[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 169 (Monday, October 30, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H11398-H11409]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  SENSE OF HOUSE RELATING TO DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND 
                              HERZEGOVINA

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the 
resolution (H. Res. 247) expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives relating to the deployment of United States Armed 
Forces on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                              H. Res. 247

       Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of 
     Representatives that--
       (1) in the negotiation of any peace agreement between the 
     parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, there should not be a presumption, and it should 
     not be considered to be a prerequisite to the successful 
     conclusion of such a negotiation, that enforcement of such an 
     agreement will involve deployment of United States Armed 
     Forces on the ground in the territory of the Republic of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
       (2) no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the 
     ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzagovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress 
     has approved such a deployment.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, we are here today to consider a resolution offered by 
the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer] and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale] expressing the sense of the House regarding 
President Clinton's announced plan to deploy up to 25,000 of our United 
States Armed Forces personnel to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement 
that may be negotiated among the parties to the conflict.
  The negotiators are to meet in Dayton, OH, beginning 2 days from now, 
and we have been told that they may reach a peace agreement in as 
little as a week or two.
  The problem, from our point of view as elected representatives of the 
American people, is that we have been told that United States personnel 
may begin deploying to Bosnia as soon as 96 hours after a peace 
agreement is reached. Ninety-six hours is not enough time for the 
Congress to examine the peace agreement and decide a matter as 
important as whether United States forces should go to Bosnia to 
enforce it.
  So, let us be clear: those who urge us not to pass this resolution 
today are really urging that the Congress not act at all.
  In my opinion, it would be irresponsible for us not to act. The 
resolution before us does not take a position on the ultimate question 
whether United States forces should be deployed to Bosnia. Rather, it 
seeks only to preserve the prerogatives of the Congress in this matter.
  This, I believe, accurately reflects the sentiment of the Congress. 
We are not isolationists, as proponents of sending United States forces 
to Bosnia have argued. We are prepared to carefully consider a request 
from the President--but we want to ask some hard questions about the 
costs, the nature of the mission, the risk to our forces, the rules of 
engagement, and the likelihood of success.
  But we will not write any blank check, and we will not sit on our 
hands while the President alone decides matters of war and peace. That 
is why we have brought this resolution to the floor, and that is why I 
urge my colleagues to give it their enthusiastic support.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior].
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Hamilton] for yielding time to me.

[[Page H 11399]]

  Mr. Speaker, in this past week, major newspapers in this country have 
detailed, once again, the brutal atrocities in Bosnia.
  In Srebrenica, 6,000 Moslems were lined up and shot by the Bosnian 
Serb Army. The Bosnian Serbs tried to cover up their crimes by 
scattering the corpses and disintegrating them with acid.
  But the details of such brutality would not stay hidden. Who can 
forget the faces of these children herded into refugee camps?
  Who can forget the stories of Banja Luka--where Bosnian Serb soldiers 
went door to door in search of Moslems?
  In a disturbing reminder of Nazism, the Serbs forced Moslems to wear 
white arm bands. White strips were painted on their houses. People were 
systematically expelled. Many of them were beaten and robbed. The women 
were raped and thousands of boys and men are still missing.
  That is what is at stake in Bosnia today.
  Will the bloodshed continue, or will we act to put a stop to it?
  These are just the latest atrocities committed during the past 3 
years of terror in Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, we have turned our backs for too long.
  We should defeat this resolution today because it sends the wrong 
message at the wrong time.
  On Wednesday of this week, in the city of Dayton, OH, the leaders of 
Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia will work with Americans, Russians, and 
Europeans to try to bring a lasting peace.
  This is a historic opportunity to bring an end to the bloodshed.
  We shouldn't prejudge their work.
  We must show that we will not turn our eyes from what has happened.
  I believe this resolution is a mistake.
  It was announced at the last minute on Friday. It was put on the 
suspension calendar.
  It is a travesty to debate a resolution that will mean life or death 
for millions of people in just 40 short minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this resolution.
  But whatever we do on this resolution today, we must send a strong 
signal that the American people will not close our eyes to the 
slaughter of innocent people.
  We must support a peace process that can bring the killing to an end.

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale].
  Mr. McHALE. Mr. Speaker, after a speech such as that, just delivered 
by my friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], so strongly 
condemning the Serbs, how can we plausibly claim neutrality? The 
gentleman from Michigan makes my point.
  In his introduction to the Constitution and National Security, former 
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie wrote:

       The initial decision to commit U.S. troops abroad in the 
     face of imminent hostilities is often the most critical 
     decision of all. If that decision is ill-advised, it can 
     rarely be reversed quickly. That's the nightmare about a bad 
     policy decision: Other bad decisions are almost sure to 
     follow in due course. When this happens, and when American 
     casualties begin to mount, it is extraordinarily difficult 
     for either the President or the Congress to extricate our 
     fighting men.
       Some people urge Congress to absent itself from the 
     process, so the President can execute policies more 
     effectively.
       These prescriptions amount to an abandonment of 
     constitutional control over war-making. These notions presume 
     that combat forces can solve the problem for which they were 
     dispatched. But what if the decision to use force is not 
     well-conceived to begin with? What if the problem is not 
     amenable to a solution by U.S. combat units in the field?
       The best way to avoid such national tragedies is to avoid 
     the first momentous lapse in judgment.

  Mr. Speaker, I believe that the President's decision to deploy 25,000 
American ground forces for a 1-year period of time at a cost of $1.2 
billion in order to carry out the completely inconsistent mission of 
training and equipping just one combatant party while pleading 
neutrality to the other is a potentially tragic misjudgment. Military 
forces should not be used merely to establish a diplomatic presence or 
to accomplish tactical missions unrelated to a clearly defined and 
achievable strategic purpose.
  Did we learn nothing from the deaths of our Marines in Lebanon and 
the loss of our soldiers in Somalia? That is the issue before the House 
today.
  Secretary Perry has said that the U.S. ground forces would be the 
meanest dog on the block.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, I would respond with the words of Thomas 
Jefferson who once said, ``We have one effective check on the dog of 
war, by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive 
to the Legislative body.''
  I urge an affirmative vote on the resolution.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha].
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, could I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman], the chairman of the committee, what effect does this have on 
the law?
  Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield, the effect is that it is a 
sense of Congress resolution.
  Mr. MURTHA. It has no effect at all.
  Mr. GILMAN. It just expresses the House feeling about an important 
measure.
  Mr. MURTHA. I understand. But I wanted to make sure.
  What I am concerned about, Mr. Chairman, is the possibility of the 
people who are negotiating after 4 years, and I have been to Bosnia 5 
times and I know the Chairman has been over there.
  I am concerned they may misunderstand us trying to actually resolve 
this situation by all at once sending the wrong kind of message.
  There is no question that in a sense of Congress, we are saying that 
American troops ought to be authorized before they are sent.
  We are not cutting off funds. We are not doing anything to stop the 
deployment of troops. We are just saying that a sense of Congress is 
not to count on it. That is what we are saying.
  Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman would further yield, the second 
paragraph in the resolution really speaks for all of us, that no U.S. 
Armed Forces should be deployed on the ground in a territory of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until 
the Congress has approved such a deployment.
  To answer the gentleman's question, there is no mandate or no 
prohibition, but it is a sense of the Congress asking the President to 
come to us for approval.
  Mr. MURTHA. The reason that I asked the gentleman the question is 
because of my concern of mixed signals that we could be sending. I 
think all of us have the same mission. All of us want to stop the 
fighting. All of us want to contain the fighting.
  When I was in Bosnia just a few weeks ago, the people were so happy 
that the fighting had stopped, the fact that they could continue their 
lives in some sort of normalcy. I just did not want there to be any 
mistake by the negotiators that we were actually doing something that 
would prohibit the U.S. troops. I have a great concern myself about 
U.S. troops being deployed and at this point would not agree until I 
saw what the agreement is, and I think we should all take that 
situation.
  I think the President should ask for authorization. But I wanted to 
make sure that the negotiators did not misunderstand that this is only 
a sense of Congress and that we have a concern about stopping the 
fighting, and this does not prohibit in any way American troops from 
being deployed if the President finally decides to deploy troops.
  Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman would further yield, I thank him for 
underscoring the position of the House with regard to this measure.
  Mr. MURTHA. It is a sense of Congress resolution, it has no effect in 
law, and I would ask the Members to vote against it in order not to 
confuse the negotiators and reduce our ability to have an impact on 
settling this peaceably.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Buyer], one of the sponsors of the measure.
  Mr. BUYER. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, leave no doubt that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 


