[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 170 (Tuesday, October 31, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S16404-S16419]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           PRESIDENT STONEWALLING ON AMERICAN POW'S AND MIA'S

  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I want to turn to a subject that has long 
been an area that I have worked on over the years, and I have come to 
the Senate floor today to report to my colleagues and to the American 
people on what I consider to be a very disturbing track record by the 
administration on the issue of unaccounted for American POW's listed as 
missing in action.
  Many of my colleagues are well aware of the deep concern that I and 
others have had on the POW/MIA issue as a result of some of the 
previous debates we have had in the Senate concerning United States 
policy toward Communist Vietnam. But I do not think some of my 
colleagues or the American people are generally aware of the extent to 
which this administration is continuing to stonewall and drag its feet 
in efforts to resolve key questions on this POW/MIA issue. Although the 
administration's rhetoric might suggest otherwise, the facts show that 
many leads which could resolve the uncertainty of our missing are not 
being pursued with vigor.
  That is a sad statement to have to make, Madam President. But it is 
true. And in some very important areas information is deliberately 
being withheld from Congress in addition to information still being 
withheld by Communist countries abroad.
  This is an outrage, Madam President. It is bad enough that Communist 
countries are still withholding information about the remains of our 
servicemen after all these years. But when our own Government 
deliberately withholds information that would shed light on this issue, 
it is especially outrageous. It is a very serious comment to say that 
our own Government is deliberately withholding information. But I am 
going to prove that on the floor of the Senate as I continue my 
remarks, because of the administration's actions and inactions which I 
shall explain in detail in a few moments.
  Communist Vietnam, Communist Laos, Communist North Korea, and 
Communist China are all being let off the hook on key questions 
regarding missing American servicemen and women.
  As a Vietnam veteran who served this country in the United States 
Navy, and as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I find 
the administration's track record on this issue deeply offensive. I am 
going to explain why. But before I do, I think it is important for 
people to have a perspective of where I am coming from on this issue.
  Many of my colleagues have worked on this issue in the past. Many are 
familiar with some of the things that I have done. I do not think I 
would be presumptuous if I said that I considered myself to be somewhat 
of an expert on this issue. I have worked on it for 11 years. Before 
coming to the Senate in 1991, I spent 6 years in the U.S. House of 
Representatives where I was a member of the POW/MIA Task Force, and 
there I worked to get access to my own Government files that they had 
in their possession to the families of the missing.
  When I came to the Senate in 1991, I introduced legislation which 
ultimately formed the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Along with 
Senator Kerry, I cochaired an 18-month investigation by this committee 
which sunset at the end of the Bush administration.

[[Page S16405]]

  Our work has been criticized, and some of that criticism is 
justified. However, I do not think anyone would dispute the fact that 
our committee played a pivotal role in helping to open many of our 
Government's files on the POW/MIA's from the Vietnam war. We held 
numerous hearings, deposed hundreds of witnesses, and learned a great 
deal about policy decisions that were made on the POW/MIA issue at the 
end of the Vietnam war.
  I am convinced that our work on that committee forced the Government 
of Vietnam to do more than to resolve to the issue, and, although I am 
not convinced that Vietnam has done enough, obviously, it did move them 
and our own Government in the right direction.
  Our committee also helped jump start the establishment of a joint 
commission with Russia which has been researching cold war shoot-downs 
along with the plight of the Korean war and the Vietnam war POW/MIA's.
  I know my colleagues would agree with me that our Government owes 
just as much to the families from those wars as they do to the Vietnam 
families.
  The Korean and cold war families have been forgotten, Madam 
President.
  I have traveled to Russia on two occasions to hold talks on this 
issue. I was the first United States Senator to travel to Pyongyang, 
North Korea, and I went there for the sole purpose of discussing POW/
MIA's. In fact, I have been to North Korea twice to discuss this issue. 
I brought back 11 remains of our servicemen on one of these trips from 
Korea.
  Finally, I have been to Vietnam five times in the years that I have 
been in Congress, and two of those trips were with Senator John Kerry 
of Massachusetts.
  I point all of this out not to draw to attention to my efforts--I do 
not want any attention drawn to my efforts--but to underscore that when 
there is an attempt to dupe those of us here in the Congress by the 
administration on information, I do not intend to be duped. I continue 
to follow this issue closely. I know what the President has done, and, 
more importantly, I know what he has not done. And he knows that I know 
what he has not done.
  When the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs sunset in January 
1993--and I might add we had to fight for the funding just to keep it 
going that long--we stated the following in our final report:

       With this final report, the committee will cease to exist, 
     but that does not mean that our own hard work on this issue 
     will also end. To the extent that there remain questions 
     outstanding that are not adequately dealt with by the 
     Executive Branch, we will ensure that these questions are 
     pursued.

  Let me now explain those issues that are not being adequately dealt 
with by the executive branch, in my judgment. I have here a chart. This 
is a summary of several POW/MIA-related provisions from last year's 
National Defense Authorization Act.
  I want the American people to know that this act was signed into law 
by the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, on October 5, 
1994. It is the law of the land. This is not Bob Smith's opinion. This 
is not a congressional resolution. This is the law of the land signed 
October 5, 1994.
  And these POW/MIA provisions that were in this bill right here, those 
provisions had bipartisan support in this Congress. And, as you know, 
in 1994 it was the other political party who controlled the Congress. 
So that further exemplifies the bipartisan support of this legislation.
  When something is signed into law by the President, the 
administration has a responsibility to adhere to it--it is the law--not 
in a manner that they deem appropriate, but in the manner prescribed in 
the law. It is now a year later. It is October 1995, 1 year since this 
law, the Defense Authorization Act, went into effect. I think it is 
appropriate for us to review whether the administration has fully 
complied with that law.
  Section 1031 requires the Defense Department to assist Korean war and 
cold war POW/MIA families seeking information about their loved ones. 
Specifically, the Secretary of Defense was required to designate a 
point of contact for these families that would assist them, the 
families, in obtaining Government records on their loved ones and 
ensuring that these records were rapidly declassified.
  This past week I received the following letter from the Korean/Cold 
War Family Association of the Missing concerning the Defense 
Department's compliance with this law. I want to read it into the 
Record because it is very disturbing.
  [Dear Senator Smith:]

       In response to your letter of today's date, I shall 
     herewith attempt to answer in what manner the Defense 
     Department has complied with Section 1031 [right here] of 
     last year's National Defense Authorization Act by the 
     numbers.
       1. Establish an official to serve as a single point of 
     contact for immediate family members of Korean/Cold War MIA/
     POW's.

  That is one of the provisions:

       In October, 1994 our association began our requests from 
     the DPMO [or the office of POW/MIA's in the government] to 
     name our Single Point of Contact. Jim Wold [who heads that 
     office] insisted that as the Director of DPMO he was 
     automatically our Single Point of Contact. Once we convinced 
     Mr. Wold that it was feasibly impossible for him to act as 
     such, he agreed to appoint a suitable person. In the first 
     quarter of 1995 we were informed Dr. Angelo Collura would 
     serve as our Point of Contact along with two assistants and 
     at that time were given his phone number. Our ability to 
     reach Dr. Collura by phone has been sporadic at best. On too 
     many occasions, when we were finally able to contact Dr. 
     Collura for follow up to previous requests, Dr. Collura 
     stated he was not able to follow through on questions because 
     he was ``pulled off Korean/Cold War to work on Vietnam War.''
       2. To have that official assist family members in locating 
     POW/MIA information and learning how to identify such 
     information. We were told explicitly that it was up to the 
     families to locate the information ourselves because 1. DPMO 
     was not tasked to do it and 2. DPMO did not have the assets 
     to do it. So obviously we have had no assistance in this. 
     When questioned on the matter, we were referred to the DPMO 
     contract with the Federal Research Division of the Library of 
     Congress. This contract was for the FRD to ``gather, copy and 
     deliver to DPMO'' documents pertaining to Korean/Cold War 
     POW/MIA held in U.S. archives and agencies. As of July, 1995 
     20,000 pages have been gathered, copied and delivered to DPMO 
     for families to review. There has been no effort to forward 
     specific case pertinent information to the individual 
     families because no one in DPMO is tasked to do so. This 
     haphazard, certainly overly expensive, redundant method of 
     research was DPMO's intent to comply with an entirely 
     separate section of law. Do we feel assistance has been 
     provided? No.
       3. To have that official rapidly declassify any relevant 
     documents that are located? Dr. Collura stated it was not his 
     job to declassify documents and he was getting no cooperation 
     from the section of DPMO whose job it was to declassify 
     documents. ``They are too busy with Vietnam,'' or ``DPMO can 
     get no cooperation from the agency which originated that 
     document.'' To date I know of no documents which have been 
     declassified by our Single Point of Contact.

  They go on to say, in conclusion:

       Can you tell me what they do other than to spend over $13 
     million annually ignoring not only the spirit of the laws 
     passed but the very laws themselves? Surely a private 
     business, contracted for half that amount of money, could 
     comply with all the sections of the 1995 Defense 
     Authorization Act pertaining to POW/MIA's and getting 
     information to the families.

  I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            Korean/Cold War Family


                                   Association of the Missing,

                                    Coppell, TX, October 23, 1995.
     Senator Bob Smith,
     c/o Dino Carluccio.
       Dear Dino: In response to your letter of today's date, I 
     shall herewith attempt to answer in what manner the Defense 
     Department has complied with Section 1031 of last year's 
     National Defense Authorization Act by the numbers.
       1. Establish an official to serve as a single point of 
     contact for immediate family members of Korean/Cold War POW/
     MIAs. In October, 1994 our association began our requests for 
     DPMO to name our Single Point of Contact. Jim Wold insisted 
     that as the Director of DPMO he was automatically our Single 
     Point of Contact. Once we convinced Mr. Wold that it was 
     feasibly impossible for them to act as such, he agreed to 
     appoint a suitable person. In the first quarter of 1995 we 
     were informed Dr. Angelo Collura would serve as our Point of 
     Contact along with assistants and at that time was given his 
     phone number. Our ability to reach Dr. Collura by phone has 
     been sporadic at best. On too many occasions, when we were 
     finally able to contact Dr. Collura for follow up to previous 
     requests, Dr. Collura stated he was not able to follow 
     through on questions because he was ``pulled off Korean/Cold 
     War to work on Vietnam War.''
       2. To have that official assist family members in locating 
     POW/MIA information and learning how to identify such 
     information. We were told explicitly that it was up to the 
     families to locate the information ourselves because 1. 

[[Page S16406]]

     DPMO was not tasked to do it and 2. DPMO did not have the 
     assets to do it. So obviously we have had no assistance in 
     this. When questioned on the matter, we were referred to the 
     DPMO contract with the Federal Research Division of the 
     Library of Congress. This contract was for the FRD to 
     ``gather, copy and deliver to DPMO'' documents pertaining to 
     Korean/Cold War POW/MIA held in U.S. archives and agencies. 
     As of July, 1995 20,000 pages had been gathered, copied and 
     delivered to DPMO for families to review. There has been no 
     effort to forward specific case pertinent information to 
     the individual families because no one in DPMO is tasked 
     to do so. This haphazard, certainly overly expensive, 
     redundant method of research was DPMO's intent to comply 
     with an entirely separate section of law. Do we feel 
     assistance has been provided? No.
       3. To have official rapidly declassify any relevant 
     documents that are located? Dr. Collura stated it was not his 
     job to declassify documents and he was getting no cooperation 
     from the section of DPMO whose job it was to declassify 
     documents. ``They are too busy with Vietnam.'' or ``DPMO can 
     get no cooperation from the agency which originated that 
     document.'' To date I know of no documents which have been 
     declassified by our Single Point of Contact.
       Dino, I still do not know what our Single Point of Contact, 
     Dr. Collura does other than to be ``pulled off the Korean/
     Cold War POW/MIAs to work on Vietnam War POW/MIAs'', but then 
     after three years of DPMO, I still do not know what DPMO 
     does. Just today I was told by DPMO that it was not a central 
     point of documentation for POW/MIAs. Can you tell me what 
     they do other than to spend over $13 million annually 
     ignoring not only the spirit of the laws passed but the very 
     laws themselves? Surely a private business, contracted for 
     half that amount of money, could comply with all the sections 
     of the 1995 Defense Authorization Act pertaining to POW/MIAs 
     and getting the information to the families.
       Again, thank you for your assistance. Without your help, 
     the men and their families would still be in the limbo of 
     1954. Please see attached final form letter sent to all the 
     families.
           Most sincerely,
                                                Pat Wilson Dunton,
     President.
                                                                    ____



