[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 195 (Friday, December 8, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18287-S18295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. McCAIN:
  S. 1641. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, relating to 
required employment investigations of pilots; to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

[[Page S 18288]]



         the air transportation safety improvement act of 1995

 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I introduce the Air Transportation 
Safety Improvement Act of 1995, which will go a along way to ensure the 
continued safety of those who use the nation's air transportation 
system. Clearly, this legislation complements current more 
comprehensive efforts to improve the Federal Aviation Administration 
and to enhance the safety and efficiency of the air traffic management 
system. In specific, this bill will permit the transfer of relevant 
employment and training records to prospective employers when an 
individual has applied for a position as a pilot.
  The bill necessarily focuses on encouraging and facilitating the flow 
of information between employers so that safety is not compromised. In 
addition, to ensure that the burden of this legislation does not fall 
on employers and the legal system, when a transfer is requested and 
complied with, both the employer who turns over the requested records 
and the prospective employer who receives them will be immune from 
lawsuits related to the transferred information. Complete immunity is 
critical--without it, the legislative cannot achieve its objective of 
making it a common practice of prospective employers to research the 
experience of pilots and to learn significant information that could 
affect air carrier hiring decisions and, ultimately, airline safety.
  After reviewing information about certain investigations and 
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, I have 
become very concerned about deficiencies in the pre-employment 
screening of pilots. Right now, the FAA requires airlines only to 
determine whether a pilot applicant has a pilot license, to check the 
applicant's driving record for alcohol or drug suspensions, and to 
verify that person's employment for the five previous years. Yet, the 
FAA does not require airlines to confirm flight experience or how a 
pilot applicant performed at previous airlines. The NTSB, however, 
after studying certain airline accidents that were determined to be 
caused by pilot error, has recommended three times since 1988 that 
airlines should be required to check information about a pilot 
applicant's prior flight experience and performance with other 
carriers.
  Compounding my concern about the insufficient sharing of pilot 
performance records among employers is that in the near future, there 
may be a shortage of well-qualified U.S. airline pilots because the 
military, which in the past has regularly trained the vast majority of 
airline pilots, will be training fewer of them. This will happen at the 
same time that the demand for pilots at U.S. major and regional 
carriers increases. Since many future pilots will not have experienced 
rigorous and reliable military aviation training, the ability of 
prospective employers to have access to records from previous employers 
will be even more critical to airline and passenger safety.
  Safety in our nation's air transportation system is paramount. I 
believe this bill will not only encourage employers to make more 
thorough background checks of the pilots they hire, but will also 
enhance safety.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this legislation and 
certain newspaper articles dealing with this matter be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1461

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
     section 44936 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end thereof the following:
       ``(f) Records of Employment.--
       ``(1) In general.--An air carrier or foreign air carrier 
     receiving an application for employment from an individual 
     seeking a position as a pilot may request and receive records 
     described in paragraph (2) relating to that individual's 
     employment from any person who has employed that individual 
     at any time during the 5 years preceding the application.
       ``(2) Records to which subsection applies.--The records 
     referred to in paragraph (1) are--
       ``(A) the personnel file of the individual;
       ``(B) any records maintained under the regulations set 
     forth in--
       ``(i) section 121.683 of title 14, Code of Federal 
     Regulations;
       ``(ii) paragraph (A) of section VI, appendix I, part 121 of 
     title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
       ``(iii) section 125.401 of title 14, Code of Federal 
     Regulations;
       ``(iv) section 127.301 of title 14, Code of Federal 
     Regulations; and
       ``(v) section 135.63(a)(4) of title 14, Code of Federal 
     Regulations; and ``(C) any other records concerning--
       ``(i) the training, qualifications, proficiency, or 
     professional competence of the individual;
       ``(ii) any disciplinary action taken by the employer with 
     respect to the individual; and
       ``(iii) the release from employment, resignation, 
     termination, or disqualification of the individual.
       ``(3) Right to receive notice and copy of any record 
     furnished.--An individual whose employment records have been 
     requested under paragraph (1) of this subsection--
       ``(A) shall receive written notice from each person 
     providing a record in response to a request under paragraph 
     (1) of the individual's right to receive such copies; and
       ``(B) is entitled to receive copies of any records provided 
     by the individual's employer or a former employer to any air 
     carrier or foreign air carrier.
       ``(4) Reasonable charges for processing requests and 
     furnishing copies.--A person who receives a request under 
     paragraph (1) may establish a reasonable charge for the cost 
     of processing the request and furnishing copies of the 
     requested records.
       ``(5) Standard forms.--The Administrator shall promulgate--
       ``(A) standard forms which may be used by an air carrier or 
     foreign air carrier to request records under paragraph (1) of 
     this subsection; and
       ``(B) standard forms which may be used by any employer 
     receiving a request under paragraph (1) for records to inform 
     the individual to whom the records relate of the request and 
     of the individual's right to receive copies of any records 
     provided in response to the request.
       ``(6) Regulations.--The Administrator may prescribe such 
     regulations as may be necessary--
       ``(A) to protect the personal privacy of any individual 
     whose records are requested under paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection and to protect the confidentiality of those 
     records;
       ``(B) to limit the further dissemination of records 
     received under paragraph (1) of this subsection by the person 
     who requested them; and
       ``(C) to ensure prompt compliance with any request under 
     paragraph (1) of this subsection.
       ``(g) Limitation on Liability; Preemption of State Law.--
       ``(1) Limitation on liability.--No action or proceeding may 
     be brought by or on behalf of an individual who has applied 
     for a position described in subsection (a)(1) of this section 
     against--
       ``(A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier with which the 
     individual has filed such an application for requesting the 
     individual's records under subsection (f)(1);
       ``(B) a person who has complied with such a request; or
       ``(C) an agent or employee of a person described in 
     subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph

     in the nature of an action for defamation, invasion of 
     privacy, negligence, interference with contract, or 
     otherwise, or under any State or Federal law with respect to 
     the furnishing or use of such records in accordance with 
     subsection (f) of this section.
       ``(2) Preemption.--No State or political subdivision 
     thereof may enact, prescribe, issue, continue in effect, or 
     enforce any law, regulation, standard, or other provision 
     having the force and effect of law that prohibits, penalizes, 
     or imposes liability for furnishing or using records in 
     accordance with subsection (f) of this section.''.
                                                                    ____


                [From the New York Times, Nov. 10, 1995]

      Safety Board Urges Government To Monitor Pilots' Job Records

                          (By Matthew L. Wald)

       Washington, November 9.--The National Transportation Safety 
     Board recommended today that the Government keep employment 
     records on pilots to keep bad ones from jumping from job to 
     job.
       The recommendation came after the board blamed the crash of 
     an American Eagle turboprop last November on pilot error; the 
     pilot had been hired a few days before he was to be dismissed 
     by his previous employer, but American did not know that.
       Currently, airlines do not share such data out of concern 
     that a pilot denied employment because of unfavorable 
     information provided by a former employer can sue.
       ``We can't permit liability to drive safety issues,'' James 
     E. Hall, chairman of the safety board, said in a telephone 
     interview today. ``Somebody has got to take a step forward to 
     do what's in the public interest.''
       But the board said privacy questions must be worked out. 
     Moreover, the Federal Aviation Administration, which the 
     safety board wants to compile the data, was reluctant to act 
     without Congressional authorization.
       The organizations representing the commuter airlines and 
     the major carriers both expressed support yesterday, although 
     a pilots' union said it objected to such a move.
       Last month the safety board concluded that American Eagle 
     flight 3372, a twin-engine turboprop on the way to Raleigh-
     Durham International Airport from Greensboro, 

[[Page S 18289]]
     N.C., crashed after the pilot, Michael P. Hillis, became confused about 
     whether the left engine had stopped and failed to focus on 
     flying the airplane. Mr. Hillis. who was killed in the crash, 
     along the co-pilot and 13 of the 18 passengers, had been on 
     the verge of dismissal from Comair, a smaller carrier, when 
     he was hired by American.
       American said it never asked Comair about Mr. Hillis's 
     record because it was unlikely that the airline would divulge 
     anything beyond the dates of employment and the kind of 
     equipment that the pilot flew.
       The safety board recommended that the airlines and the 
     F.A.A. develop a standardized report on ``pilot performance 
     in activities that assess skills, abilities, knowledge, and 
     judgment.'' The data would be stored by the F.A.A., and with 
     a pilot's permission, could be given to potential employers.
       Walter S. Coleman, president of the Regional Airline 
     Association, which represents commuter carriers said in a 
     statement that his group ``supports the intent'' of the 
     Safety Board's recommendations.
       At the Air Transport Association, which represents the 
     major carriers, Tim Neale, a spokesman, said, ``I don't think 
     this is going to cause problem for the airlines.''
       The Air Line Pilot's Association said that any deficiencies 
     in Mr. Hillis's performance should have been obvious because 
     he had been with the airline for four years by the time of 
     the crash. The union also said test results should not be 
     shared among airlines because the tests were not 
     standardized. It called for more training of pilots.
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, Sept. 29, 1995]

