[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 188 (Tuesday, November 28, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17541-S17544]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 SENDING UNITED STATES TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wanted to speak this morning in response to 
President Clinton's address to the Nation last night regarding the 
sending of American troops to Bosnia. I think the President made a 
strong case for support for his position, but I do not think that he 
made a strong enough case to justify sending American ground troops to 
Bosnia. I would like to address that point this morning because, 
obviously, in the Senate and in the House we are going to begin a 
debate which could last a couple of weeks here. After there are 
hearings, after there are briefings, presumably we will be voting on 
the issue, and I think it is important for us to begin to lay out the 
various issues, to get response from the American people, to discuss 
the matter among ourselves, and then be able to make an informed 
judgment.
  I would note that in checking this morning I found that since we 
began keeping track of it in my office, we have received 400 calls 
against sending American troops to Bosnia and 6 calls in favor. And I 
spent a fair amount of time during the Thanksgiving recess speaking 
with groups in Arizona and appearing on various radio programs. In each 
case, the response was similar to the one which I just indicated. That 
is not dispositive, but I think it is an important indicator of the 
fact that the American people do not sense there is a sufficient degree 
of interest here for the United States to participate.
  It seems to me there are two basic criteria which need to be 
satisfied in order to justify the sending of a large number of American 
ground troops into a situation where, as the President and the 
Secretary of Defense have both acknowledged, there is certainly a 
danger of some casualties.
  The first criterion which has traditionally been applied is that 
there is a national security interest of the United States at stake. 
Sometimes it has been expressed as a vital national security interest.
  The second is more operational. It generally divides into about three 
subcategories: that there is a very clear and important mission; that 
the rules of engagement are clear and 

[[Page S 17542]]
agreed to; and that there is a clear exit strategy.

  Let us talk about both of those in the context of the President's 
remarks last night.
  I did not really hear a justification for the first point, that is to 
say, that there is a vital U.S. national security interest involved 
here. I heard some talk about the fact that it was important for the 
United States as a key participant in NATO to be involved in NATO 
operations, and I also heard that we wanted to prevent conflict from 
spreading throughout Europe. Both of those have a national security 
element to them, but neither goes directly to the question of vital 
U.S. national security interests. If, for example, someone could make 
the case that war in Europe was about to break out, while American 
lives may not be directly in jeopardy, I think few of us would deny 
that vital interests of the United States would be at stake sufficient 
for us to commit to not only ground troops but other kinds of military 
operations to try to prevent that. But that case is not made here.
  The possibility that there will be some additional civil strife in 
Bosnia does not suggest the conflict is going to engulf Europe. The 
situation is very different than it was before World War I. The Austro-
Hungarian Empire no longer exists. The conditions are simply not the 
same. So it seems to me a real stretch to say there may be some 
additional conflict break out, that that would necessarily engulf 
Europe in war and therefore at this point the United States needs to 
send these troops in order to conclude that. That is just not a 
credible argument.
  As to the argument about NATO, it seems to me that either NATO is a 
strong alliance or it is not. I believe it is a strong alliance. If the 
President is suggesting that the difference between NATO continuing to 
exist as a strong alliance and its complete failure is whether or not 
20,000 of the 60,000 ground troops in this operation are U.S. troops, 
if that is the difference between NATO existing and not existing, then 
NATO is in much worse shape than I thought it was, and I think, 
frankly, it just is not true.
  NATO is strong. And since we are providing a great deal of the 
support for the existing NATO operation, and will continue to do so 
under this peace process which has been negotiated, in terms of the 
seapower that we have projected, the airpower, the reconnaissance, the 
intelligence, obviously, monetary support that we will be providing and 
material support and a lot of other things, since we have been doing 
those things and will continue to do them as part of the NATO 
operation, it does not seem to me that we are subject to criticism that 
we are not supporting the NATO operation. It is just a question of 
whether some of the ground troops are going to be U.S. troops or not.

