[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 157 (Wednesday, October 11, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15005-S15023]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY [LIBERTAD] ACT OF 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia is seeking recognition.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I come to the floor in support of the 
measure which is before the Senate, somewhat different than the 
previous speakers we have heard, to rise on behalf of the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act, otherwise called Libertad.
  I hope the good chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee will let 
me embrace an issue of international consequence, as a prelude to my 
comments here.
  A distinguished Member of this body, my good colleague from Georgia, 
Senator Nunn, as everybody knows now, has announced that he will depart 
the Senate after the conclusion of his term. Of course, this has an 
enormous impact in our home State of Georgia and the Nation as well. I 
told the Senator when we visited just before his announcement that he 
left a very rich legacy for himself, for his family, for our State, and 
for the Nation. We are all indebted to the service of the distinguished 
senior Senator from Georgia. It has been long, it has been arduous, 
statesmanlike, and it has been civil. And the Senator from Georgia has 
made a significant contribution to his era in the history of the U.S. 
Senate and our country.
  I first met the Senator from Georgia when he was in the House of 
Representatives and just before I became a member of the Georgia 
Senate. And he was equally held in high regard in our home State as he 
was here on the national scene.
  A lot of people have asked me what the effect would be of his 
departure. And I said, of course, there will be an interim effect, but 
I also pointed out that in our vast democracy filled with talent, 
capacity, one of the rich treasures of it which we have seen throughout 
our history is that we regroup and move on.
  But another point I would like to make is the Senator in his closing 
statement in the House Chamber pointed out that he is not leaving 
public life, that he will continue to be an activist in public policy 
and a resource not only to us in the Senate but to the Nation as well. 

[[Page S 15006]]

  So I wish the Senator every goodwill, and Godspeed to him and his 
family as they pursue a new adventure. He will be missed here. He will 
be appreciated. And as a fellow Georgian I think I speak for all of 
those in our State, we hold him in the highest regard and wish him the 
very best in his future.
  Of course, the Senator from Georgia has been on the international 
scene for a long time. He has watched the effects in Cuba of an avowed 
enemy of the United States in one Fidel Castro. Fidel Castro has 
throughout his history been an arch enemy of the United States and its 
people. And to this day he has not disavowed any of his intentions nor 
his hostility to this country and its people. He has been the exporter 
of terrorism. He has been the exporter of revolution. He has been the 
exporter of turmoil. And its effect in our hemisphere has been 
significant, and its effect here in the United States has been 
significant.
  There are those among us who think that this is the time to open 
relations with Cuba and that it will, through communication and 
interaction, cause Fidel Castro, this archenemy of the last three 
decades, to somehow soften his stance.
  That reminds me of the Soviet policy. This Nation's capital was 
filled with Soviet apologists who felt that the definition of the 
Soviet Union as an ``evil empire''--like former President Reagan--was 
the inappropriate approach to dealing with the Soviets. He felt that 
power and the force of power was what it was going to take to cause the 
Soviet Union to implode, and he was correct. Many of these apologists 
have become awfully silent. But there can be no doubt that the firm, 
forceful, aggressive policy of the United States toward the avowed 
enemy, the Soviet Union, had an impact and effect.
  Mr. President, no one is suggesting that Fidel Castro is near the 
national concern as the Soviet Union was, but certainly anything that 
is 90 miles off the coast of the United States that is an avowed enemy 
needs to be watched very, very closely.
  And I think the Cuban apologists are wrong, too. I believe that the 
policies of the last 30 years by Republican and Democrat 
administrations--by the vast majority of the Congress to impose tough 
sanctions, embargoes, and to hold firm that we are going to keep the 
pressure on this government of Fidel Castro until there is liberty, 
until there is democracy, until there is freedom--are absolutely 
correct.
  This legislation is nothing more than an extension of U.S. policy as 
it has been shaped in a bipartisan way, as I said, by Republican and 
Democrat administrations alike.
  Mr. President, this is absolutely no time for us to rewrite that 
policy. We are succeeding. Now that the Soviet Union cannot spoon-feed 
Castro, the sanctions are imposed and they are feeling the pressure of 
this United States power, it should be continued. It should not be 
modified. It should not be nullified. It should not be weakened. It 
should be toughened.
  When you look at the nature of life in Cuba today, we still have a 
litany of human rights violations, personal rights and freedoms being 
tramped on. This is not a leader with which the United States should 
put its credibility on the line, nor ratify and certify, nor give 
strength by the suggestions that we should begin negotiating in good 
faith with a man who has such a history of totalitarian oppression.
  Mr. President, one of the provisions which is somewhat controversial, 
but I think one of the more important pieces of debate with regard to 
the legislation, is title III, which has two parts. It denies entry 
into the United States to anyone who confiscates property or traffics 
in confiscated property; and, No. 2, it gives the U.S citizens valid 
property claims and a private right of action in Federal court.
  I have been very concerned about property rights of U.S. citizens in 
foreign countries in our hemisphere for some period of time. Cuba is 
not the only country with which we have difficulties in regard to the 
interests of United States property owners in other countries. It has 
been at the center of a long debate--I see my colleague from 
Connecticut--with regard to Nicaragua and other countries. And 
considerable progress has been made in the aftermath of President 
Chamorro's new democracy for about a year. We were thrashing through 
this issue, and over and over making the point that U.S. citizens who 
own property there needed appropriate dispensation of that property. I 
think that discussion bore fruit, and many of those properties are now 
being settled. And I give much credit to the Chamorro government for 
the good faith in which they came to the table and tried to deal with 
those legitimate property rights. I think that will no longer be an 
issue in the not-too-distant future.
  In the case of Cuba, however, we have 5,911 American property claims 
valued at $1.8 billion in 1960 value. This is an enormous issue. No one 
denies the confiscation. The Cuban Government has shown absolutely zero 
respect for this property and has indicated no intention of addressing 
the issue. And, to complicate it even further, they are using the 
property to produce currency in their hard-pressed economy.
  What this involves is taking the property that was lawfully owned by 
people who are now U.S. citizens, or were U.S. citizens at the time, 
confiscating the property and actually entering into a world market on 
the property. We have a situation now where citizens of other countries 
in our hemisphere are negotiating with the Cuban Government and 
purchasing these properties for which there are claims by U.S. citizens 
and selling them to foreign nationals of other countries.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield on this point? I do not want to 
interrupt his time, but it is an interesting conversation. I wonder if 
he might just yield.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. DODD. I am going to raise this in my own time. But my colleague 
brings up probably the most controversial part of the bill. He properly 
identified it as a controversial one. He is absolutely correct in 
identifying the number of certified U.S. claims as 5,911, that were the 
result of actions taken by the Castro government after 1959. Control of 
the country.
  My concern here is not that issue at all. That is going to be 
difficult enough to deal with. Nonetheless, I feel confident we can 
ultimately address those claims. What I think we do here is add a new 
element to the problem which he has already alluded to, and that is 
what has heretofore been international and U.S. law with respect to the 
resolution of confiscation of property of a U.S. citizen. We are now 
going to expand the definition to include the property of Cuban 
nationals who left the country and became U.S. citizens subsequent to 
their property being taken.
  We are talking about roughly a million people who have left Cuba. The 
estimates are that perhaps as many as hundreds of thousands of these 
individuals left behind property--no one suggests that everyone of the 
million people who left will have claims against Cuba, but several 
hundreds of thousands well may. So we add to the 5,911 claimants 
already certified, potentially, as many as 300,000 to 400,000 
additional potential claims.
  Those of us who are concerned about that provision naturally ask the 
question why we are prepared to provide special legal rights for this 
category of individuals. After all we have Polish-Americans, people who 
have left the former Soviet Union, people who fled China, as well as 
other countries of repression and left behind or had taken their 
property by former regimes. I think, any one of these groups can 
legitimately come forward and ask for similar treatment if we change 
the law.
  There is a reason for current international law and practice in this 
area. Under existing law, the U.S. Government is responsible for 
espousing the claims of persons who were U.S. citizens at the time the 
confiscation occurred. For those individuals who were sovereign 
nationals of the country in question, the issue is with acts of their 
government. If we change domestic law in this one case, I think we can 
fully expect individuals who may have also lived under a Communist 
government to say why not us; we left; you have changed the law to for 
one group of people; we would like a similar application of the law in 
our case.
  I just raise this with my colleague, and I am going to address it at 
greater length here, but it is one of the major concerns I have with 
this bill. I see it 

