[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 191 (Monday, December 4, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17878-S17880]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 SENDING UNITED STATES TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I, like many people, have been distressed 
over the weekend listening to a lot of the comments as to what is going 
on in Bosnia, and this seems to be--and it is portrayed by this 
administration that it is--a done deal. Many Republicans and many 
Democrats are also saying that it is a done deal; that the troops are 
going to go; the President has made up his mind. The President, back in 
February 1993, made a commitment of 25,000 American troops on the 
ground in Bosnia, and he has decided they are going to go. So I guess 
the easy thing is to say, well, the President made the decision; I may 
not agree with it or I may agree with it but nonetheless the decision 
is made, and we want to support our troops that are over there.
  I am really getting tired of the demagoging that is going on about 
supporting the troops that are over there, as if this thing is a done 
deal. I grant you, Mr. President, I agree that the President of the 
United States does have the constitutional right to deploy troops. I 
think it is wrong, and historically it has not been done. The 
Presidents have come to the American people and have come through 
Congress for resolutions of approval, and this President has chosen not 
to do this.
  Of course, I will remind all America that the House of 
Representatives, the other body, has already on two occasions expressed 
itself in a very, very strong vote in opposition to the deployment of 
ground troops to Bosnia. So we turn on the talk radio shows and we look 
at the news accounts, and they say, well, it is already a done deal and 
Congress has no role; Congress is not relevant in this debate.
  I just do not buy that. I think this is still America, and the 
American people can be heard, and the best way for the American people 
to be heard is through their elected representatives. I think we have 
just a few hours to stop this thing. I am talking now about the mass 
deployment.

  Yes, the President has already sent several hundred troops into the 
area of Tuzla, which is the northeastern sector, in which I had 
occasion to spend quite a bit of time, and I see an environment which 
is the most hostile environment that perhaps we have ever had the 
occasion to deploy any American troop into in the history of this 
country. We talk about and can identify that there are more than 6 
million mines of all shapes and sizes that are out there, and you 
cannot do anything about rendering those mines harmless because the 
ground is now frozen and they will not appear really until a heavy 
vehicle gets on top of them. Of course, we are talking about the 
deployment of 130 M1 tanks and several other armored vehicles, so it is 
a very frightening thing. It is a frightening thing to think it is not 
just a matter of three factions that do not like each other in the 
former Yugoslavia. It is not just the Serbs and the Croats and the 
Moslems, because in addition to that you have the Bosnian Serbs, you 
have the Bosnian Moslems, you have the Arkan Tigers, you have the Black 
Swans, you have the Afghanistans, you have the Iranians. You have all 
of these, what we call rogue factions over there. And yet they say it 
is a done deal.
  I think it is too easy to say that. I hope that everyone in America 
will demand that their Senator get on record on this issue. Mr. 
President, we are going to give them the opportunity to get on record 
on this issue. Last week, I served notice that there is going to be an 
up-or-down vote on the sending of troops into Bosnia.
  It is not a matter of supporting our troops that are there. You bet 
we support them. I know something about being a troop. I used to be in 
a troop, and I wanted the support of the American people and got it. I 
think every Member of this Senate, every Member of the other body, is 
going to support our troops wherever they are.
  That is not the issue. That is a copout. The issue is, should they be 
over there to begin with? I can remember so well when Michael Rose, who 
was the commanding general of the troops, the U.N. troops, in Bosnia 
said, if America sends troops over there, they will have more 
casualties than they had in the Persian Gulf. That was 390.
  In the Senate Armed Services Committee, when I asked Secretary Perry 
and Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili--I said, ``Is that 
mission to contain a civil war and to protect the integrity of NATO 
worth more than 400 American lives?'' And Secretary Perry said yes; 
Secretary Christopher said yes; General Shalikashvili said yes. But I 
say no, because, you see, Mr. President, they were speaking on behalf 
of the President of the United States, the top people, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, and, of course, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  So now we say it is a done deal and that Congress is not relevant. 
But I say we are going to have a vote on this, and people are going to 
have to be responsible for it.
  I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that at this point an 
editorial be printed in the Record, a December 1 editorial by Abraham 
Sofaer.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    Clinton Needs Congress on Bosnia

                         (By Abraham D. Sofaer)

