[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 190 (Thursday, November 30, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17841-S17844]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 SENDING UNITED STATES TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am not quite sure I can speak with the 
passion of the Senator from California, but I, too, feel a great 
concern for the situation in which this President has now in a 
foursquare way placed this country. 

[[Page S17842]]

  The President's speech this week was probably the most important 
speech of his Presidency. It was an address that outlined a decision, a 
very critical decision that only a President can make, and that is to 
deploy United States troops, in this instance United States troops, to 
be peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavian Republic. I was looking for a 
number of answers in his message, such as a very full articulation of a 
defined goal or mission, strategy for achieving that goal, an exit 
strategy, and that of our national and security interests for our 
country.
  I do not, in any way, bow from the moral imperative argument. That 
has been clear from day one. It is certainly an argument that this 
Nation has not walked away from. We have invested millions of dollars 
and lots of our manpower in air support, in sea support, in logistics. 
We have been involved.
  So it is not a question of now versus then. I am sorry, Mr. 
President, if you only caught the sails of the current moral 
imperative, the slaughter in the former Yugoslavia has been going on 
for 4 years. We have all witnessed it, and the Senator from California 
has spoken to it on the floor. So that is something that has not missed 
America. What has missed America is how do we become engaged, engaged 
in a way that we can control a situation and environment and an emotion 
that is well 300 years old in the making, where other nations, great 
and small, have chosen to at least stand aside for the very risk of the 
people, their own people, that they might chose to engage in a 
solution.
  So that becomes the issue. It is the issue that we, in this Senate, 
will have to face, because ultimately what is the President's decision 
can become our responsibility. I will not judge it on a moral 
imperative. I cannot judge it on that basis. I have to judge it on 
whether we can do it in a way in which we can go in, solve a problem, 
stabilize the situation, minimize the risk to our people, our sons and 
daughters who have gone in service to this country and its security, 
and then is there a way out. That is what I think we ought to be 
judging here.
  There is no question about the loss of human life that has gone on 
over there. And we have all spoken to it with a great sense of urgency. 
But it is not now only to be discovered. We have known it for a long, 
long while.
  What is at hand now is an issue that this President for justifiable 
reasons has attempted to bring to this country, and by his decision, 
and by the initialing of the agreement in Dayton, has clearly brought 
it foursquare. But, Mr. President, my frustration is very simple. The 
President of the United States cautioned us not to debate the issue 
until there was a decision, not to debate the issue until there was a 
plan. And we chose not to. I think we chose improperly, but we chose to 
give him the time.
  And now that he has a plan, or at least now that he soon will have a 
plan that we can look at with some detail, he has put us in a very 
unique situation. He almost has the opportunity, if we chose not to 
support him, to turn to us and say, you are breaking the peace 
agreement, you are putting at risk the men and women of the former 
Yugoslavia, and the children. Mr. President, not so, simply not so. 
They have been at risk for a long time. And this Senate and the U.S. 
House of Representatives has for many years contemplated alternatives. 
We have asked for a variety of approaches, only to be denied those, to 
create equity and balance with the warring factions over there, only to 
be denied that, to clearly create a one-sided war that by the very 
nature of its history would spell out human slaughter, and it has.
  And now finally, after all of those long denials, this President has 
said, ``Here is a solution. And here is what I propose to do. And here 
is what I am going to do.'' And that can result, not only in the 
placing at risk of 20,000 of our armed services people on the ground, 
clearly in foursquare risk, but it also places a good many more--
because of the 4-to-1 ratio, we are not just talking about 20,000 
Americans on the ground over there, we may well be talking 50,000, or 
60,000, or 70,000.
  Is it going to go on for a year? Well, Mr. President, I do not think 
you know that, and we certainly do not know that. So it is with these 
concerns that I come to the floor today, Mr. President, because of the 
constitutional role that our President has, the right that he has under 
the Constitution to do what he is doing today, and at the same time to 
recognize that we have a responsibility. And, as I have said very early 
on, my responsibility rests with Americans first and the ability to 
understand how they can best be involved and safeguarded. Our 
responsibilities also rest in whether we appropriately fund these 
actions and if the mission is effectively carried out.
  So there are a lot of questions yet unanswered. I have asked the 
people of Idaho to speak to me and our delegation on this issue because 
the Senator from California is right, this is a tough one. There is no 
question about it that we will all consider this with great, great 
concern, great passion, a great aching of the heart, not only for what 
has gone on over there but for what we might be putting our men and 
women at risk in doing.
  And so in asking that, my phone, like I think most of the phones of 
my colleagues, has been filled with phone calls from our citizens 
expressing with more passion than I have heard expressed in some time, 
a concern about what we are about to do as a country. My phone calls 
are running 100 to 1 in opposition to what my citizens now know at 
least of what our President plans to do. And they are hoping that I can 
block him from doing that. And I must tell them that I cannot, that 
under the Constitution, as Commander in Chief, he has that kind of 
authority.
  But I do hope that this Senate will speak out very clearly as to 
where we stand and what we stand for. I do not think that our message 
in any way can be garbled nor can we avoid just passing it by, just 
letting the President free rein this. Not at all. And I hope that we 
can develop a resolution that speaks clearly to our concerns that those 
who openly and aggressively support the President in this issue can 
have a right to express that, those of us who have very real questions 
at this moment who more than likely will strongly oppose the President 
can also have that opportunity to speak clearly to it.
  That is the responsibility of the Senate and the Congress, not just 
to this President, but to the citizens of this country, because we, in 
Government here, have this unique responsibility among all, and that is 
whether to engage this Nation in war or police actions and ask our 
citizens not only to support us in this but to take up arms for the 
purpose of these actions.
  The President has raised three concerns to justify U.S. participation 
in implementing the peace accord: The potential spread of the conflict, 
our leadership in NATO and the international community, and the need to 
end the carnage in the Balkans. I do not question the concerns raised 
by our Commander in Chief. However, I do reserve my support for his 
actions at this time.
  Mr. President, we would like to respond to what I will refer to as 
the ``moral imperative,'' that President Clinton outlined in his 
speech.
  The devastation and human suffering in the Balkans has left us all 
with a feeling of frustration. These feelings are not new, however. 
Four years ago, I was contacted by a Croatian-American constituent of 
mine, when the conflict first raged between the Serbs and Croatians. 
This gentleman was in regular contact with my office, and his fears and 
frustrations were very real to me. The moral imperative existed back 
then. However, then, like now, our options for involvement are very 
limited, and we still face the fundamental difficulty of trying to make 
the peace a greater victory than winning the war.
  Mr. President, while we all understand and agree with the moral 
imperative, we have yet to hear why this action would serve our 
national interest or security needs.
  In the coming days, when details of the mission are made clear, I 
will look and I will listen, but I have very grave concerns and 
reservations about this proposed action.
  I must admit, President Clinton has put the Congress in a bad 
position by bringing us into the picture after the Bosnian peace 
agreement has been initialed.
  He has put the Congress at the disadvantage of being the breakers of 
peace, if we withhold support. Even so, Congress has no choice but to 
speak. Regardless of the outcome, I want to 