                 Public Deserves More From FAA Watchdog

       How long does it take to learn from your mistakes? At the 
     Federal Aviation Administration, guardian of public air 
     safety, the answer is a disastrously long time.
       In a three-part series concluded Thursday, USA TODAY 
     reporters Julie Schmit and John Ritter reveal that the system 
     for assuring pilot competence is dangerously flawed. In fact, 
     it has contributed to 111 deaths, all but one on small 
     airlines, which have less-experienced pilots.
       At the heart of the problem is the FAA. The record shows 
     the FAA was warned repeatedly about flaws in pilot testing 
     and hiring, that it recognized the flaws and that it was 
     flagrantly ineffective in fixing them.
       One telling example:
       On Nov. 15, 1987, 28 passengers and crew died when 
     Continental Flight 1713 crashed on takeoff from Denver. 
     National Transportation Safety Board investigators blamed the 
     crash on bad flying by co-pilot Lee Bruecher. Unbeknown to 
     Continental, Bruecher had been fired from one airline. He'd 
     also flunked pilot tests and had been cited nine times for 
     motor vehicle violations, a red flag for risky pilots.
       The NTSB's conclusion: Airlines should be required to check 
     previous employer records of prospective pilots, including 
     test scores, training results, performance evaluations and 
     disciplinary actions.
       The FAA's response: No. Its rationale: Benefits from such 
     regulatory change would not justify enforcement costs.
       Eight years and six pilot-error airline crashes later, 
     airlines still were not required to verify applicants' flight 
     experience.
       That set the stage for crash 7, an American Eagle accident 
     last December in North Carolina explored in detail by the USA 
     TODAY reporters. They found that the pilot, Michael Hillis, 
     was widely known for indecisiveness. Documents showed he'd 
     failed FAA check-rides, and his judgment in critical 
     situations had been found unsatisfactory by previous 
     employers. But the airline didn't know all that until after 
     Hillis ran his plane into trees at 200 mph, killing 15, 
     including himself.
       Another pilot-safety flaw emerged from the reporters' 
     research, as well.
       Had the FAA required more crew-coordination training, 
     Hillis' co-pilot, who'd never met his captain before the 
     flight, might have been able to override his errors. The NTSB 
     has warned the FAA since 1979 of the critical need for 
     improved crew-coordination training. But the FAA failed to 
     act until this year.
       All this points to a problem larger than pilot error. Again 
     and again, the NTSB has told the FAA what's broken in 
     aviation and how to fix it. Yet critical improvements have 
     stalled--and not just because of incompetence or bureaucratic 
     sluggishness.
       The FAA is hamstrung by a conflicting mandate. It is 
     charged with both protecting safety and promoting air travel.
       So while it can mandate safety measures, it must first 
     weigh the cost-benefit wisdom of its changes. The result: too 
     little, too late in safety improvements.
       There are recent signs of progress with new FAA rules for 
     enhanced pilot training and renewed interest in background 
     checks. But even these are half-measures, requiring only some 
     airlines to comply and making some rules voluntary. And this 
     comes as a pilot shortage is approaching.
       If ever a lesson is to be learned from aviation accidents, 
     it is that timidity has no place in safety. The NTSB knows 
     that. It's time the FAA did as well.
       Regional airlines caught in a bind. Business is booming for 
     small airlines, but their supply of military-trained pilots 
     is down. And there's little incentive for prospective pilots 
     to spend four years and $70,000 for a commercial pilot's 
     license to get a job that starts at $14,000 per year. 
     Meanwhile, starting jobs at the major airlines pay twice that 
     and can reach more than $100,000 after 10 years.
       Military trains fewer pilots: 1992, 3,742; 1996, 2,678(1).
       Regional airline business soaring. Passengers (in 
     millions): 1984, 26; 1995, 60(1).
       Ranking salaries. Average second-year pay for a regional 
     airline co-pilot compared to other professions:
       Secretary, $19,100.
       Phone operator, $19,100.
       Data entry, $17,750.
       Co-pilot, $15,600.
       Receptionist, $15,400.
       Bank teller, $14,600.
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, Sept. 28, 1995]

                Pilot Performance: Top Officials Respond

       Q: American Eagle Capt. Michael Hillis washed out at his 
     first airline, Comair. Eagle hired him without knowing that. 
     Last year, he crashed a plane, killing himself and 14 others. 
     Should airlines share records of pilot training and 
     performance?
       Pena: That was a very upsetting (crash). We are working 
     with Congress to get legislation passed to allow airlines to 
     share (pilot performance) information, and we will support 
     such legislation.
       Q: What do you say to people who are shocked that a pilot 
     who failed at one airline could get hired at another?
       Broderick: I am incensed, too, every time an accident 
     happens. We work 24 hours a day trying to make this system a 
     zero-accident system. I think we've got it to where it is the 
     best in the world. It is still not good enough, and every 
     time the system fails, it is extremely frustrating to all of 
     us. We want to do whatever it takes to make sure that failure 
     never happens again.
       Q: Did the system fail in the American Eagle crash?
       Broderick: The system failed because a plane crashed and 
     people lost their lives.
       Q: Does that mean the system doesn't always identify weak 
     pilots?
       Broderick: No. It points out where they're weak so we can 
     train them in areas where they need it. Success isn't in 
     getting rid of people. Success is having qualified people on 
     the flight deck. If the system is such that you fail (and) 
     you're out, it couldn't work.
       Q: In the past 12 years, there have been 16 fatal accidents 
     in 15- to 19-seat planes. In five of those, the FAA was cited 
     for inadequate supervision of the airline. Is that 
     acceptable?
       Pena: No. Absolutely not. We're going to continue to press 
     to improve the level of safety for smaller planes.
       Q: But what are you doing to hold the FAA to a higher 
     standard?
       Pena: We have a new management team in place that is very 
     focused on this issue. And I am very focused on this issue. 
     We've changed our attitude. We've sent a strong message to 
     everybody to think of safety differently than the way it was 
     viewed in the past, which was ``accidents will happen.'' No 
     one would say that, but that was the unstated assumption. Our 
     attitude now is ``no more accidents.'' Our thinking now is 
     perfection.
       Q: What have you done to make that reality?
       Pena: We've added more inspectors. We've reached an 
     agreement, which was a big breakthrough, with the airlines. 
     We can now review all their flight data recorders (the 
     ``black boxes'' on planes that record pilot conversations). 
     In some cases, they show mistakes made by pilots. We can take 
     that information and share it with all pilots to show (that) 
     that was the wrong thing to do, here is what should have been 
     done. We've also pushed for a higher level of safety on 
     regional airlines. (Next year, all regionals will have to 
     meet many of the same safety standards already in use at 
     large regional and major airlines.)
       Q: Safety investigators have cited inadequate pilot 
     training as a factor in two fatal crashes since 1985. In one, 
     the FAA had allowed an airline to reduce training below the 
     FAA's minimum standard. Why do you set minimum standards and 
     then allow airlines to go below them?
       Hinson: Any exemption we grant is only done when it is an 
     equivalent level of safety. In regulatory law, you write a 
     regulation that focuses on what you're trying to accomplish 
     but realizes there is more than one path. It takes five years 
     to build an airplane. It takes three years to redesign an 
     airline's training program. We cannot change our regulations 
     every six months. One of the purposes of having exemptions is 
     to allow air carriers to take advantage of new technology 
     within the existing framework so we don't have to say to 
     them, `I'm sorry, the rule doesn't allow this.'
       Q: The FAA is supposed to regulate and promote aviation. 
     Aren't those conflicting responsibilities?
       Q: Hinson: No. We are to provide a safe aviation 
     environment. In that context, promotion means we should have 
     laws giving us authority to set standards, impose penalties 
     and provide enforcement. The most aggressive form of 
     promotion is to have the confidence of people who use the 
     system.
       Q: Before the FAA passes a new regulation, it must weight 
     the cost of it to the airlines.
       Q: Hinson: That's true. We could provide a regulatory 
     environment that was so strict and so punitive that people 
     would ask, `Why go into that business?' We could say (planes) 
     must have six engines, four pilots instead of 

[[Page S 18290]]
     two. We don't do that. We have 17 cost-benefit laws that we have to 
     answer to. The National Transportation Safety Board and the 
     other oversight groups can have opinions without regard for 
     cost. We can't.
       Q: One criticism is that it takes repeated accidents before 
     the FAA acts. What's being done?
       Q: Hinson: To some degree that is a fair criticism. It 
     results from a propensity of our people to be extremely 
     cautious and it comes back to the requirement of cost-benefit 
     analysis. We are beginning to see a reduction in the 
     processing time of regulations. One of my charges is to 
     create more sense of urgency in that arena.
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, Sept. 28, 1995]

     Expense Sometimes Stops FAA From Ordering Safety Improvements

                   (By John Ritter and Julie Schmit)

