[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 175 (Tuesday, November 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H11820-H11827]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                POLITICAL GAMESMANSHIP IN BASE CLOSINGS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 
12, 1995, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. 
Chambliss] for 60 minutes.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, tonight I am going to be joined by two of 
my distinguished colleagues on the Committee on National Security, my 
good friend, the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen], as well as my good 
friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Watts]. We want to discuss an 
issue that is of great importance to our constituents.
  It is also an issue that ultimately, Mr. Speaker, we view to be an 
issue of importance to every American, because it concerns the ability 
of our U.S. Air Force to protect this great Nation.
  The issue is privatization in place, and it refers to a plan that has 
been hatched by the current administration in the White House, that 
makes military effectiveness and efficiency take a back seat to 
political gamesmanship. We will use the next hour to discuss the 
President's plan and offer our thoughts about the future of our 
military maintenance system.
  Privatization in place is an issue that has come out of the White 
House recently because of the closing of two military bases, one in San 
Antonio, TX, Kelly Air Force Base, and one in California, McClellan Air 
Force Base. These two Air Force bases are two of the five air logistics 
centers that are currently operated by the U.S. Air Force.
  What is the problem with the depot system? Why are we here tonight 
talking about the issue of privatization in place?
  We are talking about that issue because of the fact that the Air 
Force has determined, and the Department of Defense has agreed, that we 
have excess capacity within the U.S. Air Force depot system from a 
maintenance standpoint. We have too much capacity out there to do the 
work that we have to do. Therefore, certain bases need to be considered 
from a downsizing standpoint or possibly from a closure standpoint.
  The U.S. Congress has a mechanism in place called the BRAC process to 
deal with this specific issue. The BRAC process is not a very well 
thought of issue within this body. The reason is because it has a very 
drastic effect on areas where it is determined that bases are no longer 
needed and must be closed.
  But the BRAC process is a nonpolitical process that was established 
by this body and by the U.S. Senate several years ago, and is a process 
that is designed to take politics out of making decisions on whether or 
not military bases should remain open or whether or not military bases 
should be closed.
  As everyone knows, since the end of the cold war we have been 
downsizing the size of the force structure of our various militaries. 
We have downsized the Air Force, we have cut back on the number of 
people that we have in that blue uniform. We have downsized the Army, 
the number that we have in that green uniform; and the Navy, the Coast 
Guard and so forth and so on.
  As we continue to downsize our military, it is necessary that we look 
at other areas that serve that force structure. For example, with 
respect to the Air Force, we now have less airplanes than we had flying 
10 years ago. We have less pilots to fly those airplanes. Therefore, we 
have less maintenance work to be done on those airplanes. That is why 
we have the excess capacity that has led to this issue of privatization 
in place.
  The BRAC process, as I say, was not a very popular item within this 
House, but the BRAC Commission was established several years ago to 
review all of the military bases all across this country from the 
standpoint of can we afford to operate without those military bases due 
to the fact that we have begun to downsize the force structure.
  We do not have as many people in uniform. We need to look to see 
whether or not we can make savings in the amount of money that the 
Government spends, no only from the standpoint of paying the salary of 
those personnel but from the standpoint of maintaining the airplanes, 
of maintaining the trucks, for maintaining tanks, for maintaining 
ships, whatever it may be with respect to each particular branch of the 
service. That is why BRAC was established.
  During the past 6 years, we have had three BRAC Commissions to take 
action with respect to military bases all across this country. Those 
BRAC Commissions have taken into consideration the fact that we have 
downsized our force structure, and they have made decisions regarding 
certain military bases, be they depots or be they nondepots.
  Those FRAC Commissions have made decisions that are not popular 
decisions within this body, to close military bases, but those 
decisions needed to be made.
  They were good judgment decisions that have been made to make certain 
base closures.
  In this particular instance, the BRAC Commission came to consider 
certain bases to determine whether or not they should be closed during 
the 1994 year and 1995 year. They considered the Air Force depots, of 
which there are five, 

[[Page H 11821]]
that maintain all of the Air Force equipment that is used by the 
personnel in this country.
  Those five bases are Hill Air Force Base, which is located in Utah, 
represented by my friend, the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen], who has 
joined us; Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, represented by our 
friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Watts]; Robins Air Force Base 
in Warner Robins, GA; McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento, CA; and 
Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX.
  Those were the five U.S. Air Force depots that were in existence that 
were under consideration by the BRAC Commission.
  At this time, I am going to ask my friend, the gentleman from Utah 
[Mr. Hansen] if he will to step in and tell us a little bit about this, 
and explain a chart that he has there concerning the excess 
capacity issue that I have alluded to, why that issue was important and 
what the BRAC Commission decided with respect to that excess capacity.