  My understanding is that the British and French and perhaps others in 
NATO insisted that part of the ground contingent be United States 
troops. That is not a justification for saying that therefore we must 
go. I would have to ask our allies, why? Why is it that you insist that 
not only do we pay for most of the operation and that we send our ships 
and our cargo planes and our jet fighters and reconnaissance planes, 
and all of the other equipment and personnel that we have in the 
region, in addition to all of that, a necessary component of this is 
that 20,000 of the 60,000 ground troops be U.S. troops? Why is that so 
essential? Is it because the Europeans do not have another 20,000 
troops? No. That is not it. It is because they want us to be in the 
operation on the ground. And my question there is, why? Why is it that 
that is so essential? If this matter is so important to the Europeans, 
then it seems to me that they would pull out all of the stops to 
enforce this peace settlement including providing the necessary ground 
troops to make it work. And surely among all of the NATO countries 
there are 60,000 ground troops available.
  So one has to answer the question I think, why do our Europeans 
allies insist on this? I cannot think of a satisfactory answer.
  So back to the first criterion. Is there a vital U.S. national 
security interest? The answer is no, and the President has not made the 
case for it.
  Let me contrast this with the Persian Gulf war because a lot of 
people have tried to say that, like the Persian Gulf war, we need to 
follow the lead of the President and accede to his request for ground 
troops. The Persian Gulf war and this situation, it seems to me, are 
relatively close cases, both of them, but one falls on the side of 
supporting the operation and the other falls on the side of not 
supporting it. And here is why. Let us say on a scale of 1 to 10, vital 
national security interest being 10, Pearl Harbor created a vital 
national security interest for the United States to be involved in 
World War II. No question. That is a 10.
  The Persian Gulf war was a situation in which most of our oil, a 
majority of our oil, came from the Persian Gulf. Its supplies were 
threatened. A foreign country had invaded another country, was 
occupying it and was threatening to invade other countries. At that 
point, it was important for the world community to come together and 
say to this aggressor, ``No. Aggression will not pay. We will remove 
you from Kuwait, take you back to where you came from. You have got to 
stop threatening all the people whose oil supplies come from that 
region.''
  That is not the same as Pearl Harbor, but clearly vital U.S. 
interests were involved. And, in fact, worldwide, countries came 
together, even other Arab countries came together, in an effort to stop 
that aggression. And I guess on a scale of 1 to 10, I would say that is 
a 6 or 7. As I said, that is a much closer call than a Pearl Harbor, 
but still justified our action. And a majority of our people and the 
Congress supported President Bush's decision to engage in military 
operations against Iraq.
  This case in Bosnia, I submit, falls on the other side of the line, 
if you want to say five is the middle ground. It seems to me there is 
only one reason why it rises to the level of maybe a three or four. 
That is the moral imperative.
  Now, a moral imperative is not the same thing as a vital national 
security interest of the United States, but in certain instances it may 
call upon the United States to do something. That is why the United 
States has been involved in various humanitarian missions. It is why we 
went into Somalia with a humanitarian mission to begin with. It is why 
we were not justified in changing that mission as it later was changed.
  The United States has done lots of things for a lot of people around 
the world in a humanitarian way for moral reasons. In addition to the 
humanitarian support that we provided, we also have supported some 
military operations in support of the humanitarian effort. But that is 
different from saying that in addition to air operations and sea 
operations and humanitarian operations and peacekeeping operations, in 
addition to all those things the United States must send 20,000 ground 
troops to keep the peace that has been negotiated at Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base.
  So, yes, there is a moral imperative. That is what makes this a 
relatively hard case. But it does not rise to the level of a vital 
national security interest. It says that we ought to be doing 
something. And we are doing something, and we will continue to do more.
  I submit that the one thing that we should have been doing a long 
time ago is still missing from this peace agreement, and that is 
ensuring that Bosnia can defend itself. For a long time many of us in 
this body have argued for arming the Bosnians, the Bosnian Moslems, so 
they can defend themselves. We always believed that a rough parity 
would eventually be created sufficient to cause the Serbs to come to 
the bargaining table.
  What happened when Croatia, after about 3 years, was able to build up 
its military forces sufficient to retake some of the territory that the 
Serbs had taken from them? At that point, the Serbs became defensive 
rather than offensive in their military operations. They also came to 
the bargaining table because they understood that it was a losing game 
for them, that the longer they persisted, the more territory likely 
would be taken from them.
  So a military balance of forces of some sort was, in fact, created. 
That is what we have sought when we said we needed to lift the arms 
embargo and support rearming the Bosnian Moslems so they could defend 
themselves. And 

