[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 194 (Thursday, December 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H14229-H14235]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         BOSNIA AND THE BUDGET

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Ganske] is recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, we are facing today debate on two big 
issues, the two B's, the two great B's, the budget and Bosnia. Since we 
have had some debate tonight on the budget, let me just spend a few 
minutes before I move on to the second B, Bosnia.
  There has been a lot of misperception about what exactly is in the 
budget that Congress has passed. But let me give you the facts.
  In 1995, we spend for Medicare $178 billion. This will go up every 
year for the next 7 years, so that by the year 2002 we will spend $290 
billion for Medicare. This is an increase by anyone's calculations.
  In the last 7 years, we have spent $926 billion on Medicare. In the 
next 7 years, we will spend $1.6 trillion. This is at twice the rate of 
inflation.
  Just a couple of years ago, President Clinton, in speaking to the 
country about his health care plan at that time, said anything goes up 
at twice the rate of inflation is not a cut.

                              {time}  1830

  Let us look at some other areas. Medicaid, 1995, we have spent $90 
billion. This will increase every year for the next 7 years so that by 
the year 2002 we will be spending $127 billion. In the last 7 years, 
for Medicaid, we have spent $444 billion, and we propose increasing 
that to $770 billion in the next 7 years. That is an increase of $330 
billion.


                    SHOULD WE SEND TROOPS TO BOSNIA?

  But let me get to the second issue, the issue of Bosnia. Let me begin 
with the basic issue. Should we or should we not put United States 
troops into Bosnia? Let us look at the various arguments President 
Clinton has laid before the public and why I believe they are flawed.
  I have given the President the benefit of the doubt. I have listened 
carefully to United States negotiators, Richard Holbrooke and General 
Clark, and have discussed this issue with several Congressmen who have 
just returned from Bosnia. I am indebted to Charles Krauthammer's 
testimony on Bosnia recently before the House Committee on National 
Security, and to Michael Glenon's article on foreign affairs a few 
years ago on the role of Congress and war. Despite Mr. Holbrooke's 
protestations, the deal calls for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be 
partitioned by a 2-mile wide demilitarized zone, a DMZ that NATO will 
patrol. There will be a Croat-Moslem coalition and a Serb republic with 
a weak central government for show.
  The NATO troops can kill anyone who stands in the way of separation 
or is presumed to constitute a threat. Approximately 60,000 troops, 
one-third English, one-third French, and one-third United States 
troops, will be on the ground. As many as 37,000 United States troops 
may ultimately be involved, and American reservists will be part of the 
operation, including some from my home State of Iowa. Up to one-third 
of current NATO forces may be committed to this venture.
  Let us examine the reasons that President Clinton, in his speech to 
the American people, gave for putting the lives of American troops into 
harm's way.
  First, in comparing the current situation in Sarajevo to World War I, 
President Clinton said, ``We must never go down the road of 
isolationism again.'' Now to argue that if we do not put troops on the 
ground into Bosnia will lead to United States isolationism ignores the 
facts. The United States is robustly internationalist today as compared 
to the Smooth-Hawley days of protectionism. Look at United States 
involvement in GATT, United States involvement in NAFTA, the $20 
billion Mexico bailout or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. 
Indeed, many would argue that the United States has been too 
internationalist in areas such as the 1993 Somalia fiasco or Lebanon in 
1982.
  Was the United States not involved in Grenada in 1983, in Panama in 
1989, and in the Persian Gulf in 1991? How can one talk about 
isolationism when we have troops in Haiti?
  Second, President Clinton invoked the moral imperative; sending 
United States troops to Bosnia is ``the right thing to do.'' It is true 
that for 3 years atrocities have been committed by both sides in a 
terrible civil war. Television has brought these horrors into our 
living rooms just as it brought the horrors of Vietnam into our homes 
25 years ago. Our hearts go out to the victims, and compassion cries 
out for action. Yet, wise leadership calls for more than compassion in 
a world torn by strife in a dozen or more places around the Earth.
  What is the difference between Bosnia and Rwanda, Bosnia and Liberia 
or the Sudan, Bosnia and Peru, Bosnia and Sri Lanka?

  I was recently in Guatemala, where an insurrection has gone on for 
years. There are victims in all of these places that tug at our hearts. 
How do we decide where to put American troops at risk?
  I believe that the American people support the use of troops overseas 
for very specific purposes only, to honor our treaties, to protect the 
lives of Americans overseas, to defend our country, and to protect our 
national security and interests.
  This brings us to the third part of President Clinton's argument, 
``Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and 
stability is vital to our own national security. That is why we fought 
two wars in Europe.'' Basically, President Clinton is resurrecting the 
domino theory for the Balkans.
  I ask, what evidence is there for the spread of this war? This civil 
war has been going on for 3 years, and there is no evidence for its 
spread. This is not 1914. The situation is totally different. There is 
no European interest in the Balkans other than the major powers staying 
out of a confrontation with each other.
  Fourth, the President says, ``As NATO's leader and the primary broker 
of the peace agreement, the United States must be an essential part of 
the 

