[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 163 (Friday, October 20, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15391-S15393]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         UNITY ON BOSNIA POLICY

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there has been substantial movement toward a 
peace agreement among the warring factions in Bosnia, and the President 
deserves great credit for exercising strong leadership for moving this 
process forward in the last 2 months. The 

[[Page S15392]]
conflict has gone on too long, and the horrendous spectacle of ethnic 
cleansing and prolonged, widespread inhumanity in the Balkans offends 
and disgusts all civilized society. It is clear that our European 
partners in NATO have been unable to bring the fighting to a halt and 
will be unable, Mr. President, to bring a lasting peace in the Balkans 
without strong American leadership. One might well argue that it is a 
European problem--and it is--and the European nations should be able to 
achieve a peaceful settlement without us--and they should. That would 
be what I think most people would like to see. But that has 
demonstrably not been the case over the last 2-3 years of carnage in 
Bosnia. Therefore, the President has taken a strong role in leading our 
allies to bring the parties to the peace table. A peace agreement has 
not yet been reached, but negotiations, so-called ``proximity talks,'' 
will begin at the end of this month of October, in Dayton, Ohio.
  Mr. President, Administration officials have testified that the 
United States should participate in any NATO operation which would 
implement an accord that is reached among the warring parties. The 
Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, have all testified that the operation would be a NATO 
operation, and that there would be no so-called ``dual key'' command 
and control structure which includes a decision-making role by the 
United Nations. Those command and control arrangements were an abject 
failure in the U.N. operation in Bosnia over the last several years. 
The United Nations has tried valiantly to play a peaceful role in 
Bosnia, but it is clear that up to now there has been no peace to keep 
and that the ferocity and hatreds which have consumed the Bosnian 
factions have overwhelmed the ability of the United Nations to operate 
in a peace-enforcing role there. Therefore, it is appropriate that NATO 
assume any peacekeeping responsibility, since only the clear promise of 
overwhelming and swift retaliation against any group or individual that 
violates a peace accord is necessary for such an accord to work in the 
environment of the Balkans.

