[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 195 (Friday, December 8, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18287-S18295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. McCAIN:
S. 1641. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, relating to
required employment investigations of pilots; to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
[[Page S 18288]]
the air transportation safety improvement act of 1995
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I introduce the Air Transportation
Safety Improvement Act of 1995, which will go a along way to ensure the
continued safety of those who use the nation's air transportation
system. Clearly, this legislation complements current more
comprehensive efforts to improve the Federal Aviation Administration
and to enhance the safety and efficiency of the air traffic management
system. In specific, this bill will permit the transfer of relevant
employment and training records to prospective employers when an
individual has applied for a position as a pilot.
The bill necessarily focuses on encouraging and facilitating the flow
of information between employers so that safety is not compromised. In
addition, to ensure that the burden of this legislation does not fall
on employers and the legal system, when a transfer is requested and
complied with, both the employer who turns over the requested records
and the prospective employer who receives them will be immune from
lawsuits related to the transferred information. Complete immunity is
critical--without it, the legislative cannot achieve its objective of
making it a common practice of prospective employers to research the
experience of pilots and to learn significant information that could
affect air carrier hiring decisions and, ultimately, airline safety.
After reviewing information about certain investigations and
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, I have
become very concerned about deficiencies in the pre-employment
screening of pilots. Right now, the FAA requires airlines only to
determine whether a pilot applicant has a pilot license, to check the
applicant's driving record for alcohol or drug suspensions, and to
verify that person's employment for the five previous years. Yet, the
FAA does not require airlines to confirm flight experience or how a
pilot applicant performed at previous airlines. The NTSB, however,
after studying certain airline accidents that were determined to be
caused by pilot error, has recommended three times since 1988 that
airlines should be required to check information about a pilot
applicant's prior flight experience and performance with other
carriers.
Compounding my concern about the insufficient sharing of pilot
performance records among employers is that in the near future, there
may be a shortage of well-qualified U.S. airline pilots because the
military, which in the past has regularly trained the vast majority of
airline pilots, will be training fewer of them. This will happen at the
same time that the demand for pilots at U.S. major and regional
carriers increases. Since many future pilots will not have experienced
rigorous and reliable military aviation training, the ability of
prospective employers to have access to records from previous employers
will be even more critical to airline and passenger safety.
Safety in our nation's air transportation system is paramount. I
believe this bill will not only encourage employers to make more
thorough background checks of the pilots they hire, but will also
enhance safety.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this legislation and
certain newspaper articles dealing with this matter be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
S. 1461
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
section 44936 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following:
``(f) Records of Employment.--
``(1) In general.--An air carrier or foreign air carrier
receiving an application for employment from an individual
seeking a position as a pilot may request and receive records
described in paragraph (2) relating to that individual's
employment from any person who has employed that individual
at any time during the 5 years preceding the application.
``(2) Records to which subsection applies.--The records
referred to in paragraph (1) are--
``(A) the personnel file of the individual;
``(B) any records maintained under the regulations set
forth in--
``(i) section 121.683 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations;
``(ii) paragraph (A) of section VI, appendix I, part 121 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
``(iii) section 125.401 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations;
``(iv) section 127.301 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations; and
``(v) section 135.63(a)(4) of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations; and ``(C) any other records concerning--
``(i) the training, qualifications, proficiency, or
professional competence of the individual;
``(ii) any disciplinary action taken by the employer with
respect to the individual; and
``(iii) the release from employment, resignation,
termination, or disqualification of the individual.
``(3) Right to receive notice and copy of any record
furnished.--An individual whose employment records have been
requested under paragraph (1) of this subsection--
``(A) shall receive written notice from each person
providing a record in response to a request under paragraph
(1) of the individual's right to receive such copies; and
``(B) is entitled to receive copies of any records provided
by the individual's employer or a former employer to any air
carrier or foreign air carrier.
``(4) Reasonable charges for processing requests and
furnishing copies.--A person who receives a request under
paragraph (1) may establish a reasonable charge for the cost
of processing the request and furnishing copies of the
requested records.
``(5) Standard forms.--The Administrator shall promulgate--
``(A) standard forms which may be used by an air carrier or
foreign air carrier to request records under paragraph (1) of
this subsection; and
``(B) standard forms which may be used by any employer
receiving a request under paragraph (1) for records to inform
the individual to whom the records relate of the request and
of the individual's right to receive copies of any records
provided in response to the request.
``(6) Regulations.--The Administrator may prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary--
``(A) to protect the personal privacy of any individual
whose records are requested under paragraph (1) of this
subsection and to protect the confidentiality of those
records;
``(B) to limit the further dissemination of records
received under paragraph (1) of this subsection by the person
who requested them; and
``(C) to ensure prompt compliance with any request under
paragraph (1) of this subsection.
``(g) Limitation on Liability; Preemption of State Law.--
``(1) Limitation on liability.--No action or proceeding may
be brought by or on behalf of an individual who has applied
for a position described in subsection (a)(1) of this section
against--
``(A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier with which the
individual has filed such an application for requesting the
individual's records under subsection (f)(1);
``(B) a person who has complied with such a request; or
``(C) an agent or employee of a person described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph
in the nature of an action for defamation, invasion of
privacy, negligence, interference with contract, or
otherwise, or under any State or Federal law with respect to
the furnishing or use of such records in accordance with
subsection (f) of this section.
``(2) Preemption.--No State or political subdivision
thereof may enact, prescribe, issue, continue in effect, or
enforce any law, regulation, standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law that prohibits, penalizes,
or imposes liability for furnishing or using records in
accordance with subsection (f) of this section.''.
____
[From the New York Times, Nov. 10, 1995]
Safety Board Urges Government To Monitor Pilots' Job Records
(By Matthew L. Wald)
Washington, November 9.--The National Transportation Safety
Board recommended today that the Government keep employment
records on pilots to keep bad ones from jumping from job to
job.
The recommendation came after the board blamed the crash of
an American Eagle turboprop last November on pilot error; the
pilot had been hired a few days before he was to be dismissed
by his previous employer, but American did not know that.
Currently, airlines do not share such data out of concern
that a pilot denied employment because of unfavorable
information provided by a former employer can sue.
``We can't permit liability to drive safety issues,'' James
E. Hall, chairman of the safety board, said in a telephone
interview today. ``Somebody has got to take a step forward to
do what's in the public interest.''
But the board said privacy questions must be worked out.
Moreover, the Federal Aviation Administration, which the
safety board wants to compile the data, was reluctant to act
without Congressional authorization.
The organizations representing the commuter airlines and
the major carriers both expressed support yesterday, although
a pilots' union said it objected to such a move.
Last month the safety board concluded that American Eagle
flight 3372, a twin-engine turboprop on the way to Raleigh-
Durham International Airport from Greensboro,
[[Page S 18289]]
N.C., crashed after the pilot, Michael P. Hillis, became confused about
whether the left engine had stopped and failed to focus on
flying the airplane. Mr. Hillis. who was killed in the crash,
along the co-pilot and 13 of the 18 passengers, had been on
the verge of dismissal from Comair, a smaller carrier, when
he was hired by American.
American said it never asked Comair about Mr. Hillis's
record because it was unlikely that the airline would divulge
anything beyond the dates of employment and the kind of
equipment that the pilot flew.
The safety board recommended that the airlines and the
F.A.A. develop a standardized report on ``pilot performance
in activities that assess skills, abilities, knowledge, and
judgment.'' The data would be stored by the F.A.A., and with
a pilot's permission, could be given to potential employers.
Walter S. Coleman, president of the Regional Airline
Association, which represents commuter carriers said in a
statement that his group ``supports the intent'' of the
Safety Board's recommendations.
At the Air Transport Association, which represents the
major carriers, Tim Neale, a spokesman, said, ``I don't think
this is going to cause problem for the airlines.''
The Air Line Pilot's Association said that any deficiencies
in Mr. Hillis's performance should have been obvious because
he had been with the airline for four years by the time of
the crash. The union also said test results should not be
shared among airlines because the tests were not
standardized. It called for more training of pilots.
____
[From USA Today, Sept. 29, 1995]
Public Deserves More From FAA Watchdog
How long does it take to learn from your mistakes? At the
Federal Aviation Administration, guardian of public air
safety, the answer is a disastrously long time.