       President Clinton has appealed to Congress and the American 
     people to support his policy committing 20,000 ground troops 
     to implement the peace agreement reached between Serbia, 
     Croatia and Bosnia. It is a tribute to the American people 
     that the president is accorded the greatest deference when he 
     calls for the greatest sacrifice. Americans respond, at least 
     initially, to such appeals from their President.
       But Mr. Clinton is exploiting this quality. He has 
     presented the agreement and the American role in its 
     enforcement as an accomplished fact, though the documents 
     have yet to be signed by the parties, and numerous 
     preconditions to U.S. involvement have yet to be fulfilled. 
     He is consulting with Congress, but he is already sending 
     troops to the area without any form of legislative approval. 
     Indeed, he claims that, while he would welcome Congress's 
     approval, he plans to go ahead regardless.
       Presidents often try to get what they want by leading 
     aggressively. Congress nevertheless has a duty to study 
     carefully the proposed operation and then express its view. 
     The essential first step in that debate is to read the 
     documents signed recently in Dayton. The complex agreement, 
     with 12 annexes, calls for Bosnia to remain a single but 
     divided nation, and all the warring factions 

[[Page S 17879]]
     to withdraw to specific lines. The agreement covers virtually all 
     aspects of future life in Bosnia, including the division of 
     its governments, the contents of its constitution, the 
     selection of its judges, and the manner in which its police 
     force is to be chosen and trained. Of principal interest to 
     Congress, though, are those aspects of the agreement that 
     create obligations and expectations for the U.S. to fulfill.


                            our obligations

       These obligations, when carefully examined in context, 
     carry to the ultimate extreme the policy of forcing a 
     settlement on the Bosnians, rather than attempting to create 
     an internal situation that is militarily balanced. Most 
     significantly, the agreement makes the U.S., through the 
     ``implementation force'' (IFOR), the military guarantor of 
     the overall arrangement.
       The role of U.S. troops cannot be characterized as 
     ``peacekeeping.'' Even ``implementation'' understates our 
     obligation, IFOR will be close to an occupying army, in a 
     conflict that has merely been suspended. We are likely to 
     have as many difficulties acting as occupiers without having 
     won a victory as the U.N.'s war crimes tribunal is having in 
     attempting to apply its decisions in Bosnia without the power 
     to enforce them.
       IFOR's principal responsibilities are set out in Annex 1(a) 
     of the agreement:
       The parties agree to cease hostilities and to withdraw all 
     forces to agreed lines in three phases. Detailed rules have 
     been agreed upon, including special provisions regarding 
     Sarajevo and Gorazde. But IFOR is responsible for marking the 
     cease-fire lines and the ``inter-entity boundary line and its 
     zone of separation,'' which in effect will divide the Bosnian 
     Muslims and Croats from the Bosnian Serbs. The parties agree 
     that IFOR may use all necessary force to ensure their 
     compliance with these disengagement rules.
       The parties agree to ``strictly avoid committing any 
     reprisals, counterattacks, or any unilateral actions in 
     response to violations of this annex by another party.'' The 
     only response allowed to alleged violations is through the 
     procedures provided in Article VIII of the Annex, which 
     establishes a ``joint military commission''--made up of all 
     the parties--to consider military complaints, questions and 
     problems. But the commission is only ``a consultative body 
     for the IFOR commander,'' an American general who is 
     explicitly deemed ``the final authority in theater regarding 
     interpretation of this agreement. . . .'' This enormous 
     power--to prevent even acts of self defense--will carry 
     proportionate responsibility for harm that any party may 
     attribute to IFOR's lack of responsiveness or fairness.
       IFOR is also given the responsibility to support various 
     nonmilitary tasks, including creating conditions for free and 
     fair elections; assisting humanitarian organizations; 
     observing and preventing ``interference with the movement of 
     civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons''; 
     clearing the roads of mines; controlling all airspace (even 
     for civilian air travel); and ensuring access to all areas 
     unimpeded by checkpoints, roadblocks or other obstacles. 
     Taken together, these duties essentially give IFOR control 
     of the physical infrastructure of both parts of the 
     Bosnian state. It seems doubtful that the 60,000-man force 
     could meet these expectations.
       Article IX of the agreement recognizes the ``obligation of 
     all parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution 
     of war crimes and other violations of international 
     humanitarian law.'' This is an especially sensitive matter. 
     Yet there is no mechanism in the accord for bringing to 
     justice men who haven't been defeated in battle and who 
     aren't in custody. This means that IFOR is almost certain to 
     come under pressure by victims and human rights advocates to 
     capture and deliver up the principal villains. Will it do 
     better than we did in fulfilling our promise to capture 
     Mohammed Farah Aidid in Somalia?
       The agreement makes vague promises about reversing ``ethnic 
     cleansing'' by guaranteeing refugees the right to return to 
     their homes. Since this is in practice impossible, the West 
     will end up paying billions in compensation awards promised 
     in the agreement.
       The agreement contains numerous provisions regarding the 
     manner in which Bosnia is to be governed, with checks and 
     balances built in that are based on ethnic or geographic 
     terms. But Americans traditionally have not believed in such 
     divisions of political authority. We fought the Civil War to 
     put into place an undivided nation based on the principle 
     that all people are of equal worth, and all must live in 
     accordance with the law. It took a Tito to keep the 
     ethnically divided Yugoslavia together. Will IFOR now assume 
     his role of enforcing a constitution based on principles 
     abhorrent to Western values? Even if the basic structure of 
     the government works, what role will IFOR have to play in 
     resolving disputes over the numerous sensitive areas that the 
     parties have seen fit to write into the accords? If the 
     parties don't resolve some matters successfully, they are 
     likely to blame IFOR for these failures.
       Finally, the agreement draws a vague distinction between 
     ``military'' and ``civilian'' matters. Ultimate authority 
     over the latter is allocated to a U.N. high representative, 
     who is to act through a ``joint civilian commission'' 
     consisting of senior political representatives of the parties 
     and the IFOR commander or his representative. The high 
     representative is to exchange information and maintain 
     liaison on a regular basis with IFOR, and shall attend or be 
     represented at meetings of the joint military commission and 
     offer advice ``particularly on matters of a political-
     military nature.'' But it is also made clear that the high 
     representative ``shall have no authority over the IFOR and 
     shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of military 
     operations or the IFOR chain of command.''
       This may seem a reassuring confirmation of IFOR's power to 
     avoid U.N. restrictions on the use of force. Ultimately, 
     however, IFOR's role could be made untenable if it finds 
     itself in a confrontation with the U.N.'s designated 
     representative about the proper handling of a ``political'' 
     matter. What would happen, for example, if the U.N. high 
     representative determined that U.S. forces had gone too far 
     in defending themselves under President Clinton's policy of 
     effectively responding to attacks ``and then some''?


