[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 164 (Monday, October 23, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15463-S15486]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        JERUSALEM EMBASSY RELOCATION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1995

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 1322, which the clerk will 
report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1322) to provide for the relocation of the 
     United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am one of the original cosponsors of this 
legislation and would like to begin the discussion of the legislation 
until the majority leader and the chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee have an opportunity to come to the floor and make 
their opening statements in support of S. 1322.
  This is historic legislation. It is important legislation, for a 
variety of reasons that affect everyone in this body and, frankly, most 
of the people in this country. It is a strong statement of foreign 
policy implications. It is a strong statement in support of our 
longstanding relationship with the State of Israel.
  I want to begin by describing briefly what the legislation would do 
and what the rationale for the legislation is. The bill begins by 
making a series of findings which report on the history of the status 
of Jerusalem, leading up to some conclusions of policy by the U.S. 
Government. Let me state those conclusions of policy first.
  The bill provides that:

       It is the policy of the United States that--
       Jerusalem should remain an undivided city in which the 
     rights of every ethnic religious group are protected;
       Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State 
     of Israel; and
       the United States Embassy in Israel should be relocated to 
     Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.

  The bill then goes on to provide a mechanism for the President to 
establish, to relocate the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem, and that that 
process would be completed by May 31, 1999. The bill originally 
provided for a beginning date in 1996, but out of deference to concerns 
expressed by the State Department and the President and others, that 
particular provision was taken out of the bill, primarily because, of 
course, the key is the date that the Embassy is opened, not the date 
that we begin construction on a new Embassy or the conversion of the 
existing consulate into a new Embassy.
  Let me now turn to the findings that are stated in this legislation 
and then discuss a little bit of the history of this particular matter:

       Each sovereign nation, under international law and custom, 
     may designate its own capital.

  And that is the first finding that we make.

       Since 1950, the city of Jerusalem has been the capital of 
     the State of Israel.

  The second finding.

       [It is] the seat of Israel's President, Parliament, and 
     Supreme Court, and the site of numerous government ministries 
     and social and cultural institutions.

  That is our third finding.
  In No. 4 we make the point that:

       The city of Jerusalem is the spiritual center of Judaism, 
     and is also considered a holy city by the members of other 
     religious faiths.
       (5) From 1948-1967, Jerusalem was a divided city and 
     Israeli citizens of all faiths as well as Jewish citizens of 
     all states were denied access to holy sites in the area 
     controlled [then] by Jordan.

  The sixth finding of this legislation is that:


[[Page S 15464]]

       In 1967, the city of Jerusalem was reunited during the 
     conflict known as the Six Day War.
       Since 1967, Jerusalem has been a united city administered 
     by Israel, and persons of all religious faiths have been 
     guaranteed full access to holy sites within the city.

  We make a point in finding No. 8 that:

       This year marks the 28th consecutive year that Jerusalem 
     has been administered as a unified city in which the rights 
     of all faiths have been respected and protected.

  We further find:

       In 1990 the Congress unanimously adopted Senate Concurrent 
     Resolution 106, which declares that the Congress, [and I am 
     quoting from the resolution now] ``strongly believes that 
     Jerusalem must remain an undivided city in which the rights 
     of every ethnic religious group are protected.''

  In finding No. 10 we make the point that:

       In 1992, the United States Senate and House of 
     Representatives unanimously adopted Senate Concurrent 
     Resolution 113 of the One Hundred Second Congress to 
     commemorate the 25th anniversary of the reunification of 
     Jerusalem, and reaffirming congressional sentiment that 
     Jerusalem must remain an undivided city.

  Finding No. 11 is that:

       The September 13, 1993, Declaration of Principles on 
     Interim Self-Government Arrangements lays out a timetable for 
     the resolution of ``final status'' issues, including 
     Jerusalem.

  No. 12 is that:

       The agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was 
     signed May 4, 1994, beginning the five-year transitional 
     period laid out in the Declaration of Principles.

  And further, in point No. 13, that:

       In March of 1995, 93 members of the United States Senate 
     signed a letter to the Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
     encouraging ``planning to begin now'' for relocation of the 
     United States Embassy to the city of Jerusalem.
       The United States maintains its embassy in the functioning 
     capital of every country in the world except in the case of 
     our democratic friend and strategic ally, the State of 
     Israel.

  That is the 14th finding of this legislation.
  The 15th finding is to note that:

       The United States conducts official meetings and other 
     business in the city of Jerusalem in de facto recognition of 
     its status as the capital of Israel.

  Finally and importantly we note that:

       In 1996, the State of Israel will celebrate the 3,000th 
     anniversary of the Jewish presence in Jerusalem since King 
     David's entry.

  And, therefore, as a result of these findings, as I say, we declare 
it to be the policy of the United States that:

       Jerusalem should remain an undivided city,
       [2] Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the 
     State of Israel; and
       [3] the United States Embassy in Israel should be relocated 
     to Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.

  As the mechanism for ensuring that this policy is adhered to, and 
that the Embassy is in fact opened on that date or before then, the 
Congress ensures that:

       Not more than 50 percent of the funds appropriated to the 
     Department of State for fiscal year 1999 for ``Acquisition 
     and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad'' may be obligated until 
     the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Congress 
     that the United States Embassy in Jerusalem has officially 
     opened.

  So, Mr. President, that is the essence of this legislation. As I 
said, I think it represents an important milestone in the relationship 
between the United States and Israel, one of the strongest friends of 
the United States, but a State which has its capital in the city of 
Jerusalem and the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv. This legislation 
remedies that and ensures that the new Embassy will open by May 31, 
1999, in Jerusalem.
  Let me go into a little bit more of the history of this, in order to, 
I think, assure everyone of the reasons why this is so important and 
why we need to do it now. The United States Government has refused 
official recognition of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem for various 
reasons since Israel's inception, at first in line with the never 
implemented 1947 U.N. General Assembly partition recommendation for 
western Palestine. U.S. policy supported a special international 
status, corpus separatum, as it was called, for the city of Jerusalem. 
The impractical notion actually appealed to neither the Jews nor the 
Arabs, and in 1948, the Arab Legion conquered east Jerusalem, including 
the old city, as part of the general Arab military offensive to prevent 
Israel from coming into being. Israel retained control over west 
Jerusalem.
  When east Jerusalem was under Arab rule, many Jews were prohibited 
from visiting their holy places and the synagogues in the old city were 
razed and Jewish burial places were desecrated.
  In 1967, as Egypt and Syria moved again toward war with Israel, the 
Israel Government urged King Hussein of Jordan to sit out the fighting 
and promised the territories he controlled would be left alone if he 
did so. The King failed to heed the warning. He attacked Israel and, as 
we all know, in the ensuing fighting he lost east Jerusalem and the 
West Bank.
  Israel, under the Labor Party leadership at the time, declared that 
Jerusalem will remain undivided forever, as Israel's capital, and all 
people will have free access to their holy places.
  Since 1967, the policy and practice of the U.S. Government regarding 
Jerusalem has, unfortunately, been somewhat inconsistent.
  United States officials have often explained our Government's 
unwillingness to recognize Israeli sovereignty over any of Jerusalem on 
the grounds that the city status should be resolved through Arab-
Israeli negotiations, or at that particular moment in time it was 
difficult, if not a good thing to do, in view of the relationships 
existing between the parties at those times.
  On the other hand, our Government has repeatedly said that we do not 
favor redivision of the city. Yet, the State Department makes a point 
of prohibiting United States officials from visiting east Jerusalem 
under Israeli auspices. In other words, for purposes of official visits 
of Jerusalem, the United States Government distinguishes between east 
and west Jerusalem. But as proposals have been made over the years to 
move the United States Embassy to west Jersualem--I note west Jerusalem 
and not east Jerusalem--the State Department refused on the grounds 
that we do not distinguish between east and west Jerusalem, and do not 
recognize anyone's sovereign claims to any of Jerusalem.
  The only thing consistent about United States policy on Jerusalem, 
unfortunately, is its antagonism to Israel's claim there. In my view, 
this policy is unprincipled, notwithstanding the fact that on many 
occasions it was urged in support of positions on which we were 
supporting the Government of Israel. But I still believe, and I think 
one of the reasons for this legislation is, that the policy has not 
been viewed as principled, but rather entirely too pragmatic depending 
upon the circumstances of the time, and that view, in my personal 
opinion, is unworthy of the United States, and, frankly, as I will 
explain later, I believe unhelpful to the cause of peace.
  Notwithstanding the several peace agreements that Israel has signed 
with its neighbors, Arab enemies of the Jewish state continue to insist 
that Israel is not legitimate, that it has no right to exist on what 
they deem to be Arab land. The international community, acting through 
the League of Nations and in the United Nations, based its 
acknowledgement of Jewish people's national rights in Palestine on the 
historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine.
  Though the long war against Zionism and Israel is now checked on the 
military level, it continues on the battlefield of ideas. That is why 
the actions of the United States with regard to a very tangible matter, 
the location of our Embassy, is so very, very important. It matters 
what position the United States takes in this battleground of ideas. 
And in this particular war, Israel's enemies have worked to not 
legitimize Israel, to deny the significance of the historical 
connection that I referred to before between the Jews and Zion, and to 
foster hope that someday Israel, perhaps then abandoned by its friends 
and exhausted by the unremitting hostility and violence of its foes, 
can be made to disappear, first as the Christian Crusaders of the 
Middle Ages wore worn down and ultimately expelled from the Holy Land.
  The belief that Israel's friends are unreliable and Israel's resolve 
is weak is a major impediment to true Arab-Israeli peace. Unrealistic 
expectations on the part of Arab parties about Jerusalem make peace 
harder to achieve.

[[Page S 15465]]

  The Jerusalem Embassy relocation bill aims to close the question of 
United States support for Israel's rights in its own capital. I want to 
restate the point, Mr. President, because it is the critical reason why 
this legislation is brought before the U.S. Senate and the House of 
Representatives at this time. This bill, the Jerusalem Embassy 
relocation bill, aims to close the question of United States support 
for Israel's rights in its own capital. It aims at the heart of the 
legitimacy issue, for Jerusalem is the essence of the historical 
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine. The interest of peace, 
in my view, is not served by anyone thinking that Israel can be divided 
from the United States over the Jerusalem issue. It is an error to 
suppose the United States is more effective diplomatically when we pose 
as a neutral, honest broker between the Israelis and the Arabs seeking 
peace in the region.
  U.S. influence does not derive from any claim of neutrality on our 
part in this particular conflict, although it is important that Arabs 
interested in peace understand the important bona fides of the United 
States in this question of peace. Rather, U.S. influence, I submit, 
derives from our status as a great power, the intensity of our worthy 
convictions, and our loyalty to our friends. And, if all three of those 
circumstances are well understood by all of the parties, it will be 
much easier for a true and lasting peace to be achieved, a peace which 
is so fragile that it can be jeopardized by the question of whether the 
United States should relocate its Embassy to west Jerusalem, a peace 
which is bound to fail on other grounds and, therefore, a peace not 
worth having. We want a lasting peace. The Israelis want a lasting 
peace. And I know that Arabs of good will want a lasting peace. And a 
lasting peace is based upon a bedrock of good faith and principles that 
are not inconsistent between the peacemaking parties.
  If there are fundamental--fundamental--differences between the 
peacemaking parties, then the peace becomes too fragile to be 
sustained. And after thousands of years of conflict in this region, Mr. 
President, the people of this region deserve to have the opportunity to 
live in peace with each other as friends and under circumstances in 
which there is not always the cloud of uncertainty and even war and 
when there is not the cloud of danger in the streets which exists as it 
does today.
  The many, many people of this body and the House of Representatives 
which support this legislation do so because we believe it will send a 
principled and constructive signal to all of the parties in the Arab-
Israeli negotiations and establish the United States position in 
support of the State of Israel in clear and unmistakable terms.
  Mr. President, before I turn the podium over, I want to acknowledge a 
couple of other points of view and some people who have been very 
instrumental in bringing this legislation forward.
  The majority leader, Senator Dole, has made stirring speeches in 
support of this legislation and believes in his heart that it is the 
best way to proceed in order to make the kind of statement that I spoke 
of a moment ago. And he is joined by all of the original cosponsors 
with that idea in mind.
  There are other Members of this body who have worked very hard to 
develop the language that would be most satisfactory to the Members of 
this body as well as to the President and to his Cabinet. Senator 
Lieberman from Connecticut is one of the people who has worked very 
long and hard to bring these ideas together and to try to achieve a 
very broad consensus so that when this legislation passes, it is with a 
broad bipartisan degree of support and, hopefully, the support of the 
administration as well.
  Senator Dianne Feinstein, who is here, the Senator from California, 
and Senator Lautenberg from New Jersey have been engaged in meetings. 
They have to some degree a somewhat different point of view as to how 
this legislation will work out in terms of the negotiations that are 
currently pending between the Israelis and the Arabs in the region. But 
it is their desire, no less than mine and the other cosponsors, that we 
work toward the day when we can achieve the situation that this bill 
would achieve--namely, the relocation of the Embassy in Jerusalem.
  So let there be no doubt that, though some Members of this body may 
have somewhat different views as to how best to achieve this objective, 
we are united in the objective, and we are determined to reach a point 
where the legislation can move forward with a strong bipartisan degree 
of consensus and eventually the support of the administration.
  Mr. President, with that opening statement and with the desire that 
when Senator Dole or Senator Helms are able to come to the floor to 
make their opening statements in support of the bill, I would be happy 
to relinquish the floor at this time to someone on the other side who 
would wish to make a statement.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from North Dakota is 
recognized.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, first, let me stand and say that I support 
this legislation and intend to vote for it. I think it is very worthy 
legislation. I recognize the role that has been played by the Senator 
from Arizona, by Senator Dole, by Senator Feinstein, by Senator 
Lieberman, by Senator Lautenberg, and some others. I think this is the 
right thing to do, and I will be voting for it.
  Mr. President, two additional items. The comments made previously by 
the Senator from Arizona discussed votes that had been cast by Senator 
Conrad any myself in previous budget issues. I shall not respond to 
them in this discussion. I will at some point later. But they are not 
at all related to the issue which we are discussing on the floor of the 
Senate. To change the subject of the debate, when it is the equivalent 
of getting lost and then claiming where you ended up was where you 
intended to be, is interesting but not, in my judgment, very useful.
  So I will discuss that at some later point this afternoon when I take 
the floor.
  I would want to say this, however. I intend to submit an amendment to 
the desk in a moment. It is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment on a 
subject unrelated to the central part of this bill, and I do it because 
it is the only opportunity I have to offer it prior to the 
reconciliation bill coming to the floor. I will agree to a very short 
time limit, 10 minutes, 5 on each side, or 10 on each side. I do want 
to get a vote. But it is my intention to offer it. It can be set aside 
as far as I am concerned and I will agree to a very brief time limit.
  So, Mr. President, again, because circumstances prevented me in 
recent days from offering this sense-of-the-Senate amendment and 
because this is the only circumstance in which one can be offered, I 
would say to those who are worried about this holding up the bill, I do 
not intend to do that at all. I will agree to 5 minutes on each side, 
and we will no doubt have some votes at some point and I hope the 
Senate would express itself on this.
  As the Presiding Officer and other Members know, we are very limited 
in our ability to address a number of issues that are very important in 
this Chamber. Often we are required to do so in this manner, a sense-
of-the-Senate resolution on a piece of legislation that is unrelated. 
But I do not intend in any way to hold this piece of legislation up. I 
will agree to the shortest of all time agreements if the majority 
wishes, 5 or 10 minutes on each side.


                           Amendment No. 2940

 (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate on tax cuts and Medicare)

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk and ask 
it be read.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2940.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, add the following new section:

     SEC.  . SENSE OF THE SENATE ON BUDGET PRIORITIES.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate finds that--
       (1) the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 
     1996 (H. Con. Res. 67) calls for $245 billion in tax 
     reductions and $270 billion in rejected spending reductions 
     from Medicare;

[[Page S 15466]]

       (2) reducing projected Medicare spending by $270 billion 
     could substantially increase out-of-pocket health care costs 
     for senior citizens, reduce the quality of care available to 
     Medicare beneficiaries and threaten the financial health of 
     some health care providers, especially in rural areas;
       (3) seventy-five percent of Medicare beneficiaries have 
     annual incomes of less than $25,000;
       (4) most of the tax cuts in the tax bill passed by the 
     House of Representatives (H.R. 1215) go to families making 
     over $100,000 per year, according to the Office of Tax 
     Analysis of the United States Department of the Treasury.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) the Senate should approve no tax legislation which 
     reduces taxes for those making over $250,000 per year; and
       (2) the savings from limiting any tax reductions in this 
     way should be used to reduce any cuts in projected Medicare 
     spending.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The clerk continued with the call of the roll.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak 
only on S. 1322.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Excuse me, Mr. President, reserving the right to object, 
under the terms the Senator from California has outlined, namely that 
she will speak only on the Jerusalem resolution, after which another 
quorum call would be called for.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise to speak about the legislation before the 
Senate, S. 1322, a bill that essentially expresses the sense-of-
Congress that Jerusalem should remain undivided and be the capital of 
Israel, and that it should be the site of the location of the United 
States Embassy at a date certain, namely May 1999.
  Mr. President, many people have participated in this discussion. And 
I know Senator Lautenberg, with whom I have been working, wishes to 
speak. I want to thank the majority leader for working with those of us 
that have concerns on this legislation. I know that there are 
discussions ongoing.
  Senators Lautenberg, Lieberman, Levin, and I just had a discussion. 
And I believe Senator Lieberman is going to talk with Senator Kyl and 
Senator Dole on what our conclusions are.
  For the purposes of these comments, I would like to make some general 
comments about the intentions of this legislation. Let me state what I 
believe some basic truths to be.
  The first basic truth is that the United States of America has an 
absolute right to place its Embassy in a capital city, any capital 
city. Clearly, Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. We need no one's 
permission to do so, and we need no piece of legislation to do so. This 
issue has been one that has percolated for a long, long time with a 
great deal of impatience on the part of many people who say, ``Why 
hasn't the Embassy been relocated to Jerusalem prior to this time?''
  Having said that, we have another basic truth, and that is that 
Israel can survive long-term as a Jewish democratic state only if there 
is peace, if that peace is recognized and bought into by Israel's 
neighbors, and that there are safe and secure borders. Therefore, the 
peace process now ongoing is key and critical to the long-term survival 
of the State of Israel.
  Jerusalem is many things to many people. All one has to do is spend 
some time there to see the Mount of Olives, the concept of the promised 
land, the Garden of Gethsemane, the home of more than 40 Christian 
denominations, the home of the Moslem religion, the home of the 
Armenian Patriarch, the Western Wall, a magical and mystical place, a 
source of religion throughout the world.
  The only democracy in the Middle East rests within the State of 
Israel; and yet it has been the site of hatred, war, and conflict 
dating from the Crusades and even back before that time. So it is a 
difficult and complicated subject. However, I want to say this, that I, 
like most Americans, believe that the U.S. Embassy should be located in 
Jerusalem. But as this bill was originally presented, there were 
concerns about the bill.
  Originally, the bill that was introduced had 62 Senators on it. This 
bill has 69 Senators. So there is a very strong bulwark of support for 
the bill.
  Some concerns remain even about the new text of the bill. Chief among 
these concerns for all of us is what the Chief Executive of this Nation 
will do. Many of us believe that whatever the politics surrounding this 
bill, we can all agree that to have a divisive vote on an issue around 
which there has always been consensus and to go through the 
unpleasantness of a veto confrontation, even with a successful override 
vote, would not be to anyone's benefit. Most of all, going through that 
process would be to the detriment of Jerusalem and Israel, as doubts 
about the U.S. commitment on this issue would certainly emerge.
  So for all those for whom Jerusalem is important and vital, I cannot 
imagine a more devastating outcome to the first legislation ever sent 
to a President mandating moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem than to 
have this legislation vetoed. For that reason, I think it is imperative 
that we try to address the concerns that exist about the bill. And we 
have tried to do that in conversations that have taken place on Friday 
and taken place today as well.
  One of the administration's concerns is that the bill in its current 
form does not provide a degree of flexibility in the end date by which 
an Embassy must be established in Jerusalem. We are hopeful that waiver 
language can be agreed upon by all the parties concerned that would 
allow the President under certain key conditions, best defined as 
national security interests, to suspend any necessary provisions of 
this bill related to the timetable if there was a determination that it 
was in the national security interest to do so.
  I suspect we can all agree that the President should, whenever 
possible, be granted this kind of flexibility. As a matter of fact, it 
is within his own constitutional responsibility to be able to do so.
  One of my concerns, for example, is that the move of our Embassy 
could overlap with key events unfolding in the Middle East peace 
process. In the opinion of this Senator, and perhaps some others would 
agree, the conclusion of a comprehensive peace between Israel and its 
neighbors is in the national security interests of the United States.
  The bill, in its current form, would require the new Embassy to be 
opened by May 31, 1999, regardless of what is happening in the peace 
process. May 1999 is, of course, also the deadline Israel and the 
Palestinians have set for themselves to complete final status talks and 
also the transition period. But we all know that despite good will on 
both sides and a series of important agreements, Israel and the 
Palestinians have missed virtually every deadline they have set during 
the course of the peace process.
  First, the agreement on withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, scheduled 
to be signed in December 1993 and implemented by April 1994, was signed 
and implemented in May 1994.
  Second, Palestinian elections were supposed to take place in July 
1994. They have not. Now the commitment is that they would take place 
prior to Ramadan, hopefully in January 1996, a year and a half later.
  Third, for weeks leading up to the recent agreement on Israeli 
redeployment in the West Bank, the negotiators set numerous deadlines 
for themselves that went unmet.
  With all of this background, can we accurately predict that a peace 
process will definitely conclude on May 4, 1999, as scheduled? Of 
course not. It is a difficult, fluid process, but it is working. The 
President should have the ability and the flexibility to postpone 
actions 