[[Page H 11400]]
McHale] and I in a bipartisan effort support the peace process with 
regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The United States has a key role to play in brokering these talks and 
providing the leadership not only in NATO, but what we should be doing 
is providing our air power, sea power, our air lift and sea lift along 
with our logistical support in the Balkans. That is the role we can 
play.
  There are 3 reasons why I oppose the administration's assumption 
there can be no peace in the Balkans without U.S. ground troops.
  No. 1. The President's premature commitment of United States ground 
troops to Bosnia without knowing the circumstances surrounding that 
deployment is ill-conceived and dangerous.
  No. 2. It is wrong to send United States ground troops into Bosnia as 
peacekeepers when there is no peace to keep. This is the lesson of 
Lebanon and Somalia.
  No. 3. History has shown that no long-term military commitment is 
sustainable without the support of the American people. The Congress as 
representatives of the people must speak on the issue before troops are 
deployed.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha] asked some very good 
questions. The message of this House resolution to the leaders of the 
warring parties when they sit down to negotiate this peace at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base is the syllogism for peace should not be based 
on the presence of U.S. ground troops to implement whatever agreement 
is reached. They should focus on the real reasons as to why they are 
killing each other. Once those are resolved, they will begin to focus 
on the real reasons of peace.
  If United States troops are deployed, do not get the image that 
25,000 United States troops will be going to Bosnia with flowers in 
their M-16's, when in the kill zone peacekeeping looks a lot like 
combat.
  That is why the Secretary of Defense said to us the U.S. troops will 
be going as combatants to implement an agreement and make peace. U.S. 
troops will become targets because they have lost the protection of 
neutrality.
  To those that say that this undermines the peace process, it is 
extremely important that the United States, this Congress, the people's 
voice, go on the record so we send the correct message to the warring 
parties to negotiate a peace so that they will stop killing each other.
  Support this resolution.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson].
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, the statement by the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the full committee, is instructive.
  The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] was concerned that there 
would only be 96 hours before a peace agreement were to be achieved and 
that would not give Congress enough time to act.
  Ninety-six hours seems like eternity compared to the time we are 
getting to consider this resolution laid before the House on Friday 
when most Members were already back in their districts, 20 minutes of 
debate equally divided. That is a thoughtful foreign policy debate on 
the floor. Are we fearful the President will be successful in this 
peace process?
  We were told air power was not going to work. Many of the geniuses in 
this House got up, ``You can't win this war with air power,'' on both 
sides of the aisle.
  Air power has taken this war to a turn that has brought them to the 
peace process. The President almost single-handedly has marched forward 
with that policy and that we now see the potential for an end of mass 
graves.
  I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], why are we in such a 
rush that without hearings, without a committee markup, without notice 
to the Members of the House, that we have to vote on this with 20 
minutes of debate? Twenty minutes of debate on whether or not years of 
effort by the United States, thousands of civilians having died will 
come to an end.
  We have a situation here where 2 weeks in a row resolutions that 
reserve more time for consideration unless there is some political 
motive are not given the time for Members of this Congress to examine 
the resolutions and to debate them in committee.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Everett). The time of the gentleman from 
Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson] has expired.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 
be granted another minute so that we can respond.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman yield time? The Chair has 
divided the time equally between the two parties. Is there an 
additional request for time?
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I believe that a good point was 
just made by my colleague from the other side of the aisle. This is an 
important issue.
  I ask unanimous consent that an additional 60 minutes of time be 
devoted to this topic to be divided equally on either side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object.
  Mr. COX of California. If the gentleman will yield, my object here is 
to extend the time so that we debate it for a full hour. That is 20 
additional minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Twenty additional minutes would be 10 
additional minutes on each side.
  Mr. COX of California. To be equally divided by each side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, under my 
reservation, let me say that what the gentleman requests is that we 
have additional time today. Very frankly I learned about this at about 
noontime today. I want to make it clear that I am opposed to this 
resolution and believe it is not timely. Having said that, the 
gentleman asked for unanimous consent to extend----
  Mr. SOLOMON. He wants an extension of 20 minutes. Do you object to 
that or not?
  Mr. HOYER. Further reserving the right to object, I understand that, 
if we want to extend it to 60 minutes.
  I think I am going to raise a legitimate point with the gentleman 
from California. If somebody is going to object, then I cannot speak 
any longer.
  Mr. COX of California. If the gentleman would yield for a moment, to 
clarify the point, the reason that we are here on the floor now without 
hearings, without any further opportunity beyond the hearings we have 
already had, and we have had hearings in our committee, the President 
and the administration are going to, in Ohio, within 48 hours commit or 
begin possibly to commit ground troops.
  We want to make sure before they go into those negotiations that we 
are on record saying do this only with congressional authorization.
  It is important that we act tonight. Else we will abdicate. But 
because it is such an important point, I thought I would ask for an 
additional 10 minutes on either side, and I would repeat my unanimous-
consent request.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Roth].
  Mr. ROTH. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, if Congress is going to be there at the crash landing, 
then Congress ought to be there at the takeoff.
  We have experience in Lebanon and Somalia. We also have experience in 
Vietnam. The very people today who say, no, Congress should not have a 
voice in it are the very people who in the 1960's and the 1970's were 
screaming we should get out of Vietnam. Let us think before we get 
involved.
  It is easy to get involved in a war, but it is awfully difficult to 
extricate yourself.
  When the Secretary of State was up here on Capitol Hill before the 
Committee on International Relations and Chairman Gilman did such a 
fine job on that day last April, he said before we put troops into any 
country, there are four criteria.

[[Page H 11401]]

  What are those four criteria? First of all, you had to have a clear 
mission. Do you have a clear mission in Bosnia? Do you know what we are 
supposed to be doing in Bosnia?
  The second criteria is that a reasonable chance of success. Who could 
say we are going to have a reasonable chance of success in Bosnia? They 
have had three peace agreements so far. Every one has meant nothing.
  The third criteria is that support of the American people and a way 
to sustain that support.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROTH. I ask the gentleman from New York if I could have at least 
30 more seconds, because I think it is important to go over these 4 
points.
  Mr. GILMAN. I regret that we do not have additional time at this 
time. We have too many speakers. If we have additional time at the end 
of the debate, I will be pleased to yield the gentleman additional 
time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Hoyer].
  (Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry. Before I take the 3 
minutes, can I make a unanimous-consent request? Is that in order?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his request.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent, and this is the 
point I wanted to make, that this debate which is an important debate 
for us to have, but it is an important debate to have with notice to 
Members in time to reflect and frankly time to hear from the public, 
that we delay this debate and set aside 2 hours for debate on this 
resolution, that it be open for at least one amendment, 1 week from 
tomorrow.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Maryland?
  Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Everett). Objection is heard.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] for 3 minutes.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, the American public again sent us all here to 
reflect and to be responsible. There was much discussion about that 
last week.
  This is probably as serious a foreign policy issue as confronts the 
United States of America that will be discussed in terms of topography 
and all of those things, and that is important to do. ``Anybody who 
moved or screamed was killed. Genocide goes on unabated in the midst of 
Europe.''
  The President of the United States and others are trying to bring 
that to a close. It is difficult to do. I have not, as most of you 
know, agreed with the President's policies and have, in fact, opposed 
his policies and supported very strongly the unilateral lifting of the 
arms embargo. That issue was deserving of serious debate, and it 
received it. It had extensive hearings and was debated over months of 
time before we voted on it.
  On this noon, I received notice that we were going to debate this 
resolution on the floor of the House. Fully debate it? No. Under 
suspension of the rules? Suspension of the rules is designed for the 
most part for those issues of little dispute and of general agreement. 
This issue is not one of those. This is a shameful, irresponsible, 
precipitous action to be proposed in this, the House of the people.
  I suggest to my friend from New York, my good friend, that if we were 
in 1938 or 1939 or 1940 and we were to tell Franklin Roosevelt to not 
lend lease, ``Do not give any aid and comfort to the British, for after 
all we may get involved,'' ladies and gentlemen of this House, this is 
one of the most serious issues that we confront.
  I disagree with some of my colleagues. Indeed, the chairman of the 
committee or the ranking member of the committee and I have seriously 
disagreed on Bosnian policy. But what we do not disagree on is that we 
ought to give this considered and thoughtful debate and effort.
  The American public expects no less of us, and indeed, my friends, 
the world expects much more of us. If we are the leaders of the free 
world, as I believe we are, I would hope that we would reject this 
resolution at this time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Solomon], the chairman of our Committee on Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, let me say this is the first resolution. 
There will be another much tougher than this.
  You know, I have been, I guess, editorialized as one of the toughest 
hawks in this Chamber over the last 18 years. I am going to tell you, 
when I stand up here in support of this resolution and in total 
opposition to sending troops into Bosnia, you know that there is 
something wrong, because I am concerned about it.
  Once again, this administration stands on the verge of putting young 
men and women in harms' way in this Balkan conflict in which America 
does not have a vital national interest. This time it may be real, and 
this is why we in Congress should do everything we can to stop this 
ill-advised, poorly defined mission, Mr. Speaker, America's children 
should only be deployed in zones of conflict when and if vital American 
national interests are at stake, and until this administration, this 
has always been U.S. foreign policy for all Presidents of this country.
  Among other things, our policy has been to come to the defense of 
sovereign democratic allies that come under external military 
aggression: That means invaded by a foreign country. Members, Bosnia 
does not meet this test. It is essentially a civil war, a conflict.
  Mr. Speaker, as heartwrenching as those pictures were, as this 
tragedy has been, and as despicable as the Serb aggression has been, 
this conflict does not justify putting one single American soldier in 
combat. Mr. Speaker, the answer to this conflict is not U.S. ground 
troops. The answer is the same as it has always been, lift the embargo 
and let them defend themselves. They have already shown they can do it, 
and that is what we ought to be doing here today. The next resolution 
will show that.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, as Bosnian, Croat and Serbian leaders gather around the 
conference table, there will be one seat for the United States of 
America, one seat, because we should be speaking with one voice, and 
only the President of the United States in those discussions can 
represent this country. That is not indeed to say what the outcome 
should be.
  There is a time and a place when the President of the United States 
will come to this body with his judgment and express to us what 
commitments were made on behalf of our country. This resolution today 
is an entirely different matter. It prejudges what the President of the 
United States might say. It is an attempt of force our will to that 
table in those negotiations as if we were two countries, two people, 
with two different concepts of how to deal with the crisis.
  My friends, I understand when we disagree on Medicare, I understand 
we have different ideas on the budget, I understand we have different 
concepts about all manner of domestic policy. But this is different. 
This is the President of the United States attempting to deal with a 
crisis which could at some point engulf Europe, just cause unspeakable 
deaths, 200,000 casualties, a massive loss of life, a test of the 
Western alliance.
  At this moment, can we not indeed as one country allow this 
President, on behalf of all of our people, to at least attempt a 
settlement and then return to this Congress, where we have a right to 
insist upon passing judgment upon what commitments he might make for 
our country? At that time, I cannot say that I would not stand with you 
and ask questions about his judgment. But at this moment, as these 
people gather, let him do his will as one President of one people.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning].