[[Page H 14230]]
mission.'' Inherent in the President's argument is the rationalization 
that the United States has an obligation to assist its NATO allies 
whose troops are already on the ground. I think this is dubious 
reasoning.
  In the first place, the United States has no NATO treaty commitments 
to policing a civil war in the Balkans.
  Second, Gen. John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staffs, concedes that from a purely military standpoint the West 
European nations could undertake the Bosnian mission on their own.
  Third, going forward with deployment could actually be worse to NATO 
than the damage of nondeployment. Krauthammer argues that deployment 
could result in one or two humiliations; first a humiliating retreat, 
as in the case of Somalia and Lebanon, in which our allies were left 
high and dry; or, second, we go in and then persist in a thankless, 
unwinnable, and costly operation that erodes the solidarity of the 
alliance.
  More than 200 U.N. troops have already been killed in Bosnia. U.S. 
generals warn that there will be casualties. When U.S. body bags start 
coming home and television interviews American amputees, where will the 
support be in the United States for NATO?
  The motives of the Bosnian accord are morally worthy. Who could not 
help but want to bring peace to those suffering war victims? Yet, as a 
political leader and as the Commander in Chief, the President has a 
responsibility not just to try to do good but also to have undertaken a 
mission that has a reasonable chance of success. By all reports, 
enforcing this agreement is going to be a tactical nightmare.
  I recently spoke to a United States Senator who served in Vietnam and 
is just back from a fact-finding mission in Bosnia. He described the 
mountainous, forested terrain as some of the most difficult to fight in 
that he is seen. The difficult terrain will negate a lot of the 
technological advantage that our forces have. Our equipment will be too 
heavy for most of the roads and bridges. Winter weather conditions will 
complicate air superiority, and there are an estimated 6 million 
unmarked land mines.
  This map of Bosnia illustrates several areas that are problematic. 
The red line represents the demilitarized zone. We have several areas 
here that are worrisome. We have an area, Gorazde, which is primarily 
Moslem. This is totally surrounded by Serb territory, and yet we have 
created a corridor in which there supposedly will be no Serbian arms.
  Another problem area will be the narrow corridor up by Brcko.
  Another area of great concern is the area surrounding Sarajevo 
controlled by the Serbs, none of whom are happy with this agreement.
  The hair-trigger task of separating the warring parties is supposed 
to take place in the first 30 days, before most of the main occupying 
force has arrived. Will the U.S. troops play local cop? I ask this 
question because during the occupation of Haiti a year ago American 
soldiers had to stand back and watch while thugs beat up local 
citizens. Will our troops in Bosnia be forced to watch atrocities just 
outside the DMZ line that they are guarding?
  If the participants want peace, why do we need to send an armored 
division? The answer, of course, is that as Assistant Secretary of 
State Holbrooke has admitted that arms had to be twisted to get the 
agreement signed by the Bosnians and the Serbs. Recent news reports 
document that the parties to this agreement are not very happy with the 
territorial provisions, and as Mr. Krauthammer has said so forcefully, 
if you are unhappy with the imposed peace, there is nothing like 
blowing up 241 Marines or killing 18 U.S. Rangers to make your point. 
Killing Americans is a faster way to victory than killing your 
traditional enemy.

  This brings us to the question: What role should Congress play in the 
Bosnia problem? Without getting into a long discussion of the 
constitutional law and the War Powers Act, it is clear that the 
Founding Fathers were fearful that the executive branch is most 
interested in war and most prone to it. This is why the Constitution 
invests the war powers with Congress.
  Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, wrote, ``We have already given an 
example of one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the 
power of letting him loose from the executive to the legislative body, 
from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.'' One obvious 
advantage Congress brings to the decision whether to participate in 
these warlike endeavors is that Congress represents the diversity of 
opinion of the country.
  President Lincoln knew the value of diverse opinion and legislative 
deliberation. He said, ``In a certain sense and to a certain extent, 
the President is the representative of the people. He is elected by 
them, as well as Congress is. But can he, in the nature of things, know 
the wants of the people as well as 300 other men coming from all the 
various localities of the Nation? If so, where is the propriety of 
having a Congress?''
  Mr. Speaker, the wiser course of action is not to put American troops 
on the ground. What we should do is lift the arms embargo.
  The Secretary of State has said recently that we will arm the 
Bosnians, if necessary, but we hope it is not necessary. Well, Mr. 
Speaker, it probably will be necessary, and we will then be viewed as 
taking sides. We already are not viewed as neutral by the Bosnian 
Serbs, but we also do not have troops at risk right now.
  In summary, Mr. Speaker, while our motives are good, I fear that 
putting American troops on the ground in the middle of a civil war, 
where ethnic hatreds run deep, where the technical details of the plan 
are suspect, where a time-limited cease-fire is likely to resume into 
full-fledged war once our troops are gone and where there is no clear-
cut U.S. interest is just plain wrong. My constituents have told me, 
``Stop don't do this. Do not send American troops on a mission they 
can't win, for reasons we don't understand.''

                              {time}  1845

  Vietnam veteran James Smith recently wrote about his son, who was 
killed in Somalia:

       As my sacrifice was wasted in Vietnam and my son's 
     sacrifice was wasted in Somalia, will there be more wasted 
     sacrifices in Bosnia? This old soldier is not convinced. I 
     cannot support sending troops to Bosnia.

  This Congressman has similar concerns. I beg the House leadership to 
give this Congress the right to vote on a resolution that would stop 
the deployment of U.S. troops now, and I beg the President to 
reconsider his decision. It is not too late.
  Throughout this debate we will hear many arguments for the need to 
support our troops. Let me be clear that I share this commitment that 
every Member of this body has toward the young men and women who will 
risk their lives to defend our freedoms. This weekend I will be in 
Bosnia with a congressional delegation, and as a physician who is in 
the Army reserve medical corps, I will be especially interested in the 
military medical preparations.
  If United States troops do end up in Bosnia, I want to know how to 
best support them. But let me also be clear, that on the basis of my 
current knowledge, I believe that we can support our troops best by not 
sending them to Bosnia. This mission is simply breathing space before 
the next round in fighting. Congress should do all it can to stop this 
action. At the end of the day, it is not that Americans cannot tolerate 
casualties. It is that Americans do not tolerate casualties for 
nothing.
  With that, I would yield to the gentlewoman from Idaho.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I appreciate his 
good comments, and I look forward to joining the gentleman and some 
other of the Members in our trip to Bosnia to look at the situation 
firsthand this weekend. I think that it is so incredibly important to 
be able to see what our troops are going to be going through and to be 
able to visit with our troops in Frankfort, not only to encourage our 
troops, but also to be meeting with the heads of State of the warring 
factions.
  Mr. Speaker, I am of firm belief that the President in this case is 
not using the constitutional authority given to him and is abusing the 
power that was given to him by the Constitution. I have asked over and 
over and over again to have constitutional scholars show me where the 
President has the authority to commit military troops to the mission 
that he has in Bosnia. I cannot find anyone who can show me, outside of 
case law, and very vague 