[[Page S 15467]]
that might have an impact on the negotiations if they were taken at a 
sensitive moment in the talks. The waiver, we hope, will be forthcoming 
as a product of these discussions and would provide, we believe, that 
kind of flexibility.
  Another purpose of a waiver amendment is to address the 
administration's constitutional concerns about this bill. The State 
Department has made it clear that they will recommend against the 
signature of a bill that they deem interferes with the constitutional 
prerogatives to conduct foreign policy. They have also indicated their 
strong objection to a specific date for location or establishment of 
the Embassy in Jerusalem.
  Specifically, the President interprets this bill to infringe upon his 
constitutional prerogatives by forcing him to establish an Embassy by a 
specific date, at a specific location. But by providing a sufficient 
waiver, renewable, if need be, the President has the opportunity to 
temporarily delay implementation of section 3(b), the timetable under 
this bill, should he find that it harms the peace process, to the 
extent of violating what we hope will be in the waiver, national 
security interests.
  There is no question that Congress and the executive branch 
frequently have differing interpretations of the constitutionality of 
particular statutes. I do not expect all of my colleagues to agree with 
every aspect of the President's interpretation. Indeed, there are 
aspects of his interpretation with which I disagree.
  But, in the interest of allowing the administration's views to speak 
for themselves, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks a legal analysis of the earlier 
version, S. 770, prepared by the Justice Department, and a June 20, 
1995 letter from the Secretary of State to the majority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. Nevertheless, despite our 
differing interpretations, we must face facts, and the fact is that the 
State Department has determined that the President should veto the bill 
in its current form.
  As I said before, the damage that would result to Jerusalem, first 
and foremost, and to our common cause of moving the Embassy there from 
passing a bill that could get vetoed cold be irreparable. So I am 
hopeful that this bill will not be vetoed.
   Mr. President, with a sufficient waiver, we can pass a bill that 
mandates the moving of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem, but 
allows the President to waive the timing of the establishment of the 
Embassy in Jerusalem if national security interests are involved.
  This would be first-time legislation, the first time a bill on this 
issue has been passed, and I think that is extraordinarily important.
  I must say, I have never conceived of this issue as a litmus test of 
one's support for Israel. I find deeply committed friends of Israel 
holding a wide variety of views on the question of when and how to move 
the United States Embassy to Jerusalem, and on these bills.
  As for the debate in Congress, let us establish a basic understanding 
that all participants in this debate agree on one fundamental truth: 
that united Jerusalem is and will remain as the capital of Israel.
  So Jerusalem's status as Israel's capital has never been in question 
here. The debate is, instead, focused on a side debate to the central 
issue, the placement of the Embassy, and I, like my colleagues, believe 
there is basic agreement in this body, and I share the view of my 
colleagues, that the United States Embassy in Israel does, indeed, 
belong in Jerusalem. It is elementary that a sovereign nation, as I 
have pointed out, has that right to place an Embassy at the site of a 
nation's capital with whom it enjoys diplomatic relations.
  So this should not in all logic, in all reason, in all sovereign 
power be privy to negotiations having to do with peace and security 
between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel, 
or between the State of Jordan and the State of Israel, or between any 
of the Arab neighbors and the State of Israel. However, there is one 
important point, and I think this is where we need to be very careful 
that we are not provocative.
  There was a letter sent to Secretary of State Christopher sponsored 
by the two distinguished Senators from New York, Senator Moynihan and 
Senator D'Amato, last March. I joined with 92 of my colleagues in 
signing this letter in which we said, and I quote:

       We believe that the United States embassy belongs in 
     Jerusalem. It would be most appropriate for planning to begin 
     now to ensure such a move no later than the agreements on 
     permanent status take effect and the transition period is 
     ended which, according to the Declaration of Principles, is 
     scheduled for May 1999.

  This letter, I believe, reflected a true consensus on this issue in 
the Senate and, to a great extent, in the community affected. In a 
letter to the Jewish Press on April 7, 1995, Senator Moynihan explained 
why the letter was written, and I quote:

       Senator D'Amato and I chose to write a letter rather than 
     to introduce legislation because we wanted to secure maximum 
     public support for the proposition that united Jerusalem is 
     the capital of Israel and the appropriate home of our 
     embassy.

  So when legislation was introduced on this issue in May, however, the 
consensus cracked and then, as we know, with the earlier bill, 62 
Senators signed on.
  There was one point in that earlier bill that very deeply concerned 
me, and that was the provision that the commencement of construction on 
the Embassy site in West Jerusalem would begin in 1996, and I felt that 
that could truly be provocative, be disturbing to the peace process at 
this very difficult time, particularly in view of the fact that 
Palestinian elections for the first time have not yet taken place and 
are about to take place. And we now know that the date agreed to is 
prior to Ramadan or in January of next year. Therefore, to mandate the 
beginning of construction in 1996 could be, I think, unintentionally, 
but very realistically, provocative and something that we would not 
want to do.
  The leader, in his wisdom, and I am grateful and thankful for this, 
and Senator Kyl agreed, did remove that section and, hence, that laid 
the basis for the new legislation which is before us today, entitled 
Senate bill 1322. So my major concern has really been addressed, and I 
am very pleased and grateful for that. The concern expressed then that 
the original bill might precipitate a difficult situation I think has 
been remedied.
  There was also a lack of consensus at that time in statements that 
were issued by a number of major American Jewish organizations who felt 
that the objectives of the legislation were good but hoped that 
everybody would come together and agree on a piece of legislation that 
would not be provocative to the peace process but could establish the 
intent with the clarity of law, in this body and the House, for the 
first time in the history of debate over this issue.
  I believe that if we can agree on waiver language that does not limit 
the constitutional authority of the President, that we will have given 
the bill the necessary features to meet a variety of needs. For the 
first time, we will have mandated in law the move of the U.S. Embassy 
to Jerusalem, an important achievement, and a variety of preparations 
for that move spelled out in the timing of report language.
  We will have also provided the President with the flexibility to 
postpone the actual move if events in the Middle East peace process or 
other U.S. National security interests warrant it, and I believe this 
is a responsible way for the Congress to legislate in this area.
  I think that, as we vote on this bill, we should be aware that some 
of the leading Middle East experts in the administration do worry, 
still, about its impact on the peace process--not in 1999, but today. I 
think this Government is so privileged to have one of the most skillful 
and determined young negotiators I have met, in the person of Dennis 
Ross. His perspicacity, his energy, his undying commitment to this 
process has really been helpful in America playing the role of the 
honest broker, in sitting down with the two sides, and in being 
responsible for bringing the chairman of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the State of 
Israel, the President of Egypt, the King of Jordan, and a host of other 
dignitaries from the European Union, 

[[Page S 15468]]
together recently at the White House to witness what was an 
unbelievable signing. I, for one, during many times in the past decades 
thought we would never see that day. But, Mr. President, we did see 
that day, and a lot of it is due to the skill and dedication of Dennis 
Ross. I think that has to be said.
  Mr. Ross has warned that passing this legislation could now 
complicate the already-difficult implementation of the recent agreement 
on redeployment in the West Bank. He is also concerned that Jerusalem 
could become a central issue in the upcoming Palestinian election now 
scheduled for January, which would likely play to the radical faction 
and put Chairman Arafat in a very difficult position. Martin Indyk, our 
Ambassador to Israel, at his confirmation hearing in the Foreign 
Relations Committee, at which I was present, has echoed many of these 
concerns.
  Mr. President, I raise these issues simply because I believe we 
should be aware of what people in the administration--in an 
administration that has been extremely supportive of Israel--are 
thinking about this legislation. This administration has achieved 
something that has never in the history of the area been achieved, and 
that is an agreement which may guarantee safe and secure borders and 
peace between the small, tiny State of Israel and the Arab nations that 
surround it. And its importance cannot be overlooked in that regard.
  So I am looking for a way that we can indicate the rights of the 
sovereign nation by saying that we should place our Embassy in 
Jerusalem, that it should be the policy of the Congress that Jerusalem 
is the capital and that Jerusalem should remain undivided, without 
presenting a provocation in what I think is the most important process 
for peace ongoing, certainly, in the history of the Middle East.
  I am hopeful that the negotiations now ongoing will be able to 
provide that form of waiver. I think it is vital--a waiver that does 
not in any way compromise the President's constitutional authority. So 
at this time I would like to yield the floor, and I will have more to 
say when those negotiations are completed.
  At this time, I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                                      Office of Legal Counsel,

                                     Washington, DC, May 16, 1995.
     Memorandum for Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President.
     From: Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General.
     Re Bill to relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to 
         Jerusalem.
       This is to provide you with our views on S. 770, a bill 
     introduced by Senator Dole and others, ``[t]o provide for the 
     relocation of the United States Embassy in Israel to 
     Jerusalem, and for other purposes.'' The provisions of this 
     bill that render the Executive Branch's ability to obligate 
     appropriated funds conditional upon the construction and 
     opening of the United States Embassy to Israel in Jerusalem 
     invade exclusive Presidential authorities in the field of 
     foreign affairs and are unconstitutional.
       The bill states that
       [i]t is the policy of the United States that--
       (1) Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the 
     State of Israel;
       (2) groundbreaking for construction of the United States 
     Embassy in Jerusalem should begin no later than December 31, 
     1996; and
       (3) the United States Embassy should be officially open in 
     Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.
       Section 3(a).
       The bill requires that not more than 50% of the funds 
     appropriated to the State Department for FY 1997 for 
     ``Acquisition and Maintenance of Building Abroad'' may be 
     obligated until the Secretary of State determines and reports 
     to Congress that construction has begun on the site of the 
     United States Embassy in Jerusalem. Section 3(b). Further, 
     not more than 50% of the funds appropriated to the State 
     Department for FY 1999 for ``Acquisition and Maintenance of 
     Buildings Abroad'' may be obligated until the Secretary 
     determines and reports to Congress that the United States 
     Embassy in Jerusalem has officially opened. Section 3(c).
       Of the funds appropriated for FY 1995 for the State 
     Department and related agencies, not less than $5,000,000 
     ``shall be made available until expended'' for costs 
     associated with relocating the United States Embassy in 
     Israel to Jerusalem. Section 4. Of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated in FY 1996 and FY 1997 for the State Department 
     for ``Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad, ``not 
     less than $25,000,000 (in FY 1996) and $75,000,000 (in FY 
     1997) ``shall be made available until expended'' for costs 
     associated with, respectively, the relocation of the United 
     States Embassy to Jerusalem, and the construction and 
     relocation of the Embassy. Section 5.
       The Secretary is required to report to Congress not later 
     than 30 days after enactment ``detailing the Department of 
     State's plan to implement this Act.'' Section 6. Beginning on 
     January 1, 1996, and every six months thereafter, the 
     Secretary is to report to Congress ``on the progress made 
     toward opening the United States Embassy in Jerusalem.'' 
     Section 7.
       It is well settled that the Constitution vests the 
     President with the exclusive authority to conduct the 
     Nation's diplomatic relations with other States. This 
     authority flows, in large part, from the President's position 
     as Chief Executive, U.S. Const. art, II, Sec. 1, cl. 1, and 
     as Commander in Chief, id. art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 1. It also 
     derives from the President's more specific powers to ``make 
     Treaties,'' id. art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2; to ``appoint 
     Ambassadors . . . and Consuls,'' id.; and to ``receive 
     Ambassadors and other public Ministers,'' id., art. II, 
     Sec. 3. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the 
     President's authority with respect to the conduct of 
     diplomatic relations. See, e.g., Department of Navy v. Egan 
     484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (the Supreme Court has ``recognized 
     `the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the 
     province and responsibility of the Executive' '') (quoting 
     Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)), Alfred Dunhill of 
     London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 n. 18 
     (1976) (``the conduct of [foreign policy] is committed 
     primarily to the Executive Branch''); United States v. 
     Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960) (President is ``the 
     constitutional representative of the United States in its 
     dealings with foreign nations''). See also Ward v. Shannon, 
     943 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, J.) (``the 
     Constitution makes the Executive Branch . . . primarily 
     responsible'' for the exercise of ``the foreign affairs 
     power''), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1558 (1992); Sanchez-
     Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
     (Scalia, J.) (``broad leeway'' is ``traditionally accorded 
     the Executive in matters of foreign affairs''). Accordingly, 
     we have affirmed that the Constitution ``authorize[s] the 
     President to determine the form and manner in which the 
     United States will maintain relations with foreign nations.'' 
     Issues Raised by Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 and 
     Section 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21 
     (1992) (preliminary print).
       Furthermore, the President's recognition power is 
     exclusive. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
     398, 410 (1964) (``[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a 
     function of the Executive''); see also Restatement (Third) of 
     the Foreign Relations Law of the United States Sec. 204 
     (1987) (``the President has exclusive authority to recognize 
     or not to recognize a foreign state or government, and to 
     maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with a 
     foreign government''). It is well established, furthermore, 
     that this power is not limited to the bare act of according 
     diplomatic recognition to a particular government, but 
     encompasses as well the authority to take such actions as are 
     necessary to make the power of recognition an effective tool 
     of United States foreign policy. United States v. Pink, 315 
     U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (The authority to recognize governments 
     ``is not limited to a determination of the government to be 
     recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy 
     which is to govern the question of recognition.'').
       The proposed bill would severely impair the President's 
     constitutional authority to determine the form and manner of 
     the Nation's diplomatic relations. The bill seeks to 
     effectuate the policy objectives that ``Jerusalem should be 
     recognized as the capital of the State of Israel'' and that 
     ``the United States Embassy should be officially open in 
     Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.'' ``To those ends, it 
     would prohibit the Executive Branch from obligating more than 
     a fixed percentage of the funds appropriated to the State 
     Department for ``Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings 
     Abroad'' in FY 1997 until the Secretary determines and 
     reports to Congress that construction has begun on the site 
     of the United States Embassy in Jerusalem. It would also 
     prohibit the Executive Branch from obligating more than a 
     fixed percentage of the funds appropriated for the same 
     purpose for FY 1999 until the Secretary determines and 
     reports to Congress that the United States Embassy in 
     Jerusalem has ``officially opened.''
       By thus conditioning the Executive Branch's ability to 
     obligate appropriated funds, the bill seeks to compel the 
     President to build and to open a United States Embassy to 
     Israel at a site of extraordinary international concern and 
     sensitivity. We believe that Congress cannot constitutionally 
     constrain the President in such a manner.
       In general, because the venue at which diplomatic relations 
     occur is itself often diplomatically significant, Congress 
     may not impose on the President its own foreign policy 
     judgments as to the particular sites at which the United 
     States' diplomatic relations are to take place. More 
     specifically, Congress cannot trammel the President's 
     constitutional authority to conduct the Nation's foreign 
     affairs and to recognize foreign governments by directing the 
     relocation of an embassy. This is particularly true where, as 
     here, the location of the embassy is not only of great 
     significance in establishing the United States' relationship 
     with a single country, but may well also determine our 
     relations with an entire region of the world. Finally, to the 
     extent that S. 770 is intended to affect recognition policy 
     with respect to Jerusalem, it is inconsistent with the 
     exclusivity of the President's recognition power. 

[[Page S 15469]]

       Our conclusions are not novel. With respect to the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, FY 1994 & 1995, which included 
     provisions purporting to require the establishment of an 
     office in Lhasa, Tibet, the President stated that he would 
     ``implement them to the extent consistent with [his] 
     constitutional responsibilities.'' Statement by the President 
     at 2 (Apr. 30, 1994). The Reagan Administration objected in 
     1984 to a bill to compel the relocation of the United States 
     Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, on the grounds that 
     the decision was ``so closely connected with the 
     President's exclusive constitutional power in 
     responsibility to recognize, and to conduct ongoing 
     relations with, foreign governments as to, in our view, be 
     beyond the proper scope of legislative action.'' Letter to 
     Dante B. Fascell, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
     United States House of Representatives, from George P. 
     Shultz, Secretary of State, at 2 (Feb. 13, 1984). Again, 
     in 1987, President Reagan stated that he would construe 
     certain provisions of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
     Act, FY 1988 & 1989, including those that forbade ``the 
     closing of any consulates,'' in a manner that would avoid 
     unconstitutional interference with the President's 
     authority with respect to diplomacy. Pub. Papers of the 
     Presidents: Ronald Reagan 1542 (1987). Indeed, as long ago 
     as 1876, President Grant declared in a signing statement 
     that he would construe legislation in such a way as to 
     avoid ``implying a right in the legislative branch to 
     direct the closing or discontinuing of any of the 
     diplomatic or consular offices of the Government,'' 
     because if Congress sought to do so, it would ``invade the 
     constitutional rights of the Executive.'' 7 James D. 
     Richardson (ed.) Messages and Papers of the Presidents 
     377-78 (1898).
       Finally, it does not matter in this instance that Congress 
     has sought to achieve its objectives through the exercise of 
     its spending power, because the condition it would impose on 
     obligating appropriations is unconstitutional. See United 
     States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936); Issues Raised by 
     Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 and Section 503 of Pub. L. 
     No. 102-140, 16 Op. O.L.C. AT 30-31 (``As we have said on 
     several prior occasions, Congress may not use its power over 
     appropriation of public funds `to attach conditions to 
     Executive Branch appropriations requiring the President to 
     relinquish his constitutional discretion in foreign affairs.' 
     '') (citation omitted).
       For the above reasons, we believe that the bill's 
     provisions conditioning appropriated funds on the building 
     and opening of a United States Embassy in Jerusalem are 
     unconstitutional.
                                                                    ____



                                       The Secretary of State,

                                    Washington, DC, June 20, 1995.
     Hon. Robert Dole,
     Majority Leader,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: I am writing to express my opposition to 
     S. 770, which would compel the Administration to move its 
     Embassy to Jerusalem. Given the sensitivity of the subject, 
     it is important that there be no misunderstanding on where we 
     stand.
       There is no issue related to the Arab-Israeli negotiations 
     that is more sensitive than Jerusalem. It is precisely for 
     this reason that any effort by Congress to bring it to the 
     forefront is ill-advised and potentially very damaging to the 
     success of the peace process.
       I do not say this lightly. Nor do I say it without 
     recognizing the depth of feeling that exists in the Congress 
     about moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. Both the 
     President and I am very much aware of this sentiment and the 
     reasons for it. The President expressed himself on this issue 
     during the 1992 campaign and he stands by that position. But 
     he also said at that time, and on a number of occasions since 
     then, that he would not take any step that would disrupt the 
     negotiating process and the promotion of Middle East peace. 
     And S. 770 would unmistakably have that consequence.
       The President's commitment to promoting peace in the Middle 
     East has been one of his key priorities in foreign policy. It 
     is a commitment all of his predecessors have had since the 
     time of Israel's founding. The President and I know how 
     important the achievement of peace with security is to Israel 
     and to our national interests. We have worked very closely 
     with Israel's leaders to pursue our common interests. The 
     U.S.-Israeli bilateral relationship has never been stronger 
     and the President and I are particularly proud of that fact.
       Our support for Israel will remain strong and steadfast, 
     and we will work actively to help Israel achieve peace with 
     her neighbors. Given the extraordinary progress of the last 
     two years, that objective appears, for perhaps the first time 
     in history, to be within reach. Having just returned from the 
     Middle East, I am even more persuaded of the opportunities 
     for progress which can ultimately produce a real peace. We 
     must not take steps that make it more difficult to achieve 
     that historic end.
       Yet, there are few other issues that are more likely to 
     undermine negotiations and complicate the chances for peace 
     than premature focus on Jerusalem. The issues on the table 
     are complex enough without pushing to the fore perhaps the 
     most sensitive and emotional issue for Arabs and Israelis, 
     Muslims and Christians alike. The enemies of peace would use 
     the Jerusalem issue to inflame passions further and attack 
     those who want to see the negotiations succeed. Jerusalem is 
     a powerful symbol of the hopes and aspirations of all sides. 
     As such it has the potential to divide, to polarize, and to 
     divert attention from the critical issues now being 
     negotiated.
       Palestinians and Israelis both understood this reality when 
     they agreed in the Declaration of Principles that Jerusalem 
     would be covered in the permanent status negotiations. They 
     recognized that deferring this highly sensitive issue as 
     essential if progress were to be made. The negotiations on 
     permanent status are slated to begin as early as May 1996.
       Safeguarding the negotiations is more vital than ever. This 
     process is now entering an especially delicate period. 
     Israelis and Palestinians have set a July 1 date for an 
     agreement on the second phase of the Oslo accords, including 
     an agreement on elections for a Palestinian Council. Israeli 
     and Syrian Chiefs of Staff are scheduled to begin discussion 
     on security issues on June 27. Few actions would be more 
     explosive and harmful to these efforts than for the United 
     States--as the key sponsor of this process--to be pushing the 
     Jerusalem issue forward. In fact, we recently vetoed a 
     Resolution in the United Nations Security Council which 
     pushed Jerusalem to the fore precisely for this reason. 
     Israeli Prime Minister Rabin recently suspended land 
     expropriations in Jerusalem, effectively reducing the focus 
     on the Jerusalem issue. The last thing we should want is for 
     the U.S. at this very moment to put the focus back on 
     Jerusalem.
       My opposition to this legislation is also strongly rooted 
     on constitutional grounds. The Justice Department's Office of 
     Legal Counsel has issued an opinion to the White House 
     Counsel concluding that the bill would unconstitutionally 
     invade exclusive Presidential authorities in the field of 
     foreign affairs. Because the bill would seek to compel the 
     President to build and open an embassy at a particular site 
     for foreign policy reasons, it is incompatible with the 
     separation of powers under the Constitution. This is the same 
     position taken by this and previous Administrations on 
     comparable legislative efforts to dictate the location of 
     diplomatic and consular facilities. Accordingly, I would be 
     remiss if I did not counsel the President to protect against 
     the unconstitutional infringement on the prerogatives of his 
     office.
       In light of this, unless the policy and constitutional 
     concerns noted above are satisfactorily addressed, I will 
     recommend that the President veto S. 770 if it is presented 
     to him. I wish it were otherwise, but for the sake of Middle 
     East peace and the President's constitutional responsibility 
     in foreign policy, I will have no choice but to do so.
           Sincerely,
                                               Warren Christopher.