       The FAA rejects dozens of changes it deems to costly or 
     burdensome to airlines, even if other experts think they're 
     important to safe airliner operation.
       Sometimes the FAA repeatedly turns down a National 
     Transportation Safety Board recommendation--under industry 
     pressure, critics say--only to accept it later after more 
     crashes.
       December's American Eagle crash near Raleigh, N.C., is an 
     example. Records show the pilot had been forced to resign at 
     one airline. But Eagle hired him unaware of his poor record.
       Three times since 1988, the NTSB had urged tougher pilot 
     background checks, including verifying flight, training and 
     disciplinary records and FAA violations. But the FAA says 
     enforcing a new regulation would be too costly and leaves 
     such checks up to the airlines.
       There are other examples:
       The NTSB urged ground-proximity warning devices on planes 
     in 1986. An FAA rule requiring them took effect last year, 
     but loopholes will delay full compliance until 1996.
       After a 1993 Express II accident near Hibbing, Minn., the 
     NTSB said the device would have given pilots 33 seconds' 
     notice they were too close to the ground--plus an urgent 
     ``pull up'' warning 21 seconds before--time enough to avoid 
     the crash, which killed 18.
       Fatal runway crashes in Los Angeles, Detroit and Atlanta 
     within a year led the NTSB in 1991 to urge the FAA to speed 
     up installing ground radar.
       The FAA moved quickly but delays persisted. In November, a 
     TWA MD-80 took off from St. Louis while a Cessna was on its 
     runway. The jet sheared the top off the smaller plane, 
     killing two pilots. The MD-80 passengers escaped.
       Investigators found that the FAA modifications had delayed 
     St. Louis' radar. The NTSB then asked for a schedule for 
     remaining airports and held a hearing to pressure the FAA. 
     Even now, ``We don't expect them to have the system fully 
     installed until 1999,'' says Barry Sweedler, director of the 
     NTSB's safety recommendations office.
       In 1979 the NTSB began urging a new kind of training to 
     make cockpit crews work together better. And although the 
     majors and some regionals now teach Crew Resource Management 
     (CRM), it's not uniform or required.
       But most crashes involving pilot error can be traced to CRM 
     deficiencies--faulty communication or poor coordination 
     between pilots.
       New FAA rules this fall will require CRM industrywide for 
     all pilots flying planes with 10 or more seats. But it won't 
     be pass-fail training--pilots whose CRM skills are weak won't 
     necessarily be pulled from the cockpit.
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, Sept. 28, 1995]

        Pilot Error: Solutions, Better Regulations, Safer Skies

       Problem: Pilot Supply 1. Provide public funding for pilot 
     training to ensure high quality. The Air Force spends 
     $533,000, on average, to train one pilot. It exposes pilots 
     to the latest aircraft and computer technologies. U.S. flight 
     schools, which rely almost completely on tuition, can't 
     afford such training. Most student pilots train in single-
     engine planes quite unlike those flown by regional and major 
     airlines. Who must act: Congress, FAA. 2. Provide pilot 
     candidates with more financial assistance, including 
     guaranteed student loans and scholarships. That would ensure 
     that the industry gets the best applicants, not just those 
     who can afford the training. The cost of a commercial pilot 
     license and four-year degree is about $70,000. Most new 
     pilots find that it takes five years, or more, to get a job 
     that pays more than $30,000 a year. Who must act: Congress, 
     FAA. 3. Require airline pilots to have four-year degrees. 
     Many major airlines used to require a four-year degree. Now, 
     most list it as a preferred qualification. The military still 
     requires it of pilot applicants. Requiring bachelor's degrees 
     would help ensure that pilots have the ability to understand 
     today's sophisticated planes. Who must act: FAA, airlines. 4. 
     Have examiners chosen at random. Make it impossible for 
     pilots and student pilots to choose their own examiners for 
     licensing and aircraft certification tests. The current 
     system is open to abuse by examiners who give easy or short 
     tests. The more tests they give, the more money they make. 
     Who must act: FAA.
       Problem: Pilot Hiring 5. Require tougher background checks 
     of pilot applicants. Airlines are required to verify an 
     applicant's pilot license and work history for the previous 
     five years. They also must check driving records for alcohol 
     or drug convictions. The FAA should require airlines to 
     verify applicants' flight experience, check FAA records for 
     accidents or violations and check any criminal records. The 
     National Transportation Safety Board has suggested tougher 
     background checks three times since 1988--each time after a 
     fatal accident. Who must act: Congress, FAA. 6. Require 
     airlines to share training records. These may reveal 
     recurring weaknesses on such things as judgment and decision-
     making, which wouldn't show up in FAA records. Today, the 
     records aren't shared because airlines fear invasion-of-
     privacy lawsuits from former employees. Who must act: 
     Congress, FAA. 7. Set minimum qualifications for new airline 
     pilots. Currently, each airline sets its own standards, which 
     go up and down based on the supply of applicants. When 
     supplies are tight, airlines often hire pilots who would not 
     be considered when applicants are plentiful. Who must act: 
     FAA.
       Problem: Training 8. Tighten monitoring of exemptions and 
     waivers to the FAA's minimum training standards. Most major 
     airlines now exceed the FAA's minimums because the airlines 
     deem them too low. Even so, the FAA allows some regional 
     airlines to shorten training programs if it is convinced 
     their alternatives won't compromise safety. Waivers are given 
     by regional FAA inspectors. There is no national database, 
     which makes monitoring difficult. Who must act: FAA. 9. Speed 
     up implementation of new techniques such as the Advanced 
     Qualification Program. AQP requires airlines to train pilots 
     as crews--rather than individually--which improves crew 
     coordination, a key factor in many accidents. AQP also 
     identifies marginal pilots sooner because pilots are tested 
     more often throughout the training process instead of just 
     once at the end. Who must act: FAA, airlines.
       Problem: Testing 10. Require airlines to better monitor 
     pilots who barely pass flight tests. Now pilots pass or fail. 
     If they pass, they don't get more training. If they fail, 
     they do. The system does not recognize that some pilots pass 
     with ease while others struggle. Who must act: FAA, airlines.
       Problem: Oversight 11. Encourage pilots to report unsafe 
     pilots by requiring airlines and unions to establish and 
     monitor reporting systems. Most airlines have union 
     committees for this, but it's not an FAA requirement. Who 
     must act: FAA, airlines. 12. Require the FAA to improve the 
     quality of its own databases, which often are incomplete and 
     inaccurate. The FAA has more than 25 databases collecting 
     information on such things as failed pilot tests and pilot 
     violations. The databases are supposed to help the FAA target 
     inspections at high-risk airlines, but inspectors cannot rely 
     on poor data. Who must act: FAA.
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA today, Sept. 28, 1995]

  House Seeks Pilot Hearings: Airline Record-Sharing ``Part of Safety 
                               Equation''

                   (By Julie Schmit and John Ritter)

       The chairman of the House subcommittee on aviation 
     Wednesday called for hearings on requiring airlines to share 
     pilot performance records.
       Record-sharing would prevent marginal pilots from moving 
     from airline to airline without the new employer learning 
     about past performance.
       Rep. John Duncan, R-Tenn., responding to a USA Today 
     investigative report, said if airlines won't start sharing 
     records voluntarily, ``we will go for a legislative 
     solution.''
       Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., Senate aviation subcommittee 
     chairman, said airlines may have to be exempted from civil 
     privacy suits. ``Safety is paramount, and we have to take 
     whatever steps are necessary.''
       ``Lives will be saved,'' said Jim Hall, National 
     Transportation Safety Board chairman. ``The flying public has 
     the right to know airlines are doing all they can to ensure 
     safety.''
       Airlines are reluctant to share records because they say it 
     opens them to privacy suits.
       But government reports show that since 1987, 111 have died 
     in seven crashes blamed on pilots' performance.
       In some cases, those pilots had poor histories at other 
     airlines, information their new employer did not have.
       ``We welcome the interest'' in Congress, said FAA 
     administrator David Hinson. ``A pilot's record . . . is an 
     important part of the safety equation.''
       The Air Line Pilots Association, the USA's largest pilot 
     union, wants airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration 
     and unions to develop national standards to screen 
     applicants.
       Many of the several dozen pilots who called USA TODAY about 
     this week's three-part series said too many marginal pilots 
     continue flying.
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, Sept. 27, 1995]

                   The Pilot Who Crashed Flight 3379


               first time as a team, pilots made mistakes

                   (By John Ritter and Julie Schmit)

       A stall warning horn blared again. ``Lower the nose, lower 
     the nose, lower the nose,'' co-pilot Matthew Sailor told 
     Hillis. By now, the plane was rotating left. ``It's the wrong 
     foot, wrong foot, wrong engine,'' Sailor said. Hillis, one of 
     several pilots with troubling flight records, tried in the 
     dark cockpit to control the plane. He pressed the wrong 
     rudder pedal. The rotation worsened. Six seconds 