[[Page H 14231]]
case law, not on point to what the President has declared to be our 
mission in Bosnia, which is, interestingly enough, not to keep the 
peace, because there has not been peace there since before the Roman 
Empire, when the Romans were trying to maintain peace in that area. But 
we will be enforcing the peace by the President's own words.
  Now, you cannot enforce the peace without committing war to enforce 
peace. That is what war is. That is why we are arming our troops to go 
to Bosnia.
  I have been very pleased to listen to Mr. Dornan from California on 
many of his special order speeches as he compares the other commitments 
by the other NATO nations. I look forward to a colloquy with Mr. Dornan 
on the other commitments by the other NATO nations, as well as getting 
into what the President's authority really is, because this President, 
I maintain, does not have the authority. He is maintaining his 
leadership by assertion, not by law, and certainly not by 
constitutional law.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I would like to followup 
on the gentlewoman's comments. There is precedent over the past 200 
years for the President occasionally doing military exercises, that is, 
Presidents have sent forces against the Barbary pirates. There have 
been missions sent out with the various expansions of our country. 
There are quite a few examples. But it seems to me that there does come 
a time, and there is a line that needs to be drawn in the definition of 
what is a police action and what is a very, very significant military 
action.

   When we are putting a division of forces on the ground in the middle 
of a civil war in the Balkans, when we are talking about 37,000 
American troops involved, this is not a small operation. I believe it 
was clearly the intent of the Founding Fathers that in something of 
this magnitude, it was inherent in the Constitution, which gives 
Congress the right to declare war, the dominant position in terms of 
deciding whether we send American men and women overseas into harm's 
way.
  With that, I will be happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman 
from California [Mr. Dornan], a Vietnam veteran, somebody who has 
spoken eloquently on the role of the military, who may desire to also 
further enlighten us on the relationship between Congress and the 
Executive, who has been through some of the vigorous discussions 
related to the War Powers Act and other things, but who also I think 
can significantly add to this discussion in terms of some of the 
technical details and what exactly we are getting into.
  Mr. DORNAN. Dr. Ganske, I appreciate your yielding to me. I enjoyed 
getting to know you at a dinner in your district and seeing that 
beautiful great turn-of-the-century house that you live in, and knowing 
that as a healer of people, you, like all of us here on both sides of 
the aisle, of every ideological persuasion, are terrified of how 
quickly this could take a bad turn, not even any worse than the streets 
of Mogadishu, 19 young men dead, and another 90 carrying wounds, some 
more severe than others, the rest of their life.
  This is a wonderful opportunity, during the first massive change of 
leadership in the House in 40 years, since I was a 21-year-old pilot in 
the very first election of my life, this House has been controlled by 
one ideology and one party, and now we get a shift. We have the 
Nation's attention, watching the political process, with this majestic 
C-SPAN broadcast of this, the world's greatest deliberative body, with 
all due respect to that gorgeous building on the Thames, the mother of 
parliaments, and we have a chance to educate one another.
  Now, if there was someone who fell down in the entrance way, and 
their lips started to turn blue and they had a heart attack, there is 
not much I could do except scream for you or Dr. Weldon or Dr. Coburn 
and say, ``Come here, Greg, what do you do? I will hold people back.''
  But let me tell you what you just said. I was only educated about 48 
hours ago. My pal John McCain during the Haiti invasion invoked Thomas 
Jefferson as you just did, starting with our third President in 1801, 
his very first few months in office, that we can go in some instances, 
because, look, Jefferson did it.
  McCain did it again, our friend John McCain, served here honorably 
for years, a fine Senator, a western Senator, just south of Idaho down 
there in Arizona, he said again on Brinkley this weekend, ``Look what 
Jefferson did with the Barbary pirates.''
  That is not only bad history; it is so wrong it is frightening. A 
scholar with a published book on Presidential war power that anybody 
can get from the Library of Congress, this one is printed by the 
University of Kansas in Lawrence, Lewis Fisher, brings me over his 
book, this scholar from our Congressional Research Service, and gives 
me a paper that was dated last year, a year and a half ago, in response 
to Haiti, and McCain and others saying well, Jefferson did this, and it 
turns out that our friend with his big medallion right up here, Thomas 
Jefferson, right above the speaker, honored as one of our 23 lawmakers, 
Jefferson said, ``I can't do anything that is offensive or attacking in 
nature. I can only respond to an attack on the United States and defend 
it.''
  That is pretty vital interest, an attack. He said, ``I need help on 
the Barbary pirates.''
  The House of Representatives not only passed resolutions; they turned 
it into public law, and one of them was the very day before Jefferson 
was inaugurated, in those days, right up through Rossevelt's second 
term, was March 4, on March 3, 1801, when Haiti, by the way, it was 
then called Santa Dominique, was exploding in bloodshed, a result of 
the French reign of terror, had now come to Haiti, where the slaves 
killed every single European heritage person on the whole island of 
Hispaniola. That includes what is today called Santa Domingo, the 
Dominican Republic. While that turmoil is going on, Thomas Jefferson 
gets a law passed the day before he is sworn in that says in effect, go 
get the Barbary pirates. Nine more public laws, pushing him as it 
pushed the single termer that he beat, John Adams, before.