  Mr. HANSEN. I appreciate my friend, the gentleman from Georgia, 
yielding to me on this very important issue that he has brought up 
tonight, and I thank the gentleman for coming up with an issue that I 
think is so very important to the people of America.
  Mr. Speaker, with permission of the gentleman from Georgia, I would 
like to explain a little about air logistics centers, if I may. Air 
logistics centers are some of the largest industrial complexes in the 
Department of Defense. They provide the critical maintenance and 
logistics support to sustain our ability to meet the national military 
strategy.
  ALC's, along with other maintenance depots, Army arsenals and Navy 
shipyards, provide a ready and controlled source of technical 
competence and repair and maintenance capability to respond to our 
Nation's national security needs. This core maintenance capability must 
include sufficient skilled personnel and capital equipment and 
facilities owned and operated by the Department of Defense to meet any 
contingency or mobilization, and must be assigned sufficient work load 
to ensure cost efficiency and technical proficiency in time of peace.
  That is what the Under Secretary of Logistics said, why a core depot 
maintenance capacity is so important. Core exists to minimize 
operational risk and to guarantee required readiness for these weapons 
systems.
  Those reasons, to minimize risk and guarantee readiness, are even 
more important in today's leaner force structure, and in fact make the 
armed services' new policy of two-level maintenance possible. Under 
two-level maintenance, a weapons system is either fixed right at the 
unit level or shipped back for depot level repair. Only consolidated 
maintenance depots under the direct control of the Department of 
Defense can guarantee a full service, flexible and on-time response for 
a predictable price in time of peace and war, without risking readiness 
for our troops in the field.
  In the First District of Utah, I represent Hill Air Force Base which 
contains the Ogden Air Logistics Center. I am proud to say that Hill 
Air Force Base was the only installation in the Air Force to be rated 
in the top tier as both an operational base and a maintenance depot.
  Let me just say a little about what Ogden ALC provides. Ogden is the 
logistics manager and depot for the world's largest aircraft fleet, the 
F-16, used by 21 nations around the world. Ogden is the world's largest 
overhaul facility for landing gear, struts, wheels and brakes, 
accommodating over 70 percent of DOD's work, with the capacity actually 
to do it all. Ogden is also the only maintenance site for the Nation's 
ICBM fleet, with a work force cited by the Vice President as heroes of 
reinvention.
  These are just a few of the tremendous assets the Ogden ALC brings to 
the Air Force. In combination with two champion F-16 fighter wings in 
the vast Utah Test and Training Range, Hill Air Force Base is simply 
the best of the best.
  In a January 1995 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Commander 
of U.S. Air Force in Europe put it this way: ``The combination of Hill 
Air Force Base,'' and I am quoting, ``and Utah Test and Training Range 
is an irreplaceable national asset.'' I could not agree more.
  While Hill Air Force Base represents the future fighter aircraft of 
the Air Force, it is Tinker Air Force Base in the great State of 
Oklahoma that is the future of jet engines. I have noticed, my friend 
from Georgia, that our friend from Oklahoma has joined us. I think that 
we should yield to him regarding Tinker.

                              {time}  2045

  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I want to say to the gentleman 
from Georgia [Mr. Chambliss] that I am delighted to be a part of this 
tonight and have an opportunity to talk about the BRAC process and the 
three facilities that survived the BRAC procedures.
  I want to take an opportunity at this time to share a little bit 
about Tinker Air Force Base, which is there in the Fourth District of 
Oklahoma, the district I represent, in Midwest City, OK. My colleagues 
owe it to themselves to come and take a look at Tinker Air Force Base 
sometime. It is a state of the art facility for the repair and 
maintenance of the world's most sophisticated aircraft engines.
  The work force is a blend of military, civilian and contractor 
support to provide for our fighting force the fabrication of parts to 
keep our most sophisticated aircraft, like the B-2 bomber, in a mission 
ready state, or the management of missiles, such as the air launch 
cruise missile, the short range attack missile, the Navy's harpoon, and 
an advanced cruise missile.
  Tinker has the responsibility of managing more than 17,000 jet 
engines. The Department of Defense' own depot maintenance operations 
indicators report states that during the period ending in the second 
quarter of fiscal year 1994 Tinker's average engine process days was 
greater than one-third, one-third better than the competition.
  Additionally, Tinker's schedule indicator index for the period 
between April of 1993 and February of 1994 was the second best in the 
entire Air Force. Tinker is leading the fleet in the area of technology 
innovation and partnering. Tinker has formed a number of technology 
advancement coalitions to address a wide spectrum of environmental 
issues. One such venture will join all Department of Defense 
installations in Oklahoma as a coalition to cross feed information on 
compliance concerns or compliance actions and improve the partnership 
between the Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal agencies.
  Also, Tinker has blazed a trial in alternative fuel use by adapting 
some 551 vehicles to run on propane, compressed natural gas, and 
electric battery power. Nearly 300 fleet vehicles have been converted 
to dual fuel clean natural gas, giving Tinker the distinction of having 
one of the largest dual fuel armadas in the Nation.
  Tinker Air Force Base, as we went through the BRAC process, we 
continued to find that Tinker was well ahead of its competition and in 
productivity and efficiency. As a matter of fact, Tinker got out about 
98 percent, or over 98 percent of its work on time.
  The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center entered into its first 
technology transfer agreement with private industry in November of 
1994. The signing of the cooperative research and development agreement 
between Tinker and Savalitch Prosthetic and Research Center represents 
the first medical involvement for practical application between an air 
logistics center and a private entity.
  There is a partnership between the Air Force and the Navy at Tinker 
Air Force Base. They share resources, some of the finest resources and 
skills and some of the best technology in human resources available.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, I have visited several military facilities 
around the country, as I serve with these gentlemen on the Committee on 
National Security. So I have the opportunity to travel around the 
country and look at different Air Force facilities and ask questions. 
Of course, any time anyone goes into a military facility, they feel 
great pride knowing that they are on grounds of responsibility and 
commitment and sacrifice and dedication to protect our Nation's 
national resources or to protect our Nation's interests around the 
world.
  I find it quite interesting to walk on the grounds of Tinker Air 
Force Base 

[[Page H 11822]]
and see how the general there, the commander, General Eichman, and his 
leadership and the management there and the civilian employees, the 
military employees, the contractors have created an air of expectancy, 
where they expect to be at the top of what they do. They expect to do 
things well. They expect to compete well, and they expect to come out 
ahead whenever they are given a task or given a challenge to do 
something for our Nation's forces.
  I am just quite proud to be a part of Tinker and representing them in 
my district, and that even just makes me feel a little worse, as I 
understand the pride and the quality and the work that they do there, 
to be on the short end of this BRAC process, as the way it is being 
recommended by the President.
  So with that, I will yield back to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. 
Chambliss].
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, may I ask the gentleman, has he commented on 
the strengths of Warner Robins, GA?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I have not yet, but I will take a moment to do that. 
As my colleagues are both deservedly proud of the work done at Tinker 
and the work done at Hill, I cannot tell them how proud I am to 
represent the Eighth District of Georgia, which is the home of Robins 
Air Force Base in Warner Robins, GA.
  Robins Air Force Base has a $2.1 billion economic impact on the State 
of Georgia, and all of central Georgia sort of evolves around Robins. 
It is the largest industrial employer in the State of Georgia. I get 
filled with a sense of real pride every time I go on that military base 
and I see those men and women dressed in blue, knowing that not only 
the military but the civilian personnel at Robins Air Force Base are 
absolutely totally and firmly committed to ensure that they do the very 
best work on every job assigned to them.
  At Robins Air Force Base we have worldwide management and engineering 
responsibility for several of the workhorses in Desert Storm, the F-15 
Eagle, the C-130 Hercules, the C-141 Starlifter, home of the electronic 
warfare and avionic centers. We do all the maintenance work on the 
helicopters operated by the United States Air Force, and we do all 
special operations aircraft.