[[Page H 11402]]

  (Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the 
resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the resolution H. 247, and in 
opposition to any attempt to send American forces into Bosnia without 
the authorization of the U.S. Congress. The American people do not 
support this adventure and their will should not be thwarted.
  The history of the Balkans is gory enough for Hollywood to make 
movies about until the second coming. The Region is torn by religious 
and territorial rivalries that span the centuries and one injustice has 
been answered by another. The United States should not presume to 
interject itself into this morass.
  Many seem to have forgotten that this area has not historically been 
a unified country which has suddenly come apart. Bosnia has been part 
of many of the great empires of Eurasia which have come and gone over 
the centuries. Each time that it has changed hands there has been 
bloodshed involved.
  The region is so well known for its savagery that as long ago as the 
15th Century the Ottoman Turks recruited soldiers from that area 
because of their ferocity. It is folly indeed to think that we will 
save the Balkans by putting 20,000 young American lives at risk.
  The lesson to be learned from previous so-called peacekeeping 
missions is that the troops are not needed if there is truly peace and 
that they cannot keep the peace if it does not already exist. Did we 
learn nothing from our ill-advised adventure in Somalia? Did we learn 
nothing from the mission to Beirut?
  Mr. Speaker, the President likes to claim that this is a NATO problem 
and if we do not act NATO's credibility will collapse. What nonsense!
  The last time I checked NATO was a defensive alliance designed to 
protect the member states from attack by a non-member, specifically, 
the now defunct Soviet Union. NATO was not designed to act as Europe's 
policeman. NATO is supposed to be a shield for Western Europe, not a 
sword to be used unprovoked, regardless of the beneficent intent.
  We should not be a party to this misuse of the alliance. We entered 
into the NATO alliance for our mutual defense and not one member state 
is at risk because of the horrors in Bosnia.
  What has happened in Bosnia is indeed a human tragedy but it is not a 
NATO problem and it is not a U.S. problem. It is a problem that the 
people who live there must solve for themselves. If France and England 
have determined that they have a vital interest in this war and choose 
to send their soldiers into Bosnia that is their business. It is not 
ours.
  We need to remind Mr. Clinton that even though the Constitution makes 
him the Commander-in-Chief of our Military Forces, the Constitution 
reserves the right to Congress for committing our people to military 
action.
  Article 1 of the Constitution firmly places power in the hands of the 
Congress when it comes to declaring war, raising, supporting and 
regulating the military forces of this Nation. This resolution simply 
reminds him that we must be consulted before American forces are put at 
risk.
  My colleagues, we must support the resolution and let Mr. Clinton 
know that we will not quietly sit by while he sends out troops on an 
ill-advised adventure.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], a senior member of our Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution and 
emphasize that this Member is deeply troubled by a number of aspects of 
the proposed troop deployment that is being proposed today. Let me use 
President Clinton's own words to emphasize my concern.
  I rise in support of the resolution. It is important that Congress 
express its view at this time, because the plan that is presented by 
the Administration as it has been described to committees of this 
Congress is tragically flawed in many respects, and we need to make it 
precisely clear now that we are not on board. We are not on board on 
this tragically flawed plan.
  The Congress should have a role in discussion of this important 
issue. Let me give you two major examples of why it is flawed. The one 
proposal is that we train and arm the Bosnian Federation. That violates 
the cardinal rule of peacekeeping or peace enforcement. You cannot be 
anything other than neutral if you expect to implement that peace 
enforcement policy.
  The second problem is that we have been given a specific period of 
time when our peace enforcement are to be pulled out, 12 months hence. 
Maybe they are going to change that time period. But an exit strategy, 
which is admittedly all-important, as the President himself said at the 
United Nations, must be strategically linked. It must be linked to 
strategic objectives not to a time certain.
  I cannot imagine, as a former infantry officer, putting our troops in 
harm's way when we are both involved in arming one side while we are 
also supposed to be neutral or peace enforcers. It is important 
Congress express its view on this issue at this time.
  We want the Congress of the United States involved in this issue 
before American troops are deployed. We want to be involved in the 
composition of this plan.
  In the President's 1993 speech to the United Nations--delivered only 
days after the loss of United States lives at that infamous ambush in 
Mogadishu--President Clinton laid out several basic criteria that he 
claimed would be the standard for future U.S. peacekeeping activities. 
The criteria set forth by the President included: ``Does the proposed 
mission have clear objectives?'' ``Can an end point be identified for 
those who will be asked to participate?'' ``How much will the mission 
cost?'' In addition, a later criteria was wisely added--Is it in the 
U.S. national interest?

  At the time that President Clinton made that speech, it seemed to 
this Member he had laid out pretty sensible criteria. What has troubled 
me, and what has troubled a great many in this body, is that these 
criteria seem to have been addressed in only the most superficial 
manner.
  There are a great many defects in the administrative plans to involve 
America land forces in Bosnia.
  First, look at the question of whether the proposed mission has clear 
objectives. As Secretary of State Christopher has made clear, our 
mission is to enforce an end of the hostilities that have plagued 
Bosnia for centuries. It is proposed that we are going to interject 
ourselves between heavily armed factions that seem incapable of living 
in peace. Presumably we are to serve as neutral honest brokers to 
prevent the three sides from killing one another. Again, this is a 
peace enforcement mission, not peacekeeping.
  But Defense Secretary Perry has testified that we will be prepared to 
train Bosnian forces and try to bring about arms control if the Bosnian 
state is to exist after the year of NATO occupation is over. In 
contrast to the peace enforcement mission--which presumably is not 
designed to take sides--the arming and training of Bosnian Moslem or 
Bosnian federation forces is taking sides. Arming the Bosnian 
federation is not the act of a neutral. I understand the desire to 
level the playing field, but one can hardly expect the Bosnian Serbs to 
quietly sit back while their peacekeepers are arming their enemy.
  This Member would also say, as a former infantry officer, that it is 
almost inconceivable to me that rules of engagement can be crafted that 
will permit us to act as a neutral peace enforcer at the same time that 
we are arming one specific faction.
  It is this type of fuzzy logic and contradictory objectives that can 
lead to mission creep and, regrettably, the unnecessary loss of 
American lives.
  Now, second, let me turn to the notion of a proper exit strategy--
again, one of the fundamental criteria laid out for any United States 
peacekeeping operation in the President's speech to the United Nations.
  This body has been told the exit strategy is to withdraw in a year. 
But this commitment is not linked to strategic objectives; nor is it 
linked to any tangible political results. Indeed, it seems that the 
only criteria in this exit strategy is the belief that 1 year is the 
extreme outer limit of American tolerance. The administration may be 
right about that, but it is entirely beside the point.
  In moments of candor it has been suggested to be by some of NATO's 
leading planners and operations people that this 1-year peace 
enforcement mission will at best provide the region with a brief, NATO-
enforced respite during which time the Serbs and Croatians fine-tune 
plans for the ultimate dismemberment of Bosnia. Then, as soon as United 
States and other NATO forces depart, war returns and the final vestiges 
of Bosnia are dismembered.
  This Member must tell his colleagues that there is no reason to take 
comfort in a mission that lacks specified strategic objectives, and is 
likely at best to buy a year of tenuous and imperfect peace. 
Unfortunately, American, British, French, other allied lives surely 
will be lost in the process. This Member, for one, cannot justify this 
inevitable loss of life.
  Last, Mr. Speaker, this Member just does not see the clear U.S. 
national interest in deploying tens of thousands of American troops 