                                 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force,

                                   Washington, DC, April 16, 1954.
     Mrs. Geraldine B. Wilson,
     MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL.
       Dear Mrs. Wilson: Reference is made to the letter from 
     General McCormick notifying you that the missing status of 
     your husband has been terminated. In order that you will have 
     all the information presently available to us, I would like 
     to advise you regarding the possible recovery of his remains 
     for return to the United States.
       The truce agreement reached with the Communist forces 
     provides for certain activities in connection with the 
     recovery of remains of our honored dead from Communist-held 
     territory. It also provides that the specific procedures and 
     the time limit for the recovery operation shall be determined 
     by the Military Armistice Commission. Until the necessary 
     arrangements for the operation have been completed, we will 
     not know when recovery and return of remains can be 
     initiated.
       I appreciate the anxiety you are experiencing, and regret 
     that no information other than that which as now been 
     furnished you is available at this time. You may be sure, 
     however, that we will notify you immediately when further 
     information becomes available.
       If I may assist you with any unusual problems or 
     circumstances regarding the above matter, please do not 
     hesitate to contact me. Correspondence should be addressed as 
     follows, to insure prompt delivery to my office:
       Director of Supply and Services, Attention: Mortuary 
     Branch, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, 
     DC.
       Please accept my sincere sympathy in the great loss you 
     have sustained.
           Sincerely yours,
                                                    L.F. Carlberg,
     Colonel, USAF.
                                                                    ____


                           Executive Summary

       The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Prisoner 
     of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO) in July 1993 to 
     provide centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in 
     action (POW/MIA) affairs within the Department of Defense. 
     Creation of the office brought together four disparate DoD 
     offices that had been working in the POW/MIA arena for 
     varying amounts of time.
       In August 1994, the Director, DPMO, on his own initiative, 
     requested an evaluation of his office by the Deputy Assistant 
     Inspector General for Program Evaluation (PED). We focused 
     our initial work on assessing the processes that provide 
     definition, direction, and structure for the organization. We 
     found that well developed processes in these areas were not 
     yet in place. Specifically, we found that: basic missions and 
     tasks were not well defined or communicated within the 
     organization; no strategic planning process was in place; and 
     the organizational structure was turbulent, poorly defined, 
     and not consistent with current policy guidance regarding 
     organizational layering.
       After documenting these observations and providing a 
     briefing to the Director in December 1994, we redirected our 
     work to provide constructive suggestions on defining mission 
     and tasks, establishing a planning process, and structuring 
     the organization at the DPMO. The results of that work are 
     presented in this White Paper and summarized in the 
     paragraphs that follow.


                      defining missions and tasks

       In defining its missions and tasks, the DPMO faces 
     challenges posed by the broad nature of its charter, the 
     different institutional backgrounds of the office's 
     components, and the divergent nature of its internal and 
     external clients. Overcoming these obstacles first requires 
     recognition of the conflicting perspectives that clients and 
     components bring to bear on the operations of the agency. We 
     suggest putting together a specific statement of the 
     organization's purpose and translating it into some general 
     goals as a way to produce awareness of where groups differ on 
     attacking a common problem. This process can also contribute 
     to communication and help foster commitment to the goals that 
     are ultimately established. Only the members of an 
     organization can validly formulate its goals, and the process 
     should incorporate a wide range of input and discussion. 
     However, we do provide some illustrative general goals for 
     DPMO to facilitate our discussion. We recommend finalizing 
     the draft instructions on Missions and Functions as a good 
     vehicle for documenting the results of this effort.


                           strategic planning

       Carrying out the missions and tasks established by the DPMO 
     means setting up a good planning process. This involves 
     translating the established purposes into more specific 
     objectives or initiatives. Formulating these specific 
     objectives should take into account the internal and external 
     environment and attempt to identify strengths and weaknesses 
     of the organization. The process should also account for the 
     resources needed to reach the objectives and determine ways 
     to measure progress towards achieving objectives. We point 
     out the strategic planning guidelines set forth in the 
     Government Performance and Results Act and urge the DPMO to 
     adopt this model. We suggest that planning efforts should 
     start small and need not wait until full developed strategic 
     plans are in place. We also recommend that the organization 
     adopt performance measures that are simple to apply and 
     linked to the budget process.


                       organizational structures

       In our discussion of organization structure, we recommend 
     that the DPMO refrain from any ad hoc structural changes 
     until it makes a more systematic assessment of its 
     organizational needs. We analyzed three general alternative 
     ways to divide the work and the assignment of 
     responsibilities and authority in the DPMO:
       Alternative 1: The Current Structure With Well Defined 
     Mission and Tasks.
       Alternative 2: A matrix-type structure using task forces 
     for specified activities.
       Alternative 3: A structure that allocates a significant 
     portion of the work load and responsibility structure by 
     geographic region.
       Criteria we present for analyzing structures include clear 
     lines of authority and responsibility, decentralization where 
     possible, and congruence with the strategy of the 
     organization. In formulating the alternatives, we assume that 
     all current functions will remain with the DPMO. The 
     description of each alternative includes any assumptions made 
     concerning the work processes at the DPMO. We believe the 
     alternatives presented are viable alternatives for 
     consideration, in whole or in part, but only those more 
     familiar with the organization can validate our assumptions. 
     Accordingly, we make no specific recommendations on the 
     structure most appropriate for the DPMO.


                           concluding remarks

       In concluding, we recognize the difficulty in setting aside 
     time for such process building. However, in our experience, 
     without the strong leadership that such actions require, the 
     organization will continue to experience difficulty in 
     justifying its resource requirements and completing the 
     assigned mission.

                              Conclusions

       Likes building a ship while under sail, it is not easy to 
     meld disparate organizational entities together while faced 
     with multiple operational demands. However, that is the 
     challenge faced by the DPMO Our initial research at DPMO led 
     us to conclude that the organization lacked (1) well defined 
     missions and tasks, (2) a planning system to see that major 
     goals were accomplished, and (3) a stable organizational 
     structure that supported effective management.
       To assist the office in tackling these areas, we outlined 
     methods that we believe will help the organization define its 
     mission, establish a planning system, and structure its 
     organization. We recognize the difficulty in setting aside 
     time for such process building. However, without the strong 
     leadership that such actions require, the organization will 
     continue to experience difficulty in justifying its resource 
     requirements and completing the assigned mission.

  Mr. SMITH. I think the letter certainly sums it up, Madam President. 
The bottom line is, on section 1031, did the administration comply? The 
answer is, no, they did not comply. Not only do they not comply, they 
indicate they have no intention of complying, that they cannot comply, 
they do not have time to comply. 


[[Page S16407]]

  You have to remember, Madam President, I would point out to you, as 
one who has worked very closely in constituent services as a Member of 
the House and Senate, this is not your typical bureaucrat runaround 
where somebody is trying to find out what happened to some particular 
thing in the Government or trying to get to the right agency. These are 
families who lost loved ones, who lost loved ones in the service of 
their country, and to get that kind of a runaround from people who are 
told to comply with law is disgraceful.
  Let me turn to section 1032. This requires the Secretary of Defense 
to recommend changes to the Missing Persons Act within 6 months; that 
is, by April 5, 1995. This is an act from the 1940's that allows the 
Defense Department to declare that servicemen who became missing in 
hostile territory are automatically dead after 1 year if no information 
surfaces indicating who they are.
  Senator Dole, Senator Lautenberg, Senator Lieberman and I sponsored 
legislation to correct this. However, I wanted to allow the Secretary 
of Defense, to be fair, a chance to submit his own recommendations that 
we could then work out and reconcile with Senator Dole's legislation 
and the Armed Services Committee. I did not try to say I had all the 
answers. I knew we had problems. We wanted to work it out.
  Did we get the report by the end of the 6-month period? The answer 
is, no, we did not. We did not get it until the end of June, 2 months 
late. It was obvious the Defense Department made no serious attempts to 
consult with Members of Congress before submitting what turned out to 
be an inadequate report. Their delay in submitting the required report 
has pushed back our own timetable in reviewing this matter. As a 
result, it remains one of the outstanding issues in the current 
conference committee deliberations on the fiscal year 1996 Defense 
Authorization Act.
  Congressman Dornan in the House has worked tirelessly to revise the 
Missing Persons Act. I want to compliment him for his work. He 
recognizes the seriousness of this issue, especially as Congress, as we 
speak, considers sending 25,000 American servicemen into Bosnia, and 
the White House is leading that effort.
  Madam President, we have memos from the Carter administration between 
President Carter, Secretary of Defense Howard Brown, and National 
Security Council staff which show in clear terms how the Missing 
Persons Act was abused, clearly abused, to satisfy other political and 
foreign policy agendas. There are always other items that move to the 
surface and push this down. As a result, many Vietnam-era POW/MIA 
families endured a great injustice as their loved ones were simply 
written off as dead. These memos clearly show why the law needs to be 
reformed.
  I ask unanimous consent that these memos that I have be printed in 
the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SMITH. To sum up on section 1032, Madam President, the record 
clearly shows that the required report was not submitted by the 
required date. The administration did not comply. So, again, 
regrettably the answer is ``no'' again to the law which was supposed to 
be complied with in April 1995.
  Section 1033 urges the Secretary of Defense to establish contact with 
the Communist Chinese Ministry of Defense officials on Korean War 
American POW's and MIA's.
  Madam President, we have learned, through declassified CIA documents 
and through documents obtained from Russia, that the Chinese have a 
wealth of information--a wealth of information --on missing Americans 
from the Korean war. In fact, the North Koreans told me that when I 
visited them in P'yongyang in 1992. They made a point of telling me. 
They showed me books. They showed me photographs of the camps. And in 
those photographs, in those books, were Communist Chinese guards.
  The North Koreans said, ``Senator, we know you're here in North Korea 
looking for information on American POW's. You ought to talk to the 
Chinese because they were the ones that ran the camps. They were the 
ones who packed up the American prisoners and took them across the Yalu 
River when General MacArthur pushed north.''

  So, Madam President, section 1033 deals with just that matter that 
was signed into law on October 5, 1994. Three weeks later, the 
Secretary of Defense--this is ironic, but 3 weeks later the Secretary 
of Defense, Dr. Perry, was dispatched to Beijing--not for this issue 
but another issue more important, more important than this one--where 
he held high-level meetings with, you guessed it, the Communist Chinese 
Ministry of Defense officials.
  So when Dr. Perry returned, I was excited. The law had passed. It was 
fresh in their minds. Dr. Perry had been to Communist China meeting 
with these officials. So I sent him a note and asked him if he raised 
the subject of unaccounted for Americans held by the Chinese on both 
sides of the Yalu River during the Korean war. I waited. I never got an 
answer. Several weeks later, I was informed by a low-level bureaucrat, 
much to my chagrin, that the subject never came up, never discussed. I 
was hoping I could say, ``Did we get any leads on some information?'' 
The subject never came up. In fact, as far as I know, Dr. Perry was not 
even made aware of section 1033 by his defense POW/MIA office at the 
time. After all, we saw the letter to the families. They are not 
interested. They are not interested.
  More than 40 years have passed, Madam President, 40 years, and we 
still have yet to hold any substantive discussions with the Chinese on 
missing Americans from the Korean war. Forty years. The families wait.
  Just a few weeks ago, I was contacted by the daughter of an American 
pilot shot down over China--not Korea, China--in the 1950's. 
Intelligence indications are that the Chinese captured the pilot. He 
was never heard from again.
  What is President Clinton waiting for before he decides to approach 
China on behalf of the family of this man? How many more years do they 
have to wait before somebody simply asks the Chinese what happened to 
him. How many more years? Is that too much to ask? When the Secretary 
of Defense goes to China for high-level talks, is it too much to ask 
the Chinese what happened to that pilot that we know was shot down? 
That is what the Congress recommended. That is what the Congress urged 
by passing section 1033.
  So again I must check the ``No'' box. Again we come up short. Again 
the President ignores the law. Again the families wait and wait and 
wait. No one cares. We do not have the assets. We do not have the 
resources. We do not have the time. We do not have the interest to be 
bothered with finding out what happened to that pilot in 1950, do we? 
Too many other important things to do, is there not?
  This is a terrible message for the President who is about to send and 
wants to send 25,000 more Americans who wear the uniform today into 
Bosnia--25,000 more Americans into Bosnia, and he cannot ask his 
Secretary of Defense to ask the Chinese if they know what happened to 
this pilot and others. I am not holding the President to a standard he 
cannot meet. I am not asking the President to say absolutely bring him 
back alive or dead or bring back information. I am asking him to ask 
the Chinese what happened to him. That is all I am asking.
  Section 1034--another section of the law--requires Secretary of 
Defense to provide Congress within 45 days a complete listing by name 
of all Vietnam era POW/MIA cases where it is possible Vietnamese or Lao 
officials can produce additional information.
  I am going to skip this section for just a moment because it pertains 
to Vietnam, and I wish to finish covering the two sections on the 
Korean war. However, even though I am going to skip it, as you might 
expect, we are going to check the ``No'' box here, too, because they 
have not complied with that either.
  This is perhaps the most disturbing affront to Congress, the Vietnam 
portion, but I will get back to that in a moment.
  Let us go to section 1035. This ``requires two reports to Congress on 
U.S. efforts to obtain information from North Korea on POW's and MIA's.
  ``Do the reports show any progress since October 1994?''

