[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 196 (Monday, December 11, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18313-S18315]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CODEL STEVENS BOSNIA REPORT

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, last month the distinguished senior Senator 
from Alaska, Senator Stevens, led a delegation of our colleagues--
Senators Inouye, Glenn, Bingaman, Hutchison, Snowe, and Thomas--to 
Europe to carefully evaluate the plans for a possible NATO mission to 
the former Yugoslavia. The result of their travels to Brussels, 
Sarajevo, and Zagreb are contained in a report, for which I ask 
unanimous consent to be printed in the Record.
  This report addresses the four central questions of the Bosnian NATO 
mission--how soon, how many, how long, and how much. As for cost, 
officials admitted that it will mount to $2.0 billion--not including 
the costs of the no-fly zone or enforcing the naval embargo in the 
Adriatic. With respect to how long, that remains a question that this 
Chamber will have to address as no one presented the codel with an 
effective exit strategy for NATO forces.
  In closing, Mr. President, I would like to thank the Members and 
staff of codel Stevens. Their fine work on a timely and important 
report will help further illuminate our upcoming debate on Bosnia.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, November 27, 1995.
     Hon. Robert Dole,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Bob: Last month, you authorized myself and Senators 
     Hutchison, Snowe and Thomas to travel to NATO, Bosnia and 
     Croatia to evaluate plans for a possible NATO mission to the 
     former Yugoslavia.
       The seven Senators who participated in this mission have 
     prepared the attached report, which addresses the four 
     central questions that you directed we study: how soon, how 
     many, how long and how much.
       We did not seek to reach any conclusions or specific 
     recommendations to you or the Senate--our personal views 
     reflected the wide range of positions held by our colleagues. 
     We did seek to identify the many differing expectations and 
     understandings that are held by the parties that will be 
     involved in the peace settlement in Bosnia.
       It is my request that the attached report be printed and 
     made available to all Senators, to assist in their 
     understanding and our upcoming debate and consideration of 
     any resolution concerning U.S. participation in a Peace 
     Implementation Force.
           Cordially,
                                                      Ted Stevens.

                              Codel Report


                              introduction

       The Delegation was authorized by the Majority Leader and 
     the Democratic Leader to travel to Europe, particularly 
     Bosnia, to evaluate the current situation in the former 
     Yugoslavia, the status of the peace negotiations, and 
     potential plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO) and the United States European Command (EUCOM) to 
     engage in a military mission to implement a peace settlement. 
     The Delegation was to assess these conditions, and report 
     their findings to the Senate.
       This report does not attempt to reach any conclusion about 
     the outcome of the on-going peace negotiations, which resumed 
     this month at Wright-Patterson AFB. The Delegation did not 
     seek to reach a consensus or make specific recommendations on 
     the military plans under consideration at EUCOM and NATO 
     Headquarters in Belgium. The Delegation hopes their mission 
     will contribute to planned Senate hearings and subsequent 
     consideration of any proposals for United States 
     participation in any peace settlement in Bosnia.
       The Delegation report consists of the following sections:
       (1) Listing of the Delegation
       (2) Listing of Delegation activities
       (3) Assessment of the situation in Bosnia
       (4) Expectations for a potential peace agreement
       (5) Plans/expectations for NATO peace implementation 
     activities
       (6) Closing observations


                       listing of the delegation

       Senator Ted Stevens--Committee on Appropriations 
     (Chairman).
       Senator Dan Inouye--Committee on Appropriations (Co-
     Chairman).
       Senator John Glenn--Committee on Armed Services.
       Senator Jeff Bingaman--Committee on Armed Services.
       Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison--Committee on Armed Services.
       Senator Olympia Snowe--Committee on Foreign Relations.
       Senator Craig Thomas--Committee on Foreign Relations.


                    listing of delegation activities

                   U.S. European Command Headquarters

       The Delegation met with the following senior U.S. military 
     officials:
       General George Joulwan; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
       Admiral Leighton Smith; Commander, Allied Forces South
       General James Jamerson; Deputy Commander, U.S. European 
     Command
       General William Crouch; Commander, U.S. Army Europe
       General Richard Hawley; Commander, U.S. Air Force Europe
       Major General Edward Metz

                         Government of Croatia

       The Delegation met with the Minister of Defense for 
     Croatia, Gojko Susak.