  It was quite ironic that Robins Air Force Base competed with every 
other Air Force Base in the World over the last couple of years and 
received the award as the best Air Force Base in the whole world. It 
was really ironic that that announcement was made back in the spring, 
and the next week Robins Air Force Base was placed on the BRAC 
Commission list to be considered for closing.
  Mr. Speaker, thank goodness we had a great experience in going 
through the BRAC process. As I worked with each of these gentlemen and 
some other gentlemen that were involved frankly in representing Kelly 
and McClellan, it was competition that we all participated in. Our 
bases participated and our bases were fortunate to come out on top. We 
want to talk a little bit about what happened in that process and why 
we are here considering the privatization in place. But let us be clear 
about the fact that the personnel at McClellan Air Force Base and the 
Kelly Air Force Base are very capable and competent, but there are just 
valid reasons why bases need to be closed occasionally.
  We went through the BRAC process. That is part of the reason why we 
are here tonight to talk about the privatization in place, and I yield 
back to the gentleman from Utah.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman continuing to 
yield, and I appreciate we are all justly proud of these Air Force 
Bases we represent. People in America should realize these ALCs are 
some of the largest military bases in the world and the largest we have 
in the Air Force.
  Now, the question comes down, the Navy has closed three out of their 
six aviation depots. If BRAC 95 goes through, as I recall, the Army 
will have six out of nine of theirs closed. But here of these depots 
are five ALCs. What is the problem? What are we talking here tonight? 
What is the problem the American people face?
  The problem can be put into two words: Excess capacity. That is why 
we have this chart up here to show the people of America what we are 
talking about.
  As everyone is aware, the Department of Defense has experienced 
dramatic downsizing over the last 6 years. In the wake of the victory 
of freedom and democracy over tyranny and communism and the end of the 
Cold War, our armed forces have experienced a real cut in spending of 
over 40 percent and a force structure reduction of over a third. 
Comparatively, even after full implementation of all three rounds of 
base closures, the department will only have closed 20 percent of its 
industrial capacity. In the Air Force, while we have only half the 
number of planes, we still have all five of the depots designed to 
maintain them.
  As I pointed out, the Navy has closed three of six; the Army six of 
nine. Let us take a look at this chart.
  The long black lines represent capacity, and they are fixed. Capacity 
in this sense measures industrial facilities and the design capability 
of real facilities and buildings. The only way to decrease this obvious 
excess capacity is to make the hard choices and close installations.
  The white lines represent workload. These will continue to decline as 
we complete the downsizing of our armed forces.
  The gray lines that we see show just how much of the current depot 
work loads are core and, as such, would remain in the organic depot 
system.

  The problem displayed so clearly on this simple chart is obvious. Our 
depot infrastructure does not match our current or planned workload 
and, thus, significantly increases the cost of each and every product 
by spreading a massive and expensive infrastructure over a smaller and 
smaller workload.
  I guess the question we have to face is, how can we solve this 
problem and eliminate the capacity?
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield, 
under this privatization-in-place plan, I believe Tinker's capacity 
would be around 42 percent. So, if the objective in the BRAC process 
was to eliminate capacity, as the gentleman from Georgia mentioned a 
few minutes ago, two words, excess capacity, they want to eliminate 
that, under this privatization-in-place plan, Tinker Air Force Base 
would have 42 percent of their capacity full.
  It does not take a rocket scientist to see that the privatization-in-
place process is going to create even more problems for the existing 
facilities. I think, again, it does not take a rocket scientist to 
understand that. The winners in this progression become the losers 
because we have even more capacity in all five of the air depot 
facilities around the country.
  We have added to that excess capacity problem rather than resolving 
that problem, which is what the BRAC process was all about.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, let us put this in the perspective of a 
business decision, which really it is. This body runs the world's 
largest business. Unfortunately, if every other business in this 
country was run the way Congress has been run for the last 25 years, 
there would not be many left, because we have been spending more than 
we make.
  What we have been talking about is the fact that we have capacity at 
all of the five Air Force depots all across the country to do a certain 
amount of work. We have capacity of 100 percent of the work that each 
base can produce. But what the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Watts] is 
saying is that at his base he is producing 42 percent of what he could 
produce. That is an excess of 58 percent up there, and it is about the 
same all the way across at all of our bases.
  It only made sense for the BRAC commission to say, hey, something is 
not right here. We are costing the American taxpayer money by having 
all of these bases open and all of this excess capacity out there that 
is costing so much just to open the gates every morning. What we have 
to do is, from a business standpoint, we have got to close some of 
those bases to narrow that capacity down and try to provide for work to 
be done during surge periods, such as Desert Storm or any other 
catastrophe that might arise or war that may break out somewhere, we 
have to leave capacity there for that, but we can do that and, at the 
same time, save the American taxpayer billions and billions of dollars. 
And this is 

[[Page H 11823]]
the way we do it. We consolidate the work at less depots than what we 
have now.
  Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Utah said, the Navy has done it, 
the Army has done it, and it was time for the Air Force to do it, and 
that is what we have done.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, let me respond to what the gentlemen have 
both said.
  I want to talk about the base analysis of how this came about. I do 
not know if the people in America realize that prior to the base 
closing law how many bases were closed. We know the answer to that was 
zero. Not one. Because any Congressman worth his salt could come in 
here and he could just stop it one way or another because all of his 
buddies did not want to have his closed.

