[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 176 (Wednesday, November 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H11912-H11913]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           TEN COMMANDMENTS FOR COMMITTING U.S. COMBAT FORCES

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I was going to spend all of my 5 minutes on 
one of the more offensive stories ever to appear in an American paper 
on foreign policy, and that is Robert Strange McNamara. That truly is 
his mother's name, ``Strange.'' Robert Strange McNamara arrived in 
Hanoi yesterday, first time he has been back there since he was the 
architect of a no-win war, struggle, against communism that took the 
lives of 8 American women and over 58,600 American men, about 47,000 of 
those in combat against a tough Communist enemy. The story in today's 
Washington Times says McNamara looks for lesson in Vietnam, that he 
returns to ask Hanoi for documents.
  Unbelievable. I will probably do a much longer special order on this 
war criminal. That is spelled w-a-r c-r-i-m-i-n-a-l, war criminal, 
Robert Strange McNamara, the most disgraceful Cabinet officer, and that 
includes some pretty bad financial scandals in the entire 206-year 
history of this country since the Father of our country, George 
Washington, was sworn in in April of 1789.

  Before I talk about Bosnia, which is the main reason I am speaking 
tonight, let me just make mention of another ghastly footnote in 
American history.
  The U.S. Senate sent to committee the infanticide bill, what some 
people call the partial-birth abortion, but it is infanticide of a 
living human body that is totally outside of the mother's birth canal 
except for its head. I watched one Senator slaughtered last night by 
both Ted Koppel and another Senator on ``Nightline,'' and my friend, 
Bob Smith of New Hampshire, is a stalwart and flying with the angels 
again on the floor of the Senate yesterday. But this is incredible, we 
cannot get this bill against infanticide out of this Congress. But we 
have not stopped fighting, and we will prevail.
  Mr. Speaker, today to three distinguished panelists at a hearing at 
the National Security Committee, I gave them 10 commandments that 
should be followed before we commit U.S. combat forces to anywhere in 
the world, and then I analyzed each one of these commandments. I have 
submitted them for the Record maybe 10 times here on the House floor 
over the last 3 or 4 years, particularly since the slaughter of our 
fine young Delta Force rangers, helicopters pilots and Delta Force 
snipers in the filthy alleys of Mogadishu. I put an analysis to each 
one of these 10 commandments. The first 6, as I have said many times on 
the floor, are conceived, crafted, by a great Secretary of Defense, the 
antithesis to a McNamara; that is ``Cap'' Weinberger, and I added the 
other 4 in counsel with ``Cap'' Weinberger about these other 4, and I 
put it in Mosaic language, 10 ``thou shalt nots.'' I will put them in 
the Record, and I will beg all million people, 1,300,000 that watch the 
proceedings of the world's greatest legislative body. I had asked them 
to write their Congressman and ask out of today's Record, the 1-year 
anniversary of the big upset election last year, ask for the Record of 
November 8, 1995, and get these commandments and my analysis of why we 
are violating each one, and in my remaining time I will read the 
Weinberger-Dornan commandments:

               [From the Washington Times, Nov. 8, 1995]

                  McNamara Looks for Lesson in Vietnam


                   Returns to ask Hanoi for documents

       Hanoi.--Robert McNamara returned to Vietnam yesterday for 
     the first time since the end of the war he helped escalate in 
     the 1960s, and he hopes to persuade the country to open its 
     archives on the conflict.
       ``We're here, obviously, for one reason--to see if Vietnam 
     and the United States can draw lessons from what was a 
     tragedy for 

[[Page H 11913]]
     both sides,'' Mr. McNamara told reporters after arriving in the 
     Vietnamese capital.
       The former U.S. defense secretary wrote in memoirs 
     published in the spring that American participation in the 
     Vietnam War was ``terribly wrong.'' His current trip to the 
     former enemy capital is to propose a conference of war-era 
     decision-makers from both countries.
       Mr. McNamara, who was defense secretary from 1961 to 1968 
     under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, came as part of a 
     delegation from the New York-based Council on Foreign 
     Relations and Brown University.
       Council Vice President Karen Sughrue said the group hopes 
     Vietnamese leaders will release new archival materials and 
     answer questions about their perceptions of American wartime 
     policy.
       ``We want to understand the Vietnamese actions,'' she said. 
     ``The majority of the American writing on this subject is 
     completely uniformed about Vietnamese decision-making.''
       The delegation plans closed meetings today and tomorrow 
     with Vietnamese diplomats, historians and officials, 
     including Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and Vice 
     President Nguyen Thi Binh. A meeting also is tentatively 
     planned with Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, architect of Vietnam's 
     victories over France and the United States.
       Mr. McNamara was an ardent proponent of U.S. support for 
     South Vietnam against the communist North, causing the war to 
     be nicknamed by some ``McNamara's War.'' But by 1964, he was 
     privately advising Johnson that the South Vietnamese 
     leadership was badly divided and the communist hold on the 
     countryside too strong.
       He resigned in 1968 but kept public silence until earlier 
     this year, when he acknowledged in his memoirs that U.S. war 
     policy was ``gravely flawed'' and the war unwinnable.
       The belated assessment touched off bitter criticism in 
     the United States, where many said he should have tried to 
     halt the fighting and save lives. Vietnam's government, 
     however, said simply that Mr. McNamara's assessment 
     ``squares with reality.''
       Ms. Sughrue said Mr. McNamara did not plan to discuss the 
     war or his book with Vietnamese leaders, but simply to 
     promote the proposed conference.
       A council news release said conference topics might include 
     why opportunities to prevent or shorten the war were missed. 
     Mr. McNamara identified several missed opportunities in his 
     book, ``In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.''
       Vietnam has joined U.S. experts in several academic 
     discussions of wartime strategies. But it has shown no 
     interest in publicizing doubts or disagreements among its 
     leaders during the war.
       Vietnamese officials, more interested now in trade and 
     investment than past battles, view war history as useful 
     chiefly in contributing to the party's image of invincible 
     leadership. They welcome Mr. McNamara because his memoirs 
     echo their view that the United States' involvement was wrong 
     and its defeat inevitable.
                                                                    ____