  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I, too, would like to ask unanimous consent 
to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks an 
editorial from the New York Times of May 29, 1995, along with a brief 
with respect to the constitutional prerogatives of the President and 
the Congress, relating to matters of this kind.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me make a couple of very brief comments 
before I take my place in the chair. I respect the views presented by 
the Senator from California. I will make additional comments with 
respect to the issue of the waiver as follows:
  One of the problems that we have had with this issue, generally, and 
one of the reasons why Senator Moynihan brought his letter to the 
Senate, and why all of us have been pursuing legislation now to 
actually bring a close to the issue and make it clear that we will move 
our Embassy to Jerusalem, is that the United States has always found a 
reason not to do it. At the time, those seemed like valid positions. 
Obviously, we would not want a waiver to provide a mechanism for 
continued lip service to the concept without actually moving toward the 
actual relocation of the Embassy. That is why there has been some 
question about how waiver language should be inserted into the bill.
  Also, there is some oddity, I think, in the matter that locating our 
Embassy in a country's capital would actually be deemed to be contrary 
to the national security interest of the United States. It seems to me 
that one has to stretch it a little bit to find that to be the case. 
Yet, I know there are those who believe that, even at this point in 
time, that is exactly the case. I think it is important that if there 
is to be some kind of waiver, it not be a waiver that the President can 
exercise because he has a policy dispute with the Congress on when and 
under what circumstances the Embassy should be moved. Such a waiver 
should be exercised by the President only because he finds that the 
national security interests of the United States require that. 

[[Page S 15470]]
And the security of the United States is not necessarily the same as 
peace in the Middle East, which is not necessarily the same as a 
controversy between Arabs and Israelis over the status of peace 
discussions. So simply because it makes some Arabs anxious or angry, or 
gives them a political issue, is not, I think, a reason why such a 
waiver would ever be exercised.
  I also think it is important that the whole world understand one 
point very clearly--and I think, on this, we are united--that when we 
talk about the final status of Jerusalem, which is subject to 
negotiation between the parties there, no one should suffer under any 
illusion that the United States feels itself bound not to locate our 
Embassy in West Jerusalem pending the outcome of those negotiations. 
The State of Israel's rights with respect to west Jerusalem, and our 
obligations and entitlements to put our Embassy in west Jerusalem, are 
in no way dependent on those final negotiations which do not go to the 
political status of west Jerusalem insofar as the Israelis are 
concerned.
  To the point of the constitutional concerns alluded to by the Senator 
from California, there are differing opinions on this. I am a very 
strong advocate of the power of the President in this regard. I do not 
come lightly to the point of view that Congress has a prerogative in 
this case to require the relocation of the Embassy. I think it is good 
that the Record contain both the arguments in support of the 
Presidential and congressional power in that regard. I am delighted to 
see them both included in the Record at the conclusion of this debate.
  I think it is important that the understanding be with all parties 
that whatever kind of waiver language may or may not be included in 
this bill, it is a temporary waiver only. We are not talking about the 
ability of the President to simply continue year after year after year, 
saying, gee, I am really with you on this, but I think I find a reason 
why we do not want to do it right now. That is the intent of any 
waiver. I know that is not what the Senator from California was saying.
  Should there by any waiver language included, I want it to be crystal 
clear on the record that nobody is talking about a waiver which, 
however open-ended it may or may not be, would allow a President, every 
6 months, to simply say that because he has a different point of view 
than Congress on this, he is going to refuse to implement what the 
Congress has directed him to do, finding that there is somehow a 
national security interest of the United States involved.
  Mr. President, I conclude by making this point. I think the 
importance of this issue is illustrated by the fact that we have had 
difficulty in arriving at the exact language because everybody is 
concerned about what the impact of it will be. Those are very 
legitimate concerns. I am going to conclude by addressing myself to 
those concerns. This is not a tangential issue. It is symbolic in one 
respect, but sometimes symbolism is extraordinarily important. In this 
case it is, regardless of how you come down on this issue. If you are 
an Arab, for example, one can argue that this would make you very 
anxious and concerned. Therefore, the symbolism of it is very 
important. There are those, in fact, who believe that it would be so 
distressing to certain Arabs if the United States exercises its 
legitimate right to put our Embassy where we want to, particularly 
since it is the capital of the host country, and that should not be 
considered to be a policy matter with respect to our position in these 
negotiations. But the fact of the matter is that some people will see 
it as that. Nobody should be allowed to use--in a political campaign or 
in the conduct of terrorism, or in negotiations--the fact that a 
country like the United States exercises its right to put its Embassy 
in the capital of the host country. That is not a legitimate concern.
  So while I understand the politics of it, that is different from the 
legitimacy of the issue.
  The final point is this: Some people have said, well, even though it 
is an irrational and illegitimate argument, people will make it. As a 
result, it could bring a halt to the peace negotiations even. People 
might stop talking peace. There may be more demonstrations over this, 
even though it is not a legitimate position to be taken.
  I will respond to that in this fashion because it goes to the heart 
of the debate. No one knows for sure. That is a very legitimate concern 
among those of us who are very, very supportive of the peace process 
and want it to succeed. Certainly, the people in the region feel that 
much more even than any of us in this body can.
  I think it is also important to reflect upon the history of U.S. 
foreign policy and to note that every time the United States has been 
firm, fair, resolute, principled, consistent in its investigation of 
friendships and positions in the world, the world has been better off 
for that firm, principled expression.
  It did not always suit nervous nellies during the cold war, that 
Presidents like President Reagan made firm statements about our 
commitments, calling the Soviet Union what at that time it was and many 
Russians since have confirmed. Sure, in many respects it was an evil 
empire. It made people very nervous when President Reagan said it. Many 
people say had the United States not taken firm positions, had 
President Reagan not spoken so clearly, that evil empire would still 
exist today.
  Had we not made it crystal clear to the Chinese that they could not 
invade Quemoy and Matsu Islands back in the 1960's, they might have 
done so. Had we made it clearer to Hitler that he would not get away 
with an attack on Poland, perhaps he would not have done so.
  Mr. President, our history is replete with examples of situations in 
which history has shown that the world frequently was thrown into 
conflict in which great human suffering and loss resulted because 
leaders at the time were not firm enough and clear enough in the 
expression of the principles that stood behind their country's 
positions.
  In this case, I think a firm, clear statement of something as simple 
as the United States exercising its right to put its Embassy in the 
capital of a country as we have with every other country in the world 
except Jerusalem, I think to the extent that the United States makes 
that statement very clearly, we advance the ultimate cause of 
fundamental peace, a peace that is lasting. To that extent, I think it 
is important that we do that prior to the time that those negotiations 
are to be concluded.
  I think that deals generally with the waiver issue however that issue 
is ultimately resolved.
  I see that Senator Levin is here, who I know has a very strong 
interest in the matter, as well as Senator Helms, the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.
  I relinquish the majority position to Senator Helms and Senator 
Levin, if he would like to speak, although I want to make a point, if I 
may, that the unanimous consent to lift the preceding quorum call by 
the Senator from California was premised upon the point that it was 
limited to the discussion of this issue and that it could not be used 
to relate to an amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota, 
Senator Dorgan.
  Subject to that agreement, I am happy to yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the New York Times, May 29, 1995]

                   To Promote Peace, Move the Embassy

                         (By Douglas J. Feith)

       Washington.--There is something more than Presidential 
     politics behind the bills in Congress to relocate the United 
     States Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It is 
     sensible policy.
       If American support for Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem 
     remains an open question, will this help promote peace? No. 
     Alternatively, are Israel's Arab interlocutors likelier to 
     make the philosophical adjustments and political concessions 
     necessary for peace if they know that America's support for 
     Israel on Jerusalem is a closed question?
       This view--endorsed by the key Republican sponsors of the 
     bills, Senators Bob Dole and Jon Kyl and the Speaker of the 
     House Newt Gingrich--has logic, though not the Clinton 
     Administration, on its side.
       Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Arab-Jewish 
     conflict over Palestine has been a fight over legitimacy. The 
     Zionists have asserted that the Jews have the right to a 
     state in at least part of Palestine. Arab anti-Zionists have 
     argued that all of Palestine on both sides of the Jordan 
     River is Arab land and that the Jews have no right to a state 
     there.
       In the conflict, periods of violence have alternated with 
     periods of quiet, though hostility has persisted throughout. 
     Quiet is a type of peace, but in recent years diplomacy 

[[Page S 15471]]
     has aimed at a higher type--peace that is formal and de jure.
       But Israel's experiences with Egypt and the Palestine 
     Liberation Organization demonstrate that formal accords do 
     not necessarily reflect or produce the highest form of 
     peace--that is, peace based on an absence of hostility.
       True peace is possible only if Israel's Arab neighbors 
     change their hearts and minds on the fundamental issue of 
     Israel's legitimacy. What might facilitate that change? When 
     Israel appeared vulnerable, it did not achieve peace, or even 
     peace talks.
       Only after being forced to acknowledge the strength of 
     Israel's position--its military power, its enduring ties to 
     the United States, and, since the end of the cold war, our 
     unchallenged global predominance--did some Arab powers 
     abandon rejectionist positions and start negotiating.
       If Israel's antagonists bow to unpleasant realities and 
     lower unrealistic expectations, the peace process may produce 
     not merely signing ceremonies but real peace.
       Inasmuch as the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
     legitimacy, the essence of the legitimacy issue is Israel's 
     right to sovereignty in Jerusalem. If Israelis do not have 
     the right to sovereignty there, they can hardly justify 
     sovereignty anywhere.
       Jerusalem has been central to Jewish nationhood for 3,000 
     years. The Jews' national movement, after all, is Zionism, 
     Zion being Jerusalem. The Arabs understand this, too, which 
     is why the importance of Jerusalem in Arab politics, 
     diplomacy, philosophy and literature increased as the 
     struggle against Zionism intensified.
       By relocating our embassy to Jerusalem, we would end our 
     anomalous policy of refusing to recognize Israel's 
     sovereignty in its own capital. We would proclaim that 
     Israel's legitimacy in Zion is not an open question for us. 
     This would signal that we expect all parties to the 
     conflict--not just Israel--to pursue peace on the basis of 
     realism.
       In the ongoing Arab-Israeli negotiations, moving the 
     embassy would not prejudice any issue that is actually open. 
     This is why even dovish voices, like that of Deputy Foreign 
     Minister Yossi Beilin, have categorically endorsed the bill. 
     The Government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says it will 
     in time negotiate Jerusalem issues, but not Israeli 
     sovereignty. In this it deserves our support.
       Across the political spectrum in Israel and among Jews 
     worldwide, there is a profound commitment to retaining 
     Jerusalem forever as the undivided capital. The cause of 
     peace will be served by whatever helps persuade Yasir Arafat 
     that he will not get American support or Israeli consent to 
     divide Jerusalem and establish part of it as the capital of a 
     new Arab state.
       The necessary adjustment in expectations on the Arab side 
     would be difficult and even painful. Passionate cries--and 
     worse--would ensue, but in the end the process would be 
     constructive.
       Like all American pro-Israel initiatives, the bill to move 
     the embassy is being deprecated in certain quarters as a 
     cynical play for political points with American Jews. Such 
     criticism is itself deeply cynical.
       Every Congressional initiative pleases some constituencies 
     and displeases others. Each is supported by some politicians 
     for substantive by some politicians for substantive reasons, 
     some for political reasons and many for both types of 
     reasons.
       But support for Israel as a fellow democracy and strategic 
     ally has been sustained by a long line of Democratic and 
     Republican administrations and Congresses. It reflects the 
     nation's strong sympathy for Israel as evinced in public 
     opinion polls decade after decade since 1948.
       The automatic assumption that a pro-Israel initiative is 
     nothing more than pandering is unfair and at odds with 
     America's national interest as most Americans see it.
                                                                    ____

                                                    Shaw, Pittman,


                                           Potts & Trowbridge,

                                                    June 27, 1995.
     To: American Israel Public Affairs Committee
     From: Gerald Charnoff, Charles J. Cooper, and Michael A. 
       Carvin
     Re S. 770; Bill to Relocate U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem


                            i. introduction

       This memorandum is in response to your request for an 
     analysis of the constitutionality of the ``Jerusalem Embassy 
     Relocation Implementation Act of 1995,'' hereinafter S. 770, 
     a measure introduced by Senator Dole in the first session of 
     the 104th Congress. Maintaining that Jerusalem should be 
     recognized by the U.S. as the capital of Israel, the bill, in 
     a Statement of Policy, states that groundbreaking for the 
     U.S. embassy in Jerusalem ``should begin'' by 31 December 
     1996 and that the embassy ``should be officially open'' by 31 
     May 1999. S. 770, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 3(a). The 
     measure further establishes that no more than 50% of the 
     funds appropriated to the Department of State in fiscal year 
     1997 for ``Acquisition & Maintenance of Buildings Abroad'' 
     may be obligated until the Secretary of State certifies that 
     construction has begun on the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem. Id. 
     Sec. 3(b). Similarly, not more than 50% of the funds 
     appropriated in the same account for fiscal year 1999 may be 
     obligated prior to certification by the Secretary of State 
     that the Jerusalem embassy has officially opened. Id., 
     Sec. 3(c). Additional provisions, contained in sections four 
     and five of the measure, earmark certain funds for the 
     relocation effort.'' \1\
     \1\ Footnotes at end of letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice 
     has taken the position that the funding mechanism 
     incorporated into S. 770 is an unconstitutional infringement 
     on the President's powers. See Bill to Relocate the United 
     States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Op. Off. Legal 
     Counsel (May 16, 1995) (``The proposed bill would severely 
     impair the President's constitutional authority to determine 
     the form and manner of the Nation's diplomatic relations.'') 
     (hereinafter ``OLC Op.'').


                              ii. analysis

       The Office of Legal Counsel (``OLC'') Opinion argues that 
     the President has primary responsibility for foreign affairs 
     and that his specific power to recognize foreign governments 
     to exclusive. OLC Op., p. 2-3. Accordingly, OLC concludes 
     that ``Congress may not impose on the President its own 
     foreign policy judgments as to the particular sites at which 
     the United States' diplomatic relations are to take place.'' 
     Id. at 3. OLC maintains that the imposition of fixed-
     percentage restrictions on the State Department's FY 1997 and 
     FY 1999 acquisition and maintenance funds until specified 
     steps are completed in the relocation effort constitutes an 
     impermissible restriction on the President's discretion in 
     foreign affairs. Although OLC does not in any way dispute 
     Congress' plenary power over the purse, it maintains that 
     Congress may not ``attach conditions to Executive Branch 
     appropriations requiring the President to relinquish his 
     constitutional discretion in foreign affairs.'' Id. at 4, 
     quoting Issues Raised by Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 
     and Section 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 16 Op. Off. Legal 
     Counsel at 30-31 (1992) (emphasis added.). In support of this 
     assertion, OLC places exclusive reliance on prior Executive 
     Branch opinions which criticize congressional appropriations 
     riders that directly required the President to take (or 
     refrain from) a particular action by stating that no 
     appropriated funds could be used for the congressionally 
     proscribed action. Id. at 3-4. See also Issues Raised by 
     Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 & Section 503 of Pub. L. 
     No. 102-140, 16 Op. Off. of Legal Counsel 18, 19 (1992), 
     citing Section 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 105 Stat. at 820 
     (1991) (``[N]one of the funds provided in this Act shall be 
     used by the Department of State to issue more than one 
     official or diplomatic passport to any United States 
     government employee. . . .''); Appropriations Limitation for 
     Rules Vetoed by Congress, 4B Op. Off. of Legal Counsel 731, 
     731-32 (1980), citing H.R. 7484, Sec. 608, 96th Cong., 2nd 
     Sess. (1980) (``None of the funds appropriated or otherwise 
     made available to implement . . . any regulation which has 
     been disapproved pursuant to a resolution of disapproval duly 
     adopted. . . .'').
       OLC's assertion concerning the primacy of the Chief 
     Executive in foreign affairs is well-supported,\2\ and its 
     further assertion that Congress may not interfere with these 
     foreign policy prerogatives even when exercising its spending 
     power is also consistent with long-standing Executive Branch 
     precedent, although Congress has taken a different view.\3\ 
     The issue has never been resolved judicially.\4\ However, 
     OLC's assertion that S. 770 ``requires'' or ``compels'' the 
     President to move the Embassy to Jerusalem, and is thus 
     subject to the same constitutional objections as 
     appropriation riders containing such unconditional 
     requirements, is belied by the plain language of the bill and 
     is otherwise unsupported by law or Executive Branch opinions.
       S. 770 does not purport to restrict the President's ability 
     to maintain an Embassy in Tel Aviv or to otherwise interfere 
     with the President's authority to use appropriated monies in 
     any manner he believes best serves the Nation's foreign 
     policy interests. Rather, the measure merely states that, 
     absent compliance with an established timetable for 
     relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel, Congress will 
     invoke its spending power to reduce the aggregate funding 
     level that can be obligated in certain related discretionary 
     accounts. Instead of a prohibition on the ability of the 
     President to use money to exercise his constitutional powers, 
     S. 770 merely provides a fiscal incentive for the President 
     to exercise his discretion in a certain manner, though 
     leaving him capable of eschewing these incentives and acting 
     in direct contravention of Congress' wishes. Thus, such a 
     mechanism in no way restricts the ability of the President to 
     use his foreign affairs power to employ appropriated money as 
     he sees fit.
       That being so, S. 770 is different in this critical respect 
     from any other appropriation rider ever objected to by 
     Executive Branch officials as an unconstitutional 
     infringement on the President's foreign affairs power or 
     other executive powers. In all such cases, the appropriations 
     riders have directed a particular course of action or 
     inaction by prohibiting certain uses of appropriated funds, 
     even if the President desired to take such actions in 
     fulfilling his constitutionally-assigned duties. Issues 
     Raised by Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 & Section 503 of 
     Pub. L. No. 102-140, supra, citing Section 503 of Pub. L. No. 
     102-140, 105 Stat. at 820 (1991) (``[N]one of the funds 
     provided in this Act shall be used by the Department of State 
     to issue more than one official or diplomatic passport to any 
     United States government employee. . . . ''); Appropriations 
     Limitation for Rules Vetoed by Congress, supra, citing H.R. 
     7584, Sec. 608, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) 