                        United Nations officials

       In Zagreb, Croatia, the Delegation met with the Senior 
     Representative of the Secretary General of the United 
     Nations, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Deputy Commander of U.N. 
     forces in the former Yugoslavia, Canadian Major General Barry 
     Ashton.
       In Sarajevo, Bosnia, the Delegation met with the Commander 
     of U.N. forces in Bosnia, United Kingdom Major General Rupert 
     Smith.

                          Government of Bosnia

       The Delegation met with the President of Bosnia, Alija 
     Izetbegovic, the Vice President, Ejup Ganic and Prime 
     Minister, Haris Sladjzic.

            North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters

       The Delegation met with the following senior NATO leaders: 
     Field Marshal Faye Vincent, Chairman of the Military 
     Committee, Mr. Willy Claes, Secretary General of NATO, The 
     North Atlantic Council--Ambassadors to NATO from: Spain, 
     Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
     Italy, Turkey, Iceland, Denmark, Greece, France, Belgium, 
     Netherlands, Canada and the United States.
       The Delegation also wishes to express its appreciation for 
     the support and assistance of the United States Embassy to 
     Croatia, the United States Embassy to Bosnia and the United 
     States Mission to NATO. Ambassadors Galbraith, Menzies and 
     Hunter all contributed significantly to the success of the 
     mission, and their individual actions and leadership are no 
     small part of the progress made so far towards a peace 
     settlement in Bosnia.


             assessment of the current situation in bosnia

       At each venue, the strong statement to the Delegation was 
     that the anticipated peace 

[[Page S18314]]
     negotiations in the United States offered the best likelihood of a 
     serious cessation of hostilities. Without exception, leaders 
     at NATO, in Croatia, in Boania and U.N. officials all cited 
     the involvement of the United States as a catalyst for peace.
       At the time of the Delegation's mission, the current cease 
     fire agreement was only a few days old. While conditions in 
     and around Sarajevo were significantly improved, according to 
     Bosnian and U.N. officials, fighting continued elsewhere in 
     Bosnia. While all parties hoped that the cease fire would 
     take hold throughout the country, fighting in northwest 
     Bosnia was especially active.
       For nearly six months preceding the Delegation's visit, 
     Sarajevo had been completely strangled. The airport had been 
     closed to all traffic, and the only road access route crossed 
     Mt. Igman. With the ceasefire, humanitarian conditions 
     appeared to be improving. Local officials reported that 
     utility services were being restored, and that food stocks in 
     the city were higher. The Delegation observed large numbers 
     of commercial trucks assembling in a convoy to exit the city. 
     Despite these factors, the airlift of food supplies 
     continued, to provide for the needs of local residents, and 
     to maintain air access into the city.
       Perhaps the most striking feature of Sarajevo, amid the 
     destruction and devastation of incessant shelling and rocket 
     attacks, was the utilization of the Olympic facilities as 
     gravesites for thousands of Bosnians who have died during the 
     fighting. Their graves serve as a poignant reminder that 
     peace will be difficult to achieve, and that the personal 
     loss of people on all sides of the conflict is severe.


