[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 160 (Tuesday, October 17, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1949-E1950]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         BEYOND THE GREAT SATAN

                                 ______


                        HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, October 17, 1995

  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, the recent incidents involving China's 
proposed nuclear reactor deal with Iran have focused attention once 
again on Iran and its troubled place in the community of nations.
  I commend to your attention a thoughtful piece which appeared in the 
Washington Post, written by Hushang Ansary, a former Iranian Ambassador 
to the United States and Minister of Finance in the Iranian Government 
before the ouster of the Shah in 1979. While I do not necessarily agree 
with or endorse all of Ambassador Ansary's proposals, I believe that he 
lays out an interesting road map for setting relations between the 
United States and Iran on a new course.

                [From the Washington Post, July 9, 1995]

                         Beyond the Great Satan

                          (By Hushang Ansary)

       THE CLINTON administration has taken a series of steps to 
     further isolate Iran and tighten the economic sanctions that 
     could throttle its economy. If successful, these new U.S. 
     initiatives against the Islamic Republic are likely to have a 
     farreaching impact on the course of events in a region that 
     supplies much of the West's oil needs.
       At the same time, U.S. failure to win strong international 
     backing for its containment policy would allow Iran to 
     continue its pursuit of a nuclear development program, one 
     that continues to raise questions.
       President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has retorted that 
     the United States will be the ultimate loser. And so far, 
     America's European allies and Japan have not been supportive.
       The latest move to raise the stakes in a decade and a half 
     of hostility between the United States and Iran is no 
     surprise. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called 
     Iran an outlaw state. President Clinton has used his 
     executive authority to nullify an agreement between Iran and 
     Conoco. A more alarming hint was dropped in February by Gen. 
     Binford Peay, commander of the U.S. Forces in the Middle 
     East, that the two countries might even become involved in 
     military conflict.
       By the time the last of the American hostages returned home 
     from Tehran just over 15 years ago, even the most optimistic 
     knew that the historic friendship between the United States 
     and Iran has suffered a terrible setback. Successive U.S. 
     administrations have pursued policies of accommodation, 
     military pressure and sanctions against Iran. Some of these 
     policies have backfired, 