  So we have got to get this scholarship, and that is why I asked 
Helen, who sat there with you as a freshman on this historic day. On 
the 53d anniversary of Pearl Harbor, today is the 54th, Newt Gingrich 
told you, Dr. Ganske of Iowa and Helen Chenoweth of Idaho, to read the 
Federalist Papers.
  It made me want to go back and read it. Steve Horn, who has joined 
us, near me in the Long Beach area of California, did not have to read 
it, he teaches it. He taught it as a professor for years. Wait until we 
look tonight briefly at the Federalist Papers again.
  Helen Chenoweth, would you please read Alexander Hamilton, another 
father of our country, and see what he says about the limit on our 
Chief Executive, because kings in England, and queens, declared war at 
will, how we wanted to take power away from our Chief Executive.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Thank you, Mr. Dornan. I was very pleased to be able 
to read the Federalist Papers, and I turn to them often, because in 
Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton did say this: ``The President is 
to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. 
In this respect, his authority would be nominally the same with that of 
the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It 
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of 
the military and naval forces as first the general and admiral of the 
confederacy, while that of the British king extends to declaring war 
and to raising and regulating fleets and armies, all which by the 
Constitution under consideration would appertain to the legislature,'' 
this body, Mr. Dornan.
  Further, Abraham Lincoln, in writing to his law partner in 1837, 
William Herndon, wrote this. It is very interesting. ``The provisions 
of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress was 
dictated as I understand it by the following reasons: Kings had always 
been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending 
generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. 
This our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly 
oppressions, and they resolved to frame the Constitution so that no one 
should hold 

[[Page H 14232]]
the power of bringing that oppression upon us.''
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Ganske, I find that that oppression is being brought 
upon us by a man who would deem to be king.
  Mr. GANSKE. If the gentlewoman would yield, I think this shows the 
essential wisdom of the Founding Fathers, because they understood that 
it is a lot easier to get involved in wars than it is to get out of 
wars. They did not want this power to be concentrated in the hands of 
one individual. Very specifically during the constitutional debates, 
they decided to vest that authority in the House of the people, in 
Congress, and over the years this has slipped, as has been mentioned.
  I think, however, there were some very important lessons that all of 
us learned about 25 years ago, and that was that in order to sustain an 
overseas military operation or effort, you have to have the American 
people behind you. They have to be committed. It is like I said before, 
the American people, if they know that they are fighting for a cause 
that is justified by U.S. interests or fulfilling treaty commitments, 
can sustain casualties. We have shown that many times in our Nation's 
history, with some of the highest casualties ever.
  The problem that we have with this current situation is that, quite 
frankly, the administration has not made the case to the American 
people that we have an overwhelming national interest in this area or 
that we have commitments, treaty, contractual commitments, that 
obligate us to this course of action, or that in the long run, after 6 
months, 8 months, a year, when our forces are gone, that it will have 
made any difference 6 months or a year afterward.

                              {time}  1900

  Mr. DORNAN. Somalia.
  Mr. GANSKE. Somalia.
  Mr. DORNAN. And maybe Haiti next year.
  Mr. GANSKE. I think we are seeing a backing away from the current 
Haiti administration from a commitment that they had made before.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield for a colloquy.
  Mr. GANSKE. I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. DORNAN. I am not a lawyer, but I want to ask Professor Horn 
something, and before a lawyer would say, ah, reductio ad absurdum, 
sometimes, if you step back and carry something to the absurd, it 
really clarifies a point.
  Suppose, hypothetically, using all the arguments we have heard out of 
the White House, and some very excellent support that they got over the 
last couple of days from some of my conservative friends who have 
thrown up their hands using this phony Vietnam line, you have to 
support the troops, We all support the troops. I am still wearing my 
old Ironsides first armored division patch here. Of course, we support 
the troops. God love them.
  But here is my example. Suppose tomorrow President Clinton said, I 
cannot stand the pictures of any more of these little beautiful black 
babies dying in Rwanda. We have to go in there with force to protect 
the distribution of food. And, by the way, Somalia haunts me. I should 
not have been so weak over 19 deaths. This is a volunteer army, they 
are paid to take chances. By the way, we hear that. So I am going back 
into Somalia. And while we are at it, I think I am going to reinforce 
Haiti. It is starting to get squirrely there. Aristide is starting to 
disappoint me, Bill Clinton, so I am sending the 10th Mountain Division 
back into Haiti.
  Now, what is the difference, except that he is doing it in five 
places instead of two? He wants to go back in and reinforce Haiti, send 
the troops to Bosnia by Christmas, and go to Somalia and Rwanda. And 
once one person from an Air Force aircraft was on the ground, a 
loadmaster putting in supplies for the first GI to arrive, we would 
hear the cry, support the troops.
  Is his power, Steve Horn, utterly unlimited, since there has not been 
a declared war since 1941 tomorrow, on the 8th? And the one before that 
was this very day in the Senate on April 7, 1917. Is that it? No more 
declared wars? Imperial presidency?
  Mr. HORN. Well, it is clear the President does not have that power, 
and only a rogue and a scoundrel would let a President have that power. 
And that is why Congress has to stand up, debate this one way or the 
other, and either by a majority vote give the President the authority 
in a special circumstance or deny the President the authority.
  As you suggest, Mr. Dornan, the bit of support our troops and waving 
it and saying that supports my policy in X, Y, or Z, is a true refuge 
for scoundrels and a misuse of the Presidency. And, of course, if it 
goes too far, and they just run over the Congress, as some Presidents 
have in the last generation, then I think somebody needs to get out the 
impeachment resolutions and say, thus, you will not go farther.
  It is very clear in the whole history of the United States that 
unless we are in a defensive mode, where we are attacked and must 
immediately respond, the President needs to consult the Congress. And 
as the gentleman suggested, the early precedents are quite clear. 
President Washington, who had commanded the revolutionary army, and 
knew, as the first President, that whatever he did was setting 
precedence for future Presidents, and Jefferson, as the gentleman will 
recall was his Secretary of State.