              expectations for a potential peace agreement

       The Delegation explored the expectations of two of the 
     potential participants in a Balkan peace agreement during the 
     mission. Key factors included the probable timetable for an 
     agreement; the timetable for any implementation or peace 
     enforcement mission; the objectives of any peace enforcement 
     mission; the rules of engagement for any peace enforcement 
     mission; and the criteria for the duration or conclusion of a 
     peace enforcement mission. The following description 
     summarize the views encountered by the delegation during the 
     mission.
       Bosnian Government: Officials of the government of Bosnia 
     made clear that any price agreement required the 
     participation of the United States in the negotiation and 
     implementation phases. From their point of view, the United 
     States brought credibility to an agreement beyond the 
     involvement of the United Nations or the European members of 
     the Contact Group (the United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
     Russia).
       Very clearly, the Bosnian government anticipated that U.S. 
     and NATO military units will serve to enforce the peace, and 
     to protect both the internal and external borders determined 
     in the peace settlement. Further, officials also cited the 
     tremendous refugee and displaced persons dilemma facing 
     Bosnia. One official also suggested the possible use of 
     United States forces to reconcile the property claims of 
     Bosnians displaced during the war.
       The Bosnian government understood that U.S. and NATO forces 
     engaged in a potential peace enforcement mission would be 
     heavily armed, and would operate under robust rules of 
     engagement. Bosnian government leaders anticipated a presence 
     for such a force of at least 12 months, and from that point 
     of view, up to 18 to 24 months.
       Croatian Government: Officials of the government of Croatia 
     made clear that the enforcement of a peace agreement would 
     have to rest outside of the U.N. framework currently in 
     place. Their concept was for the potential U.S.-NATO mission 
     to operate to separate the warring factions, acting as a 
     buffer to achieve a stable military environment.
       The Croatian government officials did not believe that the 
     peace enforcement mission could be completed in twelve 
     months. A key factor in the duration and success of the peace 
     enforcement mission would be the extent to which the Bosnian 
     government achieves an enhanced military capability. The 
     Croatian defense Minister indicated that a peace settlement 
     was likely to bring an end to the U.N. arms embargo, but that 
     there was no need to arm the Bosnians after a peace plan is 
     adopted. Croatia may not permit future weapons transfers 
     through Croatia to Bosnia government forces following a 
     negotiated peace settlement.
       The Croatian government officials commented that Croatian 
     national interests may or may not be fully addressed in the 
     anticipated peace agreement. The status of the region of 
     Eastern Slavonia will be a contention issue at the peace 
     talks, and could precipitate further military action by 
     Croatian forces.
       United Nations: The Secretary General's Senior 
     Representative made clear that a peace agreement will be 
     difficult to maintain and enforce, based on the track record 
     of all parties. Much credit was given to the renewed 
     negotiations for achieving the present tentative cease fire, 
     and the necessity of continued United States involvement in 
     any future negotiations was emphasized.
       U.N. officials stated that the current peace plans will 
     require long-term peacekeeping activities to bring a period 
     of stability to the region. They envision an on-going United 
     Nations role, following the potential NATO-U.S. peace 
     enforcement mission. The experience of the United Nations in 
     the peacekeeping and reconstruction of Cambodia was cited as 
     a possible model for participation in Bosnia.
       NATO: Officials at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     headquarters in Brussels reflected primarily the 
     understanding of United States officials about the 
     prospective peace agreement. As NATO is not a direct 
     participant in these talks, they indicated they would await 
     insight from the U.S.-European Contact Group before 
     finalizing any NATO position.
       NATO representatives made clear their expectation that any 
     peace agreement would hinge on an enforcement mechanism 
     involving NATO and the United States. In the discussion with 
     the North Atlantic Council, several Ambassadors made explicit 
     their view that the United States must participate in the 
     peace process, and that NATO involvement would be contingent 
     on U.S. participation. The consensus of the NATO Ambassadors 
     was that the United States was already involved and committed 
     to the potential deployment of a NATO peace enforcement 
     mission to Bosnia.