[[Page H 11403]]
to Bosnia. Pointing to our role as an international leader and the 
critical role importance of preserving NATO seems to me to miss the 
point. If our pre-announced goal is to stay in Bosnia for no more than 
1 year, then are we to be world leader only for a year? Does it serve 
our reputation to briefly restore order and then permit the violent 
dismemberment of Bosnia as soon as we depart?
  This Member is concerned about the damage to U.S. prestige that could 
be done by the Congress failing to support the President on such an 
important foreign policy decision, but I must tell you that this 
administration went out of its way to avoid consulting with the 
Congress. It has avoided consulting with Congress because the Clinton 
administration is fully aware that Congress does not support the 
proposed adventurism. And I must say that it is the Clinton 
administration, and not Congress, that threatens deep damage to U.S. 
international prestige by launching a tragic failure.
  It is for these and numerous other reasons, Mr. Speaker, that this 
Member supports their resolution.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Gephardt], the distinguished minority leader.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
defeat this resolution, which will only make it harder for America to 
achieve a real and lasting peace in worn-torn Bosnia--a peace that may 
finally be within our grasp.
  Mr. Speaker, none of us wants to see American troops in Bosnia 
without the prior approval of this body. None of us wants to see 
America's children sent to Bosnia without a peace agreement that has 
the full commitment of all parties, and minimizes the risks to our 
forces. If we are ultimately confronted with that choice, then this 
Congress--the branch of our Government that is closest to the people of 
this country--must have a role in deciding and authorizing America's 
course.
  That is why I have no trouble supporting the second part of this 
resolution. But the first part would do something much different, and 
much more dangerous, than affirming Congress' rightful role.
  On the eve of delicate negotiations on Ohio, this resolution would 
say to the Serbs and the Moslems: Our negotiations do not have the 
support of the Congress, or the country. Take their words with a grain 
of salt. And we stand ready to revoke their promises before they are 
even made or before they are even discussed in the Congress.
  How can we possibly tie America's hands at the very moment when peace 
is within reach?
  If we try to weigh our negotiators down with terms and conditions 
before they even negotiate, we jeopardize what must be our ultimate 
goal in Bosnia:
  To finally stop the death and destruction. To end what have been the 
worst atrocities since World War II itself. To stand up for peace 
throughout Europe, which has always been in America's best interests.
  To second guess the peace process would be more than wrong--it would 
endanger any hope of a solution to this international tragedy. And it 
simply is not necessary. The President has already committed himself to 
consulting Congress, and seeking our support for any U.S. role in 
securing peace.
  This is the wrong resolution, and the wrong time to pass it.
  I urge Members to vote no, so that peace talks can at least proceed, 
without the damaging baggage this kind of bill would be.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Smith], a senior member of our Committee on International 
Relations.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the 
bipartisan resolution before the House which succinctly encapsulates 
the concerns of many in this Congress that deployment of United States 
troops to the former Yugoslavia is a presumed option in the quiver of 
United States negotiators. Before United States troops are committed to 
such a mission, the President must make his case to the American people 
and Congress.
  Last August, the President decided to launch a United States peace 
initiative which was prompted by the sudden shifts caused by the 
Croatian military gains and by NATO bombing.
  Let me remind my colleagues that it was not until Congress 
overwhelmingly and along bipartisan lines voted to lift the arms 
embargo on Bosnia that President Clinton finally began to engage on the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Clinton vetoed that bill, 
depriving the Bosnians of the ability to defend themselves.
  In recent weeks this same administration which has vacillated for 
nearly 3 years over what United States interests were at stake in 
Bosnia is now prepared to send some 25,000 troops to a country to 
enforce the peace that has yet to be written.
  Mr. Speaker, I am particularly troubled by the comments by key 
members of the administration that all but promise that U.S. troops 
deployed to Bosnia would be home within a year. Such claims raise 
suspicions that the administration's full-court press for a peace 
settlement is indeed being driven by an electoral timetable. They also 
reveal the limits of the White House's commitment to its own plan even 
before it is fully negotiated. Assuming that the sides are able to 
reach a peace agreement, which is far from certain, the process of 
consolidating peace in Bosnia will take years, not months, to complete.
  This is not a partisan debate. There are skeptics on both sides of 
the aisle.
  Mr. Speaker, it is incumbent upon the President to make a persuasive 
case to the American people and to Congress, which clearly defines the 
mission, mandate, and modalities for a force which would be placed in 
harm's way. Ambiguity, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has 
noted, is dangerous and, in the end, self-defeating. The deployment of 
American troops to Bosnia, as he correctly points out, is a fateful 
decision requiring a full national debate led by the President. ``As a 
first step, the administration must answer these threshold questions: 
What exactly is the peacekeeping force supposed to protect? And how do 
we measure success?'' Kissinger has asked.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I have cosponsored legislation, H.R. 2550, 
which would prohibit the use of DOD funds for placing ground troops in 
Bosnia for peacekeeping or peace implementation. The President has not 
made his case for deployment. And, considering proximity talks and 
negotiations begin on Wednesday, the White House and Clinton's 
negotiators need to clearly understand that they must not presume the 
deployment of U.S. troops is politically sustainable.
  Prudence, Mr. Speaker, dictated deliberate and timely consideration 
of such fundamental points before a commitment of U.S. troops can or 
should be made. Thorough review and deliberation is prerequisite, 
rather than rushing into a decision that cannot be sustained over a 
period of time.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher], a member of the Committee 
on International Relations.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the people of this country should know 
that the debate on this issue was limited by an objection from the 
other side, and the reason we cannot wait for a week to discuss this 
for 2 hours is because the President of the United States at this 
moment may be in the process of preparing to send young Americans into 
the meat grinder of the Balkans. We need to discuss this tonight. We 
need to discuss this in depth, and we are prevented from doing so by 
the other side of the aisle.
  American policy has been directed by a foreign policy elite that has 
failed time and time again in the last 3 years. The screams of horror 
coming from the Balkans have been met with deaf ears in our own State 
Department and by our own policy makers. They have failed. There has 
been a moral equivalency to the victims and the aggressors. They 
pleaded with us, ``Please, lift the arms embargo, so we can defend 
ourselves.'' That policy that we have followed has been a failure, and 
now they plan to send American lives.
  Mr. Speaker, we have to got to stop the deployment of American troops 
in the Balkans, and stop the sacrifice of young Americans on the alter 
of globalism.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Chabot], a member of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution. 
As the Clinton administration makes its final preparations for the 
Bosnia talks set to begin on Wednesday, it is of paramount 