In a three-part series concluded Thursday, USA TODAY
reporters Julie Schmit and John Ritter reveal that the system
for assuring pilot competence is dangerously flawed. In fact,
it has contributed to 111 deaths, all but one on small
airlines, which have less-experienced pilots.
At the heart of the problem is the FAA. The record shows
the FAA was warned repeatedly about flaws in pilot testing
and hiring, that it recognized the flaws and that it was
flagrantly ineffective in fixing them.
One telling example:
On Nov. 15, 1987, 28 passengers and crew died when
Continental Flight 1713 crashed on takeoff from Denver.
National Transportation Safety Board investigators blamed the
crash on bad flying by co-pilot Lee Bruecher. Unbeknown to
Continental, Bruecher had been fired from one airline. He'd
also flunked pilot tests and had been cited nine times for
motor vehicle violations, a red flag for risky pilots.
The NTSB's conclusion: Airlines should be required to check
previous employer records of prospective pilots, including
test scores, training results, performance evaluations and
disciplinary actions.
The FAA's response: No. Its rationale: Benefits from such
regulatory change would not justify enforcement costs.
Eight years and six pilot-error airline crashes later,
airlines still were not required to verify applicants' flight
experience.
That set the stage for crash 7, an American Eagle accident
last December in North Carolina explored in detail by the USA
TODAY reporters. They found that the pilot, Michael Hillis,
was widely known for indecisiveness. Documents showed he'd
failed FAA check-rides, and his judgment in critical
situations had been found unsatisfactory by previous
employers. But the airline didn't know all that until after
Hillis ran his plane into trees at 200 mph, killing 15,
including himself.
Another pilot-safety flaw emerged from the reporters'
research, as well.
Had the FAA required more crew-coordination training,
Hillis' co-pilot, who'd never met his captain before the
flight, might have been able to override his errors. The NTSB
has warned the FAA since 1979 of the critical need for
improved crew-coordination training. But the FAA failed to
act until this year.
All this points to a problem larger than pilot error. Again
and again, the NTSB has told the FAA what's broken in
aviation and how to fix it. Yet critical improvements have
stalled--and not just because of incompetence or bureaucratic
sluggishness.
The FAA is hamstrung by a conflicting mandate. It is
charged with both protecting safety and promoting air travel.
So while it can mandate safety measures, it must first
weigh the cost-benefit wisdom of its changes. The result: too
little, too late in safety improvements.
There are recent signs of progress with new FAA rules for
enhanced pilot training and renewed interest in background
checks. But even these are half-measures, requiring only some
airlines to comply and making some rules voluntary. And this
comes as a pilot shortage is approaching.
If ever a lesson is to be learned from aviation accidents,
it is that timidity has no place in safety. The NTSB knows
that. It's time the FAA did as well.
Regional airlines caught in a bind. Business is booming for
small airlines, but their supply of military-trained pilots
is down. And there's little incentive for prospective pilots
to spend four years and $70,000 for a commercial pilot's
license to get a job that starts at $14,000 per year.
Meanwhile, starting jobs at the major airlines pay twice that
and can reach more than $100,000 after 10 years.
Military trains fewer pilots: 1992, 3,742; 1996, 2,678(1).
Regional airline business soaring. Passengers (in
millions): 1984, 26; 1995, 60(1).
Ranking salaries. Average second-year pay for a regional
airline co-pilot compared to other professions:
Secretary, $19,100.
Phone operator, $19,100.
Data entry, $17,750.
Co-pilot, $15,600.
Receptionist, $15,400.
Bank teller, $14,600.
____
[From USA Today, Sept. 28, 1995]
Pilot Performance: Top Officials Respond
Q: American Eagle Capt. Michael Hillis washed out at his
first airline, Comair. Eagle hired him without knowing that.
Last year, he crashed a plane, killing himself and 14 others.
Should airlines share records of pilot training and
performance?
Pena: That was a very upsetting (crash). We are working
with Congress to get legislation passed to allow airlines to
share (pilot performance) information, and we will support
such legislation.
Q: What do you say to people who are shocked that a pilot
who failed at one airline could get hired at another?
Broderick: I am incensed, too, every time an accident
happens. We work 24 hours a day trying to make this system a
zero-accident system. I think we've got it to where it is the
best in the world. It is still not good enough, and every
time the system fails, it is extremely frustrating to all of
us. We want to do whatever it takes to make sure that failure
never happens again.
Q: Did the system fail in the American Eagle crash?
Broderick: The system failed because a plane crashed and
people lost their lives.
Q: Does that mean the system doesn't always identify weak
pilots?
Broderick: No. It points out where they're weak so we can
train them in areas where they need it. Success isn't in
getting rid of people. Success is having qualified people on
the flight deck. If the system is such that you fail (and)
you're out, it couldn't work.
Q: In the past 12 years, there have been 16 fatal accidents
in 15- to 19-seat planes. In five of those, the FAA was cited
for inadequate supervision of the airline. Is that
acceptable?
Pena: No. Absolutely not. We're going to continue to press
to improve the level of safety for smaller planes.
Q: But what are you doing to hold the FAA to a higher
standard?
Pena: We have a new management team in place that is very
focused on this issue. And I am very focused on this issue.
We've changed our attitude. We've sent a strong message to
everybody to think of safety differently than the way it was
viewed in the past, which was ``accidents will happen.'' No
one would say that, but that was the unstated assumption. Our
attitude now is ``no more accidents.'' Our thinking now is
perfection.
Q: What have you done to make that reality?
Pena: We've added more inspectors. We've reached an
agreement, which was a big breakthrough, with the airlines.
We can now review all their flight data recorders (the
``black boxes'' on planes that record pilot conversations).
In some cases, they show mistakes made by pilots. We can take
that information and share it with all pilots to show (that)
that was the wrong thing to do, here is what should have been
done. We've also pushed for a higher level of safety on
regional airlines. (Next year, all regionals will have to
meet many of the same safety standards already in use at
large regional and major airlines.)
Q: Safety investigators have cited inadequate pilot
training as a factor in two fatal crashes since 1985. In one,
the FAA had allowed an airline to reduce training below the
FAA's minimum standard. Why do you set minimum standards and
then allow airlines to go below them?
Hinson: Any exemption we grant is only done when it is an
equivalent level of safety. In regulatory law, you write a
regulation that focuses on what you're trying to accomplish
but realizes there is more than one path. It takes five years
to build an airplane. It takes three years to redesign an
airline's training program. We cannot change our regulations
every six months. One of the purposes of having exemptions is
to allow air carriers to take advantage of new technology
within the existing framework so we don't have to say to
them, `I'm sorry, the rule doesn't allow this.'
Q: The FAA is supposed to regulate and promote aviation.
Aren't those conflicting responsibilities?
Q: Hinson: No. We are to provide a safe aviation
environment. In that context, promotion means we should have
laws giving us authority to set standards, impose penalties
and provide enforcement. The most aggressive form of
promotion is to have the confidence of people who use the
system.
Q: Before the FAA passes a new regulation, it must weight
the cost of it to the airlines.
Q: Hinson: That's true. We could provide a regulatory
environment that was so strict and so punitive that people
would ask, `Why go into that business?' We could say (planes)
must have six engines, four pilots instead of
[[Page S 18290]]
two. We don't do that. We have 17 cost-benefit laws that we have to
answer to. The National Transportation Safety Board and the
other oversight groups can have opinions without regard for
cost. We can't.
Q: One criticism is that it takes repeated accidents before
the FAA acts. What's being done?
Q: Hinson: To some degree that is a fair criticism. It
results from a propensity of our people to be extremely
cautious and it comes back to the requirement of cost-benefit
analysis. We are beginning to see a reduction in the
processing time of regulations. One of my charges is to
create more sense of urgency in that arena.
____
[From USA Today, Sept. 28, 1995]
Expense Sometimes Stops FAA From Ordering Safety Improvements
(By John Ritter and Julie Schmit)
The FAA rejects dozens of changes it deems to costly or
burdensome to airlines, even if other experts think they're
important to safe airliner operation.
Sometimes the FAA repeatedly turns down a National
Transportation Safety Board recommendation--under industry
pressure, critics say--only to accept it later after more
crashes.
December's American Eagle crash near Raleigh, N.C., is an
example. Records show the pilot had been forced to resign at
one airline. But Eagle hired him unaware of his poor record.