[[Page S 15472]]
     (``None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available shall be 
     available to implement . . . any regulation which has been 
     disapproved pursuant to a resolution of disapproval duly 
     adopted. . . .'').
       The Attorney General and OLC have reasoned that if Congress 
     is without constitutional power to make decisions for the 
     President in areas the Constitution commits to his 
     discretion, it matters not whether that intrusion is embodied 
     in appropriations or other legislation. In exercising its 
     power of the purse, Congress has no greater authority to 
     usurp the President's exclusive constitutional authority than 
     when it acts pursuant to other enumerated powers. See, The 
     Appropriations Power & the Necessary & Proper Clause, 68 
     Wash. U. L. Q. 623, 30 (1990) (``[W]hen we hear discussions 
     about Congress' weighty role in . . . the foreign relations 
     power, and Congress adverts to `the power of the purse,' it 
     does not make sense. Congress still has to point to a 
     substantive power. The power of the purse . . . is only 
     procedural.'') (remarks by the Honorable William Barr).
       Here, in contrast, Congress imposes no restrictions on 
     appropriated funds: such funds may continue to be used to 
     maintain an Embassy in Tel Aviv should the President decide 
     to leave the Embassy there. Accordingly, there is nothing in 
     S. 770 ``requiring the President to relinquish his 
     constitutional discretion in foreign affairs'' and thus OLC's 
     reliance on Executive Branch condemnation of such 
     appropriation riders is entirely misplaced. OLC Op., p. 4.
       To be sure, if the President retains the status quo in 
     Israel, the State Department will have less funds in two 
     upcoming fiscal years than it would otherwise have, and so S. 
     770 is plainly designed to influence the President's decision 
     on the Jerusalem Embassy. But this sort of ``horse trading'' 
     is a basic staple of relations between the two political 
     branches and hardly infringes the President's constitutional 
     authority or powers. For example, the President has 
     unfettered constitutional authority to nominate whomever he 
     desires for, say, Surgeon General, and Congress does not 
     unconstitutionally interfere with that presidential 
     appointment authority by abolishing or reducing the funding 
     for the Surgeon General's Office if certain nominees are 
     proposed. Similarly, Congress may constitutionally pledge to 
     reduce financial support for certain foreign interests or 
     international organizations simply because it is displeased 
     with the President's exercise of his responsibilities as 
     foreign affairs spokesman or Commander-in-Chief. Since the 
     use of these sorts of quid pro quos to influence the 
     President's exercise of his constitutional duties does not 
     unconstitutionally interfere with those duties, S. 770's 
     establishment of such a device is similarly within Congress' 
     constitutional authority.
       By entrusting the President with the authority to 
     definitively resolve certain questions, the Framers did not 
     erect a prophylactic shield protecting the President against 
     all attempts to influence the manner in which he resolves 
     those issues. Accordingly, the Founders did not erect some 
     special constitutional protection for the President which 
     immunizes him from the give and take of inter-branch 
     disagreements. Rather, they expected that a President of 
     ``tolerable firmness'' would be able to resist congressional 
     blandishments to pursue a course he deemed unwise, assuming 
     such appropriations riders survived his veto in the first 
     instance. Alexander Hamilton, ``The Federalist No. 73,'' at 
     445 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
       For this reason, even those scholars who believe Congress 
     ``ought not be able to regulate Presidential action by 
     conditions on the appropriation of funds . . . if it could 
     not regulate the action directly,'' Henkin, supra at 113, 
     acknowledge that establishment of financial penalties or 
     incentives to influence presidential action is permissible. 
     Henkin, supra at 79. (``Since the President is always coming 
     to Congress for money for innumerable purposes, domestic and 
     foreign, Congress and Congressional committees can use 
     appropriations and the appropriations process to bargain also 
     about other elements of Presidential policy and foreign 
     affairs.''). Indeed, the Attorney General has favorably 
     opined on the constitutionality of an appropriation rider 
     that imposed a markedly more onerous restriction on the 
     President's exclusive Commander-in-Chief powers than S. 770 
     imposes on his foreign policy discretion. In 1909, Congress 
     attached the following rider to the Navy's appropriation:
       ``[N]o part of the appropriations herein made for the 
     Marine Corps shall be expended for the purpose for which said 
     appropriations are made unless officers and enlisted men 
     shall serve on board all battleships and armored cruisers, 
     and also upon such other vessels of the navy as the 
     President may direct, in detachments of not less than 
     eight percentum of the strength of the enlisted men of the 
     navy on said vessels.
       ``Naval Appropriations Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 753, 773, 
     reprinted in Appropriations--Marine Corps--Service on 
     Battleships,'' 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259 (1909).
       The Attorney General found this restriction constitutional 
     because, ``Congress has power to create or not to create . . 
     . a marine corps, make appropriation for its pay, [and] 
     provide that such appropriation shall not be made available 
     unless the marine corps be employed in some designated way . 
     . .'' 27 Op. Att'y Gen. at 260.
       So far as we can discern, neither OLC nor the Attorney 
     General have subsequently disavowed or undermined the 
     vitality of this Attorney General Opinion, although they 
     opined at times that appropriation riders could not direct 
     the President to take action within his constitutional 
     sphere. Presumably, then, even Executive Branch officials 
     have recognized a distinction between impermissible riders 
     that mandate certain action or inaction and permissible ones 
     which, like the Marine Corps appropriation, provide the 
     President with at least a nominal choice between two courses 
     of action, with financial ``penalties'' if he chooses the 
     disfavored option. In the 1909 naval appropriation, the 
     President's ``choice'' was between having marines constitute 
     eight percent of battleship crews or having no funding for 
     the Marine Corps at all. This complete defunding penalty for 
     exercising the disfavored option is obviously far more 
     draconian than the 50% reduction in construction funding 
     occasioned by S. 770.
       In short, there is an obvious and constitutionally 
     significant difference between an appropriations law 
     forbidding the President to take action which the 
     Constitution leaves to his discretion and a law which merely 
     sets out the negative financial consequences that will ensue 
     if the President pursues a certain policy. This distinction 
     between coercive laws and laws which offer financial 
     incentives to exercise one's sovereign power in the preferred 
     way has been well-recognized by the Supreme Court in directly 
     analogous circumstances.
       Most notably, in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), 
     the Supreme Court considered a congressional statute, known 
     as Section 158, which directed the Secretary of 
     Transportation to withold five percent of allocable highway 
     funds from any state in which individuals under the age of 21 
     could legally purchase or possess alcohol. Like S. 770, the 
     funding mechanism in Dole constituted a congressional attempt 
     to provide indirect financial inducement to affect policy in 
     an area presumably beyond Congress' power to legislate 
     directly.
       Despite earlier recognition that the ``Twenty-first 
     Amendment grants States virtually complete control over 
     whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to 
     structure the liquor distribution system,'' \5\ the Court 
     upheld this statutory incursion into state sovereignty, 
     asserting that the ``encouragement to state action found in 
     Sec. 158 is a valid use of the spending power.'' Dole, 483 
     U.S. at 212. Accordingly, even though the Constitution 
     assigned to the states the responsibility for establishing 
     drinking ages, and thus Congress presumably could not direct 
     the states to set a minimum age, this funding restriction was 
     permissible because ``Congress has acted indirectly under its 
     spending power to encourage uniformity in the States' 
     drinking ages.'' Id. at 206. Thus, such restrictions are 
     permissible because the potential recipient of appropriated 
     federal funds is free to reject Congress' financial 
     inducement and exercise unfettered discretion in the relevant 
     area, so long as the recipient is willing to endure the 
     financial sacrifice that ensues. Id. at 211-212 (``Congress 
     has offered . . . encouragement to the States to enact higher 
     minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose. But 
     the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the 
     States not merely in theory but in fact.''). Similarly, in 
     upholding federal appropriation riders requiring the 
     regulation of State employees' political activities, the 
     Supreme Court has ruled that even though Congress ``has no 
     power to regulate local political activities as such of state 
     officials,'' the federal government nevertheless ``does have 
     power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to 
     states shall be disbursed.'' Oklahoma v. Civil Service 
     Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). The Court found that the 
     state's sovereignty remained intact because the state could 
     adopt ``the `simple expedient' of not yielding to what she 
     urges is federal coercion.'' Id. at 143-144.
       Thus, Dole would seem to directly establish that the sort 
     of conditional funding provided by S. 770 is constitutionally 
     permissible. In Oklahoma and Dole, the Tenth and Twenty-first 
     Amendments provided the states with exclusive authority over 
     their employees' political activities and citizens' legal 
     drinking age, yet Congress did not unconstitutionally 
     infringe these powers by offering financial incentives to 
     adopt a particular policy. By the same token, the fact that 
     the Constitution vests the President with exclusive 
     recognition authority does not disable Congress from using 
     its plenary spending power to seek to influence the exercise 
     of that authority.
       Like the drinking-age restriction in Dole, the funding 
     mechanism in S. 770 merely attempts to induce recipients of 
     federal funds to pursue policy ends advocated by Congress via 
     clearly established conditions on future appropriations, 
     while leaving that decisionmaker with the option of refusing 
     such conditions. The President may exercise his discretion to 
     retain the American embassy in Tel Aviv and accept the 
     potential of reduced congressional funding in certain related 
     discretionary accounts, or he can move the embassy. S. 770 
     does nothing to alter the fundamental fact that the decision 
     as to where to locate the U.S. embassy in Israel ``remains 
     the prerogative'' of the President ``not merely in theory but 
     in fact.'' Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12.\6\
       To be sure, the President differs from state governments 
     because, as noted, he cannot pursue any action requiring 
     expenditures without congressional funding. Thus a blanket 
     prohibition against using appropriated 

[[Page S 15473]]
     funds does not leave him with any option to pursue the proscribed 
     activity. Because of this distinction, a straightforward 
     restriction against using any funds for an action otherwise 
     within the President's constitutional power is an effective 
     prohibition against taking such action and thus presents a 
     different, and more difficult, constitutional question. As 
     noted, however, that is not the situation here. The President 
     has been offered a choice directly analogous to that offered 
     the states in Dole--he may pursue the congressionally 
     disfavored option and accept the financial consequences or 
     acquiesce to the preferred option without any such sacrifice.
       OLC has nonetheless previously sought to distinguish Dole 
     on the grounds that the Supreme Court's decision in 
     Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for 
     the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991) 
     (hereinafter ``MWAA'') found Dole ``inapplicable'' to issues 
     that ``involve separation-of-powers principles.'' Issues 
     Raised by Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 and Section 503 
     of Pub. L. No 102-140, supra, at 31. This assertion is 
     patently untrue. MWAA in no way suggests that, while Congress 
     is free to use its spending power to influence the sovereign 
     power of states guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment and the 
     Constitution's basic structure, the sovereign powers of the 
     President are somehow different and thus immune from such 
     congressional blandishments. Contrary to OLC's misleading 
     selective quotation, MWAA never said Dole's rationale was 
     ``inapplicable'' to cases involving ``separation-of-powers 
     principles,'' it simply stated that Dole's Nationale was 
     ``inapplicable to the issue presented by this case.'' MWAA, 
     1111 S. Ct. at 2309 (emphasis added). Dole's rationale was 
     inapplicable not because the sovereign authority of the 
     President is somehow different from that of the states, but 
     because the infringement of executive powers in MWAA was 
     obviously and significantly different from the funding 
     appropriation conditions at issue in Dole.
       The issue that divided the dissenting and majority opinions 
     in MWAA was whether Congress was effectively responsible for 
     creating the Board of Review, which was composed of Members 
     of Congress and had veto power over the Airport Authority's 
     important decisions. Id. at 2313 (White, J. dissenting). The 
     dissent argued that no separation-of-powers issue was 
     implicated by this Board of Review because the Commonwealth 
     of Virginia (and the District of Columbia) had created that 
     Board and no federalism principles prevented the states from 
     so utilizing the talents of Members of Congress. Id. 
     According to the dissent, the fact that Congress had coerced 
     Virginia to make this decision was of no moment because this 
     ``coercion'' was no different than Congress' use of the 
     spending power to influence states in Dole. Id. at 2316-17.
       In the section of the opinion relied upon by OLC, the 
     majority refuted both prongs of the dissent's arguments:
       ``Here, unlike Dole, there is no question about federal 
     power to operate the airports. The question is whether the 
     maintenance of federal control over the airports by means of 
     the Board of Review, which is allegedly a federal 
     instrumentality, is invalid, not because it invades any state 
     power, but because Congress' continued control violates the 
     separation-of-powers principle, the aim of which is to 
     protect not the States but ``the whole people from 
     improvident laws.'' Chadha, at 951, 103 S. Ct. at 2784. 
     Nothing in our opinion in Dole implied that a highway grant 
     to a State could have been conditioned on the State's 
     creating a ``Highway Board of Review'' composed of Members of 
     Congress.''--Id. at 2309.
       The first two sentences merely make the obvious point that 
     since MWAA deals with a ``federal instrumentality'' and there 
     was no question about the propriety of ``federal power to 
     operate the airports,'' there is simply no issue of federal 
     interference with state power.\7\ Since there was no question 
     of federal interference with, or bargaining for, state power, 
     the only relevant question was who controlled the federal 
     power--Congress or the Executive. In that regard, Congress 
     had not ``bargained'' with the Executive by establishing 
     financial conditions analogous to S. 770, but had directly 
     commandeered control over the Airport Authority by 
     establishing the Review Board.
       The third sentence in the quoted passage simply says that 
     Dole is inapplicable because the infringement in MWAA is 
     different from the appropriation restriction in Dole and 
     would be impermissible if applied to the states. This 
     obviously belies the assertion that Dole was found 
     inapplicable because different standards govern infringement 
     on the President's powers than those which govern state 
     intrusions. Specifically, Dole was distinguishable because, 
     in MWAA, Congress did not provide money in return for 
     Virginia exercising its sovereignty in a certain way. Rather, 
     Virginia agreed to transfer its sovereignty over the Airport 
     Authority to Congress. As the opinion's derisive citation to 
     a ``Highway Board of Review'' makes clear, while the federal 
     government may use its spending power to influence a state's 
     exercise of its own sovereignty, Congress cannot use its 
     spending power to induce the state to enhance congressional 
     authority by creating congressionally-controlled federal 
     instrumentalities. In short, Virginia was not trading away 
     its own state power over airports; it had none. Rather, it 
     was trading away the pre-existing Executive power over the 
     airports to Congress. Since Virginia obviously had no 
     Executive power to trade, Congress could not invoke Dole to 
     justify its exercise of Executive power.
       As this detailed review establishes, MWAA said that Dole 
     was inapplicable because 1) there was no state power to 
     bargain away, and 2) states cannot enhance congressional 
     power in return for congressional dollars. Nothing in MWAA 
     suggests that Dole was inapposite because the Executive, 
     unlike states, in somehow disabled from agreeing to exercise 
     his sovereign authority in a particular manner in return for 
     increased congressional monies.
       To the contrary, like the states, the Executive Branch, 
     ``absent coercion . . . has both the incentive and the 
     ability to protect its own rights and powers, and therefore 
     may cede such rights and powers.'' MWAA, 111 S. Ct. at 2309. 
     The fact that preserving the President's powers against 
     congressional enactments is ultimately designed to protect 
     the ``whole people from improvident laws'' does not suggest a 
     different rule, since the federalism concerns implicated in 
     Dole were also designed to preserve the people's liberty. See 
     U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626-27 (1995) (``Just as the 
     separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the 
     Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of 
     excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power 
     between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the 
     risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.''), quoting 
     Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); New York v. 
     U.S., 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2431 (1992) (``[t]he Constitution 
     divides authority between federal and state governments for 
     the protection of individuals.'') (emphasis added.)
       To be sure, under MWAA, Congress could not condition 
     appropriations on the President's agreement to establish an 
     ``Israeli Embassy Board of Review,'' where congressional 
     agents determine the location of the Embassy. The President 
     cannot transfer his recognition powers to congressional 
     decisionmakers and, as indicated, there is a plausible 
     argument that Congress cannot directly supplant the 
     President's decisionmaking authority on such matters, even 
     though directives in appropriations bills. Like any other 
     sovereign, however, the President may consider many factors 
     in making his own decisions. Just as he may consider the 
     reaction of foreign countries, he may also consider a 
     negative congressional reaction. Accordingly, nothing 
     precludes Congress from seeking to influence that decision 
     through use of its own constitutional powers including the 
     spending power.
       Indeed, OLC's contrary position demeans the President's 
     constitutional status and certainly cannot be advanced in the 
     name of a strong Executive. The OLC Opinion suggests that the 
     President, unlike the states, lacks the ability or the will 
     to resist Congress' financial inducements. Particularly given 
     the existence of his veto power, this view of the President's 
     authority vis-a-vis Congress is obviously untenable and 
     irreconcilable with the Framers' views. The Framers did not 
     erect a prophylactic constitutional umbrella protecting the 
     President from the persuasive power of Congress' financial 
     inducements, they forged only a shield against congressional 
     directives. OLC simply ignores this vital distinction and the 
     Executive Branch and judicial precedent which support it.
       Under these precedents and a proper understanding of the 
     constitutional framework, S. 770 does not violate any 
     separation-of-powers principle or infringe any constitutional 
     authority of the President.


                               footnotes

     \1\ Section 4 of S. 770 merely reprograms $5 million in funds 
     appropriated in the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, 
     the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 
     1995. Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 60 (1994) (Title V 
     contains appropriations specifically for the Department of 
     State and related agencies.) Specifically, $5 million 
     previously contained in the aggregate account for expenses of 
     general administration is earmarked for costs incurred in 
     activities associated with the relocation of the U.S. embassy 
     in Israel: Id., Sec. 4 (``Of the funds appropriated for 
     fiscal year 1995 for the Department of State and related 
     agencies, not less than $5,000,000 shall be made available 
     until expended for costs associated with relocating the 
     United States Embassy in Israel. . . .'').
     The $5 million authorization is to remain in effect without 
     temporal restriction until such funds are expended. Sec. 4 
     Though the President is in no way obligated to spend the $5 
     million earmarked for the relocation effort, such funds 
     cannot be used for any other purposes. General Accounting 
     Office, ``Principles on Federal Appropriations Law'' 6-6 (2. 
     ed., 1992) (In an appropriations bill providing $1,000 for 
     ``[s]moking materials . . . of which not less than $100 shall 
     be available for Cuban cigars . . . portions of the $100 not 
     obligated for Cuban cigars may not be applied to the other 
     objects of the appropriation.''); Earmarked Authorizations, 
     64 Comp. Gen. 388, 394 (1985) (asserting that where measure 
     providing funding for the National Endowment for Democracy 
     earmarks ``Not less than $13,800,000'' for projects of the 
     Free Trade Union Institute, ``awards should not be made'' 
     where there is no worthy programs, ``but the consequence of 
     this [non-allocation] is not to free the unobligated earmarks 
     for other projects.''). Similarly, Section 5 of the bill 
     earmarks a specified amount of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated in the Department of State's general account for 
     ``Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad'' in fiscal 
     years 1996 and 1997, requiring that such earmarked funds be 
     spent on the embassy relocation effort. As in Section 4, the 
     budget authority is not temporarily restricted and is to last 
     ``until expended'' on the relocation effort. Given the 
     identical requirement that ``not less than [the earmarked 
     amount] . . . shall be made available'' in fiscal years 1996 
     and 1997 respectively, the President has discretion as to 
     whether to use the money, but cannot use earmarked funds for 
     other general purposes.

[[Page S 15474]]

     \2\ See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
     Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 n. 18 (1976) ( ``[T]he conduct of 
     [diplomacy] is committed primarily to the Executive Branch.'' 
     ); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 
     (1964) (``Political recognition is exclusively a function of 
     the Executive.''); Unites States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 
     (1942) (Asserting that the executive's constitutional 
     authority to recognize governments ``is not limited to a 
     determination of the government to be recognized. It includes 
     the power to determine the policy which is to govern the 
     question of recognition.'').
     \3\ Congress has repeatedly used its control over 
     appropriations to influence executive actions on foreign 
     policy and has repeatedly opined that these conditions are 
     constitutional. See, e.g., William C. Banks & Peter Raven-
     Hansen, ``National Security and the Power of the Purse'' 3-4 
     (1994); Louis Henkin, ``Foreign Affairs and the 
     Constitution'' 114 (1972). (``Congress has insisted and 
     Presidents have reluctantly accepted that in foreign affairs 
     . . . spending is expressly entrusted to Congress and its 
     judgment as to the general welfare of the United States, and 
     it can designate the recipients of its largesse and impose 
     conditions upon it.''); ``Report of the Committees 
     Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,'' S. Rept. No. 100-216, 
     H. Rept. No. 100-433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1987) 
     (``[W]e grant without argument that Congress may use its 
     power over appropriations . . . to place significant limits 
     on the methods a President may use to pursue objectives the 
     Constitution put squarely within the executive's 
     discretionary power.'' ). Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
     Sec. 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (1984), reprinted in Banks, 
     supra at 138. ( ``During fiscal year 1985, no funds available 
     to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of 
     Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States 
     involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or 
     expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of 
     supporting . . . military or paramilitary operations in 
     Nicaragua. . . .'' ); Arms Control Export Act of 1976, Pub. 
     L. No. 94-329, Sec. 404, 90 Stat. 729, 757-58 (1976) ( ``[N]o 
     assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or 
     which would have no effect, of promoting . . . the capacity 
     of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual 
     to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola. . . 
     .'' ).
     \4\ It is well-established that Congress may not use its 
     spending power to coerce activity that itself violates a 
     provision of the Constitution. See United States v. Butler, 
     297 U.S. 1, 69-70, 74 (1936): United States v. Lovett, 328 
     U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946) (striking a funding restriction as a 
     bill of attainder in violation of the U.S. Constitution). 
     Obviously, this doctrine has no application here since the 
     Constitution does not prohibit moving the American Embassy in 
     Israel to Jerusalem. However, OLC, as it has in the past, 
     further maintains that the spending power cannot be used to 
     force the President to take action that is perfectly 
     constitutional, if the appropriation restricts the 
     President's power to exercise his unfettered discretion in an 
     area within his constitutional authority. There is no 
     judicial precedent either way on OLC's extension of the 
     ``independent constitutional bar'' principle in a separation-
     of-powers context. In the context of congressional funding 
     conditions on state governments, the Supreme Court has 
     unequivocally rejected an expanded notion of the independent 
     constitutional bar:
     ``[T]he ``independent constitutional bar'' limitation on the 
     spending bar is not, as petitioners suggest, a prohibition on 
     the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not 
     empowered to achieve directly. Instead, we think that the 
     language in our earlier opinions stands for the 
     unexceptionable proposition that the power may not be used to 
     induce activities that would themselves be 
     unconstitutional.''
     South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987). See also 
     Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). Of 
     course, the President, unlike the states, has no access to 
     funds other than those appropriated by Congress. Thus, unlike 
     the situation with state governments, a prohibition 
     precluding the President from spending any appropriated 
     monies on a particular activity is a direct prohibition 
     against pursuing that activity. This provides a plausible 
     basis for distinguishing the statute involved in Dole from a 
     direct appropriations restriction on the President's 
     activities. As we discuss below, however, Dole provides 
     direct support, where, as here, there is no prohibition 
     against spending money on the President's desired activity.
     \5\ California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal 
     Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) cited in Dole, 483 U.S. at 
     205.
     \6\ The Supreme Court has recognized that at some point, a 
     financial inducement becomes so lucrative that ``pressure 
     turns into compulsion'' and such incentive becomes 
     unconstitutional coercion. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. See also, 
     Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
     However, the Dole Court dismissed any claim of coercion 
     involved in the drinking age funding provision, stating that 
     the ``relatively small percentage'' of highway funds involved 
     in the cutoff were not coercive. 483 U.S. at 211. The Court 
     further asserted that the mere fact that a conditional grant 
     of money is successful in achieving compliance with 
     congressional restrictions will not establish coercion. Id. 
     seems clear that, given the minuscule amount of funding 
     involved in S. 770, especially relative to the substantial 
     highway fund allocations involved in Dole, the incentive 
     mechanism at issue could not be deemed coercive. Should the 
     President refuse to move the embassy, he would be barred from 
     obligating funds amounting to a mere one percent of the 
     budget authority reserved for international affairs in each 
     of the fiscal years involved and a mere one one-hundredth of 
     one percent of the aggregate budget in those same years. 
     Office of Management & Budget, ``Appendix to the Budget of 
     the United States for Fiscal Year 1996'' 692-93 (1995); 
     Office of Management & Budget, ``Historical Tables to 
     Supplement the Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 
     1996'' 14, 69 (1995).
     \7\ The Court had previously noted that the Board of Review 
     was ``an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the 
     powers of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which 
     is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and 
     membership in which is restricted to congressional officials. 
     Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal power 
     as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of-powers 
     scrutiny.'' Id. at 2308.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the bill which I have 
cosponsored which will relocate the American Embassy to Israel's 
capital of Jerusalem by a date certain.
  For nearly 50 years now, Jerusalem has served as the capital of the 
State of Israel. Israel is the only place in the world that I know of 
where the United States has established its Embassy in a city other 
than that identified by the host nation as its capital. Jerusalem is 
the seat of Israel's Government and there should be little question of 
where our Embassy should be.
  Now, some have suggested that establishing the American Embassy in 
Jerusalem during the ongoing peace negotiations might adversely affect 
the peace process. For reasons just stated by Senator Kyl, I think it 
actually could have the opposite effect, that our clear determination 
to place our Embassy in Jerusalem by a date certain will avoid any 
misunderstanding, and it is that misunderstanding or lack of clarity 
which could harm the peace process, because surely no one seriously 
suggests that Israel would ever agree to change the status of Jerusalem 
as Israel's capital.
  I do not think anyone has made that suggestion. I do not think anyone 
in the world would make that suggestion.
  It is now Israel's capital. It is clearly going to remain Israel's 
capital. We, as Israel's ally, should make it very clear that we 
recognize that fact and that we act to assure the movement of our 
Embassy to the capital of the State of Israel by a fixed date.
  Mr. President, there will be and has been some discussion about a 
possible Presidential waiver. We had such a waiver with the Jackson-
Vanik legislation, for instance--very important legislation which 
focused some very significant pressure on the then Soviet Union.
  That legislation had an impact. It worked well to focus pressure on 
the Soviet Union. It made a very important statement about our feelings 
about human rights in the Soviet Union and its relationship to trade. 
But it also had a waiver.
  The question is, what kind of a waiver would be appropriate for the 
President in this instance? It is clear to me that the waiver should be 
narrowly drawn so as not to undermine or detract from the point of this 
legislation.
  This is historic legislation. This is action which is long overdue. 
It is cosponsored by 67 Senators, which will, hopefully, assure its 
overwhelming passage today. I cosponsor it in the hope that it will 
receive the overwhelming bipartisan support of the Senate that it 
deserves.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am among those who have long supported 
the concept embodied in the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Implementation 
Act of 1995. Since Senator Dole introduced this legislation, there has 
been great gnashing of teeth and wringing of hands that have 
trivialized a fundamental and significant fact: Jerusalem is the 
capital of Israel, and the capital is where the United States Embassy 
should always be regardless of the country involved.
  The Government of Israel has asserted that Jerusalem is and will 
remain the capital of Israel. The dire warnings being heard that the 
peace process will be endangered are, in fact, threats. The peace 
process will be dismantled only if and when Yasser Arafat wants to 
dismantle it.
  I commend Senator Dole for his efforts, for his conviction, and for 
accomplishing what I feel should have been done years ago. I am pleased 
to be a cosponsor, and I will be pleased to visit the United States 
Embassy in Jerusalem, capital of the State of Israel.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am honored to rise today as an original 
cosponsor of S. 1322, the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Implementation 
Act of 1995. I would like to commend Majority Leader Dole and Senators 
D'Amato and Moynihan for the leadership they have shown on this 
important issue.
  I think it is only fitting--and long overdue--that the Senate act on 
this resolution this week, prior to Wednesday's ceremony in the Capitol 
rotunda celebrating the 3,000th anniversary of the Jewish presence in 
Jerusalem.
  The resolution before us today would put the Senate clearly on record 
as supporting a unified Jerusalem as the permanent capital of the State 
of Israel. Some have argued that Senate passage of this resolution 
would somehow harm the peace process--in particular, the upcoming 
negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem. I would point out to my 
colleagues that this resolution has been carefully drafted so that it 
is compatible with the timetable established by the peace process. 
Under the terms of this resolution, the 

