a country by the hand and accompany it a little 
     bit, while it tries to stand on its own two feet. We don't do 
     it perfectly, but it's still useful, even if it doesn't 
     create paradise. But no one should kid themselves. It's a 
     constant uphill struggle.''
                                                                    ____


             [From the Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 3, 1995]

                          A Page From History

                          (By Bradford Smith)

       American troops are preparing to impose a peace settlement 
     in Bosnia that appears to have arisen largely from the 
     fatigue of the negotiators in Dayton. History and the posture 
     of the Serbs in Sarajevo make it doubtful that this latest 
     agreement will lead to ``peace in our time.'' But how much 
     history can we expect the negotiators to remember after 
     pulling an all-nighter?
       Bosnians nearly always have played the pawn in the 
     political games in the Balkans. When was Bosnia last an 
     independent state? For that, we have to look back to the 14th 
     century. Even then, Bosnia was a divided country. In the 
     north, the Kotroman family held sway. In the south, the Subic 
     family ruled. In 1305, the Subic family emerged as the 
     dominant power, but Stjepan Kotromanic seized control with a 
     little help from Hungary--the local ``superpower''--and the 
     Serbs. The modern outlines of Bosnia resulted from his 
     conquests.
       After Kotromanic's death in 1353, Bosnia fell apart, as 
     local nobles attempted to gain autonomy. Several provinces 
     broke away from the Bosnian state, again with Hungarian 
     assistance. The centers of discontent were the region around 
     Banja Luka and Herzegovina. The political divisions of Bosnia 
     then conformed to the current lines of conflict.
       One thing seems clear: Foreign intervention has been more 
     likely to produce disorder than concord. Hungarian 
     involvement consistently prevented the restoration of 
     equilibrium. This was also true in the 1920s, when Comintern 
     and the Italian Fascists exploited the ethnic tensions 
     between Croats and Serbs, leading to chaos, terrorism and 
     assassination.
       Given that so many leaders have vowed not to respect the 
     Dayton peace agreement, should we expect a new show of force 
     to convince them otherwise? Is there any lack of foreign 
     interest groups that could further their own agenda by giving 
     aid and comfort to the Serbs?
       The rulers of 14th-century Hungary always claimed that they 
     were intervening in Bosnia to support oppressed Catholics 
     from Bosnian heretics. Likewise, our intervention is 
     justified by the ideals of ``democracy'' and ``self-
     determination.''
       Bill Clinton is, in fact, merely continuing the policies of 
     his two predecessors, who were trying to undo the legacy of 
     the Cold War. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev long ago 
     stated that as the Soviets supported ``wars of national 
     liberation,'' the United States would be forced to support 
     dictators, on the pretext that they were anti-communist.
       The result of that policy was our support for a host of 
     petty tyrants, all of whom eventually caused us much 
     embarrassment. And ultimately we lost in Iran, Nicaragua, 
     Vietnam and nearly everywhere else we got involved. But with 
     Ronald Reagan a turn began when U.S. military force was used 
     to support ``freedom fighters.''
       The invasion of Grenada was our first attempt to ``impose'' 
     democracy, and the success of that little engagement led to 
     other glorious wars. An episode in Panama and the specter of 
     Manuel Noriega before the Inquisitor bailed out the War on 
     Drugs, preparing Americans for a descent on the Middle East 
     to liberate the oil barons of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. 
     Soon we had Bob Hope shows and all those things we associated 
     with good wars.
       Clinton is merely trying to keep up the pace. 
     Unfortunately, the situation in Bosnia is too ambiguous to 
     provide the basis for a Crusade. Additional U.S. involvement 
     is more likely to upset the balance of power even further. 
     Unless the new Bosnian state can develop its own internal 
     equilibrium, it cannot survive.
       The United States must play a role in the negotiating 
     process, but Clinton could find better venues for a military 
     action to redeem his political career.
       How about the Bahamas?

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