Three times since 1988, the NTSB had urged tougher pilot
background checks, including verifying flight, training and
disciplinary records and FAA violations. But the FAA says
enforcing a new regulation would be too costly and leaves
such checks up to the airlines.
There are other examples:
The NTSB urged ground-proximity warning devices on planes
in 1986. An FAA rule requiring them took effect last year,
but loopholes will delay full compliance until 1996.
After a 1993 Express II accident near Hibbing, Minn., the
NTSB said the device would have given pilots 33 seconds'
notice they were too close to the ground--plus an urgent
``pull up'' warning 21 seconds before--time enough to avoid
the crash, which killed 18.
Fatal runway crashes in Los Angeles, Detroit and Atlanta
within a year led the NTSB in 1991 to urge the FAA to speed
up installing ground radar.
The FAA moved quickly but delays persisted. In November, a
TWA MD-80 took off from St. Louis while a Cessna was on its
runway. The jet sheared the top off the smaller plane,
killing two pilots. The MD-80 passengers escaped.
Investigators found that the FAA modifications had delayed
St. Louis' radar. The NTSB then asked for a schedule for
remaining airports and held a hearing to pressure the FAA.
Even now, ``We don't expect them to have the system fully
installed until 1999,'' says Barry Sweedler, director of the
NTSB's safety recommendations office.
In 1979 the NTSB began urging a new kind of training to
make cockpit crews work together better. And although the
majors and some regionals now teach Crew Resource Management
(CRM), it's not uniform or required.
But most crashes involving pilot error can be traced to CRM
deficiencies--faulty communication or poor coordination
between pilots.
New FAA rules this fall will require CRM industrywide for
all pilots flying planes with 10 or more seats. But it won't
be pass-fail training--pilots whose CRM skills are weak won't
necessarily be pulled from the cockpit.
____
[From USA Today, Sept. 28, 1995]
Pilot Error: Solutions, Better Regulations, Safer Skies
Problem: Pilot Supply 1. Provide public funding for pilot
training to ensure high quality. The Air Force spends
$533,000, on average, to train one pilot. It exposes pilots
to the latest aircraft and computer technologies. U.S. flight
schools, which rely almost completely on tuition, can't
afford such training. Most student pilots train in single-
engine planes quite unlike those flown by regional and major
airlines. Who must act: Congress, FAA. 2. Provide pilot
candidates with more financial assistance, including
guaranteed student loans and scholarships. That would ensure
that the industry gets the best applicants, not just those
who can afford the training. The cost of a commercial pilot
license and four-year degree is about $70,000. Most new
pilots find that it takes five years, or more, to get a job
that pays more than $30,000 a year. Who must act: Congress,
FAA. 3. Require airline pilots to have four-year degrees.
Many major airlines used to require a four-year degree. Now,
most list it as a preferred qualification. The military still
requires it of pilot applicants. Requiring bachelor's degrees
would help ensure that pilots have the ability to understand
today's sophisticated planes. Who must act: FAA, airlines. 4.
Have examiners chosen at random. Make it impossible for
pilots and student pilots to choose their own examiners for
licensing and aircraft certification tests. The current
system is open to abuse by examiners who give easy or short
tests. The more tests they give, the more money they make.
Who must act: FAA.
Problem: Pilot Hiring 5. Require tougher background checks
of pilot applicants. Airlines are required to verify an
applicant's pilot license and work history for the previous
five years. They also must check driving records for alcohol
or drug convictions. The FAA should require airlines to
verify applicants' flight experience, check FAA records for
accidents or violations and check any criminal records. The
National Transportation Safety Board has suggested tougher
background checks three times since 1988--each time after a
fatal accident. Who must act: Congress, FAA. 6. Require
airlines to share training records. These may reveal
recurring weaknesses on such things as judgment and decision-
making, which wouldn't show up in FAA records. Today, the
records aren't shared because airlines fear invasion-of-
privacy lawsuits from former employees. Who must act:
Congress, FAA. 7. Set minimum qualifications for new airline
pilots. Currently, each airline sets its own standards, which
go up and down based on the supply of applicants. When
supplies are tight, airlines often hire pilots who would not
be considered when applicants are plentiful. Who must act:
FAA.
Problem: Training 8. Tighten monitoring of exemptions and
waivers to the FAA's minimum training standards. Most major
airlines now exceed the FAA's minimums because the airlines
deem them too low. Even so, the FAA allows some regional
airlines to shorten training programs if it is convinced
their alternatives won't compromise safety. Waivers are given
by regional FAA inspectors. There is no national database,
which makes monitoring difficult. Who must act: FAA. 9. Speed
up implementation of new techniques such as the Advanced
Qualification Program. AQP requires airlines to train pilots
as crews--rather than individually--which improves crew
coordination, a key factor in many accidents. AQP also
identifies marginal pilots sooner because pilots are tested
more often throughout the training process instead of just
once at the end. Who must act: FAA, airlines.
Problem: Testing 10. Require airlines to better monitor
pilots who barely pass flight tests. Now pilots pass or fail.
If they pass, they don't get more training. If they fail,
they do. The system does not recognize that some pilots pass
with ease while others struggle. Who must act: FAA, airlines.
Problem: Oversight 11. Encourage pilots to report unsafe
pilots by requiring airlines and unions to establish and
monitor reporting systems. Most airlines have union
committees for this, but it's not an FAA requirement. Who
must act: FAA, airlines. 12. Require the FAA to improve the
quality of its own databases, which often are incomplete and
inaccurate. The FAA has more than 25 databases collecting
information on such things as failed pilot tests and pilot
violations. The databases are supposed to help the FAA target
inspections at high-risk airlines, but inspectors cannot rely
on poor data. Who must act: FAA.
____
[From USA today, Sept. 28, 1995]
House Seeks Pilot Hearings: Airline Record-Sharing ``Part of Safety
Equation''
(By Julie Schmit and John Ritter)
The chairman of the House subcommittee on aviation
Wednesday called for hearings on requiring airlines to share
pilot performance records.
Record-sharing would prevent marginal pilots from moving
from airline to airline without the new employer learning
about past performance.
Rep. John Duncan, R-Tenn., responding to a USA Today
investigative report, said if airlines won't start sharing
records voluntarily, ``we will go for a legislative
solution.''
Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., Senate aviation subcommittee
chairman, said airlines may have to be exempted from civil
privacy suits. ``Safety is paramount, and we have to take
whatever steps are necessary.''
``Lives will be saved,'' said Jim Hall, National
Transportation Safety Board chairman. ``The flying public has
the right to know airlines are doing all they can to ensure
safety.''
Airlines are reluctant to share records because they say it
opens them to privacy suits.
But government reports show that since 1987, 111 have died
in seven crashes blamed on pilots' performance.
In some cases, those pilots had poor histories at other
airlines, information their new employer did not have.
``We welcome the interest'' in Congress, said FAA
administrator David Hinson. ``A pilot's record . . . is an
important part of the safety equation.''
The Air Line Pilots Association, the USA's largest pilot
union, wants airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration
and unions to develop national standards to screen
applicants.
Many of the several dozen pilots who called USA TODAY about
this week's three-part series said too many marginal pilots
continue flying.
____
[From USA Today, Sept. 27, 1995]
The Pilot Who Crashed Flight 3379
first time as a team, pilots made mistakes
(By John Ritter and Julie Schmit)
A stall warning horn blared again. ``Lower the nose, lower
the nose, lower the nose,'' co-pilot Matthew Sailor told
Hillis. By now, the plane was rotating left. ``It's the wrong
foot, wrong foot, wrong engine,'' Sailor said. Hillis, one of
several pilots with troubling flight records, tried in the
dark cockpit to control the plane. He pressed the wrong
rudder pedal. The rotation worsened. Six seconds
[[Page S 18291]]
later, the plane slammed into trees four miles from the runway at 200
mph.
December 13, 1994, an American Eagle Jetstream descends in
darkness, rain and fog toward Raleigh-Durham Airport.
A light blinks on, warning of possible engine failure.
Two pilots, flying together for the first time, scramble to
sort out what has gone wrong. Fifty seconds later, the twin-
engine turboprop slams into woods west of Raleigh at 200 mph.
Both pilots and 13 passengers die.
American Eagle officials believe the crew of Flight 3379
bungled a situation it was trained to handle. In November,
the National Transportation Safety Board is expected to
report--as it does in 7 out of 10 airplane accidents--that
the pilots made mistakes. Almost certainly the NTSB will
urge--for the fourth time in seven years--tougher background
checks of the nation's airline pilots.