[[Page S16408]]

  We have a situation where the answer happens to be ``Yes.'' But it 
further requires the President to seriously consider forming a special 
commission with North Korea to resolve the issue as recommended by the 
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in 1993, and the answer to 
that one is ``No.''
  The remains of those soldiers that we know were in those camps buried 
in North Korea during the war, where are they? I was allowed to visit, 
when I went to P'yongyang, the anti-American War Museum in 1992, and I 
caught a glimpse of their vast archives. It is obvious--obvious--that 
North Korea has substantial information on Americans that they shot 
down, captured, or turned over to the Chinese or had taken from them by 
the Chinese--room after room after room. We were allowed to see maybe 
half a dozen, maybe a few more, 7 or 8 rooms, in an 80- to 90-room 
museum full of information on Americans--Americans. It was called the 
American museum. Some in our Government denied it existed, said there 
was not any such museum. You are wasting your time to go over there and 
try to find it. North Koreans denied it, too, but we knew where it was, 
and we got there.
  Let me tell you something. Having served in the Vietnam war and spent 
11 years on this issue, to walk through a museum with letters from 
American POW's that were sent home but never were received at home 
because the North Koreans intercepted them and hung them up on their 
walls as trophies, to see photographs of dead American POW's and live 
American POW's who had been tortured and suffered, to see it all as the 
North Koreans proudly displayed with a high-ranking North Korean 
military officer on either side as I and others walked through that 
museum, that is tough. That is tough to have to go through.
  You know what. As tough as it was, it is not half as tough as coming 
back here and knowing I cannot get anybody in Government who cares 
enough to go back over there and try to get answers for these families. 
That is what is tough.
  The key question here is, Do the reports show any progress in these 
two specified areas? And again the answer to that question is ``No.'' 
And the reports make it clear. So I think I will check the ``No'' box 
again. There was a little ``Yes'' box here. That is the only ``Yes.'' 
In fact, the discussions with the North Koreans have been at an impasse 
now for a long, long time. The North Koreans want several millions from 
the United States for remains they have already turned over. I am not 
into that blackmail. We have done that to Vietnam now--millions of 
dollars for remains, body parts. That is blackmail. It is disgraceful. 
We should not agree to it. That is not what I talked to the North 
Koreans about. However, it does not mean that we should not set up a 
better mechanism to address all of our concerns--remains, possibility 
that somebody may be, through some heroic effort, left alive, and 
information, all three, as well as the North Korean concerns about 
compensation for expenses they can justify.
  It was interesting; a South Korean soldier after spending 43 years in 
a North Korean camp came back alive about a year ago. That did not get 
a lot of publicity. His picture was not in Time magazine.
  It was O.J. Simpson's picture or some rock star's picture, but not 
this guy.
  (Mr. ASHCROFT assumed the chair.)
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, let me tell you something, he happened to 
be a South Korean, but what if he had been an American? What if he had 
been an American? He would have been on Time magazine, would he not? 
Well, he could have been. He could have been.
  I do not know what the President or anyone else in our Government 
today would have to say to that man, not a young man, not today. What 
would you say to him when you looked him in the eye when he asked you, 
``Where had you been for the past 43 years?'' What would you say?
  That is where the second half of section 1035 comes in. The Congress 
required the President to give serious consideration to forming a 
special commission with the North, and this is something the Senate 
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs recommended in its final report. 
All 12 Senators-- Democrat, Republican, liberal, conservative--agreed 
on this point.
  Nonetheless, the administration, obviously, has not given this 
suggestion any serious consideration, and if they had, they would have 
contacted me to discuss what the Bush administration and I had already 
worked out and presented to the North Koreans shortly before President 
Bush left office. I was very involved in those discussions and there 
has been no followup with me whatsoever--not one word from the previous 
administration or this administration, absolutely no interest, no 
consideration, no interest whatsoever in what those discussions were. I 
am not a State Department official. I have no authority to negotiate. 
These were simple discussions, but I thought they might be interested 
in knowing what we talked about and what we might be able to do as a 
result of those discussions, but I was hoping for too much.
  But, oh, you hear the rhetoric, though, you hear the rhetoric. How we 
worked so hard, we tried so hard, we have the POW/MIA stamp, we have 
the ceremonies, POW/MIA recognition day, and we have these great 
speeches about how we will never forget, ``You are not forgotten.'' 
Words, Mr. President, they are cheap. There has not been compliance 
with the second half of section 1035. So we will just check the ``no'' 
block there.
  Section 1036, require public disclosure of all Defense Department 
records on American POW's and missing personnel from the Korean war and 
the cold war that are in the possession of the National Archives by 
September 30, 1995, 1 month ago. Our National Archives, Mr. President. 
Not the North Korean's national archives, not the Chinese, not the 
Russians, our own archives.
  Two weeks ago, the administration reported that they had not complied 
with this section. They need more time, Mr. President. One year was not 
enough. So Senator Kerry and I have now extended their deadline until 
January 2, 1996, in the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization Act. We 
gave the administration 3 more months, and it remains to be seen 
whether they are going to comply.
  Open up the archives. Let us see what is in there. It is the Korean 
war, over 40 years ago. Are there national security secrets in there? 
What is amazing about this is that Defense Department officials have 
admitted to me--admitted--and I will not quote them, but they admit it, 
that they did not even begin to consider whether they would be in 
compliance with this provision until 10 months after the bill was 
signed into law.
  At that time, when they were asked about it by family members, then 
they decided they might have to do something. It is not that we did not 
warn them. In fact, after the law was signed last year, I sent a letter 
to the Department of Defense reminding them of this obligation. They 
did not care about the deadline. It is not important. They have too 
many more important things to do.
  So, again, let us check the final ``no'' box, Mr. President. That is 
not a very good record, the way I look at it. This is the law. This is 
the law. These are not simple requests by letters. This is the law. Not 
one item on there was complied with.
  The administration, probably not a very good metaphor, basically 
thumbed its nose at the Congress and the American people and the 
families and our Nation's veterans by not complying with the sanctions 
of this law. I am offended, and every single decent American should be 
offended. Every mother and father who has a son or daughter poised to 
go into Bosnia today, sent there by this President or this Congress, 
ought to be offended.
  This is contempt for the laws of Congress, and I know a lot of laws 
get passed and I know a lot of things are difficult to comply with. God 
knows I understand that. I serve on the Armed Services Committee and I 
sympathize with so many of the regulations and laws with which they 
have to comply. But I have reminded them over and over. I have offered 
to help. I have given them extensions. Nothing. And yet, if you read 
any manual on POW's and MIA's today, you know what it will say--try not 
to laugh, this is the highest national priority--it says in the 
handbook, ``the highest national priority.'' If that is the highest 
national priority, I would hate to see what is, really. The President 
clearly does not care 

[[Page S16409]]

about disregarding this law, and I think the American people are 
rightfully going to hold him responsible for it.
  Let me come back to 1034, the final point on here. This is the 
section which last year's law pertained to the Vietnam-era POW/MIA 
cases. This is the most disturbing violation of all, because it 
occurred during the same period--and this is very offensive to me 
personally--it occurred during the same period that the President is 
showering the Communist Government of Vietnam with full diplomatic 
recognition and expanding the commercial contacts there. In fact, the 
State Department and our trade representatives are now coming to the 
Hill to brief congressional staff on further efforts to expand the 
economic relations, to set up the diplomatic office.
  I have stated all along, and fought this every inch of the way and 
lost, that these initiatives are premature and that they simply amount 
to nothing more than putting profit over principle. That is what it is.
  Section 1034 requires the Secretary of Defense to provide Congress 
within 45 days--this is not an unreasonable request--within 45 days a 
complete listing by name of all Vietnam-era POW/MIA cases where it is 
possible that Vietnamese or Lao officials can produce additional 
information. Not additional men, not unreasonable requests, not 
somebody that was blown up in a fire fight that nobody saw, but POW/MIA 
cases where it is possible that Vietnamese or Lao officials can produce 
additional information.
  Mr. President, there are 2,170 Americans still unaccounted for from 
the Vietnam war. We know half of them were believed to be killed in 
combat at the time of their incident and the other half were listed as 
missing in action--we know that--which means we did not know what 
happened to them at the end of the war. That is what it means.
  There has been a great debate about how many cases Vietnam really 
still owes us answers on, how many out of these 2,170 can they 
legitimately give us answers on. We know they cannot do it all. That 
would be an unreasonable expectation, because in some cases, frankly, 
they do not know what happened. There was a lot of concern about some 
of the wartime photographs that surfaced in the Vietnamese archives on 
cases where Vietnam had previously said they had no information, no 
information, do not know what happened to this guy and suddenly up pops 
a photograph.
  So we wanted a case-by-case assessment on this issue. Now you would 
think that the Department of Defense would have had this information 
readily available in some type of a database that is constantly 
updated, if it is the highest national priority. We are trying to find 
out what happened to the 2,170 men. If we have intelligence information 
that this or that happened, we ought to be feeding it into a database, 
we ought to be able to pull it up and send it over here. Wrong.
  They spend $54 million a year of the taxpayers' money working on this 
issue, and they cannot produce a simple list of 2,170 people in which 
it says on one side this guy was killed in action, here are the 
witnesses; this guy was captured alive, he was led off, here is the 
information; this guy was photographed in a POW camp, never came back. 
They cannot produce it. They cannot do it.
  They have the information, Mr. President, because I have read it. I 
have seen it. Do you know why they do not want to produce the list? I 
will tell you why. Because if they produce the list, it might screw up 
the diplomatic relations, mess up the economic gains that American 
businessmen are going to make by exploiting Vietnam. That is why they 
do not want to put the list out.

  How could the President of the United States--any President--proceed 
with the normalization of relations with any country--in this case, 
Vietnam--without first knowing just a simple, basic knowledge of how 
many cases of missing American servicemen there are? If Vietnamese and 
Lao officials had more information on them, based on all of our 
intelligence and investigative activity to date, how can we, in good 
conscience, move on without getting just that basic information--not 
out of the Vietnamese, Mr. President, but out of our own Government--
what they have that they think the Vietnamese and the Lao have?
  I am not saying account for every one of these men. That is not what 
I am asking for. I am asking them to give me the information on the 
cases of the men that they have in their best intelligence--perhaps a 
witness, a buddy who saw a guy led off, whatever. Give it to us because 
we have reason to believe that the Vietnamese would know what happened 
to these men, and we can confront them on this.
  One example: David Hrdlicka was shot down, captured by the North 
Vietnamese in Laos, photographed, filmed, used in Communist propaganda, 
paraded around. Never a word from the Lao or the Vietnamese as to what 
happened to David Hrdlicka. Do you think they do not know what happened 
to him? Of course, they know what happened to him. But that information 
is in that list.
  If the Government sends that list over here--our Government--that is 
going to be a little embarrassing, because when Carol Hrdlicka, David's 
wife, who has waited all these years, says, ``Why are you normalizing 
relations with a country that will not even tell you what happened to 
my husband?'' What are you going to say, Mr. President? The 
administration has not complied with this law.
  You have to ask yourself these questions: Why? Why? I could go over 
there, probably in a month, with a couple of staff people and get it 
myself. It is there. It is not that it is not there. Of course, it is 
there. Of course, there is a database. What are they afraid of? Are 
they covering up or sitting on information that would show the American 
people that Vietnam is not fully cooperating on missing Americans? You 
bet. You bet. That is exactly the reason why they are not giving us the 
information, because it is going to show that the Vietnamese are not 
fully cooperating--are not cooperating in any way, shape, or form, to 
the full capacity that they could.
  If this information were released to the public, it would undermine 
all of the rhetoric from the President, the Secretary of State and 
their adjectives like ``splendid,'' ``superb,'' and all this 
cooperation they claim we have been receiving from Communist Vietnam. 
That is what we have heard--not just cooperation, but ``splendid,'' 
``superb,'' ``outstanding,'' ``unprecedented.''
  Well, boy, it would sure blow that up if the U.S. Congress and every 
staff member for every Senator and Congressman in this place could look 
at that list. That is why we do not have the list. Hold the list up, 
ignore the law until we get it all done, until we get the mission set 
up, get the full diplomatic relations set up, then let it out, but do 
not do it now; you will sure mess it up.
  I recall the statements by assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord 
during his last trip to Vietnam this last May. He stated: ``We have no 
reason to believe that the Vietnamese are not making a good-faith 
effort on the POW/MIA issue.'' Well, Mr. Lord, let me just say it as 
nicely as I can: That is not the truth. That is not the truth, and you 
know it.
  If the President has no reason--and that is the exact word--to 
believe they are not cooperating, which is what he cited as the basis 
for announcing his decision to normalize relations this past summer, 
then where is the list? Why do you not let us see the list?
  There will be some who will come back down here on the floor, perhaps 
tonight or tomorrow and say, ``There goes Smith again. I thought we 
could get the war behind us; I want to get it over and move on. I am 
tired of fighting the war.''
  Some things have to be fought. Some things have to be continued 
because they are right. Many of my colleagues in the 1840's and 1850's 
stood on the floor of this U.S. Senate and argued against slavery, and 
it took them a while to get it right, but they got it right, and they 
were right when they were making those statements and having those 
discussions on the floor of the Senate. And we are right now to make 
them now.
  History will judge us as being right. History will judge us, who 
stood up and said we did not get the information, not only from the 
Vietnamese and the Lao, but from our own Government. We did not get it. 
History will judge us as being absolutely right. I do not care 

