[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 188 (Tuesday, November 28, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H13705-H13707]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                CLINTON'S CASE FOR SENDING IN THE TROOPS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, there is a remarkable column in today's 
Washington Times by its gifted editor/writer Wesley Pruden. It is 
titled ``The Macabre Tribute to McNamara's Band.'' Some of us took to 
the floor here earlier this month to point out that Robert Strange 
McNamara was literally in Hanoi all but begging forgiveness and asking 
for a seminar on Vietnam in Vietnam where he could expiate his guilt on 
sending 58,700 American men to their death, 8 women, and try and go to 
his grave with some peace. He did this with Castro, a war criminal, 
down in Cuba, and now he wants to do it with the war criminals that 
prevail in Hanoi.
  Listen to the opening of Mr. Pruden's column:
  The man has no shame, but we knew that, and he is not talking about 
McNamara. He said:
  Bill Clinton, who did everything but to defect to Hanoi to avoid 
doing his duty to his country 30 years ago, yesterday tried to make a 
case for sending young men to do their duty in Bosnia, and, being Bill 
Clinton, naturally he cast it as something else. In the afternoon, as 
an opportunity to immunize little children against childhood disease--
this is an extraordinary opportunity, the President said, announcing $2 
million for needles and serum for the children of all of that tragic 
area of the world.

  It says that this man has a problem that others do not. If Mr. 
Clinton truly loathes the military, and he used that word in his 
infamous letter to Colonel Holmes that he wrote from England on 
December 3, 1969, there is no better way to show it than to send 
upwards of 20, 25; 40 is the better figure, Mr. Speaker, of our 
loathsome sons to a wintry nonholiday in the mountainous wilds of 
Bosnia where sniping at Americans or planting land mines under their 
feet will be the season's sport. Mr. Clinton enlists all the bromides 
and cliches, many weathered in antiquity, to make his case.
  But as I listened to that case last night, Mr. Speaker, Vietnam, the 
killing fields of Cambodia and the tragedy of Laos kept going through 
my head. Clinton mentioned in his remarks that Americans will do good 
things in the face of defending freedom, and he mentioned World War I, 
which began in Sarajevo, by the way, World War II, Haiti, Iraq, the 
Middle East, Northern Ireland; he even mentioned Korea, but he 
studiously dodged paying tribute to the American sacrifices in Vietnam, 
a sacrifice he acidly scorned in the past, and when asked about Mr. 
McNamara's disgusting book of self vindication, Clinton told CNN 
reporter Wolf Blitzer that he, Clinton, felt vindicated by the war 
criminal McNamara's insidious book.
  Mr. Speaker, I am going to do a 1-hour special order tonight. I hope 
my friends, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Cunningham], who is going to speak after me, will 
join me.
  Here is the problem in the Balkans, and any one of these can be 
defeated singly. We have threatened and killed Serbs from the air. Now 
we are going to act as peacekeepers on the ground. We have trained the 
Croatian Army. I witnessed it myself in August. We have armed the 
Bosnian military through the airport at Zagreb with Iranian arms. One 
out of every three airplanes loaded to the gunnels with arms going to 
the Croats, the other two to the Bosnian Moslems. Now we have conducted 
peace negotiations, and we claim we are going to see through the 
indictment of the 53-plus war criminals, all but one a Croat, and he is 
a Serb, and the Croat is in custody, none of the Serbs are; that we are 
going to see through the war crimes trials going on at the Hague in the 
Netherlands. How can we do all of this together unless it is some 
complicated, incoherent mess that is going to get young American men, 
and now women. According to the Aspin, Halperin, Clinton plan, women 
will be going in harm's way, and I will bring to the floor tomorrow 
night the photograph and cowboy hat, working at home, of Randy Shugart, 
Medal of Honor winner from the streets of Mogadishu, along with a 
picture of my dad the day after the war in France with about 20 
children. That war that started in Sarajevo, my dad was hit once with 
shrapnel, twice poison gas with mustard gas.

  Mr. Speaker, I question and I want proof that Pope John Paul II, 
whose advice Clinton has not taken on the sanctity of human life; I 
doubt he asked Clinton to send our young men to Sarajevo so we would 
not end this century with a war there. I have a call in to the papal 
nuncio. I will give you a report on the veracity of that tomorrow 
night.

