[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 176 (Wednesday, November 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H11905-H11907]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 
 OF MASS DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
                         (H. DOC. NO. 104-131)

  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message 
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together 
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the 
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed.

To the Congress of the United States:
  On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction'') and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued 
Executive Order No. 12938, and declared a national emergency under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 
Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its 

[[Page H 11906]]
declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to 
the Congress a notice of its continuation.
  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am hereby 
advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November 
14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1995. 
Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in 
Executive Order No. 12938 and have sent the attached notice of 
extension to the Federal Register for publication.
  As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order No. 12938, 
the Executive order consolidated the functions of and revoked Executive 
Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, which declared a national 
emergency with respect to the proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapons, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, which 
declared a national emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons, and their means of delivery.
  The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and 
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), 
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency 
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is 
contained in the annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and 
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the annual 
report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical 
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 
(Public Law 102-182).
  The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in force and continue 
to be used to control the export of items with potential use in 
chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons 
of mass destruction.
  In the 12 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, 26 
additional countries ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (CWC) for a total of 42 of the 159 signatories; the 
CWC must be ratified by 65 signatories to enter into force. I must 
report my disappointment that the United States is not yet among those 
who have ratified. The CWC is a critical element of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy and an urgent next step in our effort to end 
the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical 
weapons. As we have seen this year in Japan, chemical weapons can 
threaten our security and that of our allies, whether as an instrument 
of war or of terrorism. The CWC will make every American safer, and we 
need it now.
  The international community is watching. It is vitally important that 
the United States continue to lead the fight against weapons of mass 
destruction by being among the first 65 countries to ratify the CWC. 
The Senate recognized the importance of this agreement by adopting a 
bipartisan amendment on September 5, 1995, expressing the sense of the 
Senate that the United States should promptly ratify the CWC. I urge 
the Senate to give its advice and consent as soon as possible.
  In parallel with seeking Senate ratification of the CWC, the United 
States is working hard in the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in 
The Hague to draft administrative and implementing procedures for the 
CWC and to create a strong organization for verifying compliance once 
the CWC enters into force.
  The United States also is working vigorously to end the threat of 
biological weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction 
(BWC) Ad Hoc Group, which was commissioned September 1994 by the BWC 
Special Conference to draft a legally binding instrument to strengthen 
the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. The 
Group convened its first meeting in January 1995 and agreed upon a 
program of work for this year. The first substantive meeting took place 
in July, making important progress in outlining the key issues. The 
next meeting is scheduled for November 27 to December 8, 1995. The U.S. 
objective is to have a draft protocol for consideration and adoption at 
the Fourth BWC Review Conference in December 1996.
  The United States continues to be active in the work of the 29-member 
Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime, and attended the 
October 16-19 AG consultations. The Group agreed to a United States 
proposal to ensure the AG export controls and information-sharing 
adequately address the threat of CBW terrorism, a threat that became 
all too apparent in the Tokyo subway nerve gas incident. This U.S. 
initiative was the AG's first policy-level action on CBW terrorism. 
Participants also agreed to several amendments to strengthen the AG's 
harmonized export controls on materials and equipment relevant to 
biological weapons, taking into account new developments since the last 
review of the biological weapons lists and, in particular, new insights 
into Iraq's BW activities.
  The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full 
adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the only way to achieve a 
permanent global ban on CBW, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities 
support these goals.
  Australia Group participants are taking steps to ensure that all 
relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC 
and CWC, and will be fully consistent with the CWC upon its entry into 
force. The AG considers that national export licensing policies on 
chemical weapons-related items fulfill the obligation established under 
Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the 
acquisition of chemical weapons. Moreover, inasmuch as these measures 
are focused solely on preventing activities banned under the CWC, they 
are consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to 
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and 
related information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
  The AG agreed to continue its active program of briefings for non-AG 
countries, and to promote regional consultations on export controls and 
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national 
policies in these areas.
  The United States Government determined that two foreign companies--
Mainway Limited and GE Plan--had engaged in chemical weapons 
proliferation activities that required the imposition of sanctions 
against them, effective May 18, 1995. Additional information on this 
determination is contained in a classified report to the Congress, 
provided pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
  The United States carefully controlled exports which could contribute 
to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, 
exercising restraint in considering all such proposed transfers 
consistent with the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR). The MTCR Partners continued to share information about 
proliferation problems with each other and with other possible 
supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized 
the need for implementing effective export control systems.
  The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its 
MTCR partners in multilateral efforts to combat missile proliferation 
by nonmembers and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to 
adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Three new Partners were admitted to the 
MTCR with U.S. support: Russia, South Africa, and Brazil.
  In May 1995, the United States participated in an MTCR team visit to 
Kiev to discuss missile nonproliferation and MTCR membership criteria. 
Under Secretary of State Davis met 

