[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 183 (Friday, November 17, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H13222-H13248]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 528

  Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my 
name be removed as a cosponsor of H.R. 528.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Nebraska?
  There was no objection.
  
[[Page H13223]]


               PROHIBITION ON FUNDS FOR BOSNIA DEPLOYMENT

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 273, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 2606) to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the 
Department of Defense from being used for the deployment on the ground 
of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation 
force, unless funds for such deployment are specifically appropriated 
by law, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of H.R. 2606 is as follows:

                               H.R. 2606

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. PROHIBITION OF USE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS 
                   FOR DEPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND OF UNITED STATES 
                   ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND 
                   HERZEGOVINA AS PART OF ANY PEACEKEEPING 
                   OPERATION OR IMPLEMENTATION FORCE.

       None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to 
     the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for 
     the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in 
     the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of any 
     peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation 
     force, unless funds for such deployment have been 
     specifically appropriated by a law enacted after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 273, the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 30 
minutes, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  For what purpose does the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] 
rise?
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, as I understand the rules under which we 
are operating, there is 1 hour of general debate on the Hefley 
provision and 1 hour in the event there is a substitute to be offered. 
May I ask the Chair, is that correct?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is correct.
  Mr. DELLUMS. At this time I will inform the Chair and my colleagues 
on the other side that we have no intention to offer a substitute, and 
as I understand it, the 1 hour of debate on the potential amendment 
would then be rolled into general debate on the Hefley provision, is 
that correct?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would tell the gentleman that 
pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 273, the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] 
will each control 60 minutes.
  The chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, for the past couple of weeks, proximity 
peace talks have been taking place in Ohio between leaders of the 
warring parties in Bosnia. Reports indicate that a political agreement 
may be near, with the hope of moderating, at least, this latest chapter 
in the violent history of the Balkans. Yet the issues being discussed 
by the parties remain unclear to many Americans.
  In order to bring these issues into sharper focus, the House National 
Security Committee has held a number of hearings over the past few 
weeks. I believe these hearings have helped many members on the 
committee to deepen their understanding of this complex conflict.
  Although a peace agreement has yet to be finalized, the Clinton 
administration has, nevertheless, committed to deploy up to 25,000 U.S. 
ground troops in Bosnia as part of a larger NATO peace implementation 
force. This prospective deployment has raised questions about what the 
nature, scope, role, duration, and, most importantly, purpose of any 
American military presence on the ground in Bosnia would be.
  It is with these questions in mind that the National Security 
Committee has sought to shed some light on the administration's plan 
and its potential impact on the readiness of our Armed Forces, the 
credibility of our alliance commitments, and the wisdom of placing 
American soldiers in harm's way for what remain ambiguously defined 
U.S. national security interests.
  To date, we have heard the assessment of the United States 
intelligence community about the current situation in Bosnia. Regional 
experts, experienced military officers--both active and retired--
seasoned strategists and veteran diplomats have also testified 
regarding various aspects of the Bosnian problem. And the 
administration has also been before us to present its case.
  In presenting its case to the committee, the administration has 
raised more questions than it has answered. What we have learned so far 
is troubling. Moreover, from all I have heard, it appears that the 
American people find the administration's arguments unconvincing as 
well.
  The committee was told that a United States military presence on the 
ground in Bosnia is necessary because our NATO allies want us there. 
This is hardly a sufficient rationale for deploying 25,000 Americans to 
Bosnia. Without American troops, we are told, neither a meaningful 
peace agreement nor an effective force to implement it are possible. 
One can only wonder how meaningful a peace agreement is that requires 
60,000 foreign troops, including up to 25,000 Americans, to enforce it. 
Peacekeeping has worked in the Sinai because both sides are committed 
to making peace work. I don't believe the same can be said about the 
numerous factions involved in the Bosnian conflict.
  Neither Secretary Perry nor General Shalikashvili identified any 
military tasks that only U.S. forces could fulfill. In fact, General 
Shalikashvili stated that from a strictly military perspective, the 
task of implementing a peace accord in Bosnia could be accomplished 
solely by European forces. The United States can and probably should 
bring some unique support capabilities to any peacekeeping operation, 
but these would not require the on-the-ground presence of up to 25,000 
U.S. combat troops.
  We were told that America must play a role on the ground because the 
United States is the leader of NATO and that Alliance solidarity would 
crumble if we did not. But to argue that the future credibility and 
effectiveness of NATO rest upon committing American forces to an ill-
defined peacekeeping mission is suspect. In fact, the strains of a 
prolonged military deployment, in support of ambiguous objectives could 
do more to pull the alliance apart in the long run than to solidify it.
  Further, we were told that failure to participate with troops on the 
ground would make peace impossible and therefore might lead to a 
wider conflict that would engulf all of Europe. Yet, for the first time 
in this conflict, the warring parties have attained a rough military 
balance on the ground. More than any other factor, it is this rough 
parity that has paved the way for the peace talks in Dayton. Since the 
Dayton talks have commenced, even the New York Times has recognized 
that ``the possibility of the Bosnian war spreading has been 
eliminated.'' What matters now is how committed the warring parties are 
to making peace, not whether U.S. troops will be on the ground to 
enforce it.

  What we have learned is that the administration has a strategy for 
putting United States troops into Bosnia, but not for getting them out. 
The President has said that troop deployments will begin within days of 
completion of a formal peace agreement. And while the administration 
has promised to withdraw forces after 1 year, this deadline for 
withdrawal is arbitrary. Well troops be withdrawn regardless of the 
situation on the ground? What if the peace collapses prior to our 
withdrawal? Would we cut and run? Would we damage NATO credibility more 
by bugging out when the going gets tough? Who, if anyone, will be left 
to fill the void if the United States were to withdraw? These are just 
some of the many questions that remain unanswered.
  On a broader point, I remind my colleagues that the first rule of 
peacekeeping is to take no sides and make no enemies. Yet the United 
States has already violated that cardinal rule through the application 
of airpower over the past several months. Consequently, how can 
Americans be seen as neutral after having crossed the line of 
impartiality through the use of force? Moreover, it strains credibility 


[[Page H13224]]
to believe that U.S. neutrality can be maintained at the same time that 
we are indicating our intention to arm and train one party to the 
conflict. As a result, Americans are likely to become targets in a 
conflict where peacekeepers already have been killed. American 
peacekeepers were tragically killed in both Lebanon and Somalia after 
the mission changed, which, in turn, changed the perception of one or 
more of the warring parties. If Americans are not neutral, which they 
will not be perceived as in Bosnia, we will be a target.
  Finally, the nature of the mission itself remains an open question, 
as is the yardstick by which we are to measure its success. Any 
decision to place American fighting men and women in harm's way must 
not be taken lightly. There should be a clear U.S. National interest at 
stake and a well-defined mission--neither of which have been 
articulated, in my opinion, to date.
  Mr. Speaker, in May 1993 Secretary Christopher himself advanced 
appropriate criteria to guide United States participation in any Bosnia 
mission. At that time he claimed that any such mission should have 
military goals that are clear and understandable to the American 
people, that the chances for success must be high, that support of the 
American people must be assured, and that the administration must have 
an exit strategy. These, it seems to me, are the essential minimum 
preconditions for congressional support.
  To date, the Clinton administration has not satisfied these 
conditions. Therefore, I would agree with the conclusion of General 
Lewis MacKenzie, the first UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo. A few weeks 
ago, he told the committee, and I quote, ``Don't touch this with a ten-
foot pole.'' Over the past weeks of hearings, I have heard nothing to 
change that recommendation.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Hefley, a senior 
member of the National Security Committee and author of the legislation 
before us today, manage time on this side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] the ranking member of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill. I think we should vote 
against it for several reasons. The first reason is that this bill ties 
the hands of the President. It tells the commander in chief that he 
cannot deploy troops to Bosnia, period. When you are the commander in 
chief, you have the power to deploy troops. That is fundamental, and 
this bill takes away that power.
  Now, the authors of the bill say that Congress must assert its 
constitutional right to decide whether to allocate funds for the 
commitment of troops. That is correct. We do have that constitutional 
authority and responsibility, but may I point out to my friends that 
this bill goes far beyond that. It simply prohibits the President from 
action as commander in chief.
  Second, I think this bill does jeopardize the peace process. This is 
the make-or-brake weekend in Dayton. The Secretary of State is on his 
way back; the parties have completed a number of preliminary 
agreements, and we are told that they could be close to a final 
settlement. At this very delicate and fragile moment, the Congress of 
the United States ought not to take any step which would undermine 
these talks. The parties in Dayton expect the United States to help 
implement this agreement. They are insisting upon it. The bill states 
that we will not do it.
  Secretary Christopher put it very bluntly to us. He said that at a 
time when parties must make difficult decisions for peace, a House vote 
on this bill could be misinterpreted and give the parties reason for 
delay and hesitation. Why take that risk? Why take that risk at this 
very hour?
  The Bosnian peace talks should be given every chance to succeed and 
we should take no action that might kill the negotiations and send the 
parties back to war.
  Third, I believe that this bill is unnecessary because Congress will 
have a chance to vote later on troop deployments. I know there are many 
people in this Chamber who want that right, and I think they should 
have it. We should vote on the question of sending troops to Bosnia. I 
think it is our constitutional duty to do so whenever the President 
puts U.S. troops in harm's way.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe we will have that choice. The President has 
stated in a letter in writing to the Speaker that he will request a 
vote after an agreement has been reached in Dayton and before the 
troops are deployed. I think he will honor that commitment.

  There is no need to vote tonight, because there is no agreement yet. 
We have no request in this Congress to send troops. There is no plan 
before us on the details of United States deployment in Bosnia. The 
President cannot submit the plan until the parties have reached an 
agreement. He cannot submit the plan until our military has drawn up 
its recommendations.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I think it is a mistake to pass this bill 
because I think a vote against the bill is that the stakes are too high 
to act prematurely. The stakes are too high in Bosnia. NATO and 
European security and stability are on the line in Bosnia.
  We all know that we are at a decisive moment in Bosnia. We all know 
it could tip towards peace or war. We cannot get peace in Bosnia unless 
NATO enforces it.
  The President made a commitment 2 years ago that we would participate 
in any NATO force implementing an agreement. Our NATO partners in 
Bosnia will not enforce a peace agreement without us. The people of 
Bosnia and all of the parties to the agreement in Dayton want our 
participation and they are dependent upon it. They know that without 
U.S. participation and leadership, there will be no peace. If we rule 
out now a United States role, and that is what this bill does, before 
we see the details of a peace agreement or an implementation plan, we 
risk the collapse of the peace efforts in Bosnia and a wider war.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me say it is very important that we debate this measure now. This 
is not a trivial matter. I know the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums] shares my deep conviction about that. I would hope that 
everybody who speaks on this will not put it in the context of 
politics, Democrat, Republican, conservation, liberal, presidential, 
Congress. That is not what we want to talk about here today. We want to 
talk about American lives and American families. For many American 
families, this is the most important vote that the 104th Congress will 
name and make no mistake about it.
  As the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth] said earlier, this is the 
vote on Bosnia. This is the vote on Bosnia. Do not think you can go 
home and say, ``Well, I didn't really approve of sending troops to 
Bosnia but we ought to do it, the timing was just bad.'' That is not 
the way it is going to work. If we want a meaningful vote, it has to be 
right now.
  This bill does one thing: It requires specific appropriation of money 
prior to ground troops being inserted in Bosnia. That is all it does. 
It does not infringe on the rights of the Commander in Chief. It does 
not tell him what he can and cannot do. It simply says, do not do it 
until you have Congress and the American people behind you. How much 
stronger the effort will be if we have the President and Congress and 
the American people all together signing off the shame sheet.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
  Mr. McHALE. Mr. Speaker, the Washington Times, November 17, 1995. I 
would urge Members, particularly those on the other side of the aisle, 
listen to these words:
  ``Bosnia, a Vote Too Far.
  If ever there was a need for Solomonic wisdom, it would have to be in 


[[Page H13225]]
Dayton, OH. Negotiations are not going well and what will surely not 
make the negotiations any easier are the votes coming up in the 
Congress today on troop deployment. With relations between Capitol Hill 
and the White House as poisonous as they can be, this is simply the 
wrong time and the wrong way to make decisions about the most pressing 
foreign policy issue of the day.''
  The Washington Times.
  ``To vote preemptively before there is even something to vote on is 
inappropriate. The Republicans--again, the Washington Times--the 
Republicans should ask themselves, is that really what they want.''
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that there are two issues that must be 
considered by the House. The first is the issue of the wisdom, dubious 
though I think it may be, of deploying ground troops in Bosnia.
  I stood here in the House 2 weeks ago in a bipartisan effort prior to 
the commencement of the negotiations in an attempt with my good friend 
the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer] to send a clear, unequivocal 
message to the President of the United States that we do not want 
ground troops in Bosnia. My views have not changed one bit. Three 
hundred-fifteen of us said to the President of the United States, do 
not send ground troops.
  The issue before the House today is not the wisdom or lack thereof in 
sending troops. The issue before the House today is the timing of the 
congressional role. When do we exercise our constitutional 
responsibility?
  The President of the United States in response to a request that 
several here in this Chamber made to him and contrary to the assertions 
previously made by some Members on this floor has said in unequivocal 
language that upon the conclusion of the negotiations, there will be a 
vote requested in this House.
  Let me assure my Republican friends, if the President does not heed 
the will of the American people, if he does not correct the mistaken 
analysis of those who are advising him on the military issues, no one 
will stand on this floor and fight him more firmly with the full power 
of the law given us under the Constitution in order to avoid the 
deployment of ground forces. But today that issue ought not be before 
the House.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is constitutionally irresponsible for 
this Congress, or any Congress, to statutorily cripple the President, 
any President, in the conduct of foreign policy during a delicate stage 
of diplomatic negotiations.
  If we pass this bill today, future Republican Presidents and future 
Congresses of the United States will regret the precedent. To stop this 
President, we need not weaken the presidency.
  I urge a negative vote.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2606.
  The resolution simply states that none of the Department of Defense 
funds may be used to deploy United States ground troops to Bosnia 
unless specifically authorized by the Congress.
  I have been very concerned about Mr. Clinton's unwillingness to 
consult with the Congress and seek congressional approval for other 
endeavors. Mr. Clinton failed to get congressional approval prior to 
spending tens of billions of dollars in taxpayer money to bail out the 
Mexican economy.
  Additionally, during the recent debate on the Federal budget impasse 
and the debt limit, Mr. Clinton has by-passed the requirement that the 
Congress pass legislation enabling the Federal Government to incur a 
debt in excess of $4.9 trillion.
  This President has consistently demonstrated a willful disregard for 
the legislative process and Congress. In spite of Mr. Clinton's 
statements, I have no reason to believe that his actions with regard to 
Bosnia will be any different. Besides, if the President has said he 
would seek congressional approval before sending United States troops 
to Bosnia, he should have no problem signing this bill.
  I am very concerned about President Clinton's plans to send United 
States troops to Bosnia, and I believe it would be wrong for the 
President or his administration to make promises of United States 
troops to Bosnia.
  I welcome all efforts to reach a settlement in the region, but oppose 
any increased U.S. military role in this volatile area. I do not 
believe United States military intervention in Bosnia will bring a 
lasting peace. Even a minimal military involvement holds the very real 
potential of miring the United States in a prolonged and unwinnable 
struggle. The last thing we need is to get tangled up in another 
Vietnam-like war with the loss of many American lives.
  Before taking another ill-conceived step, President Clinton needs to 
define our policy and objectives in the region. What are the specific 
objectives of U.S. military involvement? Why must the United States 
shoulder so much of this burden in Europe's own backyard? Why is Europe 
itself hesitating to use troops? What will be the next step if limited 
military engagement fails? These questions remain unanswered. At this 
point, the Clinton administration's policy seems to be driven by 
shifting winds instead of sound military strategy.
  Unlike Kuwait, Bosnia is not a well-established State and is under 
attack from its own people. The civil war there results from resurgent 
nationalism, conflicting territorial claims, and past historic grudges 
that are centuries old.
  The cold war may be over, but Mr. Clinton and his foreign policy 
advisors have not yet learned how to deal with regional conflicts that 
affect international security. The administration's vacillation in 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti has eroded United States credibility abroad. 
In addition, defense down-sizing has reduced our ability to protect our 
own vital interests and the Clinton administration has asked for even 
deeper cuts.
  Bosnia is not at peace. This centuries-old conflict is continuing. 
The Clinton administration is prepared to put our military men and 
women in the position of implementing the peace. I am not.
  President Clinton has failed to demonstrate why United States troops 
should be sent to Bosnia and he should seek congressional approval 
before endangering the lives of our men and women in uniform by sending 
them to the Balkans.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. DeLay], the distinguished Republican whip.
  Mr. DeLAY. I thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefly] for 
bringing this resolution to the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, no matter how nicely we try to tell him, President 
Clinton still has not gotten the message that the American people have 
strong reservations about sending our young men and women into an 
extremely dangerous situation in Bosnia when our national interests are 
not directly threatened.
  I would like to just read a quote from Philip Merrill, former 
Assistant Secretary-General of NATO, which appeared this week in the 
Wall Street Journal:

       Our future policy seems to be to simultaneously threaten 
     Serbs from the air, act as peacekeepers on the ground, train 
     the Croation army, arm the Bosnian military, conduct peace 
     negotiations, and indict Bosnian war criminals. Any one of 
     these policies is defensible; taken together, they're 
     incoherent. As flare-ups occur, these inherently conflicting 
     policies will leave us powerless to act effectively.

  This is not a situation into which I could justify sending our young 
Americans. If a peace agreement is reached, and I truly hope that one 
is, the United States has the responsibility to help implement it, but 
not with ground troops.
  It is neither in the President's nor the country's best interests to 
forge ahead with a plan to send United States troops to Bosnia without 
the full support of the American people through their representatives. 
H.R. 2606 sends a clear message to the President that he has not 
sufficiently made his case and that he is going to have to work with 
Congress if he wants to follow this path.
  I support the Hefley legislation and I urge my colleagues to support 
it. Congress has a duty to exercise its power of the purse when it 
feels the President is making a grave mistake.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky].
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Speaker, whether or not U.S. forces should be put on 
the ground as peacekeepers is one of the most troubling questions 
facing this country today. I can say it is a personal problem for me. 
There are risks whatever we do. If we go in, we may place ourselves in 
the line of fire by those who choose not to abide by a peace agreement.
  I have been returned to this House 7 times, almost 14 years now. One 
of the reasons that I consider I have been returned is that I try to do 
what most of 

[[Page H13226]]
my people that I represent want. I can say in all honesty, they do not 
want the troops to go into Bosnia. But there are times that I think 
that we have to rise above what our constituents read and hear, not 
trying to replace what they want, but I think we have to rise above 
that. That is why I am opposed to this.
  This is a precarious situation. There is no easy answer, there is no 
certain outcome, and I hope the peace talks in Dayton make some of the 
questions easier to answer.
  But the bottom line is that U.S. credibility, I believe, is on the 
line. Mind you, I did not say the prestige was on the line. I am not 
too concerned about prestige. But I think that our credibility is at 
risk.
  The chairman of our committee mentioned General McKenzie. I want to 
just tell Members a little bit about me questioning General McKenzie 
and two of the brightest people in the Reagan administration in the 
Pentagon who testified before our committee. They were very simple 
questions that I asked.
  I asked them, ``Are you in favor of a unilateral lifting of the 
embargo?''
  They said, ``Absolutely.'' These are the two people, the former 
Pentagon secretaries.
  I asked General McKenzie, I said, ``General McKenzie, is it true that 
the British and the French would pull out if we unilaterally lifted the 
embargo?''
  He bowed his head, and he said, ``Yes.''
  I said, ``Is it also true that the United States of America would 
have to extract the British and French with 50,000 troops under wartime 
conditions?''
  And everybody--and those in that National Security meeting know what 
I am talking about--everybody ducked their head.
  Because the truth of the matter is we are talking about not 25,000 
troops, 20,000 troops, on the ground in peacekeeping. The other 50,000 
troops if we lifted the embargo unilaterally would be at wartime risk. 
As members of the committee know, I never give up my time, and I said: 
``I yield back the rest of my time.''
  We cannot abdicate our responsibility, bury our head in the sand, and 
retreat into isolationism. That is a failed policy of the past and it 
will fail again if we try today.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Colorado 
[Mr. Hefley] for yielding me the time and for bringing this matter 
before us at this time.
  Mr. Speaker, it is most regrettable that we have come to this 
juncture on the question of whether United States armed forces should 
be deployed to Bosnia to help implement a peace agreement.
  Ideally we would not be voting on this matter before an agreement has 
been reached. Ideally we would wait until an agreement was reached, 
carefully consider that agreement, assess the proposed mission of our 
forces, the likehood that our forces will be able to successfully 
accomplish that mission, and then, after careful deliberation, we would 
vote on whether to approve or disapprove the deployment of United 
States forces to Bosnia to help implement the agreement.
  Regrettably, we are not in the ideal situation with regard to Bosnia. 
That is because the Clinton administration is apparently circumventing 
the Congress in its determination to deploy up to 20,000 of our armed 
forces to Bosnia.
  The administration has kept us in the dark about the negotiations in 
Dayton. They have been evasive about what the precise mission of the 
U.S. forces would be, particularly the degree to which our forces will 
be called on to coerce the parties into complying with the agreement.
  By refusing to talk about the degree to which the mission will be one 
of Somalia-style peace enforcement rather than Cyprus-style 
peacekeeping, they have precluded any serious consideration of the risk 
that this mission will turn out like the earlier United States 
operations in Somalia and Lebanon, where the United States became not a 
peacekeeper, but rather just another party to the conflict.
  Most importantly, the administration has declined repeated 
invitations to commit that the Congress will have a reasonable period 
of time to consider whether to approve or disapprove the deployment 
before any United States forces are sent to Bosnia. They have, of 
course, hinted that Congress will have plenty of time to act. They have 
told us not to worry; the check is in the mail.
  But, every assurance we have been given has been carefully hedged. 
Most recently, in the President's November 13 letter to the Speaker, 
the President told us there would be a timely opportunity for Congress 
to consider and act, but then he went on to say in the next sentence 
that: ``However, there is a requirement for some early prepositioning 
of a small amount of communications and other support personnel.''
  We have tried to find out what that means. We have been told it means 
that as many as 4,000 NATO personnel may be deployed into Bosnia 
starting about 72 hours after an agreement is initialed in Dayton, up 
to half of whom may be Americans.
  What it means, in other words, is that almost before the ink is dry 
in Dayton, thousands of American soldiers may be on their way to 
Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, I include our exchange of letters with the President on 
this issue in the Record at this point:

