[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 163 (Friday, October 20, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S15378]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I come to the floor to inform my 
colleagues that at noon today the administration will announce that the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France will sign the three 
protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone Treaty [SPNFZ], known 
as the Treaty of Rarotonga. I wholeheartedly welcome that decision.
  The SPNFZ, which took effect in 1986, is signed by Australia, New 
Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, 
Tuvalu, the Cook Islands, and the Solomon Islands. The treaty includes 
three protocols which are open to signature by nuclear countries 
outside the region. Protocol I prohibits any nuclear power with 
territories in the zone from manufacturing, stationing, or testing any 
nuclear device within those territories. Protocol II commits the 
protocol signatory not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against any treaty signatory. Finally, Protocol III commits each 
protocol signatory not to test a nuclear explosive device anywhere in 
the zone. While no nuclear power has adhered to Protocol I, both Russia 
and the People's Republic of China have adhered to Protocols II and 
III.
  The SPNFZ is modeled after the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone 
Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which includes two protocols open to 
signature by the nuclear powers. While the United States is a signatory 
to both the Tlatelolco protocols, we have not signed the similar 
Rarotonga protocols. The reason appears to have been the tendency of 
the western nuclear powers to be hesitant to sign on unilaterally. 
Although both we and the British appeared to be amenable to signing, 
because of French interests we refrained from doing so.
  The continued obstinacy of the French, coupled with their decision to 
go ahead with France's announced nuclear tests in the South Pacific, 
caused me great concern for several reasons. First, I believed that a 
resumption of testing would result in the disintegration of the current 
testing moratorium and a renewal of underground testing by other 
states. Moratoria are like truces--they are only good as long as all 
the parties to them observe their provisions. Second, it called into 
question France's commitment to the extension of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. In May, the world's five announced 
nuclear powers persuaded the rest of the world to extend indefinitely 
the NPT. To win that consensus, the five promised to sign a 
comprehensive test ban treaty [CTBT] by the end of 1996. I believed 
strongly that the resumption of French testing, only 4 months after 
France signed the agreement, called into serious question its 
commitment to the CTBT and threatened to undermine international 
efforts to curb proliferation. Finally, the decision was vehemently 
opposed by most, if not all, of the countries in the region.
  As a result of these concerns, on August 10 the distinguished ranking 
minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, and I 
wrote President Clinton asking him

       . . . to give serious consideration to an early decision to 
     seek Senate advice and consent to ratification of the 
     protocols to the Treaty. The timetable of such action would 
     be consistent with the achievement of a complete ban in 1996. 
     It would send a clear signal to the French that, while we 
     commend their decision to join in a compete test ban next 
     year, they should accede now to the overwhelming sentiment of 
     the peoples of the South Pacific that there should be no 
     further testing of any nuclear explosive devices in the 
     region. Moreover, it would send an unequivocal message to 
     regional nations that we support them in their desire to make 
     their zone nuclear-free. Finally, it is important to give 
     substance to the commitments we gave the regional nations 
     when they supported the U.S. this spring in the effort in New 
     York to secure the permanent extension of the [NPT].

  The announcement today is an important step toward achieving a ban by 
the end of 1996. While I would like to think that our letter had 
something to do with the decision--and here I would like to commend the 
distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island for his efforts in that 
regard--I must realistically credit the Government of France with 
making the agreement possible. France was the only country testing 
nuclear weapons in the zone, and had maintained that they would not 
join the protocols until the entry into force of the CTBT. Their 
decision to join us in signing the protocols represents in my mind a 
major step forward in our drive towards 1996. I would hope that the 
parties would move quickly to sign the protocols, and pledge to respect 
them pending each country's ratification process.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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