[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 187 (Monday, November 27, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17516-S17517]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  SENDING AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, as the President tonight begins the process 
of trying to convince America that we should put American soldiers' 
lives at risk on the ground in Bosnia, I think it is appropriate to 
take a look at some of the other foreign policy activities of this 
administration in the terms of what they represented as being when they 
originally proposed it and what has occurred in reality.
  Probably the most significant example of this administration 
presenting a policy in one form and having it executed in another form 
is today being seen in Haiti. When the President decided to go into 
Haiti--and he did this on a unilateral action, as much as his policies 
in Bosnia so far have been unilateral--he stated to us that the purpose 
of this was to restore democracy, to put back in place the elected 
leader of a government that had been replaced by a military coup of 
sorts, and to allow the nation of Haiti to reestablish economic 
strength and have the capacity to pursue a peaceful and democratic and 
economically prosperous future.
  He told us that our troops would be there briefly and that the cost 
would not be excessive. I think we need, however, now to take a look at 
what has actually happened in Haiti, whether or not the policies of the 
administration as represented have actually come to pass.
  First, let us look at the issue of who they have put back in power in 
Haiti, Mr. Aristide. Has Mr. Aristide turned out to be a democratic 
individual? I think it would be hard to put that identification on him. 
He has been an individual who has had a history of being violently 
anti-American, of being a proponent of Marxist philosophy, of being an 
individual who has historically proposed the use of violence against 
his political enemies.
  Did he change his way when he was put in as President by us as a 
nation, using our military? It does not appear he has. In a meeting 
which took place--it was not a meeting, it was a ceremony of mourning 
for a person who had been unfortunately killed by violence in Haiti--
about a week and half ago, Mr. Aristide called on his supporters to use 
violence. This is the President of the country, someone who has been 
put in place by American forces, someone who is protected by American 
soldiers, calling for the use of violence against the citizens of his 
country, mob violence against the citizens of his country.
  As might be expected, the people of Haiti responded to this call from 
their President for mob violence with mob violence. It is estimated 
that many people died, maybe as many as 11; homes were burned, looting 
occurred, and the streets were on fire. The words that he used to 
counsel this violence were reported as being, ``Go to the neighborhoods 
where there are big houses and heavy weapons, and retaliate against the 
big men,'' inciting the mob to violence. That is the leadership of the 
individual who we have put the American imprimatur of authority on, who 
this White House has chosen as their leader in Haiti.
  Has he also accepted the fact that elections should occur in 
December? We are not sure of that. In another recent meeting just a few 
days ago, there was a nonbinding resolution put forward by his 
supporters which called on him to remain in office beyond the election 
for another 3 years. Such action would be inconsistent with, should he 
undertake it, the constitution, which he is allegedly functioning under 
in Haiti, which says he cannot succeed himself, and his term is up in 
February.
  What was his response to that nonbinding resolution which was put 
forward by his own people and which you have to presume he laid a hand 
in authoring, at least his people did, with his countenance? He said to 
the delegates, ``If you want me for 3 years, I will walk with you. I 
think what you think,'' a pretty clear statement that he has no great 
interest in the elective process or in his own Constitution, which he 
is allegedly sworn to support.
  In addition, of course, the election, which is coming up on December 
17, is a fraud and has been made so by President Aristide's party. Four 
of the five opposition parties have decided not to participate. We know 
that it is going to essentially be a nonelection election, the purpose 
of which will be simply a ballot-box-stuffing event for the 
confirmation of the Aristide party.
  The opposition parties have been crushed both through mob violence 
and through use of a controlled press, and there is very little in the 
form of what anyone would arguably call democracy occurring in Haiti 
today. And at what price has this occurred to the American taxpayers 
and American military?
  First off, as I said, we have used our military to basically prop up 
a dictator in Mr. Aristide. In doing that, we have undermined, in my 
own estimation, the credibility of American military force, which is 
not supposed to be used for the purposes of promoting dictatorships but 
clearly is.
  In addition, it is costing us, the taxpayers of this country, 
approximately $2.2 billion, or at least that is the best number we can 
estimate. I think personally that is low, but that is still a lot of 
money. And $2.2 billion is all the taxes that are paid by the folks 
that I represent in New Hampshire in any given year. Somehow I think 
those folks would have preferred to have their money go to better 
schools or better environment or better roads somewhere in our country, 
than to go into the coffers of Mr. Aristide in Haiti.
