[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 193 (Wednesday, December 6, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S18057-S18059]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     UNITED STATES TROOPS IN BOSNIA

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I rise to talk about an issue that all of 
us are concerned about and all of us are thinking about, and that is 
the President's policy to put United States troops on the ground in 
Bosnia.
  First, let me make it clear that I am opposed to that idea. I had an 
opportunity about 5 weeks ago to go to Sarajevo along with some other 
of my associates here. We went to Stuttgart in 

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Germany and visited for a day with the supreme commander there. I was 
impressed by the preparation, by the way, of our military, as always. I 
am sure they will be able to carry out whatever mission is assigned to 
them.
  We spent some time in Croatia talking particularly to the Defense 
Minister there in terms of the Croatians' activities and their 
concerns. We spent a portion of our time in Sarajevo where we visited 
with the President of Bosnia, had a chance to talk with the U.N. 
commander there, and also spent some time coming back through Brussels 
in Belgium, and spent some time with the NATO commander and all 16 of 
the Ambassadors that were there.
  Certainly, I am not an expert in the field, having been there just a 
few days, but I have to tell you that you do get a sense, you do get a 
sense from being there as to what the feelings are, a sense that, as 
you would imagine, those people are tired of fighting and looking for 
some resolution. You get a feeling, also, however, that there is not a 
willingness to give up some of the positions that people have taken and 
will maintain, antagonistic positions and conflicts that are very long 
lasting and have been there for hundreds of years.
  So, Mr. President, I came back having not changed my opinion. I do 
think we need to continue to be involved. I think we have had an 
excellent representation there in terms of the negotiation. I 
congratulate the negotiators. We met yesterday with Secretary 
Holbrooke. But I was no more convinced of the responsibility to have 
20,000 or 30,000 troops on the ground there and of our chances of 
coming away in the period of time, as described by the President, of 1 
year, or that the solution is any better than it was before.

  Let me say, however, that we are going to have differences of view 
here. I hope we have an extended discussion of the issue here on the 
floor. I think everyone who comes forward will honestly have their 
views--and I do not impugn anyone's motives as to why they are where 
they are.
  Let me comment on a number of things that have concerned me. One is 
the process and the process of involving American citizens, through 
their Congress, through their elected representatives, in this 
decision. And I have to tell you that it is my observation that the 
Congress has essentially been co-opted in this decision.
  It started some 2 years ago when the President, for whatever the 
reason, indicated that he would place 25,000 troops in Bosnia, at that 
time mostly to remove the U.N. forces if that was necessary. So that 
was the first indication why it was 25,000. Why it was not 20,000, why 
it was not 40,000, why it was not 10,000, I am not sure. No one has 
ever been able to tell us that.
  So, then not much happened, and the Congress then passed resolutions 
saying we ought to lift the arms embargo on the Moslems. However, that 
was not pushed by the administration. That was not something that the 
administration worked hard to encourage. But shortly thereafter, I 
think it did cause some action. Shortly thereafter, the United States 
then moved to get NATO to do some airstrikes, which tended to bring 
together then the Croatians and the Moslems to a federation that sort 
of equalized, began to equalize the forces there, and so we saw a 
change, I think prompted, at least partially, by the action of this 
Congress to recommend that we lift the arms embargo.
  So then we saw some effort to come to a peace agreement. When I was 
there, there was just recently installed a cease-fire. I think it was 
the 31st cease-fire, however. Nevertheless, it was an effort to do 
that. Then we moved toward the peace agreement and a meeting in Dayton, 
OH, or wherever, to do that. So the administration said, gosh, we 
cannot really talk to you about what is in the wind here because we are 
having a peace conference and it would disrupt the peace conference.
  We had a number of hearings, and we did not get too much information, 
because they said we cannot do that. So then, for whatever commitment 
there is to it, there was a peace agreement initialed in Ohio. I am 
glad there was and I congratulate those who helped bring it about. No 
one is certain what it means and how much commitment there is to it. 
Then we are told by the administration, ``Well, we have a peace 
arrangement now. We can't really talk to you much because we can't 
change that.''
  The next thing we knew, the President was in Europe on a peace 
mission talking to a number of countries, including NATO and European 
countries, saying, ``We are willing to bring these troops in.'' Of 
course, it was received with a great deal of enthusiasm. Who would not? 
If we agreed to do most of the heavy lifting, you would imagine that.
  So then following that comes the commitment for troops, and some 
preliminary troops are there now.
  Mr. President--and I asked this question of the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defense in a hearing last week--what is the role 
of Congress? I did not get an answer, other than provide the money. I 
do not think that is appropriate.
  I do not want to get into the great discussions of the 
constitutionality of the President's authority. There is disagreement 
about that. I do not happen to think the President has unlimited 
authority because he is named Commander in Chief in the Constitution.
  Nevertheless, there must be a role here for the Congress. I think it 
has been handled very poorly, frankly, in terms of some involvement and 
commitment.
  It seems to me--and I am sorry for this--it seems to me the 
administration is more in the posture of defending their decision and 
winning the argument than really talking about the substance of why we 
should, in fact, be in Bosnia. We can talk about details, and that is 
what we hear, all the details of how we are going to train, how we are 
going to move, all these things, but the real issue is not the details, 
as important as they may be. The real issue is, why are we there and 
what is the rationale and reason and the vital American interests for 
us to be there.
  We hear some saying, ``Well, we're going to put troops in harm's 
way.'' Of course, no one wants to put troops in harm's way. On the 
other hand, that is what troops are for. The question is not are they 
in harm's way, the question is, is there a good reason and rationale 
for them being in harm's way?
  We hear, ``If they don't go, there will not be any peace.'' I am not 
sure that is true.

