[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 164 (Monday, October 23, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15496-S15499]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. BREAUX:
  S. 1354. A bill to approve and implement the OECD Shipbuilding Trade 
Agreement; to the Committee on Finance.


                  THE SHIPBUILDING TRADE AGREEMENT ACT

 Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I introduce legislation to approve 
and implement the Agreement Respecting Normal Competitive Conditions in 
the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, also known as the OECD 
Shipbuilding Agreement. While not perfect, this agreement appears to be 
our last best chance to eliminate unfair subsidies, to counter 
injurious pricing policies, to reign in trade distorting export 
financing, and to institute an effective binding dispute settlement 
system for shipbuilding controversies. Because of this agreement, for 
the first time, U.S. shipyard workers will have safeguards against 
having to compete with continued funding from foreign treasuries.
  My involvement with the issue of unfair foreign shipbuilding 
practices relates to my State of Louisiana being one of the premier 
shipbuilding States in the country. Over 27,000 Louisiana jobs are 
impacted by constructing or repairing ships. As has been the case 
nationwide, Louisiana's shipbuilding employment has suffered 
significantly since the 1980's. This situation is due to U.S. defense 
downsizing and to unfair foreign shipbuilding practices. Since 1989, 
I've been actively working to eliminate unfair foreign shipbuilding 
practices and to restore the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry.
  How did the United States get in this dilemma? From 1974 to 1987, 
worldwide overall demand for ocean going vessels declined 71 percent. 
During the same time span, United States merchant vessel construction 
dropped drastically from an average of 72 ships/year to an average of 
21 ships/year. Also during this period governments in all the major 
shipbuilding nations, with the exception of the United States, 
dramatically increased aid to their shipyards and their associated 
infrastructure with massive levels of subsidies in virtually every 
form.
  The U.S. Government, however, decided to unilaterally terminate 
commercial construction subsidies to U.S. yards. Instead, U.S. Defense 
shipbuilding increased. U.S. Defense shipbuilding construction rose 
from an average of 79 ships/year in the 1970's to an average of 95 
ships/year in the 1980's. The net result was a virtual abandonment by 
the large U.S. Defense yards to subsidized foreign yards of the 
international commercial shipbuilding market. In 10 years, the number 
of major U.S. shipyards producing only commercial ships declined from 
11 to 1.
  The end of the 1980's saw a Department of Defense reevaluation of the 
need for a 600-ship navy. It also saw the U.S. shipbuilding industry 
reevaluate its need to compete for commercial ship construction orders 
in a subsidized world market. Consequently, in June of 1989, the U.S. 
shipbuilding industry, 

[[Page S 15497]]
represented by the Shipbuilders Council of America, filed a claim for 
injurious unfair subsidies under section 301 of the U.S. trade laws 
against the major shipbuilding countries of the world.
  Later that year, however, U.S. Trade Ambassador Carla Hills, 
persuaded the industry that a better way to eliminate the foreign 
subsidies was through multilateral negotiations. Industry decided to 
give international negotiations a chance and therefore withdrew its 
section 301 claim. The 5-year OECD quest to eliminate shipbuilding 
subsidies had begun.
  From late 1989 to late 1994, the OECD negotiations were constantly on 
again and off again. During 1993, when the talks had seemingly 
collapsed, I introduced a bill in the Senate (S. 990) and Congressman 
Sam Gibbons introduced a bill in the House (H.R. 1402), that would have 
invoked significant sanctions against ships constructed in foreign 
subsidized yards when those ships called upon the United States. This 
legislation became unnecessary when the agreement was finally signed.
  From June 1989 until the present agreement was signed on December 21, 
1994, the U.S. objective and the industry's urgent request appeared to 
be straightforward: ``Eliminate subsidies and we can compete.'' When 
the Clinton administration came into office, to its credit, it proposed 
a shipyard revitalization plan. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Don 
Phillips described the nature of the plan for the Senate Finance 
Committee Trade Subcommittee on November 18, 1993 when he said:

       Finally, this five-point program is a transitional program, 
     consistent with federal assistance to other industries 
     seeking to convert from defense to civilian markets. In 
     addition, it seeks to support, not undercut, the negotiations 
     that are currently underway in the OECD. In this regard, we 
     have made clear our intention to modify this program, as 
     appropriate, so that it would be consistent with the 
     provision of a multilateral agreement--if and when such an 
     agreement enters into force. (emphasis added).