[[Page S 18291]]
     later, the plane slammed into trees four miles from the runway at 200 
     mph.
       December 13, 1994, an American Eagle Jetstream descends in 
     darkness, rain and fog toward Raleigh-Durham Airport.
       A light blinks on, warning of possible engine failure.
       Two pilots, flying together for the first time, scramble to 
     sort out what has gone wrong. Fifty seconds later, the twin-
     engine turboprop slams into woods west of Raleigh at 200 mph. 
     Both pilots and 13 passengers die.
       American Eagle officials believe the crew of Flight 3379 
     bungled a situation it was trained to handle. In November, 
     the National Transportation Safety Board is expected to 
     report--as it does in 7 out of 10 airplane accidents--that 
     the pilots made mistakes. Almost certainly the NTSB will 
     urge--for the fourth time in seven years--tougher background 
     checks of the nation's airline pilots.
       What is clear from the third fatal crash in a year 
     involving a regional carrier--and the 18th in four years--is 
     that the flight captain, Michael Patrick Hillis, was a 
     marginal pilot who had managed to slip through the airline 
     industry's elaborate safety net. Moreover, the crash puts 
     under fresh scrutiny a decades-old, traditional-bound system 
     of hiring and training airline pilots.
       The young Eagle captain had no violations on his record. 
     Hillis had never been in an accident. But he had failed tests 
     and shown poor judgment at two airlines. He had struggled 
     with landings easier than the one that confronted him out-
     side Raleigh. He was not, his fellow pilots made clear, a man 
     they wanted to fly with in an emergency.
       Shy, studious and unassuming, a quiet loner who found 
     relationships difficult, Hillis, 29, did not fit the take-
     charge image of an airline pilot. An instructor who had him 
     in a small ground-school class weeks before the accident 
     couldn't remember him.
       And throughout a five-year airline career, doubts had 
     persisted about his flying abilities.
       ``He was very indecisive and very hesitant,'' says his 
     pastor, the Rev. Robert D. Spradley. ``Unless he changed into 
     something other than what we saw when he got in the cockpit, 
     those emergency decisions must have been very difficult for 
     Mike.''
       William Gruber, a 20-year pilot at Embry-Riddle 
     Aeronautical University, concludes after reviewing Hillis' 
     career: ``I can't say I'd allow him to take command of an 
     aircraft.''
       Hillis survived in a system that should have weeded him 
     out--a system of hiring, training and testing pilots that has 
     no fail-safe mechanism to keep track of marginal performers, 
     no way even to ensure that their records follow them from one 
     job to the next.
       Flight 3379 underscores the randomness of air travel: 
     Pilots fly whole careers and never have an engine fail.
       It underscores the contracts: The brief career of Hillis' 
     co-pilot, Matthew Sailor, was an exceptional and full of 
     promise as Hillis' was bumpy and unremarkable.
       And it underscores the irony: On the eve of the fatal 
     flight, Hillis was ready to quit American Eagle. He had even 
     asked a friend about working at a Wal-Mart.
       Most of all, Hillis' story underscores the imperfections of 
     the airline pilot system.
       Eagle managers say Hillis was competent because he passed 
     every test he had to pass. ``We don't know any way we could 
     have caught this guy,'' says Robert Baker, vice president of 
     AMR, parent of American Eagle and American Airlines.
       But a USA Today investigation reveals a less reassuring 
     picture of Hillis' hiring and advancement. Eagle never 
     learned the real reason he wanted to leave his first airline 
     for a lower-paying job at a second one.
       Hillis was brought on board quickly by Eagle, an expanding 
     carrier eagerly hiring pilots. He didn't move up Eagle's 
     applicant pool gradually as Sailor, hired three years later, 
     did.
       And, the preliminary crash report shows, when Hillis failed 
     an FAA check-ride--a key benchmark--Eagle ignored its own 
     rules and let the same examiner retest him.
       In his Eagle file, Hillis had no evaluations by senior 
     captains he flew with his first year--a tool many airlines, 
     but not Eagle, use to identify poor performers.
       He kept advancing, as he had since his first solo flight 
     not long after high school in 1984--from small single-engine 
     planes to twin engines, to planes that carried a few 
     passengers to planes that carried more.
       But once he hit the airlines, troubles cropped up. When he 
     couldn't cut it in his first job, as a first officer at 
     Comair, a Cincinnati-based regional airline, Comair got rid 
     of him. That alone would have ended many careers, but not 
     this one.
       Hillis' problems started in the first check-ride.
       Hillis joined Comair as a co-pilot trainee in January 1990, 
     after flying four years for a small Memphis freight 
     operation. Weeks after arriving at Comair, he had his first 
     FAA check-ride and bombed.
       In a check-ride, an examiner tests a pilot's skill on 
     takeoffs, approaches and landings. Hillis flunked three of 
     four landings, three of nine instrument procedures and one of 
     five takeoffs. Worse, he got what pilots liken to a scarlet 
     letter: ``unsatisfactory'' on judgment.
       ``It means the examiner believes the guy shouldn't be 
     flying,'' says Robert Iverson, a longtime Eastern Airlines 
     pilot and former KIWI Airlines top executive. ``It is a 
     subtle way to pass that along . . . to say, `Hey management, 
     you better wake up.' ''
       Instead, Hillis got more training and passed his retest two 
     days later. But in his early flights, captains flying with 
     him commented that his landings were still weak.
       In April 1990, Comair Capt. Mitchell Serber rated Hillis in 
     the lowest fifth of pilots on flight skills, but above 
     average on willingness to learn. Serber also found him 
     impatient, a ``very high-strung person . . . who gets upset 
     with his performance to the point it distracts him.''
       He had ``functional knowledge of his duties'' but not a 
     good understanding of the plane. After a month in the cockpit 
     with Hillis, Serber rated ``his overall performance as 
     weak.'' He certainly wasn't ready to be a captain, Serber 
     felt. He should stay a first officer at least a year.
       On evaluation forms that asked if they would be comfortable 
     flying as a passenger with Hillis, Serber and two other 
     captains checked ``no.''
       But by December, one of those captains found him ``moody 
     and unpredictable'' and urged dismissal. Serber, after talks 
     with Comair chief pilot Roger Scott, agreed. He had never 
     recommended firing a pilot.
       Senior pilots warned about Hillis' flight weaknesses.
       Serber was worried, he told safety investigators after the 
     crash, that Hillis would get tunnel vision in an emergency. 
     His timing was off: ``Mike was frequently behind the 
     airplane.'' He often lost situational awareness. He would 
     ``make large abrupt corrections, mostly on instrument 
     approaches.'' These deficiencies would all come into play in 
     the crash.
       But even senior pilots' warnings weren't enough to get 
     Hillis fired. He was allowed to resign, on Jan. 3, 1991, 
     after less than a year at the airline. Comair won't discuss 
     details, but vice president K. Michael Stuart says, 
     ``Our system at a very early point determined that there 
     was a problem and we took care of it.''
       Took care of it to a point. Unknown to Comair, in October 
     Hillis had applied for a job at Nashville Eagle, a regional 
     carrier flying under American Eagle's logo. In an application 
     letter he said he wanted to return to Tennessee.
       On paper, he was a dream candidate: 2,100 flight hours, 
     above the 1,500 Eagle requires. And as a working airline 
     pilot, he had had more training than most. ``We naturally 
     assume they know what they're doing,'' says American's Baker.
       Eagle officials had no idea Hillis was on thin ice at 
     Comair. They sent Comair a questionnaire they send all 
     previous employers. Hillis even authorized Comair in writing 
     to furnish information. One of the questions was, ``To what 
     degree was this person's job performance satisfactory?''
       Comair didn't send the form back, Eagle executives say. 
     Rarely will an airline release information about a pilot. 
     Comair says it provides only dates of employment. Eagle has 
     the same policy. So do many companies outside the aviation 
     industry. They won't risk invasion of privacy and defamation 
     suits from ex-employees.
       ``Sure, we'll ask for more,'' says former Eagle president 
     Bob Martens, ``but we don't get it for the same reason we 
     don't give it out: We're subject to lawsuits from 
     individuals.''
       But privacy lawyers say there's no liability if the 
     information is true. ``It's a phobia companies have,'' says 
     Robert Ellis Smith, a Providence, R.I., privacy lawyer. ``I 
     call it a conspiracy of silence.''
       But not by all. Some airlines won't hire without 
     information from previous employers. They want to know: Would 
     you hire this person again? ``If we don't get a response to 
     that, we don't hire,'' says William Traub, United Airlines 
     vice president.
       Hiring without knowing how well a pilot performed elsewhere 
     worries safety experts. Three times since 1988, the NTSB has 
     urged the FAA to require airlines to do detailed background 
     checks before they hire and to provide the records of their 
     former pilots when another airline requests them. The FAA has 
     said enforcing such regulations would be too costly.
       But since December's crash, FAA officials are considering 
     ways to require carriers to share information.
       American officials, in hindsight, acknowledge the value of 
     sharing previous employment records. They want the FAA or 
     Congress to mandate it. ``We're already doing it with drug 
     and alcohol testing,'' Baker says. ``We're required by law to 
     pass that information on.'' The information goes into an FAS 
     database, which airlines can access.
       But when Hillis applied, Eagle relied--as it still does 
     today--on its own screening and training to spot unworthy 
     pilots.
       In that process, senior captains grill applicants on 
     cockpit situations. A security agency investigates gaps in 
     work history. Driving records are examined. There's a flight 
     test in an aircraft simulator and a medical exam, which, 
     like those at most airlines, exceeds FAA requirements.
       Hillis went through his screening on Oct. 24, 1990, and 
     passed. But there should have been concern. He lacked two 
     qualifications Eagle prefers in its pilots: a college degree 
     and an airline transport pilot certificate, the highest class 
     of license.
       In a Cessna simulator, Hillis flew adequately, and 
     evaluator Sam White saw ``very good captain potential.'' But 
     White also noticed that Hillis leveled off too low after 
     descending form cruise altitude, and was slow to correct the 
     mistake.
       When asked if he had ever been fired or asked to resign 
     from a job, Hillis could honestly answer no. It wasn't until 
     two months 

