[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 184 (Saturday, November 18, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S17440-S17441]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 BOSNIA

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to divert from that just for a 
moment because, were it not for the overshadowing presence of the 
budget debate, which is appropriate, I suspect we may be on this floor 
debating an issue that is of great significance and great importance.
  As we speak, the United States is leading an effort in Dayton, OH, to 
attempt to reach some kind of peace agreement between the warring 
factions in Bosnia. That has been an elusive goal, one which different 
parties and different factions have been attempting over nearly a 600-
year period of time; in this latest conflict, 4 years of serious 
engagement with disastrous and tragic consequences for hundreds of 
thousands of people, if not millions of people, in that part of the 
world.
  But, if we have learned anything, I think, from our recent history in 
terms of the United States involvement in conflicts abroad, it is that 
any kind of involvement, and particularly a long-term involvement, 
anything exceeding just a matter of days, ultimately cannot succeed 
without the support of the American people.
  That support is expressed through their elected representatives. The 
President has said and Congress has said that it is appropriate for 
Congress to examine the conditions upon which any U.S. troops will be 
subject to deployment to a foreign land, particularly one in which 
potential conflict and potential threat to their health and safety and 
life exist.
  At this point, hopefully, we are nearing a real peace agreement in 
Dayton. I have some very deep concerns about the nature of that 
agreement and whether it can even be accurately described as a peace 
agreement. But, unfortunately, the President of the United States for 
whatever reason some time ago, and on numerous occasions, has made 
commitments to deploy troops as soon as this agreement is reached.
  There have been some recent indications that the President is willing 
to let Congress take a look at, examine, and analyze the peace 
agreement but no commitment that, even if we disagree, the troops will 
not be sent. In fact, there is pretty good indication that an advance 
party of up to 2,000 American troops will be sent there to sort of hold 
the line while the so-called 2-week ``period of examination'' passes. 
The President hopes for congressional support and authorization. He has 
not yet received it, nor will he unless he is able to go before the 
American people and go before this Congress and make a compelling case 
for use of United States troops on the ground in Bosnia. That case, I 
suggest, has not been made, and has not even been attempted to be 
presented to the American people a cogent, logical, understandable 
reason why 20,000 uniformed troops of the United States Armed Forces 
need to be inserted into the conflict in Bosnia. The President may 
intend to do that. I do not know. He has waited a dangerously long 
time.
  The argument that the administration has made, feeble as it is, is 
that it is necessary for two reasons: One, to contain the spread of the 
conflict to other areas which involve other NATO allies which 
eventually will pull in all of Europe. There is little reason to 
suspect that will happen. It has not in a 4-year period of time.
  What we have essentially looked at is a civil war within a confined 
border of three factions fighting for land which they have fought for 
for nearly 600 years--avenging tragedies, avenging killings, avenging 
land seizures and private property seizures which have taken place over 
a significant period of time. Even if spreading beyond the current 
borders were a real possibility, there are strategies, containment 
strategies, that NATO could employ which are far different and involve 
far less risk than inserting 20,000 American troops and 40,000 NATO 
troops for a total of 60,000 onto the ground in the middle of the 
conflict that currently exists in Bosnia.
  The second reason the administration postulates is that our 
involvement with troops on the ground is necessary to maintain the 
integrity of NATO. I think that even that is a questionable 
proposition.
  In a recent article in Time magazine by Charles Krauthammer he talks 
about that very point, saying, ``Of course, the single most powerful 
argument in favor of deployment invokes NATO: to renege on this promise 
of American relief for our NATO allies already trapped in Bosnia in a 
fruitless `peacekeeping' mission.'' He asserts that it ``would be the 
worst blow Clinton has yet dealt''--I am quoting--``to NATO cohesion.''
  ``Whatever the strategic policy of having our troops in Bosnia, the 
argument goes, our NATO allies want us to take the lead on the ground, 
and we promised that we would do that.''
  But, as Krauthammer goes on to explain, our recent history indicates 
that one of two things are going to probably happen. Either we will 
suffer a loss of life--either we will suffer a situation which is far 
different than what could be described as peace, and, therefore, 
without having gotten the commitment of the Congress, or the commitment 
of the American people, we will call for a withdrawal of those troops 
which would be a serious blow to the integrity of NATO--or it may 
result in a long-term deployment and commitment of those troops which 
we have not again made the case for, nor do I think we can begin to 
expect American support for, a long-term commitment to that.
  Either one of those occurrences, one of which is likely to happen, 
could do great damage to the NATO alliance and, as Krauthammer argues, 
and I agree, actually do more damage than not providing troops on the 
ground.
  The President has not defined our vital interests in that 
involvement. He has not defined what our objective and mission would 
be. He has not defined how we would exit from the situation other than 
to say we will be out of there within a year. I think what he means by 
that is that we will be out of there before the next election. It is 
politically not feasible, and untenable to think the troops would still 
be there and become an election issue. That in 