[[Page H 11404]]
importance that the President gets a strong message from the Congress 
that the American people do not support the commitment of United States 
ground troops in Bosnia. A strong bipartisan vote of approval for this 
resolution will send that message.
  This resolution is an important first step, but I emphasize first 
step Mr. Speaker, I and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle intend 
to take up binding legislation that will exercise Congress' power of 
the purse by prohibiting the use of funds for this dangerous and ill-
conceived idea.
  Put American lives at risk on the ground in the middle of the bloody 
mess in Bosnia? Have we not learned anything from Vietnam, from 
Lebanon, from Somalia?
  Mr. GILMAN Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to make it clear, I do hope at the right time to 
help the President in his Commander-in-Chief duties. But this issue, as 
it comes before us now, is a fuzzy issue, and, of course, if I were to 
write this less resolution, I would write it a bit differently. But we 
have before us a proposal for the NATO forces to participate in so-
called peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United States 
forces would be part of it. I thoroughly agree that the Congress of the 
United States should be part of this decision, and I hope we can have a 
full and fair debate at the time.
  But as we look at it as of this moment, there are so many unanswered 
questions, I feel I must vote for this resolution. We must look forward 
as we ask these questions, what will the agreement say? What is our 
mission to be as troops? Will they be peacekeepers or peacemakers? What 
will the rules of engagement be? When can we say we have a successful 
mission? Will the peacekeepers, if we are as peacekeepers, be 
evenhanded to enforce the peace against both the Serbs and the Muslims? 
Will the rules of engagement apply to both? And the most serious 
unanswered question, Mr. Speaker, that I have in my own mind, is 
whether at the same time we are there as peacekeepers, we will also be 
having American troops training, equipping, and arming the Muslims?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, in order to grant our colleagues the 
opportunity to more fully debate this important measure, I ask 
unanimous consent that the time for debate on this measure be extended 
by an additional 20 minutes, to be equally divided between the 
proponents and opponents of this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Everett). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New York?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Maine [Mr. Longely].
  Mr. LONGELY. Mr. Speaker, I rise as a Member who has voted not just 
once, but twice to support the administration's policy in Bosnia. But I 
have to stand in support of the resolution that is on the floor today.
  Mr. Speaker, Congress has a major oversight responsibility in this 
area, and I have a grave concern over the two assumptions that we have 
built into our policy. First, it assumes the use of American forces 
going into the negotiations, as is spelled out in the resolution. 
Second, it assumes that we will take a partisan role in support of the 
Bosnians and the Croats, in training and equipping their forces, when I 
believe it is our objective and should be to remain neutral in the 
conflict.
  Mr. Speaker, I think that the resolution is very constructive. It 
does not dictate anything to the administration other than that in the 
negotiation of any peace agreement, it should not be considered a 
presumption that implementation of such an agreement will include the 
deployment of U.S. Armed Forces.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance on my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 
6 minutes.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution. 
The first point I want to make relates to process. I think all of us in 
this Chamber would agree that this is an important, serious foreign 
policy question. No hearings were held on this resolution, no committee 
consideration took place, the administration was not given a chance to 
state its case before Members, no amendments are in order, the 
resolution was placed on the suspension calendar without consulting the 
minority, which is a direct violation of the majority's conference 
rules, and no opportunity has been given to assess the impact of this 
resolution on the peace talks that are scheduled to begin on Wednesday.
  Now, I understand that they on the other side have made a request for 
20 additional minutes, and I appreciate that, but I really do not think 
that that makes right the process that has been followed here.
  We have done this now for 2 weeks in a row on important foreign 
policy questions. Let me say again that I think it demands the role of 
the House of Representatives in its role in making American foreign 
policy by the quick and cursory way in which this matter has been 
handled today. Most Members were not advised of it until Friday 
afternoon, some not until this morning.
  I am told that Secretary Christopher tried three times from the 
Middle East this weekend to talk to the Speaker, and the National 
Security Advisor, Mr. Lake, also tried. I am not aware that those phone 
calls were returned.
  So much for process. Let me say a word about substance. I agree that 
the Congress should vote on the question of whether to send United 
States ground troops to Bosnia to implement an agreement among the 
parties to the conflict, and ideally that vote should be an 
authorization vote. But no one should mistake that statement with what 
this resolution says.
  This resolution raises a serious constitutional problem. It is one 
thing to say that the House of Representatives should vote on 
authorization before the President commits troops to Bosnia. I agree 
with that statement. But that is not what this resolution says. This 
resolution says that no United States Armed Forces should be deployed 
on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has 
approved such a deployment. That resolution says no United States 
troops should be sent to Bosnia until the Congress approves it, and 
that is a very different statement.
  What we do by that statement is prevent the President from acting as 
a commander-in-chief, and, when you do that, you raise very grave 
constitutional issues. If this were simply a statement that we should 
approve whether to send United States ground troops to Bosnia to 
implement an agreement, I would agree with it.
  Now, there are other reasons to vote against the resolution. It is 
premature. There is no peace agreement. The resolution presumes to 
speak about the result of that agreement.
  We cannot decide today whether it is wise or whether it is foolish to 
send United States troops to enforce a Bosnia peace agreement, because 
there is no peace agreement. That is no request from the President.
  This resolution sends the wrong signal to the negotiators to end this 
terrible war. My friends, we put the Secretary of State into the field 
to negotiate. We put the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs in the 
field to negotiate. We applaud what they have accomplished in these 
least few days. They tell us today, and I quote Secretary Christopher, 
``This resolution could be seen by the parties and the world as an 
indication that the House will not support an ultimate peace 
agreement.'' The chief negotiator, Mr. Holbrook, says that this 
resolution is extremely unhelpful and we come along and pass this 
resolution and undercut our negotiators at a very sensitive time. The 
Secretary of State says that this resolution is potentially dangerous.

  They are the ones that have been negotiating. They are the ones in 
the field. They are the ones trying to speak for the American national 
interests. And we just come in and undercut it, by their words. I do 
not think that is a wise thing for the Congress of the United States to 
do.
  Mr. Speaker, I think this resolution does not pay any attention to 
reality. 

[[Page H 11405]]
It says that we will address the presumption of the parties to the 
negotiations. How can we do that? We say in the resolution that there 
shall not be a presumption. These parties come to the table with a 
presumption. They have already stated the presumption. How can we in 
the U.S. Congress tell the negotiating parties, when we are the 
negotiating party, how can we tell them what kind of presumptions they 
must have before they come to the table? The Congress has no power to 
do that.
  These are clearly matters beyond the purview of the House. We do not 
have the power to tell them what their presumptions are. That is 
precisely what the resolution does. The Members of this body cannot 
tell the negotiators from Bosnia and from Croatia and from Serbia what 
they should presume. But that is precisely what we try to do in this 
resolution. We certainly cannot determine what are our perquisites to a 
successful negotiation.
  Mr. Speaker, this administration has worked very hard in the last few 
months to end this war in Bosnia, and I urge a vote against the 
resolution.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
time for debate on this measure be extended by an additional 20 
minutes, to be equally divided by the proponents and opponents of this 
resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Indiana?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
debate on this resolution be extended by 5 minutes on each side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Indiana?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I continue to object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Ewing].
  Mr. EWING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I would have to say that if we sit quietly by while this 
action takes place, then it will be too late for this Congress to be 
heard on this issue. Now is the time for us to express our frustration 
with sending troops to Bosnia, not after an agreement has been made by 
the President. Then it will be too late. So today and this resolution 
is absolutely the time to do it.
  The American people do not want troops in Bosnia. If the President 
wants to send them there, I suggest he come to this body and to this 
Congress and get approval before he tries to do it. Let us not forget 
the message and the lesson of Vietnam.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, we were told about the process. In 48 
hours the President is going to ask our troops to go to war. Yes,;any 
process to tell the President that we disagree should be moved up. A 
lengthy debate should follow. But take a look at our record in Somalia, 
in Haiti, in the bombing of Somalia and Bosnia, just recently. The 
lasting effect is zero. We killed Americans and we spent billions of 
dollars.
  Mr. Speaker, this is going to cost us $1 to $5 billion. The President 
will come back and ask for an emergency supplemental. Is it wise? Well, 
this is Afghanistan with trees. General MacKenzie said he would not 
touch it with a 10-foot pole. Today, the French President said plan on 
a 20-year American occupation. Twenty years. Are we ready to make that 
commitment when we are trying to take care of our own house in this 
country?
  Mr. Speaker, I advise a yes vote on this resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Kansas [Mrs. Meyers].
  (Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 
resolution. There are serious questions about this possible deployment 
that must be answered before any leader can in good conscience allow 
young American men and women to be sent in harm's way.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. Congress should 
vote before 20,000 to 25,000 American ground troops are sent to Bosnia. 
There are serious questions about this possible deployment that must be 
answered before any American leader can, in good conscience, allow 
young American men and women to be sent in harm's way. Unfortunately, 
the Clinton administration has not answered those questions.
  The administration has not articulated a coherent strategy for our 
deployment, or expressed what the objective of such a deployment would 
be. A date on a calendar is not an exit strategy. Secretary Perry and 
General Shalikashvili have stated our mission would be accomplished in 
a year. That would make sense if our mission were simply to occupy a 
patch of territory in Bosnia for a year and then leave. We have to know 
what changes in Bosnia our troops are supposed to accomplish. We would 
then have to consider whether it is indeed within the realm of 
possibility that our forces could accomplish that mission and consider 
how long it would probably take.
  We cannot even get agreement from within the administration as to 
where our troops would be deployed. Secretaries Perry and Christopher, 
and General Shalikashvili, testified before Congress earlier this month 
saying that our forces would patrol the buffer zone between the Croat-
Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic in order to keep the 
opposing armies separated. This weekend, Ambassador Holbrooke said that 
our forces would be stationed on Bosnia's international borders. We 
need to have this information, if only to be assured that the 
administration knows what its plans are itself, and it is not merely 
drifting into a quagmire.
  We must pass this resolution, and then Congress must insist on having 
its vote on this deployment before it actually takes place.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cox].
  Mr. COX of California. The resolution before us, Mr. Speaker, is 
clear and unambiguous. The President should not unilaterally commit 
25,000 United States ground troops to Bosnia without congressional 
approval. Congressional approval for sending U.S. troops into war is no 
mere formality. It is not a constitutional question, it is a question 
of whether we want our troops to succeed. It is a question of whether 
we want the military mission to succeed. It is a question of whether 
they deserve the support of the American people before rather than in 
the middle or after. It is a question of protecting our constitutional 
process under which the Congress, not the President, presumes to commit 
billions of dollars in U.S. funds to support such an operation.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no peace to support. We are sending our troops 
into the middle. Right now we all know the situation on the ground in 
northwest Bosnia. There is nothing that distinguishes this, the 35th 
cease-fire, from the 34th or the 36th. And when this one breaks down 
the only military mission of our troops, purported neutrals, will be to 
get shot at just as it was in Lebanon. The Clinton doctrine now 
emerging is that we will commit U.S. troops to protect the gains of a 
military aggressor.
  Yes, Mr. Speaker, those were the pictures that we saw, naked military 
aggression committed by such as Slobodan Milosevic. Now we are told it 
is wise to trust Milosevic's signature on a piece of paper and U.S. 
troops will risk their lives to plot his gains and his conquests for a 
precise period of 1 year, following which he will be free to advance.
  U.S. troops should not be committed cavalierly. The question is, 
Should U.S. troops be committed by the President without congressional 
approval? If we believe the answer to that question is no, vote for 
this resolution. Vote for this resolution to require congressional 
authorization.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  (Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Burton], a senior member of our Committee on International 
Relations.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, there is a full court press by 
this 

