[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 190 (Thursday, November 30, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2265-E2266]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E2265]]


                        A SHORT HISTORY OF HAITI

                                 ______


                          HON. BILL RICHARDSON

                             of new mexico

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, November 30, 1995

  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to my colleagues' 
attention the following article by one of America's preeminent 
authorities on Haiti. Robert Pastor has been deeply involved in issues 
affecting Haiti in his capacity as director of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Program at the Carter Center. It would serve my colleagues 
well to take Mr. Pastor's views under consideration.

             [From the Foreign Service Journal, Nov. 1995]

                        A Short History of Haiti

                         (By Robert A. Pastor)

       In 1791, stirred by the spirit of the French Revolution, 
     Haitian slaves began a punishing, 13-year war for 
     independence against Europe's most powerful army. The 
     proclamation of the world's first independent black republic 
     on Jan. 1, 1804, posed a dual challenge for Haiti and the 
     world. The challenge for Haitians was to fulfill the ideals 
     that moved them to insurrection--liberty, equality and 
     fraternity. The challenge to the world was to accept a black 
     republic as a sovereign and equal state. Neither passed the 
     test then. Today, presidents Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Bill 
     Clinton are doing better in meeting the dual challenge than 
     at any point in Haiti's 200-year history.
       Haitians rid themselves of colonialism in 1804 but not of 
     oppression. Its new leaders exploited the people while 
     transforming the richest colony in the Caribbean into the 
     poorest country. A peaceful, democratic process never took 
     hold. Instead, a succession of civil wars and brutal 
     dictators devastated the country. Only the pride of Haiti's 
     birth helped Haitians to withstand 200 years of abject 
     poverty, international isolation and brutal dictatorship.
       In the 19th century, Europe feared that slave revolts could 
     spread through their colonies, and so they tried to contain 
     and isolate the new republic. The U.S. response was similar, 
     but more tragic because Haitians also had been inspired by 
     the U.S. revolution, and the United States owed them a debt 
     for preventing Napoleon from using the island as a base to 
     capture North America. The United States only contemplated 
     relations with the republic after emancipating its own 
     slaves.
       Haitians were saddened by the imposed isolation, but they 
     adjusted, becoming a kind of political Galapagos island with 
     unique political and spiritual forms. Its politics became 
     virtually impervious to outside influence until U.S. marines 
     landed in 1915. But when the marines departed 19 years later, 
     a new generation of dictators returned, culminating with the 
     30-year Duvalier dynasty.
       On Feb. 7, 1986, Jean-Claude ``Baby Doc'' Duvalier fled to 
     France, and the most recent and promising phase in Haiti's 
     liberation struggle began. The issue, once again, was whether 
     a new government would meet the people's democratic and 
     material needs or whether the corrupt alliance between 
     Haiti's armed forces and its wealthiest elite would maintain 
     its grip on the country. The challenge for the international 
     community was whether it would take the steps necessary to 
     bring Haiti into the fold of democratic nations, or whether 
     it would simply wash its hands of Haiti.
       After trying unsuccessfully to manipulate the electoral 
     process, the military grudgingly allowed a free election in 
     1990. This did not happen by accident. Since the lessons of 
     1990 were lost by the June 1995 elections, it might be useful 
     to review them.
       In 1990, the provisional president Ertha Pascal-Trouillot 
     invited the international community to Haiti to observe and, 
     indirectly, help construct an electoral process. The U.N. and 
     the OAS advised the Provisional Elections Council (CEP) and 
     did a quick count--a random sample of results--that permitted 
     a reliable prediction of the final results of the 
     presidential election. In addition, she invited former 
     president Jimmy Carter, chairman of the Council of Freely-
     Elected Heads of Government, an informal group of 25 current 
     and former presidents of the Americas. The council, working 
     with the National Democratic Institute for International 
     Affairs mediated for five months among the political parties, 
     the CEP and the government.
       One ``mediates'' an electoral process by listening to the 
     opposition parties, distilling their complaints, and helping 
     the government and the CEP fashion fair responses. This 
     process increased confidence in the electoral process so that 
     all the candidates and parties felt a sense of ownership in 
     the elections and would therefore accept the results even if 
     they lost. In addition, the council, through two incumbent 