  Mr. President, the question has arisen as to what role the Congress 
will play in determining the policy and possible deployment of American 
forces to the Balkans in connection with a peace treaty. There is 
substantial risk of casualties there, in spite of the fact that the 
purpose of any NATO force would be to police and implement an agreement 
among the parties. Cease fires in the Balkans have been routinely 
entered into and they have been just as routinely violated. The parties 
to the conflict cannot resist, it seems--cannot resist the temptation 
to take advantage of temporary weaknesses of their opponents to gain 
more territory or to commit more atrocities. Furthermore, the terrain 
is treacherous, made more so by the harshness of winter weather, which 
is the likely season that this accord will be reached, and, hopefully, 
such an accord will be reached.
  I believe that any President, Democrat or Republican, is on dubious 
constitutional ground in deploying forces to be at risk abroad without 
the positive action in support thereof, by the Congress.
  We could debate this all we want to debate it. I know we say, on the 
one hand, any President does not need Congress' approval. On the other 
hand, there are those who say he needs congressional approval. And 
there are arguments to be made on both sides. But I think of the wild 
animals in the forest, the lion, the tiger, the elephant--the wild 
animals in the forest. At some point or another they have to come to 
the waterhole. There is a big waterhole in that forest. Some may have 
to come sooner than others. But eventually they all have to come to the 
waterhole.
  Well, the power of the purse is the waterhole in the constitutional 
process. The appropriation of money is the waterhole. So we can argue 
all we want, until we are blue in the face. But in the final analysis, 
unless that appropriation is there, unless the funds are provided, the 
use of military forces would automatically have to be cut off, you see. 
So that is the waterhole. We can argue all we want, but that power of 
the purse is the most effective power in the whole constitutional 
system--the power of the purse. That is why I have stood on my feet 
many, many times in the Senate and argued against shifting that power 
of the purse to the executive branch.
  Well, I will not go further into that at this point. But we should 
all keep in mind the waterhole. All government agencies have to come 
down to the waterhole, sooner or later.
  Well, only the Congress can fund such operations, and Congress has 
the sole responsibility, under the Constitution, to raise and maintain 
land and naval forces. But, aside from this constitutional requirement, 
from a commonsense political perspective, I think that any President is 
well advised to gain the prior support of the Congress, and therefore 
the American people, before committing forces that risk casualties, 
which will result in the expenditure of substantial sums of money, and 
which might be employed over a period of rather extended duration. 
Regardless of the differences between this proposed operation and the 
American deployment in 1990 to the Middle East to counter the 
aggression of Iraq against Kuwait, the risks, the costs, and the 
duration of peace implementation in Bosnia argue for the same need--the 
same need--for the President to solicit and gain the support of the 
Congress before going forward. As I wrote to the President on October 
13th, I believe he should welcome the opportunity to rally the Nation 
behind him and ask for the approval of Congress for this proposed 
mission. As I stated in that letter, ``while this effort, of course, 
risks rejection, a sure political foundation seems essential to carry 
it over the shoals and storms of difficulties which could possibly 
confront our forces during an extended period of American military 
involvement.'' In my letter to President Clinton, I encouraged him to 
seek Congressional support and endorsement of any deployment of U.S. 
forces to the Balkans which might be required to enforce a peace 
agreement.
   I am pleased to report to my colleagues that the President has 
responded to my inquiry, and he has responded in a most positive way. 
He wrote a letter to me, dated October 19, 1995, in which he says that 
he ``would welcome, encourage, and, at the appropriate time, request an 
expression of support by Congress promptly after a peace agreement is 
reached.''
  Promptly after a peace agreement is reached. Let me say that again. 
He states that he ``would welcome, encourage, and, at the appropriate 
time, request an expression of support by Congress promptly after a 
peace agreement is reached. Such an expression of support would be in 
the national interest.'' Mr. President, I congratulate and commend 
President Clinton for taking this position. It will require a debate 
over the detailed plans adopted by the President to lead a NATO 
deployment, if and when an acceptable peace treaty is reached among the 
parties.
  I emphasize the preliminary nature of these assurances. Delicate 
negotiations are underway among the parties, with the strong 
intermediary role played by this Administration and others in the 
European region. We in this body, in what we do and say, need to be 
cognizant of the delicacy of this process. It would be unfortunate if 
Congressional action at this time made that process more difficult. It 
would be most unfortunate if the peace process were to be derailed by 
premature action here as to what we would or would not do or should or 
should not do in the event of an agreement. Let us wait and see what 
the Administration can accomplish with the parties in the upcoming 
negotiations.
  Given the preliminary nature of this process, I certainly cannot say 
today what my position will be on an American deployment. The President 
will have to make a clear case and a strong case, and a convincing case 
for it, if he desires to employ American forces on the ground in 
Bosnia. There will be a debate. There will be a thorough examination 
and understanding as to what the American national interests are in 
that event. I, personally, will approach such a request for 
Congressional support with an open mind.
  The President goes on in his letter to me to say that ``our foreign 
policy works best when we are united in purpose . . . I intend to work 
with the Congress to make this happen.'' Mr. President, there will need 
to be a very 

[[Page S15393]]
detailed understanding of the risks, duration, the nature of forces to 
be deployed, the command and control arrangements, the funding, and 
many other aspects of the ingredients of the participation of our 
forces in implementing any of these treaties involved. There 
undoubtedly will be a major debate, as occurred in the Senate before 
President Bush deployed forces in combat against Iraq. Now is not the 
time for that debate, or for second guessing. Let us let history take 
its course, certain that the President will, as he has promised, 
request Congressional support, endorsement, and participation when the 
details of an accord are reached and when the allies have determined 
whether and how NATO should implement it.
  Mr. President, the President's letter is short. I shall read it into 
the Record.

       Dear Robert: Thank you for letter regarding whether or not 
     I will seek Congressional authorization prior to committing 
     United States troops to a NATO implementation force in 
     Bosnia. I welcome the opportunity to set forth my position.
       While maintaining the constitutional authorities of the 
     Presidency, I would welcome, encourage and, at the 
     appropriate time, request an expression of support by 
     Congress promptly after a peace agreement is reached.

  So, Mr. President, what could be more clear as to the President's 
intention?

       Such an expression of support would be in the national 
     interest. I believe, however, action at this time is 
     premature pending the proximity peace talks to be held in 
     Dayton, Ohio at the end of this month. I hope as the peace 
     talks commence we can continue the process begun in 
     Congressional hearings to brief and consult with Congress so 
     that we secure the widest support possible for peace.

  Those hearings have begun. They began in the Armed Services Committee 
just a few days ago, and the able Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. 
Smith], who is presently presiding over the Senate with a degree of 
dignity and grace and skill that is ``so rare as a day in June,'' was 
present at the hearing, as I was, when we heard testimony.