  Mr. DORNAN. That is right.
  Mr. HORN. And Adams, who was deeply involved in carrying on the 
federalist tradition after Washington, he, of course, was Vice 
President under Washington.
  So when Washington wanted to deal with an Indian tribe situation, 
which was the case in his time, he went to Congress and Congress gave 
that authority. That also happened with Adams. And as the gentleman 
says, when Jefferson got in, he convened his cabinet and listened to 
the arguments. Some of them wanted to give him more, quote, inherent 
power. Now, that game has been played by a lot of 20th century 
Presidents who say I have inherent power to do thus and so because I am 
either Chief Executive, or, more romantically, I am Commander in Chief. 
Utter nonsense.
  When President Truman tried to do that by seizing the steel mills in 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube versus Saywer, even his own friends on the 
court said, no, you cannot do that, Mr. President. As the gentleman 
will recall, they had a resolution flowing through here in no time to 
draft strikers into the military at that time. Cooler heads prevailed 
in the Senate.
  Interestingly enough the leader of that was Senator Taft of Ohio, who 
was very much disliked by labor at that time because he was the author 
of the Taft-Hartley Act. He said, wait a minute, you just cannot do 
that. That is improper conduct. Everybody cooled down, due to the 
Senate's cooling influences, and we went back to business as usual.
  It is simply wrong for Presidents to claim inherent power. That is 
king John at Runnymede, and that is why the barons reigned him in 
somewhat. Not necessarily for the people of England, but certainly for 
the barons of England.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Horn, for the younger people listening, I digress for 
something rather wonderful. When I got here, in 1977, the British had 
lent us one of the three surviving copies of the Magna Carta from June 
1215 at Runnymede. That is about the time the Serbs started fighting 
the Ottoman Serbs. Well, a few years later. And it sat in the center of 
the rotunda from our bicentennial, when I had just won a primary in 
California, all the way through that year, through our Republican 
caucuses. And then there were only 19 in my class, and 19 in Henry 
Hyde's class before, and we were suffering unfairly. The American 
people were punishing the Hill for Richard Nixon, and not a single 
Congressman or Senator had a scintilla of guilt on what came to be 
called Watergate.
  But it sat there through my whole first 6 years. And also, in the old 
House of Representatives, in Statuary Hall, was Thomas Jefferson's 
first original draft, where he had erased things so hard, like public 
property to turn into pursuit of happiness, that he wore out the page 
and glued in a little strip, like I used to do in grade school, and 
then rewrote on top of it. And when I would walk over to the Senate, I 
would pass Thomas Jefferson's original draft, in the center of the old 
House Chamber, and just run my hand across the top of the plastic case, 
and within seconds I am looking at the Magna Carta.

[[Page H 14233]]

  When they took it home, they left the gold reproduction that is still 
in the Rotunda. We are still learning things here about the abuse of 
power and about the quotes that Mrs. Chenoweth was just reading to me 
over here, and we will get to them later, when my hour starts, about 
our forefathers. We throw that off so flippantly in school, the 
Founders, and then the Framers. And trying to be politically correct, I 
always try to throw in an Abigail Adams and the terrific wives that did 
not get the vote until 1920, but they were weighing in with their 
opinions, and they were all talking about King George III. Excellent 
Academy Award movie about him losing his marbles right in front of 
everybody's eyes. But this is not kingly power.

  And, remember, that when all these great thinkers in the beginning of 
that age of enlightenment, at least there was enlightenment over here 
and a reign of terror in Paris, they said their concept of a Commander 
in Chief was George Washington; a self-term-limiting man, two terms, a 
man who knew his limitations, and who was such a towering person of 
character, not with the intellectual ability to muse about things like 
Benjamin Franklin or Thomas Jefferson, but a tall character that 
presided over the Continental Congress in uniform. He was not puffed up 
about his uniform. He told people this lends me a little aura of 
dignity to settle some of these disputes here.
  That is who they were thinking of when they talked about Commander in 
Chief, not this person down there in the White House who thinks he is 
going to coast this entire year making our life miserable vetoing 
everything except defense bills. We got him locked on that because of 
Bosnia.
  Mr. HORN. He let that become law without his signature.
  Mr. DORNAN. That is right. He thinks he has an escape valve there 
somehow, so he can whine to other people about things in there that he 
did not want.
  By the way, and then I wan to turn to one of my other colleagues, 
people say how can he be so cavalier about where the money is coming 
for this? Not just the men on the ground, and I know I am annoying 
people I am saying it so much, but I want it in people's heads that I 
am not an isolationist. I am not echoing Pat Buchanan. I do want to 
help in Europe, and we are in there with air strikes. That is called 
air power. Sea power in the Adriatic, more than everybody else in the 
world combined. Airlift, sealift, fuel, food. I have walked in the 
hospitals in Zagreb. We are ready for massive casualties. Intelligence 
is dotting the ``I'' all right. It is 99, 98 percent ours. And we have 
500 men and women as a blocking action in Macedonia wearing those Blue 
Berets. We are involved at great cost.
  Put yourself in Clinton's shoes. He did not want $7 billion in that 
defense appropriations. He started out saying this will cost a billion. 
A week ago it was 2. Today it is 4. He still thinks he has $3 billion 
to burn. There is $7 billion in defense appropriations for this 1 year 
that started October 1 that he does not want there. If he burned up $7 
billion in this operation, he is back to where he wanted the defense 
appropriations bill anyway.