[[Page S 18292]]
     later that Comair would force him out. There's no record that Eagle 
     asked him during the screening about his work there.
       Jennings Furlough, an Eagle flight standards manager who 
     interviewed Hillis, pronounced him a ``very good candidate.'' 
     On Jan. 7, 1991, four days after leaving Comair, he began 
     first officer training in a 19-passenger Jetstream turboprop.
       Co-pilot Sailor came from a different flight background:
       As Hillis started a new job, the co-pilot who died with him 
     in the crash, Matthew Sailor, was beginning his final 
     semester in aeronautical studies at the University of North 
     Dakota in Grand Forks, one of the top collegiate aviation 
     programs.
       Over the next two years, Sailor, 22, would build a solid 
     resume flying as an instructor pilot to gain hours. ``He was 
     very proficient, one of the best we've had,'' says Joe 
     Sheble, owner of Sheble Aviation in Bullhead City, Ariz., 
     where Sailor earned advanced pilot and instructor ratings and 
     spend hundreds of hours teaching students how to handle 
     engine failure. ``He was probably as comfortable flying with 
     one engine as two,'' Sheble says.
       Eagle hired Sailor in December 1993, two years after he 
     applied. He had both the college degree and top pilot 
     certificate Hillis had lacked. In contrast to Hillis, two 
     captains rated Sailor outstanding his first year, one of the 
     airline's best first officers.
       By the time Sailor was hired, Hillis had been with Eagle 
     almost three years. His first year was unremarkable. A month 
     into his initial training as a first officer, he passed an 
     FAA check-ride in a Jetstream.
       But in January 1992 he faced a crucial decision. Eagle's 
     ``up or out'' policy meant he had to upgrade to captain when 
     he rose high enough on the pilot seniority list or leave the 
     company. ``We do not want people to make careers of being co-
     pilots,'' Baker says. Most airlines agree.
       This was seven months after Command Airlines and Nashville 
     Eagle had merged to form Flagship, one of the four American 
     Eagle carriers. the new carrier was expanding rapidly.
       It needed captains, and many first officers were upgrading. 
     It's not clear how eager Hillis was, but he had no choice. In 
     1993, the policy changed, and Eagle began allowing first 
     officers to defer upgrades up to a year.
       Hillis began captain training in a Shorts 360, a 36-seat 
     turboprop. Almost immediately, he had problems.
       Watching him in a simulator, instructor Ray Schaub rated 
     him unsatisfactory on two maneuvers. One was handling an 
     engine failure. The other was for not executing a go-around 
     of the airport after an engine failed on approach--the very 
     situation he would confront before the crash. After 15 
     sessions Hillis passed his captain's check-ride and began 
     flying out of Raleigh-Durham.
       Less than four months later, he was back in a Jetstream 
     when the number of Shorts captains was reduced. Now he had to 
     recertify in the plane he'd flown before as co-pilot.
       Records show once more he struggled, blowing an approach 
     and flunking an FAA check-ride for the second time in his 
     career. He got his second unsatisfactory on judgment.
       At most airlines, including Eagle, two failed check-rides 
     and two unsatisfactories on judgment would get a pilot kicked 
     out. But Eagle knew nothing of the record at Comair.
       Hillis' FAA examiner, Kevin Cline, told investigators he 
     failed about 1 in 5 pilots, but only 2 percent or 3 percent 
     got an unsatisfactory in judgment.
       Hillis got 1.8 more hours of simulator training. Then Cline 
     retested him, even though Eagle's policy is for another 
     examiner to retest. Cline passed him the second time.
       Assigned to Raleigh-Durham, Hillis flew uneventfully for 
     the next two years. Eagle records show he passed eight checks 
     from September 1993 to July 1994.
       Rumors spread and one pilot balked at flying with Hillis:
       If Hillis struggled during those tests, a record wouldn't 
     have been kept at Eagle's training academy. That is Eagle's 
     policy, approved by the FAA, so that instructors make no 
     assumptions about how a pilot will perform.
       But while Hillis was bearing up in the Eagle training 
     academy's predictable environment, pilots he was flying with 
     at Raleigh-Durham were talking about his indecisiveness and 
     poor judgment.
       On Nov. 18, 1994, Sandra O'Steen was scheduled to be 
     Hillis' co-pilot from Raleigh to Knoxville, Tenn. She'd heard 
     the rumors and told Raleigh base manager Art Saboski she 
     didn't want to fly with Hillis--the only time she'd ever done 
     that.
       Saboski confronted O'Steen: Did she want to be judged on 
     rumor? She said no and agreed to fly. During the flight, 
     Hillis asked her about the rumors. Ignore them, O'Steen said.
       Later, she e-mailed Saboski that the flight ``went by the 
     book,'' signing off ``sorry for the fuss.'' She told 
     investigators that Hillis' flying skills were OK, but he 
     wasn't decisive.
       Hillis was so upset about the rumors that he called Saboski 
     at home on a Saturday. They met on Monday, and Hillis told 
     his boss his reputation was being smeared. Saboski asked 
     Hillis twice if he thought he needed more training. ``He 
     pooh-poohed it,'' Saboski says. The meeting ended.
       Saboski, who was supervising nearly 300 pilots, was torn. 
     ``Rumors fly like crazy,'' he says. ``The pilots are a 
     fraternity. But there's always a question in my mind as to 
     whether there's truth in what's being said.''
       Former Eagle president Martens agrees Saboski did not have 
     enough information to act on.
       Everyone's morale was low; layoffs were expected:
       Three weeks later, on Dec. 10, American Eagle announced it 
     was pulling out of Raleigh-Durham. Low morale plunged lower. 
     Pilots were angry because they'd have to relocate or be 
     furloughed. They'd been grumbling all year about their 
     contract. They felt overworked and underpaid. Hillis shared 
     the anger, and the announcement, along with the flap over 
     rumors, apparently galvanized a decision to quit. He called 
     in sick on the 10th, 11th and 12th.
       ``I tried to contact him. I knew something was going on,'' 
     says Jody Quinn, a friend since Hillis had come to Raleigh 
     two years before. He was, she says, not a hard person to 
     figure out: ``Just a good ol' down-to-earth everyday person. 
     But incredibly conscientious. On top of everything. Very 
     together and organized.''
       To Quinn and North Carolina State University students Brent 
     Perry and Mike Parsons, who shared a house with him, Hillis 
     was a dedicated churchgoer, a man who liked nature and 
     photography. He studied a lot--especially airplane manuals 
     and economics. He'd accumulated 42 hours at Memphis State 
     University and was now taking courses at N.C. State.
       ``He'd bounced around from here to there to everywhere,'' 
     Quinn says, ``and he just liked North Carolina and decided to 
     stay. . . . He wanted to finally finish something, finish his 
     degree. He wanted some roots.''
       Hillis' mother, Theresa Myers of Wauchula, Fla., says her 
     son loved flying but was uncertain about his future. ``I 
     never wanted him to fly,'' she says. ``I wanted him to get a 
     college degree, and in the end I think that's what he wanted, 
     too.''
       Spradley, his pastor, thought Hillis battled depression. 
     ``He lacked self-confidence and personal strength, not just 
     in his spiritual life but his social life as well. He didn't 
     make friends easily and while he wanted them desperately, he 
     didn't seem to know how to manage friendships.''
       A job at Wal-Mart began to look appealing:
       On Monday the 12th, Hillis studied for a final in his 
     economics class. He and Parsons watched the Monday Night 
     Football game, but Hillis was brooding about his future. He 
     asked Perry how he like working at Wal-Mart and whether it 
     had good benefits. ``He didn't like the idea of being 
     unemployed,'' Perry says.
       The two talked about the Raleigh-Durham hub closing, and 
     Hillis said he was thinking of quitting that week. ``We 
     prayed about it, prayed about what he hoped to do,'' Persons 
     says.
       Hillis' scheduled co-pilot the next day, Sailor, spent that 
     night in a hotel near the airport. Based in Miami, Sailor was 
     assigned temporarily to Raleigh-Durham. He had been an Eagle 
     pilot just a year, but told friends he wasn't worried about 
     being laid off.
       He and Hillis--who had never met--were scheduled for a two-
     day trip Tuesday and Wednesday. They flew the initial 38-
     minute leg to Greensboro on Tuesday afternoon uneventfully.
       As they took a break before flying the second leg, back to 
     Raleigh, Hillis told airport service rep Sara Brickhouse, 
     ``The company doesn't care about me.'' He was somber and 
     unhappy, she told investigators.
       Less than two hours later, as the Jetstream descended 
     toward final approach into Raleigh, a small amber ignition 
     light, the left one, flashed on. Hillis, flying the plane, 
     said: ``Why's that ignition light on? We just had a flameout 
     (engine failure)?''
       Sailor answered: ``I'm not sure what's going on with it.'' 
     Then Hillis declared: ``We had a flameout.''
       The timing was bad. The plane, carrying a maximum weight 
     load and its engines on idle, was quickly slowing down. It 
     was at a point when Hillis should have been applying power to 
     maintain minimum approach speed.
       For 30 seconds, he and Sailor considered what to do as the 
     plane stayed stable on its glide slope. They'd already 
     lowered the landing gear and set the flaps for landing. 
     Hillis decided to continue the approach and asked Sailor to 
     back him up. Twice the cockpit recorder caught the sound of 
     propellers out of sync.
       Then Hillis made a fateful decision: He would abandon the 
     approach, fly around the airport and try another landing. It 
     would give them time to work the problem. Sailor said, ``All 
     right.''
       The plane by then had slowed dangerously. A stall warning 
     horn blared, and Hillis called for maximum power in the good 
     engine to gain speed. But he apparently failed to make two 
     critical adjustments. Powering up the right engine would 
     cause the plane to rotate left. To counter that, he should 
     have raised the left wing and set full right rudder.
       A stall warning horn blared again. ``Lower the nose, lower 
     the nose, lower the nose,'' Sailor told Hillis, to gain speed 
     and lift. Three seconds later, both stall horns went off. 
     Again, Sailor said, ``Lower the nose.'' By now, the plane was 
     rotating steeply left.
       Then, ``it's the wrong foot, wrong foot, wrong engine,'' 
     Sailor said. Hillis trying in the dark cockpit to counter the 
     rotation and control the plane, had pressed the wrong rudder 
     pedal with his foot. The rotation, or yaw, only worsened.
     
