[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 186 (Monday, November 20, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H13632-H13634]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       IS BOSNIA WORTH DYING FOR?

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, we theoretically were supposed to adjourn 
the first week in October. Theoretically, all 13 major appropriation 
spending bills finished before that in sequence. Everything would have 
been authorized in the U.S. House. The Money House, the most important 
among equals around here in the separation of powers between the 
Supreme Court, the executive branch, the White House, and the Congress.
  We are the first among equals. That is the way it was designed by our 
Founders, by the Framers of the Constitution. Between this House and 
the Chamber at the north end of the building, the U.S. Senate, we are 
the ones who control the power of the purse. The right to tax and the 
right to spend starts here.
  The whole authorization, to appropriations to conference with the 
Senate process, is completely convoluted and all mixed up. Now, we are 
going out for 7\3/4\ days, and the talks involving a war criminal from 
Belgrade at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base are breaking down.
  Meanwhile, in Germany the 1st Armored Division over there is being 
trained to be ready to go in 48 to 72 hours and start sending thousands 
of men into Bosnia and Herzegovina without the consultation with the 
United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives and 
without Clinton having made his case.
  Mr. Speaker, here it is in one sentence on the cover of today's 
brand-new Time magazine. The face of a typical handsome young soldier 
and it says, ``Is Bosnia Worth Dying For?''
  Mr. Speaker, I did not get a chance during the brief debate on Friday 
to read a letter, which I meant to put in the Record and inadvertently 
forgot, a letter to the editor that I think says it all. It is from the 
Wall Street Journal of 6 days ago, November 14. It is about somebody 
who is experienced, Philip Merrill, a former Assistant Secretary 
General of NATO, and this article about says it all.
  Listen to this, Mr. Speaker: ``The Clinton administration is still 
apparently planning to insert 25,000,'' now they say 20,000, ``American 
troops into Bosnia with no clear military objective, no definition of 
victory and no exit strategy,'' a huge mistake.
  Jumping forward to the middle of the article, which I ask unanimous 
consent to put into the Record in its totality, listen to this: ``This 
is not to say there is no moral issue in Bosnia.'' I also believe there 
is a moral issue. There is especially the atrocities, mostly Serb 
atrocities. ``We can best help the Bosnians by making sure their 
120,000-man army fight for itself.''
  ``It's very doubtful that the Balkans can sustain a multiethnic 
society of the kind envisioned by Clinton. The U.S. has no strategic 
stake in this fight and cannot and should not be the military 
arbiter.''
  ``Our future policy seems to be,'' listen, Mr. Speaker, and any 
American following this Chamber, about 1,300,000 of our fellow 
Americans, listen to this: We seem to be simultaneously threatening 
Serbs from the air and killing them. We are in hiatus on that. We are 
going to act as a peacekeepers on the ground; at the same time train 
the Croatian Army, which I just came back from witnessing in August; 
arm the Bosnian military, which is what the leader in the Senate wants 
to do, and I do not have much argument with that, we voted 
overwhelmingly in the House to do that; and at the same time indict 
Bosnian Serb war criminals and a couple of Croatian war criminals. The 
Croatians have been turned over. The Bosnians, including three senior 
army officers, have all been promoted and are not being turned over. 
There are now over 54 or 54 war criminals involved in this; almost all 
of them Bosnian Serbs. No Moslems have been indicted yet.
  Any one of those policies is in itself coherent and defensible. Taken 
together they are incoherent. As flare-ups occur, these inherently 
conflicting policies will leave us powerless to act effectively.