  Mr. GANSKE. Reclaiming my time, if the gentleman would allow me, I 
think the thing that will be on most of our constituents' minds in just 
a few weeks, unless Congress asserts the authority that it should, and 
that takes courage from the Congress to do this, as the gentleman from 
California was saying, but unless Congress at least has a full debate, 
up or down, should we be there, should we provide funding or not, then 
we will be. And I think what will be on our constituents' minds 2 or 3 
weeks from now are the men and women in a cold, windy, mountainous, 
dangerous place at Christmas.
  And this is a long commitment that we are talking about. The French 
have recognized the reality of this situation. They have basically said 
we recognize this is not a short-term proposition. The disputed areas 
held by the Serbs all around Sarajevo is a situation where the Serbs do 
not want to leave. We, the French, understand that this could be a 10, 
15, 20-year commitment.
  Remember the history in this area. A dictator with an iron hand ruled 
this country for 50 years. Peace was maintained. One might think that 
in a 50-year period of enforced peace that the various ethnic factions 
could begin to put aside their traditional centuries-old hatreds. And 
yet, as soon as that discipline was gone, we were back to a civil war.
  Mr. DORNAN. If the gentleman would yield for a second, can I show him 
something about these hatreds that is very upsetting? And I called to 
California to ask 1 of my 10 grandchildren to watch, because you do not 
have to meet one of my grandchildren, named Kevin Griffin, to know what 
he looks like. Here is his picture in both Time and in Newsweek, and 
taken by different photographers, I might add.
  Because these cameras will not zoom in this year, we will change that 
next year, I am going to pass these to Mrs. Chenoweth. This is my 
grandson in San Juan Capistrano, Kevin Griffin, and he is a refugee, a 
Moslem refugee from Srebrenica that fled to Tuzla, where we will be. 
They look at our American GIs that arrived there the other day to a 
welcome, the 1st Armored Division, and they want to just touch the 
Americans.
  Now, look at that blond haired, blue-eyed boy. And I am not giving 
any preferences, because I have Robert K. Dornan, III, here in 
Virginia, who is one-quarter Croatian with huge brown eyes. He is going 
to get a great tan and has dark hair. I have grandkids of all sizes and 
shapes, and 5 females and 5 males and a fifth female on the way, number 
10, I think. I am asking my son not to tell me. But, of course, the 
hatreds are there and they are so intermarried for 600 years that if I 
look at somebody and I say, well, this guy has red hair, what, is he 
Irish? And they say, oh, he is a Moslem. No, sorry, he is Croatian. No, 
that is right, he is Serbian. And they are all killing one another 
based on traditions that are pathetic.
  I just got informed by our chief of everything here, Ron Lasch, that 
I had the misimpression that I have an hour coming up.

                              {time}  1915

  The gentleman took our second hour, and he has got about 15 minutes 
left, and then I can take a 5. The gentleman from California already 
had his 5, but Helen can take a 5, and that is about it.
  I do have something newsworthy and earthshaking. This morning I got a 
call from a friend in New York. They said the National Review magazine, 
dated Christmas Day, that goes in the mail because it is fortnightly, 
tomorrow has an article from an eyewitness at Dayton that will 
absolutely boggle your mind. It is called ``Yalta in the Balkans.''
  He says there was a secret deal. This is starting to leak out now. I 
do not believe Mr. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, knew. I 
think he was kept out of the loop by his number 2, Strobe Talbott, 
whose foreign policy has always been Soviets first, and now Russia 
first. He is fluent in Russian. Translated Khrushchev's memoirs when he 
was at Oxford with Clinton. He did the translating for this secret 
deal. The deal is: Poland go to hell; and Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia, you will not be in an expanded NATO.
  Let me read some of this, because I think this is really hot, 
newsworthy stuff. I have taken it over to the Senators. My pal, Bob 
Dole, is in turmoil over there, because he is trying to drive the 
policy to make sure we arm the victims who have had all of those 
atrocities committed.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to put it in the Record. I will 
end the opening paragraphs, one gusty one at the close, then we will 
talk about it. Peter W. Rodman, a former national security adviser to 
both presidents Bush and to President Reagan.

       One of the better arguments for the Dayton Accords and the 
     dispatching of U.S. troops to Bosnia was that putting the 
     Bosnian conflict on ice would serve larger American strategic 
     interests. One such interest was the future of the Western 
     alliance. We are being browbeaten with this.
       The prolongation of the Bosnia war and the squabbles among 
     allies were poisonous to the Alliance itself, and the 
     resulting incoherence of policy was poisonous to NATO's 
     credibility. A second key strategic was the enlargement of 
     NATO into Central Europe and the prolongation of this Bosnian 
     war was complicating this.''
       During the climactic NATO bombing operations in September, 
     starting in August, Boris Yeltsin gave a tempestuous news 
     conference in which he conflated the two issues, 

[[Page H 14234]]
     blustering that an enlarged NATO would soon be dropping bombs on 
     Russia's doorstep. The Dayton accords offer us a chance, in 
     other words, to put all of this behind us and to refocus our 
     European policy on larger concerns.

  The next three paragraphs are priceless, but in the interest of time, 
I will put them in the Record. It says this:

       As usual, the administration has its strategic priorities 
     totally bass-backwards. This guy is writing tough street 
     words. It is wrong to pay a price to Russia over Bosnia in 
     the strategic coin of our larger interest in consolidating 
     security in Central Europe. It is wrong to sacrifice NATO 
     enlargement to the Russians over Bosnia or anything else.
       The administration's repeated assurances to Congress, and 
     to the allies, that Russia would not have a veto over NATO 
     enlargement turned out to be empty. Perhaps is just another 
     of the ``terminological inexactitudes,'' that is the Clinton 
     administration dialogue, that have become so familiar. A huge 
     price will ultimately be paid for this.
       There is no current threat to Central Europe. The newly 
     liberated states of the region, however, have just recently 
     awakened from a 60-year nightmare. Still find themselves 
     situated between Germany and Russia, and know in their bones 
     that their survival is not guaranteed by history. They 
     consider themselves part of the West culturally, politically, 
     and morally and, therefore, seek Western assurances that we 
     feel a stake in their security and independence.
       Seen in this light, NATO enlargement is not a new act, but 
     a consolidation of the post-1989 status quo. They are free. 
     This is Poland, Hungary, et al., sovereign countries 
     exercising their free sovereign choice to associate with us. 
     Either Russia accepts this, or does not.

