[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 172 (Thursday, November 2, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2101-E2102]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           ISRAEL COULD GAIN GROUND BY EXITING SOUTH LEBANON

                                 ______


                         HON. NICK J. RAHALL II

                            of west virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, November 2, 1995

  Mr. RAHALL. Mr. Speaker, I bring to the attention of my colleagues in 
the House an op-ed piece which appeared in the October 23 edition of 
the Christian Science Monitor written by Frederic C. Hof, a former U.S. 
Army officer and State Department official and currently a partner in 
Armitage Associates. Mr. Hof illustrated, in my opinion, a solution for 
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, thereby preventing further 
attacks on Israeli soldiers by Hizbullah which so poison the Israeli-
Syrian peace negotiations.
  Mr. Speaker, I traveled to Lebanon in August, including southern 
Lebanon, the home of my grandfathers. After discussions with people, 
political, religious, educational, and military leaders most 
importantly Gen. Emile Lahoud the very capable commander-in-chief of 
the Lebanon Army, there is no doubt whatsoever that given the political 
go-ahead the Lebanon Army can control every inch of Lebanese territory 
and prevent cross-border attacks upon Israel. This is confirmed by our 
U.S. Embassy.
  Mr. Hof's op-ed follows:

          [From the Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 23, 1995]

           Israel Could Gain Ground by Exiting South Lebanon

                          (By Frederic C. Hof)

       The recent deaths of Israeli soldiers patrolling the 
     ``security zone'' in southern Lebanon grimly illustrate an 
     inescapable fact: that Israel's continued occupation of 
     Lebanese territory is a liability both for Israel 

[[Page E 2102]]
     and for the Middle Eastern peace process. The time is right for 
     Israel's leaders to take a fresh look at how best to secure 
     their northern border.
       Israeli forces have been on Lebanese territory since March 
     1978, when they consolidated a security zone nominally 
     administered by a Christian Lebanese officer. The purpose of 
     the zone was twofold: to place Israeli territory beyond the 
     reach of Palestinian gunners, and to place on the table a 
     strong Israeli card in the high-stakes game of determining 
     Lebanon's political future.
       In June 1982 Israel moved decisively to destroy the 
     Palestinian military presence in southern Lebanon and 
     rearrange the Lebanese political scene to its advantage. The 
     fist objective was achieved as Palestinian forces were driven 
     back to Beirut and eventually evacuated from Lebanon. The 
     second was frustrated by Lebanese political disunity and 
     skillful Syrian subversion. By 1984 Israeli forces were 
     essentially back within the security zone, with a new and 
     more potent opponent--one enjoying the support of Iran and 
     Syria.
       In a 1984 study of security and water disputes in the 
     Galilean region, I noted that ``In the long run, unless 
     Israel is willing to assume complete responsibility for the 
     economic and political aspirations of the volatile Lebanese 
     Shi'a community in the south, there will be no peace for 
     Galilee without a real government for Lebanon.'' Lebanon is 
     still--in the south--without a real government, and over the 
     past decade Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon has acted 
     as a magnet for Syrian-supported Hizbullah attacks on Israeli 
     forces, Israel's surrogates, and Israel itself.
       It may well be that 25 years of cross-border violence has 
     rendered a ``solution'' to the current impasse impossible. 
     There may be no one in Israel still interested in embracing 
     the Lebanese ``tar baby,'' but how to let it go is the issue. 
     Is there a way Israel might extricate itself from Lebanon 
     and, at the same time, enhance the security of its citizens? 
     Must such an extrication await a formal peace treaty with 
     Lebanon, or might its unilateral implementation help break 
     the logjam blocking the Israel-Syria-Lebanon track?
       One hypothesis worth testing is that neither Hizbullah nor 
     Syria will have any compelling reason to attack Israeli 
     territory from Lebanon if the occupation ends and Israeli 
     forces withdraw to Israel's side of the international 
     boundary. The fighters of Hizbulla claim to be motivated by a 
     desire to end Israel's occupation. A unilateral Israeli 
     withdrawal might suit them fine. Having ``Liberated'' 
     southern Lebanon, would it make sense for them to press the 
     attack into Israel proper?
       It can be argued, no doubt convincingly, that no Israeli 
     government could permit Hizbullah to claim ``victory'' in 
     this manner and that nothing could ``guarantee'' in this 
     manner and that nothing could ``guarantee'' the security of 
     Israel's northern towns. A corollary to this argument is that 
     neither Hizbullah nor Syria is to be ``trusted,'' and a 
     unilateral withdrawal would convey to Israel's enemies a 
     sense of ``weakness'' sure to be exploited.
       If, however, it is just possible that Israel's security 
     would be enhanced as a result of evacuation, it is worth 
     asking anew whether the cost of trying it would be 
     prohibitive. In view of the fact that Israel makes no claim 
     on Lebanese territory, is there any issue except the security 
     of Israeli citizens worth considering in a withdrawal 
     scenario? How might the government of Israel proceed in a 
     manner defensible both in terms of internal Israeli politics 
     and the safety of Israeli citizens?
       The government of Israel could consider declaring 
     unilaterally its intention to withdraw all of its forces from 
     Lebanese territory within 90 days. It could request that the 
     UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convene, as soon as 
     possible, a meeting of Israeli and Lebanese military officers 
     to work out the details of a professional handover. Israel 
     could make it clear at the outset that its forces will be 
     gone in 90 days and that no amount of stalling, hand 
     wringing, or haggling would alter the timetable.
       Coupled with this declaration should be another statement 
     designed to fix, once and for all, the responsibility of 
     Israel's neighbors to respect the inviolability of Israel's 
     borders. Israel could declare that it will hold the 
     governments of Lebanon and Syria fully responsible for 
     ensuring that no party in Lebanon, to include all of Syria's 
     Palestinian and Lebanese surrogates, violates Israeli 
     sovereignty in any way. Israel could make it especially clear 
     that it will make no return of territory to Syria unless the 
     border with Lebanon becomes as quiet as the cease-fire line 
     on the Golan Heights. Indeed, the willingness of Syria and 
     its Lebanese proxies to act responsibly in Southern Lebanon 
     before, during, and after the evacuation of Israeli forces 
     will instruct the Israeli people as to the advisability of a 
     territorial settlement with Syria.
       In the manner the liability presented by southern Lebanon 
     can be converted to an asset in the hands of those sincerely 
     interested in a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. 
     Should new attacks on Israeli territory be mounted from 
     Lebanon, direct retaliation by Israeli forces on those 
     responsible for maintaining law and order in Lebanon would be 
     warranted. Instead of creating massive flows or embittered 
     refugees, Israel would be striking at the actual malefactors. 
     Who, under such circumstances, could blame Israel?
       Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon helps perpetuate an 
     ambiguity that does not exist on the Golan Heights, arguably 
     the most peaceful spot on earth for over 20 years. Syria has 
     exploited this ambiguity to strike indirectly at Israel by 
     encouraging fighters who claim to be waging a war of national 
     liberation. Israel alone can remove this ambiguity by 
     withdrawing and forcing its neighbors to accept full 
     responsibility for their actions. Such an action could hardly 
     be characterized as a defeat.

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