        Questions on Deploying U.S. Forces to Bosnia for Clinton

       1. What vital U.S. national interests are being threatened 
     in Bosnia?
       2. Have all options been used or considered before 
     deploying U.S. forces?
       3. Are you willing to extend the U.S. military commitment 
     past one year to achieve success?
       4. What do you consider a success in this operation?
       5. What are the specific military and political objectives 
     requiring deployment of 20,000? Why not more than 20,000 
     young American men and women?
       6. If the aforementioned objectives change during the 
     course of U.S. deployment, are you willing to provide our 
     military with the adequate resources needed to meet the 
     changed objectives?
       7. Should U.S. forces be sent if the American people and 
     Congress do not explicitly support such action?
       8. Will it be guaranteed that the operational command of 
     these forces be kept in American and allied hands?
       9. Are you willing to ensure that U.S. personnel are always 
     properly armed and 

[[Page H 13706]]
     trained to defeat any threat presented in Bosnia?
       10. Are U.S. intelligence gathering operations properly 
     sufficient in the Bosnia theater to maximize the security and 
     protection of our troops and make their mission a success?
       11. Will U.S. and allied intelligence be kept away from 
     United Nations officials?
       12. Are you ready to explain to American families why their 
     son and daughter was put into harm's way?
       13. If American air crews are shot down in the Bosnian Serb 
     region, will U.S. forces be able to retrieve those forces and 
     retaliate against those responsible?
       14. What guarantees are you willing to make that every 
     American will be accounted for in this operation?
       15. Are you willing to increase resources and manpower 
     significantly if that is what is determined to be needed to 
     achieve success?
       16. Volunteer reserve units are being called up for this 
     operation. If this does not prove adequate, are you going to 
     call into service various reserve units?
       17. What are the specific rules of engagement for U.S. 
     military personnel?
       18. Will the rules of engagement include using force to 
     protect civilian populations even when U.S. personnel are not 
     threatened?
       19. Does that include protecting civilian populations like 
     ethnic Serbs in Croatia?
       20. What will be the financial cost of this operation to 
     U.S. taxpayers?
       21. How do you intend to pay for these costs?
       22. It is stated that an international conference will be 
     held to discuss financing for the reconstruction of Bosnia, 
     who will be a part of the international conference?
       23. What kind of authority will these negotiators have in 
     committing U.S. funds?
       24. In Annex 1A, Article II of the Dayton Agreement, the 
     parties to the agreement commit themselves to disarm and 
     disband all armed civilian groups, except for authorized 
     police forces. How will this be monitored to ensure all sides 
     comply?
       25. What will be the consequences of non-compliance?
       26. In Annex 11, Article I of the agreement, a U.N. 
     International Police Task Force (IPTF) will be created to 
     carry out the program of assistance for law enforcement. Who 
     will comprise the IPTF?
       27. Will the IPTF be armed?
       28. If so, will there be IPTF officers in the American 
     protected region?
       29. According to the agreement, the IPTF officers will only 
     be able to notify higher officials of failure by the parties 
     to comply with IPTF mandate. What good will that be if IPTF 
     officers come across severe human right violations or other 
     criminal activities?
       30. NATO Army commanders had counted on a zone of 
     separation 12 miles wide between the Serb and Muslim-Croat 
     sides to keep Serb artillery as far away as possible. Why did 
     U.S. negotiators agree to just a zone of separation 2\1/2\ 
     miles wide?
       31. The Bosnian Serbs will be required to reduce their 
     military potential to the level where it is no longer a 
     threat to the Muslim-Croat Federation. How will it be 
     determined if the Serb military potential is a threat?
       32. If the Bosnian Serb forces do not comply, will U.S. 
     forces be used to weaken the Bosnian Serb military potential 
     or to strengthen the Muslim forces?
       33. Will strengthening the Muslim forces include arming and 
     training the Muslim forces?
       34. Will the Croats consider such U.S. action a threat?
       35. Will not the Bosnian Serbs consider the U.S. as its 
     antagonist if we try to weaken their side or strengthen the 
     Muslims?
       36. Doesn't such a strategy place U.S. forces in the 
     precarious position of being directly in between the Serbs 
     and Muslims?
       37. In Annex 1A, Article III, the agreement states that all 
     foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom 
     fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from 
     neighboring and other states, shall be withdrawn from the 
     Bosnian territory. How will this be carried out?
       38. Will this require U.S. forces trying to prove every 
     individual's true national identity in their sector?
       39. How will it be determined who are foreign nationals in 
     the Serb zone while there are no Implementation Forces in the 
     Serb region?
       40. Many officials in the region believe that without an 
     accounting of the human rights abuses in the Balkans and just 
     punishment for those acts, a long-term solution will not be 
     achieved. Will U.S. forces be used to help account for the 
     numerous violations?
       41. Will U.S. forces be used to continue uncovering the 
     evidence of mass killings in the Bosnian Serb regions?
       42. The agreement states that 54 accused Serbian war 
     criminals will not be allowed to hold democratically elected 
     offices. What about the one Croatian accused war criminal 
     General Tihomir Blaskic, now the top inspector in the 
     Croatian army, indicted by the U.N. war crimes tribunal?
       43. Will U.S. forces be used to chase down war criminals, 
     like the failed Delta Force operation to arrest Aideed in 
     Somalia, which resulted in the death of 19 Americans and the 
     mutilation of five of their bodies?
       44. There were 400,000 Serbs; 90,000 Muslims and 20,000 
     Croats displaced from their homes just in 1995. How will the 
     NATO forces guarantee that these people can have safe passage 
     back to their original homes in Bosnia?
       45. What will be done to ensure that Serbs who had lived in 
     Croatia will be guaranteed safe return back into Croatia?
       46. Ethnic Serbs control the Eastern Slavonia region of 
     Croatia around the devastated town of Vukovar and are 
     supposed to cede control back to Croatia. What if that does 
     not happen?
       47. A wider Posavina Corridor in Northern Bosnia, which 
     links the western and eastern regions controlled by the 
     Bosnian Serbs, is supposed to be surrendered to Bosnian Serb 
     forces by Croatian forces. Will U.S. forces be used to ensure 
     Croat compliance?
       48. Will U.S. forces be used to protect the Muslim enclave 
     of Gorazde in Eastern Bosnia, which is totally surrounded by 
     the Bosnian Serbs?
       49. The Dayton agreement stipulates that each side will be 
     allowed to maintain their own army and parliament. What will 
     be the makeup of the Muslim-Croatian confederation parliament 
     and what will be the structure of the Confederation Army?
       50. What is the exit strategy for U.S. forces?