  Now we have such an agreement, but the largest U.S. Defense shipyards 
don't want it because current U.S. transitional subsidies will need to 
be curbed, as well as additional future subsidies prohibited, in order 
to be consistent with the agreement. This is really the issue in a 
nutshell. We can talk about the Jones Act, we can talk about the 
trustworthiness of other countries, we can talk about the adequacy of 
enforcement mechanisms, but what it really seems to come down to for 
these big shipyards is whether or not we can keep our currently 
advantageous subsidies.
  In all the comments I have heard to date about this agreement, I have 
yet to hear of a scenario whereby U.S. industry is better off fighting 
unfair foreign shipbuilding practices without the agreement than it 
would be with the agreement. For example, this agreement will give us 
real tools to fight unfair French subsidies. It will allow us to 
counter unfair dumping of ships by Japan and Korea. It will finally 
plug the gap in existing U.S. trade laws that has cost so many American 
shipyard workers their jobs.
  The assertions that this agreement somehow puts the Jones Act 
domestic build provisions in jeopardy is discredited by our own Jones 
Act carriers who stand to lose the most under a faulty agreement. The 
largest Jones Act carriers, in fact, support the agreement and they 
clearly would not if this agreement hurt their interests--it does not. 
In addition, many of the new shipbuilding orders that have been placed 
at U.S. shipyards are for use in the Jones Act trade.
  It also seems that the optimism over the current success of our title 
XI financing program may be overstated. As I understand it, the new 
export orders associated with the current title XI program exist 
because our stepped-up title XI program is currently protected by a 
standstill clause in the OECD agreement. If we reject the agreement, we 
lose the standstill clause, and consequently it seems to reason that we 
will lose our current title XI advantage. While I recognize the need to 
conform our title XI program, I am willing to explore the continuation 
of current title XI terms, subject to reasonable due diligence 
negotiations, to the date that we implement the terms of the agreement.
  Unless we are prepared to win a long-term subsidies race with our 
competitors, I don't understand how we can reject this agreement. Not 
only is Congress faced with dire budgetary decisions, such as cutting 
over $450 billion from Medicare and Medicaid over the next 7 years, but 
the Department of Defense has also indicated that it will not fund 
commercial shipbuilding subsidies through its DOD accounts.
  Add heightened competition due to increasing world shipbuilding 
capacity and it seems to me, and history supports, that our competitors 
are very likely to match or exceed what little amounts we will be able 
to devote to title XI. It was estimated by the Shipbuilding Council in 
1993 that the top six subsidizing nations in the OECD were budgeting 
over $9 billion on average each year to assist their shipyards. We may 
then find ourselves in the same untenable situation that confronted our 
industry in 1981: No international subsidies disciplines, inadequate 
U.S. trade remedies, and no recourse for the U.S. commercial 
shipbuilding industry and its workers.
  Mr. President, we're all in the same boat, so to speak. However, 
before anyone attempts to scuttle this agreement to help revise our 
U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry, I'd like to redouble efforts 
with all members of the industry to see what we can do to close the 
remaining competitiveness gap. Our goal should be to couple the 
significant advantages of this agreement with genuine and creative 
improvements in U.S. shipbuilding competitiveness.
  With this in mind, I am introducing the Shipbuilding Trade Agreement 
Act. The text of this bill closely reflects an administration draft 
that we have attempted to improve and strengthen. It is a bipartisan 
work-in-progress bill composed of two titles. Title I contains 
``injurious pricing and countermeasures'' provisions that closely track 
current U.S. antidumping laws, while taking into account the unique 
nature of ship transactions. Title II contains ``other provisions'' 
including amendments to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, repeal of the 
U.S. vessel repair statute for signatory countries, and a special 
monitoring provision to ensure foreign country compliance with the 
terms of the shipbuilding agreement.
  The House Ways and Means trade Subcommittee has already held a 
hearing on this agreement. I understand the subcommittee is currently 
making final revisions to the same USTR draft that we used and intends 
to introduce a bill in the House shortly. It is my hope that the House 
can move its bill quickly in order that both legislative bodies might 
pass a bill and send it to the President for signature before year-end. 
I have requested a full committee hearing on this Senate bill with the 
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Commerce Committee Surface 
Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee Chairman Trent Lott has 
also indicated interest in holding a hearing on the agreement.
  In closing, we stand before a window of opportunity for the U.S. 
commercial shipbuilding industry. The $265 billion commercial 
shipbuilding market is fast approaching its cyclical peak. I am hopeful 
that we will seize this moment and implement this agreement. It may be 
our best and only chance to end foreign shipbuilding subsidies and 
finally five our workers and yards the level playing field for which 
they have asked, and deserved, for too long.
  I also ask unanimous consent that a copy of the October 19, 1995, 
Journal of Commerce editorial supporting the OECD Shipbuilding 
Agreement be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From the Journal of Commerce, Oct. 19, 1995