What is clear from the third fatal crash in a year
involving a regional carrier--and the 18th in four years--is
that the flight captain, Michael Patrick Hillis, was a
marginal pilot who had managed to slip through the airline
industry's elaborate safety net. Moreover, the crash puts
under fresh scrutiny a decades-old, traditional-bound system
of hiring and training airline pilots.
The young Eagle captain had no violations on his record.
Hillis had never been in an accident. But he had failed tests
and shown poor judgment at two airlines. He had struggled
with landings easier than the one that confronted him out-
side Raleigh. He was not, his fellow pilots made clear, a man
they wanted to fly with in an emergency.
Shy, studious and unassuming, a quiet loner who found
relationships difficult, Hillis, 29, did not fit the take-
charge image of an airline pilot. An instructor who had him
in a small ground-school class weeks before the accident
couldn't remember him.
And throughout a five-year airline career, doubts had
persisted about his flying abilities.
``He was very indecisive and very hesitant,'' says his
pastor, the Rev. Robert D. Spradley. ``Unless he changed into
something other than what we saw when he got in the cockpit,
those emergency decisions must have been very difficult for
Mike.''
William Gruber, a 20-year pilot at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, concludes after reviewing Hillis'
career: ``I can't say I'd allow him to take command of an
aircraft.''
Hillis survived in a system that should have weeded him
out--a system of hiring, training and testing pilots that has
no fail-safe mechanism to keep track of marginal performers,
no way even to ensure that their records follow them from one
job to the next.
Flight 3379 underscores the randomness of air travel:
Pilots fly whole careers and never have an engine fail.
It underscores the contracts: The brief career of Hillis'
co-pilot, Matthew Sailor, was an exceptional and full of
promise as Hillis' was bumpy and unremarkable.
And it underscores the irony: On the eve of the fatal
flight, Hillis was ready to quit American Eagle. He had even
asked a friend about working at a Wal-Mart.
Most of all, Hillis' story underscores the imperfections of
the airline pilot system.
Eagle managers say Hillis was competent because he passed
every test he had to pass. ``We don't know any way we could
have caught this guy,'' says Robert Baker, vice president of
AMR, parent of American Eagle and American Airlines.
But a USA Today investigation reveals a less reassuring
picture of Hillis' hiring and advancement. Eagle never
learned the real reason he wanted to leave his first airline
for a lower-paying job at a second one.
Hillis was brought on board quickly by Eagle, an expanding
carrier eagerly hiring pilots. He didn't move up Eagle's
applicant pool gradually as Sailor, hired three years later,
did.
And, the preliminary crash report shows, when Hillis failed
an FAA check-ride--a key benchmark--Eagle ignored its own
rules and let the same examiner retest him.
In his Eagle file, Hillis had no evaluations by senior
captains he flew with his first year--a tool many airlines,
but not Eagle, use to identify poor performers.
He kept advancing, as he had since his first solo flight
not long after high school in 1984--from small single-engine
planes to twin engines, to planes that carried a few
passengers to planes that carried more.
But once he hit the airlines, troubles cropped up. When he
couldn't cut it in his first job, as a first officer at
Comair, a Cincinnati-based regional airline, Comair got rid
of him. That alone would have ended many careers, but not
this one.
Hillis' problems started in the first check-ride.
Hillis joined Comair as a co-pilot trainee in January 1990,
after flying four years for a small Memphis freight
operation. Weeks after arriving at Comair, he had his first
FAA check-ride and bombed.
In a check-ride, an examiner tests a pilot's skill on
takeoffs, approaches and landings. Hillis flunked three of
four landings, three of nine instrument procedures and one of
five takeoffs. Worse, he got what pilots liken to a scarlet
letter: ``unsatisfactory'' on judgment.
``It means the examiner believes the guy shouldn't be
flying,'' says Robert Iverson, a longtime Eastern Airlines
pilot and former KIWI Airlines top executive. ``It is a
subtle way to pass that along . . . to say, `Hey management,
you better wake up.' ''
Instead, Hillis got more training and passed his retest two
days later. But in his early flights, captains flying with
him commented that his landings were still weak.
In April 1990, Comair Capt. Mitchell Serber rated Hillis in
the lowest fifth of pilots on flight skills, but above
average on willingness to learn. Serber also found him
impatient, a ``very high-strung person . . . who gets upset
with his performance to the point it distracts him.''
He had ``functional knowledge of his duties'' but not a
good understanding of the plane. After a month in the cockpit
with Hillis, Serber rated ``his overall performance as
weak.'' He certainly wasn't ready to be a captain, Serber
felt. He should stay a first officer at least a year.
On evaluation forms that asked if they would be comfortable
flying as a passenger with Hillis, Serber and two other
captains checked ``no.''
But by December, one of those captains found him ``moody
and unpredictable'' and urged dismissal. Serber, after talks
with Comair chief pilot Roger Scott, agreed. He had never
recommended firing a pilot.
Senior pilots warned about Hillis' flight weaknesses.
Serber was worried, he told safety investigators after the
crash, that Hillis would get tunnel vision in an emergency.
His timing was off: ``Mike was frequently behind the
airplane.'' He often lost situational awareness. He would
``make large abrupt corrections, mostly on instrument
approaches.'' These deficiencies would all come into play in
the crash.
But even senior pilots' warnings weren't enough to get
Hillis fired. He was allowed to resign, on Jan. 3, 1991,
after less than a year at the airline. Comair won't discuss
details, but vice president K. Michael Stuart says,
``Our system at a very early point determined that there
was a problem and we took care of it.''
Took care of it to a point. Unknown to Comair, in October
Hillis had applied for a job at Nashville Eagle, a regional
carrier flying under American Eagle's logo. In an application
letter he said he wanted to return to Tennessee.
On paper, he was a dream candidate: 2,100 flight hours,
above the 1,500 Eagle requires. And as a working airline
pilot, he had had more training than most. ``We naturally
assume they know what they're doing,'' says American's Baker.
Eagle officials had no idea Hillis was on thin ice at
Comair. They sent Comair a questionnaire they send all
previous employers. Hillis even authorized Comair in writing
to furnish information. One of the questions was, ``To what
degree was this person's job performance satisfactory?''
Comair didn't send the form back, Eagle executives say.
Rarely will an airline release information about a pilot.
Comair says it provides only dates of employment. Eagle has
the same policy. So do many companies outside the aviation
industry. They won't risk invasion of privacy and defamation
suits from ex-employees.
``Sure, we'll ask for more,'' says former Eagle president
Bob Martens, ``but we don't get it for the same reason we
don't give it out: We're subject to lawsuits from
individuals.''
But privacy lawyers say there's no liability if the
information is true. ``It's a phobia companies have,'' says
Robert Ellis Smith, a Providence, R.I., privacy lawyer. ``I
call it a conspiracy of silence.''
But not by all. Some airlines won't hire without
information from previous employers. They want to know: Would
you hire this person again? ``If we don't get a response to
that, we don't hire,'' says William Traub, United Airlines
vice president.
Hiring without knowing how well a pilot performed elsewhere
worries safety experts. Three times since 1988, the NTSB has
urged the FAA to require airlines to do detailed background
checks before they hire and to provide the records of their
former pilots when another airline requests them. The FAA has
said enforcing such regulations would be too costly.
But since December's crash, FAA officials are considering
ways to require carriers to share information.
American officials, in hindsight, acknowledge the value of
sharing previous employment records. They want the FAA or
Congress to mandate it. ``We're already doing it with drug
and alcohol testing,'' Baker says. ``We're required by law to
pass that information on.'' The information goes into an FAS
database, which airlines can access.
But when Hillis applied, Eagle relied--as it still does
today--on its own screening and training to spot unworthy
pilots.
In that process, senior captains grill applicants on
cockpit situations. A security agency investigates gaps in
work history. Driving records are examined. There's a flight
test in an aircraft simulator and a medical exam, which,
like those at most airlines, exceeds FAA requirements.
Hillis went through his screening on Oct. 24, 1990, and
passed. But there should have been concern. He lacked two
qualifications Eagle prefers in its pilots: a college degree
and an airline transport pilot certificate, the highest class
of license.
