[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 163 (Friday, October 20, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S15398]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS TO BOSNIA

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this week the Senate and the House began 
conducting hearings on the potential deployment of American ground 
forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event a peace agreement is 
reached. This is the beginning of a very important process of 
congressional review and debate. I am pleased that the administration 
sent the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify on behalf of the 
administration's proposal.
  Any decision to send American Forces into harms' way requires the 
utmost consideration. American interests may justify sending Americans 
into Bosnia, but the goals must be clear and the risks must be 
understood and weighed carefully.
  Unfortunately, the administration has not yet made the case for its 
proposed operation. Many questions remain unanswered and many answers 
remain ambiguous.
  The first task must be to persuade the Congress that this is the best 
option of the options available. And let me be clear, there are other 
options.
  For over 3 years now, I have called for American leadership. For over 
3 years now, I have called for NATO involvement. But, I am not 
convinced that exercising United States leadership and deploying NATO 
ground forces in support of a peace agreement that partitions Bosnia is 
the best or only option. We need to know: will American Forces be the 
guarantors of ethnic cleansing? Will they be used to prevent Moslem 
refugees from returning to their homes in what becomes the Bosnian Serb 
Republic?
  With respect to the peace settlement, the administration must be able 
to ensure that any peace reached is a stable and sustainable peace--
that there are defensible borders; that the Bosnian Government 
structure is viable; that this is not just the first step toward a 
greater Serbia.
  If there is a genuine peace, there is a real question why tens of 
thousands of peacekeepers, including Americans, are needed? Moreover, 
how did the administration come up with the number 25,000 for the 
American ground force contribution? Is this solely the result of 
President Clinton's speech 2 years ago or is there a military rationale 
for it?
  There is a lot of confusion as to what NATO's role will be. Will NATO 
ensure the territorial integrity of Bosnia? Who will accomplish the 
tasks that NATO does not wish to be involved in, such as facilitating 
the return of refugees, the conduct of free and fair elections, 
humanitarian operations?
  What will this operation cost? What factors are current cost 
estimates based on? How does the administration plan to pay for such an 
operation? Was Secretary Perry serious when he said that the 
administration would take funds from missile defense programs--intended 
to protect Americans from the growing threat of missile defenses--for 
peacekeeping?
  What are the criteria for success of this operation? What is the exit 
strategy? How do we ensure that the Bosnians can defend themselves once 
peacekeepers leave? Who will arm and or train the Bosnians?
  It seems to me that developments in recent months have vindicated the 
overwhelming majority in Congress who argued that the Bosnians and the 
Croats were capable of defending themselves if armed. It has also 
demonstrated that NATO air power can be used effectively and that 
Bosnian Serb Forces are not invincible. The military balance began 
shifting in Bosnia, but I am not sure that it has stabilized. In my 
view, lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is as relevant in a post-
settlement situation as it is now. This matter cannot be avoided and 
must be resolved as part of any peace settlement.

  The bottom line is that Congress is not yet in possession of the 
facts. Indeed, the administration is not in possession of the facts. 
There is no settlement yet. But, with that in mind, we must make sure 
that we do not deploy any forces without clear answers to these 
critical questions. I am deeply concerned that since current NATO plans 
call for initial deployments within a few days of a settlement being 
signed that we may not have all the answers--and that the 
administration will go ahead and deploy forces and try to figure out 
what they will be doing after they are already on the ground.
  In view of these many unanswered questions--and those I have raised 
are by no means all-inclusive--I would strongly urge the administration 
to cooperate with the Congress and provide us with the information we 
need to make an informed judgment.
  Furthermore, I strongly urge the administration to seek congressional 
authorization for any deployment of United States ground forces to 
Bosnia. This was my view prior to the gulf war, and it is now. It is 
essential that the American people are behind any undertaking that 
places thousands of our soldiers in a dangerous environment for a 
prolonged period of time.
  Mr. President, let me also express my deep concern about other 
aspects of the diplomatic process and the talks that are due to begin 
on August 31 in Dayton, OH. The agenda does not include Kosova which 
has been under martial law for over 6 years now. This is not just a 
matter of human rights, but a question of Kosova's status. Even in the 
former Yugoslavia, Kosova had autonomous status--the people and their 
assembly could make their own decisions. Today, there are 2 million 
Albanians there under an apartheid-like system--A large majority 
terrorized and oppressed by a small minority.
  We cannot let Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic off the hook for 
Kosova, or for his continued support of paramilitary forces which are 
reported today to have slaughtered hundreds of Moslem men and boys in 
northern Bosnia. Milosevic is no peacemaker, rather the mastermind 
behind ethnic cleansing, oppression, and aggression in the former 
Yugoslavia. As early as 1992, senior U.S. Government officials accused 
him of war crimes. But today, he has been invited by this 
administration to the United States to participate in peace talks. I 
believe that this was a serious error in judgment which calls into 
question the administration's commitment to the prosecution of war 
criminals in the former Yugoslavia. Sure, Milosevic has not yet been 
indicted by the war crimes tribunal, but, there is no doubt that he has 
given support and safe haven to some of the most notorious war 
criminals. Slobodan Milosevic should not be issued a visa. If the 
administration insists on this, at the very least, it should ensure 
that any visa issued to Milosevic confines him to Wright Patterson Air 
Force Base. He does not deserve to be treated like other foreign 
dignitaries.
  Finally, there should be no comprehensive sanctions relief on Serbia 
until there is a satisfactory resolution of the situation in Kosova. 
Unless there is a comprehensive settlement including Kosova, there will 
be no stability in the region--one of the key objectives presently 
being cited by the administration. The sanctions on Serbia are the only 
leverage the United States and the international community have been 
willing to use on the Belgrade regime.
  Mr. President, I hope that the administration will address my 
concerns and those of my colleagues, and cooperate with the Congress so 
that together we can determine what is in the best interest of the 
United States.

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