                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, October 26, 1995.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We wish to reaffirm our conviction that 
     it would be a grave mistake to introduce U.S. Armed Forces 
     into Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement without the support 
     of Congress and the American people. For this reason, we 
     applaud the commitment set forth in your October 19th letter 
     to Senator Byrd to ``welcome, encourage and, at the 
     appropriate time, request an expression of support by 
     Congress promptly after a peace agreement is reached.''
       Last week's congressional testimony by Secretary of State 
     Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili was a useful step in the dialogue 
     that must take place between the Administration and Congress 
     over this issue. At this time, however, we continue to have 
     serious reservations about the introduction of U.S. Armed 
     Forces into Bosnia.
       In order for Congress to properly consider and act upon 
     this issue, we will require considerably more information 
     about the proposed deployment than has been made available to 
     us to date. Further, we need some clarification of the 
     sequence of steps leading up to the possible deployment of 
     U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia.
       Accordingly, we are submitting to you the questions set 
     forth below. These questions are submitted in the spirit of 
     your October 19th letter and are designed to foster 
     cooperation between our two branches in this important 
     matter. We hope that the following questions will receive the 
     immediate attention of your Administration and a prompt and 
     complete response:
       1. The Sequence: What steps must occur between the time a 
     peace agreement is reached and the time that U.S. Armed 
     Forces are first introduced into Bosnia? How much time is 
     each of these steps likely to require? At what stage in this 
     process do you intend to submit your request to Congress, and 
     how much time will this likely afford Congress to act on your 
     request prior to the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into 
     Bosnia?
       2. U.N. Authorization: Do you intend to obtain a new 
     resolution from the United Nations Security Council before 
     deploying U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia? If so, will your 
     request to Congress be submitted before, simultaneous with, 
     or after you go to the Security Council to obtain its 
     approval? If such a Security Council resolution is vetoed, 
     would you consider proceeding without such a resolution? How 
     would the timeline for proposed congressional action be 
     affected if the Security Council refused to authorize the 
     operation?
       3. U.S. Commitment: The Administration has argued 
     repeatedly that the credibility of the United States and the 
     solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will 
     suffer if Congress does not back up your commitment to deploy 
     up to 25,000 U.S. troops into Bosnia to help enforce a peace 
     agreement. Precisely when did you make this commitment, to 
     whom did you make it, and what conditions, if any, were 
     attached to it?
       4. Consultation With Congress: Was there any consultation 
     with Congress about this commitment before it was made? If 
     there was such prior consultation, could you please provide 
     the dates on which those consultations took place and the 
     names of the Members who were consulted.
       5. Mission of U.S. Forces: In making this commitment, did 
     you specify the type of mission the U.S. Armed Forces would 
     be prepared to carry out? In particular, was the commitment 
     limited to carrying out traditional peacekeeping operations--
     essentially 

[[Page H13227]]
     acting as a neutral observer of the parties' compliance with the peace 
     agreement--or did it extend to using armed force to coerce 
     the parties into compliance with the agreement?
       6. National Security Interests: What are the vital U.S. 
     national security interests that require sending American 
     ground forces to support a peace enforcement operation? What 
     are the political and security objectives and military tasks 
     to be accomplished in Bosnia? What is the measure of success 
     for the operation? Why is the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces 
     limited to one-year?
       7. European Capabilities: In recent testimony before 
     congressional committees, General Shalikashvili states that 
     ``strictly from a military point of view, [European] NATO 
     forces are capable of carrying out this mission.'' If 
     European forces have the capability to conduct this mission 
     alone, why must U.S. ground forces be involved?
       8. Arms Control: With regard to the Administration's plan 
     to create a military balance in Bosnia through arms control, 
     now and when will an arms control regime for Bosnia be 
     established? Who will responsible for ensuring compliance 
     with it? Is it possible that U.S. Armed Forces deployed to 
     Bosnia will be asked to disarm Bosnian Serb or other forces 
     in accordance with such an arms control regime?
       9. Arming Bosnia: With regard to the Administrations's 
     alternative plan to create a military balance in Bosnia by 
     equipping and training Bosnian Federation military forces, is 
     implementation of that plan conditioned on failure of efforts 
     to create a military balance through arms control? If so, who 
     will judge whether arms control has failed, and at that point 
     will that judgment be made?
       10. Lifting Arms Embargo: Will the U.N. arms embargo have 
     to be lifted before equipment and training can be provided to 
     the Bosnian Federation forces? Have Russia, France, and 
     Britain agreed in principle to lift the arms embargo for this 
     purpose? Will any lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia 
     necessarily require that the arms embargo on Serbia also be 
     lifted? If so, what will prevent the Russians and others from 
     arming the Serbs while we arm the Bosnians?
       11. Maintaining Neutrality: What role will the 
     Implementation Force, U.S. Armed Forces, or U.S. contractors, 
     have in providing military equipment and training to the 
     Bosnian Federation Forces? How does the United States remain 
     a ``neutral peacekeeper'' if it is simultaneously providing, 
     either directly or indirectly, military equipment and 
     training to one of the parties to the conflict?
       12. Coercing Compliance: What happens if it becomes 
     apparent after U.S. Armed Forces are deployed in Bosnia that 
     one or more of the parties to the conflict is not committed 
     to peace? Would you withdraw our forces at that point, or 
     would you seek to coerce the misbehaving party or parties 
     into compliance with the agreement?
       13. Survival of Muslim-Croat Federation: Is the Muslim-
     Croat Federation likely to survive a peace? In particular, 
     are Croatia and Serbia committed to survival of the 
     Federation, or are they just waiting to partition the 
     country?
       14. Role of Russian Troops: What role will Russian troops 
     play in the Implementation Force and in the peace process? 
     Will the United States be asked to underwrite directly or 
     indirectly any portion of the cost of Russian participation? 
     Under what command and control arrangements will Russian 
     forces serve?
       15. Costs: What are the estimated incremental costs for 
     this operation and what plan are those estimates based upon? 
     Are these costs based on the deployment of 20,000-25,000 
     forces for one full year, or do they assume a phased drawdown 
     during that period? Beyond the deployment of U.S. ground 
     forces, what are the cost estimates for total U.S. activities 
     in Bosnia, including costs for air combat units, naval 
     carrier groups, support staff, etc. What are the cost 
     estimates for NATO for this operation, and what percentage of 
     those costs will be billed to the United States? Are these 
     costs in addition to incremental costs identified above?
       16. Supplemental Appropriation: How does the Administration 
     plan to pay for this operation? If a supplemental 
     appropriation will be requested, when will that occur?
       17. Effect on U.S. Readiness: Even though the U.S. troop 
     contingent alone will be insufficient to police the extent of 
     the planned American area of operations in Bosnia, this 
     mission, in conjunction with the ongoing border monitoring 
     mission in Macedonia, will effectively tie up most of U.S. 
     Army Europe. What will be the effects of the overall U.S. 
     activities in and around Bosnia on U.S. readiness in Europe 
     and worldwide? What effects will the deployment have on the 
     Defense Department's ability to execute its strategy for 
     responding to two major regional contingencies?
       18. Command and Control: What are the current command and 
     control arrangements for this mission? What assurances can 
     you give us that there will be no ``dual key'' arrangements? 
     Please explain the military and political chains of command. 
     What are the rules of engagement for U.S. forces?
       19. Return of Refugees: What is the long term viability of 
     a peace settlement if the displaced persons in Bosnia--who 
     constitute half of the country's population--are unable to 
     return to their homes? Will U.S. Armed Forces have any role 
     in ensuring the right of return is respected for those who 
     wish to exercise it? If so, how will our Forces perform this 
     function?
       20. Casualty Estimates: What is the estimate of U.S. 
     casualties over the one year period of deployment in Bosnia?
       21. Agreements With U.N.: Will you make available to us all 
     documents and understandings between those residual U.N. 
     peacekeeping forces and the Implementation Force, including 
     any intelligence-sharing arrangements, Status of Forces 
     Agreements, and understanding or commitments involving the 
     use of U.S. troops to protect any residual U.N. forces or 
     observers?
       22. Reconstruction of Bosnia: We understand that at the 
     upcoming London Conference the United States will make a 
     substantial financial commitment for the relief and 
     reconstruction of Bosnia. What is the size of that 
     commitment, how will it be paid for, and what are the 
     implications for FY 1996 program levels? What programs will 
     suffer reductions to fund this effort?
       Thank you for your consideration of these questions, and we 
     look forward to your prompt response.
       With best wishes,
           Sincerely,
         Newt Gingrich; Tom DeLay; Chris Cox; Bob Livingston; Dick 
           Armey; John Boehner; Bill Paxon; John R. Kasich; ------ 
           ------; Barbara F. Vucanovich; Susan Molinari; Ben 
           Gilman; Bob Walker; Bill Archer; J. Dennis Hastert; 
           Floyd Spence.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                    Washington, November 13, 1995.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: In your letter of October 26, you and 
     your colleagues posed a number of questions concerning 
     current and future U.S. activities surrounding the Bosnian 
     peace process. I welcome this opportunity to deepen the 
     dialogue between the Congress and the Administration over the 
     peace process and the U.S. role in it.
       Your questions fell into several broad categories and for 
     clarity of presentation, my responses are arranged to address 
     each of those categories. I am providing the most current, 
     definitive information available. As you know, however, 
     negotiations in Dayton have been underway for less than two 
     weeks. Many of the issues you raise are still under 
     discussion by the parties themselves. The outcome of those 
     discussions will significantly affect some of the questions 
     you have posed. As I am sure you will understand, it is 
     impossible to provide detailed information about aspects of a 
     settlement that does not yet exist.
       In addition, since some of the questions you raise 
     concerning U.S. participation in implementing a Bosnian 
     settlement depend on the terms of the agreement itself, you 
     will understand that I must reserve my decisions until the 
     actual details of the agreement are clear. There must first 
     be an agreement among the parties to which they are seriously 
     committed. I look forward to continued, close consultations 
     with you and your colleagues as the peace process moves 
     forward.


                             u.s. interests

       This Administration, and that of previous Democratic and 
     Republican Presidents, have been firmly committed to the 
     principle that the security and stability of Europe is of 
     fundamental interest to the United States. The conflict in 
     Bosnia is the most dangerous threat to European security 
     since World War II. If the negotiations fail and the war 
     resumes, as it in all probability would, there is a very real 
     risk that it could spread beyond Bosnia, and involve Europe's 
     new democracies as well as our NATO allies. Twice this 
     century, we paid a heavy price for turning our backs to 
     conflict in Europe.
       If the negotiations now taking place under U.S. leadership 
     in Dayton are successful, we will have a real opportunity not 
     only to end the dreadful humanitarian suffering and 
     outrageous atrocities that we have seen in Bosnia, but also 
     to advance our goal of an undivided, peaceful and democratic 
     Europe--with benefits for our own security and prosperity. 
     Such a result is clearly in our nation's interest.
       This result, however, can only be achieved with U.S. 
     leadership. The events of the past several months illustrate 
     the importance of that leadership. Following the assaults on 
     Srebrenica and Zepa by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States 
     led the international community to take serious and effective 
     steps to protect the remaining UN-mandated safe areas. We 
     secured an agreement from our NATO allies to meet further 
     assaults on the safe areas with a decisive military response. 
     American pilots participated in the NATO bombing campaign 
     following the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace, 
     demonstrating our resolve and helping to convince the parties 
     to turn from the path of war to the path of negotiations and 
     peace.
       Finally, U.S. diplomatic leadership has seized the 
     opportunity for peace that these developments created. In 
     August, I directed my National Security Advisor, Anthony 
     Lake, to present a new U.S. initiative to our Allies and the 
     Russians. Since then, our negotiating team, directed by 
     Secretary Christopher and led by Richard Holbrooke, has 
     conducted tireless shuttle diplomacy throughout the region 
     and Europe as a whole. Their remarkable progress over the 
     past three months has resulted in a cease-fire and agreement 
     on the basic principles of 

[[Page H13228]]
     a settlement, laying the groundwork for the current negotiations in 
     Dayton.
       U.S. leadership has brought the parties within reach of a 
     peaceful resolution of the conflict for the first time in 
     years of terrible human tragedy. We must not abandon this 
     process now. The parties, in particular the Bosnians, have 
     made clear to us that U.S. leadership has created this 
     opportunity for peace after years of bloodshed, and that NATO 
     and U.S. participation is essential if they are to take 
     decisive steps toward a peaceful future. In short, if our 
     commitment to helping implement a peace is broken, there will 
     be no peace in Bosnia. I would particularly emphasize the 
     importance of U.S. involvement with regard to NATO. For 
     almost 50 years, the Alliance has been the anchor of 
     America's and Europe's common security. If we do not do our 
     part in a NATO mission, we would weaken the Alliance and 
     jeopardize American leadership in Europe.


                           sequencing/timing

       If an agreement is reached at the Dayton talks, a number of 
     steps must be taken prior to the deployment of troops. While 
     the precise details of such sequencing depend on the terms of 
     the agreement, let me suggest the general outline.
       When and if all substantive issues are resolved among the 
     parties, they would initial the documents that would comprise 
     the comprehensive peace agreement. Following the initialing 
     of the accord, NATO must promptly complete its operational 
     planning for an Implementation Force (IFOR) based upon the 
     terms of the settlement. I would review the agreement and the 
     final NATO plan and determine whether U.S. participation in 
     the IFOR is warranted. There would be an international 
     conference to discuss aspects of civilian implementation, a 
     final peace conference of all the parties and, ultimately, a 
     signing of the agreement by the parties. During this period, 
     the North Atlantic Council also must approve the final 
     operational plan for the IFOR.
       I will submit a request for a Congressional expression of 
     support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation 
     Force in Bosnia promptly if and when the parties have 
     initialed an agreement that I consider to be a genuine 
     agreement and after I have reviewed the final NATO 
     operational plan.
       While expeditious IFOR deployment is desirable, after 
     initialing of an agreement, there will be a timely 
     opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon my request 
     for support before American forces are deployed in Bosnia. 
     However, there is a requirement for some early prepositioning 
     of a small amount of communications and other support 
     personnel.
       As I have said previously, I believe Congressional support 
     for U.S. participation is important and desirable, although 
     as has been the case with prior Presidents, I must reserve my 
     constitutional prerogatives in this area.
       Once a final decision is reached and the peace agreement 
     has been signed and has entered into force, IFOR would deploy 
     rapidly to minimize the potential for renewed conflict. The 
     final peace agreement would contain the parties' request and 
     authority for IFOR deployment, thus IFOR's presence would be 
     consensual. The UN Security Council may also approve a 
     resolution endorsing the deployment.
       Without an agreement in hand, it is impossible to set an 
     exact timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but the 
     IFOR operation should have a finite duration. Based on 
     current planning by my military advisors, we believe that 
     approximately 12 months would be adequate to accomplish the 
     needed IFOR tasks and allow the peace to become self-
     sustaining, although we cannot make that final judgment until 
     the terms of the agreement are defined.


                    IFOR Mission/Command and Control

       Once deployed, IFOR would monitor and enforce compliance 
     with the military aspects of the settlement in an evenhanded 
     manner. The precise tasks depend on the terms of the 
     agreement but would include maintaining the cease-fire and 
     separation of forces. IFOR would be an active, robust force 
     capable not only of implementing a peace agreement but also 
     of defending itself vigorously under all circumstances.
       Although the parties would have the primary responsibility 
     for implementing the agreement, the parties have made clear 
     that a strong international military presence would be needed 
     to give them mutual confidence that commitments would be met 
     and to provide them with a breathing space to begin 
     rebuilding their country. NATO is the only force that offers 
     the strength, effectiveness and credibility to provide the 
     needed deterrent to renewed conflict. The United States, as 
     the heart of NATO, must be an integral part of that 
     enterprise. Though no details can be finalized prior to a 
     settlement, we envisage that the United States would 
     contribute approximately 20,000 ground troops in Bosnia to 
     the force, with our Allies and non-NATO countries 
     contributing approximately 40,000 more. Additional personnel 
     stationed outside Bosnia would provide support for IFOR.
       IFOR would not be a UN peacekeeping force. It would be a 
     NATO-led peace implementation force, operating under clear 
     and unified command and control, with robust rules of 
     engagement. All political guidance would come from the North 
     Atlantic Council to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 
     U.S. General George Joulwan. General Joulwan would, in turn, 
     provide overall direction to the IFOR commander, Admiral 
     Leighton Smith, the Commander of NATO's Southern Forces. NATO 
     has learned the lesson of the problems associated with the 
     ``dual key'' arrangement and there would be no return to that 
     approach. This is an essential precondition for U.S. 
     participation.
       We expect that non-NATO countries, including Russia, would 
     help implement the agreement. Secretary Perry and Russian 
     Defense Minister Grachev agreed on November 8 to a military 
     framework that would allow for the participation of a brigade 
     of Russian troops in the Bosnia implementation force. They 
     agreed on common principles for Russian participation. Russia 
     would retain national command of its forces, as the United 
     States would retain over U.S. forces. Operational control of 
     the Russian contingent would come from General Joulwan, 
     transmitted to them through a Russian deputy, and the Russian 
     brigade would be under the tactical control of a U.S. 
     division commander. While this arrangement would allow Russia 
     to assert that their forces are not under NATO command, 
     Russian forces would receive their missions and orders from 
     U.S. officers who would report through the NATO chain of 
     command, thus preserving the principle of unity of 
     command.
       The details for liaison arrangements with non-NATO nations 
     have yet to be finalized. Let me make clear, however, that in 
     no case would non-NATO nations or organizations have a veto 
     over NAC instructions or authority over U.S. troops.
       IFOR commanders would operate under operating procedures 
     and rules of engagement that allow them great flexibility in 
     determining the proper response to a violation of the 
     agreement or a threat to IFOR. This would help ensure that 
     violations are dealt with effectively and further violations 
     deterred.
       Violations of the military aspects of the settlement would 
     be met with swift, decisive force if that is necessary. I 
     would not ask American troops to implement a plan that cannot 
     be enforced. In the event of a significant breakdown in 
     compliance, the NAC would assess the situation in 
     consultation with the NATO military authorities and authorize 
     any necessary changes in operating procedures and the rules 
     of engagement. Allies agree that if there were a total 
     breakdown in compliance, IFOR would be withdrawn.
       It is not possible to make meaningful casualty predictions, 
     since casualty models for peace operations do not exist. Let 
     me emphasize that our troops will not be deployed unless and 
     until there is a genuine peace agreement. The parties must 
     show that they are serious about peace. Given the size of the 
     IFOR and its rules of engagement, as well as the high quality 
     of U.S. and NATO troops, training, and equipment, we would 
     have created conditions that would offer the minimum possible 
     risks to our soldiers.
       The signing of a peace agreement and the deployment of IFOR 
     would mean the end of UNPROFOR's mandate. Some elements of 
     UNPROFOR immediately would become part of IFOR under NATO 
     command. The rest of the troops making up UNPROFOR would be 
     withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina under the command and 
     control of the IFOR commander.


                          Effects on Readiness

       U.S. participation in the IFOR would not seriously reduce 
     the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win a regional 
     conflict elsewhere. Combat forces most needed in the opening 
     phase of a regional conflict would still be available to 
     deploy on short notice. There would, of course, be some 
     degradation in the preparedness of units deployed in Bosnia 
     to engage in combat missions elsewhere. Units engaged in 
     contingency operations sometimes lose the opportunity to 
     conduct a full range of training.
       I would note, however, that the need to withdraw combat 
     forces from peace operations and redeploy them rapidly is 
     likely to be required only in the event of two nearly 
     simultaneous major regional conflicts. In such cases, we 
     envision that most of the forces from the peace operation 
     would be redeployed to fight and win during the later phases 
     of the second major conflict. This being the case, we 
     anticipate that time would be available to provide units with 
     retraining, restocking, and other ``readiness upgrades'' 
     prior to being redeployed and committed to operations in the 
     second major conflict. Readiness degradation to critical 
     support forces can be prevented by implementing a planned 
     limited call-up of the reserve forces.
       Finally, timely reimbursement in the form of supplemental 
     appropriations is the surest way to avoid any adverse impact 
     on service operations and maintenance for ongoing operation.