  What has that $2 billion purchased the people of Haiti? It has 
purchased them Mr. Aristide back in power, that is correct, but not a 
great deal more. In fact, as a result of the policies of this 
administration, we put in place sanctions, which was a mistake to begin 
with, as I said earlier, when they were put in place, sanctions which 
ended up terminating essentially the private sector in Haiti. The loss 
of jobs was dramatic; tens of thousands of jobs which were in the 
private sector which existed in Haiti were lost as a result of the 
sanctions.
  Have we seen those jobs restored? Has there been a return to 
democracy, to a market economy in Haiti? Has there been any expansion 
of the private sector in Haiti? Marginal at best. In fact, Mr. 
Aristide, who prior to being put back in power as a celeb in residence 
of this administration when he was here in Georgetown, stated rather 
aggressively his views that he believed 

[[Page S 17517]]
in a socialist approach to government and since being the President has 
refused to privatize a number of the state-controlled activities which 
it was understood he was going to privatize as part of getting the 
economy going again. And so not only were the jobs lost, and they have 
not been re-created, as a result of the sanctions, we are seeing an 
administration in Haiti which has accomplished very little in the 
effort to create a market force in Haiti. So all in all, it is not a 
great success story.
  But what is really of significant concern--even I think should be of 
concern for the American people as we go down the road toward the 
Bosnian debate--is the gap between what was represented was going to 
happen and what was represented would be and what has occurred, the gap 
between how Mr. Aristide was defined by this administration and who he 
really is, which is dramatic, the gap between what then was told to us 
was going to cost us and what it eventually has cost us, the fact that 
we may have American soldiers on the ground there well past February 
when we are supposed to have them out, another example.
  And so, as we move down the road on the decision on Bosnia, I think 
the American people have the right to ask the serious and difficult 
questions of this administration and to be a little suspicious of the 
answers and presentations as to what this administration's views and 
decisions are in Bosnia.
  We just recently read--I did not read it, but we heard synopses of a 
book published by Robert McNamara, who was the Secretary of Defense 
under John Kennedy and under Lyndon Johnson, and who now states rather 
openly that he knew the war in Vietnam was wrong, that it was a mistake 
from a public policy standpoint, but that because of the need to 
protect, basically, the political position and ego of the Presidency, 
they continued to pursue the war in Vietnam--truly one of the more 
disconcerting revelations to come forward from a leader of this 
country, certainly in this half century, but I suspect a very accurate 
one.
  Maybe we should put a new term in the American language called 
``McNamaranism.'' That is when you pursue a policy which you know is 
substantively wrong but you pursue it because of the political need or 
the need of the ego or the need of the presentation of the Presidency 
to the people. You pursue it not because you know it is right 
substantively, not because you know it is going to correct a problem 
which you think is there, but because you know, as a member of the 
policymaker at the highest level in Government, that if you do not 
pursue it, you are going to put at risk the President's imprimatur of 
authority, his personal leadership role or his reelection efforts.
  McNamaranism--I think that is a term that we should start with and we 
should identify. Clearly, McNamaranism occurred in the early sixties. I 
think a form of McNamaranism has occurred in Haiti. We pursued a policy 
in Haiti not because we knew we were going to correct that country. We 
knew that country was going to continue to have serious economic 
problems and serious political problems no matter what we did, because 
it has had those problems a long time and we do not have the 
wherewithal to change that culture unless we are willing to essentially 
take that country over and dominate it for years, something we tried to 
do from 1919 to 1935 and failed to do during that period. So we know it 
will take longer than that length of time, which is when we last 
occupied that country.
  But we went into Haiti because this administration had a political 
need to go into Haiti, to be quite blunt. There were certain forces 
within the constituency which support this Presidency who demanded 
unequivocally that we go into Haiti, and they were effective in making 
their case. So it was a political decision to go into Haiti, even 
though substantively we knew we were not going to correct the 
situation, and we are now seeing the result of that.
  McNamaranism struck us in Haiti. Let us hope that McNamaranism does 
not strike us in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I yield back my time.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

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