           expectations for a nato peace implementation force

       Senior officers of the United States European Command, and 
     component units, discussed in depth the planning underway for 
     the training, organization and potential deployment of United 
     States military forces as the largest single component of a 
     NATO force. Many of the specific details were presented to 
     the Delegation at the Secret or Top Secret classification 
     level. The summary provided in this report does not reflect 
     any classified information, but explains the approach and 
     concerns presented to the delegation by these officials.
       Significance of the Peace Agreement Details: All military 
     officials made clear that exact planning for any operation 
     will hinge on the specific determinations of the anticipated 
     peace agreement. Those factors include the location of U.S. 
     forces deployed to Bosnia, the composition of any U.S. 
     military force, the interaction of U.S. military forces with 
     the United Nations or non-governmental reconstruction 
     organizations, the conditions under which U.S. military 
     forces deploy to Bosnia and the conditions and timing under 
     which U.S. military forces would withdraw from Bosnia.
       These uncertainties made difficult specific estimates on 
     force size, mission cost and mission duration.
       United Nations forces now deployed to the former Yugoslavia 
     will constitute some portion of the NATO led peace 
     implementation force. The attached chart details current 
     deployments.
       Once the peace enforcement mission begins, forces provided 
     to UNPROFOR by NATO member nations will revert to NATO 
     command and control, pursuant to NATO procedures. Military 
     forces from other nations may remain as part of a 
     complementary United Nations effort elsewhere in the former 
     Yugoslavia, or may be incorporated into the NATO force, 
     accepting NATO command and operational management. This 
     approach may come to resemble relationships established 
     during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
       All parties had differing specific expectations about the 
     mission for the NATO peace implementation force. Those 
     differing views highlighted the significant challenge facing 
     the negotiations at upcoming peace talks in the United 
     States.
       Mission expectations fall in the following categories:
       Implementation of Peace Agreement: NATO and U.S. officials 
     anticipate that an agreement will detail the role for the 
     peace implementation force. This could include geographic 
     zones of responsibility and whatever functions are ultimately 
     determined by the parties and the Contact Group.
       Separation of Forces: In discussions with the Delegation, 
     NATO officials indicated that the NATO force will provide a 
     buffer between the armed forces of the Combatants. This 
     concept would entail an occupation of specific areas, and a 
     responsibility to police the military activities of the 
     combatants.
       Secure Borders. Some parties indicated that the NATO force 
     would serve as a protection force, to maintain the 
     territorial integrity of parties to the settlement reached in 
     the peace negotiations.
       Displaced Persons/Property: On a more complex level, there 
     were suggestions to the delegation that the implementation 
     force would play a role in assisting the return of displaced 
     persons to areas determined by the peace settlement, and 
     potentially enforce the return of property belonging to 
     displaced persons.
       U. S. EUCOM officials expressed concern about taking on any 
     functions or responsibilities beyond their direct role as a 
     peace implementation force--such as election monitoring, 
     refugee resettlement or other initiatives related to nation-
     building.


       composition and size of a nato peace implementation force

       The ultimate composition of the NATO peace implementation 
     force will reflect the ``proportionate contribution'' of NATO 
     members, according to officials in Brussels. Those nations 
     with troops currently deployed will most likely sustain that 
     presence. Other nations will nominate forces based on the 
     plans developed by the Supreme Allied Command, reflecting the 
     capabilities available in those national military forces. The 
     attached chart reflects anticipated force levels.
     
[[Page S18315]]

       The United States, France and the United Kingdom each 
     anticipate providing roughly a division sized combat force. 
     Each nation will tailor that force to reflect the specific 
     geographic and ethnic characteristics of the region in which 
     they will operate. Other nation's will contribute units 
     ranging from company to battalion size, based on mission 
     requirements.
       For the United States, the call-up of approximately 1,500 
     to 2,000 reserve component personnel is likely. These units 
     will participate primarily in combat support, service 
     support, medical, civil affairs and military police 
     functions. The reserve components have been heavily taxed 
     over the past three years supporting U.N. and humanitarian 
     relief missions in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and now Bosnia. Air 
     Force Reserve and Air National Guard units are an essential 
     element of the on-going airlift to support the Bosnian 
     people.


                             COST ESTIMATES

       Officials at the U.S. European Command were unable to 
     provide any specific estimate on the cost of U.S. operations. 
     Discussions with senior officials at the Department of 
     Defense indicate that the likely incremental cost for fiscal 
     year 1996 of the ground force component of a NATO peace 
     implementation force will total approximately $1.5 to $2.0 
     billion. This amount does not address the costs of the on-
     going ``no fly'' enforcement mission or the naval embargo in 
     the Adriatic Sea.
       More detailed estimates are expected upon completion of the 
     peace agreement, and the finalization of NATO operational 
     plans.