  Three more great paragraphs in the Record. Call your Congressman and 
ask for it.
  Mr. Speaker, here is the punch line. By fear of antagonizing Russia, 
bad faith, whatever the short-term plot is for putting Bosnia on ice, 
in Central Europe we are seeing a strategic blunder of historic 
proportions.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the hidden deal at Dayton, OH.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the following article for inclusion in the 
Record.

               [From the National Review, Dec. 25, 1995]

                          Yalta in the Balkans

                          (By Peter W. Rodman)

       Washington, DC.--One of the better arguments for the Dayton 
     Accords and the dispatching of U.S. troops to Bosnia was that 
     putting the Bosnia conflict on ice would serve larger 
     American strategic interests. One such interest was the 
     future of the Western alliance: the prolongation of the 
     Bosnia war and the squabbles among the Allies were poisonous 
     to the Alliance itself, and the resulting incoherence of 
     Western policy was poisonous to NATO's credibility. A second 
     key strategic interest was the enlargement of NATO into 
     Central Europe, and prolongation of the Bosnia war was also 
     complicating this (During the climatic NATO bombing 
     operations in September, Boris Yeltsin gave a tempestuous 
     news conference in which he conflated the two issues, 
     blustering that an enlarged NATO would soon be dropping bombs 
     on Russia's doorstep.) The Dayton Accords offer us a chance, 
     in other words, to put all this behind us and to re-focus our 
     European policy on our larger concerns.
       These arguments for Dayton still hold, but National Review 
     has learned of a stunningly duplicitous turn in the Clinton 
     Administration's policy toward Russia, Bosnia, and the 
     Atlantic Alliance: The President and his associates are 
     reported to have given Moscow secret assurances that, in 
     return for its cooperation with the U.S. in Bosnia 
     peacekeeping, NATO enlargement will be put ``on the back 
     burner'' for the foreseeable future. The rationale was that, 
     given this demonstration of Russia's readiness to be a 
     partner in a new cooperative ``European security 
     architecture,'' the extension of NATO security guarantees to 
     Central Europe would not be a priority any time soon. This 
     account comes from official and authoritative sources, both 
     Russian and American.
       It has long been understood (indeed, admitted by some 
     Administration officials) that concrete decisions on 
     admitting new NATO members would be put off until after the 
     Russian elections, especially the presidential election 
     scheduled for June 1996--which meant, as a practical matter, 
     until after the U.S. presidential election as well. Russian 
     officials interpret the new assurances to mean that if Mr. 
     Clinton is re-elected, nothing will happen on NATO 
     enlargement in his second term either.
       The story is accompanied by reports of other assurances to 
     the Russians that their cooperation on Bosnia would put the 
     United States in their debt and earn them greater American 
     understanding on other issues, such as their reassertion of 
     control in their ``near abroad'' (Central Asia and the 
     Caucasus, including the oil-rich Caspian basin).
       As usual, this Administration has its strategic priorities 
     totally bass-ackwards. It is wrong to pay a price to Russia 
     over Bosnia in the strategic coin of our larger interest in 
     consolidating security in Central Europe. It is wrong to 
     sacrifice NATO enlargement to the Russians over Bosnia or 
     over anything else. The Administration's repeated assurances 
     to Congress and to the Allies that Russia would not have a 
     veto over NATO enlargement turn out to be empty--perhaps just 
     another of the ``terminological inexactitudes'' that have 
     become so familiar. A huge price will ultimately be paid for 
     this.
       There is no current threat to Central Europe. The newly 
     liberated states of the region, however, have just recently 
     awakened from a 60-year nightmare, still find themselves 
     situated between Germany and Russia, and know in their bones 
     that their survival is not guaranteed by history. They 
     consider themselves part of the West culturally, politically, 
     and morally; they therefore seek Western assurances that we 
     feel a stake in their security and independence. Seen in this 
     light, NATO enlargement is not a new act, but a consolidation 
     of the post-1989 status quo: they are free, sovereign 
     countries exercising their free, sovereign choice to 
     associate with us. Either Russia accepts this, or it does 
     not.
       Leaving the security status of Central Europe ambiguous 
     only leaves open temptations to Russian irredentists. NATO 
     membership for Central Europe is among other things a way of 
     telling the Russians that their acceptance of the post-1989 
     status quo in Central Europe is the sine qua non of any 
     relationship with us. If the Russians have a problem with 
     this--which they clearly seem to have--then we are all facing 
     a major problem five or ten years down the road as Russia 
     regains its strength.
       The Administration's rationale for delaying NATO 
     enlargement has been twofold. One is the claim that it will 
     be easier to achieve such enlargement if we go about it 
     gradually. But the nationalist turn in Russian politics, 
     expected to be given new impetus by the December elections 
     for the Duma, tells us that it will not get any easier. 
     Russia is only getting stronger and more assertive; every 
     month, the risks and inhibitions on our side will only grow. 
     The Administration's second rationale (at least, so I 
     suspect) is what philosophy majors will remember as Zeno's 
     Paradox: the idea that if you divide a distance into an 
     infinite number of tiny increments, you never get to the 
     destination. This may be the Administration's real 
     calculation. In other words, it just doesn't want to enlarge 
     NATO--for fear of antagonizing Moscow. The first rationale is 
     bad judgment; the second is bad faith.
       Whatever the short-term plaudits due to the Administration 
     for putting the Bosnia conflict on ice, in Central Europe we 
     are seeing a strategic blunder of historic proportions.