[[Page S17843]]
make one point very clear: If Americans are deployed to defend the 
peace, I will support our troops.
  Mr. President, I have great concern about sending Americans into the 
Balkans to implement and enforce a peace agreement that was hammered 
out in Dayton, OH.
  My concerns stem from the fact that despite their sincerity and good 
intentions, the negotiators may not be able to deliver on their 
promises.
  One of the great problems with the situation in the Balkans--and one 
of the reasons we have had approximately 30 failed cease-fires--is that 
there is an inordinate number of people who are often referred to as 
``irregulars.'' In Idaho, we would probably call them vigilantes.
  The bottom line is that this kind of disorder, combined with 
extraordinary tensions and emotions, is a recipe for disaster.
  Mr. President, as outsiders, we cannot impose peace under these 
circumstances. We may not even be able to serve as the conduit of 
peace.
  There has been some discussion about the need for detail in this 
peace agreement. The Dayton agreement has detail, but there are people 
who wield power, such as Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who were 
not at the negotiating table.
  With the ink barely dry on the agreement, Karadzic announced that 
peace in the capital would be difficult to ensure and that the transfer 
of Serb-held neighborhoods was not final. Karadzic, who was not at the 
negotiation table, but represented by Serb President Slobodan 
Milosevic, is committed to making changes to the peace agreement. 
However, it is my understanding that negotiators in the agreement have 
rebuffed the idea that Bosnian Serbs could restructure the agreement.
  In an interview with NBC, U.S. negotiator Richard C. Holbrooke said, 
``Dayton was an initialing. Paris will be a signing. There will be no 
change between Dayton and Paris.''
  Defense Secretary William J. Perry on ``Face the Nation,'' 
reconfirmed that position by saying,

       . . . I want to make clear: We're not going to renegotiate 
     this agreement. This agreement is the agreement, and that's 
     what we're proceeding on.

  Karadzic does not appear stonewalled. It is my understanding from 
reports I have read, that he is mobilizing community leaders from the 
suburbs around Sarajevo, to force changes in the agreement, prior to 
the signing date on December 10. While we may dismiss Karadzic's power 
with the Serbian people, there is one thing that cannot be overlooked: 
His message strikes a chord with many Serbians who have fought for 
gains that are now being signed away, in the name of peace.
  The issue at hand may be peacekeeping, but we cannot ignore the fact 
that peace will only come with a high price:

       What is wrong with the Dayton agreement [is that it] has 
     created a new Beirut in Europe. It is going to bleed for 
     decades.

