[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 163 (Friday, October 20, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1990-E1991]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            STATE OF CHIAPAS

                                 ______


                          HON. BILL RICHARDSON

                             of new mexico

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, October 19, 1995

  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, at the request of my constituents in 
Taos, NM, I would like to take this opportunity to express my views to 
my colleagues about the 22-month-old uprising in the southern State of 
Chiapas, Mexico.
  The state of Chiapas, where a large indigenous population of various 
tribes of Mayans 

[[Page E1991]]
lives, is one of the poorest in Mexico. Only 67 percent of the 
households in Chiapas have electricity, only 41 percent have access to 
sewers, and only 58 percent have access to running water. The level of 
illiteracy is also astonishing high. Only 71 percent of children under 
the age of 14 attend school and only 70 percent of the people over 14 
can read. In addition, Chiapas has a history of human rights abuses 
which includes summary executions and torture.
  To bring attention to the precarious situation of the Indians in 
Chiapas, armed guerrillas of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
[EZLN] seized several towns on January 1, 1994. They killed policeman, 
ransacked stores, freed prisoners, kidnapped the governor of Chiapas, 
and stole dynamite. Accompanying the armed uprising in Chiapas was a 
car bombing in Mexico City and the destruction of electricity pylons in 
two other Mexican States, the EZLN claimed responsibility for both of 
these actions as well.
  The Zapatistas stated that they were declaring war on the 
``illegitimate'' Government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari; denounced 
human rights abuses, lack of opportunities and discrimination against 
the Mayan Indians in Mexico, and called for the building of socialism 
in the country.
  The Mexican Government quickly responded to the unrest by sending in 
the army. They strafed suspected guerrilla strongholds, engaged in 
house to house combat with the Zapatistas, and seized many Chiapan 
villages. Violations of human rights, particularly against the 
indigenous communities, were reported during the fight.
  The guerrilla leaders demanded the recognition of the EZLN as a 
belligerent force; a cease-fire by both parties; the army's withdrawal 
from all communities; the creation of a national commission to deal 
with indigenous issues; and the suspension of indiscriminate bombing. 
They also asked for land distribution, justice for the indigenous 
population and major democratic and social reforms on a national level.
  On January 10, President Salinas agreed to the cease fire and sought 
a political, negotiated settlement of the crisis. The Mexican 
authorities created a Commission for Peace and Reconciliation to begin 
negotiations for a lasting peace. In addition, on January 27, the 
Government and eight political parties agreed on a Pact for Peace, 
Justice, and Democracy, which included a far-reaching electoral reform.
  During the peace talks that took place from February 21 to March 2, 
the Government agreed to address the land, health, education and other 
material needs of the State's poor indigenous communities. Among the 
tentative agreements announced to the public on March 3, 1994, the 
Government proposed to give limited autonomy to indigenous communities; 
legislation forbidding discrimination against Indians; redrawing 
electoral boundaries to permit more indigenous representation; 
distribution of land from large ranches; and major public works to 
construct roads, schools and health clinics.
  By this time, EZLN's demands had gained relative support throughout 
Mexican society and guerrilla's leaders announced that they would 
consult the local indigenous communities to see if the tentative 
agreements were acceptable. Tensions mounted after the assassination of 
the PRI's presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio on March 23, 
1994. On March 26, the Zapatistas suspended peach negotiations, accused 
the Salinas government of complicity in the murder of Colosio and 
stated that the murder was being used as a pretext for a military 
offensive against guerrilla strongholds.
  Meanwhile, peasant groups in Chiapas were seizing thousands of acres 
of land, and landowners started to press for action claiming that they 
would take matters into their own hands if the Government did not take 
action to prevent seizures of the land in the area. In April, the EZLN 
claimed a local leader had been shot by a landowner, and a military 
roadblock in Chiapas was attacked by an unidentified group.
  On June 11, the EZLN leadership announced that they were rejecting 
the Governments March peach plan. After the election of President 
Zedillo, the EZLN claimed that the gubernatorial elections were 
fraudulent, objected to the election of PRI candidate Eduardo Robledo 
as Governor of Chiapas, and threatened to renew the armed rebellion 
unless Robledo resigned.
  Robledo offered to resign if the guerrillas leaders laid down their 
arms, and agreed to form a non-partisan State government. He appointed 
a PRD member as his interior minister and a PAN leader as his health 
minister to show his good intentions. Robledo also pledged to develop a 
pluralistic government, to address the serious needs of Chiapas, and to 
revise the State constitution and electoral law to make future 
elections more credible.
  In February 1995, President Zedillo instructed the Attorney General 
to arrest the Zapatistas leaders on the basis of evidence that they 
were preparing for further violence in Chiapas and other States in 
Mexico. President Zedillo also stressed the importance of full 
observance of the law and affirmed that channels for the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict remained open.
  Following the results of a national referendum the EZLN called in 
last August, which suggested that the Mexican people wanted the 
Zapatistas to lay down its arms and become a political force, President 
Zedillo called on the rebel army to take part in a national dialog for 
political reform. In September 1995, the negotiators reached a modest 
agreement that set an agenda for discussions of social issues that 
contributed to the conflict.
  The United States-Mexico relationship has greatly matured over the 
last decade. Our mutual interests have expanded from strategic concerns 
to economic and social matters that are vital to each nation's domestic 
stability. Our commitment to a strong relationship with Mexico was 
embodied in the NAFTA agreement which acknowledged Mexico's eligibility 
to take advantage of free trade and the global economic marketplace. 
The American commitment to Mexico was reinforced by President Clinton's 
courageous move to open a $20 billion line of credit to Mexico to 
rescue the troubled peso.
  The financial package designed to hasten the stabilization of 
Mexico's economy will benefit all Mexicans by lessening the impacts of 
the crisis. As all Mexicans work to resolve the Chiapas problem, the 
United States should continue to urge restraint, respect for human 
rights and full compliance with the legal process. We should encourage 
Mexico to determine the best way to re-establish law and order, to 
address social problems, and to work toward a new political order in 
Chiapas. We should support all efforts underway to provide amnesty for 
EZLN members who give up their weapons and agree to channel their 
demands peacefully within the political process.
  The promotion of democratic values in Mexico increases stability and 
legitimacy in our valued southern neighbor. Domestic violence and 
insurgencies are among Mexico's greatest threats, and the United States 
should play a constructive role in encouraging peaceful democratic 
solutions to address these concerns. Despite rumors to the contrary, 
the State Department insists that the United States did not pressure 
the Mexican Government to take a harder line in Chiapas as part of the 
financial assistance package for Mexico. Nor does the United States 
Government provide military assistance to Mexico beyond some low-level 
training programs. United States State Department personnel have 
travelled to Chiapas to assess the situation there, but have never 
accompanied or advised Mexican military troops stationed there. I am 
comfortable that the above claims are correct.
  I support the willingness of President Zedillo's administration to 
solve the conflict through dialog and peaceful negotiations and every 
effort of the Government to solve not only the crisis in Chiapas, but 
also similar social problems that affect other parts of the country.

                          ____________________