                       Arms Control/Stabilization

       The objective of our participation in implementing a peace 
     agreement is the creation of a lasting peace in the former 
     Yugoslavia. To that end, we are pressing for the inclusion of 
     arms control and confidence-building measures in the final 
     settlement. Initial steps, beyond a separation of forces, 
     could include sharing of military information between the 
     parties, restrictions on exercises and deployment of heavy 
     weapons, and notifications of military activities. We will 
     also press for a commitment by the parties to a regime 
     providing for a ``build-down'' of forces. OSCE has already 
     begun planning and may eventually take the lead in trying to 
     forge a lasting arms control regime in Bosnia.
     
[[Page H13229]]

       One important factor in producing a stable environment will 
     be a balance of forces between the parties. We are hopeful 
     that arms control and the other confidence-building measures 
     cited above would help bring this about. To the extent arms 
     control measures are not sufficient to provide stability 
     after a peace settlement, we are prepared to play a role in 
     an international effort, separate from IFOR, to help equip 
     and train the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation to 
     ensure that they have an effective self-defense capability. 
     To this end, we intend to move for a lifting of the UN arms 
     embargo after a settlement is reached, allowing the 
     Federation to arm itself consistent with legitimate 
     requirements of self-defense.


                             the federation

       A strong and effectively functioning Bosnian Federation is 
     an essential prerequisite to a durable peace in Bosnia. It 
     has been a central U.S. objective since last year's 
     Washington accords that ended the fighting between Bosnia's 
     Muslims and Croats and established the Federation. 
     Strengthening the Federation has been one of my highest 
     priorities in every meeting I have had with Bosnian and 
     Croatian leaders.
       On November 10 in Dayton, Bosnian President Izetbegovic and 
     Federation President Zubak signed an important agreement that 
     brings the Federation and its institutions to life. The 
     Dayton agreement, witnessed by Croatian President Tudjman and 
     Secretary of State Christopher, provides for the political, 
     economic and social integration of the Federation. It also 
     defines the division of responsibilities between the 
     Federation and the central government of the Republic of 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina. By strengthening the Federation, the 
     agreement should give additional impetus to negotiations with 
     the Serbs on the constitutional arrangements for Bosnia as a 
     whole.
       As you know, the parties have already agreed, in the basic 
     principles adopted in Geneva, to a single Bosnia-Herzegovina 
     within its current borders, and to rule out any arrangements 
     that are inconsistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and 
     territorial integrity. As I have stressed in the past, the 
     United States will not support any settlement that represents 
     a partition of Bosnia. A major goal in the current 
     negotiations is to assist the parties in reaching agreement 
     on amendments to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
     provide for effective central governing structures for the 
     Bosnian state while defining the scope of autonomy to be 
     provided to the two constituent entities. We expect the 
     agreement would also contain provisions for elections 
     throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the OSCE.


            Civilian/Humanitarian Issues and Reconstruction

       The conflict in Bosnia has taken a huge toll on the fabric 
     of Bosnian life. The reprehensible practice of ethnic 
     cleansing and the violence of war have uprooted millions of 
     people from their homes. Atrocities unknown in Europe since 
     the Second World War have occurred. The production and 
     delivery of food and everyday necessities have been 
     disrupted. Extraordinary damage has been done to economic 
     enterprise and infrastructure.
       We expect that as part of a settlement there would be a 
     coordinated international effort to address these problems. 
     These activities would not be part of the IFOR mission but 
     would be undertaken by the entire international community 
     under civilian coordination. We would not allow ``mission 
     creep'' that could involve IFOR in such a nation-building 
     role. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees would coordinate 
     the return of refugees and displaced persons. The 
     International Red Cross would deal with prisoners and missing 
     persons. International aid agencies would help the people of 
     Bosnia rebuild the immediate needs of survival. And an 
     international police task force would work to monitor and 
     retrain civilian police.
       Separate from, but complementary to, the immediate 
     humanitarian efforts would be an international reconstruction 
     effort to repair the devastation brought about by years of 
     war. The European Union has indicated a readiness to take the 
     lead in these efforts in tandem with the international 
     financial institutions. The nature and scope of what would 
     need to be done in Bosnia, in terms of reconstruction and 
     relief, is still under review, both within the Administration 
     and with our allies. We do not yet have a complete analysis 
     of Bosnian needs and have not made a commitment on the size 
     of U.S. participation. For planning purposes, we are working 
     with an estimated U.S. contribution of $500-600 million over 
     a period of several years. We will be consulting with 
     Congress on this issue in the coming weeks.
       The British have proposed a conference in London to discuss 
     and coordinate all aspects of peace implementation, including 
     regional reconstruction. As the negotiations progress, we 
     will work closely with the British to make the best use of 
     their proposed conference, and, of course, consult closely 
     with Congress on these issues.


                                 Costs

       Obviously, the effort that I have described would involve 
     costs, both for U.S. participation in IFOR and our 
     contribution to reconstruction efforts.
       The Administration's ability at this time to estimate the 
     actual costs of a NATO deployment to Bosnia in support of a 
     negotiated settlement is limited. This is because such an 
     estimate is heavily dependent on the terms and conditions 
     under which the force will be introduced. For example, 
     factors such as force composition, scope and type of mission, 
     operating environment, force sustainment and duration of 
     assignment, among others, would all contribute to determining 
     the ultimate costs that participants will have to pay. 
     Additionally, the United States would seek equity and balance 
     with European and other participants in any funding 
     arrangement or material support we provide to such an 
     operation. Our best estimate at this time is that it would 
     cost approximately $1.5 billion to deploy U.S. forces for one 
     year. Under any deployment plan, the Administration would 
     share information with Congress on the terms, developments 
     and support requirements affecting our commitment.
       We will work closely with the Congress on funding U.S. 
     participation in IFOR. No decision has been taken on seeking 
     a supplemental appropriation to meet funding requirements 
     associated with a Bosnian peace agreement. Until 
     appropriations have been finalized for FY 1996, we will not 
     be in a position to determine how best to fund this 
     operation.
       In terms of reconstruction and relief funding, we are 
     studying a number of funding possibilities. For FY 1996, only 
     a fraction of projected Bosnian reconstruction costs have 
     been budgeted, and sources for reprogramming are likely to be 
     severely limited.
       As planning for economic reconstruction advances, a variety 
     of funding options should be kept on the table, particularly 
     given the large cuts already made to international affairs 
     funding.


                               conclusion

       Unquestionably, there are costs and risks to all involved 
     in making peace. But the costs and risks of failing to make 
     peace are far greater. The human costs of continued war in 
     Bosnia would be another cruel winter of starvation and 
     suffering, followed by a spring of renewed, bloody conflict. 
     The economic costs of continued war would be additional 
     millions of dollars in humanitarian aid, in funds for ongoing 
     sanctions and No-Fly Zone enforcement, and in the efforts of 
     our Allies to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees 
     throughout Europe. The security costs would involve the risk 
     of wider and even more dangerous conflict, as well as serious 
     damage to the credibility and effectiveness of NATO and U.S. 
     leadership if the war resumes. Moreover, if the war resumes, 
     NATO and the U.S. could be called upon to undertake a 
     potentially dangerous mission involving the withdrawal of 
     UNPROFOR under hostile circumstances.
       Peace is the less risky alternative. But there will be no 
     peace without America's engagement. If we turn our backs on 
     this responsibility, the damage to America's ability to lead, 
     not just in NATO but in pursuit around the world of our 
     interests in peace and prosperity, would be profound. This 
     truly is a decisive moment.
       The meetings in Dayton offer the people of Bosnia and 
     Europe a real opportunity for peace. The United States must 
     stand by our principles and stand up for our interests. We 
     must be leaders for peace. I hope you and your colleagues in 
     the Congress will work with us in this effort.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is simply unacceptable that thousands of 
Americans may be sent to Bosnia without proper consideration by the 
Congress. Recent history reminds us that deployments of U.S. Armed 
Forces into hostile situations are untenable without the strong support 
of Congress and the American people. This resolution does not rule out 
the deployment of United States forces to Bosnia, but it does make 
certain that the President come to the Congress first.
  The Clinton administration has avoided doing the groundwork of trying 
to win the support of our Nation and the Congress with regard to our 
involvement in Bosnia. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to pass 
this resolution as a signal of our strong concern over the direction of 
administration policy and our determination to assert the prerogatives 
of the Congress in this matter.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior].
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, after 4 long years of war in Bosnia, we have 
seen:
  Over 250,000 people killed.
  Over 16,000 children slaughtered.
  Tens of thousands of women raped.
  Tens of thousands of innocent people herded into camps.
  And nearly three million people left homeless.
  We have seen cease fires come and go.
  And through it all, there has been very little reason to hope.
  But finally, we see the possibility to end the bloodshed.
  Finally, we see peace talks that mean something.
  
[[Page H13230]]

  Finally, we have a chance to resolve this horrible conflict.
  And we should do nothing to interfere with that.
  But this resolution today drops an 800-pound weight on a peace 
process that is balancing like a house of cards.
  If we pass this resolution today, it won't advance the peace talks in 
Ohio. It will undermine and undercut them.
  Mr. Speaker, it took a long time to get this peace table. There are a 
lot of delicate issues that need to be worked through. We should not 
tie the hands of our negotiators at this crucial time. We should let 
them do their jobs.
  It's not hard to understand the concern that underlies this bill. The 
decision to commit troops is the most difficult decision any of us will 
have to make. And none of us take it lightly.
  But that is not the issue today.
  The Washington Times is right: this is the wrong move at the wrong 
time.
  The President has already said: Before troops are deployed, Congress 
will have a debate and Congress will have an up or down vote.
  There is a time and place when Congress should and will be voting on 
this issue. But now is not that time.
  Congress has enough to worry about right now with the budget 
negotiations. This is not the time to be rushing head-first into the 
very delicate negotiations on Bosnia.
  I would hate to think that someday, historians will look back on this 
day and wonder why the House of Representatives intentionally disrupted 
the peace process before an agreement was reached. We can avoid that 
fate here today.
  I urge my colleagues: Oppose this resolution. Let our negotiators do 
their jobs. And give the peace process a chance to work.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen].
  (Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.
  I rise today in strong support of this bill which only reaffirms the 
Congress' constitutional right to control the way we spend the 
country's money and to participate in any decision to send large scale 
U.S. forces in harms way.
  For me, and I think for most Americans, there are a few simple rules 
for peacekeeping.
  First, if there is a real peace you don't need peacekeepers.
  And second, that when there is no real peace, sending peacekeepers, 
and especially American peacekeepers is a recipe for disaster, as we 
have seen all too recently in Somalia.
  When the two, or in this case three, sides decide it is in their own 
interests not to continue the war, peacekeepers, like the few Americans 
observing the Israeli-Egyptian peace, need only binoculars and tennis 
rackets.
  Until there is a real peace, no American should become a target. When 
there is a real peace, supported by all sides in this tragic conflict, 
then and only then, American leadership may be necessary to help 
maintain that peace.
  It is important that the Congress show that leadership now, and not 
blindly support the President's ill-conceived and arbitrary promise of 
25,000 heavy armed American troops to police an agreement that does not 
yet exist.
  This is too important for our Nation, and for the lives the brave 
young men and women who serve in uniform. The proper role for the 
United States is leader, not policeman. And the proper time for 
congressional action is before the decision is made, not after failure 
is guaranteed.
  I urge all Members to support this bill and the President to include 
the Congress and the American people in this important debate.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young].
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the many, 
many expressions of concern for the safety of our American forces 
should they be sent to Bosnia, that have been expressed by so many of 
our colleagues here today.
  None of us can forget, will ever forget what happened to the American 
Marines in Beirut with more than 200 American Marines who were there as 
peacekeepers were murdered in their barracks. None of us will forget 
Somalia, where Americans went there on an honorable mission, in a 
humanitarian mission, but mission creep took us from that successful 
humanitarian mission to the disaster that became so-called peacekeeping 
when 18 American soldiers were gunned down in the streets of Mogadishu 
and their bodies dragged through the streets. They were there as 
peacekeepers.
  The point that I would like to make, though, Mr. Speaker, is that on 
those missions and especially in the Somalia mission, I recall 
distinctly the fight that we had here in the House to get those who 
supported the mission creep to a peacekeeping mission refused to stand 
and vote for the appropriation to pay for it.
  In the case of Bosnia, we have been told, we started out that the 
cost was going to be about a billion dollars. Then it went up to $1.2 
billion, then up to $1.5 billion, now up to $2 billion. Now we are 
talking possibly about as much as $3 billion.
  Again the point, where is the money coming from? The President's 
spokesman today at the White House, when asked about the defense 
appropriations bill that this House and Senate passed yesterday, 
indicated that the President would find it difficult to sign because 
maybe it included too much money. But where else would the President 
get the $2 billion to $3 billion to finance the deployment to Bosnia? 
He had better think twice about vetoing this defense appropriations 
bill because if it does not get signed, if it comes back here and 
should this resolution not pass today, I can almost assure you that the 
House will force us to put this same kind of binding language in the 
next defense appropriations bill.
  I have an idea that the President and the administration should take 
the advice of this Congress, the advice of Secretary Perry and General 
Shalikashvili, and they should sign a good defense appropriations bill 
that will be sent to them shortly.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose the Hefley bill, and not because I support the 
deployment of American troops in Bosnia. I voted for Buyer-McHale and, 
frankly, I remain skeptical.
  But if checks and balances are part of our Constitution, so is 
comity, and the circumstances here demand it. This is not the time to 
bind the President's hands; not the time to doom the peace in Bosnia 
before we even know the terms of the peace agreement. During most of 
the years I have served here in the House, my party has been in the 
majority. And though we were often tempted, we never preempted 
President Bush or President Reagan in the way this bill would.
  President Bush sent 500,000 troops to the Persian Gulf, and long 
before most of us decided that we would give him the power to take 
those troops to war, we cut him the slack he needed to stand up to 
Saddam Hussein, and to bring the Security Council and rest of the world 
around to our position. President Clinton deserves no less.
  The Constitution gives Congress the power to decide when our troops 
will be dispatched in a foreign theater and put in harm's way. But 
history has taught us that we have to be practical; and as a practical 
matter, we cannot expect the President to huddle with Congress before 
calling every play in foreign policy. We have to and can send the 
President strong signals, as we did when we passed McHale-Buyer, 315-
to-103. But this bill is more than a warning signal; it flat-out 
prohibits the President from sending any U.S. ground troops to Bosnia 
as part of any peacekeeping operation unless funds are specifically 
appropriated.
  Several problems came to my mind, just as a result of the drafting. 
For example:
  Hefley could prevent U.S. troops from being sent to pull out U.N. 
personnel, and NATO allies, should the talks falter and the fighting 
resume. You may say that this is not the intent of the language, but if 
not, why not explicitly say so?
  Hefley does not bar United States airstrikes, it is true; but it 
might stop a significant number of United States troops from being 
brought into Bosnia to search for and rescue American fliers who get 
shot down.

[[Page H13231]]

  And what happens if a peace agreement is agreed to, and embraced by 
all the parties, and a majority of Congress finds it to be a genuine 
peace, one we can implement and not one we have to impose; but then, 
the appropriation gets attached to a bitterly contentious bill--like an 
omnibus budget reconciliation act?
  After all, nothing in Hefley says that this appropriation must be 
sent to the President clean, or stand-alone, so we could see a Bosnian 
peace agreement bound up with the resolution of totally unrelated 
disputes in the Congress.
  I know that these problems may never come up. But eliminate them, and 
the biggest problem still remains, and that is timing. If this bill 
passes, at this time, it is bound to cast a pall on the peace talks.
  I have yet to be persuaded that sending American troops to Bosnia is 
a good idea or a necessary move. But I am willing to reserve judgment; 
willing to give the President and the parties the chance to produce an 
agreement that is workable and worthy of our support. In the end, I may 
cast my vote against sending United States ground troops to Bosnia--I 
reserve that right. But with the peace talks moving forward, and an 
agreement coming together, now is not the time to pass this bill.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I am not here to use my vote 
to undermine our President. I am an ardent supporter of our military, 
and I am a strong supporter of humanitarian aid to the people in 
Bosnia.
  For the past 3 years I have worked with the gentleman who is here in 
the room with us tonight, John Jordan, and a volunteer firefighter from 
Rhode Island, who went to Sarajevo to help provide emergency relief to 
the citizens of all factions, the Serbs, Croats, and Moslems. He spent 
3 years, was recognized by ABC News as their person of the week because 
of his unselfish efforts on the part of peace. The United Nations 
eventually canceled their support of him after 2\1/2\ years, and our 
State Department refused to pick it up.
  But we did provide that assistance, tons of relief, and John Jordan 
was key in that process. I am concerned like everyone else about the 
cost, but the key concern here is the troops, the boys and the girls, 
the men and the women, the sons and the daughters of America who are 
going to be sent to this region without the support of this Congress on 
the ground. I would support the use of aircraft, sealift, and air 
strikes, but we will not have that chance to vote on when the President 
comes back to us, because the decision will have already been made for 
us.
  When I had to make up my mind this morning about what to do on this 
issue, I did not seek Warren Christopher and his armchair estimates or 
the President or any of my colleagues. I went to John Jordan. John 
Jordan was shot twice directly in Sarajevo. John Jordan has had 
concussions. In fact, he has been wounded by shrapnel, had his chest 
beaten in by the butt of a rifle trying to rescue citizens in Sarajevo.
  In an AP interview, this is what John Jordan had to say, and I 
encourage every one of my colleagues on both sides to read this quote 
in its entirety. This is not someone from Washington sending our boys 
over there and our girls over there, and this is the only chance you 
are going to get to vote on this. Read what John Jordan had to say 
about the Serb commander saying to him, ``I really wish the U.S., 
instead of the French, were running the airport,'' they said to him 
many times. ``If we can just get enough of you in one place at one 
time, we can kill 200 or 300 of you. You will be out of this war 
forever, and you will not be a problem anymore. You will leave just 
like you left Beirut.''
  Mr. Speaker, that is what this is all about, and, my colleagues, you 
will not have a chance to vote on ground troops again, because the 
President will come back already committed to it.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on the Hefley amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I insert the following letter for the Record.

                                                November 17, 1995.
     Hon. Curt Weldon,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Weldon: Congress and the President each 
     have their own criteria regarding deployment of American 
     troops to Bosnia. All these criteria ignore one important 
     fact.
       The war in Bosnia is not about Bosnia. It is in fact about 
     one man, Slobodan Milosevic, turning neighbor on neighbor via 
     his control of the media long before the first shot was 
     fired.
       To those of us who have fought fire and war in Bosnia, the 
     thought of American troops sitting between victims and 
     aggressors is a living nightmare. The picture of American 
     troops deployed to ensure ``only half'' of Bosnia is stolen 
     is too ugly to contemplate. Our troops will become casualties 
     of both the aggressors and those who thought they were about 
     to be saved.
       Time and time again during my team's stay in Bosnia, we 
     were warned by Serb commanders, ``If we could just get enough 
     Americans here and kill them, America would leave like they 
     did in Beirut and Somalia.'' At that point, the Serbs believe 
     they will be able to finish off Bosnia.
       There is no peace process worth the paper it is printed on 
     if it is signed by Mr. Milosevic. Our troops should not be 
     deployed on the basis of goodwill with a mass murderer.
       Speaking for myself and those who have fought to see that 
     Bosnia was not exterminated, we would rather see no 
     deployment at all, to the choice of seeing U.S. troops 
     supervising an honorless plea-bargain with the perpetrators 
     of genocide. I urge you to do all in your power to prevent 
     this deployment from proceeding.
           Sincerely,

                                                   John Jordan

                     Chief, Global Operation Fire Rescue Services.

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. This is 
the wrong bill at the wrong time.
  You know, many of us on this side of the aisle voted to support 
President Bush in the Persian Gulf War. It was not an easy vote, but we 
did it because we think it was right. When the temptation arose amongst 
some colleagues to do this kind of thing to undermine President Bush at 
this same time, when the President was trying to build a consensus, we 
said, ``No; give the President a chance to put it together, and then 
let him come to Congress.''
  Well, President Clinton has said he will come to Congress. So I do 
not understand why we are not giving President Clinton the same 
courtesy we gave to President Bush. I do not see why we are undermining 
the President and undermining the peace talks going on now in Dayton, 
OH, with this bill.
  The same people that are talking against this now are the same ones 
that said Haiti would never work. Haiti, by all means, has been a 
success. And where were these people when Republican Presidents did not 
come to Congress and sent U.S. troops to Grenada, to Lebanon, and to 
Panama?
  You know, my friends, we cannot afford to slip into a dangerous sense 
of isolationism. The NATO alliance is a very important alliance, and 
the United States has to be the leader of that alliance. We cannot 
undermine the NATO alliance and not participate and then at the same 
time say we are going to be the leader of the free world and at the 
same time say we are going to increase our defense spending.
  One of our friends asked how are we going to pay for it. Well, let us 
kill two B-2 bombers. We will have $4 billion right there.
  Some of us have been yelling for years to lift the arms embargo. Some 
of our friends on the other side of the aisle have been critical of 
this Administration. They say the President is not decisive, the 
President has done nothing, and now that the President has finally 
gotten the peace talks going and success seems to be right there, they 
are undermining the President.