In a Cessna simulator, Hillis flew adequately, and
evaluator Sam White saw ``very good captain potential.'' But
White also noticed that Hillis leveled off too low after
descending form cruise altitude, and was slow to correct the
mistake.
When asked if he had ever been fired or asked to resign
from a job, Hillis could honestly answer no. It wasn't until
two months
[[Page S 18292]]
later that Comair would force him out. There's no record that Eagle
asked him during the screening about his work there.
Jennings Furlough, an Eagle flight standards manager who
interviewed Hillis, pronounced him a ``very good candidate.''
On Jan. 7, 1991, four days after leaving Comair, he began
first officer training in a 19-passenger Jetstream turboprop.
Co-pilot Sailor came from a different flight background:
As Hillis started a new job, the co-pilot who died with him
in the crash, Matthew Sailor, was beginning his final
semester in aeronautical studies at the University of North
Dakota in Grand Forks, one of the top collegiate aviation
programs.
Over the next two years, Sailor, 22, would build a solid
resume flying as an instructor pilot to gain hours. ``He was
very proficient, one of the best we've had,'' says Joe
Sheble, owner of Sheble Aviation in Bullhead City, Ariz.,
where Sailor earned advanced pilot and instructor ratings and
spend hundreds of hours teaching students how to handle
engine failure. ``He was probably as comfortable flying with
one engine as two,'' Sheble says.
Eagle hired Sailor in December 1993, two years after he
applied. He had both the college degree and top pilot
certificate Hillis had lacked. In contrast to Hillis, two
captains rated Sailor outstanding his first year, one of the
airline's best first officers.
By the time Sailor was hired, Hillis had been with Eagle
almost three years. His first year was unremarkable. A month
into his initial training as a first officer, he passed an
FAA check-ride in a Jetstream.
But in January 1992 he faced a crucial decision. Eagle's
``up or out'' policy meant he had to upgrade to captain when
he rose high enough on the pilot seniority list or leave the
company. ``We do not want people to make careers of being co-
pilots,'' Baker says. Most airlines agree.
This was seven months after Command Airlines and Nashville
Eagle had merged to form Flagship, one of the four American
Eagle carriers. the new carrier was expanding rapidly.
It needed captains, and many first officers were upgrading.
It's not clear how eager Hillis was, but he had no choice. In
1993, the policy changed, and Eagle began allowing first
officers to defer upgrades up to a year.
Hillis began captain training in a Shorts 360, a 36-seat
turboprop. Almost immediately, he had problems.
Watching him in a simulator, instructor Ray Schaub rated
him unsatisfactory on two maneuvers. One was handling an
engine failure. The other was for not executing a go-around
of the airport after an engine failed on approach--the very
situation he would confront before the crash. After 15
sessions Hillis passed his captain's check-ride and began
flying out of Raleigh-Durham.
Less than four months later, he was back in a Jetstream
when the number of Shorts captains was reduced. Now he had to
recertify in the plane he'd flown before as co-pilot.
Records show once more he struggled, blowing an approach
and flunking an FAA check-ride for the second time in his
career. He got his second unsatisfactory on judgment.
At most airlines, including Eagle, two failed check-rides
and two unsatisfactories on judgment would get a pilot kicked
out. But Eagle knew nothing of the record at Comair.
Hillis' FAA examiner, Kevin Cline, told investigators he
failed about 1 in 5 pilots, but only 2 percent or 3 percent
got an unsatisfactory in judgment.
Hillis got 1.8 more hours of simulator training. Then Cline
retested him, even though Eagle's policy is for another
examiner to retest. Cline passed him the second time.
Assigned to Raleigh-Durham, Hillis flew uneventfully for
the next two years. Eagle records show he passed eight checks
from September 1993 to July 1994.
Rumors spread and one pilot balked at flying with Hillis:
If Hillis struggled during those tests, a record wouldn't
have been kept at Eagle's training academy. That is Eagle's
policy, approved by the FAA, so that instructors make no
assumptions about how a pilot will perform.
But while Hillis was bearing up in the Eagle training
academy's predictable environment, pilots he was flying with
at Raleigh-Durham were talking about his indecisiveness and
poor judgment.
On Nov. 18, 1994, Sandra O'Steen was scheduled to be
Hillis' co-pilot from Raleigh to Knoxville, Tenn. She'd heard
the rumors and told Raleigh base manager Art Saboski she
didn't want to fly with Hillis--the only time she'd ever done
that.
Saboski confronted O'Steen: Did she want to be judged on
rumor? She said no and agreed to fly. During the flight,
Hillis asked her about the rumors. Ignore them, O'Steen said.
Later, she e-mailed Saboski that the flight ``went by the
book,'' signing off ``sorry for the fuss.'' She told
investigators that Hillis' flying skills were OK, but he
wasn't decisive.
Hillis was so upset about the rumors that he called Saboski
at home on a Saturday. They met on Monday, and Hillis told
his boss his reputation was being smeared. Saboski asked
Hillis twice if he thought he needed more training. ``He
pooh-poohed it,'' Saboski says. The meeting ended.
Saboski, who was supervising nearly 300 pilots, was torn.
``Rumors fly like crazy,'' he says. ``The pilots are a
fraternity. But there's always a question in my mind as to
whether there's truth in what's being said.''
Former Eagle president Martens agrees Saboski did not have
enough information to act on.
Everyone's morale was low; layoffs were expected:
Three weeks later, on Dec. 10, American Eagle announced it
was pulling out of Raleigh-Durham. Low morale plunged lower.
Pilots were angry because they'd have to relocate or be
furloughed. They'd been grumbling all year about their
contract. They felt overworked and underpaid. Hillis shared
the anger, and the announcement, along with the flap over
rumors, apparently galvanized a decision to quit. He called
in sick on the 10th, 11th and 12th.
``I tried to contact him. I knew something was going on,''
says Jody Quinn, a friend since Hillis had come to Raleigh
two years before. He was, she says, not a hard person to
figure out: ``Just a good ol' down-to-earth everyday person.
But incredibly conscientious. On top of everything. Very
together and organized.''
To Quinn and North Carolina State University students Brent
Perry and Mike Parsons, who shared a house with him, Hillis
was a dedicated churchgoer, a man who liked nature and
photography. He studied a lot--especially airplane manuals
and economics. He'd accumulated 42 hours at Memphis State
University and was now taking courses at N.C. State.
``He'd bounced around from here to there to everywhere,''
Quinn says, ``and he just liked North Carolina and decided to
stay. . . . He wanted to finally finish something, finish his
degree. He wanted some roots.''
Hillis' mother, Theresa Myers of Wauchula, Fla., says her
son loved flying but was uncertain about his future. ``I
never wanted him to fly,'' she says. ``I wanted him to get a
college degree, and in the end I think that's what he wanted,
too.''
Spradley, his pastor, thought Hillis battled depression.
``He lacked self-confidence and personal strength, not just
in his spiritual life but his social life as well. He didn't
make friends easily and while he wanted them desperately, he
didn't seem to know how to manage friendships.''
A job at Wal-Mart began to look appealing:
On Monday the 12th, Hillis studied for a final in his
economics class. He and Parsons watched the Monday Night
Football game, but Hillis was brooding about his future. He
asked Perry how he like working at Wal-Mart and whether it
had good benefits. ``He didn't like the idea of being
unemployed,'' Perry says.
The two talked about the Raleigh-Durham hub closing, and
Hillis said he was thinking of quitting that week. ``We
prayed about it, prayed about what he hoped to do,'' Persons
says.
Hillis' scheduled co-pilot the next day, Sailor, spent that
night in a hotel near the airport. Based in Miami, Sailor was
assigned temporarily to Raleigh-Durham. He had been an Eagle
pilot just a year, but told friends he wasn't worried about
being laid off.
He and Hillis--who had never met--were scheduled for a two-
day trip Tuesday and Wednesday. They flew the initial 38-
minute leg to Greensboro on Tuesday afternoon uneventfully.
As they took a break before flying the second leg, back to
Raleigh, Hillis told airport service rep Sara Brickhouse,
``The company doesn't care about me.'' He was somber and
unhappy, she told investigators.
Less than two hours later, as the Jetstream descended
toward final approach into Raleigh, a small amber ignition
light, the left one, flashed on. Hillis, flying the plane,
said: ``Why's that ignition light on? We just had a flameout
(engine failure)?''