[[Page H 11406]]
administration to put young Americans in harm's way in Bosnia, 25,000 
of them. No matter that the American people do not want us involved.
  Does the President remember what happened in Beirut when 235 Marines 
were blown apart because they were sitting ducks? Does the President 
remember the body of a young American, naked and being dragged through 
the streets of Somalia? And today the problems are just as bad in 
Somalia as they were back then.
  I would just say to the President, if he were here, this a grave 
mistake. The people of the United States, through their elected 
representatives, have said clearly do not send our troops into harm's 
way in Bosnia. It is not in our national interest. Mr. President, 
listen to the people of this country. Do not send our troops into 
harm's way. It is going to be a tragic mistake.
  Mr. President, you demonstrated against Vietnam and you are about to 
put us in another situation in another part of the world that is not in 
our national interest. Do not make this mistake. A lot of young people 
are going to die. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said 
very clearly there are going to be casualties, there are going to be 
deaths. It need not happen, Mr. President.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Everett). All Members are reminded to 
address their remarks to the Chair and not the President.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this resolution, I rise 
today in strong support.
  The measure we are considering states clearly that there should be no 
presumption by any of the parties to the Bosnian peace negotiations 
that United States troops should be deployed to Bosnia to participate 
in peacekeeping operations without congressional consent.
  I am strongly opposed to the deployment of United States ground 
troops to Bosnia. I believe there are ways that our Nation can and 
should help end the bloodshed there. Indeed, we have already played a 
major military and diplomatic role, and we will soon be hosting peace 
negotiations. The United States ought to continue to provide air, sea, 
intelligence, and logistical support to NATO forces in Bosnia. This is 
a significant contribution.
  But the fact of the matter is that none of the combatants view the 
United States as a neutral party, which is essential to playing an 
effective peacekeeping role. The administration is attempting to put 
our forces on the ground under much the same circumstances that our 
Marines found themselves in Lebanon in 1983. We should have learned 
from that tragic experience.
  Even if we are not targeted because of someone's belief that we are 
biased, I can easily see one or more of the combatants staging attacks 
on U.S. personnel designed to look like another party was responsible. 
They know that the United States has the ability to impose serious 
damage on any perceived aggressor. They will target our troops in the 
hope of drawing us into striking hard at one of their adversaries. In 
Bosnia today this is not even a matter of slipping undetected past 
enemy lines to launch a false attack; as Canadian Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, 
the former commander of UNPROFOR, told the National Security Committee 
in hearings this month, it is more likely to be accomplished by simple 
bribery.
  Mr. Speaker, the President must know that the Congress has grave 
reservations about the deployment of our troops to Bosnia. It is my 
strong hope that this vote will succeed in focusing his attention on 
the level of concern that resides in the Congress and lead him to 
rethink his policies.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strongest opposition to this ill-
conceived and flawed resolution. I wish to outline for may colleagues 
the reasons for my strong opposition.


            A flawed process for considering this resolution

  First, serious procedural irregularities along justify rejection of 
this resolution. Mr. Speaker, the difference between a democracy and an 
authoritarian regime lies principally in the procedural rules that are 
followed to reach decisions. In a democracy we have rules that assure 
that full, open and fair discussion and consideration are given to an 
issue before a decision is taken.
  With great fanfare the Republican majority in this House adopted 
rules at the beginning of this Congress that were supposed to bring 
greater democracy to the House of Representatives. In practice, 
however, the Republican majority flaunts these rules and procedures. 
Today, we are considering this resolution on Bosnia without following 
House rules that call for committee deliberation before legislation is 
considered. We are supposed to have proper consultation with the 
minority before issues are placed upon the House calendar. None of 
these rules has been followed in this case.
  Mr. Speaker, this resolution has not even been considered by the 
Committee on International Relations--the committee which has principal 
jurisdiction. The International Relations Committee and the National 
Security Committee have each held one initial hearing with the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those two hearings were held last week. There 
has been no committee consideration at all of this specific resolution.
  There has been no opportunity for the administration to review the 
text and make its position on this resolution known to the Congress.
  The resolution itself was only added to the schedule late on Friday 
of last week, and until late this afternoon, we did not even have a 
resolution number or a text of the resolution to review. This is hardly 
the way a serious deliberative legislative body should be considering 
major issues of foreign policy and national security. The total of 40 
minutes allocated for consideration of this resolution this afternoon 
hardly can be regarded as adequate deliberation of an issue of this 
importance.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this is not the first such flagrant 
breach of the rules of this body. Last week the House also considered 
legislation moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. That 
bill was brought to the floor without committee hearings or committee 
consideration. While I strongly agreed with that legislation, I cannot 
agree to the blatant abuse of power and the flagrant ignoring of 
procedure by the Republic leadership. Later today we will see yet 
another such example when the House Rules Committee will present a 
completely closed rule on the legislative branch appropriations bill.
  If such a egregious violation of the rules of the House had taken 
place under a Democratic majority in this body, the shrieks of outrage 
from my distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle would 
still be echoing. This is the wrong way to conduct the serious business 
of the United States. These procedures are reminiscent of the regimes 
whose overthrow we celebrated just 5 years ago.


   the text of this resolution is fundamentally flawed and factually 
                               inaccurate

  Second, Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this resolution because it is 
flawed; it is a document that simply boggles the mind. It puts the 
House on record as making a statement of the views of this House that 
is blatantly and completely inaccurate. The resolution says that 
``there should not be a presumption, and it should not be considered to 
be a prerequisite to the successful conclusion of such a negotiation, 
that enforcement of such an agreement will involve deployment of United 
States Armed Forces on the ground'' in Bosnia.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is such a presumption, and this 
resolution can and will do nothing to change that presumption. The 
truce agreement that was negotiated with the involvement of the United 
States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, as well as the parties to 
the conflict--the Bosnian Government, the Croatian Government, the 
Serbian Government, and representatives of the Bosnian Serbs--agreed to 
participate in the peace negotiations that are to begin later this week 
in Ohio because they received assurances that the United States and 
other partners would participate in a peace-keeping force.
  If the House passes this resolution, it does not change that fact. To 
call black white or to call white black does not make it so--even if it 
is done by a resolution of the U.S. House of Representatives.


the purpose of this resolution is to undermine the president's ability 
                       to conduct foreign policy

