[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 169 (Monday, October 30, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2064-E2065]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               SECRETARY WEINBERGER SEES   B-2'S STRENGTHS

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                     HON. RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Monday, October 30, 1995

  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, among the many budget issues that 
Congress continues to work on is our effort to revitalize our national 
security. In these tight budgetary times, every spending decision we 
make must be cost and benefit justified.
  The following commentary, written by former Secretary of Defense 
Caspar W. Weinberger in the November 6, 1995, issue of Forbes magazine, 
provides some of the many outstanding arguments for our Nation to 
continue to fund the B-2 Stealth Bomber Program. As Secretary 
Weinberger notes, ``few people understand just how good, how 
revolutionary, this stealth bomber is.'' That said, I recommend that 
all of my colleagues in the 

[[Page E 2065]]
House and Senate read this piece, and consider the value and benefit 
that the B-2 offers our national defense.

                  [From Forbes magazine, Nov. 6, 1995]

                       Keep the B-2 Program Alive

                         (By Caspar Weinberger)

       Whether to continue production of the B-2 stealth bomber, 
     the world's most advanced aircraft, is an issue that creates 
     strange alliances. Many proponents of a strong defense favor 
     terminating the B-2 program, leaving us with only the 20 
     aircraft already paid for. A second group favor making the 
     required expenditures now (roughly $500 million) that would 
     enable us to resume production of the B-2 should 
     international conditions require it. This would be far less 
     expensive than closing the production line and having to 
     start it up later. A third group, small in number, believe we 
     need more B-2s and should continue production on a low-level 
     scale.
       The second group's approach is the most reasonable, 
     practical and necessary. The B-2--the world's only stealth 
     bomber--is, as even one of its strongest opponents admits, 
     ``a technological marvel . . .widely praised by our highest-
     ranking military leaders.'' But few people seem to understand 
     just how good, how revolutionary, this stealth bomber is and 
     what it adds to our ability to keep peace and freedom.
       Of course, the word ``stealth'' does not mean the plane is 
     invisible. But when the B-2 is at high altitudes, where it 
     flies when delivering nuclear or conventional bombs, it is 
     virtually impossible for any existing or projected defense 
     system to detect it on radar, and it therefore is 
     invulnerable. Two B-2s with a total crew of four can deliver 
     a bombload which, if dropped from conventional planes, would 
     put the lives of 132 crewmen at risk. In the Gulf war's first 
     hours, 45 sorties by stealth fighter F-117s struck almost as 
     many Iraqi targets as did 850 sorties by conventional 
     aircraft. In the first 24 hours of Desert Storm, we sent 
     1,263 conventional aircraft to strike 144 major targets. 
     Thirty-two B-2s could have attacked the same number of 
     targets-- and more effectively because of precision 
     weaponry--in less time.
       The debate turns on whether we need this astonishing 
     capability now that the Cold War is over. Senator John McCain 
     (R-Ariz.), a skilled and effective advocate of a strong 
     defense, believes that we no longer need a ``large fleet of 
     stealthy, long-range, nuclear delivery aircraft.'' He also 
     views aircraft carriers, submarines and other weapons as 
     better serving our national security needs because they are 
     ``visible, forward-deployed forces,'' enabling us to ``put 
     our capability on peaceful display''--a good deterrent in and 
     of itself. McCain makes the point that, although the B-2 can 
     carry conventional weapons, having it do so is not cost-
     effective at a fixed price of $556 million per aircraft. Each 
     additional B-2 will use scarce defense budget funds, 
     precluding necessary modernization and replacements for the 
     trucks, tanks, other aircraft, artillery and ships that will 
     be needed shortly. These are understandable, reasonable 
     arguments.
       It seems to me, however, that events over the last several 
     years have demonstrated conclusively that we are going to 
     need the B-2's capabilities. The Gulf war exemplifies why we 
     need to be able to project our military power over vast 
     distances quickly and effectively. It would be nice--but 
     scarcely safe--to believe that there will be no more Gulf 
     wars or events that will require such capabilities. But, for 
     example, we are committed to the defense of two other 
     potential hotspots: Taiwan and South Korea. Should the U.S. 
     be called into action, the B-2 would be extremely useful. It 
     serves us well to remember that the more strength we have, 
     the less likely it is that we will have to use it.
       In any event, the ultimate question of whether we need to 
     buy more than the already-ordered B-2s need not be decided 
     now. What we do need now is the option to acquire more later 
     and the ability to exercise that option without the 
     staggering costs of restarting production. If we terminate 
     the B-2 production line now, we virtually preclude securing 
     any more of those remarkable aircraft in the future.
       We should instead agree to use the funds in the Defense 
     appropriations bill to procure some of the parts necessary 
     from the B-2's nearly 3,400 suppliers, thereby keeping the 
     line open for later low-level production. General John Loh, 
     former commander of our Air Combat Command, sums it up well: 
     ``I see the B-2 as the centerpiece of . . . [a] strategy that 
     places increasing importance on projecting immediate, 
     responsive power from the U.S. to a regional crisis anywhere 
     in the world.''

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