[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 190 (Thursday, November 30, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2275-E2276]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      REMEMBER THE NIXON DOCTRINE

                                 ______


                         HON. Y. TIM HUTCHINSON

                              of arkansas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, November 30, 1995

  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, considering the high level of interest 
in the President's plan to deploy 20,000 American servicemen and 
servicewomen to Bosnia, I thought my colleagues might find the 
accompanying article of special interest.
  It should be noted that Jim Webb, a former counsel on the Veterans' 
Affairs Committee, was a highly decorated marine in Vietnam, as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, as well as Secretary of the Navy.

                [From the New York Times, Nov. 28, 1995]

                      Remember the Nixon Doctrine

                            (By James Webb)

       Arlington, Va.--The Clinton Administration's insistence on 
     putting 20,000 American troops into Bosnia should be seized 
     on by national leaders, particularly those running for 
     President, to force a long-overdue debate on the worldwide 
     obligations of our military.
       While the Balkan factions may be immersed in their 
     struggle, and Europeans may feel threatened by it, for 
     Americans it represents only one of many conflicts, real and 
     potential, whose seriousness must be weighed, often against 
     one another, before allowing a commitment of lives, resources 
     and national energy.
       Today, despite a few half-hearted attempts such as Gen. 
     Colin Powell's ``superior force doctrine,'' no clear set of 
     principles exists as a touchstone for debate on these 
     tradeoffs. Nor have any leaders of either party offered terms 
     which provide an understandable global logic as to when our 
     military should be committed to action. In short, we still 
     lack a national security strategy that fits the postcold war 
     era.
       More than ever before, the United States has become the 
     nation of choice when crises occur, large and small. At the 
     same time, the size and location of our military forces 
     are in flux. It is important to make our interests known 
     to our citizens, our allies and even our potential 
     adversaries, not just in Bosnia but around the world, so 
     that commitments can be measured by something other than 
     the pressures of interest groups and manipulation by the 
     press. Furthermore, with alliances increasingly justified 
     by power relationships similar to those that dominated 
     before World War I, our military must be assured that the 
     stakes of its missions are worth dying for.
       Failing to provide these assurances is to continue the 
     unremitting case-by-case debates, hampering our foreign 
     policy on the one hand and on the other treating our military 
     forces in some cases as mere bargaining chips. As the past 
     few years demonstrate, this also causes us to fritter away 
     our national resolve while arguing about military backwaters 
     like Somalia and Haiti.
       Given the President's proposal and the failure to this 
     point of defining American stakes in Bosnia as immediate or 
     nation-threatening, the coming weeks will offer a new round 
     of such debates. The President appears tempted to follow the 
     constitutionally questionable (albeit effective) approach 
     used by the Bush Administration in the Persian Gulf war: 
     putting troops in an area where no American forces have been 
     threatened and no treaties demand their presence, then 
     gaining international agreement before placing the issue 
     before Congress.
       Mr. Clinton said their mission would be ``to supervise the 
     separation of forces and to give them confidence that each 
     side will live up to their agreements.'' This rationale 
     reminds one of the ill-fated mission of the international 
     force sent to Beirut in 1983. He has characterized the 
     Bosnian mission as diplomatic in purpose, but promised, in 
     his speech last night, to ``fight fire with fire and then 
     some'' if American troops are threatened. This is a formula 
     for confusion once a combat unit sent on a distinctly 
     noncombat mission comes under repeated attack.
       We are told that other NATO countries will decline to send 
     their own military forces to Bosnia unless the United States 
     assumes a dominant role, which includes sizable combat 
     support and naval forces backing it up. This calls to mind 
     the decades of over-reliance by NATO members on American 
     resources, and President Eisenhower's warning in October 1963 
     that the size and permanence of our military presence in 
     Europe would ``continue to discourage the development of the 
     necessary military strength Western European countries should 
     provide for themselves.''
       The Administration speaks of a ``reasonable time for 
     withdrawal,'' which if too short might tempt the parties to 
     wait out the so-called peacekeepers and if too long might 
     tempt certain elements to drive them out with attacks causing 
     high casualties.
       Sorting out the Administration's answers to such 
     hesitations will take a great deal of time, attention and 
     emotion. And doing so in the absence of a clearly stated 
     global policy will encourage other nations, particularly the 
     new power centers in Asia, to view the United States as 
     becoming less committed to addressing their own security 
     concerns. Many of these concerns are far more serious to 
     long-term international stability and American interests. 
     These include the continued threat of war on the Korean 
     peninsula, the importance of the United States as a 
     powerbroker where historical Chinese, Japanese and Russian 
     interests collide, and the need for military security to 
     accompany trade and diplomacy in a dramatically changing 
     region.
       Asian cynicism gained further grist in the wake of the 
     Administration's recent snubs of Japan: the President's 
     cancellation of his summit meeting because of the budget 
     crisis, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher's early 
     return from a Japanese visit to watch over the Bosnian peace 
     talks.
       Asian leaders are becoming uneasy over an economically and 
     militarily resurgent China that in recent years has become 
     increasing more aggressive. A perception that the United 
     States is not paying attention to or is not worried about 
     such long-term threats could in itself cause a major 
     realignment in Asia. One cannot exclude even Japan, whose 
     strong bilateral relationship with the United States has been 
     severely tested of late, from this possibility.
       Those who aspire to the Presidency in 1996 should use the 
     coming debate to articulate a world view that would 
     demonstrate to the world, as well as to Americans, an 
     understanding of the uses and limitations--in a sense the 
     human budgeting of our military assets.
       Richard Nixon was the last President to clearly define how 
     and when the United States would commit forces overseas. In 
     1969, he declared that our military policy should follow 
     three basic tenets:
       Honor all treaty commitments in responding to those who 
     invade the lands of our allies.
       Provide a nuclear umbrella to the world against the threats 
     of other nuclear powers.
       Finally, provide weapons and technical assistance to other 
     countries where warranted, but do not commit American forces 
     to local conflicts.
       These tenets, with some modification, are still the best 
     foundation of our world leadership. They remove the United 
     States from local conflicts and civil wars. The use of the 
     American military to fulfill treaty obligations requires 
     ratification by Congress, providing a hedge against the kind 
     of Presidential discretion that might send forces into 
     conflicts not in the national interest. Yet they provide 
     clear authority for immediate action required to carry out 
     policies that have been agreed upon by the government as a 
     whole.
       Given the changes in the world, an additional tenet would 
     also be desirable: The United States should respond 
     vigorously against cases of nuclear proliferation and state-
     sponsored terrorism.
       These tenets would prevent the use of United States forces 
     on commitments more appropriate to lesser powers while 
     preserving our unique capabilities. Only the United States 
     among the world's democracies can field large-scale maneuver 
     forces, replete with strategic airlift, carrier battle groups 
     and amphibious power projection.
       Our military has no equal in countering conventional 
     attacks on extremely short notice wherever the national 
     interest dictates. Our bases in Japan give American forces 
     the ability to react almost anywhere in the Pacific and 
     Indian Oceans, just as the continued presence in Europe 
     allows American units to react in Europe and the Middle East.
       In proper form, this capability provides reassurance to 
     potentially threatened nations everywhere. But despite the 
     ease with which the American military seemingly operates on a 
     daily basis, its assets are limited, as is the national 
     willingness to put them at risk.
       As the world moves toward new power centers and different 
     security needs, it is more vital than ever that we state 
     clearly the conditions under which American forces will be 
     sent into harm's way. And we should be ever more chary of 
     commitments, like the looming one in Bosnia, where combat 
     units invite attack but are by the very nature of their 
     mission not supposed to fight.
     