[[Page S 17441]]
and of itself is a recipe for disaster given the nature of the warfare. 
And anybody who understands the enmity that exists between the parties, 
and the conflict over who owns what land, knows that the American 
troops being out longer than a year is likely to just promote and 
produce a situation in which the parties wait out the situation, and 
then would return to the status quo, which is obviously not something 
that any of us looks forward to.
  There are a couple of other concerns that I have. One is the question 
of neutrality. It is one thing to send troops into a situation when 
those troops are viewed--and that nation sending the troops is viewed--
as a truly neutral partner in the process. In this case, we have 
decidedly sided with one faction in this conflict--the Bosnian Moslems. 
While we have not seen the final details of the peace agreement, the 
United States has indicated that one of our objectives in this 
deployment will be to arm the Moslems, will be to bring them to ``a 
level of parity'' with the other factions. That may be comforting news 
to the Bosnian Moslems. I doubt that is very comforting to the other 
parties in the conflict, and certainly not the Serbs.

  So what our goal should be is a disarming of all parties involved, to 
reduce the level of tension and reduce the level of potential conflict 
rather than build up the capacity of one of the parties but, in doing 
so, even if that were an agreed upon military strategy, I think that is 
a terrible political strategy because we will not be viewed as a 
neutral party. The United States, which is already by the very nature 
of its--I ask unanimous consent for 3 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS. The United States which is already viewed by a number of 
countries as not necessarily a neutral entity, and which has become a 
target, unfortunately, over the years for terrorists and extremists and 
others that want to disrupt either the peace talks or simply make a 
point, I think would clearly be identified as a party which was not 
neutral in this conflict and clearly would be a potential target for 
terrorism.
  I had the experience nearly a decade ago of traveling to Beirut 
visiting the marines that were encamped between warring factions, and 
witnessed the aftereffects of the tragic bombing of the marine barracks 
that cost the loss of several hundred lives. Those that perpetrated 
this incident wanted to make a point, and by making that point they 
felt that they could influence the course of that conflict. And they 
did. I think the very same something--maybe not the very same but 
something similar--happened in Somalia.
  So we at great risk put our troops between the warring factions.
  My final point is that I think we need to be very, very careful about 
what a peace agreement says and means that might come out of Dayton. 
Dayton could very well produce a ``peace''--I put that word in 
quotation marks. Again, I am referring to the Krauthammer piece--a 
``peace'' that is unstable and divisive, and largely unenforceable. It 
may be a peace imposed rather than a peace sought and agreed to by the 
warring factions; imposed by outside forces. If that is the case, we 
are likely to have a situation where, as Krauthammer says, this lowest 
common denominator peace plan commands three grudging, resentful 
signatures from unreconciled parties. That is a disaster for American 
troops on the ground. And particularly, if the President has not sought 
the support of the American people, the support of their elected 
representatives, and defined for the American people just why it is 
necessary to utilize American troops on the ground. We need to make 
sure.
  I ask for one additional minute, and I promise to quit even if I am 
not finished.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  We should make sure that we have an ironclad commitment from the 
three parties involved that they not only are seeking a true peace but 
they are willing to self-enforce a true peace; that they will do so 
with a builddown of forces instead of a buildup of forces; that they 
will do so with wide zones of separation between them; that the peace 
will be essentially self-enforcing; and that they will be committed to 
bringing about that cessation of hostility and conflict between them.
  If that is the case, one has to ask themselves the question, why are 
60,000 troops needed to enforce that? If that is not the case, I think 
we have a very serious question.
  My time has expired, and I promised to quit, and even though I have 
more to say, I will say it later. I thank the Chair and the patience of 
my colleague from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). The Senator from Nebraska.

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