                              {time}  2100

  So they would close them all. People would come in, and they would 
not allow them to be closed. And they would go out to their districts 
and brag how well they had done.
  Was it necessary to do a base closing? I think absolutely it was 
necessary. There is no way we could continue with the amount of money 
we were putting in defense, when we were facing the old evil empire, 
the old Soviet Union. At that point we had to pour billions and 
billions of dollars into defense. And because of that, we were able to 
bring them to their knees.
  I still remember when Mr. Gorbachev gave his concession speech. A man 
that I knew from the Soviet Union said, you spent us under the table. 
Your technology was so great. We could not run with you. You are way 
ahead of us.
  Well, we did that, but then we cannot keep it going at that level. We 
all know that. It could not happen. So we passed the base closing law 
out of that. That is Public Law 101-510. It established the independent 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission. And incidentally, there is not 
one of those for parks, in case anyone wants to bring that up. This 
independent commission was designed to shield the difficult issue of 
base closure from the political pressure of an individual congressional 
district and political favoritism of the President and the 
administration. In other words, we said, Mr. President, you do not have 
anything to do with it. Congressman Oklahoma, Georgia, Utah, you guys 
do not have anything to do with it. We are going to put this 
independent commission there to get this job done. Because if the 
political element there is, it is not going to happen.
  This process has worked well. We have closed well over 100 major 
installations with project savings of billions and billions of dollars. 
The reason it works is because decisions are made on certified, 
objective data designed to reevaluate military value and are reviewed 
by an independent BRAC commission. Each community, each political 
leader, we are all given a shot. We all had our shot. We all realized 
our bases were on the base closing list. So we said, come on, you can 
go in there.
  They came to our bases respectively. We toured them around. We made 
the best pitch. We got people in there from our community to put up 
thousands of dollars. They had bands playing and kids yelling and 
giving out lollipops and the whole bit to try to influence the BRAC 
commission. And every one was a big boy. We all knew we were taking our 
chances, but the main thing was not the balloons and the lollipops. The 
main thing was the information that they got from where? From the 
Pentagon.

  And I happen to have here a base analysis, and this was flashed up in 
front of the BRAC commission, put there by the U.S. Air Force. I 
recalled, as you gentlemen did, on the last day when the BRAC 
commission decided whether or not to close some of these ALCs. The Navy 
has done it. The Air Force has done it.
  They asked the question, is this the chart you looked at, will you 
stand by that chart? And the answer from the Secretary of the Air 
Force, General Fogleman, was yes, we stand by that chart.
  As you both pointed out, we have nothing against our good friends at 
McClellan. We have nothing against our good friends at San Antone, but 
they came in last in both these instances. So it was easy for the BRAC 
commission to look at this. Look at the tiers. Look at how they rated 
them. Look at the cost to close. Look at the annual savings, the return 
on investment, the economic impact. It was simple to do that. It did 
not take a rocket scientist to look that up. This was the military. 
This was the Air Force's own version of what should happen.
  It is not something that we came up with, even though we were doing 
our very best to show the best side of our bases, and we were right, 
our bases were excellent. But it came up from those people.
  We know about the BRAC process in my home State of Utah. Utah has had 
a base closed every round of BRACC. From 1987 to 1993, Utah dropped 
from 5th to 15th in defense-related expenditures. With the closure of 
the second largest employer in the State, Twill Army Depot in BRACC 
1993, Utah has dropped from 23d to 48th nationally in total defense 
dollars in the State. And we had to go through that. We cannot 
selfishly say, yes, hurt you, hurt them and do not hurt me. That was 
the reason behind BRACC.
  And now the question comes up, what did the 1995 BRACC commission 
decide and why? Would either of my colleagues like to respond?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Well, what the BRAC commission decided was that it was 
time to look very closely at the five Air Force depots and make a 
decision as to whether or not any of them ought to be closed as opposed 
to the downsizing in place of all five, as was recommended by the Air 
Force. The Air Force wanted to keep them all five open just in case 
there was a major outbreak of war. And they had a plan designed where 
they thought they could keep operating, but the BRAC commission thought 
that was not the right thing to do.

  The BRAC commission took the numbers that the gentleman has on the 
chart right there and went down the list of each of the eight criteria 
that the BRAC commission set forth. And they made a decision based on 
the consideration of all of those eight criteria that it was in the 
best interest of this country from a taxpayer standpoint and from a 
national security standpoint that two of those bases be closed, that we 
could handle all of the depot maintenance capacity at Hill Air Force 
Base, at Tinker Air Force Base and at Robins Air Force Base. Based upon 
their decision to do that, they made the recommendation that those two 
bases be closed.
  And it was right interesting what evolved from that decision, which 
was made back July 1, I believe, is the date that that was done and the 
President had about 15 days to come back and either accept that 
recommendation along with the BRAC recommendation with respect to all 
other bases all across the country, or he could reject it. And then 
Congress had the same option of either accepting it or rejecting it. 
And it was interesting that the president started playing politics 
immediately.
  There are 53 electoral votes in California. There is 40 something in 
Texas. Those two States are very important to any President who wants 
to get reelected. He knew that this would have a negative, closing of 
those two bases would have a negative effect on his reelection campaign 
in 1996. So what did he do? He began immediately playing the role of 
what can I do to preserve my position with respect to those two huge 
military facilities and hopefully be able to save the votes that are 
going to be necessary for me to secure the electoral votes in 
California and Texas.
  And I have in front of me the letter that the President wrote back to 
the Congress when he reported back on his decision following the BRAC 
commission's recommendation. I would like to read just a couple of 
sentences out of there because we want to get both of you gentlemen to 
talk about what privatization in place is and why we are here tonight 
talking about it.