[[Page H 11907]]
with Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Hryshchenko in May, July, and 
October to discuss nonproliferation issues and MTCR membership. As a 
result of the July meeting, a United States delegation traveled to Kiev 
in October to conduct nonproliferation talks with representatives of 
Ukraine, brief them on the upcoming MTCR Plenary, and discuss U.S. 
criteria for MTCR membership. From August 29-September 1, the U.S. 
participated in an informal seminar with 18 other MTCR Partners in 
Montreux, Switzerland, to explore future approaches to strengthening 
missile nonproliferation.
  The MTCR held its Tenth Plenary Meeting in Bonn October 10-12. The 
Partners reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports to prevent 
proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. They 
also reiterated their readiness for international cooperation in 
peaceful space activities consistent with MTCR policies. The Bonn 
Plenary made minor amendments to the MTCR Equipment and Technology 
Annex in the light of technical developments. Partners also agreed to 
U.S. initiatives to deal more effectively with missile-related aspects 
of regional tensions, coordinate in impeding shipments of missile 
proliferation concern, and deal with the proliferation risks posed by 
transshipment. Finally, MTCR Partners will increase their efforts to 
develop a dialogue with countries outside the Regime to encourage 
voluntary adherence to the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of 
missile proliferation risks.
  The United States has continued to pursue my Administration's nuclear 
nonproliferation goals with success. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed last May at the NPT 
Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and 
without conditions. Since the conference, more nations have acceded to 
the Treaty. There now are 180 parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
  The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues its efforts to improve 
member states' export policies and controls. Nuclear Suppliers Group 
members have agreed to apply technology controls to all items on the 
nuclear trigger list and to adopt the principle that the intent of the 
NSG Guidelines should not be undermined by the export of parts of 
trigger list an dual-use items without appropriate controls. In 1995, 
the NSG agreed to over 30 changes to update and clarify the list of 
controlled items in the Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Annex. The NSG also 
pursued efforts to enhance information sharing among members by 
establishment of a permanent Joint Information Exchange group and by 
moving toward adoption of a United States Department of Energy-supplied 
computerized automated information exchange system, which is currently 
being tested by most of the members.
  The increasing number of countries capable of exporting nuclear 
commodities and technology is a major challenge for the NSG. The 
ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, 
including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear exports 
in accordance with the NSG guidelines. Members continued contacts with 
Belarus, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), and Ukraine regarding NSG activities. Ambassador Patokallio of 
Finland, the current NSG Chair, led a five-member NSG outreach visit to 
Brazil in early November 1995 as part of this effort.
  As a result of such contacts, the ROK has been accepted as a member 
of the NSG. Ukraine is expected to apply for membership in the near 
future. The United States maintains bilateral contacts with emerging 
suppliers, including the New Independent States of the former Soviet 
Union, to encourage early adherence to NSG guidelines.
  Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to 
the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the 
national emergency in Executive Order No. 12938 during the period from 
May 14, 1995, through November 14, 1995.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, November 8, 1995.

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