[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 188 (Tuesday, November 28, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H13709-H13710]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            CONCERN ABOUT DEPLOYING GROUND TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I too am deeply concerned about the 
President's announced commitment to deploy 20,000 United States ground 
troops in Bosnia. I do not believe, Mr. Speaker, that document has 
articulated a compelling national interest in Bosnia worth the loss of 
American soldiers. We have no overriding national interest in Bosnia, 
and there is absolutely no reason American troops should be placed in 
harm's way as part of an ill-defined mission there.
  Mr. Speaker, calling this mission a peacekeeping mission is a 
misnomer. This is a tenuous peace at best, and a potential quagmire for 
our troops at worst.
  This is clearly not a legitimate peacekeeping mission, or 240,000 
troops would not be required. Yes, I say 240,500, as the spokesperson 
at the Pentagon was quoted in Defense News today, counting the support 
troops. We hear the number 60,000, including 20,000 American servicemen 
and women, but the total number of troops, according to this statement 
today, is 240,000 troops.
  Mr. Speaker, this mission goes way beyond peacekeeping to nation 
building. History should have taught us that we cannot build a nation 
from the outside.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask, how much longer can the United States be denying 
a one-one number for the rest of the world? This is a European 
conflict, and using United States troops as a global peace force is 
neither a defensible function nor a practicing pragmatic reality for 
our military. Using our troops as a global police force in my judgment, 
and I say this respectfully, but I believe that it reflects a basic 
misunderstanding of our military's historic mission and capabilities.

                              {time}  2030

  Mr. Speaker, this situation is fraught with danger. Our troops will 
be sitting ducks, literally, physically, sitting ducks, positioned 
between the two warring factions.
  Mr. Speaker, I think we have to recognize what is going on, what the 
political realities are in this part of the world. This is a war that 
has been going on for ethnic strife for 4,000 years. The present 
fighting has been going on for 40 years and longer.

[[Page H 13710]]

  Just today, just today, the Serb leader, Karadzic, and the mayors of 
the Sarajevo suburbs held a protest march; and some of the things they 
were saying, and I am quoting now, that the Dayton Agreement has 
created a new Beirut in Europe, referring of course to Lebanon's 15-
year civil war, and that there will be bloodshed for centuries to come, 
that the ethnic Serbs will not be dominated by the Croats and the 
Moslems, that this is a Balkan powder keg.
  We all know, Mr. Speaker, there are 6 million land mines waiting in 
the former Yugoslavia for our troops. Sixty thousand ethnic Serbs, 
according to Karadzic, will have grenades in their pockets. Well, Mr. 
Speaker, we have to be aware of these dangers.
  The President mentioned the unspeakable human rights' violations. 
Certainly these crimes against humanity are as loathsome as any in the 
history of the world. But, Mr. Speaker, similar crimes have been 
documented by Amnesty International in 58 other countries. Why not 
Afghanistan? Why not go to Rwanda, to China, to Cuba, and all of the 
other countries in which similar crimes are being perpetrated against 
humanity?
  Mr. Speaker, this mission is a logistical nightmare and will be 
extremely dangerous for U.S. troops who will be potentially under fire 
from all three factions.
  Mr. Speaker, what is the solution here in this very complex and 
difficult situation? I would ask unanimous consent to submit for the 
Record, and I would commend all of my colleagues' attention to this 
editorial from today's Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1995, by two 
former Under Secretaries of Defense. Let me quote from this very 
provocative and profound piece:

       The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian 
     self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the 
     Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. 
     Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to 
     Bosnia unless the administration make clear and binding 
     commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian 
     Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between 
     Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.

  Mr. Speaker, that criterion has not been met.
  This article goes on to say, very wisely,

       Unfortunately, the Daytona Accords lack clear commitments 
     to equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration 
     statements are disturbingly ambiguous on this point.

  This piece concludes by saying,

       If we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a 
     position to defend itself, the administration will find, when 
     it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that if 
     cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

  This piece is written by two people who served in previous 
administrations in the Defense Department who know about what they are 
writing.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope and pray that the Congress will have its say on 
behalf of the American people before this deployment is made. I fear 
that we will not have such a voice in this deployment. I think each one 
of us here in this body, in the people's House, needs to examine our 
consciences, needs to listen to the people we represent and press this 
issue in the people's House. I know in Minnesota, in the Third 
District, my calls in the last 2 days have run 178 to 2 against this 
deployment.
  Mr. Speaker, I offer for the Record the following article which I 
referred to earlier.