[[Page S 17543]]
yet that commitment is not part of this particular peace agreement. So 
it seems to me that the one thing that we could do in this situation we 
have not done in this particular peace agreement.
  Turning for a moment from the vital national security interest, let 
us go to the other part of the equation, the second part. The mission 
has not been clearly defined. The rules of engagement have not yet been 
established. And, third, there is no exit strategy. Tony Lake, the 
National Security Adviser, was quoted in the newspapers yesterday--I 
think he made the statement Sunday--that our first mission is self-
defense.
  Mr. President, the way you fulfill that mission is by not sending the 
people in the first place. That is not a mission. That is very muddled 
thinking to suggest that our first mission there is self-defense.
  The mission has to be stated much more clearly, and it has not been, 
nor have the various contingencies been defined. What happens if 
various kinds of military conflicts break out? We have not decided how 
we are going to handle those things. And that has to do also with the 
rules of engagement. They have been only very generally stated up to 
this point. As my colleague, Senator McCain, has pointed out, what is 
really glaringly missing is any kind of an exit strategy. A 1-year 
timetable is not an exit strategy.
  What is to prevent mission creep, and what is to define success of 
the mission? Most observers have said for this peacekeeping mission to 
really succeed, it is going to have to be a commitment of years, 
perhaps decades. And that gets to the next point, Mr. President.

  Perhaps the primary justification that the President has given for 
sending American ground troops to Bosnia is that if we do not do so, 
the war will reignite and there will be additional suffering. In other 
words, if you believe in war, you vote no; if you believe in peace, you 
vote yes. That is a false choice, Mr. President. That is a false 
choice.
  If this peace that has been negotiated is so fragile, if it is so 
fragile that the only thing between peace and war is that of the 60,000 
ground troops, and 20,000 have to be Americans, then this is a peace 
which is bound to fail. It is not a peace of the heart. It is not a 
peace that has been committed to by the belligerents, but rather a 
convenience that has probably been forced upon the parties and is 
probably doomed to, if not failure, at least a very rocky road, which 
means a lot of casualties on the part of the peacekeepers. And that is 
a situation we need to take into account before we support the 
President's decision to send the troops.
  What is it that makes the 20,000 American ground force contingent 
sine qua non, to use that Latin phrase, that without which this peace 
agreement cannot succeed? We are already providing sea power and air 
power and reconnaissance and intelligence and humanitarian assistance, 
diplomatic assistance, monetary assistance. The President has committed 
to some additional monetary assistance. We are already providing a lot 
of things to promote peace in the region.
  Our European allies have said we need a ground contingent of 60,000. 
They are willing to support that with 40,000. What is it that makes the 
additional 20,000 required to be American troops? Why cannot they be 
European? Is the President saying that if all 60,000 are European, the 
agreement will fail? That is what he said in effect. What is the magic 
of 20,000 of those being American? ``Well, America has prestige, and 
American prestige is necessary to enforce this agreement.''
  American prestige will be demonstrated every time a U.S. fighter jet 
passes overhead. It will be demonstrated every time you look out to sea 
and see one of our carriers or destroyers cruising in the Adriatic. It 
will be present with the diplomatic presence of the United States, the 
power of the U.S. Presidency and our support for NATO, and demonstrated 
in 100 ways.
  What is it that is so magical about one-third of the ground troops 
being American? Sure, that will demonstrate an additional presence, but 
is it absolutely essential?