[[Page S 15007]]
subjecting our Federal court system to substantial increased costs in 
order to process these new claims. In addition I am concerned that 
these new claims will probably make it very difficult to resolve the 
5,911 certified U.S. claimants who have a right under longstanding law 
to have their claims addressed. These claimants have expressed that 
very concern. There are some strong letters from them--worried about 
exactly what happens to them as a result of this explosion of claims 
that may come before the court as a result of this legislation.
  I raise that just as an issue. I know my colleague has been involved 
with the issue of expropriation generically, as have others. 
Expropriations have occurred in many countries--Panama, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, a whole host of countries.
  With respect to the issue you raise about companies from other 
countries doing business in Cuba. By my count 58 countries have some 
form of business interest in Cuba today. Great Britain has a number of 
interests--France, Germany. It is not just Latin American countries. 
Some of the most conservative democratic countries in Europe have major 
economic enterprises there. And we will virtually be precluding 
entrance into this country citizens of our allies in Europe who may 
have business interests there. Do we really want to alienate our 
closest trading partners in this way? It seems to me that we may be 
raising a tremendously complicated problem for ourselves down the road. 
I raise that for my colleague's comments.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I appreciate that. As the Senator noted, I singled 
this out as one of the more controversial provisions.
  Mr. DODD. He is absolutely correct.
  Mr. COVERDELL. And my colleague would also acknowledge that this 
issue does not confine itself to Cuba alone. In fact, one of the 
countries in which we both maintain a rather high interest is 
Nicaragua, and that very question is preeminent in the struggle to 
resolve property rights of individuals who were Nicaraguan citizens at 
the time, came to the United States, became U.S. citizens and are now 
claiming property rights in Nicaragua.
  So my response to my colleague from Connecticut is I believe that it 
is time for this to be elevated in debate and search such as we are 
doing today and will continue through the process of dealing with this 
legislation.
  Frankly, I believe we need to obtain the interest and attention of 
the countries that the Senator pointed to, and I might also point out 
they are on both sides of our northern and southern border, too, with 
Canada and Mexico dealing with properties that were, in the Senator's 
definition, without question property confiscated by the Castro 
government, acknowledged property owned by U.S. citizens at that time.
  Those properties--forget for a moment the question the Senator raised 
about expansion, which I think is a legitimate question. Those 
properties are being bartered by the government with full knowledge. We 
are not having a situation here where over the years the title is 
confused, a citizen acquired it or got it and somehow has sold it to a 
foreign national of another country. This is a program on the part of 
the Cuban Government to deal with its currency problems, which are 
immense. And I think the United States is morally required to confront 
that issue, I think not only with Cuba but we need to be making a 
statement, we need to be searching for resolution with our allies in 
terms of our respect for U.S.-owned property.
  On a broader scale, I would say to the Senator from Connecticut, I 
think this is an issue that has not received enough attention, whether 
it is in Cuba or Nicaragua or some of the former Communist governments 
even in Europe. And I believe it is an issue of law.
  I am not a lawyer, as is my distinguished colleague. But it is a 
question that requires more definition in this era of international 
history. We are talking about a period where we have an interdependent 
economy, far more open economy. We all acknowledge that. This question 
is basically in law 30 years or more old.
  I think it deserves attention, and I am glad the Senator from North 
Carolina put it in the bill because I think it is going to force all of 
us to confront the issue more effectively than we have in the past. 
That would be my response to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Just one more piece on that. The fact that the business interests in 
our immediate hemisphere, in our immediate sphere of influence, feel 
free enough to engage in transactions that affect these known 
properties, I think is very serious.
  I hope the discussion--in fact, I would take it even further. I think 
that we may come to the point where we need to be entering into direct 
discussions with these governments with regard to these particular 
properties. I am talking about the 5,911 claims. There is a rather--I 
will not get into detail, but there is a rather elaborate circumstance 
of a company in Canada today that, with full knowledge of the 
situation, is pursuing and developing one of these pieces of property.
  So, Mr. President, the point I want to make here is that this 
legislation is a direct extension of contemporary policy with Cuba that 
has been shaped by Republican Presidents and Democrat Presidents since 
Cuba was taken over by Fidel Castro. That is No. 1.
  No. 2, I believe this entire question of property deserves and 
requires far more attention than it has received. And I think this is a 
valid attempt to deal with that. I am absolutely comfortable that the 
debate will modify this language before the end of the day, but I think 
it is appropriate that we are being drawn to this debate.
  No. 3, the conditions in Cuba continue to be extensive human rights 
violations, extensive oppression, and imprisonment. It is an arbitrary, 
totalitarian government with its leadership showing no signs of any 
legitimate movement to democracy. And, Mr. President, I think it must 
be noted that Fidel Castro, exporter of terrorism, exporter of 
revolution, has made no--zero, none--accord to a movement to democracy 
or to renounce his adversarial, hostile attitude toward the people and 
Government of the United States of America.
  And that is why I stand in support of the thrust of the legislation 
that is before this Senate today.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor. I think the Senator from 
Connecticut is seeking recognition.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I appreciate my 
colleague's yielding to me in the middle of his remarks. And I just 
wish to make the point, I urge my colleagues here in the coming 2 
days--I know that they have a lot of other things on their mind--to 
take a good, hard, close look at this bill. Because in the 
consideration of any matter like this, we ought to all ask ourselves 
several basic questions, the first being: Is what is being proposed in 
the best interests of our own country? That is the first question.
  Put aside for a second what it may do to the targeted country where 
we are focusing the legislation. But what does it do to our foreign 
policy? And then, second, the obvious question: Is the legislation 
going to achieve the desired results? Those are two pretty basic 
questions we ought to ask ourselves.
  Mr. President, when it comes to the issue of Cuba, unlike even North 
Korea apparently, but Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, the 
Eastern bloc countries--when still under the control of the Soviet 
Union--the Soviet Union itself, despite all of our difficulties, we 
managed to, at least for the most part, try to conduct our foreign 
policy in a way that made sense for us. That entailed having relations 
with them. And, in many of those cases that I have just mentioned, 
achieved the desired results such that today we find ourselves in a 
situation that is far beyond the imagination of most of us. The Eastern 
bloc countries that were under the control and the thumb of the Soviet 
Union today are struggling with their own form of democracy, but the 
world has changed.
  I would make a case there were several reasons for that success. 
Certainly, on the one hand was the fact that their economies ended up 
being bankrupt because they spent such a tremendous percentage of their 
gross domestic product on arms.
  One can argue that buildup had a desired effect economically. But I 
would also suggest, Mr. President, that it was the clever, clear idea 
that exposing the peoples of those countries to the fraud that was 
being perpetuated on them by 

[[Page S 15008]]
the controllers, as well as the options that existed elsewhere, also 
contributed to the change that occurred.
  I want to get to that argument as we look at Cuba. But Cuba is 
unique. This is almost a domestic political debate rather than a 
foreign policy debate, I would say. If we could step back and say to 
ourselves, what is in our best interest and how do we collectively, in 
a wise and thoughtful way, try to propose ideas that are going to 
achieve, as soon as possible, the desired results. Those results are to 
bring democracy to Cuba. We all agree on that.
  However, if you disagree with all of the tactics of how to achieve 
that, then you are immediately suspect and usually the victim of a lot 
of name calling about where your political leanings are. God forbid you 
disagree with how we might achieve the desired results.
  And so my objection to the bill being offered by the Senator from 
North Carolina is not what the Senator from North Carolina or others 
desire. I do not believe there is probably any debate about that or any 
division here. I think every one of us would like to see democracy come 
to Cuba. I will not say restored to Cuba, because the notion somehow 
that prior to 1959 we were looking at a democratic government is 
specious. But let us bring democracy to Cuba.
  How do we best achieve that? What steps should we take? How do we 
work collectively with our allies, in this hemisphere and elsewhere, to 
produce those results? If we can step back and do that without worrying 
whether we are going to offend various factions or groups in this 
country that have, at least as far as I am concerned, a certain amount 
of right to be red-hot angry over the situation because they are the 
ones who were victimized or their families, then I think we might 
actually make some significant steps forward.
  I mentioned briefly a moment ago that my concern with title III of 
this bill is because it potentially exposes our country to a tremendous 
number of similar problems in other places where there will be claims 
of an equal degree of legitimacy. There are 38 countries in the world 
where we presently have, Mr. President, outstanding claims by U.S. 
citizens against those governments because properties have been 
expropriated and there has been no compensation. I have now become a 
U.S. citizen, and I'm going to go to U.S. courts and try and get paid 
for it.''

  (Mr. ABRAHAM assumed the chair.)
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, that will cause an explosion of demands on 
our U.S. court system. So the first test is, what is the impact of this 
legislation on us, put aside for a minute on Cuba, on us? And if my 
colleagues will merely look at just what it does if we only take the 
Cuban case and given the average court costs associated with such 
claims and multiply it by the number of claimants, it is a tremendous 
amount of money the United States taxpayers will be asked to come up 
with so that our courts can handle this.
  I would also argue that it is going to be rather difficult for us to 
turn down other claimants who lived in other countries at the time 
there was an expropriation without compensation. They are going to want 
the law changed for them as well.
  So I urge my colleagues over this next day or so to please examine 
this provision of the law and understand that while you are trying, and 
I think all of us are, to effectuate some change in Cuba, that in doing 
so, we may be doing more injury to ourselves, adding more of a 
financial burden on ourselves, complicating things for ourselves 
without necessarily doing anything to Cuba.
  I hope people will pay some attention to this, step back a little 
bit: ``If I don't vote for this I will look like I am not for democracy 
in Cuba,'' or ``I am in favor of Fidel Castro if I vote against the 
bill.'' That is not the case at all. Look at the provisions and what we 
are doing.
  There are several basic questions we ought to be asking, and I will 
try over these next several minutes to address each of the questions 
that I think ought to be raised, aside from the basic questions about 
whether or not the bill before us is going to help or hurt the United 
States and, second, whether or not it is going to have the desired 
effects on the country in question, in this case Cuba, to effectuate 
the desired results, and that is a change to democracy.
  Are we more likely as well to impose additional hardships on the 
people of Cuba, not the Government, but the people of Cuba? That is a 
legitimate question, it seems to me. Are we going to make the 
transition to democracy more difficult or less difficult if this 
legislation is adopted and signed into law? Finally, will this 
legislation place added strains on our relations with other 
governments?
  I am not suggesting that this final question in and of itself ought 
to be the sole criteria, because if what you are doing is right, if it 
is good for us, if it produces the desired results, I am willing to 
accept the fact that some other governments may be uncomfortable.
  I recall during the debate on whether or not to impose sanctions on 
the Government of South Africa, there were many of our allies that were 
uncomfortable. My reaction then, as it would be now, is so what, in 
some ways. We have to be a leader in the world, and if that is what it 
takes from time to time, then you ought to be willing to sacrifice 
that. But consider what you are doing. Make a very careful calculation 
as to whether you are going to produce results that you are seeking.
  Lastly, as I said earlier, whether or not we are going to overwhelm 
our Federal court system, which I think is a very important question 
people ought to look at.
  So, Mr. President, today we begin this debate. By the way, let me say 
to my colleagues, I think the raising of the issue of the Medicare and 
Medicaid debate and long-term care issues of nursing homes, while 
obviously not the subject of the bill before us, I think does raise a 
legitimate question, and that is, here we are now going to consume 2\1/
2\ days of the Senate's time on this one bill. A cloture motion was 
filed immediately. So we are now going to take up 2 days. We did not 
have 1 day of hearings on Medicare or Medicaid with regard to the 
proposal that is now being considered by the Finance Committee.
  I think Members of this body raise a legitimate issue when they 
question whether or not the priorities of the American public, if given 
the choice to express themselves, would have this body spend 2 days 
debating Medicare, Medicaid and long-term health care conditions or 
Cuba. I do not have any doubt in my mind what their priorities would 
be.
  So we are going to end up next week or the week after with 20 hours 
equally divided, 10 hours on a side, to discuss all of Medicare, all of 
Medicaid, all of the tax breaks, all of the earned income tax credit 
provisions, and yet I am going to have 2\1/2\ days, apparently, to talk 
about one bill affecting Cuba.
  Maybe somebody else thinks that is the priority of the country. I do 
not think so. Yet, that is the position we are in, because the majority 
has decided that is what the order of business will be.
  I would have urged we spend 2 days with a good healthy debate on 
Medicare and Medicaid and long-term health care without necessarily 
having a bill in front of us, but a good solid discussion of what we 
are going to do in the next several weeks to millions of Americans and 
their families, and yet we are going to spend 2\1/2\ days on an issue 
that has not even had a vote in the Foreign Relations Committee. We had 
some hearings at least on the Cuba bill. No hearings on Medicare, 
Medicaid or long-term nursing home care and, as the Senator from 
Arkansas pointed out a moment ago, we are now going to strip 
regulations from legislation we adopted in a bipartisan fashion only a 
few years ago.
  Mr. President, I want to turn, if I can, in this debate about Cuba to 
the decisions reached by President Clinton just a few days ago. Those 
decisions have now been highly criticized, a moral outrage has been 
expressed over changes in regulations affecting the Government of Cuba 
and related matters. I have seen press reports that the majority leader 
took strong exception to the Executive order and others have been 
trying to one-up each other as to who can come up with the most 
outrageous statement to describe the decisions taken by President 
Clinton.
  I am not sure every report accurately reflects the feelings of my 
colleagues, but nonetheless some rather extreme statements have been 
made. 