Sailor answered: ``I'm not sure what's going on with it.''
Then Hillis declared: ``We had a flameout.''
The timing was bad. The plane, carrying a maximum weight
load and its engines on idle, was quickly slowing down. It
was at a point when Hillis should have been applying power to
maintain minimum approach speed.
For 30 seconds, he and Sailor considered what to do as the
plane stayed stable on its glide slope. They'd already
lowered the landing gear and set the flaps for landing.
Hillis decided to continue the approach and asked Sailor to
back him up. Twice the cockpit recorder caught the sound of
propellers out of sync.
Then Hillis made a fateful decision: He would abandon the
approach, fly around the airport and try another landing. It
would give them time to work the problem. Sailor said, ``All
right.''
The plane by then had slowed dangerously. A stall warning
horn blared, and Hillis called for maximum power in the good
engine to gain speed. But he apparently failed to make two
critical adjustments. Powering up the right engine would
cause the plane to rotate left. To counter that, he should
have raised the left wing and set full right rudder.
A stall warning horn blared again. ``Lower the nose, lower
the nose, lower the nose,'' Sailor told Hillis, to gain speed
and lift. Three seconds later, both stall horns went off.
Again, Sailor said, ``Lower the nose.'' By now, the plane was
rotating steeply left.
Then, ``it's the wrong foot, wrong foot, wrong engine,''
Sailor said. Hillis trying in the dark cockpit to counter the
rotation and control the plane, had pressed the wrong rudder
pedal with his foot. The rotation, or yaw, only worsened.
[[Page S 18293]]
Six seconds later, at 6:34 p.m. ET, the plane slammed into
trees four miles from the runway at 200 mph. Fifteen of the
20 on board died.
From wreckage, investigators determined that at impact both
engines were functioning fully. Experts familiar with the
flight data say Hillis misdiagnosed the ignition light and
overreacted--escalating a minor anomaly into a catastrophe.
Familiar flaws had shown up again, this time for real:
suspect landing skills; the tendency to make major, abrupt
corrections; poor judgment. Preoccupied by the engine
problem--the tunnel vision others had worried about--Hillis
ignored the first rule in an emergency: keep flying the
plane.
He decided unequivocally that he had a dead engine but then
didn't conform it by advancing the throttle or checking the
rpm gauge.
The left engine could have lost power then regained it. One
thing the light is designed to indicate is that an internal
system is trying automatically to reignite the engine.
But in training, according to crash investigation records,
Eagle pilots were taught an ignition light coming on meant
only one thing: flameout.
Eagle instructors followed the operating manual of the
Jetstream's manufacturer, British Aerospace. Less than a
month after the crash, the company issued a ``Notice to
Operators'' that clarified what it means when the light comes
on. And Eagle has since changed its training manual.
The decision not to land turned out to be fatal.
In post-crash tests, investigators found that sometimes,
with engines at idle, the light came on when propeller speed
levers were advanced quickly. Hillis had done that five
seconds before he saw the light.
One thing is clear: Most pilots, trained to land planes on
one engine, would have shut down the bad engine and landed--
not tried a go-around at 1,800 feet. It was the decision to
circle that led to the sequence of events that caused the
crash.
Sailor must have sensed what was happening. As an
instructor in Arizona, he'd logged hundreds of hours teaching
people to handle engine failure in flight. American's Baker
is convinced, reading the voice transcript, that he ``had a
much better sense of what was going on.''
Pilots who have read transcripts of the final seconds give
this interpretation:
Sailor's comments seem intended to keep Hillis on track. ``
'K, you got it?'' he asks Hillis seconds after the light came
on. (Translation: Are you going to keep flying the plane?)
Then, ``We lost an engine?'' (You want the engine-out
procedure?)
Later, ``Watta you want me to do; you gonna continue'' the
approach? And Hillis says: ``OK, yeah. I'm gonna continue.
Just back me up.''
Fifteen seconds before impact, the plane slipping out of
control, Sailor says, ``You got it?'' (You want me to take
it?)
Finally, six seconds to impact, the recorder catches one
last word, from Sailor: ``Here.'' (Here, give it to me.)
But if Sailor thought the captain was in trouble, shouldn't
he have suggested shutting down the engine? And if he did
finally grab the plane from Hillis, why did he wait until it
was too late?
``It's a very difficult move,'' Baker says, ``But if I saw
the treetops coming up, you'd have to fight me for that
airplane.''
In the culture of airline cockpits, co-pilots assume that
seasoned captains know what they're doing. Sailor had been
flying as a first officer less than a year. On loan from
Miami, he probably hadn't heard the rumors about Hillis.
Otherwise, he might have been more assertive.
The NTSB likely will criticize Eagle for not giving pilots
enough training in cockpit teamwork. But questions remain:
Was the crew--Hillis and Sailor--dysfunctional? Did Hillis,
the pilot in command with the questionable record, fail when
it mattered most?
Or were Hillis and Flight 3379's passengers the victims of
a system that failed?
____
[From USA Today, Sept. 26, 1995]
Marginal Pilots Put Passengers' Lives at Risk
(By Julie Schmit and John Ritter)
Marvin Falitz, a pilot at Express II Airlines, failed three
flight tests in six years, hit a co-pilot and was suspended
once for sleeping in the cockpit during a flight.
On Dec. 1, 1993, on a short trip from Minneapolis to
Hibbing, Minn., Falitz tried a risky, steep approach.
Flight 5719, a Northwest Airlines commuter, crashed short
of the runway. All 18 on board died. Investigators blamed
Falitz. They also blamed the airline for ignoring repeated
warnings about his performance.
Other airlines have ignored warnings about bad pilots, too,
and passengers have died because of them.
Since November 1987, pilots with documented histories of
bad judgment, reckless behavior or poor performance have
caused six other fatal crashes--all but one on small
airlines. Death toll: 111, including crewmembers.
A USA Today investigation--including reviews of the
government's own safety reports--has found that despite the
nation's elaborate air safety system, marginal pilots get and
keep jobs. This is particularly true at commuter, or
regional, airlines, which often run on small budgets and hire
the least-experienced pilots.
At regionals, hiring standards vary widely and are
sometimes dangerously low. Training and testing procedures
don't catch all marginal pilots. A system of independent
contractors who test and license pilots is ripe for abuse.
And airlines are sometimes reluctant to fire bad pilots.
These problems are about to get worse: A shortage of well-
qualified pilots is expected through the next 15 years
because the military, which used to train 90% of U.S. airline
pilots, is training fewer and keeping them longer. At the
same time, demand for pilots is exploding, especially at
regionals--the fastest-growing segment of U.S. aviation.
``The surplus of quality pilot applicants is about to
end,'' says Robert Besco, pilot-performance expert and
retired American Airlines pilot. ``It is a big problem. But
it is a tomorrow problem so the government and airlines have
their heads in the sand.''
The military has been a dependable supplier of pilots since
the passenger airline industry began growing after World War
II. It trains and tests pilots rigorously to weed out poor
performers.
As the supply of military pilots shrinks, regional airlines
will have to dip deeper into the pool of those trained at
civilian flight schools.
Regionals fly smaller planes between cities that major
airlines don't serve. Since 1988, major airlines have turned
over 65% of the routes less than 500 miles to commuters, says
airline analyst Sam Buttrick.
New regional pilots are paid $13,000 to $19,000 a year,
one-third of what major airlines pay new pilots. But
experience at that level can lead to lucrative jobs at the
majors.
Last year, new pilots hired by regionals that fly
turboprops had slightly more than half the experience of
pilots hired by major airlines. Yet regional pilots can fly
20% more hours than major airline pilots.
Their planes are less automated, and they fly at lower
altitudes where the weather is more severe. And because their
flights are shorter, regional pilots make more daily takeoffs
and landings, which is when most accidents occur.
According to government reports, for the past decade the
accident rate for regional airlines has been significantly
higher than the rate for major airlines. Still, accidents are
rare. People are nearly three times more likely to die in a
car than in a 15- to 19-seat plane, says aviation consultant
Morten Beyer.
The Federal Aviation Administration, which regulates
airlines, asserts regional airlines are safe--and getting
safer. Says Transportation Secretary Federico Pena: ``If
they're not, we shut them down.''