  The President said as follows:

       In a July 8, 1995 letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense 
     White, Chairman Dixon confirmed that the commission's 
     recommendations permit the Department of Defense to privatize 
     the work loads of the McClellan and Kelly facilities in place 
     or elsewhere in their respective communities. The ability of 
     the Defense Department to do this mitigates the economic 
     impact on those communities while helping the Air Force avoid 
     the disruption in readiness that would result from relocation 


[[Page H 11824]]
     as well as preserve the important defense work forces there.

  First of all, let me just say, did the gentleman from Oklahoma have 
any conversation with members of the BRAC commission concerning this 
issue of privatizing in place that the President has referred to here?
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Yes, I did. It is interesting, before I get 
into some of the letters I had written, I wrote all of the 
commissioners of BRAC and they reported back to me. I got responses 
back from several of them. I will read those here in just a second. But 
it is quite interesting to me that these commissioners had a very, very 
difficult job to go into these communities, every one of these 
communities, these five different communities, Hill, Tinker, Robins, 
Kelly, and McClellan, go into these communities and look in the eyes of 
every one of the taxpayers, every one of the people in those 
communities that were dependent on these jobs and finally conclude that 
these two have to be closed is what we are going to recommend for 
closure. That was a very, very difficult job.
  I think it is a sad commentary on what the President has done and 
just kind of, in my opinion, kind of backhanding the commissioners and 
saying, I am going to ignore all the trials and tribulations and 
difficulties and burdens you went through and try to be fair and being 
apolitical and saying we are not going to play politics, Republican or 
Democrat, and we are not going to consider that one is in Oklahoma City 
or in Georgia, Utah, California, Texas, that is not important to us. We 
are after excess capacity. Went in and made some difficult decisions. 
They recommended two facilities be closed. And they also went on to say 
that over a 7-year period of time that if these recommendations were 
implemented or executed, that $19 billion, $19 billion would be saved 
over a matter of 7 years.
  When you talk about the electoral votes in California and Texas, that 
tells me that if the President is going to ignore saving $19 billion 
over the next 7 years because of electoral votes, that is a pretty 
doggone expensive campaign, $19 billion. That is, boy, you are talking 
about campaign reform. We really need campaign reform from that.
  As you said, my friend from Georgia shared that I have written the 
commissioners and got some responses back from them. I want to share 
with you, with my colleagues, what I got back from these commissioners, 
the response that I got back from several of them.
  First of all, I had written a letter asking them questions about what 
their intentions were, did they intend to privatize in place or 
recommend that or encourage that. And I shared with them a letter that 
the President had proposed for the privatize-in-place option for 
McClellan and Kelly air logistics centers. However, I questioned the 
viability and merit of this plan. Simply put, I have thought through 
Dr. White's proposal and cannot make sense out of it. A few questions 
come to mind, and I asked them these questions.
  My primary concern results from an apparent contortion of the BRAC 
recommendations. By any reasonable standard, the winners appear now to 
be the losers, and I refuse to accept that after the long and hard 
battle was fought and won by Tinker Air Force Base and the other two 
facilities, how privatization in place results in reducing excess 
capacity cited by the BRAC commission without reducing infrastructure 
at the three other air logistics centers.
  I went on to ask, did the BRACC truly intend privatization in place 
as a viable option for McClellan and Kelly. I know it was recommended 
at two of the other locations, but why was it not specifically 
mentioned for McClellan and Kelly if it was intended as a BRACC 
recommendation? If privatization in place is such a good idea, why was 
this strategy not brought to light in hearings or at the final vote?
  Why was privatization in place not mentioned as part of the Air 
Force's original proposal? How does privatization in place at McClellan 
and Kelly provide for and enhance national security position?
  I believe, and I shared with the commissioners, I said, I believe in 
the BRACC and do not want to see a political strategy overtake a 
responsible and reasonable approach to downsizing our 
defense structure. I encouraged them to give me an apolitical answer. I 
shared with them a letter. I seek an apolitical answer to these 
questions. And these are some of the comments that I got back as I went 
through the responses.

  One of the commissioners said:

       Moreover, not allowing the remaining ALCs, all of which 
     ranked higher in military value, to compete for the 
     additional workload would cause them to become increasingly 
     less cost competitive in the future. Even beyond common sense 
     issues of most effectively utilizing our limited defense 
     resources, I am at a loss to understand why it would be in 
     the Air Force's interest to protect its lowest ranking depots 
     at the expense of its three superior installations.

  He went on to say:

       As difficult as it was to vote for the closure of two 
     facilities of this size and quality, the commission voted 6 
     to 2 to do so because we felt that it was in the best 
     interest of the air force, DOD and the American taxpayers.

  This is one I really found interesting:

       If any commissioner had offered a motion to privatize in 
     place as the President proposes, I am 100 percent certain 
     that such a motion would have been defeated handily.

  That sounds like to me that this commissioner is pretty confident 
that this privatization in place or deal was never meant to be by any 
of the commissioners.
  Mr. HANSEN. Is the gentleman saying, from what he has in front of 
him, that the commissioners said, if that motion had been made by any 
one of the eight commissioners to privatize in place like the President 
of the United States is now changing the BRACC law to do, that it would 
have been soundly defeated? Is that what they said?
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Soundly defeated. As a matter of fact, the 
words of the commissioner were, ``I am 100 percent certain that it 
would have been defeated unanimously.'' ``I am at a loss to understand 
why'' were some of the other comments that I got from the response. I 
am at a loss to understand why it would be in the Air Force's best 
interest, as I said, to protect its lowest ranking depots at the 
expense of its three superior installations. We had one commissioner 
that said, he did not provide a written response to me but I talked to 
him on the phone.