[[Page S 15475]]
Senate would state that it is the policy of the United States that 
``the United States Embassy in Israel should be relocated to Jerusalem 
no later than May 31, 1999.'' That is the date established in the Oslo 
Agreement of 1993 for the completion of final status negotiations for 
Jerusalem. I think it is appropriate that we send a clear signal of 
congressional support for our Israeli allies as they enter these 
difficult negotiations.
  Mr. President, Jerusalem has been the declared capital of the State 
of Israel since January 23, 1950. And yet, over 45 years later, the 
United States has not recognized Jerusalem as the capital of our friend 
and ally, the State of Israel. Israel is the only nation in the world 
where the United States Embassy is not located in the host nation's 
capital.
  Like many of my colleagues, I have had the privilege of visiting 
Jerusalem on many occasions. I have seen the many holy sites which make 
Jerusalem the cradle of three of the world's largest religons--Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam--and an inspiration to us all.
  I have also seen the bombed out buildings in West Jerusalem that 
stand just outside the wall of the Old City--buildings which were 
shelled during the time of the Jordanian occupation of East Jerusalem. 
Those buildings serve as a constant reminder of the sacrifices endured 
by the Jewish people from 1947 to 1967 when Jews were denied access to 
the holy sites in East Jerusalem; and a reminder that the world must 
never allow the citizens of Israel--and indeed Jews around the world--
to be subjected to such suffering again.
  Mr. President, Israel is our strong friend and ally in the Middle 
East. As the only democracy in the region, this brave nation stands as 
a symbol of hope for millions. The people of Israel claim Jerusalem as 
their capital. This is their right. Their choice should be honored. 
America should recognize that Jerusalem is, and will remain, the 
undivided and permanent capital of the State of Israel.
  I thank the Chair.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I support this legislation, and would like 
to congratulate the distinguished majority Leader for his consistent 
leadership on this very important issue. This bill states the simple 
fact that Jerusalem is Israel's national capital. It puts in place a 
series of careful, measured steps to eventually locate our Embassy in 
Israel's capital city, but in any case no later than May 31, 1999.
  I am a cosponsor of both S. 770, the original Jerusalem Embassy 
Relocation Implementation Act, as well as the slightly modified bill 
that we are considering today, S. 1322. S. 770 was introduced on May 9 
by the gentleman from Kansas, Senator Dole, and I am proud to have 
joined with 62 of my colleagues as a cosponsor of both S. 770 and S. 
1322.
  I was also pleased to join 92 of my colleagues in our March 20 letter 
to Secretary of State Christopher calling for the relocation of our 
Embassy to Jerusalem no later than May 1999, the time when both the 
Israelis and Palestinians have agreed that the final status of 
Jerusalem would be settled.
  Some may argue that now is not the time for us to establish a firm 
policy on the eventual location of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. The 
irony, of course, is that it appears that for 47 straight years the 
State Department has never yet found precisely the right moment to take 
this commonsense action. All we are saying in this legislation is that 
we are giving State 4 years in which they certainly can find an 
appropriate time.
  As a cosponsor of the original House Lantos bill to take this action 
over a decade ago, I have consistently supported this position 
throughout my congressional career.
  Only in the sometimes fantastic politics of the Middle East could 
this issue even be considered remarkable. It is a simple fact that 
Jerusalem--or at least some part of Jerusalem--has been Israel's 
capital city ever since Israel's 1948 war for independence. Observing 
this fact is no different than observing that the sun rises in the 
east. And trying to deny the act does not make it any less true.
  This takes us to a potentially troubling aspect of the State 
Department's consistent refusal to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's 
capital. This policy originated from the days of the U.N. partition 
plan ending Britain's colonial mandate over the region. That plan 
envisioned the establishment of Jerusalem as an international city not 
under the sovereignty of any nation.
  The U.N. partition plan of 1947, however, was never implemented due 
to its total rejection by the Arab countries because it would have 
split the British protectorate into a Jewish and Arab state. Thus, the 
State Department continues to cling to a formal position refusing to 
acknowledge Israel's sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem.
  The only, and I repeat only possible justification for such a 
position would be if the State Department believed that Israeli 
sovereignty over even west Jerusalem was illegitimate, and that Israel 
must cede the entire city to an Arab state or to international control.
  If our country does not take this position, we have no more right 
maintaining our Embassy in Tel Aviv than we do insisting on maintaining 
our Embassy in Alexandria, Egypt, which was that country's capital 
until the military overthrow of its monarchy by Col. Gamel Abdel Nassar 
in 1952.
  Mr. President, I believe it is long past time for our country to 
begin treating our closest ally in the Middle East--Israel--in the same 
way that we treat every Arab country, and indeed, every other country 
in the world with whom we maintain diplomatic relations. It is time for 
us to locate our Embassy in Israel's capital city, and stop making 
excuses why any particular moment never seems to be exactly the right 
moment. Sometime in the next 4 years that moment will arrive, and that 
is all this bill is saying.
  I urge overwhelming bipartisan support for this important bill, and I 
again congratulate the Senator from Kansas for his leadership on this 
issue.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 1322, a bill 
to relocate the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel 
Aviv. I am honored to be a cosponsor of this legislation and to have 
joined the overwhelming majority of my colleagues in writing a letter 
to Secretary Christopher this past March regarding this issue.
  Mr. President, for nearly 50 years, the United States and Israel have 
shared a unique and historic relationship. Israel has been our 
strongest, most loyal ally in the Middle East, and the location of our 
Embassy in Tel-Aviv is inconsistent with this relationship.
  Israel is the only country in the world where the United States 
Embassy is not located in the capital city, and I believe this policy 
must change. It is important to note that Israel's Parliament, supreme 
court, central bank, and all other state institutions and headquarters 
are located in Jerusalem, including the Foreign Ministry. Beyond just 
the important symbolism, the location of our embassy in Jerusalem, 
rather than in Tel Aviv, an hour away from the seat of government, 
makes practical sense.
  Mr. President, I believe that since this year marks the 3,000th 
anniversary of King David establishing Jerusalem as the capital city of 
the Jewish nation, there is no better time for the United States to 
recognize this historic seat of government. The site for the Embassy is 
not located in disputed territory, the status of Jerusalem as Israel's 
capital is not disputed, and we ought to support this valuable friend 
and ally.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, the Arab-Israel peace process must be 
judged by one question, and one question only: Will Israel be stronger 
and more secure at the end of the process than it was at the beginning? 
To achieve that end, I support this legislation to move the U.S. 
Embassy to Jerusalem.
  Our Embassy should be located in Jerusalem. Jerusalem is Israel's 
chosen seat of government, where its Parliament, prime ministry, 
Supreme Court, and most government ministries are located. The United 
States has diplomatic relations with 184 countries, and in every 
country--except Israel--our embassy is located in the capital 
designated by the host nation.
  The Clinton administration argues that moving the Embassy will 
destroy the peace process. I believe that the peace process can 
continue only if Israelis believe that their nation's vital 

[[Page S 15476]]
interests will not be compromised. Moving our Embassy to Jerusalem will 
strengthen that conviction, and it will be a clear demonstration of the 
fact that no wedge will be driven between Israel and the United States 
over the status of Jerusalem.
  This week, we will begin a celebration of Jerusalem and its 3,000 
years of playing a critical, central role in world history. As we begin 
this celebration, I am pleased to support this bill in the conviction 
that moving the American Embassy would send an unmistakable signal that 
the unity of Jerusalem is irreversible, and it will remain, now and 
forever, the capital of Israel.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 1322, as an 
original cosponsor, an author, along with my colleague Senator Moynihan 
of a letter to the Secretary of State along with 91 of our colleagues 
proposing this very idea, and finally as a true believer in the 
principle of this legislation. I want to make it very clear: Jerusalem 
is and shall remain the undivided capital of the State of Israel. 
Jerusalem belongs to Israel and our Embassy belongs in Jerusalem.
  Relocation of our Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem should begin as 
soon as possible. Under this bill, it will.
  It is outrageous that we have diplomatic relations with 184 countries 
throughout the world and in every one, except Israel, our Embassy is in 
the functioning capital.
  Israel has endured much throughout her history and for her to have to 
suffer the indignity of her main ally refusing to place its embassy in 
her capital is an insult.
  We would never allow another country to tell us where to locate our 
capital. Why are we dictating this to Israel?
  In a time when the Palestinians are placing more and more demands on 
Israel and when the United States is providing $500 million to the PLO, 
only to find Yasir Arafat unable to deliver on his end of the peace 
agreement, we must make it clear that some things are not negotiable. 
Jerusalem for one is not a topic for negotiation. Jerusalem belongs to 
Israel.
  If we delay moving our Embassy any longer, we will be raising 
unrealistic hopes about the future of this holy city.
  It was for this reason that I along with Senator Moynihan and 91 
other Senators sent a letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
urging him to begin planning now for the relocation of the Embassy to 
Jerusalem by no later than May 1999. At this time, I ask unanimous 
consent that the text of this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                         United States Senate,

                                   Washington, DC, March 20, 1995.
     Hon., Warren Christopher,
     Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: We believe that Jerusalem is and shall 
     remain the undivided capital of the State of Israel. It is 
     now over eleven years since 50 United States Senators and 227 
     members of the House of Representatives joined in endorsing 
     the transfer of the United States embassy In Israel from Tel 
     Aviv to Jerusalem.
       In the subsequent decade both Houses of Congress have 
     passed, by near-unanimous margins, a total of four 
     resolutions calling on the United States government to 
     acknowledge United Jerusalem as the capital of the State of 
     Israel. A fifth resolution adopted last year called on the 
     administration to veto language in United Nations Security 
     Council Resolutions that states or implies that Jerusalem is 
     occupied territory.
       This administration has been open, direct and specific with 
     regard to its position concerning an undivided Jerusalem. In 
     this light, we are particularly pleased to note that the most 
     recent edition of ``Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts: 
     Guide for Business Representatives,'' published by the 
     Department of State lists Jerusalem under Israel for the 
     first time in 46 years, albeit with a disclaimer. This is not 
     enough.
       There can be little doubt that Jerusalem is a sensitive 
     issue in the current peace process. While the Declaration of 
     Principles stipulates that Jerusalem is a ``final status'' 
     issue to be negotiated between the parties, we share Prime 
     Minister Rabin's view which he expressed to the Knesset that:
       ``On Jerusalem, we said: `This Government, like all of its 
     predecessors, believes that is no disagreement in this House 
     concerning Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel. United 
     Jerusalem will not be open to negotiation. It has been and 
     will forever be the capital of the Jewish people, under 
     Israeli, sovereignty, a focus of the dreams and longings of 
     every Jew.''
       United States policy should be equally clear and 
     unequivocal. The search for peace only be hindered by raising 
     utterly unrealistic hopes about the future status of 
     Jerusalem among the Palestinians and understandable fears 
     among the Israeli population that their capital city may once 
     again be divided by cinder block and barbed wire.
       The United States enjoys diplomatic relations with 184 
     countries. Of these, Israel is the only nation in which our 
     embassy is not located in the functioning capital. This is an 
     inappropriate message to friends in Israel and, more 
     importantly, a dangerous message to Israel's enemies.
       We believe that the United States Embassy belongs in 
     Jerusalem. It would be most appropriate for planning to begin 
     now to ensure such a move no later than the agreements on 
     ``permanent status'' take effect and the transition period 
     has ended, which according to the Declaration of Principles 
     is scheduled for May 1999. We would appreciate hearing from 
     you as to what steps are being taken to make such a 
     relocation possible.
           Sincerely,
         Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Alfonse M. D'Amato, Paul S. 
           Sarbanes, Bob Packwood, Russell D. Feingold, Jess 
           Helms, Barbara Boxer, Connie Mack, Frank R. Lautenberg, 
           Don Nickles.
         Joseph I. Lieberman, Mitch McConnell, Bob Graham, 
           Christopher S. Bond, John D. Rockefeller IV, Olympia J. 
           Snowe, Richard H. Bryan, James M. Inhofe.
         Charles S. Robb, Dirk Kempthorne, Howell Heflin, Jon Kyl, 
           Carl Levin, Phil Gramm, Carol Moseley-Braun, Larry E. 
           Craig.
         Patty Murray, Robert Dole, Paul Wellstone, Slade Gorton, 
           Dianne Feinstein, Hank Brown, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 
           Mike DeWine.
         Tom Harkin, Charles E. Grassley, Daniel K. Inouye, Thad 
           Cochran, John Glenn, Arlen Specter, Wendell H. Ford, 
           Richard C. Shelby.
         Claiborne Pell, Trent Lott, Paul Simon, Dan Coats, Ben 
           Nighthorse Campbell, Conrad Burns, Max Baucus, William 
           S. Cohen.
         Daniel K. Akaka, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Christopher J. 
           Dodd, John Ashcroft, John F. Kerry, Robert F. Bennett, 
           Thomas A. Daschle, Larry Pressler.
         Barbara A. Mikulski, Bill Frist, Herb Kohl, Paul 
           Coverdell, Bill Bradley, Rod Grams, Harry Reid, Lauch 
           Faircloth.
         J. Bennett Johnston, John McCain, J. James Exon, Bob 
           Smith, Robert J. Kerrey, Richard G. Lugar, John B. 
           Breaux, Rick Santorum.
         Edward M. Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch, Kent Conrad, Strom 
           Thurmond, Ernest F. Hollings, Craig Thomas, Byron L. 
           Dorgan, John W. Warner, Jeff Bingaman, Alan K. Simpson.
         Sam Nunn, Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Patrick J. Leahy, Pete 
           V. Domenici, William V. Roth, Jr., Judd Gregg, Frank H. 
           Murkowski, Fred Thompson, Ted Stevens.

  Mr. D'AMATO. The bill calls for completion of the Embassy in May 
1999, to ensure that such a move occurs no later than when the 
agreements on permanent status take effect and the transition period 
has ended, according to the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel 
and the Palestinians in September 1993.
  Jerusalem is and will remain the permanent and undivided capital of 
Israel. I am not going to let the State Department bureaucrats forget 
that.
  The Clinton administration must recognize this and begin the process 
of moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. It is shameful that the United 
States continues to bend to pressure to keep its Embassy outside of 
Jerusalem.
  While I understand that the present Middle East peace negotiations 
are both complicated and delicate, I do not want this administration to 
be under the impression that Jerusalem will belong to anyone other than 
Israel.
  Further delay in moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem will only 
embolden the Palestinians who believe that they have a justified claim 
to the city.
  While some worry that such a move will damage the peace process, 
delay can only hurt it. If the future of Jerusalem remains unclear in 
the minds of the Palestinians then they will increase their demands and 
this will further complicate the already tense negotiations.
  Let the message be clear: A united Jerusalem is off limits to 
negotiation. Jerusalem belongs to Israel and our Embassy belongs in 
Jerusalem.
  Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  
[[Page S 15477]]