[[Page S 18293]]

       Six seconds later, at 6:34 p.m. ET, the plane slammed into 
     trees four miles from the runway at 200 mph. Fifteen of the 
     20 on board died.
       From wreckage, investigators determined that at impact both 
     engines were functioning fully. Experts familiar with the 
     flight data say Hillis misdiagnosed the ignition light and 
     overreacted--escalating a minor anomaly into a catastrophe.
       Familiar flaws had shown up again, this time for real: 
     suspect landing skills; the tendency to make major, abrupt 
     corrections; poor judgment. Preoccupied by the engine 
     problem--the tunnel vision others had worried about--Hillis 
     ignored the first rule in an emergency: keep flying the 
     plane.
       He decided unequivocally that he had a dead engine but then 
     didn't conform it by advancing the throttle or checking the 
     rpm gauge.
       The left engine could have lost power then regained it. One 
     thing the light is designed to indicate is that an internal 
     system is trying automatically to reignite the engine.
       But in training, according to crash investigation records, 
     Eagle pilots were taught an ignition light coming on meant 
     only one thing: flameout.
       Eagle instructors followed the operating manual of the 
     Jetstream's manufacturer, British Aerospace. Less than a 
     month after the crash, the company issued a ``Notice to 
     Operators'' that clarified what it means when the light comes 
     on. And Eagle has since changed its training manual.
       The decision not to land turned out to be fatal.
       In post-crash tests, investigators found that sometimes, 
     with engines at idle, the light came on when propeller speed 
     levers were advanced quickly. Hillis had done that five 
     seconds before he saw the light.
       One thing is clear: Most pilots, trained to land planes on 
     one engine, would have shut down the bad engine and landed--
     not tried a go-around at 1,800 feet. It was the decision to 
     circle that led to the sequence of events that caused the 
     crash.
       Sailor must have sensed what was happening. As an 
     instructor in Arizona, he'd logged hundreds of hours teaching 
     people to handle engine failure in flight. American's Baker 
     is convinced, reading the voice transcript, that he ``had a 
     much better sense of what was going on.''
       Pilots who have read transcripts of the final seconds give 
     this interpretation:
       Sailor's comments seem intended to keep Hillis on track. `` 
     'K, you got it?'' he asks Hillis seconds after the light came 
     on. (Translation: Are you going to keep flying the plane?)
       Then, ``We lost an engine?'' (You want the engine-out 
     procedure?)
       Later, ``Watta you want me to do; you gonna continue'' the 
     approach? And Hillis says: ``OK, yeah. I'm gonna continue. 
     Just back me up.''
       Fifteen seconds before impact, the plane slipping out of 
     control, Sailor says, ``You got it?'' (You want me to take 
     it?)
       Finally, six seconds to impact, the recorder catches one 
     last word, from Sailor: ``Here.'' (Here, give it to me.)
       But if Sailor thought the captain was in trouble, shouldn't 
     he have suggested shutting down the engine? And if he did 
     finally grab the plane from Hillis, why did he wait until it 
     was too late?
       ``It's a very difficult move,'' Baker says, ``But if I saw 
     the treetops coming up, you'd have to fight me for that 
     airplane.''
       In the culture of airline cockpits, co-pilots assume that 
     seasoned captains know what they're doing. Sailor had been 
     flying as a first officer less than a year. On loan from 
     Miami, he probably hadn't heard the rumors about Hillis. 
     Otherwise, he might have been more assertive.
       The NTSB likely will criticize Eagle for not giving pilots 
     enough training in cockpit teamwork. But questions remain:
       Was the crew--Hillis and Sailor--dysfunctional? Did Hillis, 
     the pilot in command with the questionable record, fail when 
     it mattered most?
       Or were Hillis and Flight 3379's passengers the victims of 
     a system that failed?
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, Sept. 26, 1995]

             Marginal Pilots Put Passengers' Lives at Risk

                   (By Julie Schmit and John Ritter)

       Marvin Falitz, a pilot at Express II Airlines, failed three 
     flight tests in six years, hit a co-pilot and was suspended 
     once for sleeping in the cockpit during a flight.
       On Dec. 1, 1993, on a short trip from Minneapolis to 
     Hibbing, Minn., Falitz tried a risky, steep approach.
       Flight 5719, a Northwest Airlines commuter, crashed short 
     of the runway. All 18 on board died. Investigators blamed 
     Falitz. They also blamed the airline for ignoring repeated 
     warnings about his performance.
       Other airlines have ignored warnings about bad pilots, too, 
     and passengers have died because of them.
       Since November 1987, pilots with documented histories of 
     bad judgment, reckless behavior or poor performance have 
     caused six other fatal crashes--all but one on small 
     airlines. Death toll: 111, including crewmembers.
       A USA Today investigation--including reviews of the 
     government's own safety reports--has found that despite the 
     nation's elaborate air safety system, marginal pilots get and 
     keep jobs. This is particularly true at commuter, or 
     regional, airlines, which often run on small budgets and hire 
     the least-experienced pilots.
       At regionals, hiring standards vary widely and are 
     sometimes dangerously low. Training and testing procedures 
     don't catch all marginal pilots. A system of independent 
     contractors who test and license pilots is ripe for abuse.
       And airlines are sometimes reluctant to fire bad pilots.
       These problems are about to get worse: A shortage of well-
     qualified pilots is expected through the next 15 years 
     because the military, which used to train 90% of U.S. airline 
     pilots, is training fewer and keeping them longer. At the 
     same time, demand for pilots is exploding, especially at 
     regionals--the fastest-growing segment of U.S. aviation.
       ``The surplus of quality pilot applicants is about to 
     end,'' says Robert Besco, pilot-performance expert and 
     retired American Airlines pilot. ``It is a big problem. But 
     it is a tomorrow problem so the government and airlines have 
     their heads in the sand.''
       The military has been a dependable supplier of pilots since 
     the passenger airline industry began growing after World War 
     II. It trains and tests pilots rigorously to weed out poor 
     performers.
       As the supply of military pilots shrinks, regional airlines 
     will have to dip deeper into the pool of those trained at 
     civilian flight schools.
       Regionals fly smaller planes between cities that major 
     airlines don't serve. Since 1988, major airlines have turned 
     over 65% of the routes less than 500 miles to commuters, says 
     airline analyst Sam Buttrick.
       New regional pilots are paid $13,000 to $19,000 a year, 
     one-third of what major airlines pay new pilots. But 
     experience at that level can lead to lucrative jobs at the 
     majors.
       Last year, new pilots hired by regionals that fly 
     turboprops had slightly more than half the experience of 
     pilots hired by major airlines. Yet regional pilots can fly 
     20% more hours than major airline pilots.
       Their planes are less automated, and they fly at lower 
     altitudes where the weather is more severe. And because their 
     flights are shorter, regional pilots make more daily takeoffs 
     and landings, which is when most accidents occur.
       According to government reports, for the past decade the 
     accident rate for regional airlines has been significantly 
     higher than the rate for major airlines. Still, accidents are 
     rare. People are nearly three times more likely to die in a 
     car than in a 15- to 19-seat plane, says aviation consultant 
     Morten Beyer.
       The Federal Aviation Administration, which regulates 
     airlines, asserts regional airlines are safe--and getting 
     safer. Says Transportation Secretary Federico Pena: ``If 
     they're not, we shut them down.''
       An analysis of official crash reports, however, shows that 
     some airlines are not always as safety conscious as they 
     should be--or as they say they are. The problems occur at 
     every stage in a pilot's career: licensing, hiring, training 
     and testing.