                              {time}  2115

  He said, ``Privatization in place would not have been approved if 
offered before the BRACC.'' I said one Commissioner told me they were 
100 percent certain it would have been defeated unanimously. Do you 
stand behind that? He said, ``You bet I do. I, too, am 100 percent 
certain that it would have been defeated unanimously.'' There is 
another Commissioner who said, ``The Commission's review clearly 
documented significant excess capacity in the five Air Force logistics 
centers. Privatization in place of all of the workload of Sacramento 
and San Antonio air logistics centers could result in privatizing 
excess capacity rather than eliminating it.'' That was the objective of 
the BRACC, to eliminate the excess capacity, not privatize it.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I think this is fascinating, what the two 
gentlemen have brought up, absolutely damning evidence, if I may say 
so. First, the BRAC Commission took the response from the Air Force. We 
all know the Air Force said, ``Keep all five of them open.'' The BRAC 
Commission looked at it and said, ``We've got too much excess 
capacity,'' which is what we are talking about.
  The General Accounting Office reviewed that and agreed completely 
with the BRAC Commission. There were so many. So here are the words 
that the BRAC Commission came up with in the final report after they 
had done this exhaustive study, all of this work with all these high-
paid staffers. ``The Commission found that significant excess capacity 
and infrastructure in the Air Force depot system requires closure of 
McClellan Air Force Base and the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, and 
the Commission found the closure of the McClellan Air Force Base and 
San Antonio Logistics Center permits significantly improved utilization 
of the remaining depots and reduces DOD operating costs.''
  So if we go to this next chart, we see if we close those in this 
capacity, here we are without BRACC, and here we are with BRACC. We are 
now up to 73 percent. That is about where we ought 

[[Page H 11825]]
to be, considering that contingencies come along. We do not know when 
it is going to play that peak and valley thing predicated upon 
conditions in the world, so this is principal, the ultimate place to 
be, 73 percent.
  However, you gentlemen have both brought another factor into this. 
After the BRACC wisely made this decision, after they had finished 
their work which they had to do under public law, they then submitted 
it to the President of the United States. May I ask the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Chambliss] what were the choices the President had under 
the law as you understand it by your legal mind?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. The President had the right to either accept the 
recommendations of BRACC or reject the recommendation of BRACC. There 
was not option one way or the other.
  Mr. HANSEN. I would ask the gentleman, does he have any third 
alternative to this? Does the law say you could bring an additional 
thing to it, or does he just have those two options?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Those are the only two options he had.
  Mr. HANSEN. That is the way the gentleman from Oklahoma understands 
it.
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. That was my understanding. The President 
called a play that was not in the playbook. What he was doing was never 
an option, it was never intended by the Commissioners of BRACC. I think 
those charts are very telling of the dilemma that this privatization-
in-place plan puts the Air Force in.
  Mr. HANSEN. Those of us who were here when that law went through and 
those of us who argued it thought it was crystal clear. Our attorneys 
thought it was crystal clear. The Pentagon attorneys thought it was 
crystal clear. At that time the Reagan and Bush administration thought 
it was crystal clear, or I guess it was the Bush administration. They 
thought it was all crystal clear.
  Now we come along and, all of a sudden we have a new play that was 
not in the playbook.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. If it was not crystal clear, why was not the 
privatization-in-place issue brought up by the White House prior to the 
time the BRACC decision was made?
  Mr. HANSEN. A great question to bring up, is it not?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Also what if Tinker Air Force Base and/or Robbins Air 
Force Base and/or Hill Air Force Base had been closed? Did you 
gentlemen receive any indication that the President would have stepped 
forward and, said ``Mr. Watts, we want to privatize in place out at 
Oklahoma City and keep your employees out there and continue to pay 
these folks?'' Was that ever mentioned to you?

  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. That was never mentioned, no.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. No.
  Mr. HANSEN. Possibly for this discussion tonight, we should read into 
the Record what the law really says, so people who are listening could 
see this for themselves. Public law 101-510 states:

       If the President approves all the recommendations of the 
     Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of said 
     recommendation to the Congress, and if the President 
     disapproves the recommendation of the Commission, in whole or 
     in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and 
     the Congress the reasons for the disapproval. The Commission 
     shall transmit to the President a revised list of 
     recommendations. The law gives the President no authority to 
     forward the list of recommendations to the Congress with any 
     changes or specific guidelines for its implementation.

  If that is the case, what happened here? What did we get out of this 
after the President of the United States looked at the recommendation 
that the BRAC Commission worked all that time on, all that money, all 
that effort, all that work of the best heads in America? What did we 
get?
  As the gentleman from Georgia brought up, no one had ever heard of 
this term ``privatization''. Where did this idea come from? If that is 
the case, there are 71 bases out there besides the ones we are talking 
about tonight, and I bet if we send a letter to the folks there, do you 
know what they would say? ``Privatize me, too. How come I am being 
discriminated against? Privatize me, defense depot Ogden, Tooele Army 
depot,'' as I mentioned, in my State, and we can mention in all the 
States the same thing, ``Privatize us.''
  But the gentleman from Georgia and the gentleman from Oklahoma hit 
upon why that is. It seems abundantly clear, and sadly, too, I may add; 
52 electoral votes in one State and 47 in another State. Why would the 
President make those promises when he knew he would be in violation?
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. If the gentleman will continue to yield, I 
think it is very clear, and I want to reiterate that again, this 
privatization-in-place plan was not about jobs, it was about one job, 
the job that allows you to occupy that big white house down there on 
Pennsylvania Avenue. Again, I just think it is really unfortunate that 
we have circumvented a very--that a very sound, apolitcal process has 
been circumvented. I think, too, this hurts the credibility of a system 
that has been used for some time, the BRACC process, and I think it 
obviously will hurt the credibility of the BRACC process if we ever go 
through this again, simply because people just will not have any 
confidence in it anymore, so we are not just fighting for the 
facilities that we represent. We are fighting for the integrity of the 
process, the integrity of those Commissioners that went in and faced 
those citizens and those taxpayers.
  I remember, the day after the recommendation had been made public, 
seeing the Oklahoma City paper the next day and seeing the faces of 
some of the people down in San Antonio that had been around for 37, 38 
years and had been employed there, and people were talking about what 
they were going to do now.
  To have the Commissioners go through that torture of making some 
very, very difficult decisions, and any one of the three of us could 
have been in the same position, going into the process. We did not know 
who was going to be saved, we did not know who was going to make the 
cut. We had no idea. All I had ever asked in the process is, judge us 
on our merits, judge us on our quality, judge us on the standards of 
the leadership at Tinker and the community of Midwest City and the 
surrounding communities, and the employees and the contractors of 
Tinker. Judge us on the standard that they have created for themselves, 
created of expectancy, judge us on that. We can live with that.
  We went through that, we won, and through this process now all three 
of us become the losers.
  Mr. HANSEN. Do you not think that the United States of America and 
this Congress and the administration owes a great debt to eight very 
courageous people?
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. That is right.
  Mr. HANSEN. They did one whale of a job. The others were good. I have 
lived through those. I think these eight individuals did a super job. 
They laid politics aside and they did what they thought was the best 
for America, and no one moved the goalpost on them, no one came up with 
some new rules. They played by the rules they knew.
  I guess the question we have to look at as we wind up our special 
order here tonight is, does the President have the right--he did not 
have the right, which is very clear with everybody, and I do not 
know anyone that disputes that, that he had the right to privatize. 
That was not even part of it. It was not even a consideration in the 
entire BRACC hearing. No one even brought it up until he did. Then the 
question comes up: Would he have the right to privatize under the law 
of the land as we know and understand the law? Is anybody above the 
law?