[[Page S16410]]

who says what differently. History will be the judge. I will stand on 
that judgment.
  I want to review in more detail now exactly where we have been 
concerning this requirement over the last year. I want my colleagues 
and the American people to see what is going on. I know this is a long 
speech and people want to go home, but it has been a lot longer for the 
people who have waited for answers for their loved ones, some all the 
way back into the fifties, from the cold war. So I am doing it for 
them. No one else cares, so I am doing it for them.
  I want everybody to know what happened over the last year. It would 
make you sick, Mr. President, to see the obfuscation, the delay tactics 
that have taken place. I have drawn my conclusion. I am going to be 
criticized for this. It is a coverup; that is what it is. It is not a 
coverup in any sense other than you got information and you will not 
give it to us, according to the law. If you have information that the 
law prescribes and you will not give it to us, then you are covering it 
up. If you are not covering up, get it over here. If I get this 
information over here tomorrow morning, I will withdraw and retract the 
comment about a coverup. If I do not get it, or there is some 
indication that I am going to get it quickly, I am going to assume that 
this information is being covered up so we can get on with 
normalization and not mess it up.
  This information, if we get it here, will show that right up to the 
present, despite all the comments about cooperation, the Government is 
nonetheless holding back information on several hundred--not 10, 12 or 
20--American servicemen that were lost or captured in Communist Laos 
and North Vietnam during the war. Several hundred are on that list. 
What is that list? That list is the best case, best information 
available by the United States Government through intelligence sources, 
buddies on the battlefield, copilots, back seaters, men on the ground 
as to what happened to these individuals. It is not necessarily that 
they are alive, but that we know what happened to them, and we think 
the Vietnamese know what happened to them. That is all we are asking 
for. But, you see, if we publish that list, it would destroy the 
argument for normalization.
  Do you know what people say to me? It is amazing. ``Why would a 
Vietnamese hold back any information?'' First of all, I am not 
interested in why. The first question is, are they holding back and not 
disclosing information about the fate of our men? In the absence of 
this list of cases, I can only conclude that the administration is 
presently engaged in a coverup of information that would answer this 
question in the affirmative. Pure and simple.
  People will yank this phrase out of context. But if you put it in the 
context that I have said it--and I have been quoted out of context 
before--they are covering up in providing the information, the best-
case information, best available information, as to what happened to 
certain men who are missing, in order to move forward with diplomatic 
relations and trade. I am going to let my colleagues and the American 
people be the judge after they see what happened, because do you know 
what? Sooner or later I am going to get that list, because I have seen 
it and I know it exists.

  This list was required by law on November 17, 1994. As that date 
approached, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense sent a letter to 
Congress requesting a 3-month extension. He also informed us there was 
an interagency agreement within the executive branch that no revised or 
new list would ever be produced.
  Let me read from the letter we received at the time from the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense.

       Dear Mr. Chairman: The fiscal year 1995 National Defense 
     Authorization Act contained a request that the Secretary of 
     Defense report not later than 45 days to the Congress 
     specified information pertaining to the U.S. personnel 
     involved in the Vietnam conflict that remain unaccounted for.
       This letter is to advise you the study is underway and that 
     considerable progress has been made, but it is unlikely the 
     report will be finalized by the time requested. It is 
     anticipated that the report will be finalized within 135 
     days, at which time it will be forwarded to your committee 
     for review.

  This was addressed to Senator Nunn.

       The comprehensive review must be carefully constructed to 
     reinforce current and near-term negotiations. Specifically, 
     there is great potential to any new list to cause confusion 
     for the governments of Vietnam and Laos, and this concern 
     resulted in an interagency agreement that would not produce 
     any new lists.

  Gobbledygook.
  Mr. President, the law does not give the administration the luxury to 
decide whether or not a new list would be produced. It said produce a 
list.
  I reminded the administration of that fact last November. I am, 
frankly, not interested in some bureaucrat's view about causing 
confusion for the Vietnamese. The Congress, the American people, and 
the families are the ones who have been confused by Government 
distortions on this issue since the end of the war. That is another 
reason we want a straightforward list in the first place.
  Notwithstanding that, I try to be reasonable, and in spite of all the 
hardships these families try to be reasonable. A 3-month extension 
seemed OK to me, and the Armed Services Committee agreed with it.
  I met with the Deputy Assistant Secretary in December of last year in 
my office and told him I had no objection. Even though I did, I said I 
had no objection to extending the deadline to February 17, 1995. I 
expressed my amazement that such a list did not already exist. In fact, 
I still do not know how the President can look at normalizing relations 
with Communist Vietnam without having the list of the American POW 
cases that Vietnam might be holding back on. He is not concerned about 
it. I just am absolutely aghast to think that that does not bother him, 
because apparently it does not or he would provide the list.
  When the new extended deadline began to approach after the Christmas 
holidays last year, rumors started to surface that we still would not 
get the list by the new February deadline. Those rumors turned out to 
be true.
  On January 24, 1995, after more rumors surfaced that the President 
might upgrade relations with Vietnam, several of my colleagues joined 
me in sending a letter to the President reminding him of his obligation 
to provide the required list. In fact, we asked him to give us the list 
before any decision was made to upgrade relations.
  That sent the red flag up, so now we had to speed up the process. Let 
me just say I sent the letter. But let me tell you who else signed it. 
It was signed by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator 
Helms; it was signed by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
Senator Thurmond; it was signed by the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, Senator Specter; signed by the chairman of the Asian Pacific 
Subcommittee, Senator Thomas; the chairwoman of the International 
Operations Subcommittee, Senator Snowe; the House chairman of the 
International Relations Committee, Congressman Gilman; the House 
chairman of the Asian Pacific Subcommittee Bereuter; and the House 
chairman of the National Committee on Military Personal, Congressman 
Dornan.
  The President ignored the request. He said, you will get the list 
soon, period. This was in January 1995. January 28, he announced the 
formation of liaison offices between Vietnam and the United States in 
both Hanoi and here in Washington. Fast track, we call it.
  For the first time now we are allowing the Communist Vietnamese 
government to establish an office here in Washington, even though 
Congress still had not provided the American people with a list, the 
White House had not provided Congress with a list of POW/MIA that 
Vietnam might be holding back on. No list.
  I think the administration realized their decision to upgrade 
relations would not be viewed in a positive light if the list was 
released just last February. You can be the judge on that.
  I next raised the issue with Secretary of Defense Bill Perry at a 
hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 9, 1995. I 
told Dr. Perry's staff beforehand that I would raise the question so 
there would be no surprises. I do not play the game that way. I wanted 
him to have a response ready so I did not catch him by surprise.
  When I asked him at the hearing if he was going to meet the new 
deadline by February 17, he said, ``Yes, yes.'' I immediately followed 
up that day with a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

[[Page S16411]]

  The following day I received a response which stated, ``The 
Department will respond to the legislation by February 17, 1995. Let me 
assure you our response to this Congressional requirement will be 
provided in compliance with the law.''
  On February 17, 1995, we received a letter from the Secretary of 
Defense which did not comply with the law. I repeat, did not comply 
with the law. It did not provide the updated listing of cases of 
missing Americans that Vietnam and Laos officials might have more 
information on.
  I want to read an excerpt from that letter that we received from the 
Secretary of Defense which I have blown up here on a chart. This is the 
letter to Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee.

       In response to this legislation, the Department of Defense 
     has initiated a comprehensive review of each case involving 
     an American who never returned from Southeast Asia.

  That sounds good.

       As of February 12, 1995, nearly 50 percent of all cases 
     have been reviewed as part of this process.
       Completion of this painstaking case-by-case review will 
     take at least several additional months, at which time these 
     findings will be reported to Congress.

  Well, here we go again. We do not have a list. Several additional 
months--no list.
  Is it not a little audacious for the Pentagon to talk about a request 
if a straightforward analysis--let me quote this language which really 
jumps off the page, Mr. President. ``Completion of this painstaking 
case-by-case review will take at least several additional months.''
  Painstaking. How about the pain and the uncertainty that the families 
have had to endure with their missing loved ones? Believe me, the 
Pentagon's pain on this issue is nothing compared to the pain of the 
families. I think the word is an insult. I take offense with the use of 
that word to imply there is some analyst over in the Pentagon who is 
going through this whole painstaking process of putting a list 
together--a simple list of information they already have. I am not 
asking them to extract this from the Vietnamese and Laos but from our 
own intelligence files that we believe the Vietnamese have or the Laos 
on our missing men.
  How would you compare their pain? That must be awfully painful for 
them, is it not, these bureaucrats going through this painstaking 
process?
  What have they been doing for the last 25 years? What have they been 
doing for the last 25 years if they do not have the information on 
these people that are missing? My God, what are they telling the 
families? How can anybody have any sympathy for anybody in this 
administration or any other administration with that kind of analysis 
on this issue?
  Consider the roller coaster ride that the families have been on year 
after year, decade after decade, waiting for answers. Hopes up, dashed. 
Hopes up, dashed. They are the ones that have gone through the pain, 
Mr. President, not these bureaucrats.
  I am not saying that the people in there are not loyal Americans 
trying to do a job, but we should get the job done.
  How much more time do you need? It was clear by this past February 
that the administration had violated the law. That is the exact 
phrase--violated the law. I sent a long letter, again, to the Secretary 
of Defense on March 7, 1995, and I expressed my disappointment that you 
violated the law. Everybody else has to comply with the law but 
apparently the President does not.
  A month later on April 7, I received another written response from 
the Under Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe, allegedly on behalf of 
Dr. Perry. Let me just read an excerpt from that letter:

       Section 1034's impact has been to refocus the analyst' work 
     to conduct this comprehensive review earlier than 
     anticipated. Currently, DOD has committed 22 of the 33 
     analysts (67 percent) within DPMO and an additional 12 
     analysts from Joint Task Force Full Accounting to working 
     full-time on the comprehensive review. To ensure the type of 
     comprehensive review of all 2,211 cases that both Congress 
     and the families demand and have a right to expect, it is 
     essential that the analysts expend the time and scrutiny 
     required to evaluate every individual's case in the light of 
     all available evidence.
       While there will be no arbitrary deadline, I assure you 
     that DOD will continue to give this effort the utmost 
     attention. I am confident the review will be completed during 
     the summer. The department will report the results of DPMO's 
     review to Congress on its completion.

  That was in April. Imagine that. The law imposes a deadline. That is 
what I thought, that you had to comply with the law. I am sure the 
Senator in the chair, the Senator from Missouri, when the EPA tells one 
of the communities in your State they have to comply with the Safe 
Drinking Water Act or Clean Air Act, they nail you with a fine and 
threaten your community.
  This law imposed a deadline, and not an unreasonable one. Yet the 
Under Secretary of Defense says to Congress, ``There will be no 
arbitrary deadline.'' In other words, ``To heck with you, Congress. Do 
not tell me when we have to do this. We will get it when we are ready. 
That is an arbitrary deadline.''
  Who is he, Mr. President? Who elected him? Is he under the law? I 
guess not. The Department of Defense must be above the law. And the 
Clinton administration, I guess the President himself, he must feel the 
same way--above the law.
  You wonder why people are cynical about politics and politicians? It 
is an affront. It is an affront to Congress. I am taking the floor 
tonight, and taking the time to work my way through this because I want 
my colleagues to know that we have laws on the books that are being 
ignored, and blatantly ignored. We are not even allowed to review our 
own Government's assessment to judge for ourselves whether Vietnam is 
fully cooperating. I am not asking for my own assessment. I am asking 
for our Government's assessment. That is all I am asking for.
  And then, without getting that information, my colleagues and I are 
asked to rubberstamp the President's discussion on diplomatic 
relations. That is what we did.
  I do not think it is going to be that easy. I urge my colleagues to 
consider these matters the next time they are asked to vote on this 
issue. I certainly commend Senator Craig Thomas for his support in his 
committee. I hope it will be a long time coming before you get an 
ambassador approved out of the Senate.
  There used to be an expression as you go along through a speech 
``stay tuned, it gets worse.'' The next chart is a statement from June 
28, 1995, before Congress. This is a full 3 months after the last 
letter from Under Secretary Slocombe wherein he assured us that all his 
analysts were working full time on these cases.
  Three months later, in June, we still did not have the list. So, this 
is sworn testimony by Jim Wold, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for POW/MIA affairs. Here is what he said.

       We must never forget, however, that the goal of achieving 
     the fullest possible accounting can only be achieved with 
     diligence and hard work. With that in mind, I launched the 
     ongoing DOD comprehensive review of all Southeast Asia cases, 
     which I hope will be completed in mid-July. This all-
     encompassing look at every individual case will provide a 
     solid analytic assessment of the appropriate ``next steps'' 
     for achieving the fullest possible accounting. Our 
     unaccounted Americans deserve no less. I will work to ensure 
     that we keep our promise to them. Thank you.