  Mr. Speaker, again I submit for America the Weinberger-Dornan 10 
principles for committing U.S. combat forces:

       1. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless the 
     situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.
       2. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless all other 
     options already have been used or considered.
       3. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless there is a 
     clear commitment, including allocated resources, to achieving 
     victory.
       4. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless there are 
     clearly defined political and military objectives.
       5. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless our 
     commitment of these forces will change if our objectives 
     change.
       6. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless the 
     American people and Congress supports the action, therefore 
     insuring that the American people have been represented.
       7. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless under the 
     operational command of American commanders or integrated 
     allied commanders under a ratified treaty, thereby having 
     insured joint training.
       8. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless properly 
     equipped, trained and maintained by the Congress.
       9. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless there is 
     substantial and reliable intelligence flow including HUMINT 
     (human intelligence).
       10. The U.S. must not commit combat forces unless the 
     commander in chief and Congress can explain to the loved ones 
     of any killed or wounded American soldier, sailor, Marine, 
     pilot or aircrewman why their family member or friend was 
     sent in harm's way.

                    [From USA Today, Nov. 27, 1995]

       Weighing U.S. Role: Arguments for, Against Sending Troops

       Key arguments for and against a U.S. military role in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina peace plan:


                                  pro

       The United States has a moral obligation to try to end the 
     genocide and random violence.
       The United States, as a guarantor of the peace pact, must 
     send troops to separate warring forces and establish clear 
     borders.
       U.S. forces will represent only a third (20,000) of the 
     60,000-person NATO force.
       U.S. forces will operate under NATO, not United Nations, 
     command, and have broader authority to respond to threats 
     than they did in Somalia and Haiti.
       The United States must lead the Bosnia peace effort to 
     maintain its leadership role in NATO and Europe.
       The United States cannot go back on the president's pledge 
     to send troops without losing credibility internationally.
       U.S. forces can withdraw if the peace agreement is 
     violated.
       Keeping peace in Bosnia keeps conflict from spreading.
       Bosnian Serb leaders indicted as war criminals will have no 
     role in the new government.
       U.S. troops will not be required to track down war 
     criminals or cope with refugees.
       The firepower of Bosnian Muslims, long outgunned by Bosnian 
     Serbs, will be improved, helping stabilize the situation.
       For the first time, three warring parties, the Bosnians, 
     Croats and Serbs, have initialed an agreement that divides 
     land and agrees to a central government, signaling their 
     interest in peace.


                                  con

       There is no vital U.S. security interest in providing 
     peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.
       About 45,000 to 60,000 dissident rebel Serbs object to the 
     accord. Operating in small groups, they could kill U.S. 
     troops in retaliation.
       The deployment will cost $1.5 billion at a time of budget 
     constraints.
       The peace pact is suspect because it would not have been 
     reached without the U.S. commitment to send troops as 
     enforcers.
       Bosnian Serbs who have been bombed by NATO may view 
     peacekeepers as the enemy.
       An estimated 6 million land mines threaten U.S. troops.
       U.S. troops will be required to settle local disputes over 
     the treaty, which may give them the appearance of taking 
     sides, and lead to retaliation.
       The fighting in Bosnia is based on age-old disputes 
     unlikely to be resolved in the 12-month period the U.S. 
     peacekeeping force would be in the region.