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the 
legislation before us, which would compel the movement of the United 
States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.
  Jerusalem, city of peace, the holy city, was entered almost 3,000 
years ago by King David. Mr. President, 47 years ago, in 1948, the 
modern State of Israel was established. The Prime Minister at that 
time, David Ben-Gurion, declared Israel a state and declared also that 
its capital would be Jerusalem, although at that time, after the war 
for independence, Jerusalem was a divided city: the western part 
Israeli; the old city and the eastern part, Jordanian.
  In the normal course of diplomatic relations, every nation in the 
world would have established their embassy in the city, Jerusalem, 
designated as the capital by the new state of Israel, the state having 
been recognized by the United States, having been accepted as a member 
of the United Nations. But, for reasons that need not be spelled out in 
detail here, because of controversy that surrounded the State of Israel 
and its creation, the modern state, the United States did not move its 
Embassy to the capital of the State of Israel.
  When you think about it, it is nothing short of outrageous. We have 
gone through 47 years of the history of this country, 47 years of 
extraordinary friendship between the United States and Israel based on 
common values, common history, our common commitment to what is 
appropriately described as the Judeo-Christian tradition, our common 
commitment to democratic values. Through most of that time, the 47 
years, Israel was the only country in the Middle East that was a 
democracy. It was 47 years in which our strategic relationships have 
grown ever closer, with joint military exercises and joint work on 
research and development, even, in this time, as we in the Senate have 
recently considered the priority threat that ballistic missiles 
represent to our country, the United States and Israel have been 
working jointly on a ballistic missile defense.
  I remember once years ago hearing the then Prime Minister of Israel, 
Golda Meir, say, and I believe it is true today, that there is one 
country in the Middle East where the United States will always know--
not just today, not just 10 years from now or 50 years from now or 100 
years from now--as long as Israel exists, because the ties between 
these countries are so deep and so strong--there is one country in the 
Middle East where the United States will always know that in a time of 
need, in a time of conflict, in a time of danger, the United States can 
always land its planes, can always keep its equipment, can always bring 
its ships into Israeli docks. As she said, hopefully there will be a 
time--and, of course, we echo that here in this Chamber, and there is 
such a time now--where there are other countries in the Middle East 
where that is so, where U.S. troops, U.S. personnel, are welcome. But 
it will always be so in Israel.
  Yet, in spite of all these points of common value, common interest, 
common strategic purpose, shared strategic developments, nonetheless 
the United States continued to be frozen into this inconsistent, 
illogical and in some senses insulting position of not moving its 
Embassy to the city of Jerusalem, which Israel has designated as its 
capital. There have been succeeding generations of American 
politicians--of both parties--who somehow manage to be committed to the 
movement of the embassy to Jerusalem during campaigns, but then when it 
comes time that they hold office, it does not happen.
  I think we are about to change all that, and I think we are about to 
change it in a truly bipartisan way. It is, though a long overdue 
moment, nonetheless a critically important moment when we are in reach 
of a strong, bipartisan majority in this Chamber and in the other body 
in support of this legislation.
  Would that the legislation were not necessary. But, it is. In some 
senses it may be unfortunate that it is, but in other senses it is 
fortunate that we bring this legislation to the Senate because the 
effect will be to show the world, to show the people of Israel, to show 
all concerned parties in the Middle East, that the representatives here 
in the Senate and in the House, both parties, from every section of the 
country, agree that this is a matter of principle, a matter of common 
sense, a matter in which the United States, a strong nation--the 
strongest nation in the world--acts like a strong nation and does what 
is consistent with its principles.
  Mr. President, I congratulate those who have brought this legislation 
forward: the distinguished majority leader, Senator Dole, Senator 
Inouye, Senator Kyl, Senator Moynihan, and the countless others who 
have fought this battle for so many years now, standing together 
shoulder to shoulder behind this piece of legislation. I am privileged 
to join them as a cosponsor.
  Mr. President, the details of the legislation have been spelled out. 
But the heart of it is that by this legislation, Congress will have 
stated a clear message. The Embassy of the United States in Israel will 
be relocated to Jerusalem, recognizing Israel's choice of that city as 
its capital.
  That relocation will occur no later than May 31, 1999. Why that day? 
Obviously, if you believe that the Embassy ought to be moved to 
Jerusalem, it should be moved as soon as possible, but that date was 
inserted by the sponsors--and I think wisely so--as an expression of 
deference, or respect, if you will, for the peace process embodied in 
the Declaration of Principles signed by the parties, Israel, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the United States, and Russia on 
September 13, 1993, here in Washington. May 1999 is the termination of 
the process begun by this Declaration of Principles, the so-called 
Middle East peace process. But let us set that definite date. Let us 
leave no uncertainty about it, that by that date the Embassy of the 
United States will be located in Jerusalem.
  Mr. President, there are those who are concerned about what impact 
this movement now will have on the peace process. Of course, every time 
in the past--I heard Senator Inouye speak in a meeting about this--any 
time he has begun to move forward moving the Embassy to Jerusalem, 
there is always something going on in the Middle East that makes it 
less than the perfect time.
  So there are those who will say they are worried about what effect 
this movement will have on the peace process. But I say that this is 
the perfect time, though long overdue, to move the Embassy to Jerusalem 
because of the peace process, because we have a growing level of trust, 
because we have a growing level of mutual interest, and of common 
purpose among the parties in the Middle East. The United States has 
played a leadership role in bringing those changes about. But at the 
heart of those changes, at the heart of the peace process, must be an 
honest relationship between the parties involved.
  I do not think the United States should be at all unclear about this. 
We are committed to doing in Israel what we do in every other country 
that we know about in the world--putting the Embassy in its capital. 
Let this not be an act of delusion of the Palestinians or any of the 
other parties to this process. Let us be honest about it and, in a 
sense, let us get the question of where the American Embassy is in 
Israel off the table in the peace process. Let us get it over with. 
There is a lot to negotiate.
  Some have suggested that somehow moving the Embassy was contrary to 
the Declaration of Principles. Mr. President, I read from article V of 
the Declaration of Principles signed here in Washington on September 
13, 1993. It says in section 3 of article V that it is understood that 
these negotiations--which is to say, the permanent statis negotiations 
that begin next year--shall cover the remaining issues, including 
Jerusalem; presumably final status of Jerusalem, and certainly not the 
question of where the United States locates its Embassy in this 
country. We are a great nation. How could we, as a great nation, yield 
that sovereign determination of ourselves to a process in which third 
parties are negotiating?
  So I think we ought to be honest with the Palestinians here and 
indicate that this Embassy of ours will move to Jerusalem. That kind of 
honesty will lead to trust as we go forward in the peace process.
  Second, Mr. President, I need not go on at length but would simply 
say I 

[[Page S 15478]]
have supported the peace process. I think the status quo before the 
peace process was going nowhere good, nowhere good for Israel, nowhere 
good for the Arab world, nowhere good for the Palestinians, and nowhere 
good for the Israeli security. There were no viable options to the 
attempt to make peace between the parties in conflict, understanding 
that peace would not come overnight. It would be built step by step and 
with each step outlined in the Declaration of Principles, hopefully 
enough trust would have been built to go on to the next step.
  There are enemies of peace all around, and the worst enemies of peace 
are committing acts of terrorism still. Those acts of terrorism, 
directed particularly against citizens of Israel, have an effect on the 
body politic in Israel and shake confidence in the peace process, shake 
support for the peace process.
  So I want to say, Mr. President, is that as the Israel people wonder 
and ask themselves whether the peace process really will provide more 
security; as they express diminishing support for the peace process in 
polls that are taken; and as the Rabin government finds that in taking 
Oslo 2 or Oslo B, the most recent agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinian authority, to the Israeli parliament--in the Knesset, the 
vote on ratification was 61 to 59; it is that close--the people of 
Israel look to the United States, the foremost, most steadfast 
supporter of the state, and ask where security will come from. Are 
there limits to what Israel will be asked to do?
  I think this is the perfect moment for the Congress of the United 
States to say there are some limits here. There are some matters that 
are off the table. We understand the critical importance of the city of 
Jerusalem to the people of Israel. And as a sign of that, this is the 
appropriate moment--long overdue, as I have said, but nonetheless a 
constructive moment--to say by this act we are ready to move our 
Embassy to Jerusalem.
  So I hope, though I know there are questions raised, we will find a 
way, and perhaps before too long here today, to build a strong, 
overwhelming bipartisan vote for this measure.
  I know there are concerns about constitutional questions. I know 
there is a discussion of a possible waiver going on; that is to say, to 
give the President the authority under some circumstances to waive the 
ultimate penalties associated with not moving the Embassy by May 31, 
1999. I understand those questions, and I am involved in the 
discussions of those questions.
  But it seems to me, as my friend and colleague from Michigan, Senator 
Levin, said, it is critically important that any waiver be narrowly 
drawn in that it not be a waiver that will go on forever, but that if 
the President determines--first, the President must be required to find 
a genuine threat to America's national security to stop the forward 
movement of the Embassy to Jerusalem, a threat to our national 
security. Second, that the waiver ought to be limited in time to 
perhaps 6-month periods so that the President will have to make that 
decision each time those 6 months are over.
  Mr. President, I am confident at this moment that we share--all of us 
in this Chamber--a goal; that is, to do what is right, to move the 
Embassy to Jerusalem. The question now really is over legislative 
wording, the appropriate relationship between the branches. I am 
optimistic that we can do that because I think we all share in this 
goal, and we are all committed to strengthening both our relationship 
with our cherished ally, Israel, but also in bringing peace both to the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, and to the Arab nations throughout the 
Middle East.
  So I urge my colleagues to do what I know they want to do, which is 
to vote for this proposal.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I also rise to speak in favor of S. 1322, 
which is the Israel Embassy Relocation Act. I have long supported 
moving the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and I firmly 
believe that Jerusalem should remain as the undivided capital of 
Israel.
  Earlier this year, I joined 92 of my Senate colleagues in sending a 
letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher endorsing the transfer 
of the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and as an 
original cosponsor of S. 1322, I commend the majority leader and 
Senator Kyl of Arizona for their constant and persistent leadership on 
this issue.
  Of the 184 United States Embassies around the world, our Embassy in 
Israel is the only one that is not located in the chosen capital of the 
host country. Israel has been mentioned many times on the floor today 
as a key strategic ally for America and the only true democratic nation 
in the Middle East. It makes good sense that the United States Embassy 
should be located in the same city where the business of government is 
conducted. The Israeli people will not abandon the rightful claim to 
Jerusalem as the eternal and undivided capital, and the United States 
will not force them to relinquish that claim. This simply is not a 
negotiable matter.
  As the peace process continues, moving the United States Embassy to 
Jerusalem again will send a clear message that America supports 
Israel's claim to Jerusalem. It is far better that all parties in the 
Middle East peace process understand America's position and know that 
it is a clear position. By allowing our position to remain ambiguous 
throughout the peace talks, we would risk creating false and 
unrealistic expectations about the status and the destiny of Jerusalem.
  Critics out there, including some in the administration, try to 
dismiss this bill as political pandering, but during his 1992 campaign 
it was President Clinton who deplored the fact that ``George Bush has 
repeatedly challenged Israel's sovereignty over the united Jerusalem 
and groups Jerusalem with the West Bank and Gaza as up for negotiation. 
Bill Clinton and Al Gore will . . . support Jerusalem as the capital of 
the State of Israel.''
  S. 1322 has strong bipartisan support with 67 cosponsors. This bill 
has already been modified to provide the administration with more 
flexibility in trying to determine the construction timetable for a new 
Embassy in Jerusalem, and as a member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, I hope the administration will drop any of its remaining 
opposition to this important symbolic legislation.
  Mr. President, S. 1322 would rectify a half-century-old wrong, 
contribute to the ongoing peace process, implement the wishes of the 
American people, and it would fulfill the hopes of the Israeli people. 
I close by urging my colleagues to show that Congress overwhelmingly 
supports this effort.
  I yield the floor, and I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, we have before us an issue that I 
think commands attention all around the world. It is an issue about 
whether or not we acknowledge what is a fact of life--that the Embassy, 
our Embassy, embassies of countries with diplomatic relations with 
Israel, belong in Israel's capital. There is no doubt that Jerusalem 
will remain the undivided capital of Israel. What we are discussing 
today, frankly, is not whether or not the United States Embassy belongs 
in Jerusalem, our Ambassador to Israel should be stationed there; we 
are talking about something that is, frankly, I believe, a matter of 
timing more than a matter of principle.
  The question of timing raises many arguments and many views. I am 
only able to stand in the Chamber a few minutes now because I have a 
Budget Committee meeting, which is kind of at the crux of lots of 
things at the moment--reconciliation, how we develop our revenues and 
what our expenses are and how we get to a balanced budget.
  That is certainly critical when we talk about foreign relations 
generally because we continue to reduce America's ability to 
communicate its views and ideas and implement its policies around the 
world as we limit the funds available for the operation of the State 
Department and our ability to grant aid. 

[[Page S 15479]]

  Just by way of quick example, in 1986 we gave 21 billion dollars' 
worth of foreign aid, and in 1996 we are going to provide around $12 
billion. And when you consider inflation, it is probably more like 30 
billion dollars' worth of aid or more at present values. But we will be 
giving less than half of that, kind of saying that America is 
withdrawing; America is stepping back; we are returning to a period, 
not a very pleasant one in history, where we isolated ourselves from 
the rest of the world. We continue to fund friendly nations like Egypt 
and Israel so that we can help maintain stability and an honest 
relationship with these countries. And so part of what we want to do is 
respect the sovereign view of where the capital lies and functions, 
and, as a responsible ally, place our Embassy there, within the normal 
reach of their Government. I think there are few in this Chamber who do 
not want it to happen.
  I ask unanimous consent that an article in today's Washington Post on 
page A9, entitled ``He Felt What I Felt,'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1995]

 ``He Felt What I Felt''--Jew, Palestinian Reach Out After Sons' Deaths

                          (By Barton Gellman)

       Jerusalem, Oct. 22.--Almost exactly a year ago, Abed Karim 
     Bader pinned on a skullcap to pass for a Jew and stopped his 
     rented car for a hitchhiking Israeli soldier.
       With three confederates from Hamas, the Islamic Resistance 
     Movement, Bader overpowered Cpl. Nachshon Waxman and abducted 
     him to the West Bank. Israeli commandos staged a rescue raid, 
     and the kidnappers shot their bound captive to death in his 
     chair. Bader died in the gunfight moments later.
       This is a conflict that trains even bystanders for their 
     roles. Loss calls for vengeance, hate for hate. Most of the 
     time those calls are answered. But not always.
       Tonight two grieving fathers, Bader's and Waxman's sat 
     together behind a table and spoke of treading a new path of 
     peace. They each wore a gray beard and a skullcap--Yehuda 
     Waxman the knitted kippah of a religious Zionist, Yassin 
     Bader the white linen takiyah of a Muslim sheik.
       They told a gathering of Israeli and Palestinian youths 
     that things had to change--that, as Waxman said, ``we have no 
     choice but to live together.''
       ``We are two peoples who live in this land,'' Bader said. 
     ``We have each suffered. We have paid a heavy price with our 
     sons. Mr. Waxman is a religious man. He felt what I felt, and 
     I felt what he felt. I hope no one here will ever feel what 
     we have felt or suffer what we have suffered.''
       There was no political program in the words, just a heart-
     heavy hope good might somehow come of their loss. Waxman is 
     tortured by the time he did not make for his son, the 
     conversations he was always too busy to have. Bader asks 
     himself how he could have missed the signs that his son had 
     turned to Hamas. Both want to be teachers of tolerance, and 
     they started here.
       The result were mixed. All the teenagers gathered at East 
     Jerusalem's American Colony Hotel were inclined to listen. 
     The Israelis were from Peace Now Youth, the Palestinians from 
     an informal peace group in Ramallah. Even so, there was anger 
     in the room, and strong distrust.
       Ori Dirdikman, 17, an Israeli, stood up and said she wanted 
     to ask how Bader ``responded to all his son's expressions of 
     extremism, since I assume it didn't suddenly happen and he 
     must have had an opportunity to respond.''
       Bader, a dignified man who runs a grocery in the Beit 
     Hanina section of East Jerusalem, composed his face. ``It is 
     hard,'' he said. ``I didn't know what was inside my son.''
       Afterward, the Israeli teenager shook her head. ``I want to 
     believe him,'' she said, ``but no. I'm sorry, but I don't 
     think it is possible. If he was really for peace, he was 
     obliged to do something.
       Fayez Othman, 17, a Palestinian, asked Waxman why Jews who 
     kill Arabs seem to get off lightly, while Arabs who dare cast 
     a stone are imprisoned for years.
       Waxman tried to deflect the question at first, saying such 
     matters are for the government. But Othman pressed again. 
     ``What do you call this government? Is this a just 
     government?'' he asked.
       ``You're a young man and you're looking for justice,'' 
     Waxman replied. ``I'm not looking for justice any more. There 
     are no just governments. There is only the best that people 
     can do. . . . It's better for a man to look for justice near 
     his home, with his brothers, with his friends. There you can 
     make a difference. Absolute justice? There's no such thing.''
       Othman liked the second answer better, but only a little.
       ``I didn't want to hear, `This is not my responsibility,' 
     '' the Palestinian said. ``I wanted to hear that this is 
     wrong.''
       Even so, Othman said, he respected a man who could respond 
     to his son's death with a gesture of tolerance. ``This will 
     encourage us,'' he said.
       Nachshon Waxman's kidnapping transfixed Israel last year. 
     His kidnappers released a videotape of the young man pleading 
     for his life. Yehuda Waxman, who said he could not stand to 
     watch, must be one of the few Israelis who did not see it. 
     His son, who held American and Israeli passports, died the 
     same day that the Nobel Peace Prize committee announced the 
     award would be shared among Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, 
     Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Foreign 
     Minister Shimon Peres.
       At first, the two families, Waxman and Bader, shared no 
     link save trauma. Yehuda Waxman prayed and spoke of 
     punishment for Hamas. At the Bader home--just a mile away--
     the funeral tent featured slogans painted by Hamas declaring 
     Yassin Bader's son a martyr righteous cause.
       The idea for reconciliation came as something of a 
     journalistic stunt. A weekly newspaper called Jerusalem 
     worked tirelessly to bring the two men together, negotiating 
     every detail for months.
       Israeli soldiers had sealed the Bader home in retribution, 
     and Yassin Bader wanted nothing to do with Israelis. Yehuda 
     Waxman feared being used. Before he would meet Bader, he 
     insisted on a letter dissociating the sheik from his son's 
     acts.
       Gradually Bader became convinced. He sat down and wrote out 
     longhand the requested note. ``I had no control over my 
     son,'' he wrote. ``I did not know of his plans. Had I known, 
     I would have opposed them. For who would want his son to risk 
     his life? Who would want his son to do such deeds?''
       When the two men finally met, they said, they were struck 
     by how alike they were. Devout and serious, they decided to 
     work together.
       Did it help? ``To tell the truth,'' said Naomi Cohen, 17, 
     ``with all the pain and for all the fact that I've grown up 
     on the left, I couldn't help hating [Bader] since he is the 
     father of a murderer, and he was sitting beside the total 
     opposite. They symbolize different things. Waxman is an 
     example to me. He is able to be more forgiving than I am, and 
     it was his son.''
       Nihaya Harhash, also 17, said she felt ``anger and tension 
     on both sides.''
       Waxman, interviewed afterward, said he was not discouraged 
     or surprised. ``This is our purpose, to see this anger melt 
     off,'' he said. ``It will take a long time. It will take 
     years and years. But we will do it.''

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. The article talks about the pain of two fathers, one 
whose son was kidnapped by the other's son and put on television when 
this young man was held by Hamas, pleading for his life. His father 
heard the pleas of the young man as they held a gun to his head.
  When the rescue attempt took place, just a little later on, not only 
was the victim killed, but the perpetrator was killed. And now the 
fathers are meeting a year later and discussing their feelings. Nothing 
can restore their children, but they can describe how they felt, their 
anger, their pain, the call for revenge, the call for healing, still 
unsure about what to do.
  Mr. President, what we are witnessing now is almost a modern miracle. 
I have traveled many times to Israel and Jerusalem. I know people 
there. I have visited the entire breadth of the country. And I know how 
important Jerusalem is to all faiths and that Israel has promised that 
its responsibility is to make sure that all faiths have access. There 
is not a lot of debate about what the capital of the country is. But 
more than anything else, people want peace. They want to stop the 
killing.
  What we have seen in the last couple of years has been astonishing. 
President Clinton and the United States have help make peace between 
these long-term enemies. It is something that, to me, resembled a 
modern miracle. Everyone knows Yasser Arafat. They know his costume. 
They know his manner. They know he was at the United Nations some years 
ago with a gun on his hip; and he was there this time, 2 days ago, 
yesterday, talking about peace and moving the process along.
  It was noted on this same page of the Washington Post, ``Joint 
Jordanian-Israeli Flight Marks Anniversary of Treaty.'' Two air forces, 
Israel and Jordan, flying side by side in joint maneuvers over both 
countries. And I am sure the sirens in Israel did not go off when the 
Jordanian airplanes flew over, and vice versa.
  Peace in the making, but violence continues. Fathers and mothers 
still anguish to understand what it is that takes their young son's 
lives. A few days ago six Israelis died on their northern border with 
Lebanon. This killing has to stop.
  Yesterday in New Jersey I spoke on behalf of a newly opened school. 
It was a religious day school. And I met a man who I had only known by 
telephone. His name is Stephen Flatow. I 

[[Page S 15480]]
spoke to him on the phone while I was touring Israel and Egypt in April 
of this year, 6 months ago. The day I arrived in Israel from Egypt, an 
attack took place on a bus in which a number of people, innocent 
people, died.
  At that time the newly appointed Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, 
was presenting his credentials in Israel. And he said to me, ``Frank, I 
have terrible news. A young woman, 20 years of age, was on that bus and 
is on life support at the moment. She comes from New Jersey. She comes 
from West Orange, NJ. Her family has been just notified.''
  I tried to find out more about her condition. It was precarious, at 
best. And within 2 days she died. Twenty years old. She was in Israel 
studying, on a learning experience. Murdered. For what reason? No 
explanation. Terrorism. People angry at one another, so angry that 
reason was obliterated. The father flew to Israel immediately and saw 
his daughter before she took her last breath.
  I spoke to him on the phone after the funeral was held in New Jersey. 
I expressed my sympathy and he said one thing to me that, frankly, I 
found almost so overpowering that it was hard to understand. He told me 
that his 16-year-old daughter, his other child who was studying in 
Israel also, was being asked by her father and mother, who just lost a 
20-year-old daughter, to continue her studies in Israel and to continue 
to fight for peace. Their daughter was killed in a senseless act of 
terrorism, and they continued to search for peace.
  I saw him yesterday, as I said, and we talked about the peace 
initiatives that are taking shape. I said, ``I may quote you. I want 
you to know that I am going to mention our conversation. Do you want to 
see the search for peace continued there, raising all kinds of 
questions at the same time? Can Chairman Arafat keep law and order in 
the Palestine community? Will there be disruptions from Hamas and other 
mad organizations, angry, supported by mad men with lots of money, by 
mad nations with lots of money? Is it worth the pursuit?''
  And he said, ``Yes,'' it was worth the pursuit. ``And they should 
continue to search for peace.''
  And the relevance of this, Mr. President, goes to the discussion 
underway about whether or not the Embassy should be moved immediately, 
after 47 years of being established in Tel Aviv, whether it should move 
immediately or whether the move takes place in the context of general 
discussions of peace.
  Now, I, for one, have advocated the establishment of the American 
Embassy in Jerusalem from the day that Israel was declared a State, a 
country. I have said so as well in my many visits there--the first one 
being 1969 after the city had been united, when I saw what happened to 
holy Jerusalem during the years of occupation when there was total 
disregard for artifacts, for archeological treasures, for custom, for 
religion, for culture. I was stunned and glad to see the city 
undivided, and declared then, in 1969, that as long as I live and could 
do anything about it, that city would never be divided again, that it 
was essential that the world recognize that Jerusalem is the capital of 
Israel.
  And I do not like being in a discussion, Mr. President, where there 
are those saying, ``Well, perhaps it ought to take a little more 
time.'' I do not want it to take more time. But I want it to be 
consistent with the discussions that are taking place.
  I could not believe that a couple weeks ago I stood with Chairman 
Arafat, shook his hand. I have been very angry with Arafat in the past. 
And I am sure he felt the same way about me. But there we were, shaking 
hands and taking pictures because he was here in Washington on a peace 
mission.
  We do not have to like the people we do business with, but if they 
are on the same wavelength, if they are on the same track, share the 
same goals and principles, then one would have to be a fool not to 
respect it.
  And so, Mr. President, I fully support the establishment of the 
American Embassy in Jerusalem, the undivided capital of the State of 
Israel, but I will continue to debate the process as to exactly when 
and how we move. That is the only thing I ask, an open discussion.
  The people who I know, the people I talk to feel similarly about 
whether or not Jerusalem is the place that embassies belong. It is the 
capital of the country. It does not belong anyplace else. We do not go 
to France and say we are going to locate our Embassy in Marseilles. We 
do not go to Russia and say we will locate it outside of Moscow. It is 
up to them to decide where their capital is, and it is up to us, as 
full diplomatic partners, to locate our Embassy where their capital is.
  So I hope that as this debate unfolds, Mr. President, that we will 
keep in mind that peace is the objective, a noble objective. I hope we 
will try to understand the many sides of this peace discussion, because 
there is now Jordan, a full diplomatic partner with Israel, there is 
Egypt, and there is hope that other countries will come along.
  I hope the situation with the Palestinians can be resolved into a 
full understanding. I hope we will see a more structured community and 
assistance to help the Palestinians establish themselves to have jobs, 
to have schools, to have a structured life, to have a chance to live 
peacefully.
  So while I respect and appreciate Senator Dole's willingness to have 
this move take place as well as the willingness of our colleague from 
Arizona, who has been fully supportive of the establishment of the 
Embassy in the capital of Israel, I hope that we have a chance to work 
out an understanding that we do not take away the President's 
initiative to conduct foreign policy, and I hope that he will help us 
to help them conclude the peace discussions and get the Embassy moved 
as part of a total understanding.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would like to pass on that the majority 
leader, with whom I was meeting, asked me to make the point that he is 
enormously gratified at the support over the years and, in particular, 
the support of the Senator from New York for the bill on which he is 
about to speak and without the support of the Senator from New York, 
obviously we would not be nearly as far along in this process as we 
are. The majority leader appreciates that very much.