  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time for a moment, I think the 
gentleman has pointed out, as I did in my initial statement, that 
possibly the worst thing that could happen from our getting more 
involved is that we now have increased the proximity to some 
significant interactions with the Russians.
  The United States troops will be positions in this area right here, 
very close to the Russian troops that will be in this area. Mrs. 
Chenoweth and I will be looking at this area this weekend. But, 
remember, General Clark informed us in a briefing that approximately 
one-third of NATO forces will be tied up in this endeavor.
  Now, there is a great deal of unrest in Russia. What happens if later 
this year there is a significant turnover in power and then we have a 
problem not in the Balkans, but in the Baltics, and we have this type 
of commitment? I mean, it is a matter of weighing some real significant 
options.
  Mr. Speaker, with that, I would yield to the gentlewoman from Idaho 
[Mrs. Chenoweth].
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Speaker, it is very interesting as we stop and 
think about the tests that we have been talking about, that the 
President, as Commander in Chief, simply has not passed. And one of 
those major tests is what I call the mother's test.
  I guess my major claim to fame is the fact that I am a mother. I am a 
mother of a military man who would respond to the command of his 
Commander in Chief, because that is the way he has been raised. But my 
heart breaks to think of mothers across this Nation having to let their 
sons and daughters go because of a President who does not understand 
what his role is and the role of the military, his responsibility as 
Commander in Chief; because, since the beginning of civilization, 
mothers have been willing to send their sons off to war to protect the 
interests of the country or the tribe or the community, to preserve the 
peace and tranquility of their existence, to make sure that freedom and 
liberty will reign for their future generation. That silent mother's 
test.
  But he has failed the mother's test. He has even failed the test of 
his own Secretary of State, who back in 1992 stated that we will commit 
troops only upon the following four criteria: No 1, 

[[Page H 14235]]
is he said if the mission is clearly defined; No. 2, would be if the 
people in this country are behind the mission; No. 3, is if there was a 
very clear and reasonable chance for success; and No. 4 is if there is 
a good, strong exit strategy. All four of those the President fails on.
  And probably, Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman, the biggest 
failure is what will this do to the spirit of the military? The spirit 
of the military has been captured by a speech given by General 
MacArthur. I would like to quote just a paragraph from a great general 
who really understood warfare, understood how necessary it was for the 
general to take responsibility for his troops in the field.
  On May 12, 1962, in his speech, ``Duty, Honor, and Country,'' General 
MacArthur said, ``And through all of this,'' he said this to the 
graduates at West Point, he said:

       And through all of this welter of change and development 
     that you will face, your mission remains fixed, determined, 
     and it is to win our wars. Everything else in your 
     professional career is but a corollary to this vital 
     dedication. All other public purposes, all other public 
     projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find 
     others for their accomplishment, but profession of arms, the 
     will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no 
     substitute for victory, and that if you lose, the Nation will 
     be destroyed.

  What are we setting our troops up for? Are we disspiriting our 
troops? Are we putting ourselves on a slippery slope, like we did in 
Vietnam, where we never have recovered economically, like the post-
Vietnam wars? And the spirit of America took a hit that we were not 
even able to begin to recover until we had a President like Ronald 
Reagan who could really again show us how we could go in and win with 
the likes of Colin Powell and Dick Cheney.
  Mr. GANSKE. I thank the gentlewoman, and I am sure your phone calls 
have been the same as mine: overwhelmingly against this. The public 
does not understand the reason that we should be there, and my phone 
calls are 8 or 9 to 1 against this. Time and time again, people are 
phoning saying, do not do this. We do not understand. We think you will 
not accomplish anything of significance.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HORN. Well, Mr. Speaker, I would say to the gentleman, we have 
exactly the same experience, and I know a lot of our Democratic friends 
had that experience. The other day one representative, when asked how 
many letters do you get on this subject and what are they saying, she 
said all of them are against, 100 percent; not even one or two out of 
100 supporting it. And I think the wisdom of the people in this case is 
right on the mark. People are not stupid. They know where our national 
interests ought to lie.
  No one has convinced us that American lives are at stake, even though 
Bosnia is one of the most tragic situations in the world. So was 
Cambodia, so were a number of places, so are those places right now in 
Asia and the Mideast and Africa. But we cannot be, as I said earlier 
today, super cop to the world, and that is sort of what we are getting 
ourselves into.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield for a minute, 
there is an option. The option is something that Senator Dole, for 
instance, recommended a couple of years ago, and that was make for a 
level playing field. Lift the arms embargo. Allow the various factions 
to have a level playing field and to settle their own civil war with 
the same type of support that we have done in the past, logistical and 
air, and yet not interpose ourselves into the middle of essentially a 
civil war.
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, one of our most successful operations, as the 
gentleman knows, happened under the Carter administration. It is ironic 
that many of the advisers of President Carter also are advising this 
administration. But what they did that was successful, they began the 
effort to provide arms to the Afghan Mujaheddin, and through Pakistan 
they did just that as really a covert operation without using American 
troops, and they were able to have sufficient arms go in that the 
world's second strongest superpower was driven out of Afghanistan where 
it never should have been in the first place.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, let me summarize, and I thank my colleagues 
for joining me in this colloquy. I believe that this mission is 
primarily going to involve a breathing space for the warring parties. 
They need to rearm. They will do that on a brief enforced peace.
  I think at the end of the day it is not that America cannot tolerate 
casualties; it is that Americans just do not tolerate casualties unless 
they can see a real purpose.

                          ____________________