                               either/or

       Congress cannot redo the agreement reached by the parties. 
     But there is no need for lawmakers to accept President 
     Clinton's either/or approach--either support his plan to 
     implement the agreement, or pull out entirely. If the 
     agreement represents a genuine desire for peace among the 
     warring parties, then presumably the accord is not so fragile 
     as to depend on the oral commitment of U.S. troops made by 
     the administration (and which isn't even part of the 
     agreement). Congress can and should consider other options. 
     The U.S., for example, could assist European forces in 
     demarcating the boundary lines, and could enforce peace in 
     the area through the threat of air strikes on important 
     targets. Or the U.S. could offer greater monetary and 
     diplomatic support for the agreement but not any ground 
     troops.
       Whatever happens with the troop commitment, Congress should 
     insist that the agreement's provisions allowing the training 
     and arming of the Bosnian Muslims be rigorously adhered to. A 
     balance of power among the hostile parties is ultimately the 
     only basis for long-term stability in the region. And if 
     American troops are sent to Bosnia, they will be unable to 
     leave responsibly until such a balance has been developed. 
     That would certainly take longer than the yearlong limit 
     imposed by the administration.

  Mr. INHOFE. This is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution who 
took the time to read the some 12 annexes that we have to this 
agreement that has been initialed and all that was said.
  We realize the responsibility that we have in the United States for 
this so-called peacekeeping effort. But stop and think. This is not 
peacekeeping; this is peace implementation. There is a little thing 
called mission creep. We saw it in Vietnam. We saw it in Somalia. It is 
a thing where you go in and tell the American people, ``We are just 
keeping peace. There is no war on over there.''
  Mr. President, I was in the northeast sector of Bosnia. There is a 
war going on over there. The firing did not stop. The firepower is 
going on right now. You can hear it. You are walking around with a 
shrapnel jacket and helmet. You are not doing that to keep warm even 
though you are doing anything you can to keep warm in that area. There 
was a blizzard 3 weeks ago when I was there.
  Nonetheless, when this scholar read the accords, not only are we 
responsible for implementing, that is, making peace; but we also are 
responsible for rebuilding the infrastructure. This $2 billion they 
bandy around is not even a drop in the bucket of what we are going to 
have to spend if the President has his way and has a mass deployment 
into Bosnia.
  I had a telephone conversation not more than just 10 minutes ago with 
a retired captain, Jim Smith, who lost his leg in Vietnam and lost his 
son in Somalia. His son was one of those soldiers, one of those 18 
Rangers that were sent over there originally for some type of a 
humanitarian mission that was supposed to open up the roads so we could 
send humanitarian goods in to some of the Somalian people.
  Yes, that seemed to be a good idea. It was a 45-day mission to start 
with. Then President Clinton was elected. I was serving in the other 
body at the time, and every month we sent a resolution that said, ``Mr. 
President, bring our troops home from Somalia. We do not have anything 
at stake there in terms of our Nation's security.'' He did not do it 
and did not do it and did not do it until finally 18 of our Rangers 
were murdered in cold blood, their corpses were mutilated and dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu. And one of those corpses was Cpl. Jim 
Smith, the son of Capt. Jim Smith.
  I talked to Capt. Jim Smith, who spent a career in the military and 
knows a lot more about it than I do. Captain Smith said there are so 
many parallels between what happened to his 