[[Page S 15009]]

  As I understand it, the President's policy initiatives are, in large 
measure, perfectly consistent with related provisions contained in the 
House-passed bill and the most recent version of the Senate substitute 
which is before us. So I am somewhat surprised that there is such a 
vehement attack on President Clinton and his proposals, where a mere 
simple reading of the bill before us includes many of the things the 
President did by Executive order.
  Section 712 of the version of the amendment available to me 
specifically authorizes the President of the United States, and I 
quote:

       To furnish assistance to nongovernmental organizations to 
     support democracy building efforts in Cuba.

  That was a key element of the President's announcement last Friday. 
Section 722 of that same measure authorized the President to, and I 
quote:

       Establish and implement an exchange of news bureaus between 
     the United States and Cuba.

  That is another key element of the President's actions. Surely, the 
supporters of this legislation do not object to the implementation of 
these measures that they themselves have recommended in the context of 
the legislation before us.
  What about the other elements of last Friday's announcement? Do my 
colleagues object to provisions which seek to put an end to the 
profiteering associated with legal transfers of funds--legal transfers 
of funds--by Cuban-American families in this country to their family 
members in Cuba seeking to emigrate to the United States under 
provisions of the United States-Cuban immigration agreement?
  That is why the President has authorized Western Union to open 
offices in Cuba to make legal transfers of this nature easier and 
cheaper. Today, the families in this country trying to provide 
assistance to their families in Cuba, in many cases, get held up. It is 
a mugging, in effect, the prices they have to pay.
  So here we are setting up Western Union offices in that country to 
help families, Cuban-American families, legally transfer funds to 
assist them. That is part of what the President did. Is that not what 
we ought to be trying to do in these particular cases? Or do our 
colleagues take issue with the enhanced enforcement measures announced 
by the President? These measures would step up enforcement of sanctions 
regulations, as well as compliance with the Neutrality Act. The 
President has also instructed that the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, the embargo enforcement agency, be strengthened in Washington 
and in Miami.
  I am hard pressed to understand the moral outrage over the 
President's decisions when virtually every one of them are at least de 
facto or de jure included in the bill we are now considering in part, 
and yet that is exactly--exactly--the case.
  Now I would like to turn to the bill before us. Many stated purposes 
of the legislation are laudable and, again, let me emphasize, every 
single Member in this body I know, if they could will it, tonight would 
will that there be change in Cuba. That is not the issue. Every one of 
us would like to see democracy come to that country.

  Secondly, Mr. President, I recall being offended when people would 
talk about my ethnicity in ways in which all of us who happened to be 
of one particular group are of a particular mindset--that they could 
speak for everybody who was an Irish-American. Today, to suggest 
somehow that every Cuban-American thinks exactly alike is insulting.
  There is a great diversity of thought within the Cuban-American 
community as to how we ought to address the problem of Cuba. None that 
I know of disagree with the bottom line; that is, that we should seek 
to bring democracy to that country. But there is an honest division of 
thought among Cuban-Americans who believe there might be better ways of 
achieving those results.
  It is offensive to many, some of whom even disagree with their fellow 
Cuban-Americans, that somehow they ought to be maligned because they 
think there may be a better way of achieving the desired results. 
Certainly, we ought to take that into consideration as we look at the 
legislation before us.
  None of us argue about the goals. But the measures that we take have 
to be examined and examined carefully. All of us, I hope, would like to 
see that the transition from the present government in Cuba to 
democracy would happen without bloodshed. I hope it is not a point of 
contention that, ideally, we ought to try to achieve the same kind of 
peaceful transformation we saw happen in Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and other of the New Independent States. Many thought 
it would come to a war one day. I thought so, too. But I think all of 
us are grateful today for the fact that the transition--occurred 
without a shot being fired at least in recent times.
  I think it would be in all of our interests to get a peaceful, 
bloodless transfer of power in Cuba and to figure out ways in which 
that could be advanced.
  Certainly, I think we could have serious and negative implications on 
our Federal courts. I mentioned this at the outset of my remarks, but I 
want to spend some time on it because this is a critical piece of this 
bill.
  Again, I urge my colleagues, or their staffs who may be listening, to 
look at these sections and understand the implications, because I think 
they could have profound results if we are not careful. It could have 
implications on some of our closest trading partners and run the risk 
of subjecting our country to reciprocal kinds of actions in the coming 
years.
  I happen to believe it is imperative that our colleagues have a 
better understanding of the true impact of the legislation on the 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy and on international trade and commerce. 
Clearly, I think additional hearings and committee consideration of the 
bill would be the best way to achieve that outcome. That is, 
apparently, not going to happen.
  I have to hand it to the authors of the legislation. They have 
tinkered with the language in this bill in an effort to conceal and 
obscure some of its fundamental problems. Unfortunately, none of the 
changes remove the inherent flaws.
  The Helms-Dole substitute is 40 pages in length. It has gone through 
significant changes since being first introduced back in February. As I 
mentioned earlier, no hearings have been held in the Senate on later 
versions of the bill, including the one before us. Again, I doubt that 
is going to occur. My colleagues ought to look carefully at the bill 
and analyze what is in it.
  This legislation breaks significant new legal ground in reversing 
more than 40 years of international and domestic law in the practice 
and treatment of confiscated property. Nor, I point out, is there 
universal support for the bill among those whose property was 
expropriated.
  I hope my colleagues will pay attention to this. This is important. 
Some of the very individuals who have the most interest in this 
legislation--the certified American claimants--have gone on record in 
opposition, Mr. President, to the centerpiece of this legislation.
  David Wallace, chairman and chief executive officer of Lone Star 
Industries, one of the major corporate claimants in Cuba, has made it 
clear where he stands on the central provisions of this bill. He is 
opposed to them, Mr. President. Let me state for the record that Mr. 
Wallace is a resident of my State of Connecticut and the headquarters 
of Lone Star is located in Stamford, CT.
  Mr. Wallace speaks not only for Lone Star, but for a number of other 
important claimants, who are members of the Joint Corporate Committee 
on Cuban Claims, which he chairs. That organization represents 30 of 
the major corporate claimants holding more than half of the total value 
of certified claims.
  He has written to me and other Members several times on this issue, 
most recently on October 10. He raised some very critical issues that I 
want to bring to the attention of my colleagues.
  I ask unanimous consent to have his letter printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                         Joint Corporate Committee


                                              on Cuban Claims,

                                   Stamford, CT, October 10, 1995.
       Dear Senator: I recently wrote to urge you to oppose Title 
     III of legislation, the ``Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
     Solidarity Act,'' that purports to protect the property 
     rights of U.S. nationals against the confiscatory takings by 
     the Castro regime. At that 