             licensing: pilots can shop for easy examiners

       To get a license to fly passenger planes, most pilots are 
     required by the FAA to have at least 191 hours of flying 
     time. Then they must pass FAA tests, usually given by FAA-
     approved examiners for fees from $100 to $300. Pilots or 
     their instructors can choose the examiners. Just as lawyers 
     can shop for sympathetic judges, pilots can seek easy 
     testers.
       ``If you're a real hard-nosed examiner, you run the risk 
     that (they) aren't going to call you,'' says John Perdue, an 
     aviation consultant and a retired Delta pilot.
       Some flight schools, concerned about abuse, will let 
     students take tests only from examiners they endorse. ``I 
     want to know that (students) are tested by someone who's not 
     giving away that ticket,'' says Steve Van Kirk, 49, at 
     Northwest Airlines pilot and owner of Control Aero Corp. in 
     Frederick, Md.
       But not all flight schools are that strict. And the system 
     is vulnerable to other abuses, such as examiners who rush 
     through tests so they can do more in a day.
       In 1987, Continental Airlines hired 26-year-old Lee 
     Bruecher as a co-pilot. He was flying a DC-9 when it crashed 
     shortly after takeoff in Denver. The captain, Bruecher and 26 
     others were killed. Bruecher had been fired in 1985 by Able 
     Aviation in Houston because he had a chronic problem of 
     becoming disoriented--a fact Continental failed to discover.
       Safety investigator cited Continental for poor pre-
     employment screening. Continental has since tightened its 
     screening procedures.
       But Bruecher's career might have been cut short long before 
     he got to Continental. In 1983, he passed a test that allowed 
     him to fly multi-engine planes. Two months later, his 
     examiner was fired by the FAA for giving short, easy tests--
     including one to Bruecher. FAA records say the examiner had 
     been under investigation for nine months.
       Poor examiners remain a problem for the FAA. In May, it 
     revoked or suspended the licenses of 12 designated pilot 
     examiners for giving each other phony certificates, allowing 
     them to fly numerous types of planes. The FAA canceled the 
     certificates. It said none of the pilots had used them to fly 
     passengers. It appears the certificates were being collected 
     almost as a game.


             hiring: fewer pilots, less cockpit experience

       After pilots are licensed to fly passengers, most spend 
     years instructing others or flying 

[[Page S 18294]]
     cargo. Their goal: build flight hours to land jobs with airlines. Most 
     major airlines require at least 2,500 flight hours; most 
     regionals, at least 1,500. Most pilots, when hired, exceed 
     the minimums.
       But when faced with a shortage of pilots, airlines lower 
     their standards.
       In 1985, 22% of new regional pilots had fewer than 2,000 
     hours, says FAPA, an Atlanta-based aviation information 
     service. In 1990, when regionals faced tight pilot supplies, 
     44% of new pilots had fewer than 2,000 flight hours.
       Even in years when pilots are plentiful, regionals hire 
     less experienced pilots.
       In 1992, GP-Express hired pilot Vernon Schuety, 29, who had 
     850 flight hours, and pilot James Meadows, 24, who had 1,100 
     hours. That June, the two flew together for the first time. 
     They crashed near Anniston, Ala., while attempting to land. 
     Three people died.
       Investigators said the pilots lost awareness of the plane's 
     position and blamed pilot inexperience, among other things.
       The flight was Capt. Schuety's first unsupervised flight as 
     an airline pilot. GP-Express, a Continental Express carrier, 
     had made him a captain right away, without the usual co-pilot 
     experience.
       GP-Express president George Poullos says the pilots met all 
     of the FAA's requirements and that the airline only hires 
     pilots who meet or exceed the FAA's minimums.


             hiring: little background checking is required

       On April 22, 1992, Tomy International Flight 22, doing 
     business as air-taxi Scenic Air Tours, hit a mountain on the 
     island of Maui, Hawaii.
       The pilot, Brett Jones, 26, and eight passengers died. 
     Investigators said Jones failed to use navigational aids to 
     stay clear of the mountain. He flew into clouds that hid it.
       Investigators faulted the air taxi for not checking Jones' 
     background properly and faulted the FAA for not requiring 
     substantive background checks for all pilots. Jones, 
     investigators' records show, had been fired by five 
     employers, including a major airline, for poor performance. 
     He also lied about his flight experience.
       Tomy International didn't uncover those facts because it 
     didn't have a policy of verifying an applicant's background. 
     The FAA started requiring a five-year employment check in 
     1992. Jones was hired in 1991.
       The pre-employment check into Jones' aeronautical 
     background consisted of one phone call to a charter and cargo 
     airline, where Jones had worked one year. That operator said 
     Jones departed in good standing.
       Jones also received a recommendation from the previous 
     owner of Tomy International, who had once employed him as a 
     van driver.
       Tomy International did not return repeated phone calls.
       The FAA requires airlines to do very little when checking 
     an applicant's background. They must verify that the 
     applicant has a pilot license; check motor vehicle records 
     for alcohol or drug suspensions; and verify the applicant's 
     employment for the previous five years.
       The FAA does not require airlines to verify flight 
     experience, nor to check FAA records for accidents, 
     violations, warnings or fines--or if an applicant has a 
     criminal history.
       ``They are strongly encouraged to check all those things 
     and we make it easy for them to do that,'' says Jeff Thal, 
     FAA spokesman.
       Most important, an airline is not required to find out how 
     an applicant performed at any previous airline.
       Airlines do give applicants flight and oral tests. And most 
     check FAA records and driving histories for more than just 
     alcohol or drug convictions. Two speeding tickets over a year 
     can get an applicant rejected at Southwest Airlines, for 
     example.
       ``They're not law-abiding,'' says Paul Sterbenz, 
     Southwest's vice president of flight operations.
       But an analysis of government crash reports shows that poor 
     pre-employment screening has contributed to passenger deaths.
       Consider the Jan. 19, 1988, crash of a Trans-Colorado 
     plane, a now-defunct Continental Express carrier, near 
     Bayfield, Colo. Both pilots and seven passengers died. 
     Investigators faulted the pilots.
       The captain, Stephen Silver, 36, had used cocaine the night 
     before the flight. His pre-employment record included a non-
     fatal crash landing on the wrong runway, a suspended driver's 
     license and five moving vehicle violations in three years.
       Co-pilot Ralph Harvey, 42, had been fired from another 
     regional airline for poor performance. his pre-employment 
     record also included two alcohol-related driving convictions 
     and one non-driving alcohol conviction.
       At the time, the FAA did not require airlines to check for 
     alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions. Trans-Colorado 
     executives told investigators they were unaware of Harvey's 
     alcohol history, and Silver's driving history and previous 
     crash.
       In another example, Aloha IslandAir hired Bruce Pollard. In 
     1989, Pollard crashed into a mountain, killing himself and 19 
     others. Investigators cited Pollard's recklessness and 
     faulted the airline's hiring procedures. IslandAir didn't 
     check with Pollard's previous employers, the accident 
     investigation showed.
       Two previous employers said he was careless and one of them 
     was about to fire him before he resigned to join IslandAir.
       IslandAir learned. After the crash, it added tough 
     screening procedures that weeded out the pilot who later was 
     involved in Tomy International's 1992 Maui crash.
       No airline checks what could be the most important records 
     of all: an applicant's training records at previous airlines. 
     To do so could run afoul of privacy laws, they say, and 
     subject the airline that shared them to suits.
       Nonetheless, many airlines refuse to hire a pilot unless 
     they get a good reference from a previous airline-employer. 
     Threat of lawsuit or not.
       But actual training records aren't shared. Those reveal how 
     pilots make decisions, handle stress and work with others--
     insights that don't show up in FAA data and insights airlines 
     are hesitant to share.
       If training records had been shared, 15 people might not 
     have died on Dec. 13, 1994, when an American Eagle plane 
     crashed near Raleigh-Durham, N.C. A preliminary government 
     report points to pilot error. Capt. Michael Hillis, 29, was 
     distracted by an engine failure warning light. While figuring 
     out what to do, he and his co-pilot let the plane lose too 
     much speed. It crashed four miles from the runway.
       Hillis had been forced to resign from his first regional, 
     Comair, because his superiors worried about his skills and 
     decision-making abilities--facts documented in training 
     records that Eagle never saw.
       The American Eagle crash has the FAA reconsidering its 
     stance, and Pena says he would support legislation to mandate 
     sharing of information between airlines.
       ``We need to have that. I don't want unqualified pilots 
     flying those planes,'' he says.