  Jim Wold is not entirely accurate or he would have said the goal will 
only be achieved when Vietnam decides to fully open its archives and 
its prisons. Then we can say we are diligent hard workers.
  We can ``say'' that. That is not going to resolve this matter if the 
Vietnamese are deliberately withholding information, and I am going to 
discuss some of the information that is being withheld. There is a lot 
of heartwarming rhetoric at the end of this statement, ``Our 
unaccounted Americans deserve no less. I will work to ensure that we 
keep our promise to them.'' That is what he said. That is real nice. 
But the fact is the administration was supposed to work to get the job 
done and report it to Congress under the reasonable deadline imposed by 
Congress: 45 days, not 245 days later which was mid-July or 330 days, 
as it now stands, nearly a year since the deadline. No list.
  This information should already have been compiled and available for 
policy makers, the Congress and the families. It has been held--it has 
been withheld from the American people. They have it. They can put it 
together. It may not be in a sheet form that you can just 

[[Page S16412]]

say ``Here,'' listed with the information. They can put it together and 
they can put it together quickly. They have it. Of course they have it. 
Could they produce it? Yes. Why do they not? Because it is going to 
show in black and white the degree to which Vietnam is sitting, as we 
speak, on information concerning the fate of several hundred American 
servicemen. Not a few dozen like the administration likes to claim--no, 
no, no. This is an outrage. It is going to show that they have 
information on several hundred Americans.
  The next chart is a copy of a letter that I sent, again to the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Slocombe, continuing to try here. This was 
dated August 18, 1995, after the President announced, in July, his 
intention to establish diplomatic relations with Communist Vietnam. You 
remember that debate. I again tried by sending another letter. My 
letter followed a similar letter from Senator Thomas in mid-July on 
this subject, in which he has made clear his intent to withhold in his 
subcommittee any funding for Vietnam or any ambassadorial nominee to 
Hanoi until this is reviewed by Congress.
  I commend him for having the courage to do that. He has taken 
considerable heat for it. I cannot possibly say how much I appreciate 
his support. He has been steadfast on this issue as the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
affairs.
  But in my August letter, without reading it all, I basically said: 
Mr. Secretary, where is the list? Where is the list? Where is the list?
  No response. No response from the August 18 letter. Not even an 
acknowledgment, despite numerous followup phone calls after this. 
Senator Thomas--no response.
  I am told from other sources that these cases finally moved up the 
policy ladder in the administration, but only after the President made 
his decision to normalize, which was my point all along. Once we get 
passed that bogey, then we are home free. They did not want to get it 
in the way as the President made his decision. Apparently, staffers at 
the National Security Council are now ``very concerned'' about 
releasing this information because of what it shows and the way things 
are worded in the study. The word is that this assessment or study, 
which is now being withheld from Congress--and it is being withheld 
deliberately --shows that Vietnam is likely withholding information on 
hundreds of POW/MIA cases.
  I want to underscore why I am concerned about this. The fact that we 
still have in my judgment a discrepancy of several hundred cases with 
no answers from Vietnam or Laos. To do this, I want to refer to the 
charts, information about POW's from Vietnam that has surfaced in the 
last 12 years from the Communist Party and intelligence archives of the 
former Soviet Union. The Russians, to their credit--the Russians to 
their credit--have been very, very helpful. I am a member of the U.S.-
Russian Commission. I met with the Russians on numerous occasions on 
this subject.
  For those who are not familiar with the reports about these 
documents, let me explain. In 1993, only a few months after President 
Clinton was sworn in, the administration received from the Russian 
archives two reports that the Soviet Union, the old Soviet Union, had 
covertly obtained from the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam war--
covertly obtained; a very touchy subject. These were copies of speeches 
given by two Vietnamese military officials to the North Vietnamese 
Politburo in 1971 and 1972.
  Sections of both of these speeches concern American POW's being held 
by North Vietnam, and they stated flatly that more American POW's were 
being held than those the Vietnamese had acknowledged. This is not our 
intelligence. This is the Soviets.
  I might add that the numbers were larger than those that we had 
assumed.
  Sections of both of these speeches were looked at. I might add, as I 
said, that these numbers were much larger than what we found in the 
Paris Peace Accords in 1973.
  That is the essence of these secret speeches before the North 
Vietnamese Politburo. They had told the world that they held X number 
of POW's, but in reality they held X-plus, and they were not going to 
release them until we withdrew from Vietnam and paid war reparations, 
which we never did.
  These are not my words. This is the document. As our select committee 
showed in 1992, yes, we withdrew our military forces in 1975 after 
Congress had cut off the purse strings, but we did not pay the 
reparations that President Nixon had promised the Vietnamese in secret 
communications in February of 1973.
  So the first Politburo report turned over was a translation of a 
wartime secret speech by North Vietnamese Gen. Tran Von Quang, who was 
a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army. In their 
report, he stated that 1,205 Americans were being held. As I previously 
pointed out, only 591 came home. So there is an obvious discrepancy. 
General Quang says in the document we have 1,205; 591 came home.
  The secret Politburo report turned over was a translation of another 
speech given earlier in the war by the Vietnamese former Vice Minister 
for National Defense Hoang Anh. Like General Quang, he stated that he 
had only released a list of 368 names of Americans but that they were 
in fact holding 735. As I previously stated, that figure had gone up to 
1,205 a couple of years later when General Quang addressed the 
Politburo.
  These numbers are all confusing, but this is what the report says. 
This is not a debate about what Bob Smith believes. It is not a debate 
about that report itself. It is a debate about what this report says. 
It says it. It is a document taken from the archives of the Soviet 
Union. I do not know whether these numbers are accurate. I do not know. 
But I know that General Quang said they were accurate. It was not a 
propaganda document. It was said before the Vietnamese Politburo.
  Do you not think that President Clinton would be naive if he believed 
the Vietnamese did not hold back the total number of Americans they had 
captured during the war for whatever strategic purposes they deemed 
appropriate at the time? Even former Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, to 
his credit, had held a press conference in 1970 to say that the list 
the Vietnamese published at the time was not complete.
  For the record, I want to say that these two Russian documents 
surfaced on President Clinton's watch--not on President Nixon's or Dr. 
Kissinger's watch in 1973. They did not know about these documents.
  There can be no doubt that President Clinton has to be the one to 
bear the responsibility with regard to holding the Vietnamese 
accountable in terms of explaining these Politburo reports, these 
documents. We cannot go back and say, ``Dr. Kissinger should have done 
something on these specific reports,'' because they did not know about 
this. It is my judgment that the administration has tried to brush 
these documents aside.
  There will be plenty of people out there who will say, ``Oh, my, here 
is Smith again.'' This is a disservice to the Congress, and to the 
members of the Armed Services Committee, and to the members of our 
armed services. Instead of keeping faith with the American fighting men 
by pursuing information like this until we are certain we are doing 
everything we can to account for the missing Americans, the President 
has broken faith.
  What about the investigative activity of these reports? Did we look 
into them sufficiently? In short, no. The administration has not even 
asked to meet with Hoang Anh, the author of one of these reports, even 
though he is living in retirement in Vietnam. We are going over there 
to establish diplomatic relations, going to drill for a little oil, set 
up some airline offices, but we cannot meet with Mr. Anh. We cannot 
meet with him, and have not met with him. There has been no credible 
type of detailed information from the Vietnamese Government on either 
of these reports, just deny them and that they were accurate.
  Let me concentrate on that report by Quang which went into a lot of 
detail about the number of Americans being held. When that document 
publicly surfaced from the Soviet archives in April of 1993, the 
Vietnamese put a full court press on it, believe me, to label the 
document a ``fabrication.'' They knew 

[[Page S16413]]

the President was close to lifting the trade embargo. In fact, some 
said it was created to squash the trade embargo. I do not know who 
could create it. It came out of the Soviet archives. It was an 
authentic document. It was said they were caught between a hot rock and 
a hard place.
  What do they do? They lie. They said the report was cooked up and 
fabricated by a Harvard researcher. That is where it got very 
interesting. This was not a POW/MIA activist. This was not a nut. This 
was a Harvard researcher who had nothing to do with MIA's. He was over 
there doing another project. He found it. He said, ``Whoops. Holy 
mackerel. Here, this is something important.'' He tucked it away. His 
name was Stephen Morris.
  When the Russians officially turned that document over, the Russians 
were able to convince every reasonable scholar and analyst that this 
was an authentic intelligence document from the GRU, the equivalent to 
our Defense Intelligence Agency. Simply put, the Russians confirmed 
when they turned the document over that the Vietnamese had apparently 
lied to the United States for 20 years.
  Was there an uproar by the administration, Mr. President? No. In 
fact, the first thing they did was to classify the document secret, and 
withhold it from the American people. ``Oh, we do not want to mess up 
the embargo. We cannot let that out.'' But Dr. Morris released it to 
the New York Times. Now we have a problem. So then the administration 
had to respond.
  I have a chart here that is a synopsis of the official comments by 
the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
  Let me just quickly go through this. You have to remember that this 
is an independent researcher, Dr. Morris, who finds the document in the 
Soviet archives. The Soviets say it is true, it is an accurate document 
in the sense that it is authentic. You cannot vouch for the exact 
language in it. But these remarks were made by General Quang, it is an 
authentic document out of the Soviet archives, out of the GRU 
intelligence community. So now we have a problem. This is two Communist 
nations during the war who were friends. This is an embarrassment. And 
the Communist Vietnamese were livid because it embarrassed them. But 
they were caught with their proverbial pants down. They had to say 
something. Here is what they said.
  ``Vietnam totally denies that ill-intentioned fabrication * * *. 
Realities prove that the report * * * is completely groundless.''
  That was in the Foreign Ministry.
  ``General Tran Van Quang had nothing to do with the General Staff of 
the Vietnamese People's Army,'' said the Foreign Minister.
  ``This is a pure fabrication, and we completely reject it,'' said the 
Deputy Director of Vietnam's Office for Seeking Missing Persons.
  ``* * * it is a forgery document. It's totally false.''
  This is Le Van Bang, former U.N. Ambassador from Vietnam, the charge 
d'affaires in Washington, DC. He is here now.
  ``[General Quang] was in no position to make such a report.''
  ``It's a sheer fabrication. It's non-existent.''
  ``The intelligence service that manufactured this report was a very 
bad intelligence service. It was absolutely wrong. Never in my life did 
I make such a report because it was not my area of responsibility * * 
*. I had nothing to do with American prisoners,'' said General Quang in 
April 1993.
  Did anybody from the U.S. Government, anybody from the Clinton 
administration, meet with General Quang? You guessed it. No.
  But I did. I did. I went over and spent a half-hour with him. He lied 
throughout the entire discussion. The reason I know he lied is because 
I asked him questions that I knew the answer to. He gave me the wrong 
answers to about just the basic information, about the war years, about 
information he had that I knew was accurate. He lied. He lied about 
this.
  This is when the Vietnamese really got hot.
  ``The Russians can possibly open up their documents for you, but as 
long as the United States side is treating the Vietnamese as `Trading 
with the Enemy,' we cannot open our documents for this reason.''
  That is what the Vietnamese said. He said that to me, particularly 
the Vietnamese official in Hanoi. It is pretty revealing--that last 
quote, Mr. President, because the Vietnamese told me personally--that 
the Russians can open their documents, but we are not going to as long 
as there is a trade embargo.
  That is exactly what they said to me. The Russians can open them up, 
but we are not opening them up until you get rid of the trade embargo; 
that is, Trading With the Enemy Act.
  Well, the President lifted the embargo 2 years ago. After he lifted 
the embargo, we were going to have this whole raft of information which 
was going to come sweeping out of Vietnam.
  We were going to be just besieged with it.
  Well, we still do not have access to their Communist Party records on 
POW's. We had to get it through the Russians. So much for superb, 
splendid, outstanding cooperation, Mr. President.
  Let us look at the second chart. Let us see what the Russians had to 
say about this document. I hope everyone is following this because we 
just saw what the Vietnamese had to say. These are the Russians. They 
do not have any reason to be lying to us about this. This is 
embarrassing to them if anything else. It would be the equivalent of 
England and the United States with some agreement during the war years 
that would embarrass one of us against the other. But here we have Dr. 
Rudol'f Germanovich Pikhoya, the Chief State Archivist of the Russian 
Federation in August of this year. Here is what he said:

       I am absolutely certain that the numbers--

  That is the numbers of POW's.

     cited by General Quang are true. I believe that the data 
     still exists in Vietnam which deals specifically with U.S. 
     POW's . . . I am absolutely positive that the 1205 figure is 
     absolutely true and correct as far as intelligence data is 
     concerned. As an archivist and someone who has analyzed a 
     great many documents, military and otherwise, I can tell you 
     that this is an absolute truth:

  He has used the word ``absolute'' two or three times:

       This number was announced by Quang at a closed Politburo 
     meeting.

  How do Russians get information out of a closed Politburo meeting? We 
do not need to get into that, but we all know how to get it.
  Colonel General Ladygin, Chief, Main Intelligence Directorate of the 
General Staff Ministries of Defense. That is the GRU, the intelligence 
arm:

       General Tran Van Quang, according to the position he held 
     in the Vietnamese military political leadership in 1972, 
     would have been fully competent in the matters stated in the 
     report and qualified to speak about them at Politburo 
     sessions of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee.

