[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 162 (Thursday, October 19, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15315-S15317]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY [LIBERTAD] ACT OF 1995

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of H.R. 927, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 927) to seek international sanctions against 
     the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a 
     transition government leading to a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba, and for other purposes.
       Pending:
       Dole amendment No. 2898, in the nature of a substitute.
       Helms amendment No. 2936 (to amendment No. 2898), to 
     strengthen international sanctions against the Castro 
     government and to support for a free and independent Cuba.
       Simon modified amendment No. 2934 (to Amendment No. 2936), 
     to protect the constitutional right of Americans to travel to 
     Cuba.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I have a couple of amendments that I would 
like to offer to the pending legislation. I point out we have already 
spent, I guess, 4 or 5 days on this bill, and I think people might 
suggest probably more time than the legislation deserves, but 
nonetheless it is taking a great deal of time.
  What I would like to do, if my colleague and chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee would agree, rather than having separate debates on 
amendments, I will try to confine my remarks to both amendments--they 
are related, I would say to my colleague from North Carolina--and then 
either have back-to-back votes on them or, if he prefers, I could ask 
unanimous consent that these two amendments be considered as one 
amendment for the purpose of a single rollcall vote. Either way is fine 
with me, and I will yield to my colleague for any particular comment he 
may have on procedurally how we handle it.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to have the two 
amendments voted en bloc. And I would further ask the distinguished 
Senator from Connecticut if he would be willing to enter into a time 
agreement?
  Mr. DODD. I am happy to, if he wants. I know some of our colleagues 
have--there is one other amendment pending, the Simon amendment.
  Mr. HELMS. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. I believe he needs 20 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. There is a time agreement.
  Mr. DODD. Of 20 minutes. I would say 40 minutes, and it may not even 
be that amount of time necessarily.
  Mr. HELMS. Forty minutes equally?
  Mr. DODD. Yes.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask unanimous consent that the time agreement be 40 
minutes equally divided--on the two amendments?
  Mr. DODD. That is fine.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments will be 
considered en bloc.
  Mr. DODD. Fine. Mr. President, I will wait to ask for the yeas and 
nays.


          Amendments Nos. 2906 and 2908 to Amendment No. 2936

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the amendments are at the desk. They are 
numbered 2906 and 2908. I ask for their immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendments.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] proposes amendments 
     numbered 2906 and 2908 to amendment No. 2936:
  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 2906

       On page 23 of the pending amendment beginning with line 18, 
     strike all through line 21 on page 24.
                                                                    ____



                           amendment no. 2908

       On page 28 of the pending amendment beginning with line 42, 
     strike all through line 32 on page 32.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me explain, both of these amendments are 
related to title II of this bill. 

[[Page S 15316]]

  Let me explain both of these amendments. I should begin by thanking 
my colleague from North Carolina that we have gotten to this point and 
that we are considering the bill, having dropped title III of the bill.
  I should, before discussing these two amendments, make clear, having 
read the comments of the distinguished majority leader and others, that 
title III of the bill will come back in the bill, I guess, or at least 
there are threats of that when the House and the Senate go to their 
conference on this legislation. On the assumption that the bill is 
passed out of the Senate, I would just notify my colleagues that if 
that is the case and it comes back, we will be back in the same 
position we were in earlier this week where I strongly objected to 
title III of the bill and would take appropriate actions if that is the 
case.
  I certainly understand and respect the right of the conferees to have 
and decide what they are going to decide, but I would have to also put 
my colleagues on notice that I would use whatever procedural vehicles 
are available to me as a Member of this body to stop consideration of 
the legislation if that were to occur.
  Mr. President, these two amendments, as I mentioned a moment ago, 
strike portions of title II of the bill that I think unduly hamper the 
ability of our country to provide assistance--and let me emphasize 
this--to a post-Castro government. Title II does not talk about Fidel 
Castro's government in Cuba today. Title II exclusively talks about the 
government that comes after Fidel Castro.
  So my colleagues who are worried here that they may in some way, if 
they were to adopt these amendments I am proposing, do something to 
support Fidel Castro, they have nothing to do with Fidel Castro. The 
language specifically refers to the post-Castro government. And I want 
to emphasize that point because I think it sets new ground, that is, 
the language in the bill, that I think is dangerous, in my view, and 
precedent setting.
  The restrictions, of course, I mentioned are not restrictions on how 
we relate to the existing government. Rather, they are restrictions on 
a relationship with a future Cuban Government, a government in 
transition from dictatorship to democracy. And, Mr. President, this 
does not make any sense at all to me. Title II of this legislation 
relates in large measure to what the United States' policy should be 
toward a post-Castro government.
  It states, among other things--I am quoting here:

       It is the policy of the United States to support the self-
     determination of the Cuban people and to be impartial toward 
     any individual or entity in the selection by the Cuban people 
     of their future government.