An analysis of official crash reports, however, shows that
some airlines are not always as safety conscious as they
should be--or as they say they are. The problems occur at
every stage in a pilot's career: licensing, hiring, training
and testing.
licensing: pilots can shop for easy examiners
To get a license to fly passenger planes, most pilots are
required by the FAA to have at least 191 hours of flying
time. Then they must pass FAA tests, usually given by FAA-
approved examiners for fees from $100 to $300. Pilots or
their instructors can choose the examiners. Just as lawyers
can shop for sympathetic judges, pilots can seek easy
testers.
``If you're a real hard-nosed examiner, you run the risk
that (they) aren't going to call you,'' says John Perdue, an
aviation consultant and a retired Delta pilot.
Some flight schools, concerned about abuse, will let
students take tests only from examiners they endorse. ``I
want to know that (students) are tested by someone who's not
giving away that ticket,'' says Steve Van Kirk, 49, at
Northwest Airlines pilot and owner of Control Aero Corp. in
Frederick, Md.
But not all flight schools are that strict. And the system
is vulnerable to other abuses, such as examiners who rush
through tests so they can do more in a day.
In 1987, Continental Airlines hired 26-year-old Lee
Bruecher as a co-pilot. He was flying a DC-9 when it crashed
shortly after takeoff in Denver. The captain, Bruecher and 26
others were killed. Bruecher had been fired in 1985 by Able
Aviation in Houston because he had a chronic problem of
becoming disoriented--a fact Continental failed to discover.
Safety investigator cited Continental for poor pre-
employment screening. Continental has since tightened its
screening procedures.
But Bruecher's career might have been cut short long before
he got to Continental. In 1983, he passed a test that allowed
him to fly multi-engine planes. Two months later, his
examiner was fired by the FAA for giving short, easy tests--
including one to Bruecher. FAA records say the examiner had
been under investigation for nine months.
Poor examiners remain a problem for the FAA. In May, it
revoked or suspended the licenses of 12 designated pilot
examiners for giving each other phony certificates, allowing
them to fly numerous types of planes. The FAA canceled the
certificates. It said none of the pilots had used them to fly
passengers. It appears the certificates were being collected
almost as a game.
hiring: fewer pilots, less cockpit experience
After pilots are licensed to fly passengers, most spend
years instructing others or flying
[[Page S 18294]]
cargo. Their goal: build flight hours to land jobs with airlines. Most
major airlines require at least 2,500 flight hours; most
regionals, at least 1,500. Most pilots, when hired, exceed
the minimums.
But when faced with a shortage of pilots, airlines lower
their standards.
In 1985, 22% of new regional pilots had fewer than 2,000
hours, says FAPA, an Atlanta-based aviation information
service. In 1990, when regionals faced tight pilot supplies,
44% of new pilots had fewer than 2,000 flight hours.
Even in years when pilots are plentiful, regionals hire
less experienced pilots.
In 1992, GP-Express hired pilot Vernon Schuety, 29, who had
850 flight hours, and pilot James Meadows, 24, who had 1,100
hours. That June, the two flew together for the first time.
They crashed near Anniston, Ala., while attempting to land.
Three people died.
Investigators said the pilots lost awareness of the plane's
position and blamed pilot inexperience, among other things.
The flight was Capt. Schuety's first unsupervised flight as
an airline pilot. GP-Express, a Continental Express carrier,
had made him a captain right away, without the usual co-pilot
experience.
GP-Express president George Poullos says the pilots met all
of the FAA's requirements and that the airline only hires
pilots who meet or exceed the FAA's minimums.
hiring: little background checking is required
On April 22, 1992, Tomy International Flight 22, doing
business as air-taxi Scenic Air Tours, hit a mountain on the
island of Maui, Hawaii.
The pilot, Brett Jones, 26, and eight passengers died.
Investigators said Jones failed to use navigational aids to
stay clear of the mountain. He flew into clouds that hid it.
Investigators faulted the air taxi for not checking Jones'
background properly and faulted the FAA for not requiring
substantive background checks for all pilots. Jones,
investigators' records show, had been fired by five
employers, including a major airline, for poor performance.
He also lied about his flight experience.
Tomy International didn't uncover those facts because it
didn't have a policy of verifying an applicant's background.
The FAA started requiring a five-year employment check in
1992. Jones was hired in 1991.
The pre-employment check into Jones' aeronautical
background consisted of one phone call to a charter and cargo
airline, where Jones had worked one year. That operator said
Jones departed in good standing.
Jones also received a recommendation from the previous
owner of Tomy International, who had once employed him as a
van driver.
Tomy International did not return repeated phone calls.
The FAA requires airlines to do very little when checking
an applicant's background. They must verify that the
applicant has a pilot license; check motor vehicle records
for alcohol or drug suspensions; and verify the applicant's
employment for the previous five years.
The FAA does not require airlines to verify flight
experience, nor to check FAA records for accidents,
violations, warnings or fines--or if an applicant has a
criminal history.
``They are strongly encouraged to check all those things
and we make it easy for them to do that,'' says Jeff Thal,
FAA spokesman.
Most important, an airline is not required to find out how
an applicant performed at any previous airline.
Airlines do give applicants flight and oral tests. And most
check FAA records and driving histories for more than just
alcohol or drug convictions. Two speeding tickets over a year
can get an applicant rejected at Southwest Airlines, for
example.
``They're not law-abiding,'' says Paul Sterbenz,
Southwest's vice president of flight operations.
But an analysis of government crash reports shows that poor
pre-employment screening has contributed to passenger deaths.
Consider the Jan. 19, 1988, crash of a Trans-Colorado
plane, a now-defunct Continental Express carrier, near
Bayfield, Colo. Both pilots and seven passengers died.
Investigators faulted the pilots.
The captain, Stephen Silver, 36, had used cocaine the night
before the flight. His pre-employment record included a non-
fatal crash landing on the wrong runway, a suspended driver's
license and five moving vehicle violations in three years.
Co-pilot Ralph Harvey, 42, had been fired from another
regional airline for poor performance. his pre-employment
record also included two alcohol-related driving convictions
and one non-driving alcohol conviction.
At the time, the FAA did not require airlines to check for
alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions. Trans-Colorado
executives told investigators they were unaware of Harvey's
alcohol history, and Silver's driving history and previous
crash.
In another example, Aloha IslandAir hired Bruce Pollard. In
1989, Pollard crashed into a mountain, killing himself and 19
others. Investigators cited Pollard's recklessness and
faulted the airline's hiring procedures. IslandAir didn't
check with Pollard's previous employers, the accident
investigation showed.
Two previous employers said he was careless and one of them
was about to fire him before he resigned to join IslandAir.
IslandAir learned. After the crash, it added tough
screening procedures that weeded out the pilot who later was
involved in Tomy International's 1992 Maui crash.
No airline checks what could be the most important records
of all: an applicant's training records at previous airlines.
To do so could run afoul of privacy laws, they say, and
subject the airline that shared them to suits.
Nonetheless, many airlines refuse to hire a pilot unless
they get a good reference from a previous airline-employer.
Threat of lawsuit or not.
But actual training records aren't shared. Those reveal how
pilots make decisions, handle stress and work with others--
insights that don't show up in FAA data and insights airlines
are hesitant to share.
If training records had been shared, 15 people might not
have died on Dec. 13, 1994, when an American Eagle plane
crashed near Raleigh-Durham, N.C. A preliminary government
report points to pilot error. Capt. Michael Hillis, 29, was
distracted by an engine failure warning light. While figuring
out what to do, he and his co-pilot let the plane lose too
much speed. It crashed four miles from the runway.
Hillis had been forced to resign from his first regional,
Comair, because his superiors worried about his skills and
decision-making abilities--facts documented in training
records that Eagle never saw.
The American Eagle crash has the FAA reconsidering its
stance, and Pena says he would support legislation to mandate
sharing of information between airlines.
``We need to have that. I don't want unqualified pilots
flying those planes,'' he says.
training: faa doesn't keep track of all the waivers given
Once hired, pilots have to go through their airline's
training program. The FAA approves each program. The airlines
set requirements based on FAA minimums that are so low most
major airlines exceed them, sometimes by 50%.
``They are the floor and should be viewed that way,'' says
William Traub, vice president of flight standards for United
Airlines.
Regionals are much less likely to exceed the minimums. Some
even fall short. Of 16 larger regionals surveyed at random by
USA TODAY, seven--including four American Eagle carriers--
said they were allowed to reduce training below FAA minimums.