[[Page S 17880]]
son and what is going to happen to many other sons and daughters if we 
allow the mass deployment of troops into Bosnia.

  He said one of the things that stuck in his mind was the last letter 
that he got from his son, Cpl. Jim Smith, who said, ``Dad, the biggest 
problem we have is we don't know who the good guys and the bad guys 
are.'' This was in Somalia. This was one of the last letters, maybe the 
last letter, written by Cpl. Jim Smith before his body was dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu. He said, ``We don't know who the good 
guys and the bad guys are.''
  That is exactly what happened 2\1/2\ years ago when President Clinton 
made the first decision for airdrops. I asked the person--and I cannot 
use his name in this public forum because it was a restricted meeting--
I said, ``How do you know when we drop the stuff whether it's going to 
get to the good guys or the bad guys?'' He scratched his head and said, 
``You know, I don't think we know that. Come to think of it, I'm not 
sure we know who the good guys and the bad guys are.''
  That is because if you take a snapshot of any time in the history of 
Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia, you will find that at one time the 
Croats are the bad guys and the Serbs are the good guys; another time 
the Moslems have just finished butchering several thousand people, they 
are the bad guys, the Croats are the good guys. Most recently we assume 
the Serbs are the bad guys, so we, under the direction of President 
Clinton, chose sides in that civil war. At that time, many of us said, 
as soon as they do airdrops, then there will be airstrikes, and then 
they will want to send troops in. And that is exactly what has 
happened.
  So this not over. It is not a done deal. I know the President right 
now is on a wave. His numbers look good. Mr. President, I can 
understand that, because you are an excellent politician. You just came 
back from Europe. You were talking about how everyone was cheering you 
over there. No wonder they are cheering over in Europe. You are saying 
we are committing 70 percent of the cost for this, and we are 
committing 30 percent of our troops to fight with your other troops, to 
fight your battles for you.
  That is not our battle over there. That is relative to the security 
interests of Western Europe and Eastern Europe, not the United States.
  I saw the accounts on television when President Clinton was talking 
to the troops over there. I can remember when I was a troop, so I know 
how a troop thinks. When I was over there talking to those same troops 
just a few days before the President was there, they had one question. 
They said, ``What is our mission? Why are we going to this hostile 
area? Why is the President obsessed in sending us into Bosnia?''

  I only say this today. I know we are out of time, Mr. President. I 
just want to say that it is not over yet. I reemphasize there will be 
no free rides. There is going to be a vote. Most likely it will be 
Wednesday, not the vote that the leader has that is going to be a 
watered-down version of conciliatory remarks about what has gone on 
over there and about protecting our troops. We all know we are going to 
support our troops.
  But this is going to be a vote on, Are we going to have a mass 
deployment of troops into Bosnia? Yes or no. And every Senator on this 
floor is going to have to make a record and stand up and say how he 
feels so that the people at home will know.
  I do not know, Mr. President, how your calls are coming in in your 
office back in Tennessee. But I can tell you what mine are in Oklahoma. 
They are about 100 to 1 against it. That is because there is an 
infinite wisdom of the people of this country once left alone to make 
up their mind and make that judgment. It is not a beltway decision. It 
is not a Washington, DC, decision. It is not the kind of wisdom you get 
in the White House or within the beltway. It is back in real America 
where real people, real fathers and mothers are, sons and daughters who 
are going to be over there, shipped over to this endless war in Bosnia.
  It is not going to be 12 months, Mr. President. When we were up in 
the area of Tuzla where our troops are going to be deployed, I said 
something about 12 months, and they all laughed. They said, ``You mean 
12 years.'' This is the time for it to be stopped. If Somalia had been 
stopped before the murder of the 18 Rangers over there and their 
mutilated bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, that 
would not have happened. This is the time to stop this before the 
mutilated bodies of Americans are dragged through the streets of Tuzla.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DeWINE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

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