[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 185 (Sunday, November 19, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17482-S17483]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         PEACE TALKS IN DAYTON

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, there are news reporters indicating that the 
administration is trying to wrap up peace talks in Dayton, OH, by 
tomorrow morning.
  No doubt about it, the administration has put a great deal of effort 
into this diplomatic process. A significant number of our diplomats 
have been working around the clock to get an agreement. Their hard work 
should be recognized.
  However, I hope that in their understandable haste, our negotiators 
will not lose sight of the objective--which is not just to secure a 
peace, but to secure a just and lasting peace.
  Most Members of Congress would agree that for an agreement to have a 
reasonable prospect of achieving a stable peace, it must include the 
following provisions:
  First, a clear demarcation of defensible borders for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and resolution of all territorial issues among the parties;
  Second, clear lines of demarcation between the military forces of the 
parties to the agreement and procedures for separating the forces;
  Third, concurrence by all parties and witnesses to the agreement to 
multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina upon 
entry into force of the agreement;
  Fourth, acceptance by all parties and witnesses to the agreement to 
United States involvement in an effort to equip, arm, and train Bosnian 
Federation Forces;
  Fifth, establishment of clear standards for violations of the 
agreement and the unrestricted use of force by NATO to include air 
power as necessary to respond to violations of the agreement which 
threaten not only the peace, but the security of our forces;
  Sixth, an end to military intervention by the Governments of Croatia 
and Serbia and Montenegro in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  Seventh, the dismantlement of the integrated air defense network 
linkages between Serbia and Bosnian-Serb held areas of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina;
  Eighth, full NATO implementation of the deny flight operation; and
  Ninth, measures to ensure that indicted war criminals are not in 
positions of authority, including any elected office.
  Mr. President, it seems to me that these are the minimum elements of 
a viable peace agreement. Without these elements, it is unlikely that a 
genuine peace will hold. Without these elements, it is unlikely that 
Bosnia will survive.
  We should not mistake securing any peace agreement in Dayton with 
securing a stable peace. No matter how difficult the negotiations are, 
if they fail to achieve an agreement that secures the integrity and 
independence of Bosnia they will have been a waste of time.

  Also essential to a stable peace is restoring public confidence and 
trust in the Government, institutions, and leaders of Bosnia. Absent 
justice, there will be no trust and no peace will endure. For the long-
suffering Bosnian people, to believe in the peace, they 

[[Page S 17483]]
must witness for themselves that justice will be done in Bosnia. 
Justice is the only comfort we can provide to mothers and fathers who 
have lost their children to war crimes. This will not be a just peace 
if war criminals remain at large and unaccountable for their heinous 
crimes.
  Furthermore, Mr. President, any peace will be short-lived if it does 
not provide the Bosnians with the authority and the means to defend 
their territory and their people. Absent a stable military balance, 
those who have clearly been the aggressors in this conflict will seek 
to press their advantage again. Whatever agreement is initialed in 
Dayton, it must provide for lifting the arms embargo and for addressing 
the existing military imbalance. If it does not, it will serve no 
greater purpose than to delay an inevitable return to hostilities. It 
will simply be another invitation to future aggression.
  Placing these important matters aside, foremost on the minds of the 
American people is whether or not young Americans should be ordered to 
enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia.

  Mr. President, in my view, the deployment of American forces into 
harms' way requires very careful deliberation on the part of the 
administration and the Congress. The President has informed me that he 
will come to Congress for support. That is the right thing to do. It 
would be unwise to send American forces without the support of the 
Congress and the American people. Right now, I do not believe that the 
President has it.
  He certainly will not have it, if a peace agreement does not include 
the provisions I have mentioned. But, he is also unlikely to receive 
our support if the implementation plan for our military forces does 
not, at the very least, include the following essential provisions:
  First, well-defined and clearly stated mission objectives achievable 
through military means;
  Second, robust rules of engagement allowing for disproportionate 
responses, as appropriate, to any attacks on United States and NATO 
forces and no restrictions or impediments on the ability of United 
States and NATO military forces to defend themselves;
  Third, United States military forces will operate only under a 
unified NATO command whose orders and authority cannot be constrained, 
conditioned, blocked or vetoed by any other party including the United 
Nations;
  Fourth, United States military forces shall use the authority granted 
in any annexes to the maximum extent consistent with their resources 
and shall act to deter, defeat or punish any violations from whatever 
source;

  Fifth, clear criteria for measuring progress toward achieving the 
objectives of the operation, a detailed exit strategy, and adequate 
resources for achieving these objectives and effecting a safe exit for 
all United States forces from Bosnia;
  Sixth, procedures for integrating appropriate UNPROFOR forces 
currently in Bosnia into a NATO-led implementation force and procedures 
for withdrawing any other UNPROFOR forces from Bosnia; and
  Seventh, specific provisions to prevent conflict between United 
States and non-NATO Forces and members of the civilian population of 
Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I believe that these criteria are very simple and very 
basic. I am not certain that Congress will go along with sending 
American Forces even if these provisions are included in a peace 
agreement and implementation plan. However, I am certain that without 
these elements, not only will Congress overwhelmingly disapprove of the 
peace agreement and the plan to send American Forces as peacekeepers, 
but that neither of these plans will have a chance of succeeding.
  The administration says that NATO will collapse if the United States 
does not send Americans into Bosnia as peacekeepers, but what happens 
to NATO if Americans are used to keep a peace which cannot be kept? 
What happens if we send Americans without adequate authority and 
provision to protect themselves? NATO should remain strong and united, 
however, unity in failure is the worst possible outcome. How much worse 
off would NATO be if United States and other NATO Forces were deployed 
in Bosnia only to leave in failure?

  Which brings me to my final question: Why this option? Why is sending 
20,000 American troops to Bosnia the only option being considered by 
the Clinton administration? Why was no consideration given to using 
American air power and American supply lines for ground forces provided 
by our European allies?
  Mr. President, many questions remain. The President has not yet made 
the case for American involvement in Bosnia on this massive scale. The 
Congress has clearly stated its view that the President should seek 
authorization for any deployment to Bosnia. The Congress has also 
clearly stated its preference for lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia so 
that Bosnians may defend themselves. And we have done this time after 
time after time on a bipartisan basis. Many of us who supported lifting 
the embargo, did so not just because of our support for Bosnia's 
inherent right to self-defense, because we hoped we could avoid sending 
thousands of Americans into Bosnia to defend Bosnians. But, the 
President chose not to do that--and now we are where we are.
  Mr. President, we fully understand the constitutional authority of 
the President of the United States. We also understand the 
constitutional responsibility of the Congress. There is no greater 
responsibility for an elected representative than to prevent the 
needles shedding of American blood. We intend to exercise that 
responsibility with the utmost care.
  Mr. President, I want to particularly thank the Presiding Officer for 
his efforts not only in helping me prepare this statement, but for his 
consistent support for the position that I have outlined here and for 
his leadership on the Senate floor and in the Senate negotiations on 
both sides of the aisle.
  I appreciate very much his help.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the distinguished leader departs 
here momentarily, I would like to join in acknowledging the Presiding 
Officer's very active participation in this and a broad range of 
matters relating to the military. He served on the Armed Services 
Committee with great distinction.

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