The airlines say they were able to prove their programs were
superior or sufficient, even with fewer training hours.
The FAA keeps track of training exemptions, which are
granted by Washington after a formal review. But it doesn't
keep track of waivers, which are granted at the regional
level. The FAA doesn't even keep a central record of how many
waivers have been given.
The FAA even grants training waivers to its own inspectors.
In 1992, the Department of Transportation inspector general
criticized the FAA for allowing 18% of inspectors to skip
ongoing training designed to keep them sharp.
The FAA says safety is not compromised. ``The word
exemption does not mean we're giving anybody anything,'' says
FAA Administrator David Hinson. He says exemptions allow
airlines to use new techniques without waiting for new FAA
rules.
But the agency has rescinded waivers and exemptions after
crashes. For eight years, the FAA allowed Henson Airlines,
now Piedmont Airlines, to cut pilot flight training hours by
about 40%. That was rescinded in 1985 after 14 people died
when a plane crashed near Grottoes, Va.
Investigators blamed inadequate pilot training, among other
things. Currently, Piedmont has no training exemptions and
exceeds the FAA's minimum training requirements.
The FAA's willingness to grant waivers or exemptions
spotlights a flaw in its structure, safety experts say. The
agency has two missions: to promote aviation and to regulate
it. Critics say they are in conflict.
When an inspector decides on a waiver that might help a
carrier financially, is safety compromised? The FAA says no.
Others wonder.
``The FAA is understaffed and politically invaded,'' says
aviation consultant Michael Boyd, president of Aviation
Systems Research Corp. ``The system is corrupt.''
testing: in pass/fail, no one knows who barely passed
Few professionals undergo as much training and testing as
pilots. Each year, most captains must have at least two
flight tests called ``check-rides.'' Co-pilots have one.
These flights with an examiner test a pilot's skill on such
things as takeoffs, approaches and landings.
``Check-rides are a series of practiced maneuvers,'' says
Robert Iverson, former Eastern Airlines pilot and former CEO
of KIWI International Airlines. ``Practiced enough, even
marginal pilots can pass.''
In addition, pilots are graded pass/fail. If they fail,
they are pulled from the cockpit to get more training. Within
days, they are retested. If pilots pass check-rides, as more
than 90% do, they keep flying.
The pass/fail system does not recognize that some pilots
pass with ease while others struggle.
A small percentage, 1% to 2%, barely pass, flight
instructors say. Others put the percentage higher.
``Maybe 5% are getting by, but probably shouldn't be,''
says Van Kirk, the Northwest pilot. Even if 1% are just
getting by, that would be more than 500 U.S. airline pilots.
[[Page S 18295]]
In a 1994 review of major airline accidents, the NTSB
called check-rides ``subjective'' and noted differences among
airlines in how they graded pass/fail.
And most airlines do not keep closer tabs on pilots who
barely pass.
United is an exception. If pilots struggle through check-
rides but pass, they are retested within two months instead
of the usual six or 12 months, Traub says.
If Express II had a policy of following struggling pilots
more closely, pilot Marvin Falitz, who crashed near Hibbing,
Minn., might have been weeded out. He failed three check-
rides--in 1988, 1992 and 1993. In 1987, he failed an oral
exam. Each time, Falitz was retrained and retested the same
day. Not surprisingly, he passed, and continued flying.
On two tests, he failed working with other pilots--what
investigators faulted him for in the crash.
Since the crash, Express has intensified pilot training.
``Hibbing was an isolated incident and an unfortunate
incident,'' says Phil Reed, vice president of marketing. ``We
run a safe airline.''
After the crash, Northwest Airlines insisted that all of
its commuter partners, including Express, train to the
highest FAA standards.
firing: pilots are allowed to quit rather than be fired
Even when an airline decides a pilot is unfit to fly, the
pilot isn't always fired. Comair, a Delta Connection carrier,
didn't fire Michael Hillis. It let him resign. Hillis did and
started at American Eagle four days later.
Many U.S. airlines will let marginal pilots resign rather
than fire them. The reasons: Airlines fear being sued, and
problem pilots go away quicker if given an easy way out.
``They're gone with fewer repercussions,'' says Southwest's
Sterbenz.
Letting pilots resign often puts them back in the cockpit--
of another airline. Still, airlines defend the practice.
``The airlines are pretty diligent in looking out for those
people'' who have resigned, says Tom Bagley, vice president
of flight operations for Scenic Airlines.
Not always. American Eagle knew Hillis had resigned from
Comair. Hillis told Eagle he wanted to live in a different
city. But Eagle didn't know Hillis had been forced to resign.
Comair didn't provide that information, Eagle says, and the
FAA doesn't require airlines to pass on that information.
The reluctance to fire pilots goes beyond fear of lawsuits,
however. It is tied to the status and deference that pilots
enjoy and to the high cost of training new pilots.
``Airlines carry weak pilots for long periods,'' says Diane
Damos, a University of Southern California aviation
psychologist. ``It's just part of the culture.''
Says aviation lawyer Arthur Wolk: ``It's aviation's good
old boy network. Nobody wants to trash a pilot.''
Co-pilot Kathleen Digan, 28, was given the benefit of the
doubt and later crashed a plane, killing herself and 11
others. Digan was hired in 1987 by AVAir Inc., doing business
as American Eagle. She was flying a plane that crashed on
Feb. 19, 1988, in Raleigh-Durham, N.C.
During a check-ride her first year, the examiner said Digan
needed more work on landings. Another called her job
``unsatisfactory'' and recommended she be fired. A captain
who flew with her said she ``overcontrolled'' the plane.
But Digan wasn't let go. AVAir's director of operations
defended the decision to keep her, telling investigators:
``She had invested a lot in our company and our company had
invested a lot in her.''
Even the FAA has protected poor pilots. On Oct. 26, 1993,
three FAA employees died in a crash near Front Royal, Va.
Safety officials blamed Capt. Donald Robbins, 55.
That was no surprise. During his 10-year career, Robbins
flunked three FAA tests. He had two drunken-driving
convictions. Eight co-pilots avoided flying with him, and
several complained to supervisors. Nothing was done. In fact,
in Robbins' last evaluation, his supervisor gave him a
positive review and complimented him on his ability to ``get
along well with his fellow workers.''
The path pilots take to the cockpit: 1. Enter military or
civilian flight school. 2. Pass test to get private license;
can't work for hire. 3. Pass test to get commercial license;
can work for hire. 4. Many military pilots get jobs at
airlines after leaving military. Flight school pilots fly
cargo or work as instructors to build experience. 5. Get job
as co-pilot at regional airline. 6. Pass airline's training
program. 7. Pass test to fly certain type of plane. Testing
required each time a pilot switches to new type of plane. 8.
Spend first year on probation; get reviews; pass first-year
test. 9. Pass test to get air transport license; required to
become captain. 10. As captain, must pass medical and two
flight tests every year.
Regional airlines scramble for pilots. Growth in commuter
or ``regional'' air travel, coupled with a decrease in the
number of military-trained pilots, has forced airlines to
hire more pilots trained in civilian flight schools.
Military training fewer pilots 1992 3,742 1996 2,678(1).
Regional airline business soaring Passengers (in millions)
1984 26 1995 60(1).
Ranking salaries Average second-year pay for a regional
airline co-pilot, compared with the median pay for other
jobs: Secretary, $19,100; Phone operator, $19,100; Data entry
clerk, $17,150; Co-pilot, $15,600; Receptionist, $15,400; and
Bank teller, $14,600.
Comparing accident rates Accident rates for regional
airlines that fly planes with 30 or fewer seats are higher
than rates for regionals with bigger planes and major
airlines. Rates per 100,000 flights:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984 1994
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small regionals............................... .82 .32
Major airlines, large regionals............... .23 .24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this three-day series, USA TODAY reporters John Ritter,
and Julie Schmit set out to learn how a marginal pilot
slipped through the safety net of a U.S. airline and crashed
near Raleigh-Durham last December. They discovered more than
one poor pilot had kept flying and that, if nothing changes,
more are likely to.
Ritter and Schmit analyzed accident reports since 1985 and
obtained FAA documents on current aviation practices through
the Freedom of Information Act.
Other sources included the National Transportation Safety
Board, which investigates accidents, the General Accounting
Office, the Federal Aviation Administration, airline
executives, union officials, pilots and safety
experts.
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