[[Page H 13633]]

  Look at article 10, and I will put all 10 in the Record. Look at my 
10th commendment that I have sent to every Member in this House over 
the last 3 years: Thou shalt not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
commander in chief, that is Clinton, and Congress, that is us, can 
explain to the loved ones of any killed or wounded American soldier, 
sailor, Marine, pilot, or aircrewman why their family member or friend 
was sent in harm's way.
  Mr. Speaker, listen to the close of Mr. Merrill's article, and I will 
end on one sentence, Mr. Speaker. Should Clinton send American troops 
into Bosnia without congressional approval, he should be impeached. 
When the body bags start coming home, it will be a disaster, and that 
means anybody in this House or Senate that let it happen. I will draw 
articles of impeachment the minute a man or woman is killed in Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the Record:

       1. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.
       What vital interests are at stake? We already are 
     preventing the spread of conflict with troops elsewhere in 
     the Balkins such as Macedonia.
       2. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless all 
     other options already have been used or considered.
       What about lifting the arms embargo? What about tightening 
     trade sanctions? What about further air strikes?
       3. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is 
     a clear commitment, including allocated resources, to 
     achieving victory.
       Are 25,000 U.S. troops enough? Are there enough European 
     forces?
       4. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there 
     are clearly defined political and military objectives.
       What are the political objectives--protect small 
     ``enclaves'' in the middle of a civil war? What are the 
     military objectives--seize and hold specific terrain or stand 
     and become targets for all warring sides?
       5. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless our 
     commitment of these forces will change if our objectives 
     change.
       Will we realistically be able to withdraw U.S. forces after 
     a year if peace is not achieved, even is these forces are 
     directly engaged in combat?
       6. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     American people and Congress support the action.
       Neither Congress nor the American people support this 
     operation. A recent CBS/New York Times poll indicated only 
     37% of Americans support the President's position on Bosnia. 
     Further, 79% believe he should seek approval from Congress 
     before sending any troops.
       7. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless under 
     the operational command of American commanders or allied 
     commanders under a ratified treaty.
       The command structure for U.S. troops involved in this 
     operation seems confused at best with U.S. ground troops 
     serving under deputy European commanders and a NATO council 
     representatives from member states. Will France and Denmark 
     have to approve U.S. combat requests for M-1 tanks & AC-130 
     gunships?
       8. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless properly 
     equipped, trained and maintained by the Congress.
       Why has the President nearly doubled the defense cuts he 
     promised in his campaign and under funded his own ``Bottom Up 
     Review'' defense plan by as much as $150 billion? Shouldn't 
     he restore spending if he plans to use our military as world 
     policemen in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere?
       9. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is 
     substantial and reliable intelligence information including 
     human intelligence.
       What reliable hunint intelligence sources do we have in 
     Bosnia? Will our sources be compromised through intelligence 
     sharing agreements with non-NATO countries such as Russia?
       10. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     commander in chief and Congress can explain to the loved ones 
     of any killed or wounded American soldier, sailor, Marine, 
     pilot or aircrewmen why their family member or friend was 
     sent in harm's way.
       Can we honestly make this case? What do we now tell the 
     families of those killed in Somalia? American lives are at 
     stake!
                                                                    ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1995]

                        Bosnia: We Shouldn't Go

                          (By Philip Merrill)