                              {time}  1800

  I cannot understand that, for the life of me. The President is saying 
that he feels this will be detrimental. Mr. Speaker, I would say to my 
colleagues, I beg you, in a few weeks we can have this debate. This is 
the wrong debate to have right now.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I have before me the vote, three votes 
actually, from January 12, 1991, a shining moment in this House, a 
dignified and yet passionate at the same time vote.
  One of the votes that is most impressive to look back on, and we need 
a lot 

[[Page H13232]]
of corporate memory around here, is the one that was called roughly the 
Durbin-Bennett vote. Charlie Bennett, the great World War II hero is 
enjoying retirement, but the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] is 
still around.
  I would like to say, the Democratic vote on that, where the gentleman 
from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli], and our pal Steve Solarz, and 248 
other people prevailed over all of the Democratic leadership and the 
one independent, for a total of 183. We won the vote, 250 to 183. But 
two votes before, after we crushed by the exact same numbers the 
Gephardt-Colin Powell vote to just use sanctions, and we would still be 
there today, Kuwaitis would still be tortured, here is the first vote 
demanding that George Bush come to the Congress of the United States 
before we crossed the line into deadly combat. Two hundred eighty 
Democrats said ``Come here, Mr. President,'' and five Democrats said 
no.
  This is a good debate, and it is not ludicrous, ridiculous or 
premature. It is right on target.
  I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Upton] for getting 
these votes for me. The gentleman has a good corporate memory.
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DORNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, actually it was 260, not 280, Democrats that 
voted for it. But the outcome was the same.
  As we go back home to our districts, people ask us, ``Why don't you 
take some action? What is going on?'' This is exactly the same vote in 
essence of what we did with the Durbin-Bennett vote on the gulf war, 
and, that is, Congress ought to have a say in what goes on. It does not 
say whether we will approve it or not, but Congress ought to have a 
say. And this vote, of which your side of the aisle voted 260 to 5, 
ought to reflect that on this resolution, which does virtually exactly 
the same thing.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, absolutely. Here is the 
chain of command supposedly the way it is worked out now in what will 
be in Bosnia. Here is the chain of command from Somalia. This got 18 
Americans killed, or 19. Three days later, Matt Rearson. Five men, 
including two Medal of Honor winners, were dragged through the streets, 
without one of the six fighting vehicles in Waco 6 months before to 
come and rescue them, without the gun ships they trained with for 3 
months.
  Please read those commandments, particularly the last one, and tell 
me if anyone can tell the parents of any man or woman killed in Bosnia 
why they went in harm's way.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield three minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings].
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend, the 
ranking member of the Committee on National Security, for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my strong opposition to H.R. 
2606.
  The only hope we have for the former Yugoslavia is the fragile peace 
talks which are currently underway in Dayton. We arranged these talks, 
we invited the participants, and we are guiding them, hopefully, toward 
a satisfactory resolution which participants say might come as early as 
this weekend. Yet we consider today legislation which, if it passes, 
will show to the parties involved that we really have no intention of 
following through on our demands for peace. We bring the parties to the 
table, squeeze an agreement out of them, and then say ``Good that you 
came to an agreement, but don't expect us to help you implement it.'' 
This is not right.
  Would we do this with other enemies who are trying to resolve their 
conflicts? Would we initiate peace talks to resolve a prolonged 
conflict and then bail out just before the matter is resolved?
  Mr. Speaker, the real issue is this: Does the U.S. Congress want the 
United States to remain the last superpower? Because if the answer is 
yes, with superpower status comes superpower responsibilities. And this 
means carrying through on the commitments we made when we accepted the 
superpower mantle. A strong, stable Europe is in our best interest. 
Europeans will buy American products during peace, not during war. And 
a strong, stable NATO is also in our best interest because it lessens 
the chance that we will ever have to act unilaterally again.
  As a superpower and a NATO member we have a vested interest in 
bringing stability to Europe. And if we fail in this responsibility the 
war will surely spread, and we will have lost our moral authority as 
well as the respect and trust of our allies around the world who depend 
on us to do the right thing.
  We made war in the Persian Gulf to protect our oil supply. President 
Clinton is asking us to make peace in Bosnia to protect people. There 
are certainly risks involved. I am worried about our soldiers, I am 
worried about landmines threaded throughout the area, and I am worried 
that it may be impossible to negotiate through the region in the dead 
of winter. But we must take risks for peace. And I do not believe that 
saving the life of a Moslem person in Bosnia is any less valuable than 
a drop of oil in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.
  This is not the right time for this resolution. President Clinton has 
said quite clearly that he would, although he does not have to, seek 
the approval of Congress before sending Americans to the region. And I 
think he should. This conflict may be resolved within a few days. Would 
it not be smarter if we were to wait to see how this conflict is 
resolved before we decide how we will respond? I think a good chess 
player would say, don't declare checkmate before focusing your chess 
piece on the king.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], the distinguished chairman of our delegation 
to the North Atlantic Assembly.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises in strong support for 
H.R. 2606, and commends the distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Hefley] for his leadership on this vitally important question of 
national security.
  Mr. Speaker, when I was trained as an infantry platoon leader, I was 
prepared to take those 40 men up any hill and accomplish any mission, 
because, first of all, it was a duty. Second, I had the conviction that 
the people in the military and civilian command structure in the 
Pentagon, the White House and Congress would make responsible 
decisions. Now, 30 years later, I am here, one of 535 people in the 
Congress and I think it is imperative that we not send ground troops to 
Bosnia--not send ground troops.
  Mr. Speaker, read the President's letter of November 13. It says, 
``After initialing of a peace agreement communications and supply 
troops will be sent almost immediately to Bosnia.'' We are talking 
about the dispatch of a minimum of 1,000 or 2,000 American troops 
immediately, and that is upon initialing. Then the President's letter 
repeatedly mentions expression of support being welcome by the 
Congress.
  Well, my colleagues that is what we are facing. Therefore, this is 
the right time to take on this issue. To do otherwise is irresponsible.
  Mr. Speaker, in the very short time available, this Member wishes to 
make three points regarding the President's announced intention to 
unilaterally deploy 20,000 American ground groups to Bosnia. First, the 
mission lacks clear achievable objectives. Second, there is no exit 
strategy worthy of the name. And, third, legislative actions to halt 
the deployment of U.S. ground forces will not, contrary to the Clinton 
administration's allegations, will not undermine U.S. leadership role 
in NATO or the world. In fact, a failed NATO mission to preserve a 
Bosnian government will damage the United States global leadership role 
and NATO.
  First, look at the question of whether the proposed mission has clear 
objectives. The Clinton administration repeatedly has stated that 
NATO's mission would be to enforce an end of the hostilities that have 
plagued Bosnia for centuries. We would be injecting our troops between 
heavily armed factions that tragically seem incapable of living in 
peace. Presumably we are to serve as neutral honest brokers to prevent 
the three sides and the paramilitary groups from killing one another. 
This Member 

[[Page H13233]]
would note that this is a peace enforcement mission, practically an 
impossible one, and not a peacekeeping mission.
  Mr. Speaker, we have been informed by the administration that 
American troops also will train Bosnian forces and try to bring about a 
parity of weaponry so that the Bosnian state might survive after the 
year of NATO occupation is over. In contrast to the peace enforcement 
mission--which presumably is designed to avoid taking sides--the arming 
and training of Bosnian Moslem or Bosnia federation forces is taking 
sides. Arming the Bosnian federation is not the act of a neutral. This 
Member can appreciate the desire to level the playing field, but one 
can hardly expect the Bosnian Serbs to quietly sit back while our 
peace-enforcers are training and arming their declared ethnic enemy.
  This Member would also say, as a former infantry officer, that it is 
almost inconceivable that rules of engagement can be crafted which will 
permit us to act as neutral peace enforcer at the same time that we are 
training and arming one specific faction. It is this type of dangerous, 
fuzzy logic and contradictory objectives that can lead to mission creep 
and, regrettably, the unnecessary loss of American lives.
  Now let me turn to the notion of a proper exit strategy. The Clinton 
administration has announced that its exit strategy is to withdraw in a 
year. Out in ``approximately 12 months'' * * * that is the sum totality 
of their exit strategy. But this commitment is not linked to strategic 
objectives. Indeed, it seems that the only criteria in this exit 
strategy is the belief that 1 year is the extreme outer limit of 
American tolerance and beyond our next presidential election. They may 
be right about that, but specifying an exit time frame is a critical 
error, and probably a very tragic one.
  Mr. Speaker, it has been suggested most importantly, by a range of 
military specialists, including some of NATO's leading planners and 
operations people, that this 1-year peace enforcement mission will at 
best provide the region with a brief, NATO-enforced respite during 
which time the Serbs and Croatians fine-tune plans for the ultimate 
dismemberment of Bosnia. Then, as soon as the United States and other 
NATO forces depart, war returns and the final vestiges of Bosnia will 
be divided up in violent warfare.
  This body should say ``no'' right now to a mission that lacks 
strategic objectives, and to one that is likely, at best, to buy only a 
bloody lull in Balkan warfare. Unfortunately, American, British, 
French, Canadian, other allied lives surely will be lost in the 
process. This Member, for one, cannot justify this inevitable and 
ultimately futile loss of life.
  Last, Mr. Speaker, this Member fails to see the clear United States 
national interest in deploying 20,000 American troops to Bosnia. 
Pointing to our role as an international leader and the critical role 
importance of preserving NATO misses the point. Does it serve our 
reputation and that of NATO to briefly restore order and then permit 
the violent dismemberment of Bosnia as soon as we depart? No, it most 
emphatically will have the opposite effect.
  Of course this Member is aware of the charge that damage will be done 
to United States prestige in the event of a congressional failure to 
support the President's unilateral, hasty, and ill-advised decision to 
deploy American land troops to Bosnia. But I will tell my colleagues 
that it is the Clinton administration, through its ill-conceived 
proposal, and not the Congress, that will ultimately do the greatest 
damage to the U.S. international reputation as leader of NATO and as a 
superpower if we cannot deter it. The American people should be under 
no illusions--if damage is being done to NATO, it is occurring at the 
other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.
  Mr. Speaker, this Member would urge support of H.R. 2606.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I hate to do this, but I have to wonder 
about the motivations of the timing of this resolution. There are some 
things we know for sure: For 2 years, at least a year and a half, the 
President has been saying he intends to deploy 20,000 to 25,000 
peacekeepers if there is a peace agreement in Bosnia. He has said in a 
letter to the Speaker that he will submit a request for a congressional 
expression of support for U.S. participation, a vote of the Congress on 
this issue, before the peace agreement is signed and before he deploys 
these forces.
  No one offered this amendment on the fiscal year 1995 defense 
appropriation. No one offered this amendment on H.R. 7, which sought in 
every other way to constrain the Commander in Chief from exercising his 
authorities in the peacekeeping operation as approved by the Security 
Council. No one put this on the fiscal year 1996 defense appropriation 
when it came through the House, or when it came back from conference.
  All of a sudden, when the peace agreement looks possible, when the 
negotiations have gone a long way, when the ceasefire has held in place 
for a while, when it looks like the most dangerous cause of expansion 
of the war; that is, the question of whether the Serb military would 
resist a Croatian invasion of Eastern Slavonia looks like it might have 
been settled, when the siege of Sarajevo has been lifted, when the 
brutal killing has been stopped, all of a sudden we get this issue, 
even though the President has said ``You will have a chance to vote on 
this before I deploy the troops.''
  It is as if you want to scuttle the peace agreement and a chance of 
the killing stopping for good because you do not want to have to deal 
with killing it after it has already happened, and I think that is 
grossly irresponsible.
  There are so many good questions about whether or not we should do 
this. I have heard the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer], the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], and the gentlemen from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], raise legitimate questions. But either do it 
when the President first announces it and do not raise these 
expectations and cause all the achievements to be scuttled, as they 
will be if you do this now, or do it when you see the full agreement 
and you can talk about exit strategies and can look at what is achieved 
in separation of forces and what the risks to our troops are, and you 
can weight the possibility that NATO will be emasculated or the war 
will spread, and balance them. We will have a chance to debate that. 
This is the time, before we got to Dayton. In the middle of Dayton is 
not the time.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
  Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman knows that this bill is going to be 
vetoed. Now is the time to try to impact the plan that is being 
prepared over there in Dayton.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, let me respond to that. 
This bill will never see the light of day. You are right. Therefore, it 
is designed, I say, to scuttle what is happening at Dayton because of 
the timing, rather than to look at the final agreement, make a decision 
at that time, weigh and answer all the good questions that are being 
raised against the plan.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker. I might just point out this was in our appropriations 
bill, and it was in a resolution. I do not know how many messages we 
have sent to the President on this.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Kansas [Mrs. 
Meyers].
  (Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the 
gentleman for yielding time.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe we must pass H.R. 2606 now. Otherwise, I am 
deeply concerned that we will wake up one morning while Congress is out 
of the city, and discover that President Clinton has started sending 
American troops to Bosnia. The President has not said he will ask us 
for authorization. He said that he would request support, but that 
there would be a requirement for early pre-positioning of support 
personnel. When he asks for that support, those personnel will already 
be there.
  There might be a case that could be made for sending Americans to 
Bosnia. It would have to involve a rock-solid peace agreement. We would 
have to know what objectives our troops would be expected to achieve 
and how they could achieve them. The President would have to convince 
us and the American people that he knew what had to be done that would 
allow our troops to leave Bosnia in a better condition than it was when 
they arrived. Until he manages to make that case, we should make sure 
that he cannot put us into a quagmire. What the 

[[Page H13234]]
President and the administration have told us so far has not made a 
convincing case with me, or with my constituents.
  The decision to place the young men and women of America's military 
in harm's way is the toughest that any Member of Congress can make. I 
have had to make that decision before, to authorize the war against 
Iraq in 1991. Before I made that decision, I received a great deal of 
information from the Bush administration as to our objective, the 
threat our troops might face, and our ability to accomplish our goals 
with a minimum of casualties. The Clinton administration, on the other 
hand, has not provided comparable information about its plans for 
Bosnia.
  The President wrote on November 13, that his military advisors 
believe that 12 months would be adequate to accomplish the needed tasks 
to make the peace self-sustaining. That one sentence has two serious 
problems. First, there has been no discussion as to what the needed 
tasks of the Implementation Force are. What would our troops have to do 
to accomplish these tasks? All that the administration says is that the 
force will keep the warring factions apart. Second, there is no such 
thing as a ``self-sustaining'' peace. Peace has to be kept by someone. 
Otherwise you get anarchy. So, the only way the IFOR would be able to 
leave would be if the various communities in Bosnia were able to keep 
the peace themselves. Does anyone here believe the Croats, Serbs, and 
Muslims will unlearn the hatred that has been incited that led them to 
commit such outrageous atrocities on each other in just 12 short 
months?
  We need candid answers on how our troops would protect themselves 
while they are standing between the groups that hate each other so 
much, and would love to kill Americans and blame it on the other side. 
The President says that our troops would operate under robust NATO 
rules of engagement. Unfortunately, this begs the question, because 
nobody has any idea what those rules of engagement might be. NATO has 
never done this sort of mission before. The only rules of engagement 
NATO ground forces have ever had to operate under in the past, was what 
to do if Warsaw Pact forces crossed or fired into the territory of a 
member of the NATO alliance. Any deployment into Bosnia will be 
significantly different from defending the territorial integrity of one 
group of sovereign countries from the armed forces of other sovereign 
countries. NATO has no experience in settling this kind of conflict.
  Finally, the administration has been patting itself on the back for 
getting the Russians to agree to a formula by which a Russian brigade 
will participate in the IFOR without being subordinate to NATO. The 
idea is that the deputy to General Joulwan will be a Russian general 
and the orders to the Russian troops will be transmitted through him. 
That Russian general will be Colonel General Leonty Shevtsov. His last 
assignment was chief-of-staff of Russian forces in Chechnya from 
December through April. That was when Russian forces were 
indiscriminately bombing and shelling Chechen towns, killing tens of 
thousands of civilians.
  Congress must vote before we send 20,000 Americans on this doomed 
mission to Bosnia. Please join me in supporting H.R. 2606.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Houghton].
  (Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I am not going to take long. All the 
arguments have been made. I will try to be brief, but let me just say 
this. I may be the only person on our side of the aisle who is speaking 
against this amendment. I do it because I feel very deeply about this 
issue.
  Mr. Speaker, I understand all the worries that were incorporated here 
about signaling the use of American troops before there is more of a 
resolution of the problems being solved, and all the other horrible 
things; about extraction of our troops and who is in charge of the 
military.
  But, Mr. Speaker, I am going to oppose this resolution; not that I 
disagree with the words. Frankly, I may even vote against the use of 
troops. I could very well do this. But If we could pick a horrible time 
to pull our hand in this particular negotiation, this would be it.
  I have talked to Cy Vance and I have talked to Brent Scowcroft and I 
have talked to Larry Eagleburger and all those people who are very wise 
on issues like this. I think they come down and say two things. ``It is 
a mess. We understand your worries. There is no question about this. It 
is not clear. But if you are going to do something do not do it now.''
  Mr. Speaker, it is a horrible time, and as a result I am going to 
oppose this particular motion.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from San Diego, CA [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues, I support the Hefley 
prohibition because of what I call the leadership issue. This may very 
well intrude on the President's constitutional prerogatives to lead our 
troops, and I have to concede that with a different administration in 
the White House I might well vote the opposite way .
  But, Mr. Speaker, I think we have to look at what happened in Somalia 
when American troops requested tanks, because they felt they were 
needed militarily. They were denied by the Clinton administration 
because of political reasons, admitted political reasons. We suffered 
because of that. When Mr. Aideed's troops butchered and dragged 
Americans through the streets in Mogadishu, we did not pursue Aideed.
  Mr. Speaker, placing ground troops in this situation is going to 
require clear, decisive and tough American leadership, and I do not 
think we have it in the White House at this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I will support the Hefley prohibition.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].
  (Mr. DeFAZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the legislation which 
would restrict deployment of United States troops to the former 
Yugoslavia pending congressional approval.
  The language establishes an important requirement: no United States 
ground forces should be employed in Bosnia to enforce a future peace 
agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment. This would 
give an important and necessary opportunity for Congress to debate 
introduction of United States troops to former Yugoslavia. Equally 
important, it articulates a clear decision by Congress to exercise its 
constitutional duty with regards to war.
  However, I strongly object to the short time allocated for its 
debate. A constitutional question as important as whether Congress 
approves sending U.S. troops into harms way should receive more than a 
few hours of consideration. This congressional debate should not be 
construed as representing an adequate consideration before sending 
United States forces to the Bosnian--or any other--conflict.
  For more than 40 years, Congress has allowed the executive to 
continuously broaden its authority to put U.S. troops into harm's way. 
Congress' exclusive constitutional authority to initiate war is 
routinely ignored by Congress and Presidents alike.
  Unfortunately, the current War Powers Resolution implicitly grants 
broad authority to the President to engage in wars of any size without 
advance congressional authorization. It requires the President to come 
to Congress only after he has put the prestige of our Nation and the 
lives of its soldiers on the line.
  I have introduced a joint resolution (H. J. Res. 95) that seeks to 
reform the War Powers Resolution. The House of Representatives to 
address the balance of Presidential and congressional authority to make 
war. Indeed, the Constitution demands the collective judgment of the 
President and Congress on the grave question of war. The time is ripe 
for a congressional debate on the need to restore the balance of powers 
between the executive and legislature as envisioned by the Framers of 
the Constitution.
  I welcome and support this legislation. However, it is my hope that 
Congress will spend more fully debate this issue and adopt a more 
effective War Powers Resolution.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes and 30 seconds to the 
distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer].
  (Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, as many on the floor of this House know, I 
have been one of the principal advocates of a policy not supported by 
the President of the United States, and that was lifting the arms 
embargo. I think that was a good debate to have and, frankly, I believe 
it has moved us towards peace.
  In 1980, the dictator of Yugoslavia, the Communist leader, Tito, 
died, and since then Yugoslavia has been in the process of 
disintegration. As has unfortunately been the case so many times in 
history, hundreds of thousands of 

[[Page H13235]]
men, women, and children, not political, not combatants, not even 
evidencing any ethnic or national hatreds towards one another, have 
died, been raped, been removed from their homes in that phrase we 
euphemistically refer to as ``ethnic cleansing.''
  Jeane Kirkpatrick was asked just the other day, ``Does America have 
an interest?'' She said, ``Oh, yes, it does. America, as one, of if not 
the leader of the free world and of the civilized world, has a very 
direct interest when it sees genocide, when it sees the dehumanizing of 
human beings, for if it ignores that, it dehumanizes itself.''
  It is well that we remember why we are here. What is happening in 
Bosnia and in the Balkans; and what has happened through centuries? 
First of all, we are not here, as we were in January of 1991, to make 
war. We are here to make peace. Will peace be successful? None of us 
know. Is peace risk free? All of us know it is not. But the question we 
have before us is whether or not we are going to give our president, 
our Nation, unrelated to party, the chance to help those people make 
peace. The chance to retreat from carnage and genocide and rape and 
homelessness and refugee creation. That is what this is about.
  Jeane Kirkpatrick, a member of the Reagan administration, a 
distinguished American. Yes, she is a Republican, but more than that, 
she is a distinguished American who thinks hard and tough on foreign 
policy issues. She said this. ``The President's letter, directed to the 
Speaker November 13, must be taken very seriously. We all have a 
commitment also to coherent American government which enables us to 
deal responsibly with other governments and other powers, and we want 
our government to be effective in its dealing with other governments''.
  This is the key phrase Jeane Kirkpatrick said. ``I guess I think that 
the President's initiative or his response in this letter makes it 
unwise for the Congress to pass a binding resolution in advance of the 
completion of that agreement''.
  That is what the Washington Times, no great supporter of this 
administration, said today itself. Why? For the same reason that 
Speaker Foley in September of 1990, September, October, November, and 
December of 1990 said, yes, President Bush, we will not have a vote on 
this floor while you negotiate and Secretary Baker negotiates to create 
that alliance which confronted Saddam Hussein.
  There were many people in this House who asked for that vote. Tom 
Foley, the Speaker of this House, said, as an American, we will not 
have a vote, and we did not have a vote until 500,000 troops were 
deployed in harm's way to serve the interests of security in the Middle 
East. Let us act as bipartisanly for America today and reject the 
Hefley bill.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Traficant].
  (Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I submit that any Member that would allow 
a White House veto pen to ultimately send troops to Bosnia learned 
nothing, nothing from Vietnam. I support peace in Bosnia. That is not 
the issue today. The issue is not partisan. The issue is will American 
troops be sent to Bosnia to enforce the peace, and we hope that 
happens. And, second of all, what is the jurisdictional authority for 
such deployment?
  In that regard, Mr. Speaker, I want to perhaps pose a few questions. 
Does Congress give billions to NATO? Yes. Does Congress give billions 
to the United Nations for peacekeeping? Yes, Does Bosnia pose a 
national security threat to America? I say no. Does Europe have the 
military capability to provide the peacekeeping? Yes. And who is 
empowered by the Constitution with the jurisdictional authority? Who is 
empowered to commit those troops? The White House? I submit not. It is 
the Congress.
  Now, with that in mind, I listened to everything. And no doubt we are 
the big superpower and we have responsibilities, but we are not the 
only power. I think it is time to ask the question here. Where is Great 
Britain? Where is France? Where is Spain? Where is Italy? The last I 
heard, the European nations were not considered a Third World military 
pushover.
  I want to go on with my statement. I think it is bad enough over the 
years we have literally produced the world's policemen in Uncle Sam. 
And for some reason we are determined to make our military into a 
neighborhood crime watch after these issues seemed to be having some 
peaceful opportunities. I, for the life of me, cannot understand that.
  I think we have gone to far, Mr. Speaker, I think it is bad policy 
and I will not support, I will not support surrendering any more 
congressional authority on this business of deployment of troops, 
surrendering it to the White House. That is our job; that is why we are 
elected.
  And let me say this to my colleagues. This vote today is right on the 
point. I have listened to all the talk about the newspaper editorials, 
I have listened to all the talk about the newspapers saying it is not 
the time to discuss this issue. Ladies and gentleman of the Congress, 
this is the time because troops will be going to Bosnia.
  Now, let us get real here. If the Congress does not act, we will find 
troops in Bosnia. That is not a decision, ladies and gentleman, for the 
President. This is a decision of the U.S. Congress and no troops should 
be deployed without an affirmative approval and corresponding vote by 
the Congress of the United States. That is what the American people 
want.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I think there are five compelling reasons to 
reject this bill tonight. The first is that it is at least 
inconsistent, at worst hypocritical to make our foreign policy based 
upon the party affiliation of our Commander in Chief.
  In other words, I do think this bill is politically suspect in its 
motivation. But, second, for nearly a year now, the President under 
secretary----
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman's words to be taken 
down; . . . .
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman's words to be taken down.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend. The gentleman 
will please take their seats and cease.
  The Clerk will report the words of the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Moran.