     members--Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and 
     Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley--persuaded the United 
     Nations to send security observers to monitor the elections 
     and prevent violence that had aborted the election in 
     November 1987.
       The Bush administration supported these efforts, but, 
     correctly, kept some distance from the mediation. The proud, 
     nationalistic Haitians preferred to negotiate the rules of 
     the election with international and non-governmental 
     organizations rather than with the U.S. government.
       On December 16, 1990, Haitians voted for 11 presidential 
     candidates, but Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a young priest, won 
     two-thirds of the vote. Because of the effective mediation 
     during the campaign, all the political parties accepted the 
     results. Jean Casimir, who was the executive secretary of the 
     CEP in 1990 and is currently Haiti's ambassador to the United 
     States, acknowledged: ``Without electoral observation, it 
     would have been totally impossible for Haiti to rid itself of 
     its dictators and their armed forces.''
       Aristide was hardly a typical politician, anymore than 
     Haiti's politics were classically democratic. Artiside was 
     connected to the people by a spiritual bond, and this was 
     evident during his inauguration on Feb. 7, 1991 as the people 
     chanted passionately: ``Thank you God, for sending Titi 
     [Aristide].''
       The election turned the Haitian power pyramid upside down. 
     The vast majority of Haitians are poor, and for the first 
     time, they had their champion in the presidential palace. The 
     elite found themselves on the outside, fearful that the 
     masses might treat them as they had treated the people.
       It was a delicate transition, and it did not last. Barely 
     seven months after his inauguration, the military overthrew 
     Aristide with the consent of the oligarchy and perhaps at its 
     invitation. When he later reflected on what had gone wrong, 
     Aristide acknowledged that perhaps he had won the election by 
     too much. He had little incentive to compromise, and he 
     showed too little respect for the independence of the 
     Parliament. One of his mistakes was replacing the commander-
     in-chief of the Army, Gen. Herard Abraham, with Gen. Raoul 
     Cedras. Abraham, a skillful political actor, had secured the 
     election and stopped a military coup led by Duvalierist Roger 
     LaFontant in January 1991.
       In exile, Aristide tired to marshal international support 
     for his return. The international community was eager to 
     help. During the previous 15 years, a democratic wave had 
     swept through the hemisphere. When the OAS General Assembly 
     met in Santiago in June 1991, every active member had had 
     free and competitive elections. (Cuba was not an active 
     member. Mexico and the Dominican Republic had competitive 
     elections, but their integrity was questioned.) The foreign 
     ministers understood the fragility of democracy in the 
     Americas, and they passed the Santiago Commitment on 
     Democracy and Resolution 1080, pledging that if a coup 
     occurred in the Americas, they would meet in emergency 
     session to decide on action to discuss ways to restore 
     democracy.
       Three months later, in September 1991, Haiti provided the 
     first test case. Within days of the coup, the OAS Foreign 
     Ministers met in Washington, quickly condemned the coup, and 
     sent a delegation to Haiti to demand the return of Aristide. 
     The military humiliated the group, and the OAS responded by 
     imposing an economic embargo on the regime. President Bush 
     supported President Aristide's return, but some in his 
     administration did not, and that might have influenced his 
     decision to limit the means he would use to accomplish that 
     goal. He ordered the U.S. Coast Guard to return refugees to 
     Haiti, and this reduced the pressure on him to restore 
     Aristide to power.
       During the campaign, Bill Clinton criticized Bush for his 
     refugee policy, but after his election, Clinton adopted the 
     same policy and gained Aristide's support by promising to 
     restore him to power. Making good on that promise proved far 
     more difficult than the new president thought. The Haitian 
     military and the elite did not want Aristide to return, and 
     no diplomatic effort would succeed unless backed by a 
     credible threat of force. The credibility of U.S. and U.N. 
     diplomatic efforts was undermined significantly when the 
     Harlan County, a Navy ship carrying 200 U.S. soldiers on a 
     humanitarian mission, was prevented from docking in Port-au-
     Prince by thugs organized by the armed forces.
       While the president remained committed to restoring 
     Aristide, the difficulty of accomplishing that goal tempted 
     the administration to put the issue aside. However, intense 
     pressure by Randall Robinson, the director of TransAfrica, 
     and the Congressional Black Caucus compelled the 
     administration to take a giant step forward. In July 1994, 
     the United States persuaded the U.N. Security Council to pass 
     a resolution calling on member states to use force to compel 
     the Haitian military to accept Aristide's return. 

