[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 194 (Thursday, December 7, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18117-S18118]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FAILURES

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I have asked my staff in California to 
begin to monitor air traffic control failures. They have started with 
the San Francisco Bay area, and I would like to make a report this 
morning on what they have found in the last 5 months.
  The San Francisco Bay area is essentially controlled out of Oakland 
where nearly 18 million square miles of airspace is under control by 
air traffic controllers. Next week I would like to make a report on Los 
Angeles.
  I sent this in writing to the Secretary of Transportation. But I 
believe the findings of the last 5 months really deserve to be printed 
in the Congressional Record and deserve the attention of the U.S. 
Senate because I think air passengers are very much at risk today.
  I am unconvinced that the situation is being looked at with the 
urgency it demands, and my great fear is that it is going to take a 
major human tragedy to really get the kind of attention the situation 
needs.
  This morning I want to urge the FAA to make the acquisition of new 
and reliable equipment its highest priority. In the past, the FAA has 
resisted incremental improvements in the Nation's air traffic control 
system in favor of huge changes that never materialize. This leaves 
centers across the United States that are operated by mainframe 
computers and vacuum tubes that are over 25 years old. The irony here 
is that the air equipment, the planes in the air, are new. The system 
that controls their safety is old and failing. Backup systems are being 
used more and more frequently, and in some cases the backup is no more 
reliable than the equipment it is replacing.
  The following is a summary of incidents of equipment failure in the 
San Francisco Bay area since August of this year.
  Let me begin with August 8, 1995. The Bay TRACON system located at 
the Oakland airport, controlling the entire bay area airspace at below 
15,000 feet, experienced partial radar failure for 3 to 5 minutes 
before reliable radar data was displayed on controller scopes.
  The next day, August 9, 1995, the air traffic control center at 
Oakland located in Fremont, covering 18.3 million miles of airspace, 
suffered a total failure of radar, radio, and landline communications, 
including backup systems. Radar remained out for 34 minutes. Radios and 
landlines were out for 

[[Page S 18118]]
21 minutes. There were 295 airplanes airborne under Oakland's ARTCC's 
control at the time of the outage.
  A few weeks later, August 22, a power failure at Bay TRACON disabled 
Oakland's radar system again. Backup radar provided only 85 percent 
coverage and took 3 to 5 minutes to come on line.
  And 3 days later, August 25, 1995, a dual sensor problem disabled Bay 
TRACON's Oakland radar system.
  September 6, the controllers lose power to voice and computer data 
lines at Oakland ARTCC used to control and track aircraft over the 
Pacific Ocean.
  The next day, September 7, 1995, the main and backup power supply 
fails at Oakland ARTCC. Power is not restored in time to preserve the 
data base in the oceanic computer known as ODAPS. Controllers rebuild 
the data base manually when the computer power is returned. The 
shutdown lasted 4 hours.
  A few days later, September 13, 1995, the Bay TRACON's Oakland radar 
failed three times when a 26-year-old microwave link malfunctioned. The 
first failure lasted 32 minutes. The second failure lasted 81 minutes. 
And the third failure lasted for hours.
  Two weeks later, September 25, 1995, an internal power failure at Bay 
TRACON disabled so-called noncritical systems and caused air-
conditioners to go out. Controllers were exposed to 90-degree heat in 
the control room, computers overheated and failed due to the extreme 
temperature increase.
  October 1, 1995, a power surge at Moffett Field caused a radar site 
to switch to engine generators. While repairs were being made the next 
day, the bay area was without a backup system for 7 hours.
  October 27, 1995, during the morning inbound rush and foggy 
conditions, the Bay TRACON computer froze and caused controllers to 
perform automated functions manually.
  November 3, 1995, faulty computer connections forced air traffic 
controllers in Fremont to track aircraft with a backup system for 
nearly 48 hours.
  November 28, just a few days ago, airport surveillance radar at the 
Oakland airport goes down for an hour.
  Needless to say, it is a miracle that no collisions have occurred. 
This is the fourth busiest airspace in the Nation. The situation and 
the growing frequency of outages across the United States are simply 
disasters waiting to happen.
  These examples from the San Francisco Bay area are symptomatic of a 
nationwide problem. At a time when the private sector is building the 
most advanced airplanes in the world, the FAA is still using equipment 
that is over a quarter of a century old.
  I realize that resources are an issue. Yet the airport and airways 
trust fund which funds the FAA has an annual budget of $12 billion a 
year. I cannot stress enough the importance of this money translating 
into new equipment for air traffic control centers across the country. 
We cannot continue to function with a system that often fails and 
leaves the safety of airline passengers in question.
  These equipment outages, along with a recent Los Angeles Times report 
of equipment falling off old aircraft and very nearly landing on human 
beings, has me very worried about public safety. What concerns me more 
than these dangers, however, is the FAA's assessment that no lives are 
at risk.
  Given the above list of outages along with reports of equipment 
nearly killing people as it falls from the sky, I find this extremely 
difficult to believe. Some action must be taken.
  It has been suggested that the FAA could operate more effectively if 
removed from the Department of Transportation. I am not certain if that 
is the answer, but it is obvious to me that some dramatic improvements 
must be made in order to ensure the safety of the flying public.
  I would like to offer any necessary and appropriate assistance to 
facilitate a change in the priorities of the Federal Aviation 
Administration. I look forward to working with my colleagues toward a 
solution to this increasingly alarming situation.
  Next week I hope to come before the Senate to discuss similar 
incidents at Los Angeles International Airport. I yield the floor.
  PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

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