[[Page E2276]]


                  TRIBUTE TO THE LATE JAMES T. MARTIN

                                 ______


                           HON. KWEISI MFUME

                              of maryland

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, November 30, 1995

  Mr. MFUME. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to salute one of our Capitol 
Police Officers, a decorated soldier and a constituent of mine.
  James T. Martin of Catonsville died of cancer on November 27, 1995. 
He was born in Newberry, SC; the son of Ida L. Martin and the late 
Frank Martin. Mr. Martin left Newberry and enlisted in the U.S. Air 
Force in 1948 and retired as a master sergeant in 1969. While serving 
during the Korean war, Mr. Martin was decorated with the Soldiers Medal 
for Valor, the Korean Service Medal, the Good Conduct Medal and the 
United Nations Medal.
  Upon his retirement from the U.S. Air Force, Mr. Martin joined the 
U.S. Capitol Police Force, a branch of the House of Representatives and 
completed his second career serving as a sergeant and retired after 22 
years.
  Mr. Martin was an active member of St. Josephs Monastery Paris and 
was engaged in a number of organizations, including the Glad Men of 
Song, the VFW and the American Legion.
  Mr. Martin is survived by his wife Regina T. Martin, four daughters, 
Theresa, Bridghe, Eileen, and Patricia, one brother and three sisters. 
He is also survived by 3 granddaughters and 11 grandsons.
  Because of his service and dedication to our country, to the House of 
Representatives and to his family, I stand today to pay tribute to 
James T. Martin.

                          ____________________