                      unanimous-consent agreements

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 6 
p.m. today, the majority leader, or his designee, be recognized in 
order to move to table the pending Dorgan amendment No. 2940.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KYL. I further ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 5:40 
p.m., the Senate resume amendment No. 2940 and that there shall be 20 
minutes equally divided in the usual form prior to the motion to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. All Senators should therefore be informed, Mr. President, 
that there will be a rollcall vote on the motion to table the Dorgan 
amendment at 6 o'clock this evening.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I would like to carry on the manner and 
the thoughtfulness of my colleague and friend from New Jersey as we 
begin this debate, which will shortly, I think, conclude for today.
  The Senate stands ready to correct an absurdity which has endured for 
nearly half a century. We propose to respect Israel's sovereign right 
to choose her capital. We do this by providing for the relocation of 
our embassy to the city which contains the Parliament of that State.
  The bill which the distinguished majority leader has proposed will 
ensure that the United States Embassy in Israel is moved to Jerusalem, 
the undivided capital of that State, no later than May 31, 1999.
  I have been involved with this particular issue in some measure since 
my tenure as Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1975. By 
the early 1970's, the United States was faced with a General Assembly 
where a Soviet-led coalition wielded enormous power and used it in an 
assault against the democracies of the world. In that regard, I cite an 
editorial in the New Republic which recently said of the United Nations 
in that time that ``During the cold war, the U.N. became a 

[[Page S 15481]]

chamber of hypocrisy and proxy aggression.''
  Proxy aggression, Mr. President, and in particular directed to the 
State of Israel, which became a metaphor for democracy under virtual 
siege at the United Nations.
  Those who had failed to destroy Israel on the field of battle joined 
those who wished to discredit all Western democratic governments in an 
unprecedented, sustained attack on the very right of a U.N. member 
state to exist within the family of nations.
  The efforts in the 1970's to delegitimize Israel came in many forms, 
none more insidious than the twin campaigns to declare Zionism to be a 
form of racism and to deny Israel's ties to Jerusalem. Those who ranted 
against the ``racist Tel Aviv regime'' were spewing two ugly lies. Both 
had at their heart a denial of Israel's right to exist.
  The first lie, the infamous Resolution 3379, was finally repealed on 
December 16, 1991, after the cold war had ended and the Soviet Union 
dissolved.
  Today, we take an important step to refute the second lie, the absurd 
suggestion that Israel did not have a right to select its own capital 
city.
  Israel expects attempts by her enemies to undermine her, but it is 
more difficult to fathom our own refusal to recognize Israel's chosen 
capital and to locate our Embassy in Jerusalem. In so doing, we have 
given and continue to give unintended encouragement to those enemies of 
Israel who hope one day to be able to divide the United States and that 
nation, the only democratic state in the Middle East. For as long as 
Israel's most important friend in the world refuses to acknowledge that 
Israel's capital city is not its own, we lend credibility and dangerous 
strength to the lie that Israel is somehow a misbegotten, an 
illegitimate, or transient state.
  This suggestion is all the more untenable when you consider that no 
other people on this planet have been identified as closely with any 
city as the people of Israel are with Jerusalem --a city which this 
year celebrates the 3000th anniversary of King David declaring it his 
capital. No Jewish religious ceremony is complete without mention of 
the Holy City. And twice a year, at the conclusion of the Passover 
Seder and the Day of Atonement services, all assembled repeat one of 
mankind's shortest and oldest prayers ``Next year in Jerusalem.''
  Throughout the centuries Jews kept this pledge, often sacrificing 
their very lives to travel to, and live in, their holiest city. It 
should be noted that the first authoritative Turkish census of 1839 
reported that Jews were by far the largest ethnic group in Jerusalem--
and this long before there was a West Jerusalem, or even any 
settlements outside the ancient walled city.
  When the modern State of Israel declared independence on May 14, 
1948, Jerusalem was the only logical choice for the new nation's 
capital --even if it was only a portion of Jerusalem, the Jordanian 
Arab Legion having occupied the eastern half of the city and expelled 
the Jewish population of the Old City--Jerusalem was sundered by barbed 
wire and cinder block and Israelis of all faiths and Jews of all 
citizenship were barred from even visiting the section under Jordanian 
occupation.
  The world was silent while the historic Jewish Quarter of the city 
was sacked and razed to the ground, 127 synagogues were destroyed, and 
3,000 years of history were denied. This bizarre anomaly only ended on 
June 5, 1967, when Israel faced renewed aggression from Egypt and 
Syria, both then close friends of, and dependents of the Soviet Union. 
As hostilities commenced, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent a 
message to King Hussein of Jordan promising that, if Jordan refrained 
from entering the war, Israel would not take action against it. Jordan, 
however, attacked Israel that same day. Within the week, Israeli forces 
had captured all of Jerusalem, as well as other territories west of the 
Jordan River. The City of David was once again united, and has been 
since 1967. Under Israeli rule Jerusalem has flourished as it did not 
under Jordanian occupation, and the religious shrines of all faiths 
have been meticulously protected.
  Israel has found itself repeatedly attacked, boycotted, and spurned 
by its neighbors. But slowly Israel has worked to secure a less hostile 
environment. First, the historic Camp David Accords brought peace 
between Israel and Egypt. All Senators are aware of the unprecedented 
accomplishments of the last 2 years. Jordan is at peace with Israel and 
a peace process is well underway with the Palestinians. In fact, Mr. 
Arafat gave voice at the United Nations just yesterday.
  The United Nations is celebrating its 50th anniversary. Even Yasir 
Arafat, who 21 years ago addressed the General Assembly wearing a gun 
holster, spoke yesterday of the tremendous achievements in Israeli-
Palestinian relations. The New York Times characterizes Mr. Arafat's 
remarks as ``a far more conciliatory tone than during his last visit.'' 
And contrasts his earlier calls for the destruction of Israel with 
yesterday's General Assembly pledge to ``turn over the leaf of killing 
and destruction once and for all so that the Palestinian people and 
Israeli people may live side by side.''
  There are those who might criticize our proposal, saying that we have 
no business taking such action while the peace process continues. On 
the contrary--or such is my view. This is our Embassy and congressional 
sentiment should be made known. In this I am reminded of a message from 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the American-Israel Friendship League 
on November 28, 1993 in which he wrote:

       In 1990, Senator Moynihan sponsored Senate Resolution 106, 
     which recognized Jerusalem as Israel's united Capital, never 
     to be divided again, and called upon Israel and the 
     Palestinians to undertake negotiations to resolve their 
     differences. The resolution, which passed both houses of 
     Congress, expressed the sentiments of the United States 
     toward Israel, and, I believe, helped our neighbors reach the 
     negotiating table.

  The negotiators will soon turn to final status issues, as defined by 
the Declaration of Principles signed on September 13, 1993, by Israel 
and the Palestinians. The status of Jerusalem is one of the agenda 
items to be settled during this final stage of the peace process. It is 
inconceivable that Israel would agree to any proposal in which 
Jerusalem did not remain the capital of Israel. Since Jerusalem will 
continue to be the capital of Israel, it is time to begin planning to 
move the United States Embassy to ensure that at the end of the process 
it will be where it belongs.
  Our Embassy should have been moved long ago, but we recognize the 
momentous achievements taking place in the Middle East and they temper 
our actions. Our intentions are clear. When the peace process is 
completed, which according to the Declaration of Principles is 
scheduled for May 1999, our Embassy will be located in Jerusalem.
  On March 20th of this year, Senator D'Amato and I sent a letter to 
Secretary Christopher with the support of 91 other Senators. That 
letter made it clear that the overwhelming majority of Senators agree 
with the proposition that ``Jerusalem is and shall remain the undivided 
capital of the State of Israel.'' We also wrote that our embassy 
belongs in Jerusalem and we asked the Secretary to inform us of the 
steps being taken to make a relocation of our Embassy to Jerusalem 
possible.
  Today we have before us legislation that reflects the spirit of our 
letter to Secretary Christopher. I am hopeful that the President will 
be able to sign this legislation. Prime Minister Begin once advised me 
that the ``battle for Jerusalem should never be fought in the halls of 
Congress.'' I agree and am pleased that the majority leader worked with 
those of us on our side of the aisle to produce a draft that reflects 
the bipartisan consensus of the Senate. I would also like to commend my 
friend, the Senator from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, for his 
considerable contribution to the formulation of this bill.
  This administration has been effective in the Middle East peace 
process. Secretary Christopher has personally flown to the region 
numerous times and has clearly committed himself to active 
participation in the peace process. On the issue of our Embassy, I 
would respectfully suggest that the administration direct its attention 
to the comments of Prime Minister Rabin, as our letter to the Secretary 
of State noted:

       There can be little doubt that Jerusalem is a sensitive 
     issue in the current peace process. While the Declaration of 
     Principles stipulates that Jerusalem is a ``final status'' 

[[Page S 15482]]
     issue to be negotiated between the parties, we share Prime Minister 
     Rabin's view which be expressed to the Knesset that:
       On Jerusalem, we said: ``This Government, like all its 
     predecessors, believes there is no disagreement in this House 
     concerning Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel. United 
     Jerusalem will not be open to negotiation. It has been and 
     will forever be the capital of the Jewish people, under 
     Israeli sovereignty, a focus of the dream and longing of 
     every Jew.''

  It continues:

       United States policy should be equally clear and 
     unequivocal. The search for peace can only be hindered by 
     raising utterly unrealistic hopes about the future status of 
     Jerusalem among the Palestinians and understandable fears 
     among the Israeli population that their capital city may once 
     again be divided by cinder block and barbed wire.

  Charles Krauthammer adopted a similar line of argument in a column in 
the Washington Post on May 19, 1995, when he wrote:

       True, the embassy move does endorse the proposition that 
     Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. What possibly could be 
     wrong with that? Is it the PLO position that even after a 
     final peace, Jerusalem may not be the capital of Israel?

  That is the simple proposition for the Senate today, Mr. President. 
This bill would provide for the relocation of our Embassy to Jerusalem 
where it has always belonged. It does not interfere with the peace 
process, because there is no scenario in which Israel would agree to 
relinquish Jerusalem as its capital.
  The Senate's involvement in this particular issue could be traced in 
some degree to the seventh conference of heads of state of government 
of nonaligned countries, which convened in New Delhi, India, March 7 
through 11, in 1983. This summit devoted several lengthy passages of 
its final declaration as it is called--final declaration--to 
excoriating Israel and its ally the United States. Special attention 
was devoted to the question of Jerusalem's status. And not just east 
Jerusalem as had become the practice of such forums.
  I happened to be in New Delhi in the days before the summit began and 
was shown a draft of the final declaration. The draft passage on Israel 
read: ``Jerusalem is part of the occupied Palestinian territory and 
Israel should withdraw completely and unconditionally from it and 
restore it to Arab sovereignty.''
  While surely this can be read as a provocative statement that all of 
Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory, when pressed on the point, 
my Indian hosts assured me that by Jerusalem they really only meant 
east Jerusalem, which is to say the old city, or perhaps the Arab 
section. Hence, the significance of the revised final text of the 
declaration of some 101 nations. This is what nonaligned declared in 
that session in 1983:

       West Jerusalem is part of the occupied Palestinian 
     territory and Israel should withdraw completely and 
     unconditionally from it and restore it to Arab sovereignty.

  West Jerusalem, Mr. President.
  The 101 nations of the nonaligned movement declared that the Israeli 
Parliament and government buildings, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust 
memorial, the whole of the new city, did not belong to Israel. The 
State of Israel is not a nation. It has no capital, or so said the 
nonaligned.
  What was the response from Washington to such polemics? Not a word. 
In effect, our silence could have been interpreted as implying that we 
had no quarrel with those who state that Israel has no capital. And 
thus, that Israel is less than a sovereign nation.
  It was at this point that I brought the issue to the Senate floor. On 
September 22, 1983, during consideration of the State Department 
authorization bill, I offered an amendment to articulate the clearest 
and most emphatic demonstration of a policy of fairness toward Israel. 
The amendment was only one sentence long: ``The United States shall 
maintain no embassy in Israel that is not located in the city of 
Jerusalem.''
  I withdrew the amendment after Senator Percy, the distinguished 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, gave his 
assurance that a hearing would be held on the matter. On October 31, 
1983, I introduced S. 2031 which also required the relocation of our 
Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
  Senator Percy, always true to his word, convened a hearing of the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on February 23, 1984, to consider that 
bill. Lawrence Eagleburger, then Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs testified on behalf of the administration.
  I stated in my testimony to the committee:

       I begin with the simple proposition that Jerusalem is the 
     capital of the state of Israel and our embassy in that State 
     should be in its capital.
       This would seem to be an unexceptional statement, Mr. 
     Chairman. That it is not is the result of actions the United 
     States has taken and actions not taken.
       In the first category is the unprecedented and bewildering 
     practice of the United States Government in its official 
     publications to record that there is a ``country'' named 
     Israel in which our Embassy is located at a ``post'' named 
     Tel Aviv; and another ``country'' named Jerusalem in which we 
     are represented at a ``post'' named Jerusalem.

  Secretary Eagleburger suggested they might at least be able to 
correct the State Department phone book, but nothing was done.
  Offical documents published by the United States Government at the 
time, such as the State Department's ``Key Officers of Foreign Service 
Posts: Guide for Business Representatives,'' listed Jerusalem separate 
from Israel. The guide listed countries alphabetically, under each of 
which in subscript was enumerated the various diplomatic posts the 
United States Government maintained in that country.
  There was Ireland, with the one post in Dublin; then came Israel, 
with one diplomatic office listed, its address in Tel Aviv; then 
curiously several pages later, after Japan, there was listed a 
Consulate General in a country called Jerusalem. Then came Jordan and 
Kenya.
  That was how the Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts was organized 
until the end of 1994, when Secretary Christopher published the 
document with Jerusalem listed under the Israel heading. This is a 
welcome change. That simple refusal by the United States Government to 
associate our consulate in Jerusalem with the State of Israel carried 
much greater weight with the nonaligned countries than we realized.
  They would not have acted as they had done in 1983 if they did not 
think at some measure we were not in disagreement. Our documents have 
so implied.
  No doubt, we wounded the Israelis more than we intended as well, 
while sending a dangerous message to Israeli enemies.
  Clarifying the status of Jerusalem began to gain momentum in the 
Senate in 1990 when I submitted S. Con. Res. 106, which States simply: 
``Jerusalem is and should remain the capital of the State of Israel.'' 
A simple declarative sentence which gained 85 cosponsors and was 
adopted unanimously by the Senate and by an overwhelming majority in 
the House.
  Two years later, Senator Packwood and I submitted Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 113 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the reunification 
of Jerusalem.
  The measure stated that, ``Congress strongly believes that Israel 
must remain an undivided city.'' That, too, was agreed to unanimously, 
both in the Senate and the House.
  Last year, in the wake of the massacre in Hebron, the United Nations 
Security Council adopted a measure which referred to Jerusalem as 
``occupied territory.'' Senator Mack and I sent a letter to the 
President, with the signature of 81 other Senators, calling on the 
administration to veto any U.N. Security Council resolution which 
states or implies that Jerusalem is occupied territory.
  To his credit, President Clinton responded with a forceful promise to 
veto any future U.N. resolution which raised questions about the status 
of Jerusalem. A promise that he kept on May 17, 1995, when Ambassador 
Albright cast such a long overdue veto in the Security Council.
  In the winter of 1981, I wrote an article in Commentary entitled 
``Joining The Jackals'' in response to the Carter administration's 
disastrous support for a resolution challenging Israel's rights in 
Jerusalem. Almost 15 years later, we find that the jackals are in 
retreat. Israelis and Palestinians are negotiating the details of their 
future. And today we have an opportunity to make a simple but important 
contribution to this process by unequivocally recognizing Israel's 
chosen capital.

[[Page S 15483]]

  Mr. President, I see my friend from Connecticut has risen. I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to thank my friend and colleague 
from New York for his statement, which is not only characteristically 
learned--which is to say characteristic of him, not necessarily of all 
of us--but also characteristically principled.
  The history of our Government's policy on this question of the 
location of the American Embassy in Israel is a tawdry history. It is 
not the history of a great and principled nation. It is a history of a 
nation that has, I think, in the words of a musical, ``bowed and 
kowtowed'' too often and too low, when it was not necessary, on a 
matter as fundamental as respecting a country--not just any country but 
a country that is a dear and cherished, valued ally--in its own 
decision about where its capital is. It is a sovereign nation, a member 
of the United Nations.
  There has been a way in which our whole history here--harking to my 
earlier incarnation as Attorney General enforcing consumer protection 
laws--unfortunately, has been one of bait and switch. The political 
process has engaged in kind of alluring promises during campaigns and 
then switched to an entirely less principled, more pragmatic--in the 
worst sense of pragmatic--position once in office.
  But I really rise to recite that unhappy history just to say that, 
throughout all of that, as long as he has been in public office, the 
Senator from New York has been a steadfast beacon of principle on 
this--and of course other questions--but on this, unwavering, speaking 
out of the best of our traditions and the best traditions of 
international law. Hopefully, the Chamber will catch up with him in the 
vote on the measure before us.
  But I do not know that I have adequate words, not only to express my 
admiration, but to do the historical record justice here as to the 
really pioneering and principled and consistent position that the 
Senator from New York has taken. I thank him for his statement, but, 
really, more than that, I thank him for all he has done over the years 
to bring the Chamber to the point where we may finally be about to 
direct the movement of the Embassy to Jerusalem by a date certain.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, may I express my profound gratitude for 
the remarks of my friend from Connecticut. If he is only partially 
correct, I am wholly complimented and deeply honored.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for 
relocating the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. I want to share 
with my colleagues my reasons for holding this view.
  First, locating the Embassy in Jerusalem is practical and will 
streamline our diplomatic operations. For decades, the offices of 
Israel's President and Prime Minister, the Knesset, and most government 
ministries have been located in Jerusalem. Moving our Embassy there 
will make it easier to conduct diplomatic business. So it is common 
sense to move the Embassy to Jerusalem.
  Second, it is consistent with our policies for other nations. Israel 
is the only nation in the world where our Embassy is not located in the 
host nation's chosen capital. Let me repeat that. Israel is the only 
nation in the world where our Embassy is not located in the host 
nation's chosen capital.
  A number of concerns have been expressed about the wisdom of moving 
the Embassy at this time. I want to address each of these concerns 
specifically.
  Opponents have said that this bill could trigger anger and terrorism 
on the part of Israel's opponents. Indeed, when the bill was first 
being circulated, opponents said the peace process would fall apart. 
They said the peace process would fall apart if we even introduced this 
bill. But the peace process did not fall apart. As a matter of fact, 
the peace process moved forward. That is because this bill is not 
directly related to the peace process. As a matter of fact, this bill, 
as recently modified--and I support the modifications--shows great 
deference to the peace process. By removing the requirement for an 
early construction start date, this bill shows complete respect for the 
peace process. Opponents of this bill have also argued we should wait 
to move our Embassy until the so-called final status negotiations are 
complete. I would argue that, although the final status of Jerusalem 
may be an issue in the peace talks, the location of our Embassy is not. 
The location of an American Embassy is entirely an American decision.
  In any case, our Embassy will be located within the pre-1967 West 
Jerusalem border, not in the more controversial eastern section. It is 
this fact that leads me to conclude that moving our Embassy would in no 
way prejudice the outcome of the final status negotiations. It is not 
as if we are breaking new ground in a new area that has not been under 
Israeli control.
  Finally, and perhaps the most important point I wish to make for my 
colleagues today, is that when I was in Israel in November, I sensed an 
undeniable fear and concern about the future. Terrorist attacks were 
escalating. Support for peace was falling. As a matter of fact, there 
was not one person, whether it was a cab driver or a student, that I 
met who did not indicate to me the fears that they had.
  Israel, of course, is taking a risk for peace, and, therefore, the 
people are taking a risk for peace. As a matter of fact, all the good 
people who come to the table, whatever side they are on, are taking a 
risk for peace. So, when I left Israel, I thought, we need to do 
something here to just show that we support the peace process, and that 
we support our close ally, Israel. I think this is something we can do 
that demonstrates a high level of respect for the good people of the 
State of Israel, and for the peace process as a whole.
  I have a very balanced view of this issue. I believe that Yasser 
Arafat must have what he needs to build confidence among Palestinians 
for the peace process so that extremist groups like Hamas renounce 
violence and go to the ballot box as their way. I think this is very 
important. And that is why I supported the Middle East Peace 
Facilitation Act, which authorized continuing aid to the Palestinian 
authority so long as they continued to meet their commitments to work 
for peace.
  So, Mr. President, I support the Palestinians who are working for 
peace, and I support the Israelis who are working for peace. Just as we 
show support for the Palestinians through the Peace Facilitation Act, 
we must also show support for the people of Israel who have taken some 
very serious risks for peace. I think that this bill sends a very 
important message.
  I want to say again that I understand that there are those in the 
Senate who want changes to this bill. And we may have a couple of 
amendments. I will look them over very carefully.
  But the point that I want to make today is that I hope we are going 
to pass this bill with a united front--all of us together, regardless 
of political party or ideology. To pass this important legislation with 
a unified voice would send a strong message. Yes, we support the peace 
process, and yes, we support moving our Embassy to Jerusalem. Surely, 
we should do no less for our friend and ally Israel.
  Thank you very much.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, as I indicated when I previously rose to 
speak on this bill, I intend to support the bill. I think this 
underlying bill makes a great deal of sense. I offered a sense-of-the-
Senate amendment to this bill, which I understand is now going to be 
voted on at 6 o'clock this evening, and just prior to that vote there 
will be 10 minutes of debate on each side. I wanted to rise briefly to 
describe what the sense-of-the-Senate amendment is.
  I indicated when I offered it that I have no intention of holding up 
this legislation. I support this legislation. I want this legislation 
to move. But I was constrained last week from offering this sense-of-
the-Senate amendment, and it is the only way I have to 