  That is a beautiful statement. I endorse it 1000 percent. It is 
exactly the position we ought to have. Let me repeat it again.

       It is the policy of the United States to support the self-
     determination of the Cuban people and to be impartial toward 
     any individual or entity in the selection by the Cuban people 
     of their future government.

  That is exactly the position we ought to have. In fact, if it ended 
right there I would be standing up here urging all my colleagues to 
support this. But unfortunately, Mr. President, if you read further on 
in here, we seem to then contradict the very statement that I have just 
read to you. And I suspect that many of my colleagues--most would 
endorse the first statement. However, key provisions of title II belie 
that statement.
  I would urge my colleagues to take a look, if they would, at sections 
205, 206, and 207 of title II which set forth a laundry list of 
conditions and requirements that either must or should be met before 
the President, our President, the President of the United States, can 
provide even very limited assistance to help the Cuban people make the 
very difficult transition from dictatorship to democracy.
  These conditions, Mr. President, go on for four pages here, laying 
out, in some cases, ``shall,'' and what we ``must'' do.
  Section 205:

       (a) A determination . . . that a transition government in 
     Cuba is in power shall not be made unless that government has 
     taken the following actions--(1) legalized all political 
     activity; (2) released all political prisoners . . .

  Most of the list I do not have any problem with whatsoever except 
that it gets to micromanagement in a sense and lays out in great 
specificity exactly what we are going to require before we provide any 
assistance to the people of that new government.
  Again, I go back, Mr. President, to read, if you will, the statement 
I read a moment ago when we started talking about it. ``The policy of 
the United States to support the self-determination of the Cuban people 
and to be impartial toward any individual or entity.'' Again, we are 
talking about a post-Castro government here. Presumably, they are 
getting rid of the dictatorship and moving in the right direction.
  Now, I am not suggesting we ought to say we are going to provide help 
to anybody that becomes a transition government or becomes the new 
government after Castro. I would oppose just as strongly any suggestion 
in legislation that we automatically ought to be providing assistance. 
But I also think it gets rather ridiculous if we lay out four pages, 
Mr. President, of conditionality here that a government must meet 
absolutely in many ways if we are going to provide any assistance at 
all. I am talking about humanitarian assistance to people in 
transition.
  And, in fact, these standards that we have here, as much as I think 
they have value, and although I think some of the language is a little 
less than precise, I do not--``legalizing all political activity''--I 
do not know what ``all political activity'' means. I do not know what 
we mean about that in this country. But I am not going to quibble about 
the individual wording in it, Mr. President. I think there is value in 
each one of these statements.
  But my point is, if we applied these standards to the New Independent 
States that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we still 
would not be providing any assistance to them, and we would not be 
allowed to under this, if adopted. We need to provide Presidents and 
Congresses in the future with the flexibility to respond to a 
transition in Cuba. And to sit down and have a four-page minutia detail 
by detail by detail, steps that they have to go through before we can 
help them, I think just is wrong, wrong headed.
  Again, this has nothing to do with Fidel Castro. This title II works 
on the presumption he is gone, he is out of there. Now, we are talking 
about a new government.
  Mr. President, I just think it is a mistake to be passing legislation 
that micromanages and goes into such detail. It is not just this 
President. Maybe people are talking about this administration somehow. 
No one can say with certainty when the transition is going to occur in 
Cuba. We all hope it occurs peacefully and occurs soon. But it may very 
well not be for a year or 2 or 3 or 4 for 5. Who can say?
  We have listened to nine Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower talk 
about the change coming in Cuba. It has not happened yet. Now, again, 
all of us here, I presume, would like to see it happen quickly. But if 
it does not happen during this administration but some future 
administration, including the administration of some of our colleagues 
who are in this Chamber today, they could face four pages we adopt into 
law setting out in detail what that government must look like before we 
can provide assistance to them, despite the fact that we said earlier 
in the bill that it is the policy of our Government to support the 
self-determination of the Cuban people and to be impartial, impartial 
toward any individual or entity in the election by the Cuban people of 
their future government.
  Again, I would not suggest in any way whatsoever, Mr. President, that 
we ought to write a bill that would say no matter what happens, no 
matter who follows Fidel Castro, we ought to provide aid to them.
  Imagine if I wrote a bill that said that, that whoever comes after 
Fidel Castro automatically qualifies for U.S. assistance. I would be 
laughed off the floor of the Senate if I suggested a bill that proposed 
that idea. And yet, what we are doing here today, in a sense, is just 
like that. We are saying in effect that ``no matter who comes after 
Fidel Castro, unless you meet these detailed standards, we cannot 
provide any help to you at all.''
  I thought the idea was to encourage a transition, to move to 
democracy, and to then provide the kind of nurturing 