  Fully competent in the matter stated. They knew who he was. They were 
allies. They knew who Quang was. Of course, they knew who he was. That 
is why they were spying on him, to put it nicely.
  Captain 1st Rank Alexander Sivets, Main Intelligence Directorate of 
the General Staff, GRU. Listen:

       I will reaffirm that the 1205 document could not have been 
     used for propaganda purposes. It was a top secret document 
     not intended for anyone outside the chambers of the 
     Vietnamese Communist Party to see . . . the document that was 
     sent to the (Soviet) Central Party Committee is, in fact, an 
     original document and not a fake. We consider that the 
     Vietnamese leaders, in their desire to exploit the POW 
     problem for their own interests, would officially cite a 
     lower figure than the real one. This is something that we do 
     not doubt . . . we believe that there were more (American 
     POWs) than Vietnam was officially admitting to.

  Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a real hero in my mind, who has worked hard 
on this issue on the side of Russia to help us resolve this issue even 
though he is very sick:

       Upon the request of Senator Smith to President Yeltsin --

  That was a hand-delivered letter that my wife delivered to Boris 
Yeltsin, put it in his hand when he visited in America so there were no 
bureaucrats in between:

       Upon the request of Senator Smith to President Yeltsin, 
     President Yeltsin ordered me to conduct additional research--

  I mean we would not want anybody in the administration to give 
Yeltsin anything on this so I did:

[[Page S16414]]

     to include in the files of the Main Intelligence Directorate 
     of the Ministry of Defense. . . I have studied exhaustively 
     the mechanism used to gather this document--

  Listen carefully:

       I have studied exhaustively the mechanism used to gather 
     this document, and I can state that I do not know of any case 
     where such information would have been fabricated. . . 
     (General Ladygin) has stated that General Quang was fully 
     competent to give his report.

  That is a nice way of saying we collected intelligence in there. We 
are not going to tell you how we did it, but we did it.
  Maj. Gen. Anitoliy Volkov:

       The Vietnamese denied this document and said it was put 
     forth to throw cold water on U.S. relations. However, I would 
     say in response that there is an old Russian proverb--you 
     cannot change the words of a song.

  Once it is a song, it is a song. When you change the words, it is a 
different song, is it not, Mr. President?
  I want to reiterate Mr. President, the Russians have told me right to 
my face, in my office and in Moscow, that the method by which these 
reports, the Quang documents, were collected were reliable by the GRU, 
the intelligence gathering agency. And it was a method through which 
they acquired other significant reports during the war. In fact, they 
acquired another report by General Quang to the North Vietnamese 
Politburo in June 1972, which has nothing to do with POW's and MIA's. 
In that report, he talks about North Vietnam losses during the Easter 
offensive in the spring of 1992, and guess what. That information, too, 
was all accurate. So if he was in a position to know this stuff, how 
could it not all be accurate? No one in the administration has even 
asked him about it.
  Let us look at what two former National Security Advisers to the 
President had to say about the Vietnamese Politburo report.
  Now, this is very interesting--very interesting. This was on MacNeil/
Lehrer--Dr. Brzezinski, who was National Security Council adviser to 
President Carter, and Dr. Kissinger, who was the Secretary of State and 
the National Security Adviser to President Nixon.
  Again, following up on the same two reports:

       Dr. Brzezinski, you've stated publicly, and you're quoted 
     in the New York Times as believing the document--

  The 1205 document.

     is genuine. What convinces you? Dr. Brzezinski, National 
     Security Adviser to President Carter, right after the war. 
     What convinces you?
       Its style, its content, the cover note to the Soviet 
     Politburo. One would have to assume a really very complex 
     Byzantine conspiracy to reach the conclusion that this is not 
     an authentic Soviet document based on a Vietnamese document.

  Then MacNeil says:

       Dr. Kissinger, what do you think on the question of 
     authenticity, first of all, of the document?
       Dr. Kissinger: I agree with Brzezinski that those parts 
     that I know something about have an authentic ring.

  Remember, this document deals not just with MIA's. It dealt with a 
whole raft of things. They have an authentic ring:

       For example, when they (General Quang) described what their 
     negotiating tactics were, those were the tactics they were 
     using in negotiating with us.

  Kissinger was the guy who negotiated the Paris Peace Agreement:

       They say in this document that their proposals were first a 
     cease fire and overthrow of President Thieu, after which they 
     would use the prisoners to negotiate whatever other concerns 
     they had. Now, as of the date of that document, those were 
     their proposals. A month later they changed it, but I could 
     see if you make a report to the Politburo in the middle of 
     September and you want to summarize what the negotiating 
     position is. . . . 

  He goes on to say:

       If that document is authentic, and it is hard to imagine 
     who would have forged it, for what purpose, then I think an 
     enormous crime has been committed, and then we should--I do 
     not see how we can proceed in normalizing relations until it 
     is fully cleared up.

  Dr. Kissinger himself: ``I do not see how we can proceed with 
normalizing relations until it is cleared up.''
  Not only has it not been cleared up; we have not even talked to 
anybody about it.
  Dr. Brzezinski:

       As far as Vietnam is concerned, I think that if this 
     document is sustained, and it looks unfortunately to be 
     sustainable, we have the right to ask the present Vietnamese 
     government to place those responsible in war crimes trials . 
     . .

  Dr. Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser.
  Let me repeat this:

       As far as Vietnam is concerned, I think that if this 
     document is sustained, and unfortunately it looks to be 
     sustainable, we have the right to ask the present Vietnamese 
     government to place those responsible in war crimes trials . 
     . .

  We did not do that, did we? We just gave them diplomatic relations. 
We are going to give them money, trade, airplane routes.
  Dr. Kissinger:

       I don't think that we can normalize relations or ease 
     conditions in international agencies until we have cleared up 
     this issue . . . I don't see how we can proceed with North 
     Vietnamese or with Vietnamese normalization until this 
     question is cleared up . . .

  Well, we did. So much for the impact of two National Security Council 
advisers, very respected, very knowledgeable, certainly more 
knowledgeable than anyone I know on this issue.
  Let us look at what the President says, the Clinton administration 
denials concerning the 1972 Politburo report on American POW's. This is 
amazing. You heard Brzezinski, you heard Kissinger, you heard the 
Russians, the Russian intelligence. Now let us hear what our Government 
says.

       What General Quang told us is not inconsistent with what we 
     knew about him, and I have no reason to disbelieve General 
     Quang.

  That is General Vessey.

       I have no reason to disbelieve [him].
       The number of U.S. POWs mentioned in the document could not 
     be correct . . .

  Now, we are going to get to the CIA. Now we have to trash this thing, 
blow it up and make sure we could not possibly have any credibility 
left because we have to normalize. We cannot let this document get in 
the way.
  So the CIA says:

       The number of U.S. POWs mentioned in the document could not 
     be correct, they contradict what the U.S. Government knows 
     from years of research and the analysis of thousands of other 
     intelligence documents.

  So, the U.S. Government, the CIA, sitting here in Washington, DC, 
knows more than the Russian intelligence, who were on the ground, 
allies, knows more than anybody else:

       All previously known information and conventional 
     analytical thinking based on this information tend to refute 
     the Russian document . . . Based on historical information we 
     have amassed . . .

  They do not say where they amassed it. They just amassed it. No 
proof.

       We can assume that there is little evidence to support the 
     claims made in the Russian document.

  If I wanted to use profanity on the floor of the Senate--and I will 
not--there is a word for that, Mr. President. It comes from livestock 
of the male variety:

       While portions of the document are plausible and some 
     portions are accurate and true, evidence in support of its 
     accuracy concerning the POWs is far outweighed by errors, 
     omissions, and propaganda which detracts from its 
     credibility.

  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs.
  Let us drop down to Malcolm Toon, the U.S. Chairman, Joint Commission 
on POW/MIA's:

       I am now prepared to accept as the best available answer to 
     this annoying problem.

  It is now an annoying problem. That is a very interesting choice of 
words, an annoying problem. Here is a guy out of the Communist archives 
of the Soviet Union, a general who was in a position to know almost 
everything about POW/MIA's, saying that they had more POW's and MIA's 
in the turnback, and now it is an annoying problem.
  You bet your boots it is an annoying problem. If you want to 
normalize relations with a government that held them, it sure as heck 
is an annoying problem. That is what it says, an annoying problem.
  But this is the one here. This is Robert Destatte, Vietnam analyst, 
Defense POW/MIA Office, statement to the Russian Government in August 
1995. This is bizarre. Destatte is over there. And here is what he 
says. He is now going to argue with the Russian intelligence. He knows 
more about it than they do:

       We have accurate knowledge of the movement of prisoners 
     through the Vietnamese prison system. We have accurate 
     knowledge of the numbers and locations of each of the 
     detention camps in North Vietnam, [not only North Vietnam] 
     South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Regarding the number of 
     1205, 

[[Page S16415]]

     taking into consideration the Americans who are unaccounted 
     for, it's impossible to come up with the figure 1205 . . . We 
     cannot accept that figure . . . If we look at the document, 
     we know where Tran Van Quang was at the time. We also know 
     what his position was. It's highly unlikely that Tran Van 
     Quang would have presented a report on these issues to the 
     Politburo.

  Listen to that. It is highly unlikely. A very clear, precise word. 
``Highly unlikely that * * * Quang would have presented a report on 
these issues to the Politburo.'' That he would have is highly unlikely. 
``We cannot accept that figure. . .'' Baloney. They do not know what 
they are talking about.
  We are told that there is no way that the numbers add up; General 
Quang did not, could not, have given the report. In fact, we are told 
there is no reason to disbelieve Quang. I think the fact that he is a 
North Vietnamese Communist general that waged war on American soldiers 
for an entire decade, a Vietnamese general who waged war on American 
soldiers for a decade, is that not enough reason not to brush this 
report aside? Do you not think he knew what he was talking about? It 
was not a propaganda piece. It was a document allegedly of an actual 
transcription of what he said. He is talking to the Politburo in 
Vietnam. He is not talking to the world out there trying to convince 
them of something.
  It is amazing that the Clinton administration is so confident on this 
point. The Russians say it is accurate, that Quang did, in fact, give 
this report. And the Clinton administration says there is no reason to 
believe Quang. It is an annoying problem.
  I cannot imagine--I am not an attorney, but in a court of law, if you 
were trying this case, I cannot imagine not getting a conviction that 
this document was real. If the administration wants to talk about 
whether the numbers make sense, let us look at the breakdown. The 
numbers certainly are not impossible. The word was that there could not 
possibly be that many POW's.
  Well, here they are. There are the 2,170 lost in North Vietnam, South 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, China. Total: 1,101. Those are missing.
  Here are the ones KIA/BNR, another 1,000. We do not know for sure 
that every one of them is KIA/BNR, body not recovered. So there is 
certainly enough in the numbers. Baloney.
  If the numbers do add up, why should the administration let Vietnam 
off the hook on these Russian documents? Why do we not at least 
investigate?
  Let us take Laos as an example. We have 293 personnel missing from 
Laos; another 178 that we believe died during the war. So 293, 178, 
equals 471 in Laos.
  In the Politburo report General Quang states:

       From other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, 
     we have captured 391 people, including . . . 43 in Laos.

  Well, you are talking about 471. It would seem to me that if you add 
391 and 43, you are somewhere in the vicinity of 430. And if 471 are 
missing from Laos, you do not have to be a rocket scientist to figure 
out there could be 430 people that we do not have accounted for.
  Now, let me read from the excerpts from declassified minutes of a 
White House situation briefing in January 1973, 4 months after Quang's 
secret report.
  During that White House meeting, Admiral Daniel Murphy of the 
Department of Defense stated:

       We don't know what we will get from Laos.

  We are back in 1973 now:

       We don't know what we will get from Laos. We have only six 
     known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be 40 or 
     41.

