[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 190 (Thursday, November 30, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17861-S17863]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the entire Nation has its attention on the 
deployment of United States Forces to Bosnia. Congressional hearings on 
the peace agreement began this week. The President received a NATO 
troop deployment plan for the implementation force today. Many of my 
colleagues have made statements on the issue.
  I have long urged that we lift the arms embargo in Bosnia and let the 
Bosnians defend themselves. This would have been the best option for 
Bosnia and the United States. It would 

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have been the legally, morally, and strategically correct approach. 
Lifting the arms embargo would have also been the best way to avoid 
sending United States troops to Bosnia. In fact, had we done that, 
lifted the arms embargo, we would not be talking today about deployment 
of U.S. Forces.

  The record should be clear. We are where we are today because the 
President repeatedly--and let me repeat, repeatedly--rejected Congress' 
bipartisan effort to lift the embargo.
  We should also be clear at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue. It is 
time for a reality check in the Congress. The fact is that President 
Clinton has decided to send United States Forces to Bosnia. The fact is 
that these troops will be sent--and indeed some are already there. The 
fact is by next week, there will be a couple thousand American soldiers 
on the ground in Bosnia.
  The President has the constitutional power as Commander in Chief to 
send these forces. The Congress cannot stop this troop deployment from 
happening. The President and senior advisers have repeatedly said they 
will proceed with the deployment, whatever the Congress does. If we 
would try to cut off funds we would harm the men and women in the 
military who have already begun to arrive in Bosnia.
  So we should find a way, if possible, to support the American men and 
women in uniform on their way to Bosnia and who will be in Bosnia--I 
assume a full 20,000, they say, by February.
  Like all Americans, I have real concerns about this operation. First, 
I am concerned about the possibility of American casualties. The men 
and women of our Armed Forces are volunteers. But that does not make 
their lives any less valuable than those of draftees or any other 
category. They know the risks. We have an obligation to do all we can 
to reduce those risks. We can reduce the risk to American Forces by 
limiting their mission to enforcing only military provisions of the 
peace agreement: That means no Somalia-like nation-building.
  We can also reduce the threat to U.S. Forces by making it crystal 
clear that any attack on our troops will be met with an overwhelming, 
rapid, and decisive response. No more cumbersome command arrangements 
limiting ability to retaliate--no more U.N. second-guessing or dual key 
veto authority. The United Nations will not be involved. This is a NATO 
operation. It will be an American general making these decisions.
  The second major concern is that American Forces will be drawn into a 
quagmire with no way out. Many people are concerned about that because 
the administration has not articulated an exit strategy; and setting an 
arbitrary date is not an exit strategy.

  Bring them out in a year--what does that mean? That is not a 
strategy. Who knows what the strategy is?
  The President has a plan to get us into Bosnia but no realistic plan 
to get us out. Keeping Bosnia defenseless is not an exit strategy. 
Relying on Utopian arms control schemes is no exit strategy. Relying on 
unnamed third parties is not an exit strategy.
  The United States must have its own exit strategy to control its own 
destiny. We should not be dependent on the good will or actions of 
other nations. The only way to make certain that United States Forces 
will be able to leave in a timely and honorable way is to ensure that 
the Bosnians are provided the means to defend themselves when we leave.
  What is needed is a concrete effort, led by the United States, to arm 
and train the Bosnians. This effort should not be contingent on so-
called builddown provisions in the Dayton agreement.
  I understand administration officials said this morning that the 
United States or NATO would not be involved in enabling Bosnia to 
defend itself. In my view, it is an abdication of responsibility to 
rely on unspecified third countries to create the conditions that allow 
withdrawal of American forces. The sooner we start to enable Bosnians 
to defend themselves the sooner United States Forces can come home.
  In my view, the definition of success of this deployment must include 
a real end to the war--that is only possible with the creation of a 
stable military balance which enables Bosnia to defend itself. Anything 
less simply exposes American Forces to great risks in order to monitor 
a temporary interlude in the fighting. In other words, I guess if they 
all came home next year there might be a temporary interlude to get us 
through the November activities of 1996, and I am not certain it would 
last very long.
  Over the coming days--in fact, we have been working on it a couple of 
days--we will be working on a resolution that I hope the majority of my 
colleagues can support. We have not yet seen the final NATO 
implementation plan. In fact, as I said earlier, the President just 
received it today. I do not want to make a snap judgment. I hope we can 
fashion a resolution that offers support to our military forces, that 
helps reduce the risk they face, and that ensures American Forces come 
home as soon as possible with a successful mission accomplished.
  I urge my colleagues to not make this a partisan issue. I have been 
debating issues like this in the Senate floor for 20-some years. I was 
debating cut off of funds in the Vietnam war, and my colleague, Senator 
McCain was a prisoner of war. We stood on this floor day after day 
after day beating off efforts to shut off funding which I thought would 
have a direct impact on men in the service like John McCain and others 
who were in that part of the world. We had some success.

  Let me suggest that the overwhelming votes to lift the arms embargo 
were bipartisan. They were Democrats, Republicans, and they were 
bipartisan with bipartisan leadership.
  I believe the best foreign policy is conducted with bipartisan 
support. I know that the Senate votes on Lebanon and the gulf war were 
much more partisan in my view than they should have been.
  Indeed, I was dismayed, as I have said before, in the gulf crisis 
there was not a single member of the Democratic leadership in either 
the House or the Senate, when we already had troops on the ground, that 
would support President Bush's decision to protect American interests 
in the operation Desert Storm.
  I have had a long feeling that once the troops were deployed--which 
is going to happen; it is already happening--that we have some 
obligation to ensure their safe and honorable return. I have often and 
long felt it is too important for partisan posture. I know the easy 
vote on this is ``no, no.''
  I hope that some of my colleagues will look at it very carefully. We 
are talking about troops that have been committed. They are on their 
way. They will be there next week. We are going to be debating this 
next week on the Senate floor. Someone will say no troops should be 
deployed. It will be a little late for that, so it is probably not a 
difficult vote.
  Others of us, hopefully on both sides of the aisle, want to make 
certain, as I have said, that we have a way to get out. It is not hard 
to get in, but we need a way to get out. We need an exit strategy. We 
need to make certain that the Bosnians are armed and trained. We need 
to take on that responsibility.
  I know the Bosnians tried to secure that assurance in Dayton, OH, 
without success. If we do not have that, how do we leave? When do we 
leave? How long will it take?
  I just hope we can all work together in the coming days to fashion a 
resolution which supports our military forces, reduces the risk they 
face, and brings them home as soon as possible. Some would say, ``Well, 
if you do this, you are supporting the President of the United 
States.'' I say that is all right with me. We have one President at a 
time. He is the Commander in Chief. He has made this decision. I do not 
agree with it. I think it is a mistake.

  We had a better option, many better options. But as I said, he 
repeatedly rejected those options. Now it is up to high noon. The 
troops are on the way. They are from Kansas, from Arizona, from 
Tennessee, they are from Ohio, they are from all over America. They are 
looking to us for support. They are looking for us to make their job 
just as safe and just as secure as possible.
  I believe we do that. The bottom line, the President intends to send 
these troops one way or the other. He has made it very clear. He has 
told us that. It has been in the paper. I think we have the 
responsibility, as I said, in the Congress, to try to ensure to our 
best ability, that as this deployment goes forward, that we create the 
conditions to end it quickly and successfully so 

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that the U.S. Forces can return to their families.
  I am very happy to yield the floor. I know my colleague from Arizona 
wanted to make a statement.

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