       The Clinton administration is still apparently planning to 
     insert 25,000 American troops into Bosnia with no clear 
     military objective, no definition of victory and no exit 
     strategy. That would be a huge mistake.
       All the parties have coveted each other's assets for a 
     thousand years. In the unlikely event that there is a real 
     peace settlement, American troops are not necessary. If there 
     is no agreement for peace, or a deal falters, American 
     soldiers, like their British and French counterparts, will be 
     hostages to ethnic hatreds.
       Once U.S. troops are deployed, it will be in the Bosnian 
     interest to keep them there. The Bosnians will find ways to 
     ensure that enough Americans are killed and the Serbs and 
     Croats are blamed for it. Serbs and Croats will retaliate in 
     kind. Our soldiers will be caught in a deadly and deceptive 
     cross-fire.
       To mainain 25,000 Americans under combat conditions would 
     require a rotation of troops in and out of Bosnia. The U.S. 
     Army has only 10 active divisions. A Bosnian deployment could 
     mean that some 40% of our Army would be coming, going, or on 
     the ground in Bosnia, a diversion of people and money that is 
     wildly disproportionate to our strategic interest in the 
     Balkans.
       The disastrous result could mean a retreat from Europe, the 
     collapse of NATO, a failure to deal with longer term but more 
     dangerous threats elsewhere, and immeasurable costs as the 
     law of unintended consequences comes into play.
       The root problem, more evident every day, is that the 
     Clinton administration, while well-intentioned, has no 
     concept of how, when, or why to use military force. It is 
     preparing to enter Bosnia only because of essentially offhand 
     promises from a president who has no idea of America's role 
     in a post-Cold War world. Our foreign policy objectives 
     should relate far more to integrating Russia and China into 
     the community of civilized nations than to involving 
     ourselves in the ethnic and religious feuds of Eastern 
     Europe.
       This is not to say there is no moral issue in Bosnia. There 
     is--especially the Serb atrocities. We can best help the 
     Bosnians by making sure their 120,000 man army can fight for 
     itself.
       It's very doubtful that the Balkans can sustain a 
     multiethic society of the kind envisioned by President 
     Clinton. The U.S. has no strategic stake in this fight and 
     cannot and should not be the military arbiter.
       Our future policy seems to be to simultaneously threaten 
     Serbs from the air, act as peacekeepers on the ground, train 
     the Croaitian army, arm the Bosnia military, conduct peace 
     negotiations and indict Bosnian Serb war Criminals. Any one 
     of those policies is defensible; taken together they're 
     incoherent. As flare-ups occur, these inherently conflicting 
     policies will leave us powerless to act effectively.
       The European attitude toward the Balkans--which essentially 
     is a willingness to fight to the last American--is not 
     encouraging. The Germans, for example, are willing to put up 
     5,000 troops--but only for Croatia, not Bosnia. They know 
     they cannot do what the Romans, Frederick the Great and nine 
     Nazi divisions could not do--pacify the Balkans.
       To endorse the president's policy comes close to an act of 
     murder of young Americans who have sworn allegiance to our 
     country but who will serve and die under circumstances that 
     will neither advance U.S. interests nor the cause of freedom.
       When the American body bags start coming home, it will be a 
     political disaster for those who did not oppose sending 
     troops to Bosnia. Should President Clinton send Americans 
     into Bosnia without congressional approval, he should be 
     impeached.
       The time to face the choice is now, before we enter this 
     war and before American blood is shed.

  Mr. Speaker, here is the Dornan-Doolittle language from H.R. 1530.

                  Subtitle A--Peacekeeping Provisions


section 1201--limitation on expenditure of department of defense funds 
for united states forces placed under united nations command or control

       Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) signed by 
     President Clinton in May of 1994 contains a number of policy 
     initiatives intended to promote peacekeeping as an important 
     instrument of the Administration's national security policy. 
     Summary documents and extensive public and private briefings 
     on this policy initiative, make clear to the committee that 
     the Administration has adopted a policy of allowing the 
     placement of U.S. armed forces under the operational control 
     of foreign commanders when engaged in peacekeeping 
     operations.
       The Administration continues to stress that the President 
     will retain ``command'' of U.S. forces at all times. However, 
     the usage of the term ``command'' in this context refers to 
     the administrative control of military forces which has never 
     been an issue of debate or contention. On the other hand, the 
     practice of ceding ``operational control'' of U.S. military 
     forces to non-U.S. commanders remains a highly controversial 
     and troubling policy. While certain U.S. military units have 
     operated under the operational control of other nations, 
     these instances have been rare and usually as part of larger 
     coalition military operations where the U.S. retains overall 
     operational command of the theater of operation. Further, 
     these instances occurred during traditional military 
     operations that allowed a high degree of planning and 
     coordination to minimize the inherent complications resulting 
     from mixed command chains.
       By contrast, the concept of ceding operational control of 
     U.S. forces to a United Nations peacekeeping command is a 
     relatively recent practice that has thus far yielded 
     decidedly mixed results. As demonstrated during the UNOSOM II 
     operation in Somalia, peacekeeping operations place a high 
     premium on the ability to rapidly employ effective military 
     force in response to unplanned circumstances. The tactical 
     demands of such 