[[Page E2266]]
     This was a watershed event in international relations--the first time 
     that the U.N. Security Council had authorized the use of 
     force for the purpose of restoring democracy to a member 
     state. The following August, President Clinton decided that 
     the U.S. would take the lead in an invasion.
       The next month, on Sept. 15, President Clinton publicly 
     warned the Haitian military leaders to leave power 
     immediately. He said all diplomatic options were exhausted, 
     but in fact, the U.S. government had stopped talking to the 
     Haitian military six months before. Nonetheless, Gen. Raoul 
     Cedras, the commander of the Haitian military, had opened a 
     dialogue during the previous week with former president Jimmy 
     Carter, whom he had met during the 1990 elections. The 
     president, who had been told by Carter of the talks, decided 
     on Friday, Sept. 16, to send Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) 
     and General Colin Powell to try one last time to negotiate 
     the departure of Haiti's military leaders.
       The Carter team had a deadline of less than 24 hours. They 
     arrived Saturday afternoon and began their meeting with the 
     Haitian military high command about 2:50 p.m. After one hour, 
     the three statesmen had convinced the generals, for the first 
     time, that force would be used against them if the talks 
     failed. But the Carter team understood what some in the 
     Clinton administration did not--that the Haitian military 
     leaders were not interested in negotiating their exit, wealth 
     or safety. Representing the traditional elites, the military 
     were desperately fearful that Aristide would unleash the 
     masses against them. Moreover, like President Aristide, the 
     generals were proud Haitians, who did not want to surrender 
     or be lectured.
       By about 1 p.m. on Sunday, Sept. 18, the Carter team had 
     succeeded in gaining agreement to allow the peaceful entry of 
     U.S. forces into Haiti and the restoration of President 
     Aristide. But there were some details that needed to be 
     negotiated, and time was running out. Suddenly, Gen. Philippe 
     Biamby burst into the room with the news that the men of the 
     82nd Airborne were being readied for attack, a fact not known 
     to the Carter team, and he accused the three Americans of 
     deception. He informed the three he was taking Cedras to a 
     secure area. The negotiations were over.
       It is hard to find a better example of the difference 
     between a credible threat, which was essential to reach an 
     agreement, and the actual use of force, which in this case, 
     was counterproductive. Although ready to sign the agreement, 
     Cedres would not do so after learning the attack had begun. 
     Carter reached deep into his soul to try to persuade the 
     generals to complete the agreement, but he could not 
     overcome their anger and fear. He then tried a different 
     tactic--to change the venue of negotiations, and he asked 
     Cedras to accompany him. At the new site, the presidential 
     palace, de facto President Jonnaissant announced that he 
     would sign the agreement. This created problems for 
     President Clinton and for President Aristide, who was in 
     Washington, and was reluctant to accept any agreement with 
     the military or the de facto government. With the U.S. Air 
     Force halfway to Haiti, President Clinton finally turned 
     the planes around and authorized Carter to sign the 
     agreement on his behalf.
       The president asked Carter, Nunn and Powell to return to 
     the White House immediately, and they asked me to remain to 
     brief the U.S. Ambassador and Pentagon officials, who had not 
     participated in the negotiations, and to arrange meetings 
     between Haitian and U.S. military officers. This proved to be 
     extremely difficult because the Haitian general went into 
     hiding, and U.S. government officials in Port-au-Prince did 
     not trust the Haitian generals to implement the agreement; 
     they feared a double-cross like Harlan County. With less than 
     two hours before touch-down by the U.S. military, I was able 
     to arrange the crucial meetings by sending a mixed harsh-and-
     intimate message to Cedras through his wife.
       U.S. forces arrived without having to fire one shot and 
     20,000 U.S. troops disembarked without a single casualty or 
     injured civilian.
       There was no question that U.S. forces would prevail, but 
     because of the Harlan County, the Somalia experience, and the 
     need to minimize U.S. casualties, the U.S. military plan 
     called for a ferocious assault that would have involved 
     hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Haitian casualties, and 
     inevitably, some Americans. Moreover, as Gen. Hugh Shelton, 
     the commanding officer, told me, such an invasion would 
     have engendered long-term bitterness in some of the 
     Haitian population, making it more difficult for the 
     United Nations to secure order and for the country to 
     build democracy.
       Gen. Cedras stepped down from power on Oct. 12 and only 
     then, at the moment that he had the fewest bargaining chips, 
     sought to rent his houses and find a place for asylum.
       On Oct. 15, Aristide returned to the presidency and Haiti. 
     He had a second chance, and he showed that he had learned 
     some lessons. He called for national reconciliation and 