[[Page S 15010]]
     time, Senator Helms was planning to attach this legislation as an 
     amendment to the then-pending Foreign Operations 
     Appropriations Bill. It is my understanding that this 
     legislation now may be brought to the Senate floor as a free-
     standing bill as early as Wednesday of this week. I am 
     writing once again to urge you to oppose this legislation 
     insofar as it contains Title III in its present form because 
     it poses the most serious threat to the property rights of 
     U.S. certified claimants since the Castro regime's unlawful 
     expropriations more than three decades ago.
       In the rush to pass this legislation and thereby 
     demonstrate our firm resolve against Fidel Castro, the far-
     reaching domestic consequences of this legislation have 
     received far too little attention. In my letter of September 
     20th, I wrote of the irreparable harm certified claimants 
     would suffer if Title III of this legislation is passed. For 
     the first time ever and contrary to international law, this 
     legislation would permit a specified national origin group, 
     Cuban-Americans, who were not U.S. citizens at the time their 
     property was confiscated, to file Title III lawsuits against 
     the Government of Cuba for the property losses they suffered 
     as Cuban nationals. Indeed, this legislation even permits 
     Cuban exiles abroad to file lawsuits in U.S. federal courts 
     if they establish a corporation in the United States for the 
     purpose of pursuing any claim they may have against Cuba. The 
     creation of a new right to sue is never an inconsequential 
     matter yet the careful scrutiny such a provision deserves has 
     been disturbingly lacking to date.
       We can reasonably expect plaintiffs' attorneys to exploit 
     this newly created lawsuit right to the fullest extent 
     possible, creating a tide of litigation that will all but 
     sweep away the value of the claims currently held by U.S. 
     certified claimants. Each time one of those lawsuits is 
     reduced to a final judgment against Cuba, the injury to U.S. 
     certified claimants increases. Ultimately, the cumulative 
     weight of those judgments will extinguish any possibility the 
     certified claimants ever had of being compensated. A 
     virtually bankrupt Cuba cannot be expected to compensate the 
     U.S. certified claimants, who hold claims valued today at 
     nearly $6 billion, when it is also facing the prospect of 
     satisfying potentially tens of billions of dollars in federal 
     court judgments held by Cuban-Americans, whose claims have 
     been valued as high as $94 billion.
       Our already overburdened federal courts will have to deal 
     with the daunting task of adjudicating some 300,000 to 
     430,000 lawsuits, according to one estimate that has never 
     been refuted. (And that does not even take into account the 
     number of additional claims that we can anticipate will be 
     brought on equal protection grounds by Vietnamese-Americans, 
     Polish-Americans, Chinese-Americans and other national origin 
     groups.) Indeed, a litigation explosion appears to be exactly 
     what the bill's sponsors intend: They hope to enlist an army 
     of lawyers to launch a barrage of federal court lawsuits 
     against Cuba in order to hopelessly entangle the island in 
     lawsuits. In so doing, title to property in Cuba will be 
     clouded for years to come, thus ensuring that every effort at 
     privatization or market-oriented economic reform will be 
     doomed to failure. In a classic case of overkill, however, 
     this endless litigation will not only encumber the current 
     regime, but will impose an onerous burden on a future 
     democratic government that will make normalization of 
     relations with the United States virtually impossible.
       Faced with this prospect, the president, as an exercise of 
     executive prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs, may 
     elect to dismiss those federal court judgments pending 
     against a friendly government in Cuba. However, dismissing 
     those lawsuits may not turn out to be such a simple matter 
     because the U.S. Government may very well find itself liable 
     for tens of billions of dollars in property takings claims to 
     this large class of citizens who were non-U.S. nationals at 
     the time they lost properties in Cuba. In short, if Title III 
     is enacted, we will be left either with the prospect of 
     protracted litigation against Cuba, which will indefinitely 
     delay normalization of relations with a post-Castro Cuban 
     government, or enormous liability to possibly hundreds of 
     thousands of Cuban-Americans should those federal court 
     judgments be dismissed as an incident of normalization.
       Amazingly, the Senate is poised to vote on this legislation 
     without the benefit of the Judiciary Committee's views on 
     these and other critical issues that fall within its purview. 
     The Judiciary Committee has held no hearings on Title III, 
     has not reviewed it, nor has it, or the Foreign Relations 
     Committee for that matter, issued any reports on it. It is 
     astonishing that we may be so casually headed toward putting 
     our government, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, on the line 
     for tens of billions of dollars worth of Cuban-American 
     claims in a foreign land. The only conclusion that can be 
     drawn is that this legislation is being rushed to a vote 
     before these serious issues can be thoroughly considered by 
     the Senate through its normal procedures. Given the profound 
     domestic implications of this legislation beyond the obvious 
     and immediate injury to U.S. certified claimants, I urge you 
     to oppose Title III of this legislation if for no other 
     reason than to ensure that these concerns receive the careful 
     deliberation they warrant.
           Sincerely,
                                                 David W. Wallace,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me quote, if I can here, part of what he 
says in this letter:

       Amazingly, the Senate is poised to vote on this legislation 
     without the benefit of the Judiciary Committee's views on 
     these and other critical issues that fall within its purview. 
     The Judiciary Committee has held no hearings of Title III, 
     has not reviewed it, nor has it, or the Foreign Relations 
     Committee for that matter, issued any reports on it. It is 
     astonishing that we may be so casually headed toward putting 
     our government, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, on the line 
     for tens of billions of dollars worth of Cuban-American 
     claims in a foreign land. The only conclusion that can be 
     drawn is that this legislation is being rushed to a vote 
     before these serious issues can be thoroughly considered by 
     the Senate through its normal procedures. Given the profound 
     domestic implications of this legislation beyond the obvious 
     and immediate injury to U.S. certified claimants, I urge you 
     to oppose Title III of this legislation if for no other 
     reason than to ensure that these concerns receive the careful 
     deliberation they warrant.

  Mr. President, this is a letter from a claimant. This is one of the 
people who was injured by what happened, seriously, when the Castro 
Government took over. Do not believe me; listen to them. They are the 
ones urging that some prudence be followed before we rush to judgment 
with this bill in order to satisfy the domestic concerns of some 
constituency groups, who, I might add, I do not think are necessarily 
all being represented when they are spoken of collectively.
  I agree with Mr. Wallace when he concludes that ``We can reasonably 
expect plaintiffs' attorneys to exploit this newly created lawsuit 
right to the fullest extent possible, creating a tide of litigation 
that will all but sweep away the value of the claims currently held by 
the certified claimants.''
  Mr. Wallace also submitted detailed written testimony to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations in which he explained the joint 
committee's opposition to this bill. These are the U.S. citizens that 
are the injured parties. They are the ones telling us that this bill is 
wrong and will cause real problems. We ought to be listening to them.
  Among the arguments I found most compelling was that this legislation 
would produce a dramatic expansion of existing claims pool seeking 
compensation from Cuba. The vastly larger pool ``would serve as a 
significant disincentive for a post-Castro Cuban Government to enter 
into meaningful settlements of negotiations with the United States, 
given the sheer enormity of the outstanding claims and the practical 
impossibility of satisfying all those claims.''
  Mr. Wallace goes on to state that ``We, the joint committee, believe 
that a second tier of claimants will delay and complicate the 
settlement of certified claims and may undermine the prospects for 
serious settlement negotiations with the new Cuban Government that will 
come into power at some point.''
  He concluded as follows: ``It is our view, based upon well-
established principles of international law, that individuals and 
entities who were Cuban nationals at the time their property was 
confiscated must seek resolution of their claims in Cuban courts, under 
Cuban law.''
  Obviously, that is not going to happen now, Mr. President. We are 
talking about this taking effect when there is a transition government 
in place--hopefully and ideally, one that will respond. But Cuban 
nationals can then go back to that court in Cuba and satisfy them. To 
allow it, all of a sudden, to come to our courts raises very serious 
problems. In future Cuban governments, claims of former Cuban nationals 
may be fairly determined.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take the time to review Mr. 
Wallace's correspondence and statement in their entirety. Taken 
together, they provide a very careful, reasoned analysis of why giving 
former Cuban nationals the private right of action to sue in United 
States courts will be detrimental to the interests of United States 
claimants.

  I ask unanimous consent Mr. President at this juncture to have 
printed in the Record all of the correspondence and testimony from Mr. 
Wallace which he has sent to most offices, but for those who may not 
have seen them.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 
[[Page S 15011]]

                                         Joint Corporate Committee


                                              on Cuban Claims,

                                   Stamford, CT, October 10, 1995.
     Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
     U.S. Senate, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Dodd: I recently wrote to urge you to oppose 
     Title III of legislation, the ``Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
     Solidarity Act,'' that purports to protect the property 
     rights of U.S. nationals against the confiscatory takings by 
     the Castro regime. At that time, Senator Helms was planning 
     to attach this legislation as an amendment to the then-
     pending Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill. It is my 
     understanding that this legislation now may be brought to the 
     Senate floor as a free-standing bill as early as Wednesday of 
     this week. I am writing once again to urge you to oppose this 
     legislation insofar as it contains Title III in its present 
     form because it poses the most serious threat to the property 
     rights of U.S. certified claimants since the Castro regime's 
     unlawful expropriations more than three decades ago.
       In the rush to pass this legislation and thereby 
     demonstrate our firm resolve against Fidel Castro, the far-
     reaching domestic consequences of this legislation have 
     received far too little attention. In my letter of September 
     20th, I wrote of the irreparable harm certified claimants 
     would suffer if Title III of this legislation is passed. For 
     the first time ever and contrary to international law, this 
     legislation would permit a specified national origin group, 
     Cuban-Americans, who were not U.S. citizens at the time their 
     property was confiscated, to file Title III lawsuits against 
     the Government of Cuba for the property losses they suffered 
     as Cuban nationals. Indeed, this legislation even permits 
     Cuban exiles abroad to file lawsuits in U.S. federal courts 
     if they establish a corporation in the United States for the 
     purpose of pursuing any claim they may have against Cuba. The 
     creation of a new right to sue is never an inconsequential 
     matter yet the careful scrutiny such a provision deserves has 
     been disturbingly lacking to date.
       We can reasonably expect plaintiffs' attorneys to exploit 
     this newly created lawsuit right to the fullest extent 
     possible, creating a tide of litigation that will all but 
     sweep away the value of the claims currently held by U.S. 
     certified claimants. Each time one of those lawsuits is 
     reduced to a final judgment against Cuba, the injury to U.S. 
     certified claimants increases. Ultimately, the cumulative 
     weight of those judgments will extinguish any possibility the 
     certified claimants ever had of being compensated. A 
     virtually bankrupt Cuba cannot be expected to compensate the 
     U.S. certified claimants, who hold claims valued today at 
     nearly $6 billion, when it is also facing the prospect of 
     satisfying potentially tens of billions of dollars in federal 
     court judgments held by Cuban-Americans, whose claims have 
     been valued as high as $94 billion.
       Our already overburdened federal courts will have to deal 
     with the daunting task of adjudicating some 300,000 to 
     430,000 lawsuits, according to one estimate that has never 
     been refuted. (And that does not even take into account the 
     number of additional claims that we can anticipate will be 
     brought on equal protection grounds by Vietnamese-Americans, 
     Polish-Americans, Chinese-Americans and other national origin 
     groups.) Indeed, a litigation explosion appears to be exactly 
     what the bill's sponsors intend: They hope to enlist an army 
     of lawyers to launch a barrage of federal court lawsuits 
     against Cuba in order to hopelessly entangle the island in 
     lawsuits. In so doing, title to property in Cuba will be 
     clouded for years to come, thus ensuring that every effort at 
     privatization or market-oriented economic reform will be 
     doomed to failure. In a classic case of overkill, however, 
     this endless litigation will not only encumber the current 
     regime, but will impose an onerous burden on a future 
     democratic government that will make normalization of 
     relations with the United States virtually impossible.
       Faced with this prospect, the president, as an exercise of 
     executive prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs, may 
     elect to dismiss those federal court judgments pending 
     against a friendly government in Cuba. However, dismissing 
     those lawsuits may not turn out to be such a simple matter 
     because the U.S. Government may very well find itself liable 
     for tens of billions of dollars in property takings claims to 
     this large class of citizens who were non-U.S. nationals at 
     the time they lost properties in Cuba. In short, if Title III 
     is enacted, we will be left either with the prospect of 
     protracted litigation against Cuba, which will indefinitely 
     delay normalization of relations with a post-Castro Cuban 
     government, or enormous liability to possibly hundreds of 
     thousands of Cuban-Americans should those federal court 
     judgments be dismissed as an incident of normalization.
       Amazingly, the Senate is poised to vote on this legislation 
     without the benefit of the Judiciary Committee's views on 
     these and other critical issues that fall within its purview. 
     The Judiciary Committee has held no hearings on Title III, 
     has not reviewed it, nor has it, or the Foreign Relations 
     Committee for that matter, issued any reports on it. It is 
     astonishing that we may be so casually headed toward putting 
     our government, and ultimately U.S. taxpayers, on the line 
     for tens of billions of dollars worth of Cuban-American 
     claims in a foreign land. The only conclusion that can be 
     drawn is that this legislation is being rushed to a vote 
     before these serious issues can be thoroughly considered by 
     the Senate through its normal procedures. Given the profound 
     domestic implications of this legislation beyond the obvious 
     and immediate injury to U.S. certified claimants, I urge you 
     to oppose Title III of this legislation if for no other 
     reason than to ensure that these concerns receive the careful 
     deliberation they warrant.
           Sincerely,
                                                 David W. Wallace,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____