  Third, the purpose of this resolution is to undermine the President's 
authority to conduct foreign policy. No final peace agreement is in 
place. The President and his representatives who are dealing with the 
festering problem of Bosnia have made clear in public hearings with 
members of this body and with members of the Senate as well as in 
numerous public statements that no American troops will be sent to 
Bosnia until and unless a peace agreement has been negotiated and 
accepted by the parties in question. Clearly we have not reached that 
point. The negotiations are not to begin until Wednesday and they will 
take some time to conclude, U.S. troops will not be a question until a 
peace agreement has been reached.
  This resolution today is clearly intended to undermine the 
President's ability to deal with the problem of Bosnia. It is an effort 
to prevent the possible commitment of U.S. troops at some time in the 
future, regardless of the conditions under which they might be sent. It 
is an irresponsible and reckless effort to raise doubts in the minds of 
the participants in the peace negotiations and ultimately to undermine 
these negotiations.
  This resolution is being rushed through the House in stark contrast 
to the way in which the Congress considered the involvement of 

[[Page H 11407]]
U.S. troops in the gulf war. On that occasion, President George Bush 
sent 500,000 American troops to Saudi Arabia. These were not troops on 
a sight-seeking expedition; these were troops which were positioned on 
the borders of Kuwait with the clear intention of preventing an Iraqi 
invasion of Saudi Arabia. They were in harms way; they were in danger. 
The Congress considered the use of U.S. troops in the gulf area in 
numerous hearings and in numerous meetings with administration 
officials. When the President and his advisors had clearly defined the 
scope of what was intended in that conflict, the Congress was asked to 
consider the use of United States troops against Iraq. The House and 
Senate debated that issue for 2 full days, and then voted to authorize 
the use of U.S. troops.
  The House of Representatives should reject this present ill-
considered resolution because this is the wrong time to consider such 
an issue. The resolution is poorly worded and is solely intended to 
undermine the President's authority to conduct our Nation's foreign 
policy.


   this resolution articulates the wrong policy for the united states

  Fourth, Mr. Speaker, the resolution before us today articulates the 
wrong policy for the United States to follow. We are considering this 
resolution because 4 years ago the previous administration, in an 
incomprehensible and excusable fashion, failed to provide NATO the 
leadership that is now being provided. Let no one make a mistake about 
this. The 200,000 dead would still be alive. The million refugees would 
not now be refugees, but would be living in their homes. And the viable 
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious community of Bosnia would 
continue to be a thriving community. It is important, Mr. Speaker, to 
realize that we did not just arrive at this point yesterday.
  it is vitually important for the United States to show leadership 
within NATO. As we have seen so clearly, NATO works when the United 
States exercises leadership. It is essential for the United States role 
in Europe and in the world that we exercise leadership. If we had shown 
the leadership 4 years ago, as I said earlier, we would not be facing 
the problems that we now face. Now that the administration is pursuing 
a policy that demonstrates U.S. leadership, it is important that we not 
undermine that effort.
  I am one of those--and we are a vanishing breed--that does believe 
that politics should stop at the water's edge. I was one of the handful 
of Democrats in this House to support President Bush on the uses of 
U.S. troops in the Gulf war. It is my sincere hope that our Republican 
colleagues will also see fit to support a Democratic President who is 
pursuing the correct course of action.
  Mr. Speaker, for all of these reasons, I urge my colleagues to reject 
the resolution before us today.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 247, 
sponsored by Congressman Steve Buyer, an able member of the House 
National Security Committee.
  This resolution represents a sensible approach to a fast-moving, 
complex situation. It neither infringes upon the President's powers nor 
ties his hands in upcoming negotiations. At the same time, it preserves 
congressional prerogatives that ought to be carefully guarded.
  This resolution represents an attempt by the House to put the 
administration on notice that it has failed to make the case for its 
proposed course of action. It also makes it clear that the 
administration's prior commitment of United States ground forces as a 
critical element underpinning a proposed peace agreement in the former 
Yugoslavia is an inappropriate and questionable premise for the 
upcoming negotiations in Dayton.
  To date, the administration has advanced a number of arguments as to 
why the United States must provide ground troops in enforcing any peace 
agreement in Bosnia, but all of them seem to raise more questions than 
they answer.
  For instance, the administration has failed to answer the basic 
question of how American forces can serve as neutral implementors of a 
peace agreement among parties that view the United States neither 
neutrally nor impartially. We crossed the line of impartiality in 
Bosnia quite some time ago by resorting to the effective use of force 
to compel the conditions that may now actually yield a cease-fire and a 
peace accord.

  However, it is those capabilities and actions that the United States 
was uniquely suited to contribute that are also the reason why we are 
uniquely unsuited to serve as neutral peacekeepers. The first rule of 
peacekeeping is ``take no sides, make no enemies.'' As a result of the 
application of airpower over the past several months, we have violated 
the conditions that would permit us to safely and effectively deploy as 
peacekeepers.
  In response, the administration has advanced a number of alternative 
arguments. First, we are told that European stability is in the 
balance. Indeed, Secretary Christopher has not been bashful about 
invoking the specters of this century's world wars and the role of 
``the Balkan tinderbox'' in igniting those conflicts. But badly parsed 
history is not a substitute for hard analysis. There are no great 
powers ready to go to war over the Balkans, as there were in 1914. And 
we've been threatened with the prospect of a wider war now for several 
years--although it has not occurred. There is a strong burden of proof 
on those who argue that now, when at last the Balkans are moving toward 
something like a more natural balance of power, is the moment of 
greatest danger.
  A second argument we have heard is that NATO solidarity is at stake. 
But many of the wounds inflicted upon the Atlantic alliance can be 
traced to inconsistent policy in Bosnia from both past and present 
administrations. These inconsistent policies have undermined any 
previous hopes for a cessation of hostilities in Bosnia without 
offering sustained leadership. And one may reasonably ask whether the 
solidarity of NATO--still our greatest strategic alliance--even ought 
to be put at risk to bring peace to the Balkans. The most important 
future test of NATO solidarity will come over the alliance's expansion. 
But if relations are being soured through mismanagement or mischance 
relative Bosnia, NATO will have been broken in pursuit of a secondary 
issue.

  A third concern we hear concerns American credibility. Again, this 
must be regarded as a self-inflicted wound. Our President took office 
at the unipolar moment, with American global power unchallenged after 
victories of the Gulf war and the cold war. Now we are told America 
must salvage its credibility by bringing peace to the Balkans; how far 
have we fallen? And, more profoundly, what lessons will other nations 
draw about an America that has trouble distinguishing what is, and what 
is not, a vital national security interest.
  Finally, we have been told that there will be no peace without 
American participation on the ground. This suggests that the warring 
parties don't have much genuine interest in making peace. Knowing that 
American participation will only last 1 year is more likely than not to 
undermine whatever commitment to peace they may have. Advertising, in 
advance, the short-term duration of any American ground presence in 
Bosnia may only undermine the mission and endanger American lives.
  Mr. Speaker, in sum, this resolution is a manifestation of the 
growing concerns over unanswered questions concerning the 
administration's Bosnia policy. I believe it is the least we can do at 
this point, as we continue to work through the many important issues 
associated with the President's plan to send over 20,000 Americans into 
the Balkans.
  Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 247, to 
express the House of Representatives' sense that we not rush into the 
midst of the Balkan quagmire without careful and measured congressional 
consideration. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of importance to 
Europe and to the world. But, as long-time observers of the Balkans 
will note, peace has never come easily to this troubled corner of the 
globe.
  The ability of the Congress to conduct a national debate on questions 
of national interest is unparalleled. Look no further than the 
congressional debate of January 11-12, 1991, on the eve of the Persian 
Gulf war. Congress, and the Nation, debated whether the national 
interest called for deployment of military force against Iraq. Without 
that debate, Congress would have abrogated its constitutional 
responsibilities to give assent and legal authority to the President to 
meet his own constitutional responsibilities. I participated in that 
debate--a debate that I then believed, and today confirm, was 
absolutely vital to a successful U.S. mission.
  I have grave reservations about the need for United States troops in 
the Balkans. The mission of 25,000 U.S. troops and up to 80,000 NATO 
troops is uncertain. The commitment of the warring parties to live in 
peace is questionable. Debate on those questions, however, is for 
another day--another day soon, I would hope. Today, the question is on 
whether that debate should happen at all--whether the Congress should 
debate the United States national interest in the Balkans. The Congress 
can do no less. Support House Resolution 247.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the administration--
President Clinton--is taking an active leadership role in working to 
resolve the terrible conflict in the Balkans. I agree with many of my 
colleagues and the administration that we have reached a historical, 
defining moment in finding an effective strategy to the peace process. 
Together, the United States and the international community is resolved 
to press for an equitable, negotiated settlement between the parties to 
end this terrible war. I applaud the President for unequivocally 
demanding and working for this peace and for exercising strong U.S. 
leadership to realize it. 