                              {time}  1845

  The Clerk read as follows:

       I think there are 5 compelling reasons to reject this bill 
     tonight. The first is that it is at lease inconsistent, at 
     worst hypocritical, to make our foreign policy based upon the 
     party affiliation of our commander in chief. In other words, 
     I do think this bill is politically suspect in its 
     motivation. But secondly, for nearly a year now our President 
     under Secretary. . . .
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair rules that the words of the 
gentleman from Virginia are not personal references to any Member or to 
the President. Therefore, they are in order.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I realize the ruling on the comment of the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran] being in order and not violative of 
the rules. What is the general standard that would be violative of the 
rules?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under clause 1 of rule XIV, Members should 
refrain from personal references to other Members.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chair.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my 
words.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would take this opportunity to 
remind all Members that we should attempt to restrain ourselves in our 
debate and avoid personalities in debate and urges all Members to 
maintain a sense of civility with one another as we go through this 
very sensitive debate.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, the Chair's points are well taken. Might I 
inquire as to the remaining amount of time of the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Moran]?

[[Page H13236]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran] has 
2-\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, let me share with my colleagues four reasons 
why we are to reject this bill.
  The first of those four is that the President and Secretary of State 
have publicly and clearly stated for almost a year now that in the 
event a peace agreement is reached and only in that event we should be 
prepared to commit approximately 25,000 U.S. troops to that effort. 
This is a strange time to be questioning that publicly, clearly stated 
commitment.
  The third issue is that this is as much about the viability and 
credibility of NATO as it is about the salvation of Bosnia. It is the 
United States that gave birth to and nurtured NATO, and it worked, as 
the billions of dollars and the thousands of troops we committed to 
NATO were worth it.
  It is now our responsibility to continue to be a fully participating 
member of NATO. It is surely beneath this great Nation to back out of 
our international commitments when it requires more than words and 
dollars and the safe positioning of troops in a peaceful country.
  The fourth reason is that there are over 2 million refugees scattered 
throughout Europe. They are a constant and serious threat to the long-
term stability of our allies. That is a threat to our national security 
interest.
  The fifth reason, my colleagues, is the toughest one to argue because 
in the cynically political context that influences many of our 
decisions, it is difficult to make a case for doing something purely 
out of principle, regardless of the political consequences. But every 
nation in the world respects our commitment to principle. For many of 
them, it is their vision and ideal. The people of Bosnia looked to 
America as soon as Serbia fired its first shot on them and as soon as 
it invaded its first village. And throughout the mass execution and the 
mass rapes, they have cried out to us, but they have cried out not 
because we invest more in our military than all other nations of Europe 
combined, which we do. It is because they believe that we are the same 
nation that rose above the seductive rhetoric of isolationism and 
selfish interests and saved Europe, not once but twice.
  We who now control America's foreign policy and military actions must 
answer that cry and answer that question. With our vote tonight we will 
tell the world whether or not we are the same nation that they assume 
us to be. We owe it to our forefathers that risked and lost their lives 
in Europe for the cause of democracy, human rights, and religious and 
ethnic tolerance to continue to be that nation they fought and died 
for. That is why we must vote no tonight.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hostettler].
  (Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill.
  I rise today in strong support of this bill.
  It can be little doubted that proceeding in Bosnia is foolhardy. As I 
listened to members of this administration, there was no evidence that 
there is an imminent threat to any political economic institution of 
this country.
  Accordingly, many have turned to the Constitution to justify a no 
vote. I contend that the Constitution will not support such a vote.
  The Constitution has declared, and I quote from Article II, Sect. 2 
that ``The President shall be commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when 
called into actual service of the United States.''
  However, Article I, Sec. 8, of the Constitution places upon the 
Congress the following duties:
  ``To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make 
rules concerning captures on land and water''
  ``To raise and support armies . . .''
  ``To provide and maintain a navy . . .''
  ``To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and 
naval forces . . .''
  My friends, how can we argue that to limit a planned endeavor of the 
armed forces is not within the powers granted to Congress. To do so is 
to give disregard to the express language of the Constitution in favor 
of an implied power that is largely the product of the Executive 
branch's own interpretations.
  Providing forces to the Balkans is an unnecessary endeavor. It is our 
constitutional duty to address this issue today. We must make the rule, 
today, that our forces will not be in the Balkans without express 
congressional approval--it is not in our national interest. This is 
independent of the terms of whatever peace agreement that may be 
wrought between the warring parties.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Bonilla].
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Speaker, politics stop at the border. Each and every 
Member of Congress, each and every American, must always stand united 
in confronting any foreign foe.
  When our troops are sent in harm's way they deserve our full support. 
They also deserve our measured judgement not to put their lives at risk 
in the first place unless the national security of the United States is 
at stake. We must respect the President's prerogatives as commander-in-
chief, but not forget Congress' power of the purse. The President 
should feel confident that he can deploy our forces in a military 
emergency. But this, my colleagues, is not a military emergency. 
Sending U.S. combat troops to Bosnia has long been advocated by the 
administration as a political measure and linked to a flimsy, 
unrealized peace agreement.
  We will be failing our troops, failing their families, and failing 
the American people if we fail to answer the following simple questions 
posed by the majority of Americans. Is there a national security 
interest in Bosnia? Do we have goals and objectives for our forces? Is 
there a strategy which would lead to the withdrawal of our forces? Will 
peace continue after we leave?
  The answer to these questions is no, no, no.
  No--we should not involve ourselves in an embattled country where we 
have no national interest, no clear objectives, and no exit strategy.
  We owe it to our troops to vote for this resolution. We owe it to our 
troops to vote for no missions without objectives. We owe it to our 
troops to vote to keep our responsibility to declare war.
  Each and every one of us was elected to fulfill these 
responsibilities. We owe it to the American people and to our troops to 
do no less.
  There should only be two considerations when you vote today. The 
safety of our troops and the well-being of our republic. This 
legislation puts the lives of our troops and America's interest first.
  Please join me in voting for this important resolution.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Edwards].
  (Mr. EDWARDS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, for a land where Olympic bleachers have 
been dismantled to create caskets for children, I vote to give peace a 
chance.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from North Carolina [Mrs. Clayton].
  (Mrs. CLAYTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. I think 
it is premature that we do this at this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2606.
  Although I share many of my colleagues' grave concerns about the 
proposed interjection of American troops into Bosnia and I echo their 
misgivings, I can not in good conscience, vote in favor of a bill that 
will effectively tie the President's hands and remove his ability to 
bring about a negotiated and lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.
  However, Mr. Speaker, while I do not offer my opposition to the 
President's proposal, I do not believe we should offer the President 
our unconditional support.
  Placing the lives of American soldiers at risk is not something that 
should be done lightly. The President has an obligation to go to the 
American people and convince them that this mission is just and that 
the cause is pure. Further the President has an obligation to come to 
Congress if he plans to commit American troops and seek out 
consultation. This he has promised he will do. His letter to the 
Speaker confirms this commitment. He must ensure that these American 
troops will not be used to militarily impose an American solution, but 
rather, that they will be welcomed by all the 

[[Page H13237]]
warring parties as custodians and guardians of a negotiated peace.
  Through diplomatic pressure and NATO military coercion, the warring 
parties came to the negotiating table in Dayton, OH to pursue a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict in Bosnia.
  At this point, Mr. Speaker, a vote in opposition to the proposed 
American participation in a peace-keeping force is premature and will 
weaken the President's ability to influence the warring parties, 
thereby removing any leverage that he may have in seeking to bring 
forth a negotiated peace to this war-torn region of the globe.
  The bloody conflict in Bosnia has assaulted our sense of moral 
righteousness, it has shaken our firm belief in the strength of our 
Democratic ideals, and it has tested our leadership and vision for a 
world predicated upon the ideals of democracy.
  This conflict must end.
  The negotiations taking place in Dayton, OH are the world's best 
chance to end this bloody war that has caused the loss of hundreds of 
thousands of lives and left a stinging scar on the world's conscience.
  Therefore, I cannot vote in favor of H.R. 2606, a bill that will in 
my opinion, bring to an end the best chance to bring this war to a 
negotiated settlement.
  For our NATO allies, who look upon the United States for political, 
economic, and military leadership, such a vote will greatly diminish 
their faith and confidence in our ability to lead in a mutlipolar 
world. But, even more dangerously such a vote will embolden our enemies 
to aggressively pursue their own interests without regard for American 
interests or fear of reprisal.
  I urge my colleagues to reject H.R. 2606.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha].
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, at the very end of the Bush administration, 
during the election, I went over to Bosnia for the first time. I flew 
into Sarajevo and was not able to get out of the airfield because the 
fighting was so heavy, the shelling, the mortar fire. As a matter of 
fact, only a few blocks away from where I stood two young children were 
killed in a bus. Members may remember the incident.

                              {time}  1900

  I have gone back four times since then, three times in Sarajevo. The 
second time I stood in the area, in the marketplace, where 35 or 40 
people were killed by a mortar round. The last time I went into 
Sarajevo, every building had been damaged. I stood by the national 
library that had been destroyed by shell fire. The people were going to 
work, and dressed like they were going to work, and they were 
satisfied, that because the United States was involved, they were 
hopeful there would be a peace agreement.
  Now I do not know why President Clinton suggested we put American 
troops in, but I believe he felt it was necessary in order to bring 
some sort of an agreement from a war that had been going on 3 years 
since this killing that had been going on. There is no one that has 
fought harder in this Chamber over the years to get a President to 
agree to authorization.
  I do not think there is anyone in this Chamber that believes this 
fighting would have come to a halt if the United States had not gotten 
involved. I do not think there is anyone in this Chamber that believes 
if the President had not made a commitment of American troops, that the 
fighting would have come to a halt. But I also believe that he should 
have authorization; I believed in Saudi Arabia he should have had 
authorization.
  Now this is not the time to ask for a vote. This is the weekend where 
we can come to agreement. The President in a meeting the other day said 
he would give us ample time to discuss and debate this issue. The 
President of the United States assured us that he would ask for 
authority to send troops, and I do not think he should send those 
troops unless he gets authority or authorization from Congress. I think 
it would be a mistake not to have the support of Congress and the 
American people to send troops to Bosnia.
  But the point is they would not have stopped fighting and killing, 
and, if my colleagues stood there and looked at the blood on the 
ground, they would have understood how serious it was. They would not 
of stopped if it has not been for the intervention of the President of 
the United States.
  Now the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] and I have been on 
opposite sides many, many times, but I remember one meeting at the 
White House last year where everybody was clamoring for the United 
States to get involved. All the big shots around here wanted the United 
States to bomb them to oblivion, to send troops to lift the embargo, do 
everything, get this thing settled because the killing was so great. As 
soon as the killing slowed down a little bit, as soon as there was an 
agreement, things quieted own.

  Everybody thinks it is going to end peaceably? It will not without 
our involvement, and down at Dayton right now they are talking peace, 
they are trying to come to agreement. This is a delicate time. Anything 
could disrupt it. The President of the United States said to us the 
other day this could very well destroy the momentum of the peace talks. 
This could stop the peace talks from coming to a conclusion.
  Now I would ask the gentleman who is sincere, because I have had the 
same thought in my mind; I have tried over and over again to get every 
President to ask authorization for whatever deployment of American 
troops. But I would ask the gentleman to think about at this very 
delicate time why it is necessary to ask for a vote on something as 
important as this when he will have plenty of time later on to pass a 
resolution like this, and the majority party, they will have every 
right to bring up a privileged resolution and pass that resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I feel very strongly that all of us realize the 
sensitivity of what is going on in Sarajevo and in Bosnia. All of us 
feel we would like to see this end without one American life being 
lost. I have been to all the war zones. Every time there is an 
outbreak, I have seen our American troops frustrated. I was in Vietnam 
for a year with the gentleman from California, and I know what it is 
like, and I know how difficult it is to come to a conclusion. I know 
how important American power is, and I know how we were stopped in 
Vietnam. I know how we may very well be here, but we will have an 
opportunity, and I say that unless this agreement is an adequate 
agreement I will not agree to support the President of the United 
States in deploying troops to Sarajevo, to Bosnia.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  (Mr. CUNNINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, a lot of us have been working very hard 
on this bill, and I truly believe, if we can send a message to Ohio 
that we are not going to include in these peace talks 25,000 troops, 
and then we devise a peace plan with the backing of this body, with the 
backing of the American people and the backing of the President, and a 
peace plan comes out, it will be the most legitimate thing we could 
possibly do. If a peace plan comes out and the troops are in there in 
the minds of the people that are putting this peace plan together, and 
then we vote against it, in my humble opinion then we desperately taint 
this body, we taint the American President, and we taint the prestige 
of this country.
  I apologize to the gentleman from Virginia. But I do not like the 
feeling that what I believe in to my bones, that it is politically 
motivated. I do not want these kids going to war and to be killed.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Miller].
  (Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
legislation before us this afternoon which is ill-timed, overly broad, 
and unnecessary. But I wish to make it absolutely clear to my 
colleagues, to the President, and to my constituents the exact meaning 
of my vote today.
  My vote against this bill today is a vote to endorse the peace 
process now underway to resolve the war in Bosnia.
  My vote today is a vote in favor of peace.
  But my vote against this bill is in no way a blanket endorsement for 
the President of the United States to send American troops to Bosnia at 
his discretion.
  It is my hope that American troops will never be called to serve in 
Bosnia.
  But should that ever become necessary, it will be the U.S. Congress, 
acting with the President, that will decide whether to approve their 
participation.

[[Page H13238]]

  Mr. Speaker, the war in Bosnia is a tragedy. It is time for the 
parties to breach their differences and rebuild their society. The 
peace negotiations taking place in Dayton, OH, are critical to that 
effort and I support this effort. But the President should not 
misconstrue my vote as an endorsement for his discretionary use of 
American forces in Bosnia.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for 
yielding this time to me.
  I rise tonight in opposition to the Hefley bill. I think it is a 
well-intentioned measure, but I think it is ill-timed. It is premature.
  Someone said this will be the only opportunity we will have to vote 
on whether we want to send troops into Bosnia. Not true. I carefully 
looked at the letter the President sent in which he made it very clear 
that he will come back to this body and seek our support before taking 
such momentous action.
  As my colleagues know, Mr. Speaker, we become easily repulsed when we 
see pictures of the horrors of war, when we see dead bodies, when we 
see destruction, when we see evidence of rape. But when the time comes 
for action, sometimes we begin to pause, we become indecisive. We are a 
world leader. Moral indignation, rhetorical condemnation is not enough. 
We must act and act responsibly.
  Now that is not to say that I am committed nor that I believe that we 
should send troops. But what I am saying is that we ought to treat our 
allies fairly. We ought to give the peace process a chance. We ought 
not undermine the process before it has reached a fair conclusion. We 
cannot preach multilateralism and preach burden sharing, and then 
before the issue is even brought to conclusion say we are not a part of 
this play. It does not work that way. We should not tie the President's 
hands.
  People like to come down to the well and talk about how committed 
they are to peace. Mr. Speaker, there are some people in Dayton, OH, 
right now trying to fashion a peace after thousands of years of 
conflict. We ought to give them a chance. We ought not to send them a 
signal that we do not have confidence in what they are doing. We ought 
not send them a signal that we want no part of their efforts even if 
they come up with a lasting and significant peace process. We should 
not discourage the participants in this process before they have had a 
fair opportunity to complete their work.
  It may be then in the final analysis, when the President brings his 
case before the Congress, we conclude that, no, we should not send U.S. 
troops into harm's way. We may, in fact, conclude that we may be 
helpful through other ways, through intelligence, through supplying 
materials and equipment, but that is not the decision today. We should 
not make a premature decision and handicap the peace process.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Chabot].
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, on October 30, 315 Members of this House, 
Republicans and Democrats, sent a resounding message to President 
Clinton. The message was simple, and it could not have been more clear: 
Do not send American troops to Bosnia without first getting 
authorization from Congress. But make no mistake about it. The real 
vote on Bosnia is here, and it is now.
  We have asked the administration for casualty estimates for weeks 
now, but all we have gotten is silence. Mr. President, answer our 
question. How many American lives are you prepared to sacrifice in 
Bosnia? Not one drop of American blood should be shed in Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, enactment of this legislation could prevent a potential 
disaster from taking place, and therefore, I strongly urge its passage 
tonight.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I want to read a letter I received today 
from a constituent:

       Jim, please do not send our young men and women to Bosnia. 
     I was a combat corpsman in Viet Nam, I volunteered to go. The 
     death and carnage which is caused by war can not be 
     described. This is not our war. We are being used by small 
     ego driven foreign leaders. They could care less about our 
     young men and women. You and your fellow representatives must 
     care.
       Jim, I packed many body bags with parts of what was left of 
     young men. I held young men as they died in my arms and there 
     was nothing to do. You can do everything to save these men 
     and women . . . it is not our war . . . for the mothers and 
     fathers, sisters and brothers, please do not allow our young 
     people to be killed . . . Sincerely, Bill Wenmark.

  Mr. Speaker, this letter says it all. Support the Hefley resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Bateman].
  Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Hefley] for yielding this time, and I hope that through the rest of our 
debate that our passions will be sufficiently curbed, that we can 
maintain civility with one another as we deal with this issue that all 
of us have obviously anguished over, and I have anguished with my 
colleagues.
  I would like to make it clear that I am deeply opposed to the way the 
President has gone about the negotiations ongoing in Dayton, not that 
we are there. I am proud of him and of this country, that we have 
produced those negotiations. But it was, I think, extremely 
improvident, at best, for the President to have said in advance of a 
military mission being identified and defined that we will contribute 
20 to 25,000 ground forces, more than a third of the total that has 
been talked about. I think it entirely improvident for those 
negotiations to proceed on the premise that we will arm the Bosnian 
Moslems.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The time of the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Bateman] has expired.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I previously agreed to yield 1 minute to 
the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bateman], and I do so at this time.
  Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member 
for yielding the time to me.
  I think it is extremely improvident for those negotiations to be cast 
in the context of our arming the Bosnian Muslims and training them when 
we are there in a capacity as a neutral peacekeeper. This is not a 
sound way to establish a peace.

