[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 196 (Monday, December 11, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18305-S18307]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about an issue that is 
important to the security of this Nation and certainly to the world 
community, and that is the proliferation of chemical weapons.
  The widespread use of chemical weapons in world war provided the 
world with its first glimpse of these agents' destructive powers. I am 
certain many of us here in the Senate have known someone who served in 
the First World War who returned to the United States bearing permanent 
scars of his exposure to terrible chemicals such as phosgene and 
mustard gas. If we do not know someone, we have heard of people who 
were debilitated as a result of these agents.
  I was with Vice President Gore recently when he talked about his 
uncle, his father's brother, who returned from the First World War 
injured as a result of chemical weapons. The Vice President indicated 
how his uncle coughed and suffered from this condition until he died.
  Thousands of American veterans suffered for years from illnesses, 
like the Vice President's uncle, because they were exposed to gas. 
Thousands more never came home, having died as a result of this. Mr. 
President, 80 percent of the gas fatalities in World War I were caused 
by phosgene. This substance damages the lungs, causing a deadly 
accumulation of fluid quickly and it leads to death. Those who do not 
die from this gas may cough and cough for the rest of their lives.
  There were stories in the First World War of people who suffered, but 
one of the most famous poems of that conflict was written about 
poisonous gas, entitled ``Dulce Et Decorum Est.'' I will not read it 
all, but I will read enough to get the point across.
  This poem starts by describing marches and worried soldiers. The poet 
begins the second paragraph by saying:

     Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!--An ecstasy of fumbling,
     Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
     But someone still was yelling out and stumbling
     And flound'ring like a man in fire or lime . . .
     Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light,
     As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.

     In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
     He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

     If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
     Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
     And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
     His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
     If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
     Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
     Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
     Of vile, incurable sores on innocent
           tongues, . . .

  Mr. President, that describes quite well what poisonous gas does to a 
human being. But it did not end in World War I. Iran and Iraq have 
poisonous gas. In the 1980's, Iraq used poisonous gas weapons against 
its enemy Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and launched a campaign of terror 
with chemical weapons against its own population, the Kurds, in their 
own country.
  In the words of a Kurdish refugee who survived the bombing of his 
village by an Iraqi aircraft, he said:


[[Page S18306]]

       The planes dropped bombs. They did not produce a big noise. 
     A yellowish cloud was created and there was a smell of rotten 
     parsley or onions. There were no wounds. People would breathe 
     the smoke, then fall down, and blood would come from their 
     mouths.

  According to a 1988 Foreign Relations Committee report on the Iraqi 
chemical weapons attacks:

       Those who were very close to the bombs died instantly. 
     Those who did not die instantly found it difficult to breathe 
     and began to vomit. The gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs 
     of the villagers exposed to it. Many suffered temporary 
     blindness. After the bombs exploded, many villagers ran and 
     submerged themselves in nearby streams to escape the 
     spreading gas. Many of those who made it to the streams 
     survived. Those who could not run from the growing smell, 
     mostly the very old and the very young, died.

  Since the end of the Persian Gulf war, international inspectors have 
destroyed over 100,000 gallons of chemical weapons, and over 500,000 
gallons of precursor chemicals used to produce chemical weapons from 
Iraqi stockpiles. That is 10,000 50-gallon drums.
  While the use of chemical weapons during wartime is both horrifying 
and tragic, even more terrible is the prospect of these weapons being 
used by terrorists to further their aims.
  The deadly gas attacks that occurred in the Tokyo subways in March 
are a chilling indicator of the potential terrorist threat chemical 
weapons represent. The nerve gas, sarin, was used by the terrorists in 
the Tokyo incident and it was a relatively low-grade composition of the 
gas. If the terrorists had access to a more concentrated form of the 
gas, their attack could have killed thousands of innocent commuters. We 
can only imagine the terrible consequences of an attack such as that 
occurring in a U.S. city.