       training: faa doesn't keep track of all the waivers given

       Once hired, pilots have to go through their airline's 
     training program. The FAA approves each program. The airlines 
     set requirements based on FAA minimums that are so low most 
     major airlines exceed them, sometimes by 50%.
       ``They are the floor and should be viewed that way,'' says 
     William Traub, vice president of flight standards for United 
     Airlines.
       Regionals are much less likely to exceed the minimums. Some 
     even fall short. Of 16 larger regionals surveyed at random by 
     USA TODAY, seven--including four American Eagle carriers--
     said they were allowed to reduce training below FAA minimums. 
     The airlines say they were able to prove their programs were 
     superior or sufficient, even with fewer training hours.
       The FAA keeps track of training exemptions, which are 
     granted by Washington after a formal review. But it doesn't 
     keep track of waivers, which are granted at the regional 
     level. The FAA doesn't even keep a central record of how many 
     waivers have been given.
       The FAA even grants training waivers to its own inspectors. 
     In 1992, the Department of Transportation inspector general 
     criticized the FAA for allowing 18% of inspectors to skip 
     ongoing training designed to keep them sharp.
       The FAA says safety is not compromised. ``The word 
     exemption does not mean we're giving anybody anything,'' says 
     FAA Administrator David Hinson. He says exemptions allow 
     airlines to use new techniques without waiting for new FAA 
     rules.
       But the agency has rescinded waivers and exemptions after 
     crashes. For eight years, the FAA allowed Henson Airlines, 
     now Piedmont Airlines, to cut pilot flight training hours by 
     about 40%. That was rescinded in 1985 after 14 people died 
     when a plane crashed near Grottoes, Va.
       Investigators blamed inadequate pilot training, among other 
     things. Currently, Piedmont has no training exemptions and 
     exceeds the FAA's minimum training requirements.
       The FAA's willingness to grant waivers or exemptions 
     spotlights a flaw in its structure, safety experts say. The 
     agency has two missions: to promote aviation and to regulate 
     it. Critics say they are in conflict.
       When an inspector decides on a waiver that might help a 
     carrier financially, is safety compromised? The FAA says no. 
     Others wonder.
       ``The FAA is understaffed and politically invaded,'' says 
     aviation consultant Michael Boyd, president of Aviation 
     Systems Research Corp. ``The system is corrupt.''


         testing: in pass/fail, no one knows who barely passed

       Few professionals undergo as much training and testing as 
     pilots. Each year, most captains must have at least two 
     flight tests called ``check-rides.'' Co-pilots have one. 
     These flights with an examiner test a pilot's skill on such 
     things as takeoffs, approaches and landings.
       ``Check-rides are a series of practiced maneuvers,'' says 
     Robert Iverson, former Eastern Airlines pilot and former CEO 
     of KIWI International Airlines. ``Practiced enough, even 
     marginal pilots can pass.''
       In addition, pilots are graded pass/fail. If they fail, 
     they are pulled from the cockpit to get more training. Within 
     days, they are retested. If pilots pass check-rides, as more 
     than 90% do, they keep flying.
       The pass/fail system does not recognize that some pilots 
     pass with ease while others struggle.
       A small percentage, 1% to 2%, barely pass, flight 
     instructors say. Others put the percentage higher.
       ``Maybe 5% are getting by, but probably shouldn't be,'' 
     says Van Kirk, the Northwest pilot. Even if 1% are just 
     getting by, that would be more than 500 U.S. airline pilots.
     
[[Page S 18295]]

       In a 1994 review of major airline accidents, the NTSB 
     called check-rides ``subjective'' and noted differences among 
     airlines in how they graded pass/fail.
       And most airlines do not keep closer tabs on pilots who 
     barely pass.
       United is an exception. If pilots struggle through check-
     rides but pass, they are retested within two months instead 
     of the usual six or 12 months, Traub says.
       If Express II had a policy of following struggling pilots 
     more closely, pilot Marvin Falitz, who crashed near Hibbing, 
     Minn., might have been weeded out. He failed three check-
     rides--in 1988, 1992 and 1993. In 1987, he failed an oral 
     exam. Each time, Falitz was retrained and retested the same 
     day. Not surprisingly, he passed, and continued flying.
       On two tests, he failed working with other pilots--what 
     investigators faulted him for in the crash.
       Since the crash, Express has intensified pilot training. 
     ``Hibbing was an isolated incident and an unfortunate 
     incident,'' says Phil Reed, vice president of marketing. ``We 
     run a safe airline.''
       After the crash, Northwest Airlines insisted that all of 
     its commuter partners, including Express, train to the 
     highest FAA standards.


        firing: pilots are allowed to quit rather than be fired

       Even when an airline decides a pilot is unfit to fly, the 
     pilot isn't always fired. Comair, a Delta Connection carrier, 
     didn't fire Michael Hillis. It let him resign. Hillis did and 
     started at American Eagle four days later.
       Many U.S. airlines will let marginal pilots resign rather 
     than fire them. The reasons: Airlines fear being sued, and 
     problem pilots go away quicker if given an easy way out.
       ``They're gone with fewer repercussions,'' says Southwest's 
     Sterbenz.
       Letting pilots resign often puts them back in the cockpit--
     of another airline. Still, airlines defend the practice. 
     ``The airlines are pretty diligent in looking out for those 
     people'' who have resigned, says Tom Bagley, vice president 
     of flight operations for Scenic Airlines.
       Not always. American Eagle knew Hillis had resigned from 
     Comair. Hillis told Eagle he wanted to live in a different 
     city. But Eagle didn't know Hillis had been forced to resign. 
     Comair didn't provide that information, Eagle says, and the 
     FAA doesn't require airlines to pass on that information.
       The reluctance to fire pilots goes beyond fear of lawsuits, 
     however. It is tied to the status and deference that pilots 
     enjoy and to the high cost of training new pilots.
       ``Airlines carry weak pilots for long periods,'' says Diane 
     Damos, a University of Southern California aviation 
     psychologist. ``It's just part of the culture.''
       Says aviation lawyer Arthur Wolk: ``It's aviation's good 
     old boy network. Nobody wants to trash a pilot.''
       Co-pilot Kathleen Digan, 28, was given the benefit of the 
     doubt and later crashed a plane, killing herself and 11 
     others. Digan was hired in 1987 by AVAir Inc., doing business 
     as American Eagle. She was flying a plane that crashed on 
     Feb. 19, 1988, in Raleigh-Durham, N.C.
       During a check-ride her first year, the examiner said Digan 
     needed more work on landings. Another called her job 
     ``unsatisfactory'' and recommended she be fired. A captain 
     who flew with her said she ``overcontrolled'' the plane.
       But Digan wasn't let go. AVAir's director of operations 
     defended the decision to keep her, telling investigators: 
     ``She had invested a lot in our company and our company had 
     invested a lot in her.''
       Even the FAA has protected poor pilots. On Oct. 26, 1993, 
     three FAA employees died in a crash near Front Royal, Va. 
     Safety officials blamed Capt. Donald Robbins, 55.
       That was no surprise. During his 10-year career, Robbins 
     flunked three FAA tests. He had two drunken-driving 
     convictions. Eight co-pilots avoided flying with him, and 
     several complained to supervisors. Nothing was done. In fact, 
     in Robbins' last evaluation, his supervisor gave him a 
     positive review and complimented him on his ability to ``get 
     along well with his fellow workers.''
       The path pilots take to the cockpit: 1. Enter military or 
     civilian flight school. 2. Pass test to get private license; 
     can't work for hire. 3. Pass test to get commercial license; 
     can work for hire. 4. Many military pilots get jobs at 
     airlines after leaving military. Flight school pilots fly 
     cargo or work as instructors to build experience. 5. Get job 
     as co-pilot at regional airline. 6. Pass airline's training 
     program. 7. Pass test to fly certain type of plane. Testing 
     required each time a pilot switches to new type of plane. 8. 
     Spend first year on probation; get reviews; pass first-year 
     test. 9. Pass test to get air transport license; required to 
     become captain. 10. As captain, must pass medical and two 
     flight tests every year.
       Regional airlines scramble for pilots. Growth in commuter 
     or ``regional'' air travel, coupled with a decrease in the 
     number of military-trained pilots, has forced airlines to 
     hire more pilots trained in civilian flight schools.
       Military training fewer pilots 1992 3,742 1996 2,678(1).
       Regional airline business soaring Passengers (in millions) 
     1984 26 1995 60(1).
       Ranking salaries Average second-year pay for a regional 
     airline co-pilot, compared with the median pay for other 
     jobs: Secretary, $19,100; Phone operator, $19,100; Data entry 
     clerk, $17,150; Co-pilot, $15,600; Receptionist, $15,400; and 
     Bank teller, $14,600.
       Comparing accident rates Accident rates for regional 
     airlines that fly planes with 30 or fewer seats are higher 
     than rates for regionals with bigger planes and major 
     airlines. Rates per 100,000 flights:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    1984         1994   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small regionals...............................          .82          .32
Major airlines, large regionals...............          .23          .24
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       For this three-day series, USA TODAY reporters John Ritter, 
     and Julie Schmit set out to learn how a marginal pilot 
     slipped through the safety net of a U.S. airline and crashed 
     near Raleigh-Durham last December. They discovered more than 
     one poor pilot had kept flying and that, if nothing changes, 
     more are likely to.
       Ritter and Schmit analyzed accident reports since 1985 and 
     obtained FAA documents on current aviation practices through 
     the Freedom of Information Act.
       Other sources included the National Transportation Safety 
     Board, which investigates accidents, the General Accounting 
     Office, the Federal Aviation Administration, airline 
     executives, union officials, pilots and safety 
     experts.

                          ____________________