                              {time}  1915

  There will come a day when we will have an opportunity to vote, and I 
cannot support that level of our participation. But we do have a role 
in Bosnia. There is a responsibility of the United States as the 
cardinal leader of NATO, and our interest of the stability on the 
continent of Europe, that dictates our participation. And that makes it 
in our national interest that we bring about a peace, but we must do it 
in a rational way, and on another day, on another time, I may well vote 
against dispatching American forces on the ground there.
  For those reasons, tonight, and very reluctantly, because I am not 
opposed to the sense of what this bill would require, I would not be 
able to support it tonight.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill to 
prohibit the deployment of ground forces to Bosnia unless Congress 
specifically appropriates funding.
  The United States does have an interest in resolving the war in the 
Balkans peacefully, and we have engaged in appropriate efforts, 
including active diplomacy and the provision of air, sea, logistical 
and intelligence support, to that end.
  But I disagree strongly with the President on placing United States 
troops on the ground to keep the peace in Bosnia. We must not forget 
that U.S. airpower has already engaged in military action against one 
party to this conflict. I, for one, cannot countenance placing our 
soldiers on the ground under those circumstances, where they will be 
convenient targets.
  For me, the bottom line is this: I simply could never look into the 
eyes of a mother or father or spouse or child of a soldier killed in 
Bosnia and say that American interests in Bosnia were worth their 
sacrifice.
  This legislation properly assures that Congress has a say in this 
affair, as it should in virtually any instance where United States 
troops are put in harm's way. I urge its support.

[[Page H13239]]

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Manzullo].
  (Mr. MANZULLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, let me pose one simple question: Why are 
United States soldiers being asked to flight the Bosnia's war? The 
Bosnians should fight their own war. The Bosnians should be arming and 
defending themselves. In fact, they have been asking us even since the 
war began in 1991. Yet, the administration has refused to allow the 
Bosnians a level playing field. It is unconscionable that President 
Clinton has refused to lift the Bosnian arms embargo, while making 
every effort to send 25,000 American troops to protect the very country 
he has worked to disarm.
  This contradiction involves the proposed roles of the U.S. personal 
in Bosnian. Can someone explain to me how some U.S. personal can serve 
as neutral peacekeepers, while others serve as suppliers and 
instructors to the Bosnian government's army?
  These contradictory jobs personify the conflict and confusion in the 
Clinton administration's Balkan policy. American soldiers will not be 
viewed as neutral, they will be viewed as Bosnian mercenaries. 
Therefore, we should vote for the resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California [Mrs. Seastrand].
  Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this 
legislation.
  For more than 2 years President Clinton has failed to articulate a 
clear position in Bosnia. Now he tells us he will send up to 25,000 of 
our men and women to Bosnia to enforce a peace settlement that has yet 
to be agreed.
  The President has failed to meet the clear objectives his own 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out 2 years ago:
  Our goals must be clear.
  The chances of this mission's success must be high.
  We must have a clear and established exit strategy for our troops 
before they are sent.
  The American people must support this effort.
  Clearly, none of these objectives have been met.
  This administration is preparing to put our sons and daughters in 
harms way because of offhanded promises from a President that has had 
no clear policy in Bosnia for more than 2 years.
  Mr. Speaker, President Clinton has amoral obligation to come before 
this body and explain what our national interests are in Bosnia and our 
clear objectives for this deployment. The clearest foreign policy 
lesson of the past 30 years is the President's obligation to build a 
public consensus before committing American forces to hazardous long-
term mission. America should never commit its troops without first 
committing the Nation.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Taylor].
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, people may be quick to forget that the first President 
who tried to get us involved in Bosnia was President Bush. When he did 
that, I was against it. I was against it because of a conversation I 
had with then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, when I asked 
him repeatedly whether or not we should send ground troops into 
Yugoslavia. He being a good soldier said, ``That is not my decision to 
make. I am going to do what I am told.'' Only after I cornered him and 
only after I asked him the question 5 or 10 times he said, ``No, we 
should not put ground troops in Yugoslavia. If you recall, I said that 
in front of Secretary Baker, and then-Secretary of Defense Cheney, in 
the meeting at the time when President Bush was trying to get us 
involved broke up.''
  Folks, it did not make sense then. It does not make sense now. There 
is something worse than the sight of dead Yugoslavs. It is the sight of 
dead young Americans who were sent someplace with no clear-cut 
missions, who cannot tell the good guys from the bad guys, and who die 
in a needless cause.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Maine [Mr. Longley].
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Speaker, this is a difficult issue to address. In 
fact, this may be one of the most difficult issues that any one of us 
has had to address, certainly in my 10 months. I am not a supporter of 
putting American troops on the ground in Bosnia. I think it would be a 
terrible mistake. It is my intention to work as hard as I can to 
prevent in from taking place. I believe in the 10 months that I have 
been in office I have received more calls on this issue than on any 
other issue, and not a single call has been in favor of it; but 
nevertheless, I have to respect the authority of the Commander in Chief 
to conduct foreign policy.
  I think the timing is not good. I think that there is information to 
which we may not be privy that could very well be instrumental in any 
decision that we might make. Again, we may be acting without knowing 
that information. We have to assume that the President does have that 
information and is prepared to exercise that constitutional authority.
  Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, I think there is no greater threat to 
American lives than a Congress that attempts to micromanage foreign 
policy. I have told the President that I would respect his authority as 
Commander in Chief, and I would suggest, in all candor, Mr. Speaker, to 
the administration that they really have not consulted with the 
Congress. They have informed the Congress, but I know there are 
respected Members on both sides of the aisle whose opinions are 
valuable, who have a tremendous amount of experience, who have not 
truly been consulted on the development of this policy.
  Mr. Speaker, I would also remind this Chamber that there is one other 
issue, an overriding issue that hangs over this Chamber. That is the 
question of the Federal budget. Here we are, debating one aspect of 
foreign policy at the very same time that 800,000 Federal employees 
have been furloughed. I would submit to the administration that under 
no circumstances could I see us deploying a single soldier anywhere in 
the world without resolving this issue.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Baker].
  (Mr. BAKER of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Speaker, there are three important 
points to consider before American lives are committed to serve as 
ground troops in Bosnia. First, there must be a vital American interest 
before one life is risked on foreign soil. There is no NATO country in 
the region and no economic, political, or military justification for 
this risk.
  Second, Bosnia, the patient, has died. First, the Serbs; now Croatia 
sought territorial advantage. No one cares about Bosnia and the Bosnian 
federation. Let us put this State Department fiction to rest.
  Third, who will vote to pay $2 billion to $3 billion to deploy ground 
troops in Bosnia? Let those in Europe and the Middle East who have been 
arming the combatants enforce the peace. The liberal Democrats who have 
been demanding that we cut to the bone our military spending are now 
insisting that we involve American lives in yet another military 
action.
  Vote yes on the Hefley amendment. Keep American troops out of Bosnia.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Duncan].
  Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation 
by the gentleman from Colorado, and I thank him for yielding me this 
time.
  President Kennedy said in 1961:

       We must fact the fact that the U.S. is neither omnipotent 
     nor omniscient--that we are only 6% of the world's 
     population--that we cannot impose our will upon the other 
     94%--that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each 
     adversity--and that therefore there cannot be an American 
     solution to every world problem.

  This statement by President Kennedy is even more true today, because 
we are now less than 5 percent of the world population and especially 
because we now have a $5 trillion national debt.
  We should never send young American men and women to fight and die on 
foreign battlefields unless there is a real threat to our national 
security or a vital U.S. interest at stake.
  Neither of these is present in Bosnia.
  
[[Page H13240]]

  B.J. Cutler, the Scripps-Howard foreign affairs columnist, recently 
wrote: ``if guarding people from the savagery of their rules is 
America's duty, it would be fighting all over the world, squandering 
lives and bankrupting itself.''
  We cannot solve the situation in Bosnia even if we spend billions 
that we do not have and jeopardize our own future in the process.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Montgomery].
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. 
Mr. Speaker, we gave this courtesy to President Bush not to bring up 
the Persian Gulf resolution at a certain time. Mr. Speaker, I was part 
of that agreement.
  Now this President, President Clinton, has asked the body to delay a 
resolution such as this, and President Clinton told me tonight, as he 
has told other Members, that before he commits total forces into the 
Bosnian area, he will come back to the Congress of the United States. I 
think this President is entitled to the same thing that we gave 
President Bush.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Nevada [Mr. Ensign].

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. Speaker, on Veterans Day recently I was out in 
Boulder City, NV, at a veterans' memorial cemetery and I saw a woman 
who has obviously a mother kneeling over her son's grave weeping. I 
could tell the pain on this mother's face, and I thought about the pain 
of everyone who has lost a son or daughter in a military conflict in 
this country.
  Mr. Speaker, the thought came up to me during that day, and during 
some of the conversations that I had on Veterans Day with so many who 
have sacrificed so much, would that woman that was kneeling over that 
grave that day, would she accept this mission that the President wants 
to send our young men into in Bosnia? Would this be a mission that she 
would consider in vital U.S. American interest? Would this be a mission 
that she thinks that threatens our allies or that threatens the very 
defense of our country?
  Mr. Speaker, I think that that woman would say no, and I would agree 
with her. We should only be sending our troops where there is a vital 
U.S. American interest or a threat to the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. Mink].
  (Mrs. MINK of Hawaii asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to rise in 
opposition to this bill, because several Members on the majority side 
have kept noting that on October 30, over 300 Members voted for House 
Resolution 247, which asked the President to consult the Congress 
before sending troops.
  Mr. Speaker, I happen to be one of those individuals that voted for 
the resolution because, on principle, I deeply feel that the President 
has an obligation to come to consult with the Congress before taking 
such a major step. But, on this instance where the peace negotiations 
are in a position of just being concluded, the timing is absolutely 
wrong.
  Mr. Speaker, if we vote on this bill today, and it should pass this 
House, I believe it will have untoward consequences in bringing 
together the parties in Dayton, OH. The cutoff of these funds today is 
absolutely premature. Passing this bill will seriously jeopardize the 
negotiations. In fact, it might even sabotage them altogether. I 
believe very deeply that the President must be given an opportunity to 
succeed, to bring peace to this area.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote on this bill.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Knollenberg].
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my strong support for 
the Hefley amendment. It has been stated there is no public support for 
a mission to Bosnia. There is no national security interest to send 
American soldiers to die in Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, we in Congress have a responsibility. We have a 
responsibility to say no to the funding. We can help this President. We 
can prevent the President from making a mistake that will cost him more 
than a few points in the polls. It will cost the lives of young 
American men and women, our sons and daughters.
  Some may argue--and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha] did 
a tremendous job--that this is not the role of Congress to deny the 
President the ability to forge his own foreign policy. But the 
President has never told us why he believes that peace can be 
established in a war zone, a civil war, a mission impossible. He has 
never made his case.
  Mr. Speaker, we have tried to show the White House our concerns and 
the problems with their policies. They have looked away. Therefore, we 
must stand up and shout with our only real power: the funding. There 
should be no funds for Americans to die in a war that is not ours.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, might I inquire as to the remaining time?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hobson). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] has 14\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Hefley] has 16 minutes remaining.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, as a Member of the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the Committee on Appropriations, I rise to join our 
chairman, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Callahan], and our ranking 
member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wilson], in opposition to the 
Hefley amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, with all due respect for the intentions of the gentleman 
from Colorado [Mr. Hefley], but in all opposition to the timing of the 
gentleman's resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, it has taken too many years and cost too many lives to 
get the warring parties of the Bosnian conflict to the peace talks. 
They are finally there. They are talking, not shooting. Voting today to 
prohibit a possible deployment tomorrow gives impetus to the parties to 
lay aside their voices, to take up their arms, and renew a genocidal 
conflict that is a blot on the world's conscience.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not think this body wants to be responsbile for the 
collapse of the peace process. My problem, I have said again, is in the 
timing of the Hefley resolution. I believe that this legislation at 
this time before us today risks the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
civilians in the former Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Speaker, 50 years ago when the reality of the Holocaust came to 
light, people said, ``Never again'' to ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
These abhorrent actions continue, despite this promise. I believe the 
world can no longer turn a blind eye to Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Hefley 
anendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished 
gentleman from Maine [Mr. Longley] to continue his earlier thoughts.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Speaker, I would add to my earlier remarks that 
there is an overriding issue that hangs over this entire discussion, 
and that is the question of the Federal budget.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot conceive of a situation wherein this Congress 
could be approving any foreign policy decision without our resolving 
the issue that affects 250 million Americans and their future, and that 
is the need to balance the Federal budget.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Chambliss].
  (Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, while I have some reluctance about 
overriding the authority of the President given by this body, we have 
no choice in this case. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 
amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to express my 
concern about the vote we are about to make tonight.
  Scenes of the fighting in Bosnia have torn this country apart. The 
bloodshed is real, and the death is overwhelming. At this very hour, 
peace talks continue between the leaders of the warring parties, and 
there is reason to believe that a preliminary agreement is in the 
works.
  Mr. Speaker, I was elected to this Congress with a commitment to the 
people I represent to seek a seat on the House National Security 
Committee. It is a responsibility I take very seriously because the 
decisions we make will 

[[Page H13241]]
impact the lives of every brave American who volunteers to defend this 
great Nation.
  The threshold decision we must make, Mr. Speaker, is whether the war 
in Bosnia invokes a vital national security interest for the people of 
the United States. If such interest exists, we must act and act 
decisively.
  However, a vital national interest does not exist. This Nation, 
together with NATO, has made a firm commitment over the past several 
months in the form of air strikes in defense of United Nations safe 
havens. It is a humanitarian commitment that is worthy of our 
involvement. But the introduction of U.S. ground troops, American sons 
and daughters, is another matter, entirely.
  Having said this, Mr. Speaker, I must also express my grave 
reservations over the soundness of judgment exercised to this point by 
this particular President. His indecisiveness and lack of vision could 
prove lethal to the many men and women who would serve as the ground 
force.
  I also find it to the height of hypocracy for this President to send 
to Congress inadequate defense budgets in light of this newfound 
commitment to the projection of American power.
  It seems that this sentiment is shared widely among my colleagues in 
this Congress. In my judgment, it is better that the negotiations in 
Ohio proceed with this fact in mind, rather than congressional action 
of disapproval after a peace accord is signed.
  While I have difficulty casting this vote in light of the powers 
specifically enumerated this President as Commander in Chief, the 
safety of the men and women in our Armed Services demand me to cast a 
vote in support of this binding action.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth].
  (Mrs. CHENOWETH asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Speaker, observers are sickened by the strife and 
atrocities in Bosnia. The human reaction is to want to do whatever we 
can to restore peace. And as the only remaining superpower on the 
planet it seems to many that we have the power to accomplish this goal.
  However, I agree with an observation offered by the columnist William 
Raspberry, ``If righting manifest wrongs were the only consideration, 
we'd be endlessly at war.''
  History has shown that there is a limit on our ability to impose our 
will on other nations' internal problems. That limit is especially 
constricting when you add the problems caused if we place our soldiers 
under the command and control of an international organization.
  Before our Government sends our most precious resource--young 
Americans--off to fight and die in a foreign land, we have to ask 
ourselves to support the Hefley amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Foglietta].
  (Mr. FOGLIETTA asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Hefley 
resolution. President Clinton has exercised extraordinary leadership in 
bringing the warring parties in former Yugoslavia face to face for the 
first time to work toward a negotiated peace settlement. At last, peace 
might be close at hand.
  Mr. Speaker, now some of my colleagues seem determined to pull the 
rug out from under these fragile peace negotiations at this very most 
critical time. After years of fierce fighting and senseless bloodshed, 
we are finally on the brink of creating a lasting peace in Bosnia, a 
peace which will prevent the further killing of innocent women and 
children.
  However, by passing this resolution, we threaten to create a new 
leadership vacuum which will ignite renewed fighting and result in the 
death of more innocents. Furthermore, without decisive American 
leadership, this fight could easily engulf Albania and Macedonia, 
leading to a dangerous escalation of hostilities between our important 
NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Also, it could be the end of NATO as we 
know it. This would be disastrous.
  Mr. Speaker, let us not sabotage our best and maybe only chance to 
bring peace to Bosnia.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Herger].
  Mr. HERGER. Mr. Speaker, why is President Clinton insisting on 
sending 25,000 American troops into Bosnia where a number of them will 
most certainly die? We cannot take this situation lightly. Submitting 
our young men and women into a battle region is a dangerous proposition 
at best, yet President Clinton has still failed to articulate just what 
U.S. interest is at stake that requires putting American combat troops 
in war-torn Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, why should U.S. blood be spilled for a cause that is 
better handled within the European Community? What will we tell these 
brave soldiers' parents? What will we say their children died for?
  Mr. Speaker, I do not believe President Clinton has answers to these 
questions. The administration should remember the lessons of Somalia 
and Beirut. When we commit U.S. troops to unstable regions of the world 
without a defined mission, Americans die.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to distinguished 
gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Callahan].
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I have been listening to this debate for a 
couple of hours, and while listening to it I had an opportunity to read 
the Congressional Record of January 12, 1991.
  Mr. Speaker, it is interesting to note that there is a difference 
this year from 1991, because the Republicans, with a Republican 
President, were saying the same things that the Democrats with a 
Democratic President are saying tonight. And the Democrats, with a 
Republican President, are saying the opposite of what they were saying 
in 1991.
  Mr. Speaker, it would behoove all of my colleagues to get the CQ 
Almanac, the 46th annual edition of the almanac, and read the brief 
history of the entire debate on the Persian Gulf and the entire debate 
on whether or not the President of the United States has the authority 
to do what he is doing.
  Mr. Speaker, this issue tonight is not over whether or not the 
President has the authority. It is over whether we ought to delay the 
vote on this for a few days until the peace negotiations end.
  Mr. Speaker, in 1991, under a similar situation, a Republican 
President then called Speaker Foley and said, ``Could you delay a 
vote,'' because of some strategic timing needs that the President was 
aware of. Mr. Foley, who ultimately voted against the resolution that 
we ultimately submitted, granted that to the President of the United 
States.
  Now, the President has come to us today. I understand he called the 
Speaker of the House and he requested the Speaker, and I know he called 
the sponsor of this bill, and requested that they at least delay this 
vote until after this weekend, when they are optimistic that most of 
negotiations will be finished.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not going to be the law of the land after 
tonight. This is not going to be the law of the land because we pass it 
tonight. The Senate more than likely will not pass it. If they do, the 
President is going to veto it. So, it is not going to be the law of the 
land.
  Mr. Speaker, if my colleagues want an expression, then they should 
introduce a sense of Congress resolution and I will vote with them, 
because I do not believe that we ought to send troops to Bosnia either. 
Mr. Speaker, I have sent that message to the President. I have told the 
Secretary of State this. All of us have this same right to do this very 
same thing, to express our views to the President.
  But for this body at this time, when it is meaningless because it 
will not become law, to insult the President, let me tell my 
colleagues, I am not here defending Bill Clinton. I am here defending 
President Clinton, and there is a big difference.
  Mr. Speaker, the hardest message I ever gave on this floor was in 
1991 when I stood here and supported President Bush in the Persian Gulf 
resolution. If it gets to that, the President has sent us a letter and 
he has said that before he takes action, he will bring that message to 
the Congress.
  So, we can talk about constitutionality; we can talk about right or 
wrong; we can talk about history, but to deny the President of the 
United States, during the middle of peace negotiations which 
conceivably will stop this horrible bloodshed in Bosnia, is wrong.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that all of my colleagues on my side of the aisle 
are 

[[Page H13242]]
going to disagree with me, and that is their prerogative. I am 
espousing my views. I am telling my colleagues that some of them, and I 
probably too, are hopeful that in 1996, that there will be a Republican 
President there. Mr. Speaker, I hope we are not in this type of 
situation. But if we are, I am going to protect that President, just as 
I am going to protect this President tonight.