  I sat on the Ethics Committee for 12 years and I went through 29 
cases. In those 29 cases, from time to time we would find a Member of 
Congress who thought he could bend it, break it, or get away with 
something. I remember distinctly being in charge on the Republican side 
of the check-cashing area, and how many of our colleagues thought that 
they could bounce checks. A lot of them, they would go to jail if they 
were in the private sector; but no, they went ahead and did it, and did 
not think it would ever come home to roost.
  I remember one President that we all honor and respect, FDR, who 
thought he could pack the Court. That blew up in his face. There is no 
man who is above the law. There is no woman above the law.
  Now I would like to put up another chart which shows four specific 
parts of 

[[Page H 11826]]
the law that privatization would violate. I would like to know if 
someone could respond as to how anyone thinks they could get around 
this, or why they should, or why it even should be on the table.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. As the gentleman mentioned, this is a bipartisan 
issue, too. This has happened to Democratic Presidents, it has happened 
to Republican Presidents. When they were called and asked, ``Why are 
you violating the law?'' when they do not have a response to it, that 
they have to be dealt with accordingly.
  Mr. HANSEN. I would like to point out here in this chart, if people 
could see, we have four specific areas of the law. We give the code 
number. You are welcome to look it up, debate it, talk about it, and 
bring it into your legal circuit. This one identifies a requirement for 
core organic logistic functions. This second one requires studies and 
reports to Congress prior to transfer of work from DOD civilian to 
contracted performance. The third one requires no more than 40 percent 
of depot-level maintenance performed by private contractors. The fourth 
one requires merit-based competition prior to transfer of any workload 
valued over $3 million per year.
  I do not think any of us do not think that something should be 
privatized. Of course something should be. But Congress has established 
the rules of what can and cannot be. I do not think any of us want to 
turn around and say to the industrial defense complex, ``You have the 
whole thing. You fly the airplanes. You take care of it. You drive the 
tanks. You drive the submarines.'' It would not work. We would lose. We 
know that.
  How do you say to a McDonnell Douglas, ``Pack up and go to the 
Persian Gulf and fight right now?'' They are private people. They do 
not work for the Government. We have to maintain that. Whether it is 
right I guess is debated, but we think that we have worked out a good 
compromise between core maintenance work done at our military 
installations, our depots, and what goes to the private sector. That is 
the issue that we are looking at here.
  I would hope that the President of the United States, that Mr. White 
over at the Pentagon, that Secretary Perry in the Pentagon and all 
those people, and especially their legal heads, would carefully examine 
these four requirements that we have in front of us at this point, 
fully knowing the Congress will not back down from this stand, that we 
fully intend to carry this out to its conclusion, and if they do not 
like that, they should change the law.
  Every one of us in our lives have been at the dinner table or at a 
meeting with our friends or at a public meeting of the PTA and somebody 
gets all excited and says, ``Doggone it, something is wrong here.'' The 
answer is, ``Change it, then.'' I think most of the 435 of us who are 
in this Chamber are here because we wanted to change the law somewhere. 
We wanted to see a different direction for America. We wanted to see 
something happen.
  We do not say ``violate it'' when people come up to me and say, ``You 
do not have to pay your taxes.'' Do you know what is going to happen to 
you? You are going to be looking out the other side of the bars, 
because you have to pay your taxes. If you do not like that, run for 
Congress and get it changed. If Mr. White, Mr. Perry, and Mr. Bill 
Clinton do not like this, then change it, but right now this is the law 
of the land, and I expect the President of the United States, the 
Secretary of Defense, and all of us to uphold the law. What is so wild 
about that?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. The gentleman makes a good point on the issue of 
privatization. We happen to all three be Republicans. We believe in 
privatization. We think we need to get the Federal Government more out 
of our daily lives and out of our business lives than we have right 
now. I think all three of us are totally committed to trying to 
downsize the Federal Government. We think the Federal Government is 
doing too many things now that we ought not to be doing.
  But there is one key difference in privatizing military depots and 
privatizing other agencies where the Federal Government is involved. 
That issue is exactly what the gentleman just spoke to. In times such 
as Desert Storm, times of Korea and times of Vietnam, and going all the 
way back in every war that we have fought, we have had military 
personnel going to the scene of the battles, going to the location 
where wars were fought and making sure that our tanks ran, that they 
started when we turned the switch, that our airplanes flew, that our 
ships rode high in the seas to provide the security that this country 
demands. If we do not have that security, then we will never remain the 
world's greatest military power. Thus, we will never remain the world's 
greatest country that we are right now.