[[Page E 1950]]
     as in the case of the Iran-contra affair. Some have inadvertently 
     provided trading opportunities for others. By and large, this 
     potpourri of U.S. measures has not altered the fundamental 
     positions of Iran.
       These measures have, however, helped to push Iran toward 
     international isolation and accelerated the pace of its 
     mostly self-inflicted social and economic ills. Even a policy 
     of critical cooperation, advocated by Germany with French 
     support, has not had the desired effect.
       Now that the Clinton administration and the new Republican 
     majority in Congress appear to agree on placing Iran high on 
     the agenda of U.S. foreign policy, is it not time to address 
     the Iranian dilemma at its roots? The United States may hold 
     to its current course of isolating Iran, but it has to reckon 
     with all the international forces at work on this issue. 
     Russian and Chinese nuclear agreements, and German and 
     Japanese debt refinancings, give evidence of the fragility of 
     the administration's approach.
       This appears to be a propitious time for a different 
     approach and it is, therefore, worth considering how 
     relations between the United States and Iran might be set on 
     a new course.
       Iran is now facing mass unemployment, double-digit 
     inflation, falling productivity and massive foreign debt. The 
     value of the Iranian currency, the rial, dropped from 75 to 
     the dollar in 1977 to 6,000 at one point. Iran's GNP per 
     capita is now less than half its 1977 level.
       Iran is also feeling the weight of diplomatic isolation. 
     Sixteen years after the revolution, the only Western head of 
     state to have paid a visit to Tehran is Kurt Waldheim, the 
     former Austrian president.
       Economic and governmental disorder have unleashed political 
     forces beyond the control of the radical clergy. In recent 
     months, Iran has faced a number of industrial strikes and 
     anti-government demonstrations. Important social groups, 
     including lawyers, doctors, bazaar merchants, retired 
     military officers, writers and journalists, have publicly 
     challenged the government and its policies.
       Even the Shiite Muslim clergy, initially the backbone of 
     the revolutionary regime, has asserted its independence. Some 
     senior ayatollahs have said publicly that they would support 
     new policy makers and policies capable of turning the economy 
     around and ending the nation's diplomatic isolation.
       The constant theme of these dissenting voices is a call for 
     a new political course, one freely chosen by the Iranian 
     people. As the level of dissent rises, there is reason to 
     believe that even some of the more extreme elements of the 
     regime, their customary rhetoric notwithstanding, may now be 
     inclined to consider a plan that would address the country's 
     economic disorder and diplomatic isolation. General elections 
     are scheduled in 1996 and presidential elections in 1997. A 
     workable plan, properly monitored and performance-related, 
     could have a positive effect on these two crucial events.
       Such a plan should let the people of Iran normalize the 
     state of the nation. At home, it should aim for democracy, 
     respect for human rights and an agreeable quality of life. 
     Abroad, it would need to restore the image of Iran as a 
     responsible member of the United Nations, ready to live in 
     peace with all other nations.
       In the first phase of such a plan, Iran would have to take 
     appropriate steps, in keeping with its constitution, to 
     dismantle the bureaucracy it created to cope with the 
     problems of the early years of the Islamic revolution. These 
     steps should include the rehabilitation of those unjustly 
     deprived of their civil rights on the basis of their 
     political beliefs, the repeal of laws and regulations that 
     discriminate on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity and faith, 
     and the removal of restrictions, often unconstitutional, on 
     freedom of expression, association and election.
       The normalization of political life in Iran would 
     facilitate the no less complex task of bringing the country's 
     foreign policy into line with its international obligations. 
     This would, of necessity, include measures to dispel any 
     notion that Iran supports international terrorism and the 
     assassination of dissidents abroad. Iran would also need to 
     cease its campaign against the Middle East peace process, 
     adhere to the now renewed version of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty and take steps to make credible its 
     announced decision not to acquire nuclear weapons.
       Iran could also facilitate visits by the International 
     Committee of the Red Cross to prisons where it is alleged 
     that prisoners of conscience and members of religious and 
     ethnic minorities are being held, often without charges being 
     filed. It should allow international human rights 
     organizations access to its officials and open itself to the 
     international media in the normal manner.
       Linking its response to Iranian performance, the United 
     States would need to give evidence of its own willingness to 
     make positive contributions. First steps would include 
     establishing a timetable for the final settlement of all 
     outstanding claims between the two countries and for the 
     release of the remaining Iranian assets, setting up a 
     procedure in which sanctions against Iran would be lifted in 
     stages and normalizing visa requirements for Iranian 
     nationals visiting the United States.
       The United States could encourage the formation of a 
     Council on Trade and Economic Cooperation with Iran with the 
     participation of the leaders of the U.S. business community. 
     The United States might also form an appropriate body to 
     advise on various aspects of U.S.-Iranian relations. While 
     policies are obviously formulated by governments, this could 
     help mobilize private resources in the services of the new 
     set of foreign policy objectives as containment gives way to 
     rapprochement.
       In the next phase, Iran would resume its quest for 
     democracy that started almost 100 years ago. The Iranian 
     people would be given the opportunity to return to the 
     electoral process and the organization of presidential and 
     parliamentary elections in line with the provisions of Iran's 
     constitution. These elections should be open to political 
     parties of all denominations and conducted in a verifiably 
     fair fashion.
       The last phase of the plan would thus begin in an 
     atmosphere of stability, without which all attempts at 
     reviving Iran's economy through domestic and international 
     cooperation will remain tentative and fragile. At this point, 
     the Council on Trade and Economic Cooperation with Iran, 
     having completed its initial studies, would be in a position 
     to sponsor a series of conferences designed to help Iran 
     reintegrate into the world-economy and to realize its 
     economic potential, estimated to reach $100 billion in annual 
     trade and economic opportunities.
       The stage could thus be set for the Middle East to open a 
     chapter in regional economic cooperation--possibly including 
     Central Asia, which hungers for peace and development--an 
     enterprise that could foster opportunities not dissimilar to 
     those in the Pacific Rim nations. Moderate Arab nations too 
     would be helped to accelerate the pace of their social and 
     economic transformation, and the way would be paved for a 
     more constructive relationship between the West and the world 
     of Islam as a whole.
       Is this farfetched? It is no more farfetched than the 
     thought of a visit to Jerusalem by President Anwar Sadat of 
     Egypt in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War or the thought 
     in the mid-1980s that the Berlin Wall could be brought down 
     before the end of that decade. The Middle East has always 
     dealt with logjams that block the normal course of its 
     politics through courageous steps that have defied 
     conventional wisdom. History belongs to those who do not 
     merely contemplate the sour aspects of present reality, but 
     labor with persistence to give birth to new possibilities of 
     hope.

                          ____________________