  It is the difference between war and peace, the President says. If it 
is--and I doubt that it is--but if it is, then this peace is too 
fragile, in the first place. We already have signs that that is true 
with some of the Serb leaders saying in effect, no, never, that blood 
will be spilled, that they are not going to go along with this.
  So, if the basic criterion, as the President laid out, was that there 
would be peace, and we would simply be implementing the peace, one 
questions whether that condition will even exist when our troops hit 
the ground over there, if they do.
  There has been another justification, and I think that this is 
perhaps one of the most difficult for us to deal with because all of us 
support, not only the President, but the office of the Presidency. We 
generally try to defer to the President and the executive branch in 
foreign policy matters to a large extent, anyway. But the Senate has 
certain constitutional prerogatives. We have the advice-and-consent 
prerogative. We have the ability to ratify treaties, and so on.
  The President, in effect, has invited the Congress to decide whether 
or not to support his action or not. So I do not think there is any 
question that we need to make an independent judgment here of whether 
or not the sending of these troops is a good idea. But the argument of 
the President in this regard goes something as follows. Up until the 
time that the agreement in Dayton was initialed, we were not supposed 
to debate the issue because, after all, there was not anything to 
debate. We had not decided what to do.
  Well, the reality was the President had already committed to send the 
20,000 troops, but we were not supposed to debate that because the 
agreement was not clear yet. So we did not. We basically deferred. 
There were many of us here, myself included, who wanted to speak much 
more specifically about it, to ask a lot of questions, and perhaps to 
lay down some conditions for the peace agreement, but we did not do 
that out of deference to the President.

  But now the argument goes, once the agreement was initialed, ``You 
would be pulling the rug out from under the Presidency, indeed from 
under U.S. foreign policy, if you did not approve my commitment to send 
20,000 American troops.''
  That is a catch-22, Mr. President. You cannot argue about it before 
the treaty is initialed and as soon as it is initialed, it is too late 
to argue about it. So when are we going to have the debate as to 
whether or not this is good policy?
  It is true, if the Congress turned its back on the President at this 
point, there would be some embarrassment to the United States. The 
question we have to ask ourselves is: Is the risk of casualties and is 
the precedent which is being set to send these troops outweighed by 
some temporary embarrassment to the United States?
  I submit at this point, at least I have concluded that the answer to 
that is no, that the Congress has to make it clear to the President 
that he cannot simply go around making premature commitments without 
the advice and consent of the Congress, commitments which some of us 
believe not to be wise, and then justifying the support for that on the 
basis that the commitment was made and, therefore, cannot be questioned 
anymore.
  Either you consult with the Congress in advance and have some sense 
that you have the support of the Congress and the American people and 
then argue, once the commitment is made, that it is too late to argue 
about it, or at least I think you have been estopped, to use a legal 
phrase, to argue there should not be a robust debate about it after the 
decision has been made. My point is, there is no argument to say, ``I 
made the commitment to send the troops and now it would be embarrassing 
to the United States, it would diminish the leadership role of our 
country if I were not backed up in that commitment,'' to use the 
President's argument.
  My point is very simple. The President should have thought of that 
before he made the commitment. He made a commitment, and I think at 
this point we have to debate it.
  The bottom line is this: The President has not demonstrated a vital 
national security interest of the United States involved, nor has there 
been a 

[[Page S 17544]]
clear delineation of the operational aspects, its mission, the rules of 
engagement, and the exit strategy.
  Until those cases are made, I think the President is asking too much 
of us to commit U.S. ground troops to this operation. Therefore, Mr. 
President, it would be my hope that after we have had a full debate, 
after there have been hearings, after there have been briefings by the 
administration, and after we have had an opportunity to consider within 
this body and the House has had an opportunity to consider it, that we 
would have a vote on the matter; that we be able to express ourselves 
either to support the President's request or to reject it.
  At this point, my own view is that we reject it. I invite any debate 
and any rationale that can be expressed in support of the President's 
position. As I said, at this point, I think it is far too serious a 
matter for the United States Congress to support the President's 
request that 20,000 ground troops be sent to Bosnia, in addition to all 
the other things which we have already done and which we continue to 
do.
  I close with this point. Nobody wants this tragedy to continue. 
Everybody wants peace to succeed. We all commend the President and 
those who negotiated on his behalf for this peace agreement, and I 
would want to do everything we could to support that agreement, short 
of the commitment of these ground troops. They are not the necessary 
ingredient to make it work. If they were, it would be destined to fail.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from Vermont.

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