                           End Ship Subsidies

       Government subsidies have been the mainstay of foreign 
     shipbuilders for decades. That has been a good deal for 
     companies that buy ships but a burden for taxpayers who 
     underwrite the handouts, and a problem for unsubsidized 
     shipyards, including those in the United States.
       Much of this would change under a pending global agreement, 
     which would end most subsidies and give U.S. shipbuilders a 
     better chance to compete. But the agreement is languishing in 
     Congress, a victim mainly of political concerns. After more 
     than six years spent negotiating this deal, lawmakers would 
     be foolish to let it unravel over partisan sniping. Congress 
     should approve it, and soon.

[[Page S 15498]]

       Japan, Korea and Europe dominate the world shipbuilding 
     market, and for years their governments have showered them 
     with financial support. The United States, which ended its 
     direct subsidies in 1981, has been trying for six years to 
     stop the foreign handouts. A deal completed in 1994 would 
     largely do that, and it is scheduled to take effect Jan. 1 
     but only if the major shipbuilding nations ratify it. So far, 
     the United States has not, and the prospects for approval are 
     uncertain.
       Most of the problems are purely political. The shipbuilding 
     agreement's strongest supporter, Rep. Sam Gibbons, is the 
     former Democratic chairman of the House Ways and Means 
     Committee. The new Republican chairman, Rep. Bill Archer, has 
     been cool toward an agreement viewed largely as a Democratic 
     initiative--even though, as a Republican, Mr. Archer should 
     be stumping for any plan that ends government subsidies. 
     Indeed, Mr. Archer might eventually back the agreement, but 
     only if influential Democrats support one of his bills. This 
     is the usual Washington game of political trade-offs, but if 
     a deal isn't struck soon, the pact may not be ratified by the 
     January deadline.
       The other problem is rooted in the White House. The Clinton 
     administration negotiated the shipbuilding agreement and 
     supports it publicly. But several big shipyards oppose it, as 
     do their labor unions. Mr. Clinton, anxious to rebuild his 
     labor base in time for the election, has been careful not to 
     offend unions this year, so the White House hasn't been 
     pushing Congress very hard.
       Mr. Clinton and Republican leaders would do well to look at 
     the larger issue here. Like farming and steel, shipbuilding 
     has been one of the most distorted of international 
     industries. Decisions on where to build ships have been based 
     as much on government subsidies as on quality and 
     workmanship. This has hurt U.S. shipyards, and the agreement 
     would begin to change that.
       Ironically, the biggest U.S. shipyards continue to fight 
     the pact, arguing, instead, for new direct subsidies to help 
     them make up for lost time. That is stunningly shortsighted. 
     Any new subsidy plan by the United states would be matched 
     instantly by other shipbuilding nations. Indeed, other 
     countries most likely would top any U.S. subsidy, as they 
     have before. That would leave U.S. shipbuilders in the same 
     position they've been if for the last 15 years. For that 
     reason, many smaller shipyards, including those with more 
     commercial experience, are supporting the agreement.
       Foreign shipyards, admittedly, have a leg up on their U.S. 
     competitors because of existing subsidies, some of which will 
     not be completely phased out until 1999. But U.S. yards have 
     had their own advantages over the years, including lucrative 
     military work and a government-created monopoly on building 
     ships for the U.S. domestic trades. In fact, commercial ship 
     orders actually have been increasingly lately at U.S. yards. 
     A generous government loan guarantee program has spurred the 
     new orders, and while the program will be scaled back under 
     the new pact, it has given U.S. yards a foot in the door with 
     commercial buyers.
       No trade agreement can ever instantly level the competitive 
     field between nations. Still, the shipbuilding pact gets 
     other countries off the subsidy treadmill and restores some 
     sense to the global market. Leaders of both parties should 
     put aside politics and get this deal done.
                                 ______