                              {time}  1945

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Thornberry].
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, voting to prevent the President of 
whatever party from sending troops somewhere should never be done 
lightly, but no Member of this body can ignore our responsibility to 
our soldiers and to our Nation as well.
  The issue is not whether a peace treaty or a piece of paper gets 
signed in Ohio this weekend. That is not what we are after. What we are 
after is a peace that will stick, a peace that will be enforceable. It 
has to be based on solid ground. If they negotiate a treaty that 
assumes U.S. combat troops will be part of the peace enforcement, they 
are making a false assumption because the support is not there in the 
Congress or the country to do that. It is better they know the facts 
now and tonight rather than find out the hard way later.
  The fact is the President promised to send in troops without 
consulting Congress and now he is asking us to back him up. Our job, on 
the other hand, is to ask whether there is a vital national security 
interest in Bosnia that justifies risking the lives of young men and 
women. I do not think there is. Risking their lives just to make good 
on a rash, premature promise by the President is flat wrong and we 
ought to stop it.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Roth].
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me time.
  This is the key vote this evening, whether we send troops into Bosnia 
or not. And the reason for that is because the President point-blank 
tells us that he is going to preposition a number of troops into 
Bosnia.
  We are going to be deploying some 4,000 NATO troops, either a third 
or a half of them U.S. troops. So the next time this issue comes up for 
a vote, it is not whether we are going to send troops into Bosnia. The 
issue will be whether we are going to support the troops that are 
already there, and that is why this vote this evening is such a crucial 
vote, and that is why this vote this evening is a historic vote.
  Speaking of history, Mr. Speaker, sometimes I think the only thing we 
learn from history is that we do not learn from history. I see in the 
paper here we have Mr. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the time 
of Vietnam, and what is he saying is, he said I knew we could not win 
the war. He said I did not believe in the war. But they kept on putting 
thousands, hundreds of thousands of boys over into Vietnam. 58,000 
names we can see when we walk out of this building and walk down to The 
Mall.
  But where is McNamara? He is a big hero over in Vietnam. He is 
selling his book all around the country. But there are 58,000 names we 
have on the plaque down here. Look at history. Let us learn from 
history this evening.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, we hear give peace a chance; do not 
disrupt the negotiations. That is the central argument being offered by 
this side for us not to act. And I will tell my colleagues that if we 
do not act and we send 25,000 Americans into the Balkans meat grinder, 
it will be because we bought that argument that some of our colleagues 
have presented to us. But that argument is nonsense. Total absolute 
nonsense.
  If peace talks are predicated on deploying 25,000 American troops 
into the Balkans, what is going on in Ohio is not a peace process but a 
tragic game. We are doing no one a favor. We are not bringing peace 1-
inch closer by having the parties of a negotiation in Ohio base their 
agreement on predicating that 25,000 American troops are going to be 
sent to the Balkans.
  What is reality? That is not reality. Ignoring reality and wishful 
thinking will not bring peace to the Balkans or anywhere else in this 
world. All it will do is put 25,000 young Americans in harm's way and 
possibly bringing them back in body bags. What is reality? The American 
people do not support the deployment of these thousands of young 
Americans, our young defenders, into this bloody and confusing morass.
  Mr. Speaker, I worked in the Reagan White House when he made his 
worst mistake, and that was deploying the Marines to Beirut. This has 
every small of that same situation. We had very little chance of 
success. I ran all over the White House saying what are we doing? What 
are we trying to accomplish? They said, well, if this happens and that 
happens and this happens, we are eventually going to bring peace to the 
Middle East. I said, look, the chances of success are 1 in 10. The 
chances of this turning into a bloody failure are one in two. It makes 
no sense.
  Well, that is exactly what we are doing tonight. The situation in 
Bosnia, our chances of success are maybe 1 in 10, maybe 1 in 100. The 
chances of a catastrophic failure and the death of many young Americans 
is very high. It is nonsense. This is a horrible policy. We must do 
everything we can not to let it happen.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the chairman of the Committee on 
Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, earlier today I spoke in support of this 
resolution. Let me please urge Members to vote for this. It may be 
their last chance to stop these troops from going into this place 
called Bosnia where they have no place being.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2606 and commend Mr. 
Hefley for forcing this critical issue to the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, I have been a member of the North Atlantic Assembly for 
16 years and currently serve as chairman of the Political Committee.
  I have been proud to be affiliated with what has been the greatest 
treaty of all time--NATO.
  And for that matter, it has been the greatest peacekeeper of all time 
too.
  NATO, with its laser-like focus on military deterrence and collective 
defense, kept the peace in Europe for over 40 years in the face of the 
Soviet threat.
  But let me tell you what is going on in our allied European 
countries. There is a noticeable leftward drift, especially in terms of 
foreign policy.

  More and more, NATO is being pushed by this leftward drift into out 
of area missions--missions that don't involve direct threats to NATO 
members, such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and the like.
  Missions like Bosnia.
  And the Clinton administration has been getting us sucked into this 
morass for 3 years.
  After 3 years of doing nothing, after 3 years of subjecting the 
Bosnian victims to a cruel and strategically myopic arms embargo, the 
administration now says that if we don't send 20,000 young people into 
harm's way in this hornet's nest, we will destroy NATO.
  Ladies and gentlemen, that's baloney.
  This mission will destroy NATO. Let me tell you how.
  The administration has a plan, folks. They have a plan to partition 
Bosnia, divide it into sectors, and insert United States, British, 
French, and yes, Russian troops in to enforce the partition.
  What does that sound like? It sounds an awful lot like Berlin to me.
  And another Berlin is exactly what NATO cannot withstand.
  We can't afford another 40-year deployment, Mr. Speaker, especially 
in this place where there is no vital national interest.
  And we can't afford to let the Russians snatch victory from the jaws 
of defeat by giving them a free pass into the Balkans.
  To be blunt, they have a history of coming to a place and hanging 
around for a while. How are we going to get them out?
  And how are we going to prevent them from arming and supplying the 
Serb aggressors?
  We know they will do this.
  And are American soldiers going to square off with the Russians if 
they do this, or are we going to turn a blind eye as the Serbs re-arm?
  Either way, it is a fiasco for NATO.
  Mr. Speaker, let's stop this mission from proceeding until the 
President comes to us and secures our approval.
  This is what the Hefley bill will do and I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Metcalf], who has been so effective and so helpful in 
helping to bring this matter before us tonight.
  (Mr. METCALF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

[[Page H13243]]

  Mr. METCALF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his kind words.
  Mr. Speaker, American ground troops may soon be dispatched to Bosnia. 
These men and women are entering a combat zone plagued by centuries of 
conflict and three failed peace agreements in recent years. It is the 
duty, the constitutional duty of Congress to allocate funds or to deny 
funds for long-term troop deployments. We have learned through sad 
experience that it is easy to rush troops into a conflict, but it is 
extremely difficult to solve the problems once they get there, and even 
more difficult to get out in a timely and honorable way.
  Mr. Speaker, the American people know that it is folly to send combat 
troops to Bosnia, and I ask Members to support them with their vote for 
this resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, November 17 is the 30th anniversary of the 
Ia Drang Valley. Three hundred two killed in action. Americans. Look 
where that led.
  I rise again for this amendment.
  I include the following for the Record.

                         Iadrang Valley Battle

       About 1,200 troops of the U.S. First Cavalry Division 
     (Airmobile) fought North Vietnamese regular troops Nov. 14-17 
     in the Iadrang Valley, between the Cambodian border and 
     Pleime. The First Cavalry troops had been scouring the area 
     in a search-and-destroy operation since the Communists had 
     mounted an unsuccessful siege of a U.S. Special Forces camp 
     at Pleime in late October. The Iadrang Valley clash was the 
     operation's 4th contact with the Communist forces.
       About 2,000 North Vietnamese of the 66th Regiment were 
     reportedly involved in the Iadrang engagement. Before U.S. 
     troops withdrew from the valley Nov. 17 a total of 890 North 
     Vietnamese bodies were counted, according to a military 
     spokesman in Saigon. Although First Cavalry losses were 
     described as ``moderate,'' they were believed to have been 
     the heaviest sustained by U.S. troops in any single 
     engagement of the war.
       The North Vietnamese opened their attack Nov. 14 with a 
     heavy 4-hour assault on U.S. positions. The Communists 
     renewed the attack Nov. 15 against 4 U.S. companies of 750 
     men defending a clearing in the valley for a helicopter 
     landing. The North Vietnamese then broke off the attack, 
     pressed the assault again Nov. 16 but were thrown back in 3 
     separate drives. The U.S. troops repelled 2 similar Communist 
     attacks later in the day. U.S. commanders decided Nov. 17 to 
     withdraw the First Cavalry units from the valley since North 
     Vietnamese had a tactical advantage by holding positions on 
     high ground. About \1/2\ of the U.S. troops were evacuated by 
     helicopters; the remaining soldiers walked out of the valley.
       (A U.S. military spokesman in Saigon had reported Nov. 5 
     that 5 regiments of North Vietnam's 325th Division were in 
     operation in South Vietnam.)
                                                                    ____


                Vietnam War Almanac--Battle of Ia Drang

            (By Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry)

       Although it was not apparent at the time, the Battle of the 
     Ia Drang Valley between elements of the U.S. Army's First Air 
     Cavalry Division and regiments of the North Vietnamese Army 
     was especially significant. It not only marked the first 
     major engagement between American and North Vietnamese 
     troops, it also presaged the final campaign almost 10 years 
     later that would lead to the total collapse of South Vietnam.
       In 1964 the North Vietnamese Politburo had made the 
     decision to commit regular army units to the war in the 
     south. After a buildup in supposedly neutral Cambodia, the 
     North Vietnamese intended to attack across the Central 
     Highlands and drive to the sea, splitting South Vietnam in 
     two and ultimately seizing the entire country. They executed 
     this plan on October 19, 1965 with an attack on the U.S. 
     Special Forces camp at Plei Me, but they did not foresee the 
     reaction to this attack. General William Westmoreland made 
     the decision to commit the U.S. Army First Air Cavalry 
     Division, just arrived from the United States, to the relief 
     of Plei Me. The division's helicopters enabled it to fly over 
     enemy roadblocks, and its firepower was instrumental in 
     breaking the Plei Me siege. On October 26, South Vietnamese 
     relief forces were able to break through to the camp. With 
     this success, General Westmoreland ordered the U.S. First Air 
     Cavalry Division to switch from defensive to offensive 
     operations and its reconnaissance units began to seek out the 
     fleeing enemy.
       Unknown to the Americans, the North Vietnamese Army's 
     2,000-man 66th Regiment, joined by the 700 survivors of the 
     33rd Regiment that had laid siege to Plei Me, was regrouping 
     in the Ia Drang Valley to the southwest. On November 14, the 
     430 men of the U.S. First Battalion, Seventh Cavalry were 
     ordered to make a helicopter assault into what appeared to be 
     an unoccupied landing zone in the Ia Drang Valley. As soon as 
     they landed they came in contact with elements of the North 
     Vietnamese Army 66th Regiment. Fighting was intense and one 
     U.S. platoon was cut off from the main body. Reinforced by 
     air by elements of the U.S. Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry 
     and supported by intense artillery and air support, including 
     strikes by B-52 bombers, the First Battalion was able to hold 
     on in the face of heavy odds. On November 15 it was further 
     reinforced by the Second Battalion, Fifth Cavalry, which had 
     moved by air to a landing zone some two and a half miles to 
     the southeast and had marched overland to the sound of guns. 
     Thus reinforced, the First Battalion, Seventh Cavalry was 
     finally able to reestablish contact with its isolated 
     platoon. The North Vietnamese broke contact, with some troops 
     fleeing back across the border into Cambodia and others 
     fleeing eastward into the jungles of the Ia Drang Valley.
       Ten years later the North Vietnamese would launch their 
     Final Offensive to conquer South Vietnam just a few miles 
     south of Ia Drang Valley with their attack on Ban Me Thuot on 
     March 10, 1975. They had tipped their hand to their long-
     range strategic objectives in 1965, but because the United 
     States was so obsessed with the doctrines of 
     counterinsurgency, it could not see that with the Battle of 
     Ia Drang the entire nature of the war had changed. The North 
     Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong, would prove to be the 
     decisive military force in the war.

  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Torkildsen].
  Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the National Security 
Committee, I rise in strong support of the bill offered by my friend 
and colleague from Colorado.
  Before this Congress offers its support for any commitment of troops, 
several critical questions must be answered.
  What are United States interests in Bosnia? Are they solely 
humanitarian, or does the U.S. have other interests in the area as 
well?
  What are United States objectives in Bosnia?
  Can the commitment of U.S. troops protect these interests and achieve 
these objectives? If yes, how many Americans will be expected to give 
their lives to protect these interests and achieve these goals.
  These are the questions that must be answered in advance of any 
congressional support to commit troops to this or any other area. I 
have voted in the past to give this President, and any President, the 
greatest possible leeway in setting the foreign policy of the United 
States.
  But I cannot sit back and allow a President to commit troops to a 
part of the world when he has not defined U.S. interests, and has not 
identified what his objectives are.
  Mr. Speaker, I reject the notion that this Chamber should withhold 
judgment on the critical issue of whether or not to commit troops while 
talks are underway in Dayton.
  As we learned in Beirut and Somalia, once deployed, even for the most 
humanitarian and noblest of reasons, United States forces often become 
a target of aggression rather than a symbol of peace.
  Peace may well be the objective, but the deployment of tens of 
thousands of American soldiers in Bosnia may escalate the conflict 
beyond anything this administration acknowledges.
  I ask my colleagues to support this bill and require the Congress to 
be involved in any decision to commit troops in Bosnia.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cox], chairman of our Republican Policy Committee.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, this debate comes on a day when 
the hot news topics in Washington are the Government shutdown, the 
question of whether we will raise the debt ceiling, whether we will 
pass a Balanced Budget Act. But I think all of us, if we pause for a 
moment, recognize that 6 months from now that will not matter so much. 
That will be old news. The Government will be back operating again and 
we will have our Balanced Budget Act in place and the debt ceiling will 
have been raised.
  The more important decision is the one we are voting on tonight. I 
venture to say it is the most important decision we will make in the 
104th Congress. Six months from now, this decision will undoubtedly 
loom large. What we do or do not do tonight is irrevocable. We cannot 
take it back.
  I support the peace process. I congratulate President Clinton for 
bringing the parties together. But if we fail to act now, while there 
is still time, then, yes, an agreement will proceed 

[[Page H13244]]
for Dayton, one built on the false premise that the United States will 
commit over 200,000 combat ground troops to Bosnia.
  If we do nothing tonight, United States will have negligently sidled 
into the Balkans trying to be neutral just weeks after bombing the 
Serbs; treating war criminals like Slobodan Milosevic the same as 
victims of hideous ethnic cleansing; foolishly inviting Russian troops 
into Central Europe without any guaranty that they will not continue to 
side with the Serbs, without any guaranty that they will leave when we 
want them to; putting United States ground troops into the middle of a 
three-way crossfire with no military objective other than to be shot 
at.
  If we do nothing tonight, make no mistake, it will be an 
irretrievable decision. While Congress could theoretically vote on this 
question after the commitment is made in Dayton, the reality is, as NPR 
has reported tonight, prepositioning troops will move into the Balkans 
from the United States within hours. Fourteen days later, when the 
final agreement is initialed, it will take, according to NPR, having 
been just briefed by the Pentagon, no more than 72 hours to get the 
bulk of the 20,000 United States troops on to the ground in Bosnia.
  We will have no chance to turn back. And if we did, we would be 
voting to unravel the peace agreement. How responsible would that be? 
We would be voting to make seemingly worthless the executive commitment 
of the President of the United States in Dayton, OH. It is much more 
responsible to act now while there is still time.
  Mr. Speaker, what is really at stake here is not the unquestioned 
power of the Commander-in-Chief to send troops anywhere he likes on the 
planet. He has the power. What is at stake here tonight is the power of 
the purse, because the Congress also has the power to pay for or not to 
pay for things over which we approve or disapprove.
  The administration has made it clear they will send these troops. I 
have been down to the White House three times in the last few weeks. 
They have said so. If we fail to act tonight, we will be acquiescing to 
plans to divert funds from other vital and legitimate national security 
functions that will represent nothing less than an usurpation of this 
Congress' power of the purse.
  I urge Members to vote yes on the Hefley bill, to act responsibly 
tonight and to say no while there is still time.

                              {time}  2000

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, some Members rise with answers. I rise 
tonight with a question. What is wrong with us? What has become of this 
Chamber where for generations we have come together for common national 
purpose? Has our appetite for partisan differing made us lose our taste 
for national purpose? Is it not enough that the Government of our 
country has been paralyzed by bipartisan bickering that now, indeed, a 
desire to embarrass our President can make us lose a chance for a 
desperately needed peace?
  Several hundred miles from here, in Dayton, OH, there is just a 
chance that the worst human carnage in a generation can be brought to a 
close, while in Bosnia the soil is still fresh from the mass graves of 
the victims. Children still seek to heal from their wounds. And yet 
there is an end in sight, just a chance that peace can be restored.
  It is not right, it is not right that in a few moments from now we 
will have a vote and those negotiations will be interrupted by the 
passing of notes to those who came from peace and are told that the 
United States has lost the resolve. Our secretary of State has lost the 
credibility. Our President has been undermined.
   Mr. Speaker, I do not come here tonight holding any brief for the 
President of the United States. I believed long ago we should have 
given the Bosnians the right to arm themselves. I come here for no 
administration but for the purpose of national unity at a time when we 
can give meaning to these peace negotiations.
  Mr. Speaker, from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf, Democrats and 
Republicans have come to this floor, to this Chamber and put aside 
partisanship for national purpose. Indeed, it has become a national 
axiom, a national division stops at the water's edge.
  Tonight this President has asked for no troops. He has proposed no 
plan of military involvement. Indeed, he has pledged to come to the 
this floor and ask for Members' support before we take that national 
step.
  Mr. Speaker, if this were the British parliament and this vote were 
to pass, this government would come down. We have a different system. 
Our government will endure, but it will not be the same.
  American power does not rest on our armed forces alone. We are not 
respected simply because of our wealth. We are respected, indeed, the 
combatants tonight are in Dayton and not in Paris and not in London and 
not in Rome, because of the credibility of those who sat in these 
chairs before us, generations of Americans who came here and put their 
partisan affiliations beside.
  Mr. Speaker, that credibility is at issue tonight. I ask that this 
resolution be defeated. I ask that we stand together. I ask that we 
give the peace of Bosnia a chance and stand with Bill Clinton just for 
these days.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hoke].
  (Mr. HOKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HOKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Buyer], a gentleman who has invested an enormous amount of 
himself and his time in this effort.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, this is not about scoring political points 
tonight. I have worked with many of my Democrat colleagues, the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] and others, the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Roemer], on this issue, along with my Republican 
colleagues.
  If this body does not want to send ground troops to Bosnia, when do 
we deliver that blow? Do we do it while the parties and the diplomats 
are at the table, or do we wait until the diplomats go home? I would 
say that we place a greater blow than once they go home.
  Let me add something that is thought provoking. I have been sitting 
there watching many come to the well in argument, and the Gulf war has 
been referenced. I have watched many, this is very thought provoking, 
from the last vote that we had there are many who voted that said, yes, 
it is all right to send ground troops to Bosnia, but voted against use 
of force in the Gulf war. I think that is extremely thought provoking.
  When vital national security interests are at stake, vote no. But 
vote yes to send troops in harm's way to an ill-conceived, poorly 
defined and highly dangerous mission.
  I will share with Members that I stand here tonight with the soldiers 
who took an oath to give their life to protect freedoms, liberties and 
economic opportunities. Sending troops in harm's way is very serious. 
Some feel that it is the military's job and there is something glorious 
about flexing our might.

  My colleagues, war may sound glorious in verse or prose, but in 
reality it is not, because it is the soldier, the sailor, the airman 
and marine who sees the face of death and witnesses the long dark 
shadows of horror. But glory is found in the new levels of courage and 
fear that erupt from the American character.
  However, the strength of the American soldier's character is in her 
willingness or his willingness to give the ultimate sacrifice to 
protect United States vital security interests, not for an ill-
conceived, poorly defined and highly dangerous proposal that places 
ground troops as a predicate to a peace agreement.
  We can, the United States, and should participate in the peace 
process by providing our leadership in NATO, our air power and sea 
power, our airlift and sealift and our logistical support. But we must 
vote now, not later, now, while they are at the table.
  I ask my colleagues to support the Hefley amendment and send that 
message.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  
[[Page H13245]]

  Mr. Speaker, we are down to the last two speakers, the tail end of 
this debate. I would like to conclude this debate where my 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] began 
this debate.
  My friend and my colleague started this debate saying today is about 
American lives. With all due and profound respect to my colleague, I 
would dissent from that. Tonight is not about American lives. It is not 
about American lives because we all know that the predicate for 
deployment of American troops is a peace plan. There is no peace plan. 
Therefore, there is no request for the deployment of American troops. 
Therefore, this is not about American lives. The appropriate moment and 
the appropriate forum for that to take place is when the predicate 
becomes a reality.
  So what is tonight about? Tonight is about the lives of people who 
are living in Bosnia-Herzegovina at this moment. It is not about 
American lives. It is about the lives of people over there, the lives 
that many of us came into this Chamber just a few months ago, with 
wringing hands about the murder, the slaughter, the rape and the pain 
of people.
  I saw many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle march into the 
well with anger and with pain and with raw emotion about how women were 
plundered and raped, children killed, 16,000 of them, thousands of 
people dying in the insanity of ethnic cleansing. And as a black man, I 
understand that.
  I would like to have believed that I would have had the courage and 
the dignity, in the context of Nazi Germany, to stand up and rise above 
the notion of narrowly construed vital national interests to assume the 
moral responsibility to say that we have the responsibility to save 
human lives.
  So tonight is not about American troops. That issue is somewhere 
else. It is about those lives you cared about.
  Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress voted to unilaterally lift the arms 
embargo because they were angry and frustrated at the killing, the 
dying and the slaughter and the rape and the plunder. And you argued 
that point on moral grounds.
  I came here 25 years to raise my voice as an advocate of peace and 
the moral argument. It defied logic for me because I could not 
understand what was moral about placing more weapons in the hands of 
people so they could continue to slaughter, maim and kill each other.
  I believe, Mr. Speaker, that the human being has the capacity to rise 
beyond that level of cannibalism, beyond that level of caveman 
mentality. I believe that we can rise to a higher order of how we deal 
with each other. Tonight is not about American lives. It is about those 
lives we cared about. If we could raise the moral argument that the 
only thing left to do was to lift the arms embargo, why then are we now 
presented with a new option?
  People now who were slaughtering and killing each other are sitting 
down around a negotiating table. That has been my greatest dream. My 
argument has been that peace is a superior idea and the table of 
diplomacy is the best battlefield, not out there in the hinterlands 
killing, slaughtering and maiming human beings.
  If you believe that so strongly, if you care about those human lives, 
then why is this about American lives when that is not the issue? Care 
about those people you cared about when you wanted to lift the arms 
embargo. Assume the moral imperative to embrace the notion that peace 
is a superior idea.