           Ten Commandments for Committing U.S. Combat Forces

  [Developed by Congressman Robert K. Dornan and former Secretary of 
                       Defense Caspar Weinberger]

       1. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.
       2. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless all 
     other options already have been used or considered.
       3. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is 
     a clear commitment, including allocated resources, to 
     achieving victory.
       4. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there 
     are clearly defined political and military objectives.
       5. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless our 
     commitment of these forces will change if our objectives 
     change.
       6. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     American people and Congress support the action.
       7. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless under 
     the operational command of American commanders or allied 
     commanders under a ratified treaty.
       8. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless properly 
     equipped, trained and maintained by the Congress.
       9. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there us 
     substantial and reliable intelligence information including 
     human intelligence.
       10. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     commander in chief and Congress can explain to the loved ones 
     of any killed or wounded American soldier, sailor, Marine, 
     pilot or aircrewman why their family member or friend was 
     sent in harm's way.
                                                                    ____


                                Analysis

       1. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.
       What vital interests are at stake? We already are 
     preventing the spread of conflict with troops elsewhere in 
     the Balkans such as Macedonia.
       2. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless all 
     other options already have been used or considered.
       What about lifting the arms embargo? What about tightening 
     trade sanctions? What about further air strikes?
       3. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is 
     a clear commitment, including allocated resources, to 
     achieving victory.
       Are 25,000 U.S. troops enough? Are there enough European 
     forces?
       4. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there 
     are clearly defined political and military objectives.
       What are the political objectives--protect small 
     ``enclaves'' in the middle of a civil war? What are the 
     military objectives--seize and hold specific terrain or stand 
     and become targets for all warring sides?
       5. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless our 
     commitment of these forces will change if our objective 
     change.
       Will we realistically be able to withdraw U.S. forces after 
     a year if peace is not achieved, even if these forces are 
     directly engaged in combat?
       6. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     American people and Congress support the action.
       Neither Congress nor the American people support this 
     operation. A recent CBS/New York Times poll indicated only 
     37% of Americans support the President's position on Bosnia. 
     Further, 79% believe he should seek approval from Congress 
     before sending any troops.
       7. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless under 
     the operational command of American commanders or allied 
     commanders under a ratified treaty.
       The command structure for U.S. troops involved in this 
     operation seems confused at best with U.S. ground troops 
     serving under deputy European commanders and a NATO council 
     of civilian representatives from member states. Will France 
     and Denmark have to approve U.S. combat requests for M-1 
     tanks and AC-130 gunships?
       8. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless properly 
     equipped, trained and maintained by the Congress.
       Why has the President nearly doubled the defense cuts he 
     promised in his campaign and under funded his own ``Bottom Up 
     Review'' defense plan by as much as $150 billion? Shouldn't 
     he restore spending if he plans to use our military as world 
     policemen in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere?
       9. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is 
     substantial and reliable intelligence information including 
     human intelligence.
       What reliable intelligence sources do we have in Bosnia? 
     Will our sources be compromised through intelligence sharing 
     agreements with non-NATO countries such as Russia?
       10. Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     commander in chief and Congress can explain to the loved ones 
     of any killed or wounded American soldier, sailor, Marine, 
     pilot or aircrewman why their family member or friend was 
     sent in harm's way.
       Can we honestly make this case? American lives are at 
     stake!

  And this resolution, Mr. Speaker, was passed by the Republican 
Conference with only 5 dissents:

       Whereas President Clinton has stated that he is prepared to 
     deploy American forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
     enforce a settlement for as long as a year without prior 
     Congressional authorization, and
       Whereas the House of Representatives on October 30, 1995 
     adopted by a bipartisan vote of 315 to 103 a resolution 
     stating that there should be no presumption that enforcement 
     of any settlement in Bosnia will involve deployment on the 
     ground of U.S. forces, and that no such deployment should 
     occur without prior authorization by Congress, and
       Whereas the President has publicly stated that he believes 
     that this resolution would not have ``any effect'' on the 
     settlement negotiations in Dayton, and
       Whereas Representative Hefley has introduced legislation 
     that would prohibit the use of Defense Department funds to 
     deploy U.S. forces on the ground in Bosnia as part of any 
     peacekeeping operation or implementation force unless funds 
     for such deployment are specifically appropriated by 
     Congress,
       Now therefore be it Resolved, That the House Republican 
     Conference supports prompt enactment of legislation providing 
     that no Defense Department funds may be spent for the 
     deployment on the ground of U.S. forces in Bosnia as part of 
     any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation 
     force, unless funds for this purpose are specifically 
     appropriated by Congress, and further urges that the 
     leadership consider all appropriate vehicles for the 
     implementation of this policy, including H.R. 2550, the 
     Defense Appropriation conference report, and any continuing 
     resolution that may be approved pending enactment of 
     reconciliation.

                          ____________________