       As you know, our foreign policy works best when we are 
     united in purpose. We have an historic opportunity in Bosnia 
     to change the course of events, to prevent the spread of the 
     conflict and to end the human suffering that has plagued the 
     people of the region for so long. I intend to work with 
     Congress to make this happen.
       Thank you again for your words of support.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
not only the President's letter but also my letter addressed to him, 
and to which I have alluded earlier in my remarks.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                 Washington, DC, October 13, 1995.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear President Clinton: Press reports today quote Secretary 
     of Defense William Perry as stating that your Administration 
     will not seek Congressional authorization prior to committing 
     United States troops to a NATO peacekeeping operation in 
     Bosnia, although such authorization would be ``welcome.'' If 
     the reports are accurate, I urge you to reconsider this 
     decision and actively seek prior authorization for this 
     mission.
       Given the gravity, risks, and costs associated with an 
     extended peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, I think it would 
     be wise to have the support of the American people and 
     Congress behind you. I believe the Congressional majority 
     should share full responsibility, from the outset, for any 
     decision to accept the costs and risks of this proposed 
     operation. As you know, President Bush sought and received 
     the support of Congress and the American people for Operation 
     Desert Storm in Iraq. That support would have been invaluable 
     to him had the initial casualty predictions been realized, or 
     if international contributions had not reimbursed U.S. costs 
     associated with the mission.
       Without outlining the risks and benefits of U.S. 
     involvement in Bosnia and gaining the consent and cooperation 
     of Congress in advance, it may well be difficult, if not 
     impossible, to sustain or to pay for such involvement, 
     particularly if factional fighting recurs. Secretary Perry 
     was also quoted in the press as saying that it is ``not only 
     a possibility, but likely'' that paramilitary groups would 
     target U.S. forces in Bosnia.
       I believe you should welcome the opportunity to use your 
     considerable persuasive skills to rally the nation behind 
     you, and that you should ask for the approval of Congress for 
     this proposed mission before it commences. While this effort, 
     of course, risks rejection, a sure political foundation seems 
     essential to carry it over the shoals and storms of 
     difficulties which could possibly confront our forces during 
     an extended period of American military involvement. It 
     should also serve as a signal to those who might consider 
     testing our staying power that a strong measure of bipartisan 
     and popular support underpins it.
       As always, I appreciate your thoughtful consideration of my 
     views on matters of this importance to our nation and your 
     Presidency.
       With kind regards, I am.
           Sincerely yours,
     Robert C. Byrd.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                 Washington, DC, October 19, 1995.
     Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Robert: Thank you for your letter regarding whether or 
     not I will seek Congressional authorization prior to 
     committing United States troops to a NATO implementation 
     force in Bosnia. I welcome the opportunity to set forth my 
     position.
       While maintaining the constitutional authorities of the 
     Presidency, I would welcome, encourage and, at the 
     appropriate time, request an expression of support by 
     Congress promptly after a peace agreement is reached. Such an 
     expression of support would be in the national interest. I 
     believe, however, action at this time is premature pending 
     the proximity of peace talks to be held in Dayton, Ohio at 
     the end of this month. I hope as the peace talks commence we 
     can continue the process begun in Congressional hearings to 
     brief and consult with Congress so that we secure the widest 
     support possible for peace.
       As you know, our foreign policy works best when we are 
     united in purpose. We have an historic opportunity in Bosnia 
     to change the course of events, to prevent the spread of the 
     conflict and to end the human suffering that has plagued the 
     people of the region for so long. I intend to work with 
     Congress to make this happen.
       Thank you again for your words of support.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. GREGG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I first want to congratulate the Senator 
from West Virginia on his fine remarks relative to the issue of Bosnia. 
It is not my purpose to rise on that issue but I would make a comment 
that I think it is good that the President is willing to come to the 
Congress for prior authorization, as the Senate is familiar with the 
sense of the Senate which passed last week which I offered requesting 
the President to come to the Congress for prior approval.
  I also suggest, however, that, if we wait until the agreement is 
reached on a peace accommodation or a peace accord, we may well be past 
the time when the Congress can take action effectively; that there has 
been discussion of the fact that we would have a very short time after 
a peace agreement has been reached to expect troops to be introduced 
into the region; in fact, 96 to 100 hours has been the discussion. 
Obviously, that would give a very short window for the Congress to 
express its views on whether or not we should be putting American 
soldiers at risk on the ground in Bosnia.
  So I hope that we can take up this subject more substantively before 
a peace agreement is reached, if it is reached.

                          ____________________