  I have given my life to that notion. Suddenly, I would say to my 
colleague from California, the world is turned around. It has turned 
around because we find ourselves in the context of the post-cold war 
era where war itself is the enemy, where the challenge is peace. 
Remember what Rabin said, he said, you do not have to make peace with 
your friends. You make it with your enemies. And that is tough going. 
But we should do nothing in these Chambers that would shake that 
fragile process called peace, where people are engaging in the 
Herculean task of moving from the field of blood to the negotiating 
table where they have a possibility for peace.
  As I said earlier today, there are moments, folks, when we need to 
rise far beyond pedestrianism, rise above our partisanship, rise above 
all of these things to achieve a lofty place, that notion that what we 
do makes sense.
  We will have the chance, whether you are for or against deployment of 
the troops, that is a proper question. You have the right to step up to 
it. I stand second to no one in these Chambers about Congress's 
prerogatives. I took the President to the court of the United States to 
guarantee constitutional prerogatives when many of my colleagues did 
not have the heart to do it. I did it, if I had to stand alone.
  So I believe in the right and the responsibility. I believe the 
President of the United States, as a practical matter, needs to come 
here to the people's representatives any time you put people in harm's 
way.
  I conclude, tonight is not about American lives. It is about the 
lives of the people in Bosnia, and I think we have a moral obligation 
to stand on the threshold of peace.
  I urge my colleagues to defeat this proposition.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Flanagan].
  (Mr. FLANAGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FLANAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the measure.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], first of 
all, I would like to start by thanking him for the level of this 
debate. By and large I think the level of this debate was excellent, 
considering the emotional foundation of it, how strongly we feel. I 
respect the passion that the gentleman just expressed here on this 
House floor. I appreciate that tremendously.
  The gentleman says that we predicate sending troops on a peace plan. 
Let me say to my friend that we should have predicated committing 
troops on a peace plan, cart before the horse. We should not have 
committed and then say, oh, you have got to back up the commitment, 
when we have not even seen a peace plan.
  What we are saying by this legislation tonight is that we want to see 
the peace plan; we want the arguments made. We want the questions 
answered. And then we may say, OK, it is worth doing.
  Most of the disagreement tonight is about time. Member after Member 
on that side went to the floor and said, I may vote against sending 
troops but the time is not right.

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. Speaker, let me say to my colleagues that I think, if we do not 
do it tonight, in this time, and insist that the President bring this 
matter before this House before troops hit the ground over there, the 
time is lost, the time is gone. If this hurts the peace process, then 
the peace process is too fragile for us to risk lives in.
  I do not think this will hurt the peace process. What we are saving 
to the President is to get us together, how much stronger the process 
would be if we are together, Congress, and the President, and the 
American people on this.
  Mr. Speaker, I am sorry, but I have to personalize this a little bit. 
I had one of our Members, one of our colleagues, come to me before the 
debate started tonight and said, ``Joel, I have an 18-year-old son that 
I do not want to go to Bosnia,'' and I think of that when I make these 
kinds of decisions. Have I been given the information necessary to say 
to my three daughters:
  Janet, Bosnia is worth it; Laurie, go to Bosnia for your country; 
Julie, we need you to go to Bosnia.
  And I would ask every Member in this Chamber to personalize it a 
little bit. Based on the evidence we have, would my colleagues say, 
yes, let us send our children, our fathers, our brothers, our sisters 
to Bosnia? Do my colleagues have the answer of ``for what?'' For a 
vague dream that it might create peace? Somalia. For What? Twenty-nine 
Americans lost. We sent some people, we did some good; but for what? 
Lebanon 241 lost. For What? Vietnam, 58,000 lost, and we look back on 
it today.
  I talked to a Vietnam Veteran yesterday who said, ``The reason the 
pain of Vietnam is still so in people's hearts is because they cannot 
answer the ``for what?''

[[Page H13246]]

  I sometimes go to Arlington Cemetery to help remind me what this 
country is based on. Started burying people there in 1863. Civil war; 
we could answer the for what. First World War; we could answer the for 
what. Second World War; the answers were there.
  And all we are asking is that the President come down here and tell 
us, before he puts troops there, he tells us for what.
  As my colleagues know, in the Book of Revelations the scripture tells 
us to beware of those who cry or shout peace peace when there is no 
peace, and I am afraid that is the situation we have here. Before our 
troops hit the ground, I want the answer for what.
  I would encourage support of the Hefley bill.
  Mr. KIM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2606, the pending 
legislation that would prohibit the unauthorized use of Defense 
Department funds for sending United States ground troops to Bosnia.
  I realize that the situation in Bosnia is very complex and that the 
peace negotiations between the warring parties are at a very sensitive 
stage. I appreciate the concerns of some that every possible effort 
should be made to avoid adding further complications and questions to 
these peace talks. Therefore, given these circumstances, it is 
unfortunate that it has become necessary to consider and adopt H.R. 
2606 today.
  Approximately 2 years ago, President Clinton first stated that if a 
peace settlement in Bosnia was reached, he would commit United States 
troops to any larger NATO peacekeeping force. Clearly, the deployment 
of American military forces in as dangerous an environment as Bosnia 
should occur only after the Congress and the American people have been 
convinced that such action is absolutely necessary and that a 
comprehensive political and military plan for such action has been 
developed. yet, up to the present time, these conditions have not been 
met--even in the most minimal of fashion.
  As a member of the International Relations Committee, I have received 
many briefings from many different administration officials regarding 
Bosnia. In his own testimony before our committee, Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher laid out the four criteria that he said had to be 
met before the deployment of any U.S. forces: First, the goals must be 
clear and understandable to the American people. Second, the chances of 
success must be high. Third, the American people must support the 
effort. And, fourth, an exit strategy for getting the troops out must 
be established from the beginning. None of these criteria have yet been 
met, setting the stage for another Somalia debacle.
  Despite these failures, it appears that the administration is blindly 
committed to sending substantial numbers of American ground forces into 
the Bosnian quagmire. The argument is made that modifying or 
conditioning this hastily-made commitment could jeopardize the Bosnia 
peace process. Everything seems to revolve around the purported 
overwhelming need for American military participation.
  I understand the humanitarian motivation behind trying to end the 
bloodshed and suffering in Bosnia as soon as possible. However, Bosnian 
lives are not worth more than American lives. And, risking the lives of 
thousands--potentially tens of thousands--of American military 
personnel is a very, very serious matter. It must be treated as such.
  Furthermore, I do not believe that a genuine, lasting peace in Bosnia 
is completely contingent on American ground forces. Consider the 
current paradox: if American troops and the military might they possess 
are required to stop the fighting in Bosnia, then it sounds to me like 
the warring factions really haven't reached a true peace settlement. 
They've really just been cowered into stopping their fighting by the 
overwhelming power of the United States military. Conversely, if the 
warring factions have truly found a way to live with and not kill each 
other, then why are American troops absolutely necessary? If neutral 
observers are needed to for peace monitoring purposes, why must they be 
American?
  Because Congress is concerned about the administration's perceived 
indifference to these issues, on October 30, the House, with my ``yes'' 
vote, adopted H. Res. 247 urging the President to obtain Congressional 
approval before deploying any United States troops in Bosnia. While 
this was a non-binding resolution, its passage nonetheless should have 
sent a very strong message to the administration about the serious 
problems Congress and the American people have with its current Bosnia 
policy. Unfortunately, it seems to me that this important message was 
received by deaf ears.
  Thus, I feel it has become necessary for Congress to assert its 
constitutional authority and require the administration to receive the 
approval of the American people--through their representatives in 
Congress--before any American ground forces go to Bosnian. This was the 
process used before committing to Operation Desert Storm during the 
Persian Gulf War and it resulted in overwhelming success. Any future 
American military operations should try to duplicate the success of 
Desert Storm, not repeat the failure of Somalia. That is what H.R. 2606 
is designed to do and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting it 
today.
  Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. I oppose H.R. 2606 which prohibits the use 
of Defense Department funds for United States participation in a multi-
national effort to implement a future peace agreement in Bosnia.
  The national interest of the United States is at stake. United States 
foreign policy should be concerned with the security and stability of 
Europe.
  Finally, we should support American participation in a NATO alliance 
with other countries. This is our job and responsibility to take a 
leadership role in ending the war. Without U.S. participation, NATO 
will be hard pressed to enforce a peace agreement.
  There must be international military presence to give parties to the 
Bosnian conflict the confidence that they can lay down their arms and 
begin rebuilding their nation.
  This bill that is before us will seriously derail the peace process 
and cause havoc in the entire region. The United States must not turn 
its eyes on the massive human rights violations.
  I have been fighting for human rights for a long time. The bloody 
conflict of ethnic cleansing must end.
  Democracy can be restored and democratic institutions of government 
at the regional and national levels will flourish if the United States 
keeps their promise to the peace efforts.
  Also by limiting the President's authority as this bill will do, 
risks derailing the negotiating before any such settlement can be 
reached.
  How can the United States work toward reaching a settlement with the 
Serbs and Croats when we are not willing to support the cause?
  Let us defeat this measure. This undermines everything we have worked 
for in the name of peace. This is a crucial time.
  Mr. EWING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. 
I first want to thank the leadership in Congress for their quick 
movement and attention to this issue.
  The President says that he wants to put 25,000 American men and women 
in Bosnia in order to facilitate a peace process. I think this action 
would be a mistake and has raised many questions not only in my mind, 
but in the minds of many Americans.
  The President is asking Congress to blindly fund American involvement 
in an ethnic battle which represents no national security interest to 
America. The President has failed to explain to the American people 
what our goals and objectives are in Bosnia or what national security 
issues are at stake. While we are all deeply concerned about the 
terrible ethnic warfare in Bosnia, we cannot send American troops into 
a deadly situation without a clear mission, a timetable for their 
commitment, and a plan for getting them out. I do not think one 
American life is worth the President's misdirected, uncoordinated, 
loosely defined mission in Bosnia. I urge a ``yes'' vote on this 
legislation.
  Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2606, 
prohibiting the use of funds for the deployment of United States forces 
in Bosnia for peacekeeping operations. By interfering with the 
constitutional responsibilities of the President of the United States 
this bill retreats from our obligations as Americans and world citizens 
to establish peace throughout the world. As the recent tragedy of the 
atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia clearly demonstrate, this is no time 
for America to retire from the world community.
  The stated objective of H.R. 2606 is to prohibit the use of funds 
appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the 
deployment of United States ground forces in furtherance of the peace 
in Bosnia. This shortsighted and rushed legislation will reorder 
American foreign policy objectives by interfering with the peace 
negotiations taking place now in my home State of Ohio.
  Bosnia has been torn by warring factions engulfed in a brutal civil 
war. The current level of tensions in Bosnia represent a real threat to 
world peace. On June 9, 1994, the House of Representatives voted 244 to 
178 to unilaterally lift the arms embargo of bosnia. I voted against 
this effort.
  It has been and continues to be my position that the United States 
should exercise leadership on this issue and continue to work with the 
international community to restore peace to the region. This includes 
support for the peace process, permitting humanitarian aid to the 
citizens of Bosnia and enforcing international laws prohibiting 
genocide.
  Just last week this house voted 315 to 103 to support a resolution 
that stated that no United States Armed Forces should be deployed in 
Bosnia to enforce the peace process. Sensitive to the wishes of 
Congress, the President stated that if the negotiations in Ohio are 
successful, he will seek Congress' support for any 

[[Page H13247]]
future deployment of ground forces in Bosnia. There is simply no need 
for H.R. 2606.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2606 will not only undermine the peace process in 
Bosnia, it also compromises the President's initiatives in foreign 
affairs. In a seven to one decision, the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304(1936) held 
that because of ``fundamental differences'' in national power with 
respect to internal and external affairs, the President of the United 
States possesses additional prerogatives in the foreign affairs field 
that in my opinion this resolution compromises. This bill seeks to 
hamper the ability of the United States to follow through with its 
obligations to contribute to maintaining peace in Bosnia.
  Contrary to the arguments that have been made by the supporters of 
H.R. 2606, President Clinton demonstrated admirable leadership in the 
quest for peace in Bosnia. Negotiations taking place in my home State 
of Ohio offer the best chance for peace in Bosnia since the war began 
nearly 4 years ago. Continued American leadership is vital if we are to 
seize that chance and do what is right for Bosnia, for Europe and for 
the United States.
  Making peace will prevent a war we have managed to keep from 
spreading. Making peace in Bosnia will promote our goal of a peaceful, 
democratic and undivided Europe. A Europe at peace will make America 
more secure and more prosperous. We should not at this critical moment 
short circuit the peace process in Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt that with the end of the cold war the 
United States now reigns supreme as the world's only superpower. Over 
the past 7 years, our foreign policy has undergone a massive 
undertaking to adjust to a post-cold war world which as allowed us to 
help promote peace throughout the world. I urge my colleagues to vote 
against the bill.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, as a Member of Congress, I feel strongly 
that no United States troops should be deployed as part of a 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia without prior congressional authorization.
  That is why the November 13, 1995, correspondence from the President 
to the Speaker of the House is so important. In that letter, the 
President stated:

       I will submit a request for a Congressional expression of 
     support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation 
     Force in Bosnia promptly if and when the parties have 
     initiated an agreement that I consider to be a genuine 
     agreement and after I have reviewed the final NATO 
     operational plan
       After initialing of an agreement, there will be a timely 
     opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon my request 
     for support before American forces are deployed in Bosnia.

  In light of this assurance, I cannot support the resolution before 
the House.
  This resolution appears to be driven by a political motive to 
embarrass the President, irrespective of the peace negotiations 
underway between the warring parties in Dayton, Ohio.
  The carnage and devastation in the Former Yugoslavia has been far too 
tragic to jeopardize the fragile hope of reaching a peace accord in any 
way by premature congressional action.
  The President has said he will send no troops without a prior vote in 
Congress. If that event would occur, I will vote against sending troops 
unless a compelling case is made to justify the U.S. commitment.
  I will reserve judgment on this important issue until all relevant 
facts are known, including the precise mission and objectives of U.S. 
forces, the number of troops, the length of the mission, the risk to 
U.S. troops, the probability of success, and the equity of our role 
relative to our NATO partners.
  Congress--by the vote today--is callously jeopardizing vitally 
important peace talks. The memories of all the innocent men, women and 
children whose lies have been lost in this savage civil war deserve 
more responsible action by us sitting comfortably here in the House of 
Representatives this afternoon.
  Mr. LAZIO of New York. Mr. Speaker, there is an old maxim that we 
ignore at our own peril when we consider sending United States troops 
to Bosnia: ``Look before you leap.''
  Before we leap towards sending the young men and women of our Armed 
Forces to former Yugoslavia, we ought to know where they will go, what 
they will do when they get there and how they will get home.
  Will our Armed Forces be assigned to keeping the peace or creating 
peace between the various warring factions? What will the rules of 
engagement be? Will our troops be able to adequately defend themselves? 
Will there be clearly defined and obtainable military objectives? Will 
there be a clear exit strategy and a finite time commitment? And will 
the mission have the full support of the American people?
  Until we have clear, unambiguous answers to these questions, we 
should not be sending United States troops into harm's way, in Bosnia 
or anywhere else.
  Recent history shows that well-intentioned peacekeeping missing 
sometimes end in disaster. Take the case of Somalia. This tragedy did 
not just result in the loss of young American lives, it led to the loss 
of American prestige and raised serious questions about American 
resolve among our friends and our foes.
  The three sides involved in this conflict, Bosnians, Croats, and 
Serbs are meeting for peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in 
Dayton, OH as we speak. On October 30, 1995, the House overwhelming 
approved a bipartisan resolution stating that there should be no 
presumption by the parties of any Bosnia peace negotiations that the 
enforcement of any peace agreement will involved the deployment of 
United States troops. We all pray that these talks will produce a 
lasting peace agreement on which all sides will agree. At the same 
time, I feel strongly that if the President wants to commit our nation 
to a military role in the former Yugoslavia, he should first make the 
case to the American people,and get the approval of Congress.

  This bill prohibits the use of funds appropriated to the Department 
of Defense to pay for the deployment of United States ground forces, or 
any implementation force, in Bosnia, as part of a peacekeeping 
operation, unless such funds have been specifically appropriated by 
Congress for that purpose. Article I of the Constitution gives the 
legislative branch, the one that is closest to the people, the power of 
the purse, and the power to declare war. This measure simply fulfills 
our constitutional duty.
  Without a doubt, the atrocities that the world has witnessed in 
Bosnia are reprehensible. That is why I supported lifting the United 
Nations arms embargo, so that the Bosnian victims of that embargo could 
defend themselves. But sending our sons and daughters who wear our 
country's uniform to Bosnia is quite a different matter.
  We must look before we leap into a region that has been embroiled in 
conflict for generations. The stakes are far too high for precipitous 
action. Let's not give the President a free hand to send our troops to 
Bosnia without a full debate by this Congress. I urge my colleagues to 
vote for this proposal.
  Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this 
legislation to prohibit an unauthorized commitment of United States 
troops to Bosnia.
  The war raging in Bosnia is one of the most terrible, unexpected 
results of the end of the cold war. No longer restrained by superpower 
rivalry, the ethnic and religious hatreds of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and 
Moslems have been unleashed in an awful conflict. Sound evidence has 
recently come to light which shows Bosnian Serbs executed thousands of 
Moslems prisoners. There is also evidence of Croats shooting innocent 
Serbs and of Bosnian Moslems summarily executing Serbs. We should all 
pray for the success of the negotiations in Dayton.
  However, President Clinton's desire to commit up to 25,000 American 
troops to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement is another matter. One of 
the hallmarks of the Clinton administration is its propensity to commit 
American troops to dubious causes. We all remember the disastrous loss 
of American lives in Somalia when President Clinton elected to expand a 
humanitarian mission to one of ``nation building.'' And while we are 
relieved the invasion of Haiti was accomplished without loss of life, 
at this point it appears we have only succeeded in replacing a right-
wing military junta with a left-wing strongman. In neither case did 
President Clinton elect to seek the consent of Congress even though 
Congress was then controlled by his own party.
  Bosnia is shaping up to be a similar situation. Approximately 2 years 
ago President Clinton pledged American troops as part of a NATO force 
to enforce a Bosnian peace agreement. Recently, the President has asked 
for an ``expression of support'' from Congress. But the President has 
also made clear that his deployment of American troops to Bosnia does 
not need the approval of Congress. If we take no action now, President 
Clinton may send troops to Bosnia over the holiday recess and then dare 
Congress to take the only action constitutionally left to its disposal, 
cutting off funds in the midst of deployment.
  Mr. Speaker, at this point I simply see no national interest worthy 
of risking American lives in Bosnia. NATO was formed to defend Europe 
and the United States from communist aggression. It was not formed to 
act as referee to a centuries-old ethnic and religious conflict in the 
Balkans. If the parties truly want peace, an American presence is not 
necessary. This terrible situation's best hope for an enduring peace is 
in Dayton, OH, and on an agreement which is not based on American guns 
to enforce it.
  I urge my colleagues strongly to support this bill.
  Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R 
2606 to prohibit the unauthorized use of Defense Department funds for 
peacekeeping in Bosnia.

[[Page H13248]]

  Although I supported the Buyer-McHale resolution last month, that 
resolution was nonbinding and does not have the effect of law. 
President Clinton said publicly that passage of the Buyer resolution 
will not have ``any effect'' on the current settlement negotiations in 
Dayton.
  I had pushed to include binding language in the fiscal year 1996 
Department of Defense appropriations conference report, but H.R. 2606, 
if passed, will achieve the same objective; it will prohibit troop 
deployment until Congress has authorized such a deployment.
  The arguments against this bill and the timing of this vote are 
simply misguided:
  This prohibition is not premature. We cannot wait. It would be more 
irresponsible to cut off funds after the troops are already committed.
  Such action is not unconstitutional. The President does have the 
power as Commander-in-Chief to send troops abroad, but Congress has the 
constitutional authority to appropriate funds for the deployment of 
troops--or not appropriate funds.
  This legislation will not hurt the peace process. Rather, it will 
prevent the President from making commitments the American people do 
not want to fulfill.
  We are not tying the President's hands. If he makes a compelling case 
to the American people that 25,000 American service men and women are 
needed to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, Congress will authorize 
the funds for such a deployment.
  Mr. Speaker, I welcome a debate on whether or not the United States 
should send ground troops to Bosnia. But until that debate occurs, and 
until I am convinced that sending American men and women to Bosnia is 
the proper course of action, I intend to do everything in my power to 
keep us out of that civil war.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2606.
  Mr. MARTINI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2606 and 
ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.
  The President of the United States is on the verge of committing our 
sons and daughters to a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.
  In May of this year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 
established very specific criteria that should be met prior to the 
commitment of American ground troops in Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, in the opinion of this Member of Congress the President 
has not satisfied his own stipulations.
  In view of this I firmly believe it is a reasonable request that the 
President should be required to gain approval from this Congress before 
one American life is placed in harms ways.
  The commitment of U.S. troops to foreign soil is the most awesome 
power that the President possess.
  We owe it to the American people and to the brave men and women who 
proudly serve their country in uniform to pass H.R. 2606.
  Let us send the President a message by passing his important 
legislation today.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hobson). All time has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 243, 
noes 171, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 814]

                               AYES--243

     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martini
     McCollum
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Wyden
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--171

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Callahan
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Davis
     de la Garza
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     King
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Longley
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     White
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--2

     Harman
     Lofgren
       

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Baker (LA)
     Brewster
     Collins (IL)
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Hyde
     Largent
     Livingston
     McCrery
     McDermott
     Neumann
     Smith (MI)
     Stark
     Tucker
     Volkmer
     Waxman

                              {time}  2038

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Stark for, with Mr. Waxman against.

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.