[[Page H 11408]]

  This dreadful conflict in the former Yugoslavia will not solve 
itself. Much is at stake. This conflict is a threat to our interests in 
the region: It undermines European stability, our efforts to promote 
democracy and fee markets, respect for human rights, and ethnic and 
religious tolerance. The war threatens to spread to other countries. I 
have visited the region, and can speak firsthand of the severe 
repression, the systematic rape, beatings, torture, and persecution of 
the non-Serbian ethnic populations by the Serbs. The torrent of 
inhumanity is numbing. Not since Nazi Germany has the presence of 
genocide been so apparent, or the need to stop it been so pressing.
  Up until very recently, we have acted cautiously, and to my mind, too 
carefully throughout this war. This Congress, on August 1, by voting 
the arms embargo on the Bosnians, made a strong statement of support 
for strong United States leadership and intervention in the process 
toward peace in the region. Now, because of U.S. leadership and 
effective diplomacy, we have a cease-fire and a real chance to mediate 
a peace. What works is when this Government is willing to back up 
diplomacy with action--and that is what I see us doing now. The Serbs 
did not respect the U.N. safe havens, the embargoes failed, the U.N. 
peacekeepers were routinely fired upon and even taken hostage. The idea 
of peace talks were only taken seriously by the Serbs when NATO bombed 
Serbian heavy artillery sites and this was coupled with hardnosed 
negotiating by our diplomats. We have lost good men--diplomats who lost 
their lives in the pursuit of this peace. We are serious about helping 
all of the parties reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict. And, 
the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians now recognize that they have an 
overriding interest in finding a peaceful settlement.
  Now is the time to take these actions that can lead to peace and not 
to preclude the necessity of providing troops to the region. Without 
U.S. leadership there will be no peace. Thank you. I urge you to vote 
against any bill that would harm this historical opportunity for peace 
in Bosnia.
  Mr. Roemer. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this important resolution, 
I firmly support House Resolution 247 in the interest of keeping the 
Congress and the American people fully involved in any decision 
regarding U.S. troop deployment. The presence of United States troops 
in Bosnia should not be a precondition to peace. Furthermore, no U.S. 
troops should be deployed to enforce a peace agreement until the 
Congress has enacted such a measure into law.
  A deployment of American troops to Bosnia would be a major long-term 
commitment of our military personnel. It is our responsibility to 
debate this.
  Last Week, Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili briefed 
Congress on the administration's deployment plan. After hearing their 
testimony, it is evident that the plan is developing into a situation 
which could cost lives. The American military position on this should 
be clear--are the troops keeping the peace or making a peace? What are 
the rules of engagement for our troops? What is our national interest 
in this region of the world?
  Congress must have a stronger vice in whether our Armed Forces are 
deployed overseas to engage in foreign conflicts, particularly in 
peacekeeping situations. We should assert our constitutional authority 
before American lives are put at risk in Bosnia. Congress should have 
the opportunity to approve a troop commitment to the Balkans before the 
first soldier sets foot in Bosnia. A Bosnian Deployment would be a 
major long-term commitment of American military personnel. It should 
not be done without a debate and a vote in Congress.
  We all agree that current policy has not worked and it is clear that 
we cannot accept the status quo. The killings continue while the number 
of refugees increases. The efforts of NATO, the United Nations, and the 
United States have not worked.
  Introducing as many as 25,000 troops into the Bosnian conflict would 
severely intensify the situation, and immerse the United States in 
training and logistic operations for the foreseeable future. 
Intensified fighting will certainly risk a wider conflict in the 
Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. We have 
worked hard to contain the conflict within Bosnia, and we have seen 
very limited success to date. However, if the fighting spreads as a 
result of our decision to escalate with the presence of troops, it will 
be our responsibility to deal with the consequences of our 
interference. If the conflict spreads to other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, then other regional powers are likely 
to get involved, which is likely to damage the entire European security 
structure.
  The majority of Americans are opposed to United States ground troops 
in Bosnia for a variety of reasons, and Congress should not be willing 
to overlook the concerns of our European allies who have the most to 
lose in an escalated conflict. American troops will be symbolic targets 
for those who oppose peace or the partition of Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, I voted earlier this year against lifting the arms 
embargo for the same reason that I support House Resolution 247: to 
prevent the Americanization of the Bosnian conflict and the loss of 
American lives. I strongly urge all of my colleagues to support this 
resolution.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the resolution 
regarding sending United States troops to the former Yugoslavia. The 
language makes a simple statement: no United States ground forces 
should be employed in Bosnia to enforce a future peace agreement until 
the Congress has approved such a deployment, nor should United States 
negotiators assume that United States forces will be committed. The 
constitutional principle is simple and sound: before the Nation commits 
its young men and women into foreign military adventures, Congress must 
act to authorize their presence.
  I am appalled by the destruction and loss of life that has taken 
place over the past several years in the former Yugoslavia. Tens of 
thousands of people have been killed in the fighting and more than a 
million made homeless.
  There are no easy answers to the bitter ethnic divisions in the 
region. As with any negotiating process, no solution will prove 
effective until the various military factions stand ready for a 
peaceful solution. It is my sincere hope that recent developments will 
move all sides in the conflict to a lasting ceasefire and eventual 
peace. I support U.S. efforts in facilitating the negotiations toward 
this goal.
  However, I remain skeptical about the use of U.S. troops to enforce a 
peaceful solution in a conflict that has been raging for well over 700 
years. We have seen all too often how placing U.S. soldiers into a 
conflict--even with the best of intentions--can easily become a 
nightmare for our country. Just as important, United States military 
presence in Bosnia could become merely a target for both sides to vent 
their anger.
  Although I welcome and support this resolution, it is my hope that 
Congress will take a more universal approach to its constitutional 
role. For more than 40 years, Congress has allowed the Executive to 
continuously broaden its authority to put U.S. troops into harm's way. 
Congress' exclusive constitutional authority to initiate war is 
routinely ignored by Congress and Presidents alike.
  Unfortunately, the current War Powers Resolution implicitly grants 
broad authority to the President to engage in wars of any size without 
advance congressional authorization. It requires the President to come 
to Congress only after he has put the prestige of our Nation and the 
lives of its soldiers on the line.
  I have introduced a joint resolution (H.J. Res. 95) that seeks to 
reform the War Powers Resolution. The House of Representatives to 
address the balance of presidential and congressional authority to make 
war. Indeed, the Constitution demands the collective judgment of the 
President and Congress on the grave question of war. The time is ripe 
for a congressional debate on the need to restore the balance of powers 
between the Executive and Legislature as envisioned by the Framers of 
the Constitution.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, hearings have not been held on House 
Resolution 247. The chief participant in the Bosian peace negotiations, 
the administration, has not been consulted on House Resolution 247. The 
American public has not had the opportunity to discuss House Resolution 
247 with their Representatives. Common sense tells me that evaluating 
the merits of a resolution--before passing it--is an essential step in 
crafting good legislation.
  Under the cover of night, hidden away in a back room of the Capitol 
late last Friday, Newt Gingrich and his Republicans decided, once 
again, to abuse the legislative process for political purposes. This 
time they are risking peace in Bosnia with their behavior.
  Simply put, the Republican leadership has crafted a political 
document. They are rushing it to the floor without proper 
consideration. If we are to interfere legislatively with the peace 
process, let's at least proceed with proper legislative process. Let's 
have hearings, let's let the people hear the administration and others, 
and let's hear from the people. None of this has been done.
  I wish Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President 
Franjo Tudjman, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher Godspeed in the negotiations. Their efforts 
can make the world a safer place, and can return peace and democracy to 
a desperately troubled area.
  There will be a time when it is appropriate for Congress to enter the 
peace process. That time is not now--this resolution is not how. With 
serious constitutional and territorial questions for Bosnia hanging in 
the balance of the Dayton negotiations, Congress should not charge into 
the middle of the process demanding that all parties bend to our will, 
or weaken our President's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement.

[[Page H 11409]]

  I do not oppose this resolution on its merits. Peace, with 
congressional approval, is good. Military deployment, with 
congressional approval, is good. I oppose the resolution because of the 
process in which it is being considered. No hearings, no committee 
consideration, no adequate debate, or discussion.
  Let us allow the negotiators to negotiate. If and when they are able 
to come to an agreement for peace in Bosnia, then let the Congress 
judge the merits of that settlement.
  And in the meantime, let us process important business like this in a 
proper legislative fashion.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.
  The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Gilman] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the 
resolution, House Resolution 247.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

                          ____________________