                              {time}  2130

  I think it is absolutely ludicrous to think that we can go to the 
private sector and say, okay, you hire folks, train them, and tell them 
that if war breaks out, they have to go dodge bullets, they have to go 
stand on the front lines and make repairs to the vehicles and the 
airplanes and the ships or whatever it may be that the military is 
going to require, and you have to get those people on line and have 
them ready to go and dodge those bullets; we know that is not going to 
happen. We have good, qualified, trained military personnel to carry 
out those functions now. That is the difference in the privatization 
that we are talking about right now and the privatization of other 
agencies that we have in this country.
  Mr. Speaker, a good example of privatization is Fannie Mae. Fannie 
Mae is something that was privatized years ago. It works well. It got 
the government out of that particular business of financing. The 
government was losing money in it. We turned it over to the private 
sector. It works. Let us not do something that is going to make us look 
back 10 years from now and say gee whiz, why in the world did we ever 
think that we could turn the maintaining of military equipment over to 
the private sector and cost the lives of our young men and women who 
are going to the forefront of the battle.
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I have nothing further to say, 
except that I think what we have tried to do is state the facts and 
that is what we have done. The gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen] has 
four different statutes there before us that all Americans can see. 
Anyone that would be a proponent of privatization in place can see that 
you can neither circumvent, nor ignore, what is on the books.
  So I think we have spoken the facts this evening. I think we have 
shared with the American people how the President has just totally 
ignored the law, and I think it is important that we continue to fight 
this battle and continue to say to all of those that would support this 
effort of privatization in place that it will not work.
  One more thing, Mr. Speaker, before I yield back to the gentleman 
from Utah, is that it is interesting how I have been contacted by, and 
my office has been contacted by people out at Kelly saying that we do 
not want to privatize in place. We would prefer that these jobs go to 
Tinker or Utah. We would prefer that they go there and give us the 
opportunity to follow these jobs.
  So the employees, many of the employees at Kelly have said, we are 
not even supportive of the privatization in place. So again, there are 
a lot of statutes, a lot of law, a lot of common sense and wisdom 
surrounding this thing, and those who are proponents of this 
privatization effort, they are just totally ignoring these laws.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman makes an excellent 
point. Those people that have worked long and hard, many of those 
people have come into being civilian workers for the military, and have 
been there many, many years, and now privatization in place does not 
mean any sure bet for them, none whatsoever. But if their job moves, 
they could move with their job, and that is something that a lot of 
them would want, to see out their careers, to retire as Federal 
employees. Can anyone fault them for that? I cannot.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to make one point, and that is, when we 
stand up and debate in this hall about the authorization of the defense 
bill, we have people stand up constantly and say, the Cold War is over, 
we do not need submarines, we do not need bombers, we do not need 
fighters, we do not need all 

[[Page H 11827]]
of these things. Why do we have them? Let us put it in some social 
program.

  Admittedly, some of the social programs have their genesis in very 
worthwhile projects, some of them probably do not. But it really amazes 
me that America today, most of us, the three of us here, those in this 
room, those people that are listening at this particular time, were 
able to raise our families, get our education, get to whatever 
professional thing we wanted to do, build our business, because we were 
all raised for the last 40 years with a nuclear sword over our heads. 
But we did that without firing the shot that everyone thought would be.
  When I first came to Congress there was a survey done that said, 85 
percent of the people in America felt there would be an exchange 
between the old Soviet Union and the United States by the turn of the 
century. Well, that did not happen, and it did not happen because 
Congress, America, basically, had the will and the wisdom to keep a 
strong core maintenance of people keeping this Nation free.
  So a lot of us have gone on criticizing the government, doing what we 
do in our business, whatever we want to do, and you have done it 
because there has been a strong military presence in the world today.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, are there any bad guys left out there that 
we need this for? Well, think about it. I also sit on the Committee on 
Intelligence. I am not saying anything that should not be said, but we 
all know there is a lot of bad guys still there. They may be bad guys, 
but they are not dumb guys, and they know very well what they could do 
to this country and would very likely like to do if they had the option 
to do it.
  When we had our trips over to the Persian Gulf, does anyone think 
Saddam Hussein would not mind lobbing two or more in here? Do you think 
Kim Il-song likes us any better? Do you think some of these other 
nations are our best friends? No, they are not.
  You go to work every morning, you send your kids to school, you have 
the benefits and beauties and blessings of his country, and a lot of it 
is because we have fine young men and young women who have the courage 
to keep this Nation free. The least we can do for them is give them the 
right and adequate equipment, depots, airplanes, to keep this Nation 
free. We cannot let down on that promise. We would be betraying our 
oath of office if we did.

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield, the 
gentleman makes an excellent point that the Cold War certainly is over. 
The Soviet Union is not a threat to us right now, although they may 
become a threat again. We do not know where it may be 10 years from 
now; it is in some uproar over there right now.
  As Members of the Committee on National Security, we have been 
debating a very hot issue in our committee, and that is Bosnia. I bet 
if you took a vote among the three of us, I think all three of us would 
be voting the same way of having very grave doubts about whether or not 
we ought to ever send troops to Bosnia. Unfortunately, the President 
appears to be headed in that direction.
  We have airplanes flying over there right now. We had one airplane 
shot down over there. That pilot I think took some resolve in the fact 
that he knew that his rescue team was going to be Americans flying in 
there in American-made equipment and American-maintained equipment. 
Those are the type of things that our military personnel right now rely 
on. They know that their equipment is maintained by the very best that 
America has to offer, and it always will be, as long as we maintain the 
depot structure in all of our military branches. But if we ever get 
outside of it, if we lose control of it, we will never get that control 
back again.
  Let me just say that I thank both of you for participating in this 
tonight, and I think we are about to wind down, and as the gentleman 
from Utah said a little earlier, the three of us, and I would venture 
to say that most everybody in this body, intends to take this issue 
head-on with the Department of Defense and with the White House and we 
are going to win it. We are going to ensure that our depots are 
maintained and that our men and women that wear the uniforms in this 
country always have equipment that is maintained by military personnel 
in the best manner possible. Thank you very much.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________