[[Page H 13634]]
     operations tend to stress and exacerbate the limitations of mixed-
     nationality operations resulting from the usually significant 
     cultural, language, doctrine, and training differences among 
     the participating national contingents. While only U.S. 
     logistics forces were placed under UN operational control 
     during UNOSOM II, the unanimous view of U.S. commanders 
     interviewed by the committee during its review of the Somalia 
     operation was that UN mixed-nationality command chains are 
     inappropriate for demanding UN operations.
       Therefore, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1201) 
     that would regulate the circumstances under which the 
     President could commit U.S. forces under UN command or 
     control. This provision would require that before U.S. forces 
     may be deployed under the command or operational control of 
     the UN, the President must first certify to the Congress that 
     (1) such a command arrangement is necessary to protect U.S. 
     national security interests, (2) the commander of the U.S. 
     force involved will retain the right to report independently 
     to U.S. military authorities and to decline to comply with 
     orders judged to be illegal, militarily imprudent or beyond 
     the mandate of the U.S. mission, (3) the U.S. force involved 
     will remain under U.S. administrative command, and (4) the 
     U.S. will retain the authority to withdraw the U.S. force 
     involved and take action it considers necessary to protect 
     this force if it is engaged.
       While this provision seeks to ensure that any deployment of 
     U.S. forces under UN command or control is made with a clear 
     and unambiguous understanding of the right of the United 
     States to withdraw those forces at any time and to take any 
     action considered necessary to protect such forces, the 
     committee recognizes that any such decision to withdraw 
     deployed U.S. forces should be made with due regard and 
     consideration for the safety of U.S. and other national 
     contingents deployed in any such given operation.
       The provision would further require the President to submit 
     a report along with the aforementioned certification 
     providing: (1) a description of the national security 
     interests that require such a command arrangement, (2) the 
     mission of the U.S. forces involved, (3) the expected size 
     and composition of the U.S. forces involved, (4) the 
     incremental cost to the U.S. of participation in the 
     operation, (5) the precise command and control relationship 
     between the U.S. forces and the United Nations command 
     structure, (6) the precise command and control relationship 
     between the U.S. forces involved and the U.S. unified 
     commander for the region in which the forces will be 
     operating, (7) the extent to which the U.S. forces involved 
     will be relying on non-U.S. forces for self protection, and 
     (8) the timetable for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. 
     forces involved.

  Mr. Speaker consider this Time magazine title ``Is Bosnia Worth Dying 
For?'' and these few excerpts from this cover story, of November 27, 
1995.

       Is the soldier on the cover SP4 Andrew F. Hawley; just 
     another faceless U.S. soldier--No.
       1 of 25,000 or 20,000 ``American'' troops to be sent to 
     Bosnia under ``Bill Clinton'' foreign policy
       He could easily be another Randy Shugart or Gary Gordon, 
     soldiers who gave their lives in Somalia
       He could be another ``Specialist'' Michael New who refuses 
     to serve under U.N. command or U.N. uniform
       He could be your husband, or your brother, or your son, 
     going to a place far away to risk his life, not in 
     ``peacekeeping'' but combat, where we have no vital national 
     security interests, no specific military objectives, and no 
     clear exit strategy.

  What are we going to do about it?
  The House has passed binding legislation, cosponsored by myself and 
Joel Hefley of Colorado to prevent any funds from being spent on such a 
troop deployment until authorized by Congress.
  Our national Security Committee has also passed binding legislation 
by myself and John Doolittle of California that would strictly limit 
U.N. command of United States troops, which resulted in the death of 19 
United States soldiers in Somalia.
  But where's the Senate? No binding Bosnia deployment bill. No binding 
language on U.N. command. We need your help America. Let the Senate 
know that we do not want troops deployed to Bosnia, at least until the 
President has made his case to Congress, and we certainly do not want 
our troops under U.N. command at any time.

                          ____________________