[[Page H 13707]]

       Using NATO forces as peacekeepers is a mission for which 
     the defense alliance is not designed and was not created.
       The number of U.S. troops--20,000--is too small to 
     effectively police the peace agreement and puts soldiers at 
     risk.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Times, Nov. 28, 1995]

                 The Macabre Tribute to McNamara's Band

                           (By Wesley Pruden)

       The man has no shame, but we knew that.
       Bill Clinton, who did everything but defect to Hanoi to 
     avoid doing his duty to his country 30 years ago, tried 
     yesterday to make a case for sending young men to do their 
     duty in Bosnia and, being Bill Clinton, naturally cast it as 
     something else--an opportunity to immunize little children 
     against childhood disease.
       ``This is an extraordinary opportunity,'' the president 
     said, announcing that he would commit $2 million for the 
     needles and the serum.
       ``We have a very compelling responsibility,'' he said, 
     stopping just short of announcing that Miss Hillary would 
     accompany the troops as a Red Cross doughnut girl.
       Anyone who objects to doing for Europe what European boys 
     should be doing naturally despises children almost as much as 
     the Republicans hate old folks, and probably roots for 
     measles and chickenpox.
       The bad news is that the commander-in-chief has the 
     authority to send troops anywhere in the world, even to 
     liberate Scotland from Di's daffy in-laws if such a notion 
     pops into his head, and in the end Congress, skeptical or 
     not, will have little choice but to stamp it ``OK.''
       Once they're in place, there's not a man or woman among 
     us--well, not many--who won't insist that they get everything 
     they need to protect themselves and to make themselves as 
     comfortable as possible.
       Besides, if Mr. Clinton truly ``loathes'' the military, as 
     he said he does, there's no better way to show it than to 
     send upwards of 25,000 of our ``loathsome'' sons to a wintry 
     holiday in the mountainous wilds of Bosnia, where sniping at 
     Americans, or planting land mines under their feet, will be 
     the season's sport.
       Mr. Clinton enlists all the bromides and cliches, many well 
     weathered in antiquity, to make his case: ``We must not and 
     we will not turn our backs on peace. The accord [signed in 
     Dayton] offers the people of Bosnia the first real hope of 
     peace in nearly four years. Now we have a responsibility to 
     see this achievement through. That is who we are as a people. 
     That is what we stand for as a nation.''
       This is remarkably like the fervent exhortations Lyndon 
     Johnson employed to persuade young Bill Clinton three decades 
     ago, and the mature Bill Clinton can only hope that it sounds 
     better in a mock-sincere Arkansas drawl than in a tinny Texas 
     twang.
       From the snug comfort of their campaign headquarters, the 
     president and his men, who were--in Mr. Clinton's youthful 
     words--``too educated to fight,'' can live out the vicarious 
     bang-bang enthusiasms they missed in Vietnam. Just as in 
     Vietnam, the men the president sends to Bosnia will have to 
     deal with the fierce ethnic rivalries and bitter suspicions 
     that fragmented the countryside in the first place. In his 
     speech last night, the president recited the scenes of other 
     American attempts to do good in the face of fighting, in 
     World Wars I and II, in Haiti, Iraq, the Middle East and even 
     Northern Ireland. He studiously dodged paying tribute to the 
     American sacrifice in Vietnam, a sacrifice he has acidly 
     scorned in the past.
       Mr. Clinton promises to go through the motions of seeking 
     the support of Congress, and Congress will go through the 
     motions of resisting. But in the end the troops will debark--
     unless the president changes his mind, and nobody is foolish 
     enough to bet against that--and Congress will go along. How 
     can it not, if we intend to redeem whatever shred of respect 
     the rest of the world has for us three years into the Clinton 
     era.
       Bob Dole, who has seen the face of war up close and 
     personal, understands this. ``I want to be in a position to 
     support the president,'' he says. ``It seems to me, when it 
     comes to foreign policy, if we speak with one voice, we're 
     better off.'' He makes the point that the president ``never 
     thought foreign policy was important until now.''
       Congress has an obligation to the men and women it puts in 
     harm's way to make it clear, since the president and his men 
     won't, exactly who it is who's sending them there, and why. 
     Defense Secretary William Perry, echoing Robert McNamara from 
     the summer of '65, says the American role will be completed 
     within a year. Warren Christopher, echoing Dean Rusk, dusts 
     off the infamous domino theory (``the fighting could spread 
     to Europe unless we act now'').
       Nicholas Burns, a State Department spokesman who will get 
     no closer to Bosnia than Constitution Avenue, recites the 
     ``ironclad'' assurances of the Serbians that they intend to 
     be nice when the Americans arrive, and he scoffs at Radovan 
     Karadzic's grim promise to make Bosnia ``bleed for decades'' 
     as being meaningless because ``his best days are behind 
     him.''
       Perhaps. And perhaps Bill Clinton's, too, as his chickens 
     from Saigon come home to roost on Pennsylvania Avenue.

                          ____________________