                                   Lone Star Industries, Inc.,

                                      Stamford, CT, July 26, 1995.
     Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
     Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Dodd: On behalf of the Joint Corporate 
     Committee on Cuban Claims, of which I serve as Chairman, and 
     as your constituent, I am writing to express my appreciation 
     for your support on the property claims issue. In particular, 
     I want to commend you for your thoughtful views on S. 381, 
     the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, and to offer 
     the assistance of the Committee as this legislation is 
     considered by the Senate.
       The Joint Corporate Committee represents more than thirty 
     U.S. corporations with certified claims against the 
     Government of Cuba. Collectively, our members hold more than 
     one-half of the $1.6 billion in outstanding certified 
     corporate claims. As you know, the Joint Corporate Committee 
     opposes the provisions of the Helms legislation dealing with 
     property claims, and we have detailed our objections in 
     testimony we submitted for the record to the Foreign 
     Relations Committee.
       We understand that Senator Helms is contemplating a 
     strategy of attaching his legislation to the State Department 
     Authorization Bill or the Foreign Aid Bill that will be 
     before the Senate shortly. Please know that we stand ready to 
     support your efforts in opposing this legislation, and have 
     asked the Committee's Washington, D.C. counsel, Kirk 
     O'Donnell of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, to work with 
     you in that regard.
       I also have asked our counsel to arrange a meeting with you 
     in the near future in order that we might further explore how 
     our Committee can best be of assistance in this effort. I 
     look forward to meeting you and working with you on a more 
     constructive legislative approach.
           Sincerely,
     David W. Wallace.
                                                                    ____


 Statement of David W. Wallace, Chairman Joint Corporate Committee on 
Cuban Claims on S. 381, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 
of 1995--Submitted to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace 
 Corps Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate--June 
                                14, 1995

       Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate 
     the opportunity to submit this statement expressing the views 
     of the Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims with respect 
     to S. 381, the ``Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
     (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995.''
       The Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims, of which I 
     serve as Chairman, represents more than thirty U.S. 
     corporations with certified claims against the Government of 
     Cuba stemming from the Castro regime's unlawful confiscation 
     of U.S. property without just compensation. Our member 
     corporations hold more than one-half of the $1.6 billion in 
     outstanding certified corporate claims. Since its formation 
     in 1975, the Committee has vigorously supported the 
     proposition that before our government takes any steps to 
     resume normal trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba, the 
     Government of Cuba must provide adequate compensation for the 
     U.S. properties it unlawfully seized.
       Although I am submitting this statement in my capacity as 
     Chairman of the Joint Corporate Committee, I would like to 
     note parenthetically that I also serve as Chairman and Chief 
     Executive Officer of Lone Star Industries, Inc. Lone Star is 
     a certified claim holder whose cement plant at Mariel was 
     seized by the Cuban Government in 1960. Lone Star's claim is 
     valued at $24.9 million plus 6% interest since the date of 
     seizure.
       On behalf of our Committee, I want to commend the 
     significant contribution you have made to the debate on U.S.-
     Cuban policy by focusing renewed attention on the Castro 
     regime's unlawful expropriation of U.S. property--an issue 
     that all too often gets lost in the debate over the wisdom of 
     the embargo policy. Recognizing the important role that trade 
     and investment by U.S. businesses will have in Cuba's 
     economic reconstruction and its eventual return to the 
     international community, evidence of concrete steps by the 
     Government of Cuba towards the satisfactory resolution of the 
     property clams issue must be an essential condition for the 
     resumption of economic and diplomatic ties between our 
     nations.
       I think it is important to recall the essential reason for 
     which the U.S. Government first imposed a partial trade 
     embargo against Cuba in 1960, following by the suspension of 
     diplomatic relations in 1961 and the imposition of a total 
     trade embargo in 1962. These actions were taken in direct 
     response to the Castro regime's expropriation of properties 
     held by American citizens and companies without payment of 
     prompt, adequate and effective compensation as required under 
     U.S. and international law. This illegal confiscation of 
     private assets was the 

[[Page S 15012]]
     largest uncompensated taking of American property in the history of our 
     country, affecting scores of individual companies and 
     investors in Cuban enterprises.
       These citizens and companies whose property was confiscated 
     have a legal right recognized in long-established 
     international law to receive adequate compensation or the 
     return of their property. Indeed, Cuba's Constitution of 1940 
     and even the decrees issued by the Castro regime since it 
     came to power in 1959 recognized the principle of 
     compensation for confiscated properties. Pursuant to Title V 
     of the International Claims Settlement Act, the claims of 
     U.S. citizens and corporations against the Cuban Government 
     have been adjudicated and certified by the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission of the United States. Yet to this day, 
     these certified claims remain unsatisfied.
       It is our position that lifting the embargo prior to 
     resolution of the claims issue would be unwise of a matter of 
     policy and damaging to our settlement negotiations posture. 
     First, it would set a bad precedent by signaling a 
     willingness on the part of our nations to tolerate Cuba's 
     failure to abide by precepts of international law. Other 
     foreign nations, consequently, may draw the conclusion that 
     unlawful seizures of property can occur without consequence, 
     thereby leading to future unlawful confiscations of American 
     properties without compensation. Second, lifting the embargo 
     would remove the best leverage we have in compelling the 
     Cuban Government to address the claims of U.S. nationals and 
     would place our negotiators at a terrible disadvantage in 
     seeking just compensation and restitution. We depend on our 
     government to protect the rights of its citizens when they 
     are harmed by the unlawful actions of a foreign agent. The 
     Joint Corporate Committee greatly appreciates the steadfast 
     support our State Department has provided over the years on 
     the claims issue. However, we recognize that the powerful 
     tool of sanctions will be crucial to the Department's ability 
     ultimately to effect a just resolution of this issue.
       Apart from the need to redress the legitimate grievances of 
     U.S. claimants, we also should not overlook the contribution 
     these citizens and companies made to the economy of pre-
     revolutionary Cuba, helping to make it one of the top ranking 
     Latin American countries in terms of living standards and 
     economic growth. Many of these companies and individuals look 
     forward to returning to Cuba to work with its people to help 
     rebuild the nation and invest in its future. As was the case 
     in pre-revolutionary Cuba, the ability of the Cuban 
     Government to attract foreign investment once again will be 
     the key to the success of any national policy of economic 
     revitalization.
       However, unless and until potential investors can be 
     assured of their right to own property free from the threat 
     of confiscation without compensation, many U.S. companies 
     simply will not be willing to take the risk of doing business 
     with Cuba. It is only by fairly and reasonably addressing the 
     claims issue that the Cuban Government can demonstrate to the 
     satisfaction of the business community its recognition of and 
     respect for property rights.
       We are pleased that S. 381 does not waver from the core 
     principle, firmly embodied in U.S. law, which requires the 
     adequate resolution of the certified claims before trade and 
     diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuban Governments 
     are normalized. However, we are concerned with provisions of 
     Section 207 of the revised bill that condition the resumption 
     of U.S. assistance to Cuba on the adoption of steps leading 
     to the satisfaction of claims of both the certified claimants 
     and Cuan-American citizens who were not U.S. nationals at the 
     time their property was confiscated. Notwithstanding the 
     modifying provisions which accord priority to the settlement 
     of the certified claims and give the President authority to 
     resume aid upon a showing that the Cuban Government has taken 
     sufficient steps to satisfy the certified claims, this 
     dramatic expansion of the claimant pool, as a practical 
     matter, would necessarily impinge upon the property interests 
     of the certified claimants.
       Even though the claimants who were not U.S. nationals at 
     the time of the property loss would not enjoy the espousal 
     rights that the certified claimants enjoy, the recognition of 
     a second tier of claimants by the U.S. Government at a 
     minimum would necessarily color, and likely make more 
     complicated, any settlement negotiations with Cuba to the 
     detriment of the certified claimants.
       Moreover, the fact that the legislation gives priority for 
     the settlement of certified property claims is of little 
     consequence within the context of such a vastly expanded pool 
     of claimants that seemingly defies a prompt, adequate and 
     effective settlement of claims. In addition, once this second 
     tier of claimants is recognized, it would be exceedingly 
     difficult politically for the President to exercise his 
     waiver authority. Finally, this dramatic expansion of the 
     claimant pool would serve as a significant disincentive for a 
     port-Castro Cuban Government to enter into meaningful 
     settlement negotiations with the United States given the 
     sheer enormity of the outstanding claims and the practical 
     impossibility of satisfying all those claims.
       In short, while we are sympathetic to the position of those 
     individuals and entities who were not U.S. nationals at the 
     time their property was seized, we believe that U.S. 
     Government recognition and representation of this group of 
     claimants--even falling short of espousal of their claims 
     with a post-Castro government in Cuba--would harm the 
     interests of the already certified claimants. We believe that 
     the recognition of a second tier of claimants will delay and 
     complicate the settlement of certified claims, and may 
     undermine the prospects for serious settlement negotiations 
     with the Cuban Government.
       It is our view, based on well-established principles of 
     international law, that individuals and entities who were 
     Cuban nationals at the time their property was confiscated 
     must seek resolution of their claims in Cuban courts under 
     Cuban law under a future Cuban Government whereby the 
     respective property rights of former and current Cuban 
     nationals may be fairly determined. In taking that position, 
     we categorically reject any notion that a naturalized 
     American has any lesser degree of right than a native-born 
     American. That objectionale and irrelevant notion serves only 
     to cloud the real issue here, and that is simply the question 
     of what rights are pertinent to a non-national as of the date 
     of injury. Simply put, international law does not confer 
     retroactive rights upon naturalized citizens.
       Many of the same objections noted above also apply to 
     Section 302 of the revised bill, which allows U.S. nationals, 
     including hundreds of thousands of naturalized Cuban-
     Americans, to file suit in U.S. courts against persons or 
     entities that traffic in expropriated property. We believe 
     this unrestricted provision also will adversely affect the 
     rights of certified claimants. By effectively moving claims 
     settlement out of the venture of the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission and into the federal judiciary, this 
     provision can be expected to invite hundreds of thousands of 
     commercial and residential property lawsuits. Apart from the 
     enormous, if not overwhelming, burden these lawsuits will 
     place on our courts, this provision raises serious 
     implications with respect to the Cuban Government's ability 
     to satisfy certified claims.
       First, allowing Cuba to become liable by way of federal 
     court judgments for monetary damages on a non-dismissible 
     basis necessarily will reduce whatever monetary means Cuba 
     might have to satisfy the certified claims. Second, this 
     expected multiplicity of lawsuits undoubtedly will cloud 
     title to property in Cuba for years, thereby lessening the 
     prospects for restitutionary approaches in satisfaction of 
     some of these claims. Moreover, under this provision, the 
     President would have no power to dismiss these suits as an 
     incident of normalizing relations with a democratically 
     elected government in Cuba once they are commenced. 
     Consequently, the foreign investment will be crucial to 
     Cuba's successful implementation of market-oriented reforms 
     will be all but precluded by these unresolved legal 
     proceedings.
       In conclusion, we want to commend you for your efforts in 
     raising the profile of the property claims issue and focusing 
     attention on the importance of resolving these claims to the 
     full restoration of democracy and free enterprise in Cuba. We 
     also recognize and appreciate the efforts you have made to 
     modify this legislation in response to the concerns expressed 
     by the certified claimant community; however, we hope that 
     you will further consider our continuing concerns regarding 
     the implications of this legislation for the legal rights of 
     certified claimants, an already overburdened court system, 
     the claims settlement process and the orderly disposition of 
     claims, and the post-Castro investment environment.