  The potential security threat to the United States and its citizens 
from the use of chemical weapons has been a serious concern to both the 
current administration and its predecessors. Negotiations on the terms 
of a chemical weapons treaty began during the Reagan administration, 
and President Bush signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, also called 
the CWC, in 1993.
  The Clinton administration continued American support for the treaty, 
and on November 23, 1993, President Clinton submitted the convention to 
the Senate for ratification. Nevertheless, although the United States 
was a primary architect of the convention and has signed it along with 
159 other nations, the United States is not yet a member of the 
convention because the Senate has failed to act to ratify it. The 
convention must be ratified by 65 nations to come into force. To date, 
only 42 nations have ratified it.
  An overwhelming majority of the Senate supports ratification of this 
important treaty, but the Senate has been prevented from debating and 
voting on ratification by the Foreign Relations Committee's failure to 
act on it.
  I believe the Foreign Relations Committee's failure to act on this 
important arms control measure this year is a serious mistake.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is unique among weapons treaties in 
that it will, when ratified, eliminate an entire class of weapons.
  The convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use 
of chemical weapons by its signatories. It requires the destruction of 
all chemical weapons and production facilities.
  Under the terms of the convention, the Russians would be required to 
destroy an estimated 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, including 
32,000 metric tons of nerve agents.
  The convention also provides the most extensive and intrusive 
verification regime of any arms control treaty, for it permits the 
inspection of both military and commercial chemical facilities. This is 
an important safeguard against commercial facilities being used for 
military production of chemical agents, as was the case in Iraq.
  To help prevent incidents such as the Tokyo nerve gas attack, the 
convention requires its members to enact laws criminalizing civilian 
violations of its terms. Under the convention, member countries would 
have to pass national level legislation criminalizing the manufacture 
and possession of chemicals by private groups such as the religious 
sect that initiated the subway attack in Japan.
  I understand the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has 
serious concerns about the verifiability and enforceability of the 
convention's terms. But I believe the proper way to address these 
concerns would be to allow the treaty to be fully debated in committee 
and on the Senate floor.
  If there are concerns about other nations' compliance with the 
treaty, the answer is not for the United States to abandon it. As a 
member of the convention, the United States will be better able to 
monitor compliance.
  In 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral 
destruction agreement calling for each side to destroy its chemical 
stockpiles to a maximum level of 5,000 tons. The United States has been 
destroying its chemicals in accordance with the agreement, but Russia 
has not.
  If the convention comes into force, with both the United States and 
Russia as members, Russia would be legally bound to destroy its 
stockpile completely and accept challenge inspections of both private 
and military chemical facilities.
  If the United States suspected Russia of violating the terms of the 
treaty, it could demand a challenge inspection. Within days, 
international inspectors could be at the door of suspected facilities 
to check for violations because all signatories of the convention are 
required to permit inspections of both known and undeclared chemical 
production facilities with little or no warning.
  Of course, nations must become members of the convention to become 
subject to its requirements. The CWC is the first treaty that penalizes 
countries that do not join and rewards those that do.
  Once the convention comes into force, member countries will 
be prohibited from exporting certain treaty-controlled chemicals to 
nonmember states. Because businesses that produce goods such as 
pharmaceuticals and fertilizers need these chemicals for production, 
there would be enormous pressure on nonmember governments to join to 
give their industries access to these chemicals.

  Unfortunately, the convention is not likely to ever come into force 
without American leadership. The U.S. commitment to chemical weapons 
disarmament, as evidenced by our Nation's prominent role in drafting 
the convention, was fundamental to creating the spirit of cooperation 
that led to the treaty being signed by so many countries.
  The U.S. failure to ratify the treaty calls into question our 
commitment to its goals and threatens to fracture international support 
for the treaty. If the United States, which holds some of the world's 
largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, does not ratify the treaty, 
other nations will find little motivation to do so.
  The United States can no longer afford to delay giving its support to 
implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The United States is already bound by law to destroy its chemical 
weapons stockpile by 2004. The Convention would require all other 
member nations to do the same.
  Any state that refuses to join the treaty will be isolated and its 
access to precursor chemicals will be limited. And we have explained 
why that is important to the pharmaceutical development of, and the 
simple construction of, fertilizers.
  Universal compliance cannot be achieved immediately, but there is no 
doubt that the convention will slow and reverse the current pace of 
chemical weapons proliferation.
  And while the CWC cannot prevent every potential threat of terrorist 
chemical attack, it can greatly reduce the threat by halting and 
reversing the proliferation of chemical weapons. If we eliminate 
chemical stockpiles, we eliminate potential terrorist Weapons.

  In addition, we greatly diminish the threat of chemical weapons to 
U.S. troops in future military operations.
  The Senate must not shy away from taking this important step toward 
the elimination of all chemical weapons. We should act now to create a 
more secure present for the country and a more secure future for 
generations to come.
  This is not a partisan issue. In July, 1994, former President Bush 
wrote to Senator Lugar to express his support for the convention. He 
stated.

       This convention clearly serves the best interests of the 
     United States in a world in 

[[Page S18307]]
     which the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is a real and 
     growing threat. United States leadership played a critical 
     role in the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. United States leadership is required once again 
     to bring this historic agreement into force. I urge the 
     Senate to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to abolishing 
     chemical weapons by promptly giving its advice and consent to 
     ratification.

  And, in a bipartisan show of support for the treaty, the Senate 
passed by voice vote a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling for rapid 
action on the convention earlier this year.
  Mr. President, When I started my statement today, I recalled the 
horrors and widespread use of chemical weapons in World War I. They 
were real. They affected people. They killed people. They injured, and 
they damaged people. In response to those horrors the world community 
developed the Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical 
weapons.
  However, although the Geneva Protocol was passed in 1925, the U.S. 
Senate did not recommend its ratification until 1975. We must not let 
50 years pass before we act on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, I extend my appreciation to Senator Bingaman for 
bringing to the attention of the Senate last week the matters that were 
held up in the Foreign Relations Committee.
  I also extend my appreciation to the majority leader for working to 
bring these matters to the Senate floor.
  One of the things that was part of that agreement was that this 
treaty would be reported to the Senate floor no later than April 22. 
That is good.
  I urge the chairman of the committee, however, to schedule action on 
this convention as soon as possible so that the Senate can vote on this 
quickly and do it without regard to partisanship. It is important that 
we bring this matter to the floor of the U.S. Senate. Chemical weapons 
are a scourge, and they should be eliminated.
  I appreciate the patience of the Chair and other Members of the 
Senate for extending me an additional 5 minutes.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask to speak in morning business for 
20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, reserving the right to object--and 
certainly not on this issue--but I come to the floor to speak. I would 
prefer if you could allow this Senator 10, and then go back to the 
issue, if you would not mind. Is their objection to that?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized for 
10 minutes.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair.

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