     assembled a multi-party government. He proposed an economic 
     program that elicited both praise from the international 
     community and pledges of $1.2 billion. He establishes a Truth 
     Commission to investigate human rights violations during the 
     military regime but not in a vindictive way. A Police Academy 
     was established to train a new, professional police force. A 
     project on the administrative of justice aimed to train 
     justices of the peace and dispatch them throughout the 
     country. The armed forces had been so thoroughly discredited 
     that Aristide moved quickly to reduce their size and 
     influence and, by spring of this year, to virtually dismantle 
     the institution. In the year since Aristide's return, there 
     have been some political assassinations, but to most 
     Haitians, it has been a period of less fear than ever before.
       In December 1994, Aristide created a CEP to prepare for 
     municipal and parliamentary elections. Virtually all of the 
     political parties, including KON-AKOM, PANPRA and FNCD, which 
     had been partners of Aristide in the 1990 election, 
     criticized the CEP for being partial to one faction of the 
     president's supporters, Lavalas, and for being completely 
     unresponsive to their complaints. Unfortunately, there was no 
     mediation between the parties and the CEP and no quick 
     count. Three political parties boycotted the June 25 
     election, and many of the 27 parties that participated 
     were skeptical that the CEP would conduct a fair election.
       An estimated 50 percent cast their ballots, according to 
     OAS estimates. But the most serious problem occurred after 
     the voting stopped, and the counting began. Officials were 
     poorly trained, and I witnessed the most insecure and tainted 
     vote count that I have seen in the course of monitoring 13 
     ``transitional'' elections during the last decade. Even 
     before the results were announced, almost all of the 
     political parties, except Lavalas, called for an annulment 
     and the recall of the CEP members. On July 12, the CEP 
     finally released some of the results that showed Lavalas 
     doing the best, with the FNCD and KONAKOM trailing far 
     behind. Perhaps as many as one-fifth of the elections needed 
     to be held again, and the majority of the Senate and Deputy 
     seats required a run-off. Of the 84 main mayoral elections, 
     Lavalas won 64, including Port-au-Prince, by a margin of 45-
     18 percent over incumbent Mayor Evans Paul.
       The CEP went ahead with the rerun of some elections on Aug. 
     13 and the runoff of other elections on Sept. 17 despite the 
     boycott of virtually all the political parties. Again, there 
     was practically no campaign, and despite great efforts by 
     President Aristide to get people to vote, the turnout was 
     very low.
       Therefore, the parliamentary and municipal elections cannot 
     be viewed as a step forward. Moreover, the government hurt 
     the fragile party system by seducing opposition candidates to 
     participate in the runoff contrary to their parties' 
     decision. Partly because of the opposition boycott, and 
     partly because of Aristide's continued popularity, Lavalas 
     swept the runoff elections, giving it 80 percent of the 
     Deputy and two-thirds of the Senate seats.
       The opposition parties condemned the Parliament as 
     illegitimate, and many feared that Haiti was moving to a one-
     party state. Lavalas could prove as fractious as the original 
     Aristide coalition, but regardless, an opportunity for a more 
     inclusive democracy and an impartial electoral process was 
     lost.
       If an effective mediation does not enlist the participation 
     of the opposition parties in time for the presidential 
     elections next month, the new president's authority will be 
     impugned, especially if the Constitution were changed 
     illegally to permit Aristide to run again. If the U.N. forces 
     depart on the inauguration of the new president, the old 
     elite of the country will no doubt try to use the 
     questionable authority of the new president to weaken him 
     even as they try to seduce the new police force. The only way 
     that democracy can be preserved in Haiti is if the new police 
     force remains professional and accountable to the rule of 
     law. If the force is co-opted by the rich, as has occurred in 
     the past, then a popular democracy cannot survive.
       The international community and Haiti formed a remarkable 
     partnership in the summer of 1990 to reinforce the democratic 
     process and to respond positively to Haiti's double 
     challenge--to respect Haitians and to make the country a part 
     of a democratic hemisphere.
       Returning to Haiti with Carter and Powell last February, 
     Sen. Nunn said, ``We have a one-year plan for a 10-year 
     challenge.'' Haiti's democratic experiment will be endangered 
     if it does not ask the United States and the United Nations 
     to remain after February 1996, and if those two entities do 
     not agree to stay. To keep the process on track, the Haitian 
     government needs to respond fully to the legitimate concerns 
     with the electoral process raised by the opposition parties. 
     Only then can meaningful presidential elections occur. The 
     second step is for the international community to ensure that 
     a multi-party democracy takes root in Haiti.

                          ____________________