  Mr. DODD. This legislation calls into question the fundamental 
concept, I might point out, of equal protection under our Constitution 
by granting a kind of judicial relief to one category of individuals 
that no other group has ever been granted.
  This legislation is not proposed to give similar rights, as I pointed 
out earlier, to the former nationals--now U.S. citizens--of 37 other 
countries in the world where there are outstanding claims: Polish-
Americans, Chinese-Americans, German-Americans, Vietnamese-Americans.
  Are we to say to these same people who have been injured by Marxist 
governments, Communist governments, who have had their property taken 
without compensation, ``Sorry, this law does not apply to you. It only 
applies to Cuban-Americans.'' I think we will have a hard time making 
that case to other people who come forward and seek equal treatment.
  I urge my colleagues to just examine whether or not the enormity of 
that problem can be handled by our court systems. Is that the right way 
to go?
  This legislation would vastly expand the traditional definition of 
who is a United States claimant for purposes of United States law, to 
include any Cuban national who is presently a United States citizen, 
regardless of the citizenship at the time of the expropriation, as well 
as any person who incorporates himself or herself as a business entity 
under United States law prior to this bill becoming law. 

[[Page S 15013]]

  The introduction of this legislation has served as an open invitation 
to Cuban-Americans and other foreign nationals around the globe who may 
have had property taken in Cuba to come to the United States to seek 
redress. I am not arguing about the illegitimacy of it, the horror of 
it, the wrongness of it at all. That is not my point. That is not the 
issue here.
  If Cubans have left Cuba and gone someplace else, this bill says to 
them, ``come here and incorporate yourself before this bill is signed 
into law and you have access to the United States courts.''
  Again, I urge my colleagues to look at this bill. Whatever your 
feelings are about Fidel Castro and Cuba, you are about to sign on to 
something here that could have profound and incredible implications for 
our court system.
  It is not clear, Mr. President, how the courts are going to attest to 
the validity of such claims, nor do we have any firm estimate of the 
costs associated with the legal mandate.
  Initially, CBO concluded that it does not have ``sufficient 
information for estimating the number of such filings and the total 
cost that would be incurred by the Judiciary,'' although it did 
indicate that the costs to the U.S. Federal court system per case filed 
would be $4,500.
  Now assuming the 5,911 claims that are filed, between $4,500 and 
$5,000 a claim, if, in fact, you expand the universe here, consider the 
implications. The math is not that hard if you are going to have 
several hundred thousand people seeking access to these courts.
  Now, I point out to my colleagues that CBO later reversed its earlier 
conclusion that they could not determine how much the costs would be. 
They came back and said the costs may be $7 million.
  The key assumption CBO made, Mr. President, in arriving at this 
number was that very few suits would be filed at all. That assumption 
has been challenged, I might add, by a number of experts on the issue.
  The Senator from Rhode Island, Senator Pell, and I wrote to the 
Congressional Budget Office raising questions about this estimate as 
well. And, Mr. President, I point out we have not had any response to 
our latest inquiries, going back some time, about a new estimate.
  One should be mindful, Mr. President, of the fact that an estimated 1 
million Cuban emigres currently live in the United States, many of whom 
left behind business and other property when they fled the Castro 
regime, and has been expropriated without compensation.
  The State Department has estimated there are approximately $94 
billion in outstanding Cuban-American claims. That is in addition to 
the $6 billion in certified United States claims. A very detailed 
analysis has been done to give some rough estimates as to the number of 
claims that may be outstanding if this bill becomes law.
  I urge my colleagues to review the August 25 letter sent to the 
Director of CBO by attorney Robert Muse, an attorney for one of the 
major U.S. certified claimants. In that letter he sets forth in some 
detail the various categories of property claims that could be 
generated, and estimates that the total number of lawsuits could reach 
430,000. The costs could end up--just the court costs--in excess of $2 
billion.
  I ask unanimous consent that those documents be printed in the Record 
at this juncture.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                             Mansfield & Muse,