  Until these warring parties are prepared, genuinely, to have peace, I 
suspect there will not be peace. We are told, and I think sincerely, 
that we are there to keep peace, not to make peace. There is a little 
different term this time, it is called enforce peace, which is a bit 
hard to define. But when we asked the question, what do we do when 
there is an organized military resistance to the U.S. forces that are 
there, NATO forces, the answer was, ``Well, we're not there to fight a 
war, we're not there to fight, we are there to keep and enforce the 
peace.'' We were led to believe we probably would withdraw.
  So, Mr. President, it is awfully hard to know. Some say, ``Well, we 
have to have leadership, we're isolationists.'' I do not believe for 1 
second that anyone can think of this country, the things we are 
involved in both in security and trade, that would cause anyone to 
suggest this country is isolationist. That is ridiculous.
  Some say, ``Well, NATO will dissolve without us.'' I do not believe 
that. NATO was designed, of course, to bring together the North 
Atlantic nations to resist the Soviet Union, and they still have a 
mission, certainly. Although I must tell you, having been there, I 
think there is some search for a mission going on. NATO will continue 
to exist; NATO has a legitimate purpose. I do not know whether its 
purpose is to quell civil wars within Europe.
  So, Mr. President, we are in a sticky wicket here, and I guess the 
stickiest thing--and I, frankly, did not get a chance to ask the 
Secretary yesterday--is, what is our policy in the future, what is our 
position going to be with regard to our role in civil disturbances, our 
role in civil wars, our role in ethnic disturbances throughout the 
world, and there have been a number and there will continue to be.
  Is our role to place troops and keep the peace, enforce the peace? I 
do not know the answer. But we will have to make a decision with 
respect to policy, so that we know where we are, what people can expect 
from us. We want to be a leader in the world; we will be, we 

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should be, we are the superpower. People should have, however, a reason 
to anticipate that our position will be based on policy.
  Mr. President, I think we find ourselves in a very difficult 
position, one in which honest people can disagree. I happen to believe 
it is a mistake for us to put U.S. troops on the ground there, a 
mistake in terms of policy, a mistake in terms of alternatives. There 
are alternatives. It is not that or nothing.
  We can continue to be involved with diplomacy. We can continue to 
support NATO. We can give other kinds of support there. It is a 
question of what happens when we leave. What do we do to ensure that 
having spent whatever it is--I suspect even though the administration 
says $1.5 billion, maybe plus $600 million in nation building, a little 
over $2 billion, I would be willing to bet you that is not right. We 
spent nearly that much in Haiti, and this place will be three times as 
expensive.
  So the question is, what is the basis, what is the rationale for that 
kind of commitment? I hope we have an opportunity to discuss it soon. I 
had hoped we would this week. Apparently, it will be next week. We 
ought to keep in mind the mass troop movement has not taken place. We 
have some folks in there, some troops in there early to prepare, but 
the troops are not there. We still need to make a decision. We still 
need to say to the President, if that is what we believe, that we think 
this is the wrong decision. No one here, however, will resist 
supporting troops once they are there. We are not talking about that at 
this point; we are talking about the decision to be there. It is a 
tough one. We should face up to it, come to the snubbing post and make 
decisions. I am sorry we have not made them before now. We shall. It is 
our responsibility.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa, Mr. Grassley, is 
recognized.

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