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1995]

              The Argument Clinton Isn't Making on Bosnia

                (By Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas J. Feith)

       Having committed an armored division of American 
     ``peacekeepers'' for Bosnia with little analysis and even 
     less consultation, the Clinton administration now contends 
     that Congress has no responsible choice but to concur. To be 
     sure, if it repudiates the president's troop commitment, 
     Congress would be blamed for bringing about resumption of the 
     war, a collapse of American leadership in NATO and perhaps of 
     the alliance itself, and a dangerous perception around the 
     world of the U.S. becoming isolationist and unreliable.
       But even worse than not backing the president's commitment 
     would be for Congress to approve uncritically a flawed policy 
     that could fail disastrously. Congress has a duty to try to 
     force the administration to define sensible goals for the 
     mission. Americans remember Lebanon and Somalia, where we 
     managed to lose both men and credibility. we remain dubious 
     of the operation in Haiti, which may succeed in restoring 
     dictatorship rather than democracy. If U.S. troops end their 
     Bosnia mission without having achieved what they came to do, 
     especially if they take significant casualties, the 
     consequences will be graver by far.


                            little guidance

       The administration acknowledges the problem by stressing 
     that U.S. troops will not be deployed unless there is a peace 
     to enforce. But this rather sensible condition for getting in 
     gives little guidance for how and when to get out.
       There is one compelling rationale for U.S. participation in 
     the international peacekeeping force: Bosnia has been the 
     victim of international aggression and of crimes against 
     humanity that the Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Milosevic 
     regime in Belgrade, have committed against hundreds of 
     thousands of predominantly Muslim Bosnians. The U.S. and our 
     European allies and others bear a large measure of 
     responsibility for these horrors because we have maintained 
     an international arms embargo on Bosnia. The Bosnian 
     government's troops have numerical superiority over their 
     enemies, but, as a result of the embargo, they have remained 
     inferior in equipment, especially heavy armor and artillery.
       The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian 
     self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the 
     Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. 
     Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to 
     Bosnia unless the administration makes a clear and binding 
     commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian 
     Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between 
     Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.
       If the peacekeeping force is conceived as a means of 
     keeping Bosnia subject to unrealistic arms limitation 
     schemes, and therefore doomed to remain a ward of NATO or the 
     U.S., Congress should oppose it. But if peacekeepers are 
     intended to deter aggression for the year or so needed for 
     the Bosnian government to move toward self-reliance in the 
     defense field, then the strategic and moral case for U.S. 
     participation should be easier for Americans to credit.
       Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords lack clear commitments to 
     equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration statements 
     are disturbingly ambiguous on this point. U.S. officials say 
     they have assured the Bosnians that federation forces will be 
     equipped and trained, but that assurance itself is hedged by 
     a misplaced faith that new arms control agreements might make 
     it unnecessary. According to the accords, no weapons will be 
     delivered for 90 days and no heavy weapons for 180 days, 
     pending arms control talks. Also, U.S. statements make it 
     clear that we will try to get others to do the equipping and 
     training. (It is not reassuring that we still lack a good 
     estimate of Bosnian requirements, even though for three years 
     the Clinton administration said that it aimed to lift the 
     arms embargo.)
       These limitations imply that moving quickly or openly to 
     arm the Bosnians would be destabilizing, but the opposite is 
     true. To ensure a stable Bosnia and to be able to withdraw 
     our troops on schedule, we must be committed, publicly and 
     resolutely, to a rapid equip-and-train program. (Defensive 
     systems not covered by the envisioned arms control regime, 
     such as anti-tank missiles and counter-battery radars, are 
     needed with particular urgency, given the precarious position 
     of Sarajevo.)
       The administration's hesitations seem to reflect a belief 
     that equipping and training federation forces would be 
     inconsistent with a ``neutral'' role for American 
     peacekeepers.
       It is important, however, to see clearly the purpose of the 
     peacekeeping force: It must uphold the peace agreement 
     generally, but it is intended also to deter the Serbs from 
     taking advantage of their current (temporary) advantage in 
     armaments. It is not correct or constructive to talk of the 
     peacekeepers as ``neutral.'' They do not have to be neutral 
     to perform their mission any more than police have to be 
     neutral as between shopkeepers and robbers. In fact, 
     pretending to be neutral when none of the parties so regards 
     us actually increases the danger to U.S. forces at a tactical 
     level, by making it more difficult for them to decide how to 
     respond to provocations or ambiguous situations on the 
     ground. It was this posture that helped produce the 
     inadequate security precautions taken by U.S. Marines in 
     Beirut. The best way to shore up the peace is through a 
     policy that deters Serbian aggression and secures Bosnian 
     compliance through American support and cooperation.


                             exit strategy

       If the administration is to allay public and congressional 
     skepticism about the troop deployment, it must make clear 
     that arming and training Bosnian Federation forces is not 
     only consistent with our role in the peacekeeping force, it 
     is also the key to the ``exit strategy'' for our troops. If 
     we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a 
     position to defend itself, the administration will find, when 
     it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it 
     cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

                          ____________________