      By Mr. DORGAN (for himself, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Levin, 
        Mr. Reid, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Simon, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Kennedy, 
        Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Ford, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. 
        Bumpers, and Mr. Kerry):
  S. 1355. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to end 
deferral for U.S. shareholders on income of controlled foreign 
corporations attributable to property imported into the United States; 
to the Committee on Finance.


          the american jobs and manufacturing preservation act

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we will soon be making a number of tough 
choices on the Senate floor to reduce the Federal deficit. There is one 
choice, however, which should be easy for most of us: eliminating the 
costly and misguided tax subsidy which encourages American firms to 
move abroad and then compete, unfairly, with Main Street businesses in 
the U.S. market.
  That's why I rise today--with 15 of my Senate colleagues--to 
introduce the American Jobs and Manufacturing Preservation Act. It 
repeals a perverse Federal tax incentive which actually encourages many 
of the finest U.S. companies to shut down their manufacturing plants in 
the United States, move them--and the jobs they provide--abroad, and 
then supply the U.S. market from foreign tax havens.
  The often-overlooked loss of our manufacturing jobs is alarming. Yet 
the Federal Government actually rewards U.S. companies that move their 
jobs and capital to foreign tax havens.
  This special tax subsidy is called deferral. The way it works is 
quite simple. If a U.S. company moves an operation abroad, it can defer 
its taxes on the resulting profits until it sends those profits back to 
the United States in the form of dividends. Evidence shows that this 
special tax break costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars in lost 
revenues, and accelerates the movement of U.S. jobs overseas.
  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, about 3 million U.S. 
manufacturing jobs have been lost since 1979. One half of that job loss 
in manufacturing, 1.4 million, occurred between January 1989 and 
September 1993. During this time, the United States lost an average of 
26,000 manufacturing jobs per month. This is the equivalent to shutting 
down one Fortune 500 manufacturing firm per month, for 56 months. While 
there was a short period of job growth in manufacturing in late 1993 
and 1994, there are new and disturbing signs that employment in 
manufacturing is again declining.
  While the United States was losing manufacturing jobs, many foreign 
tax havens were seeing significant increases in jobs creation from U.S. 
owned subsidiaries. For example, while the United States was losing 3 
million manufacturing jobs, the number of jobs with United States based 
companies in Singapore sky-rocketed by 46 percent, or 36,800 jobs. In 
1992, U.S. firms had hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs 
located in tax haven countries.
  The Federal Government has just started to track data to tell us how 
many of the U.S. jobs lost through plant closure moved overseas. 
However, if only half of the plant closings involved these runaway 
plants moving jobs to other countries, this would account for the 
elimination of more than half a million U.S. manufacturing jobs per 
year.
  This legislation is carefully targeted. It would end tax deferral 
only where U.S. multinationals produce abroad in foreign tax havens, 
and then ship those tax haven-produced products back into the United 
States. It is important to note that this bill does nothing to hinder 
U.S. multinationals that produce abroad from competing with foreign 
firms in foreign markets.
  We can hardly be shocked when U.S. companies move jobs overseas--jobs 
which produce goods for U.S. consumption, no less--when we offer a 
special tax break giving them an unfair advantage over U.S. competitors 
to do so. Add the low tax rates and labor costs which foreign 
governments often use to entice U.S. firms to move overseas and it's 
not surprising at all that many companies find the lure to move U.S. 
jobs to foreign countries irresistible.
  Congress should act now both to protect American jobs and to prevent 
any further erosion of our domestic economic base. And I intend to 
offer this legislation as amendment to the budget reconciliation bill 
later this week.
  Some companies may still choose to dislocate thousands of workers in 
America in search of greater profits abroad. But taxpayers should not 
be asked to provide billions of dollars in tax subsidies to encourage 
them to do so.
                                 ______