                                  Washington, DC, August 25, 1995.
     Ms. June E. O'Neill,
     Director, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress, 
         Washington, DC.
     Re CBO Letter of July 31, 1995 Concerning Senator Helms' 
         Proposed ``Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
         (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995.''
       Dear Ms. O'Neill: As you know, Title III of Senator Helm's 
     proposed legislation creates a cause of action in U.S. 
     federal courts against agencies or instrumentalities of 
     Cuba--as well as foreign and Cuban individuals or companies--
     that in the words of the bill ``traffic'' in properties 
     ``confiscated'' by the government of Cuba. It makes no 
     difference under Title III whether the owners of those 
     properties were U.S. or Cuban nationals at the time of their 
     property losses. So long as the potential litigant is a U.S. 
     citizen at date of filing, he or she (or ``it'' in the case 
     of a company) is free to institute a Title III lawsuit 
     asserting, in the language of the statute, ownership or a 
     ``claim'' to property confiscated in Cuba at any time after 
     January 1, 1959. With these things in mind, CBO was asked how 
     many such lawsuits might be expected if the LIBERTAD bill is 
     enacted? It is the response to that question, given in your 
     July 31 letter to Senator Helms, which concerns my client, 
     Amstar Property Rights Holdings, Inc., and other holders of 
     claims certified against Cuba by the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission.
       In your first letter (of July 24) on this subject, written 
     to Chairman Gilman of the House International Relations 
     Committee, you said with respect to Title III that, in 
     addition to nearly 6,000 claims on file with the Foreign 
     Claims Settlement Commission, ``. . . about 15,000 U.S. 
     nationals who have not filed claims with the Commission [i.e. 
     the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission] may also have had 
     commercial property confiscated in Cuba.'' I gather from 
     talking with Ms. Susanne Mehlman of your Office that the 
     figure of 15,000 ``who have not filed claims'' was meant to 
     describe naturalized Cuban Americans and Cuban companies that 
     did not qualify to file claims with the Commission in the 
     1960's (because they were not U.S. citizens when their 
     properties were taken), but, that your Office thought would 
     qualify to file lawsuits with respect to those properties if 
     Title III of the LIBERTAD bill is enacted.
       In your July 31 letter to Senator Helms you refrain from 
     stating any figure as to the number of Cuban Americans that 
     may be expected to file Title III lawsuits. However, based 
     upon a recent revision to the LIBERTAD bill restricting 
     lawsuits to those in which the ``amount in controversy'' 
     exceeds $50,000, you offer the opinion that, ``. . . the 
     number of [Cuban American] claims would be quite small.''
       The number of potential Title III litigants is a matter of 
     understandable concern to individuals and companies, such as 
     my client, that hold certified claims against Cuba. The 
     prospects of these claimants receiving a favorable 
     disposition of their long-held claims are very much dependent 
     upon those claims not being diluted in a sea of newly-created 
     Title III causes of action conferred on companies and 
     individuals that did not meet the U.S. nationality 
     requirement of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission's 
     Cuba program.\1\ The reasoning of the certified claimants in 
     opposing Title III of the LIBERTAD bill is straightforward. 
     Each federal court judgment entered against Cuba on behalf of 
     a Cuban national at date of property loss constitutes an 
     additional claim on the limited resources of that country, 
     thereby diluting the value of those claims certified by the 
     Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.\2\ It is blindingly 
     obvious what Title III is meant to do, that is, to bypass the 
     adjudicatory process of the Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission--that Cuban Americans did not qualify for on 
     prerequisite citizenship grounds--and create an unprecedented 
     claims program in the federal courts on behalf of that 
     specific national-origin group.
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       With the foregoing concerns of certified claimants in mind, 
     I offer the following observations: First, I believe that 
     your July 24 letter's figure of a maximum of 15,000 lawsuits 
     to be expected from Cuban American individuals and companies 
     if the LIBERTAD bill is enacted constitutes a serious 
     understatement of the real number of such lawsuits. Second, 
     your Office's subsequent failure to provide any estimate of 
     potential lawsuits in your July 31 letter--except to say that 
     the number will be ``quite small''--warrants, I respectfully 
     submit, at least some explanation. Third, your descriptions 
     of Title III as only creating a right for U.S. nationals to 
     ``take civil action against persons or companies that traffic 
     in confiscated properties,'' obscures a key provision of the 
     LIBERTAD bill; that is, that it allows direct suits against 
     the nation of Cuba itself--via its various agencies and 
     instrumentalities--for ``trafficking'' in confiscated 
     property.\3\ Certain proponents of the LIBERTAD bill have 
     created the entirely misleading impression that it is aimed 
     only at what they describe as ``third party [i.e. corporate] 
     ``traffickers,'' and, because there are comparatively few 
     such corporate ``traffickers'', few lawsuits are to be 
     expected if Title III is enacted. Unfortunately, I believe 
     you have fallen into their trap by excluding from 
     consideration in your estimate of potential lawsuits what 
     will be the overwhelmingly most frequently named defendant--
     Cuba itself.\4\ Fourth, the newly-added $50,000 ``amount in 
     controversy'' requirement of Title III will not greatly 
     restrict Section 302 lawsuits, as your letter suggests it 
     will.
       To elaborate on my last point first, the figure of $50,000 
     in controversy requirement of Title III relates to the value 
     of the property that is being ``trafficked'' in; e.g., that 
     is being, among other things, ``used . . . or profited from . 
     . .'' Under Title III each trafficker must pay, in damages, 
     the ``fair market value'' of the property being trafficked in 
     to anyone who ``owns a claim'' to that property. (See, 
     Section 302(a)(i)). A property--as will be demonstrated in a 
     moment--that was worth as little as $3,500 in 1960 will today 
     meet the bill's requirement of $50,000 in controversy. This 
     is the case because, in calculating whether a given property 
     has a value of $50,000 or more for the purposes of Title III, 
     the following things are included: (1) Interest is added from 
     the time of property loss and compounded annually. (See, 

[[Page S 15014]]
     Section 302(a)(1)(B)). If only 6% interest is applied to Title III 
     court judgments (as was the case in Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission decisions relating to Cuba) the compounded 
     interest component alone, over a period of 35 years, 
     increases the value of the property by 500%. Therefore a 
     property with a value of $3,500 in 1960 equals an ``amount in 
     controversy'' of $17,500 today. (2) Title III allows for the 
     virtually automatic trebling of the value of any previously 
     determined ``sum'' (to reiterate, interest is specifically 
     included in determining the ``sum'' to be trebled). For such 
     trebling to occur Section 302(a)(3) merely requires that a 
     ``trafficker'' be given notice twice of an ``intention to 
     institute suit'' before that trafficker becomes liable for 
     ``triple the amount determined'' under 302(a)(ii). In filing 
     suit a plaintiff will allege in his complaint that requisite 
     notices were given and ignored and, therefore, that the 
     amount of damages sought (i.e. the ``amount in controversy'') 
     is the value of the property trebled. All of this means that 
     a property with a 1960 value of $3,500 has, with compounded 
     annual interest at 6%, become worth $17,500; when that figure 
     is trebled it becomes $52,500 and comfortably meets Section 
     302(b)'s requirement of a ``matter in controversy [that] 
     exceeds the sum or value of $50,000.'' \5\
       To return to the issue of the actual number of lawsuits the 
     LIBERTAD bill is likely to engender if it becomes law, a 
     Department of the Army publication reports that some 800,000 
     Cubans settled in the United States between January 1, 1959 
     and September 30, 1980. (See, ``Cuba, A Country Study'' 
     (1985) at pg. 69-70, citing a National Research Council 
     study). If we assume that a further 10,000-12,000 Cubans have 
     entered the U.S. annually in the past 15 years, a total of 1 
     million Cubans have taken up residence in the U.S. since 
     Fidel Castro came to power. The question put to CBO was, in 
     essence: How many of these Cuban Americans may be expected to 
     file suit with respect to ``claimed'' properties in Cuba if 
     Section 302 is enacted? To further distill the question, it 
     may be restated as: How many damage suits will be brought 
     with respect to Cuban properties that were worth at least 
     $3,500 in 1960?
       In the first place, many of the hundreds of thousands of 
     Cubans who suffered property losses in Cuba have died in the 
     intervening 30-35 years.\6\ Accordingly, any ``claims'' 
     relative to properties located in Cuba that might be asserted 
     in a Section 302 lawsuit, as likely as not, will be filed by 
     the children and even grandchildren of the now deceased 
     former owners. The broad definition given the word 
     ``property'' (i.e. ``future or contingent right . . . or 
     other [property] interest'') at Section 4(11) of the bill 
     ensures such a result.\7\ This fact alone will greatly 
     increase the number of suits relative to any one Cuban 
     property that may be expected under Section 302 of the 
     LIBERTAD bill. (According to the same Department of the Army 
     study quoted in the preceding paragraph, in 1958 the Cuban 
     total fertility rate--i.e. the average number of children 
     born to each woman--was 3.8. This gives us a sense of the 
     number of descendants likely to assert a claim to any one 
     decedent's former properties in Cuba).
       Second, many of the properties in Cuba that will be the 
     subject of Section 302 lawsuits had multiple ownership 
     interests. Again, Section 4(11)(A) defines ``property'' as 
     including any property ``. . . whether real, personal, or 
     mixed, or any present, future, or contingent right, security, 
     or other interest therein, including any leasehold 
     interest.'' Therefore, in the agricultural sector for example 
     we can expect claims to be filed by the descendants of not 
     only the owners of the property but also descendants of those 
     who produced commodities from the land under various colono 
     arrangements, or those who held leasehold, mortgage or other 
     interests in the confiscated property. The same is true of 
     the service and industrial sectors of the Cuban economy. This 
     greatly expands the number of suits to be expected if Title 
     III of the LIBERTAD bill becomes law. (By the way, your 
     letter of July 24 misstates the intent of Title III when your 
     projected figure of 15,000 possible litigants are described 
     in terms of having had ``commercial property confiscated in 
     Cuba''; thereby creating the erroneous impression that only 
     such properties are subject to suit. The requirement of the 
     statute is not that the property have been ``commercial''--
     under Section 4(9)(A)'s definition it can have been real or 
     personal property, or any other type of property interest for 
     that matter. The test for commencing litigation is whether 
     the subject property is being used at the time of suit ``in 
     the conduct of a commercial activity.'' (See Section 
     302(a)(1). Therefore an originally non-commercial property (a 
     residence, for instance) that is now being used in whole or 
     perhaps even in part in a commercial vein such as, as a 
     bicycle repair shop, or a hairdressers, or as business or 
     professional offices, would be subject to suit under Section 
     302. In short, residential properties are exempt from suit 
     under the LIBERTAD bill only to the extent that they are 
     being, ``used for residential purposes.'' (See, Section 
     304(11)(B). I will return to the issue of residential 
     properties later in this letter).
       In any event, even if we set aside for a moment the 
     multiplicity of litigants and property interests that will 
     assert themselves with respect to any one property, how many 
     actual properties in Cuba may be subject to suit if Title III 
     is enacted? The truth is, no one really knows for certain--
     but some informed estimates can be made.
       In 1959 when the first departures for the U.S. from Cuba 
     began, that country had a population of approximately 6.5 
     million. We can begin our analysis of potential lawsuits to 
     be expected under Title III by first considering the number 
     of various service establishments that may have existed in 
     pre-revoluntionary Cuba to serve a population of that size. 
     (Examples of such service establishments would include 
     restaurants; hotels; clothing shops; bars; groceries; dry 
     goods stores; abattoirs and butchers; barbers and 
     hairdressers; automobile service stations, distributors and 
     parts suppliers; appliance shops; construction companies and 
     building materials suppliers; shoeshops; hardware and feed 
     stores; farm provisioners; laundries; touristic enterprises 
     ranging from marinas and casinos, to nightclubs and theaters; 
     department stores; bank branch offices; drugstores; clinics 
     and professional office buildings used by doctors, dentists, 
     accountants, architects, and lawyers--e.g., there were 7,858 
     attorneys in Cuba according to the 1953 census). If we 
     arbitrarily--but certainly reasonably--assume that one of 
     each type of service establishment existed per each 500 head 
     of population, a total of approximately 12,000 such 
     enterprises existed in each service category. We will assume, 
     conservatively, that only 15 categories existed in pre-
     revolutionary Cuba. More than 15 such categories of course 
     existed, but by limiting the number of categories we are able 
     to correct our overall figure to allow for some service 
     industries that had individual establishments (for example 
     bank branches) at a rate of less than one per 500 head of 
     population. When we multiply 12,000 service establishments 
     times 15 categories of such establishments, we reach a total 
     of 180,000. If as few as \1/3\ of the owners of those 
     establishments (again, a very conservative figure) settled in 
     the U.S., a total of 60,000 service industry properties are 
     likely to be the subject of lawsuits in federal courts if the 
     LIBERTAD bill is enacted.\8\ But, to reiterate an earlier 
     point, each of these properties is capable of having multiple 
     suites filed against it by the descendants of the original 
     owners. If only two such descendant suits are brought on 
     average with respect to each property, a total of 120,000 
     suits can be expected. Finally, if only one additional claim, 
     on average, is brought by an individual alleging, for 
     example, a leasehold, mortgage or security interest in each 
     property, our total reaches a figure of 180,000 lawsuits to 
     be expected from the Cuban service sector alone.
       Turning to the Cuban industrial, manufacturing and 
     transportation sectors, how many lawsuits might they 
     engender? Again, it is difficult to know with any certainty. 
     But, let us assume only 1,000 industrial, manufacturing and 
     transportation properties in such representative enterprises 
     as sugar production; tobacco manufacturing; fishing and 
     seafood processing; rum distilling; brewing; steel making; 
     cosmetic and toiletry manufacturing; mining; warehouses and 
     freight lines; construction materials manufacturing; oil 
     processing and distribution; meat packing; electronic goods 
     and other durables manufacturing; and, finally, railroads, 
     ferries and other modes of transportation. The lawsuits from 
     this sector of the Cuba economy, it should be noted, will not 
     be limited to the claims of the companies themselves. Section 
     4(11) of the LIBERTAD bill defines ``property'' to include 
     any ``security interest.'' Therefore, the shareholders in 
     these industrial, manufacturing and transportation sectors of 
     pre-revolutionary Cuba will be filing individual lawsuits if 
     Title III is enacted. How many such lawsuits will be filed is 
     really anyone's guess. But let us assume that each enterprise 
     had even 100 shareholders now naturalized in the U.S. whose 
     individual shareholdings were worth at least $3500 thirty-
     five years ago. This means that a further 100,000 lawsuits 
     may be expected--with again the fact that descendants of the 
     original owners will be filing most of the suits ensuring 
     that the figure of 100,000 is considerably enlarged.\9\
       Then there are the lawsuits to be expected from Cuba's 
     agricultural sector. Once again, it is difficult to quantify 
     the number of such lawsuits--particularly when most 
     agricultural properties had multiple interests encumbering 
     them, such as colono and various other tenure and leasing 
     arrangements. But if we pick a figure of at least 25,000 
     rural properties (out of a total of over 150,000 such 
     properties\10\ ) whose owners emigrated to the U.S. and that 
     had a value in 1960 of at least $3,500, and if we then assume 
     two overlapping property interests asserted with respect to 
     each property (e.g., a fee simple and a colono interest) by 
     an average of two descendants claiming such interests, we 
     arrive at a figure of 100,000 lawsuits generated by Cuba's 
     agricultural sector.
       Finally, there are the lawsuits that will be brought with 
     respect to properties that, although originally residential, 
     are now being used, in the language of Section 302(a)(1), in 
     ``the conduct of a commercial activity'' and therefore are 
     not exempt from suit under Section 4(11)(B)'s exception for 
     ``real property used for residential purposes.'' (Emphasis 
     added). Cuba has no modern office blocks to speak of and very 
     few purpose-built service premises of any kind. Therefore a 
     great many formerly residential buildings are now used as 
     commercial, professional or governmental premises. (It will 
     be recalled that agencies and instrumentalities of the 
     government of Cuba may be sued if they are 