[[Page S 15317]]
support to see that that transition occurs. Now, it may not occur 
exactly as we like.
  One of the provisions says you must have free elections within 2 
years. I wish it was 6 months. I wish it were the next day. What 
happens if it is 2\1/2\ years and not 2 years, or 2 years, 2 months? It 
is that kind of detail that is in this bill, Mr. President. That is not 
smart. That is not wise. That is not prudent. I do not know of any 
other place where we provided this kind of language.
  Imagine the Philippines if we tried that. Imagine if we tried it, as 
I said, in all of these New Independent Republics that have emerged. 
Our ability to weigh in and create that kind of transition would have 
been severely hampered had we been required to meet the standards we 
are going to be adopting in this legislation if my amendment is not 
approved.
  Now, I do not know, again, how this will come out politically. But I 
hope my colleagues would look and just read the sections 205, 206, and 
207. They go on for some pages. Some require ``shall,'' others 
``should,'' in the transition.
  Last, and it gets into this same area, the settlement of outstanding 
U.S. claims. And here the language, Mr. President, is pretty emphatic 
in the bill.

       No assistance may be provided under the authority of this 
     act to a transition government in Cuba.

  And then it goes on for a page or two here talking about how we 
resolve these outstanding claims.
  Mr. President, I hope that happens. I do not think any U.S. citizen 
who has property confiscated anywhere in the world ought not to be 
compensated. But we have now 38 countries in the world, including Cuba, 
where United States citizens' property has been expropriated, and we 
are in the process of trying to get those individuals compensated for 
that property.
  Some of the countries where that occurs are very strong allies of 
ours. Germany is one, I point out. We now have diplomatic relations 
with Vietnam. The list is lengthy, 38 countries.
  We never said before we cannot provide any assistance to those 
countries until those claims and matters are all settled, and yet that 
is what we do with this legislation. We are saying we cannot provide 
under this--the language very specifically in section 207, ``Settlement 
of Outstanding U.S. Claims to Confiscated Property in Cuba,'' section 
(A), paragraph 1:

       No assistance may be provided--

  The assumption is that you are going to set up a mechanism to resolve 
these claims, again no matter how meritorious they may be, and have 
that control our foreign policy interests, which would be, I presume, 
to support the transition to get aid to people to try to establish a 
presence there and assist that process. To have it totally linked to 
claims issues, where we do not do that even among our allies around the 
globe, seems to me to be going too far. It just goes too far.
  Again, I realize with everything else going on around here that the 
attention on something like this may not seem like much to people. I 
just think it is bad policy, Mr. President, to have this kind of 
detailed step-by-step requirement that you have to meet and then 
absolutely hamstring not just this administration, but future 
administrations, from being able to move intelligently and rapidly to 
try to shore up a government that will follow Fidel Castro.
  Again, I emphasize to my colleagues, none of these provisions has 
anything to do with the present government in Cuba--not one thing to do 
with it. It is all about the government that comes afterward. It seems 
to me we ought to be trying to figure out a way how we can play the 
most creative role in that transition, to try to move that process 
toward a democratically elected government as quickly as we can--as 
quickly as we can. And yet, before we can do that, we now have to go 
through a series of hoops that will make it very, very difficult for us 
to respond creatively and imaginatively to a situation that has gone on 
far too long.
  So, Mr. President, I will not dwell on this any longer. I made the 
point, I hope, and I urge my colleagues to look at these sections of 
the bill. Some, as I said, are more advisory. Others absolutely demand 
certain things occur. They can go through and read which is which. It 
seems to me we ought to stick with the paragraph I read earlier on in 
my statement, and that is that we provide the kind of flexibility in 
allowing the Cuban people to determine for themselves what it is that 
they would like to have as that new government.
  We may not decide to support it. It may not meet our standards and we 
will act accordingly, but the best policy is the one that is included 
as a preamble to this section, and the preamble to this section is one 
that every single person in this country, let alone in this body, can 
support, and that is the policy of the United States to support the 
self-determination of the Cuban people and be impartial to any 
selection of the Cuban people as to their government. It is their 
choice. If they want to make a bad choice, that is their right. We do 
not have to support it, but that is their right if they so desire.
  The idea, then, that we are going to detail in painful minutiae every 
step that must be met, I think is a mistake. Again, I am not quarreling 
myself with any provisions here necessarily. There are things I support 
and I believe make sense. But to spell out as a roadmap what they have 
to follow in great detail before we can provide any kind of help down 
there is a mistake, and I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. President, I withhold the remainder of my time.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], 
is recognized for 20 minutes.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the distinguished President of Estonia 
waits without in the Vice President's Office. I desire to present him 
to the Senate, and I shall do so, and I shall go and invite him to come 
in. In the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum, the time to be 
charged to neither side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________