[[Page S 15484]]
express myself--and hopefully, express the sentiments of the Members of 
the Senate--on this issue. So this device is an attempt in the sense-
of-the-Senate resolution to once again weigh in on this question of 
priorities.
  My sense-of-the-Senate resolution expresses the following: It is the 
sense of the Senate that any tax cut provided by the Congress this year 
shall be limited to those whose income is under $250,000 a year, and 
the savings, by limiting the tax cut to those who earn less than 
$250,000 a year, shall be used to reduce the cut that is being proposed 
for Medicare.
  Again, my suggestion is very simple. This is always a debate about 
priorities. It is really nothing more than that. It is not a debate 
about whether there should be a balanced budget. Of course, there 
should be a balanced budget. It is a debate about how we get there. 
Some say give very large tax cuts to some very affluent people, and let 
us give very large budget cuts in Medicare that will affect some very 
low-income elderly people. I think that the proper priority would be to 
say, let us think about this more clearly.
  I offered an amendment a couple of weeks ago saying, let us at least 
limit the tax cut to those whose incomes are below $100,000 a year and 
use the savings from that to reduce the amount of cuts in the Medicare 
Program. That was voted down by the Senate.
  I say, all right. I indicated then I am going to offer another 
resolution. How about limiting the tax cut to those whose incomes are 
below a quarter of a million dollars a year? Gosh, there are not a lot 
of Americans who make more than a quarter of a million dollars a year. 
Those who do I do not think at this point need a tax cut. Their top tax 
rate has gone down from 70 percent in 1980, down to 39 percent low. Let 
us at least decide that we will limit the tax cut to those whose 
incomes are below a quarter of a million dollars a year. Then whatever 
we save from that limitation, let us use that to offset the cuts that 
are now being proposed for Medicare, to see if we can soften that blow 
a bit.
  That is the purpose of my sense-of-the-Senate resolution. And we will 
have a vote on that at 6 o'clock. I hope the Senate will approve that. 
Then I hope following approval of that, it will express itself to those 
who are writing this reconciliation bill, and maybe we will have a 
reconciliation bill to come to the floor that does just that.
  I would be happy to yield to the Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much for yielding.
  I want to commend my friend for giving us an opportunity to express 
ourselves on a very basic point. To me, it is extraordinary that the 
Republican Congress with very few exceptions--maybe one or two--are 
going to cut $270 billion out of Medicare and use about $245 billion 
for a tax cut that mostly benefits the very wealthy.
  What my friend is saying is, look--to the Republicans--we want to 
give a tax cut, but at least come along with us and say that the people 
who earn over a quarter of a million dollars a year do not really need 
that tax cut as much as our seniors need Medicare.
  In California, the average woman who is on Social Security earns 
$8,500 a year. I say to my friend from North Dakota that the numbers 
are probably even lower in his State--$8,500 a year for the average 
woman on Social Security.
  I daresay that if you talk to any decent human being, a gentleman who 
earns $350,000 or a woman who earns $500,000 a year, and you ask them, 
``Do you really need to have this tax cut, or would you rather that our 
senior citizens live in dignity,'' I daresay the reasonable, 
thoughtful, decent American in that highest 1 percent income bracket 
would say, ``You know something? Sure. It would be nice to have another 
trip to Europe, but I think that is not the American way. I do not 
think that is really family values.''
  I want to say to my friend. I wonder if he has heard some of Kevin 
Phillips' quotes on this issue. Kevin Phillips is a Republican 
commentator, and on the 19th of September he made a number of quotes. I 
wonder if I could read them to my friend and ask him to comment on 
them.
  First of all, this is Kevin Phillips. This is not Senator Boxer from 
California, a Democrat from California, speaking. This is a Republican 
commentator. On September 19, he said:
  If the Republican Medicare reform proposal was a movie, its most 
appropriate title would be ``Health Fraud II.''
  Then he says, ``Today's Republicans see Federal Medicare outlays to 
old people as a treasure chest of gold for partial redirection in their 
favorite direction towards tax cuts for corporations. Furthermore,'' he 
says, ``the revolutionary ideology driving the new Republican Medicare 
proposal is cut middle-class programs as much as possible and give the 
money back to business and high-income taxpayers.'' And finally he 
says, ``In part, the Republicans' Medicare shell game is a 
redistribution towards America's small 1 or 2 percent elite.''
  So my friend is giving us a chance here, in a bipartisan way, to be I 
think humane, reasonable, sensible, and smart. I wonder if he would 
comment on these quotations from Kevin Phillips, because I think it is 
rather extraordinary that even a Republican says they have gone too far 
with their budget proposal. Will my friend comment on that?
  Mr. DORGAN. This discussion has often been called class warfare; it 
is just more politics, just partisan.
  I really do not see it so much as Republican versus Democrat. It 
really is choices. In the case of the reconciliation bill heading our 
way, the choice is to decide that one-half of the American families 
will pay higher taxes. That is the choice. And that is not for me. That 
is from the Treasury Department and others who have analyzed it.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will my friend yield? Is it not true it is those who earn 
under $30,000 a year who will pay more taxes under the Republican plan?
  Mr. DORGAN. I was just going to give a multiple choice question, and 
the multiple choice question would be A or B.
  Mrs. BOXER. I am sorry.
  Mr. DORGAN. If you learned that the reconciliation bill coming to the 
floor of the Senate from the majority party provides that one-half of 
the American families will end up paying higher taxes, do you think it 
would be, A, the bottom 50 percent of income earners or B, the top 50 
percent of income earners?
  I will bet you that most Americans would say, well, given what we 
have read so far, they probably say that the lower half of the income 
folks ought to pay higher taxes. And you know, that is exactly what is 
coming our way. But for the top 5 or 6 or 1 percent of the American 
people it is not higher taxes. It is an enormous amount of benefits in 
form of lower taxes. That is the purpose of this amendment. It is not 
anti-Republican or anticonservative. It is to say this is about a 
series of choices we are going to make and let us express ourselves.
  Is the choice of cutting Medicare funding that is needed for senior 
citizens to the depths that they are talking about, $270 billion, is 
that a choice that ought to take precedence over a tax cut for the 
wealthy? That is what I want people to express themselves on.
  My sense is that if this Congress could sit down without all the 
lights and without a lot of fanfare and thoughtful people discuss what 
really are the priorities, just in a room without microphones, I do not 
have any question that this Congress would say those 55,000 kids, those 
little 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, all of them who have names--every 
one of them has a name--those little kids on the Head Start Program who 
are disadvantaged, come from low-income households, those that are 
going to get kicked off the Head Start Program because we have decided 
there is not enough money for those 55,000, I do not have any doubt 
that a group of thoughtful people would say you know something in our 
judgment, Head Start investment for 55,000 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds 
is a better investment and a more important investment than building 
the second $1 billion amphibious assault ship.
  I do not think there is any question at all that is the case. This 
Congress was provided with a choice during the defense bill--lots of 
choices: star wars, yes. B-2 bombers yes--20 of them, $30 billion, and 
then the choice was which of the two amphibious assault ships shall we 
build, the $900 million one or the $1.3 billion one. You know what the 

[[Page S 15485]]
Congress decided? ``Let's build both of them. Why should we have to 
choose?''
  My point is the choice is to say yes, let us build a second 
amphibious assault ship for $1 billion and then let us take 55,000 kids 
out of the Head Start Program. It is just that simple because it is 
always about choices. You choose to spend the resources and what 
represents an investment in the future of the country.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will my friend yield just one last time?
  Mr. DORGAN. I would be happy to yield.
  Mrs. BOXER. Because I am going to head back to the Budget Committee 
so I can vote against the Republican budget and proudly do it. I again 
thank my friend for pointing these things out. He is so right about the 
defense number. The admirals and generals came to us and said we need x 
billions of dollars to do our job, and this Republican Congress gave 
them $30 billion-plus, more than they asked for over the next 7 years. 
To me, it is extraordinary how far those dollars could go, whether it 
is in the Senator's home State, my home State, the Chair's home State. 
And just cavalierly not wanting to make any choice, we are going back 
to the days of the $400 hammers and the $600 toilet seats and the 
$7,600 coffee pot. The wasteful spending kind of gets lost in the 
debate.
  I wish to make one final point in support of my friend. The 
reconciliation bill that is headed here clearly is really a funnel 
plan. It is a funnel from the senior citizens in our country through 
the Medicare Program, from the poor, the disabled in our country 
through the Medicaid plan--and by the way two-thirds of our seniors in 
nursing homes are on Medicaid, so it is a funnel from those people, it 
is a funnel from those working people who the Senator described who 
earn $30,000 or less, it is a funnel from all of those groups, the 
middle-class right into this tax cut for the wealthy.
  What my friend is giving us a chance to do later on this evening is 
to say enough is enough. Enough is enough. We are hurting too many 
people in this country. For all the talk about family values, we are 
hurting families. Buried in this bill, we are repealing nursing home 
standards. It is extraordinary. And I vowed that in my mother's name I 
would fight that--seniors who are scalded in bathtubs in nursing homes, 
seniors who are sexually molested, seniors who wander out of nursing 
homes onto the streets and freeze to death. That is why we have 
national standards.
  But in the Republican budget, what is more important than nursing 
home standards is giving a tax break for the wealthiest. What my friend 
is saying is that enough is enough. Defer that tax break, if you earn 
over a quarter of a million dollars, and let us not hurt the kids, the 
families, the middle class, the working poor, the grandmas and grandpas 
in nursing homes. I will be proud to stand with my friend and I hope we 
can win this vote.
  I yield back to my friend.
  Mr. DORGAN. I thank the Senator from California. We will have a vote 
on this at 6 o'clock. And again I do not intend to pursue it further. I 
will come back for 10 minutes of debate prior to that time. But it is 
very simple. It simply says let us limit the tax cut, if there is a tax 
cut coming in this legislation--there apparently is; I would prefer 
there not be but there is--let us limit that to families earning at 
least $250,000 a year and then let us use the savings by that 
limitation to reduce the cuts in Medicare. It is a very simple sense-
of-the-Senate resolution.
  Mr. President, let me mention one additional item. I did not respond 
earlier today. following the presentation by Senator Conrad and myself, 
the Senator from New Mexico came to the floor and the Senator from 
Arizona, and there was some discussion about balanced budgets and the 
Congressional Budget Office and a whole range of other things. So let 
me respond briefly. In effect, the Senator from Arizona was generous 
enough to bring to the floor the voting records and described what 
Senator Conrad  and I had voted for.
  It always amazes me some to find someone changing the subject. That 
is the equivalent of getting lost and then claiming that where you 
found yourself is where you intended to be.
  Well, I guess that is an interesting way to describe what the debate 
is about. But the debate was not about whether Senator Conrad or I 
voted for budget resolutions in the past. Yes, we did.
  We voted for the one in 1993. We voted for previous ones. We never 
claimed those budget resolutions, which, incidentally, reduces the 
deficit, which is why we voted for them, we never claimed what the 
Republicans are claiming. They are claiming that they now have a 
balanced budget. I never claimed that the 1993 proposal balanced the 
budget.
  I have felt since 1983 that those who use, in whatever circumstances, 
under whatever conditions, the Social Security trust funds, are 
misusing the trust funds, and it does not matter whether it is the 
President's budget, President Clinton or President Bush or the 
Congressional Budget Office. When trust funds are included in the 
operating revenues--Social Security trust funds especially--it is not 
being honest.
  Now, the point we made earlier was on October 18 the majority party 
came over to the floor and held up this letter from the Congressional 
Budget Office. The letter says, we estimated, based on your submission 
to the CBO, that your plan will produce a small budget surplus in the 
year 2002. And I came to the floor and said that obviously is not true.
  I wrote to the CBO and said, ``Give us your estimate of the 
Republican plan if you do not take the Social Security trust funds and 
use them as operating revenues.'' And the next day the director sent us 
another letter and said, ``Well, we estimate, if that is the case, that 
the deficit in the year 2002 will be $98 billion.'' So it went from a 
small surplus to a $98 billion deficit.
  On the third day, October 20, they sent us another letter and said 
the deficit is not $98 billion: ``We recalculated, and the deficit 
would be really $105 billion.'' And so that is what we have learned 
from the Congressional Budget Office. And our point was to say, if you 
take the Social Security trust funds and use them over on the operating 
budget, it is dishonest budgeting, and dishonest budgeting for 
Democrats to do it and dishonest budgeting for Republicans to do it.
  This is business as usual. It has been going on way too long. I 
introduced a half dozen proposals to stop it. The Senator from South 
Carolina has. In 1983, I began to try to stop this process. But when 
the Senator came today with his big chart, and he had a gold medallion 
on the chart or a gold certificate of some type, certified with a big 
gold thing, certified balanced budget, that is baloney. There is no 
certification of a balanced budget. October 20 says that this is a 
budget with a $105 billion deficit in the year 2002.
  Why is that important? It is important because if you do not have a 
balanced budget, you cannot trigger the tax cuts presumably.
  What is that gold certificate about that they paraded on the floor? 
That is their certificate so they can go ahead and proceed to make the 
tax cuts. But it is a fraudulent certificate. It does not have any seal 
on it, so I assume it was just printed up for their purposes.
  I mean, that is just gamesmanship. It is not a certificate of 
anything. The only thing that matters is the October 20 letter that 
said, ``CBO says in the year 2002 there will be a $105 billion 
deficit.'' That is the official number. The only way you can say that 
is not true is if you believe you should take the money out of the 
Social Security trust fund and use it as an operating budget revenue.
  I would guarantee you, you run a business and do that, you take your 
employees' trust fund, pension funds and pull them over to your P&L 
statement and say, ``This is my business income,'' you will be on a 
fast track to a penitentiary of someplace. You cannot do it in 
business; you ought not be able to do it in Government. It is not 
honest budgeting.
  So when the folks came to the floor today--it is amusing to have this 
debate, I suppose, about past budgets, but no one claimed what the 
Republicans are claiming, that they have this balanced budget. This is 
not in balance. The Congressional Budget Office says it is not in 
balance. They ought to stop pretending it is in balance. If it is not 
in balance, they cannot trigger a tax cut, 50 percent of which, 
incidentally, 

[[Page S 15486]]
goes to taxpayers with incomes or families whose incomes are over 
$100,000 a year.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the amendment 
offered by the Senator from North Dakota. We are fast approaching the 
culmination of this session--the culmination of a year of significant 
debate on the course of the Federal budget.
  This amendment goes to the heart of that debate--how should we bring 
the budget into balance, and how should the burdens of that process be 
shared among the people of this country?
  As one who voted for a balanced budget amendment, and as a cosponsor 
of a balanced budget plan, I share the conviction that deficit 
reduction should be among the top priorities of this Congress. But we 
should not let the urgency of that task blind us to our fundamental 
principles, or to the other, equally important responsibilities we 
face.
  As I have explained here before, Mr. President, balancing the budget 
is essential, not as an end in itself, but a means of restoring 
healthier growth to our economy, and as a means of promoting the basic 
principles that first led me to the Senate.
  I won't revisit here the clear and convincing reasons for fundamental 
change in our Federal budget. But while I am encouraged by the powerful 
consensus behind balancing the budget, Mr. President, I am concerned 
about the shortsighted priorities and the lack of fundamental fairness 
that characterize the budget plan that is now taking shape in this 
Congress. We will debate that budget plan on the floor of the Senate 
this week.
  The amendment of the distinguished Senator from North Dakota 
represents what should be simply common sense. But unfortunately, Mr. 
President, common sense seems to be in short supply these days.
  The amendment says simply that we should limit any tax cuts to 
families with incomes under $250,000, and use the savings to reduce the 
cuts that are planned for Medicare.
  I believe that there is a real need for tax relief--in a perfect 
world, perhaps we could spread tax cuts around a little more. But there 
can be no argument that families with middle incomes have seen their 
paychecks stuck for years--with no reward from the substantial gains in 
productivity that our national economy has made.
  Those working families spend more of their waking hours running 
faster just to stay in place. Mothers and fathers strain for a few 
minutes with their kids, with each other--never mind a moment for 
themselves. Because their wages haven't gone up, they have to spend 
more hours working every day just to keep up with growing expenses.
  Chief among the costs that are growing faster than the average 
family's income are health care and education. For most middle 
Americans, Mr. President, those are not luxuries to be deferred or cut 
back--they are costs that must be met by cuts in family time, in 
savings, in things that we used to consider essential and that 
increasingly are beyond reach.
  So we should do what we can to cut the costs of health care and 
education for Americans. Incredibly, the budget that is shaping up now 
does exactly the opposite. In their search for the funds to give tax 
cuts to people with incomes over $250,000, the Republican majority is 
increasing the costs of health care and education for the average 
American family.

  And, by itself, the tax bill just reported by the Finance Committee 
would actually increase the tax burden on the majority of Americans, 
Mr. President, those with incomes of $30,000 or less. Can't we at least 
put a cap on the unfairness in that plan?
  And, as the Republicans' own Congressional Budget Office has 
certified, Mr. President, their plan does not balance the budget. It 
continues to borrow from the Social Security surplus in the year 2002 
to cover up a glaring $98 billion deficit.
  This is unconscionable, Mr. President, and it is unnecessary. We can 
reach the goal of a balanced budget, provide tax relief for the middle 
class, and restore some of the excessive cuts in Medicare that are part 
of the Republican budget plan.
  With Senator Bradley, I cosponsored earlier this year a budget plan 
that would have permitted up to $100 billion in tax relief for the 
middle class, including help with higher education expenses. That plan 
would have balanced the budget by 2002, without borrowing against the 
future obligations of the Social Security system. I also supported 
Senator Conrad's plan, that would have balanced the budget without 
raiding the Social Security system.
  We apparently cannot pass a budget this year that will not continue 
the charade of using Social Security surpluses--needed to meet its 
future legal and moral obligations--to cover up annual deficits in our 
operating budget.
  But, by supporting the amendment now before us, we can still restore 
some fairness to tax relief, and we can reduce some of the damage that 
will be caused by the exorbitant increases in Medicare costs in the 
Republican plan.
  This amendment simply expresses the sense of the Senate--a statement 
of our priorities--that we should limit any tax cuts to those who 
really need it, and that we should use those savings to reduce the hit 
on Medicare that the Republicans have planned--a hit that will be used 
to pay for tax cuts for those who don't really need it.
  I think those are the real priorities of almost all Americans--even 
those who may not directly benefit from the tax cuts. Most Americans 
share the goals of deficit reduction--because it will help all 
Americans. Deficit reduction will free up more of our scarce saving for 
private investments by homeowners, entrepreneurs, and corporations--
investments that will create jobs and sustain a growing economy.
  For those who are now well off, who will share in the benefits of a 
growing economy at least as much as anyone else, a tax brake now to 
sustain those whose incomes have been stuck for years is scarcely 
grounds for resentment.
  This amendment recognizes that we must use common sense and fairness 
as we search for ways to reduce the deficit and restore balance to our 
country's finances.
  So I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this amendment, that 
will put the Senate on record sharing the priorities of most 
Americans--doing what is right and what is fair while we do what is 
necessary.
  Mr. DORGAN. I notice, Mr. President, Senator Pell is waiting to 
speak.
  I will, because of that, relinquish the floor.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

                          ____________________