      By Mr. PRESSLER:
  S. 1356. A bill to amend the Shipping Act of 1984 to provide for 
ocean shipping reform, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


                 the ocean shipping reform act of 1995

 Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a 
summary of the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            Summary of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1995


             elimination of the federal maritime commission

       Under the new legislation the Federal Maritime Commission 
     will be eliminated no later than October 1, 1997. The 
     legislation directs that the existing functions and 
     responsibilities of the Commission should begin to be 
     transferred to the Secretary of Transportation, beginning as 
     soon as practical in fiscal year 1996.


    elimination of tariff enforcement and tariff and contract filing

       On January 1, 1997, tariffs shall no longer be enforced 
     and, on June 1, 1997, all requirements that tariffs and 
     service contracts be 

[[Page S 15499]]
     filed with the federal government are eliminated.


                            common carriage

       On June 1, 1997, a new and separate system for common and 
     contract carriage takes effect. Under the common carriage 
     regime, common carriers and conferences will be required to 
     make available a schedule of transportation rates which shall 
     include the rates, terms, and conditions for transportation 
     services not governed by an ocean transportation contract. 
     Upon the request of any person, the schedule of 
     transportation rates shall be provided to the requesting 
     person in writing. Common carriers and conferences may assess 
     a reasonable charge for providing the schedule in writing; 
     however, the charge may not exceed the cost of providing the 
     information requested. Any disputes concerning the 
     applicability of the rates, terms, and conditions provided, 
     or any claim involving false billing, false classification, 
     false weighing, false report of weight, or false measurement 
     must be decided in State or Federal court.


                           contract carriage

       The new legislation eliminates completely the rules and 
     requirements pertaining to service contracts and establishes 
     a broad and deregulated system of ocean transportation 
     contracts. Under this system, one or more common carriers or 
     a conference may enter into an ocean transportation contract 
     with one or more shippers (as discussed below the definition 
     of shipper has been expanded to include shippers' 
     associations and ocean freight forwarders that accept 
     responsibility for the payment of the ocean freight). The 
     duties of the parties to an ocean transportation contract are 
     limited to the duties specified by the terms of the contract, 
     and ocean transportation contracts may not be challenged on 
     the grounds that the contract violates a provision of the 
     Act. The exclusive remedy for an alleged breach of an ocean 
     transportation contract is an action in State or Federal 
     court.
       Ocean transportation contracts are not required to be filed 
     with the federal government as are service contracts, and on 
     January 1, 1998, such contracts may be made on a confidential 
     basis, upon agreement of the parties. Also effective on 
     January 1, 1998 is a requirement that members of a conference 
     agreement may not be prohibited or restricted from agreeing 
     with one or more shippers that the parties to the contract 
     will not disclose the rates, services, terms, or conditions 
     of that contract to any other member of the agreement, to the 
     conference, to any other carrier, shipper, conference, or to 
     any other third party.


                    independent action on contracts

       On January 1, 1997, authorization is provided to the 
     members of conference agreements to enter individual and 
     independent contracts and, on June 1, 1997, the requirement 
     that conferences may not prohibit or restrict conference 
     members from engaging in individual negotiations for 
     contracts and may not issue mandatory rules affecting 
     individual contracts is implemented. However, a conference 
     may require that a member of the conference disclose the 
     existence of an individual contract or negotiations for a 
     contract when the conference enters negotiations for a 
     contract with the same shipper.


                 independent action on conference rates

       On June 1, 1997, the notice requirements concerning 
     independent action on conference common carriage rates is 
     reduced from 10 calendar days to 3 business days.