  Mr. President, that is almost the exact number referenced by General 
Quang.
  We never got any POW's back from Laos. Not one. Not one. Nine were 
sent back by the North Vietnamese into Vietnamese prisons. Not one, 
including David Hrdlicka, even though he was filmed and those films 
were sent all over the Communist world. Never got one back. Not one. 
And they were captured and they were held.
  I was in Laos, flew in by helicopter, went up into the remote areas 
of the caves where Hrdlicka was held. We talked to the villagers who 
held him. We know he was held there. He was alive. They know what 
happened to him, too. I am not saying he is alive. I do not know that. 
My point is they know what happened to him, and there were others 
captured along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and Laos by Vietnamese units and 
taken into Vietnam. As I say, nine of them were Americans. Only nine of 
them ever came home.
  In our committee hearings in 1992, Larry Eagleburger had sent a memo 
to Dr. Kissinger. He was a DOD official at the time. He sent a memo to 
Dr. Kissinger recommending military action to get back American POW's 
believed to be captured in Laos. This was at the time peace accords 
were being negotiated.
  President Nixon said, ``It's inconceivable that there were not more 
names on the POW list from Laos.'' And this number, this 471, tracks 
with what General Quang said, Mr. President. He was there. Yet, in 
spite of all this, in spite of all these comments, in spite of all this 
information, the President of the United States, William Jefferson 
Clinton, said ``We're getting superb cooperation'' from the Vietnamese.
  The Vietnamese have turned over one document concerning shootdowns of 
Americans in Laos. One. One document, and that is it, even though our 
intelligence agencies believe that the Vietnamese have many more 
records on who they captured in Laos. We know they do. And you know 
what, if we get that list, we will find out that they do.
  The Pentagon refers to that one document that we have as the ``Group 
559'' document, since the information was apparently compiled from the 
records of the North Vietnamese unit in Laos during the war, which was 
called group 559. I might say that document was provided in September 
1993, 20 years later, 2 months after my last visit to Vietnam.
  It was during that visit I sat with the Vietnamese and went through 
declassified documents from our own intelligence agencies page by page 
and conclusively proved that North Vietnamese units were, in fact, in 
Laos during the war shooting down and capturing American pilots. I 
actually read it to them, the Vietnamese. They never heard these 
before. It was declassified, so it was perfectly appropriate to do it. 
I actually read them the radio intercepts that we had on these guys 
being captured. They were shocked. It was the first time anybody of the 
United States ever sat down with the Vietnamese and gave them graphic 
evidence and said, ``Hey, guys, I'm sorry, don't give me the line 
anymore because we have the intercepts, we know you captured these 
guys. We don't know what you did with them 20 years later, but we know 
you captured them. So why don't you tell us? Stop the game.''
  Not one shred of information on any of those guys. Not to me that 
year I was there, not to anybody else after that, but it is splendid 
cooperation, Mr. President.
  So the Vietnamese put together this summary of shootdowns in Laos. 
They called it the group 559. They turned it over 2 months later, and 
our analysts at the Pentagon went through that summary and concluded:

       The analysis of this document makes it clear that the 
     Vietnamese have additional group 559 records that may contain 
     information useful to POW resolution. This document makes 
     explicit reference to wartime documents from which 
     information was obtained.

  Do we have these documents? Do we have these documents? No. But we 
are getting splendid cooperation. We are getting the oil money pumping 
over there, opening up the airline routes, get the businesses going 
because we are having splendid cooperation.
  Ask the families, Mr. President, whether they think the cooperation 
has been splendid. Ask the families if they support normalization with 
Vietnam.
  Since that summary document on Laos losses was turned over in 1993, 
practically nothing--nothing, for the most part--nothing has been 
turned over by Vietnam concerning cases of Americans lost in Laos.
  All of these people who have come down here and railed against me on 
this issue over the years, railed against all the things I have said, 
ask them to come down here and rail about Laos. See what they know 
about Laos. Ask them to come down on the floor of the Senate and say, 
``Yes, the Lao and Vietnamese in Laos have given us all the information 
on the Lao shootdowns.'' Ask them to do that. See if anybody has the 
nerve to come down and say that.

[[Page S16416]]

  President Clinton has admitted as much in the 6-month overdue report 
which he provided to Congress on October 5, 1994. In that report, the 
President stated:

       The Vietnamese have not turned over any major documents 
     since September 1993.

  It is another year later, and they still have not done it, but we are 
moving down the old fast track. Vietnam has done nothing credible in 
terms of releasing these records on American losses in Laos in addition 
to their high level reports on the politburo on the Russians which I 
spoke about earlier. The Russian intelligence data that we stumbled on 
by the action of a researcher named Steven Morris caught them in the 
act, and yet we have to debunk it. We have to say it is not true 
because if we say it is true or even indicate it might be true, we 
cannot normalize.
  What I have tried to do is, as I have gone through this--and I must 
admit I am getting tired, Mr. President, but I cannot be as tired as 
some of the families are who have waited, so I am going to get through 
this. Bear with me just a little while longer.
  Congressman James Talent, in a hearing chaired by Robert Dornan June 
28, 1995, this is now to Gary Sydow, senior analyst, Defense, POW/MIA 
Office, Department of Defense.

       Question: Has the United States been granted access to 
     Vietnam's wartime central committee level or politburo 
     records pertaining to the subject of American POW's captured 
     during the war in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia? Have they given 
     us access to those central committee level or politburo 
     records? Because I understand that is where these matters 
     were discussed. Does anybody know?

  In other words, have they given us access to the politburo records 
General Quang referred to.
  Gary Sydow, senior analyst: ``The answer to that is no.''
  That is the end of the statement. I have known Gary Sydow since I 
have been in the Congress. He is a very respected analyst. He has no 
agenda. He is a good man. He is telling the truth. He told the truth 
before Congress. The answer to that is no. But that did not stop 
normalization. That did not stop normalization, no. We have another 
agenda.
  Even the administration representatives who traveled to Vietnam and 
those who are now stationed there have done little, in my opinion, to 
press the Vietnamese for the Quang document.
  I have to believe in most cases they are honorable men and women, but 
why do they not ask for the document, why do they not press for the 
information? That is not asking too much.
  Last Thursday, our new Charge d'Affaires in Hanoi, Mr. Anderson, met 
with General Quang. Again, I got excited. He is going to meet somebody 
other than me. He is actually going to talk to General Quang. He is 
still alive. He still has this information in his head. So he is going 
to meet with him, this Mr. Anderson. So I got excited.
  According to the press reports, the subject of the meeting was to 
thank each other for work on veterans issues, including the missing in 
action from both sides. That is what the meeting was about.
  General Quang--they could not ask him for a more credible response on 
his document. The issue was not even raised, as far as I know. This is 
very disturbing in view of the fact that our new Charge d'Affaires, Mr. 
Anderson, was the State Department's representative on POW/MIA issues 
during the interagency meetings at the end of the Carter administration 
in 1980. He served with Brzezinski. You would think he would be 
interested in pursuing these matters now that he is at Hanoi. My office 
called the State Department to find out what was actually said during 
that meeting. If the subject of the Guam report was not discussed at 
this meeting last Thursday, I would question what the point is of 
having diplomatic relations with Hanoi.

  If we are going to have diplomatic relations with Hanoi to get the 
answers, why do we not ask for the answers? President Clinton said it 
was the best way to get answers on POW/MIA's. If we are not even going 
to raise the subject--it is obvious that all we are hearing is rhetoric 
from the administration, and there is no real commitment to serious 
follow-up on the issue.
  Do you know what the sad thing is, Mr. President. I have been on the 
floor now--I do not even know--a long time. You just wonder how many 
people really care, other than the families and some who stay focused 
on this issue. It is so sad. Earlier in my remarks, I quoted assistant 
Secretary of State Winston Lord when he stated this past may, ``We have 
no reason to believe that the Vietnamese are not making a good-faith 
effort.'' Did he talk to Mr. Sydow? If you are listening, Mr. Lord, 
talk to Mr. Sydow. He has been around a long time. He knows a lot more 
about the issue than you do. Read the testimony of the committee, Mr. 
Lord.
  I think it is clear, from everything I have gone through today, that 
the American people are being misled in terms of cooperation, because 
they are not cooperating. Are they cooperating at all? Yes. If you want 
to get into semantics, yes, sure. If we pay them several million 
dollars, we can dig around out in the crash sites, find a few teeth, a 
few bone parts, airplane parts. Sure. That is reasonable. That is 
progress. I am not opposed to that.
  But that is not enough. I want the records. I want the Politburo 
access. I hate to say this, but this administration does not want the 
American people to find out what we already know about our missing 
POW's, because it is not a pretty picture, Mr. President. If it got 
out--and it will, but it will be after the fact--it would stop 
normalization because the American people would go crazy; they would 
yell and scream and write letters to their Congressmen and Senators, 
and they would be outraged. That is why we are not going to see this 
stuff until it is all done.
  That is a sad thing for me to have to stand on the floor of the 
Senate and say. It is especially true when you look at this next chart 
of quotes from President Clinton himself and Vice President Gore. I do 
not know what more you can do other than to judge people by their 
words.
  President Clinton, before he was sworn in as President, stated this 
because there was a lot of controversy about his lack of service in the 
war, and so Vietnam was an issue in the campaign. He said:

       I have sent a clear message that there will be no 
     normalization of relations with any country that is at all 
     suspected of withholding information on missing Americans.''

  That was Bill Clinton prior to his assuming office as President.
  During the campaign, he said:

       I think that the Vietnamese would be making a mistake if 
     they think they could get, somehow, a better deal from me. I 
     made real commitments to the American people and to the 
     families and friends and the POWs and the MIAs that, you 
     know, we've got to have a full, complete, good accounting 
     before we normalize relations.

  I am sorry to have to give you the bad news, Mr. President, but we do 
not have a full accounting.
  Al Gore, the Vice President, who served in Vietnam, was even 
stronger. He said, in 1993, after he took office:

       I'll tell you this. The great push towards normalization of 
     relations is very strong, and a lot of other countries are 
     moving there, but it's not going to go forward until we're 
     satisfied that the Vietnamese government has been totally 
     forthcoming and fully cooperative in giving every last shred 
     of evidence that they have on this issue. We're very 
     concerned about it.

  Every last shred of evidence? Oh, my. Last month, the President said 
that normalizing relations with Vietnam is the best way to ensure 
further progress. Now it is ``further progress.'' You go from, ``we 
have to get all the answers to normalize'' to ``if we normalize, we 
will get more answers.'' It is a complete reversal, Mr. President, a 
flip-flop on a campaign promise. The American people need to understand 
that, and so do the families have to understand that.
  The last chart, Mr. President--and this is the last chart and the end 
of my remarks for tonight--brings it home directly. This basically is a 
breakdown, by State, of all the missing. As far as I know, every State 
in the Union has American soldiers missing from the Vietnam war, 
including nine from my State of New Hampshire. I want my colleagues to 
understand something. These are not just statistics. Behind every one 
of those numbers--behind the nine in New Hampshire, behind the 210 in 
California, behind the 28 in Louisiana, or the 20 in Montana--is a 
family, a brother, sister, father, mother, wife, husband. They all 
wait. They all wait. They all wait. All these years, they wait.

[[Page S16417]]

  You know, in war, you lose people. People die. People get killed, 
lost. People are not found. We understand that, and so do the men and 
women who serve understand that, and so do their families understand 
it. But that is not what we are talking about here. We are talking 
about sharing information that this Government has with the American 
people, so they can make an intelligent decision, through their 
representatives, about whether or not we should normalize with a 
country that did this to us. They have withheld this from us all these 
years, but we have basically done that--normalized with them.
  I could go on and on. There is a case involving an aircraft shot down 
by north Vietnamese forces in Laos 1 week after the Paris peace 
accord--just a week after the Paris peace accord, Mr. President, when 
they all were supposedly accounted for. One week after, it was shot 
down. At the time, there were national security agency radio 
intercepts, and based on these intercepts, the probable capture and 
movement along the Ho Chi Minh trail of Americans by the North 
Vietnamese in this incident. To show you the agony the families have to 
go through--and I do not want to get into whether it is right or 
wrong-- now the Pentagon wants to bury the entire crew at Arlington 
because they found half of a tooth at the crash site in 1993.

  Now, how do you explain to a family why half a tooth found at a crash 
site could conclusively tell a family that is their loved one when we 
had radio intercepts that these guys were taken away from the crash 
site? How do you do that?
  I am told this is only forensic evidence that was recovered and now 
they want to bury the whole crew. Their names have been taken off the 
list. That is what it is--get that list down. Even though the 
Vietnamese may not have provided one shred of documentary evidence as 
to what happened to these men. They know what happened to these guys. 
They could tell us. If they died, they know. If they were led off and 
executed, they know. If they died in captivity, they know.
  What do they do? They say, go ahead, take your shovels. We will sell 
the shovels to you, sell you the bulldozers, or lease you the 
bulldozers, give you some men at ridiculously high prices for labor, 
and we will let you go out there and dig around at the crash site when, 
in fact, we have all the information in the archives. We know what has 
happened. That is progress. That is the cooperation we are getting.
  It is hard for a family to have to deal with that. Imagine yourself, 
a father or mother, a spouse, to have to look at that report, then be 
asked to accept a tooth at that crash site when, in fact, you have 
radio intercepts, intelligence reports that said these men were 
captured.
  I do not know what is right. I do not know if the radio intercepts 
were right or wrong but the Vietnamese know. They can tell us. They can 
tell these families so we do not have to go through this pain anymore.
  I have a long list of other cases, and I am not going to go through 
them. There has been no cooperation of the many requests from Congress 
for basic information on MIA's.
  I hope my reason for taking the time of the Senate tonight, I hope 
that this issue might somehow, some way, hit home for each of my 
colleagues. When you look up there in your State and you see that 
number, think about it. There is a family behind every single number--
children, grown now, some of them, children of their own, down at the 
wall.
  I have looked at this issue for 11 years, and I know what I am 
talking about. I know what I am talking about. Communist Vietnam, 
Communist Laos, Communist North Vietnam and Communist China, as God is 
my witness, holds information on American service personnel today as I 
speak. They hold it and they can account for them.
  We do nothing about it except normalize and go on with business as 
usual as if everything is all right, everything is more important, and 
then on top of that, we hide it from the Congress in violation of the 
law to be sure that we get it doing.
  If we do not pursue the documents, or call into serious question the 
President's ill-advised decision to normalize, I am offended as a 
veteran, as a father with two sons and a daughter, any of whom could be 
sent off to Bosnia.
  Mr. President, this is a tough issue. There is no question about it. 
It is a tough issue. The people say to me, ``Senator, why don't you put 
the war behind you? Why don't you end this?'' Because you have to get 
the truth. That is all we want, is the truth.
  We do not want something that you cannot deliver on. If the 
Vietnamese cannot provide answers, then tell us why they cannot, but 
provide us unilaterally with everything that you can. And for God's 
sake, the United States Government, in a timely fashion, please provide 
any information that you have so that the families can finally get the 
peace that they deserve after so many years.