  Radovan Karadzic, from a Washington Post article November 27, 1995.
  While Karadzic's rhetoric may be just rhetoric, it is aimed at 
destabilizing this agreement. It is also a message that many Serbians 
want to hear. From what I have seen happen in this conflict over the 
last few years, he will likely be a formidable opponent to peace.
  Reports on comments from both Bosnians and Serbs in Sarajevo don't 
bode well for peace. The bitter depth of anger in this conflict and the 
lack of trust on both sides has not created the kind of atmosphere this 
peace agreement needs to be successful.
  In short, Mr. President, citizens marching in protest of the peace 
accord are not likely to swallow the hatred they have harbored in order 
to bring about peace.
  So, what exactly does this agreement say that is so hotly contested 
by some Serbian factions? Mr. President, under the agreement initialed 
last week, the enforcement of peace will be the responsibility of a 
NATO-led peacekeeping force of 60,000 troops, with as many as 20,000 of 
them being Americans. Bosnia would be split between a joint Moslem-
Croat Government, which would have jurisdiction over 51 percent of the 
territory, and a Serb republic, which would control 49 percent.
  Sarajevo will fall under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation, 
along with its Serb-held suburbs.
  Needless to say, the apportionment does not sit well with many of the 
Serbian people.
  Before closing, Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to 
comment on the war powers resolution. Many of my fellow Idahoans have 
raised concerns about who has the power to deploy troops in the kind of 
situation we are facing in Bosnia.
  The Constitution provides authority to both the President and the 
Congress with respect to the use of our military. Our Constitution is 
one of the greatest documents ever written. The role of Congress and 
the Presidency in the use of our military is a case in point. Our 
Constitution reflects the desire to have the collective judgment of 
both the Congress and the President when making decisions on the use of 
force.
  Under article II, section 2, of the Constitution, the President has 
the authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to deploy and 
command our Armed Forces.
  On the other hand, article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives the 
Congress the power to declare war. We can all look at these powers, and 
see the clear differences. However, lines can become fuzzy when those 
principles are applied to a specific situation, such as the one before 
us in the Balkans.
  The War Powers Resolution, which passed over President Nixon's veto 
on November 7, 1973, was designed to provide a functional framework 
through which to clarify the two roles and to maintain the intended 
balance of power.
  Compliance with the resolution becomes an issue when troops are 
deployed to a location where they face hostilities or imminent 
involvement in hostilities.
  The criteria required for compliance with the War Powers Resolution 
are very clear. The President must consult the Congress, fulfill 
reporting requirements, and then seek congressional approval for 
continued deployment beyond a specific number of days--60 or 90 
depending on the situation.
  If these steps are not fulfilled. Then the Congress is left with 
using it's power of the purse. Terminating the funds necessary for the 
deployment provides the Congress the ability to curb the President's 
powers as Commander-in-Chief. This step is not an easy one, given that 
the Congress would have to override a presidential veto with a two-
thirds vote.
  Mr. President, I would like to explore one final point in this whole 
situation that has consumed my concerns. The war in the former 
Yugoslavian republics is not new; it is a continuation of an age-old 
conflict. These people have fought and suffered atrocities, especially 
over the last 4 years, that we cannot comprehend, for a goal that we do 
not understand. Yet, when cease-fires were achieved they were short-
lived, because winning the war or conflict was valued more highly than 
coexisting in peace. All sides in this conflict have had one goal: to 
win. To win, is to survive.
  However, through our efforts to contain the conflict by placing the 
international embargo on Yugoslavia and maintain it on Bosnia, the 
conflict became very uneven. The Serbians took hold of that advantage, 
and have taken hold of every subsequent advantage in their efforts to 
win.
  I do not see the average person, whether Serb, Moslem, or Croatian, 
being prepared to accept peace without a fight. A Washington Post 
article on November 27, quoted what I would call an average man who has 
lived through this conflict:

       ``It's pathetic,'' said Milorad Dugovic, a car mechanic who 
     keeps an automatic pistol tucked in his waistband. ``What 
     were we fighting for in the past four years? * * * we will 
     continue to fight. We'll fight even NATO. What's ours will 
     remain ours.''

  I do not see the Serbian people being willing to snatch defeat from 
the jaws of victory. Peace under this agreement is not a done deal. Let 
us not deceive ourselves into thinking that our troops will only be 
peacekeepers. If actions fit rhetoric, and fighting begins again, our 
troops will be in the middle of this bloody civil war. then peace will 
come only if we become the peacemakers by using force to settle this 
conflict.
  Mr. President, I remain opposed to the proposed deployment of United 
States troops into Bosnia as part of this peace agreement at this time. 
I emphasize ``at this time,'' because it is imperative that we all 
fully understand what is at stake.

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  In my view, our national and security interests have not yet been 
defined. Before I can even entertain the thought of sending American 
men and women into this situation, these interests must be real, and 
they must be defined.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

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