                       changes to prohibited acts

       All prohibited acts related to rebating are stricken from 
     the Shipping Act on January 1, 1997, and a new 
     antidiscrimination provision is added that prohibits 
     unreasonable discrimination by one or more common carriers 
     against a person, place, port, or shipper, except when 
     entering ocean transportation contracts.
       On June 1, 1997, several other prohibitions concerning 
     discrimination are stricken as is the restriction on the use 
     of loyalty contracts. However, prohibitions concerning 
     retaliation by carriers, the employment of fighting ships 
     unreasonable refusals to deal, refusals to negotiate with 
     shippers' associations, the acceptance of cargo or contracts 
     with non-licensed and bonded ocean freight forwarders, and 
     improper disclosure of information are retained. The 
     legislation adds a new and controversial prohibited act that 
     prevents conferences from subjecting a person, place, port, 
     class or type of shipper, or ocean freight forwarder, to 
     unjust or unreasonable ocean contract provisions.


                  expansion of the meaning of shipper

       The definition of shipper is expanded to include shippers' 
     associations and ocean freight forwarders that accept 
     responsibility for payment of the ocean freight. One of the 
     primary purposes of this change was to ensure that shippers' 
     associations and ocean freight forwarders could enter ocean 
     transportation contracts under the new contract carriage 
     scheme established by the legislation. This change will also 
     afford certain protections to such entities that 
     traditionally have been limited to shippers.


                    ocean freight forwarders/nvoccs

       The new Act collapses the definition of non-vessel-
     operating common carriers (''NVOCCs'') into the definition of 
     ocean freight forwarders and requires all United States ocean 
     freight forwarders to obtain a license and bond (or other 
     surety). This change effectively eliminates the confusing 
     legal distinctions between various types of third parties who 
     perform similar or related functions.


                      other changes to definitions

       The definitions of certain terms that are no longer 
     relevant or necessary under the new statutory scheme are 
     stricken (i.e. ``deferred rebates,'' ``bulk cargo,'' ``forest 
     products,'' ``loyalty contracts'' and ``service contracts'') 
     and a new definition for ``ocean transportation contracts'' 
     is added.


                     controlled carriers amendments

       All requirements that controlled carriers file tariffs with 
     the FMC are eliminated by the new legislation. Additionally, 
     a new provision is added to this section of the `84 Shipping 
     Act that would expand the application of rate scrutiny to not 
     only controlled carriers but to ``ocean common carriers that 
     have been determined by the Secretary to be structurally or 
     financially affiliated with nontransportation entities or 
     organizations (government or private) in such a way as to 
     affect their pricing or marketplace behavior in an unfair, 
     predatory, or anticompetitive way that disadvantages United 
     States carriers.'' The Secretary may make such a 
     determination upon the request of any person or upon his own 
     motion. This provision has been strongly criticized by many 
     foreign carriers.


                   marine terminal operator schedules

       In order to address concerns raised by the ports and other 
     providers of terminal services relative to the elimination of 
     tariff enforcement, a provision is included in the Act that 
     would require marine terminal operators to make a schedule of 
     rates, regulations, and practices available to the public. 
     This schedule shall be enforceable as an implied contract, 
     without proof of actual knowledge of its provisions, for any 
     activity taken by the operator to-- (1) efficiently transfer 
     property between transportation modes; (2) protect property 
     from damage or loss; (3) comply with any governmental 
     requirement; or (4) store property in excess of the terms of 
     any other contract or agreement, if any, entered into by the 
     marine terminal operator.


 policy regarding foreign governments' ownership and control of ocean 
                            common carriers

       The Secretary of Transportation is required under the Act 
     to implement a negotiation strategy to persuade foreign 
     governments to divest themselves of ownership and control of 
     ocean common carriers. The Secretary must develop and submit 
     such strategy to Congress no later than January 1, 1997.


                            other amendments

       Technical and conforming changes were made to the Penalties 
     section of the 1984 Shipping Act and the Foreign Laws and 
     Practices Act. In addition, the requirement concerning anti-
     rebating certificates is eliminated.

                          ____________________