                   TIMETABLE FOR POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT

       Officials at the U.S. European Command estimated that NATO 
     force would be tasked to deploy to Bosnia and Croatia within 
     96 hours of the formal adoption of a peace settlement. What 
     will constitute the ``formal adoption'' of an agreement is 
     not yet known. NATO leaders concurred with this estimate.
       NATO leaders had not yet defined what mechanism would 
     trigger the Alliance's participation in the mission, and the 
     timetable for consideration by the North Atlantic Council of 
     a request for NATO involvement. NATO officials anticipated 
     that the military mission would be predicated on a United 
     Nations Security Council resolution, authorizing such a 
     mission pursuant to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.
       NATO officials did not articulate the mechanism by which 
     individual nations would determine and affirm their 
     participation in the mission.


                COMMAND AND CONTROL/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

       Central to the role of U.S. military forces in a deployment 
     to Bosnia will be the command relationships and the rules of 
     engagement that would govern their participation. In every 
     discussion, the Delegation found that all parties believed 
     the utilization of NATO would obviate the problems 
     encountered by the United Nations command structure. The 
     flawed ``dual-key'' control by the United Nations of military 
     force limited the usefulness of that force, and caused all 
     the combattant parties to doubt and mistrust the commitment 
     of the United Nations to securing peace in Bosnia.
       U.S. military officials stated categorically that U.S. 
     forces would serve under the command of U.S. military 
     officers through the NATO chain of command. They affirmed 
     that the rules of engagement will provide wide latitude to 
     respond with disproportionate force to any attack or threat 
     to U.S. or NATO personnel.
       Less clear is how those rules of engagement will deal with 
     threats to local populations, whether Bosnian Muslim, Croat 
     or Serb, by any military, guerilla or terrorist force. Again, 
     the peace agreement is expected to provide guidance on the 
     role of the military peace implementation force, and how they 
     might respond to such situations.


                    PARTICIPATION OF NON-NATO FORCES

       A point of sensitivity and uncertainty in discussions with 
     U.S. military, NATO, Bosnian and Croat leaders was the 
     participation of non-NATO military units in a peace 
     implementation force. This applied both to the potential role 
     for Islamic nations and Russia.
       NATO leaders believed that the inclusion of Russian 
     military forces would contribute to the stability and likely 
     success of the mission. Officials in Croatia and Bosnia 
     believe that the Serb parties will insist on a Russian 
     presence. U.S. military officials stated that on-going 
     discussions with the Russian military were addressing 
     command, control and funding issues associated with any 
     Russian participation. U.S. officials anticipated that each 
     participant in the NATO-led peace enforcement mission would 
     pay their own costs. Again, this issue is expected to be 
     addressed in the anticipated peace settlement.


                          CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

       While reaching no conclusion about what action the Senate 
     might take regarding the potential deployment of U.S. 
     military forces to Bosnia as part of a NATO peace 
     implementation force, the Delegation believes that several 
     critical and vital issues must be resolved before a full and 
     complete understanding of the mission can be reached.
       From the perspective of the use of U.S. military units, the 
     following issues must be addressed:
       (1) The end state or ``exit strategy'' for U.S. forces.
       (2) Funding for U.S. operational costs.
       (3) Funding for non-NATO participants.
       (4) Demarcation of U.S. and allied zones of deployment.
       (5) Composition of U.S. and allied military forces.
       (6) Logistics support for U.S. and allied military forces.
       (7) Transit/air access in Bosnia.
       (8) Air defense responsibilities.
       (9) Transition for current U.N. mission to NATO control.
       (10) Rules of engagement.
       (11) Transition to civilian aid/recovery program.
       (12) Specific tasks U.S. forces will perform.
       These outstanding issues are not intended to negatively 
     reflect the discussions and meeting by the Delegation--they 
     simply represent the unknown factors surrounding this 
     mission.

                          ____________________