                               Exhibit 1


                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                Washington, DC, February 14, 1977.
     Memorandum for the President.
       I understand that at your meeting on February 11 with 
     leaders of the National League of Families, you indicated 
     that the moratorium on unsolicited status changes for MIAs 
     would continue. From our conversation before that meeting, my 
     understanding is that the Department of Defense should go 
     through all the files, getting ready to move on a program of 
     unsolicited status changes later this year depending upon the 
     outcome of negotiations with the Vietnamese.
       Do I correctly understand your wishes?
     Harold Brown.
                                                                    ____



                                    National Security Council,

                                                    March 2, 1977.
     Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski.
     From: Michel Oksenberg.
     Subject: Letter to Carol Bates of National League of 
         Families.
       Attached at Tab A is a reply for your signature to a letter 
     from Carol Bates (Tab B).
       I chose a reflective reply, since we wish to sustain Ms. 
     Bates' confidence in us. We still have to cross the difficult 
     bridge with these people.
       Recommendation: That you sign the letter at Tab A.
                                                                    ____



                                    National Security Council,

                                                   March 15, 1977.
     Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski.
     From: Michel Oksenberg, MD.
     Subject: League of Families' Reaction to Presidential 
         Commission to Hanoi.
       Signs are beginning to accumulate that many members of the 
     League of Families are distressed by the purpose of the 
     Woodcock Commission. They believe it is simply a ritualistic 
     effort to obtain an accounting, with the President already 
     having decided that he will accept whatever the Vietnamese 
     give as sufficient to justify movement toward normalization.
       I think it important to keep the League on board for as 
     long as possible.
       I have just talked to Carol Bates, Administrative Assistant 
     of the League. I think that she is basically a reasonable 
     person, and she indicated to me that a letter from you might 
     enable her to prevent the convening of a meeting and/or press 
     conference that would blast this effort before the Commission 
     returns home with its report.
       Recommendation: That you sign the letter to Carol Bates at 
     Tab A.
                                                                    ____



                                    National Security Council,

                                                   March 25, 1977.
     Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski.
     From: Michel Oksenberg, MD.
     Subject: Forthcoming Paris Negotiations with the Vietnamese.
       You might wish to underscore to the President the 
     desirability of toning down expectations, should a question 
     arise at the press conference about the Paris negotiations.
       The Vietnamese media have been vitriolic in their attacks 
     on the U.S. They have explicitly linked aid to recognition. 
     They have begun to release additional communications which 
     passed between the Nixon Administration and the DRV.
       Among other considerations, the hardened mood makes it 
     unlikely that we will be obtaining more information on MIAs. 
     At the same time, in response to the President's request, the 
     Pentagon is forwarding recommendations on status reviews of 
     the MIAs. The Pentagon will recommend that case reviews go 
     forward, i.e., that MIAs be declared KLAs. This will place 
     the President in a difficult political position, should he 
     decide to accept the Pentagon's recommendation. He had 
     earlier pledged not to allow case reviews until adequate 
     accounting had been obtained. And he had raised public 
     expectations that the Vietnamese were going to be more 
     forthcoming on MIA information. Now it looks as if we may be 
     in a deep freeze for at least many months.
       Placed in the broadest context, when one considers the 
     Vietnamese statements as well as Congressional votes against 
     aid to Vietnam, we see the inability of two bitter enemies 
     swiftly to place the past behind them, as the President had 
     hoped. I have drafted a Q&A for the President in this realm 
     which I think is appropriate for the occasion and in keeping 
     with his style. You might draw it to his attention (Tab A).
       Recommendation: That you mention this to the President 
     before the press conference. 

[[Page S16418]]



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, May 26, 1995.
     Memorandum for the President.
     Subject: Status Reviews for Servicemen Missing in Southeast 
         Asia.
       You have asked for my recommendations concerning status 
     reviews for MIAs.
       As you know, since mid-1973 DoD has conducted status 
     reviews only upon the written request of a missing 
     serviceman's primary next of kin or upon receipt of 
     conclusive evidence of death, such as the return of his 
     remains. The Woodcock Commission concluded (as had the House 
     Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, and 
     the Department of Defense) that there is no evidence that any 
     American servicemen are alive and being held against their 
     will in Southeast Asia.
       It is true that the Southeast Asian governments probably 
     have significantly more information about our missing men 
     than they have given to us. There is no reason to believe, 
     however, that continuing to carry servicemen as missing in 
     action puts pressure on Hanoi to provide information on our 
     missing men. In fact, the opposite probably is true; it puts 
     pressure on us to make concessions to Hanoi.
       Status reviews, and obtaining of a complete accounting, are 
     two distinct issues. An accounting that confirms death by 
     direct evidence validates a declaration or presumption of 
     death for a missing serviceman, but it is not a legal 
     prerequisite to a status change.
       Given the overwhelming probability that none of the MIAs 
     ever will be found alive, I believe the time has come to 
     allow the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force to 
     exercise their responsibilities for status reviews as 
     mandated by law even though we have not received a full 
     accounting.
       Reinstatement of reviews will of course be controversial. 
     Certain members of the Congress, some families of the missing 
     men, and others will charge that it is an abandonment of one 
     MIA.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       The resumption of reviews will be preceded by (1) an 
     expression of our strong commitment to obtaining further 
     information about the missing men and (2) careful preparation 
     of concerned groups for the change of policy.
       The decision will be discussed forthrightly with the 
     National League of Families.
       Appropriate Senate and House leaders and key members will 
     be given advance notice.
       The procedures for status reviews will be uniform among the 
     Military Departments, in accordance with legal requirements, 
     and announced through simultaneous letters from the Service 
     Secretaries to the PW/MIA families.
       The public will be informed of the reasons for 
     reinstituting status reviews and assured that this does not 
     detract from our determination to obtain an accounting. (I 
     suggest that the public announcement would be most effective 
     coming from you, but I am prepared to make it instead.)
       Your decision:
       1. Reinstate status reviews in accordance with the 
     foregoing: Approve {time} . Disapprove {time} . Other 
     {time} .
       2. Presidential statement to apprise public: Approve 
     {time} . Disapprove {time} . Other {time} .
       3. Prepare for your approval a detailed plan of procedure: 
     Approve {time} . Disapprove {time} . Other {time} .
                                                     Harold Brown.

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I rise today as the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs to join with the Senator 
from New Hampshire in expressing my profound disappointment with the 
way the Clinton administration is managing--or more correctly, 
mismanaging--our bilateral relationship with the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam.
  My colleagues know that I was not supportive of the President's 
decision to normalize relations with Hanoi. This opposition was not 
based on my dislike of that country's Communist dictatorship, or even 
its brutal repression of its own people--although in this 
administration's view these two bases seem sufficient to continue to 
deny recognition to Cuba and North Korea. Rather, I did not believe 
that we should reward Vietnam with the normalization of relations when, 
in my opinion and the opinion of many of the Members of this body, 
Hanoi has not been sufficiently forthcoming with information about our 
country's missing and dead servicemen in Vietnam and Laos.
  I will not rehash the normalization issue; the President made that 
decision and it serves little purpose to argue about a fait accompli. 
However, one of the issues that brings Senator Smith and I to the floor 
today are the increasing signs that this administration's has decided 
to explore expanding our bilateral relationship to the economic benefit 
of the Vietnamese Government while completely disregarding the lack of 
Vietnamese progress on both the POW/MIA and human rights fronts. 
Representatives from the State Department and the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative were scheduled to come to the Hill this week to 
brief our staffs on the administration's decision to move toward 
expanding economic relations with Vietnam. Apparently, interagency 
discussions have been ongoing to the topic of extending loans and 
assistance to the Vietnamese through the Import-Export Bank, the Trade 
Development Agency, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
This at a time when POW/MIA issues remain unresolved, the Clinton 
administration is in flagrant violation of a law requiring the 
submission to the Congress of a report about the POW/MIA issue, and two 
American citizens remain jailed in Vietnamese prisons for advocating 
democracy in that country. The Senator from New Hampshire has already 
spoken forcefully to the POW/MIA issue, so I will limit my remarks to 
the second and third topics.
  Mr. President, the Clinton Administration continues to fail to live 
up to its legal obligations with respect to the POW/MIA issue. For 
example, section 1034 of the act of October 5, 1994, Public Law No. 
103-337, 108 Stat. 2840, requires the Secretary of Defense to provide 
the Congress with a complete list of missing or unaccounted for United 
States military personnel about whom it is possible that Vietnamese and 
Laotian officials could produce information or remains. The statute 
mandated that the report be submitted to us by November 17, 1994. When 
the DOD requested an extension of the deadline to February 17, 1995, we 
did not object. We did not object when the DOD supplied us with a sadly 
incomplete interim report. But Mr. President, almost 9 months after 
that date--and almost a year after it was due to be submitted--we have 
still not received that complete report required by the statute.
  While I acknowledge that the President has wide latitude in the 
conduct of foreign policy, that latitude does not extend whether his 
administration abides by the legal requirements of Federal statutes. I 
and several other Senators wrote the President this summer requesting 
that the Defense Department comply with the law; we are still awaiting 
a response. Congress requested the list in order to determine for 
ourselves whether Vietnam was providing the United States with the 
fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIA's. Each day that passes 
without it, I believe, sends us the signal that the administration is 
indifferent to both our concerns and our role. As the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee with jurisdiction over Vietnam, I can 
assure the President that as each day passes without our receipt of the 
report, the likelihood that any ambassadorial nominee or funding 
request for that country will be indefinately held in my subcommittee 
increases commensurately.

  Second, I am very concerned with the seeming disparity with which the 
Clinton administration has chosen to treat Vietnam's jailing of two 
American citizens--Tran Quang Liem and Nguyen Tan Tri--versus its 
reaction to China's arrest of Harry Wu. I spoke at length on the floor 
on September 5 about Vietnam's atrocious human rights record in 
general, and the case of these two Americans in particular. In August, 
a Vietnamese court sentenced Tran and Nguyen who were accused of being 
counter-revolutionaries and acting to overthrow the people's 
administration. The two were part of a group trying to organize a 1 day 
conference in Ho Chi Minh City to discuss human rights and democracy in 
Vietnam. Radio Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, in somewhat characteristic 
Communist rhetoric, described their ``crimes'' as follows:

       Taking advantage of our party's renovation policy, they 
     used the pretext of democracy and human rights to distort the 
     truth of history, smear the Vietnamese communist party and 
     state, instigate bad elements at home, and contact hostile 
     forces abroad feverishly oppose our state in an attempt to 
     set up a people-betraying and nation-harming regime. . . . 
     Their activities posed a particular danger to society and was 
     detrimental to national security.

  They were sentenced to terms of 4 and 7 years respectively.
  When human rights activist and American citizen Harry Wu was arrested 
in the People's Republic of China this summer, the Clinton 
administration appropriately raised a huge diplomatic outcy. When Wu 
was jailed, public calls for his immediate release came from the 
highest levels of the administration. It was made clear that Mrs. 
Clinton would not attend the U.N. Women's Conference in Beijing if he 

[[Page S16419]]

was still being held, and that other high-level contacts would be 
disrupted. In essence, the signal went out that business as usual would 
be suspended until his release.
  Well Mr. President, where is a similar outcry about the fate of these 
two Vietnamese-Americans? The only statement I have seen from the State 
Department so far was one announcing that they had raised this case 
with the Vietnamese a number of times, here and in Hanoi. The 
information available to me and other Members of the Senate, however, 
indicated that the issue was only being raised at the consular level. 
It was for that reason that Senator Grams introduced, and I 
cosponsored, Senate Resolution 174 calling on the Secretary of State to 
pursue their release as a matter of the highest priority and requesting 
that he keep the Foreign Relations Committee informed regarding their 
status. Senate Resolution 174 passed unanimously on September 19, yet 
since that time the administration gives the appearance of moving ahead 
with business as usual. I have seen no public statements by the 
Secretary regarding the case, and as the chairman of the subcommittee 
of jurisdiction I have not seen any reports on its status. While I have 
become aware that there have been some behind-the-scenes moves to 
secure their release, it is no thanks to the State Department that that 
information came to my attention.
  During his campaign for President, then-candidate Clinton lambasted 
President Bush's relations with China--not dissimilar, I must note, 
from those Clinton himself has since adopted--and accused him of 
coddling dictators. Well, Mr. President, with movement toward increased 
economic aid in spite of the treatment of our citizens, in spite of 
Vietnam's horrendous human rights record, one might be tempted to ask 
who's doing the coddling now?
  I have no strong objection to the eventual institution of full 
diplomatic and economic relations with the people of Vietnam. But to 
move toward that goal while we have these important issues outstanding 
is, I believe, an affront to the memories of our missing and killed 
American servicemen, their families, and the families of the two jailed 
Americans.

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