[[Page S 15015]]
     using property in the conduct of a commercial activity). In any of 
     those cases if the activity going on in the property is 
     commercial in nature--that property is subject to suit under 
     Title III. Given that whole sections of Havana that were 
     formerly residential, such as Vedado and Miramar, are now 
     being used in some form of commercial manner (even if only as 
     a workshop or small restaurant (paladare) under recently 
     liberalized self-employment laws) thousands of lawsuits may 
     be expected from this quarter. In virtually every one of 
     these cases the $3,500 threshold (in 1960 values) will be 
     comfortably met. We will very conservatively assume that only 
     25,000 residential properties will be the subject of suit if 
     Title III is enacted.\11\ If, as is predictable, an average 
     of as little as two lawsuits (by either descendants' 
     interests or mortgage, etc. interests) are brought with 
     respect to each property, our final figure from this sector 
     totals 50,000 federal court litigations.
       To summarize, the number of lawsuits to be reasonably 
     expected if the LIBERTAD bill becomes law include: 180,000 in 
     the service sector, 100,000 in the industrial, manufacturing 
     and transportation sector, 100,000 from the agricultural 
     sector and 50,000 from residential properties that are now 
     being used ``in the conduct of a commercial activity''--for a 
     total of 430,000 lawsuits. Using your letter's figure of 
     $4,500 in processing costs per lawsuit, 430,000 litigations 
     will require the expenditure of $1,935,000,000 (or nearly $2 
     billion) by the federal government in court costs alone if 
     Title III of the LIBERTAD bill is enacted.
       As I have previously remarked, your letter says that, 
     because of the newly-added $50,000 amount in controversy 
     requirement of Title III, ``CBO expects that the number of 
     additional claims [i.e. from Cuban Americans] would be quite 
     small.'' I have tried to demonstrate that the figure of 
     $50,000 is illusory because the threshold amount can be met, 
     within the terms of the proposed statute, by demonstrating 
     that the property at issue was worth as little as $3,500 in 
     1960. But there is a second point I wish to make in this 
     regard, that is, I believe your letter reveals a misplaced 
     trust in the self-policing character of the American 
     litigation system. In the case of the $50,000 amount in 
     controversy requirement of Title III; (i) it will quickly 
     become known by potential plaintiffs that they need only show 
     a property value of $3,500 in 1960 in order to qualify to 
     file suit, and (ii) even if there is a doubt as to whether a 
     property interest was worth $3500, isn't it predictable that 
     many people will go ahead and aver that, at least upon 
     information and belief, the $50,000 amount in controversy 
     requirement has been met and let the court resolve whether or 
     not it really has? (Although upon what controverting evidence 
     a court would be able to dismiss a claim as monetarily 
     insufficient is unclear). In essence, I suppose I question 
     your basic assumption that an ``amount in controversy'' 
     requirement of a statute can ever realistically be expected 
     to dissuade potential litigants from commencing suit. This is 
     particularly so with Title III of the LIBERTAD bill, which is 
     overtly about an unprecedented use of the U.S. civil justice 
     system to promote certain foreign policy objectives with 
     respect to a particular country. Can we as a nation claim to 
     be surprised when hundreds of thousands of Cuban Americans 
     zealously (and quite patriotically in their view) file 
     lawsuits against Cuban properties? Is something like an 
     amount in controversy requirement of a U.S. statute really 
     going to much dampen the litigious excitement the LIBERTAD 
     bill will ignite in south Florida?
       It is worth reiteration that all a plaintiff must show to 
     receive a judgment against Cuba and other ``traffickers'' 
     under Title III is, (i) ownership of a ``claim'' to property, 
     and (ii) that the property is being used in a commercial 
     manner by the government of Cuba or a private company or 
     individual. As far as establishing the value of properties 
     being ``trafficked'' in (in order that litigants may receive 
     that sum as ``damages''), we may trust that a body of experts 
     will develop in Florida to provide appraisal evidence as to 
     property values in pre-revolutionary Cuba. And, as is the 
     nature of most experts, they may be expected to assess the 
     value of properties in a way that is agreeable to the 
     plaintiffs' lawyers who seek and retain their services and 
     who are probably bringing the case on a not disinterested 
     contingency fee basis. In short, it will be a very rare 
     property that is not confidently asserted to have a value 
     well in excess of the amount in controversy requirement of 
     Title III.
       For all of the reasons set out above, there can be little 
     doubt that if Congress passes Title III it will produce a 
     litigation explosion of a magnitude never before seen in this 
     country.\12\ I genuinely believe you could not be more wrong 
     in your July 31 opinion that the ``claims [of Cuban 
     Americans] will be quite small and that additional costs to 
     process these claims [will] not be significant.'' I have 
     tried in this letter to explain and demonstrate the basis of 
     my belief. No claim is made that the estimates appearing in 
     this letter are beyond reasoned dispute from either 
     direction. For example, it may be the case that service 
     establishments existed in Cuba, on average, at the rate of 
     one per 1,000 head of population rather one per 500, as 
     argued earlier in this letter. If so, that would reduce the 
     number of service sector lawsuits by half, to a total of 
     90,000. As a result, the final figure of lawsuits to be 
     expected would be 340,000 instead of 430,000. On the other 
     hand, we could probably easily double the estimate of 50,000 
     lawsuits expected to arise from Cuba's residential property 
     sector--with more such suits to come with each liberalizing 
     economic step of the Cuban government that allows broader 
     scope for self-employment and small business formation. The 
     point is, thoughtful adjustments can and should be made to 
     the total number of lawsuits projected to be ultimately 
     engendered by Title III of the LIBERTAD bill. However, I 
     think it highly credible that the number of lawsuits to be 
     expected must be in the range of 300,000 to 450,000--as large 
     as these figures may seem, there is a logic to their 
     calculation.
       On a final point, Section 303(a)(2) of the LIBERTAD bill 
     provides that ``. . . a court may appoint a Special Master, 
     including the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, to make 
     determinations regarding the amount and ownership of claims 
     to ownership (sic) of confiscated property by the Government 
     of Cuba.'' This provision of Title III leads you to remark in 
     your July 31 letter that: ``The Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission could incur additional costs because it could be 
     asked to assist the courts in reviewing cases. CBO estimates 
     that the Commission will require several new attorneys and 
     support personal (sic) to fulfill this responsibility, with 
     costs up to about $1 million each year.'' In assessing your 
     estimate that ``several new attorneys'' will be required by 
     the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to determine 
     ownership and value of claims against Cuba it is instructive 
     to consider that that is precisely what the Commission did in 
     the Cuba claims program. In an approximately six-year period 
     between 1965 and 1972, 5,911 claims of U.S. nationals were 
     certified against Cuba--a further 2,905 were denied--making a 
     total of 8,816 claims actually decided, producing a rate of 
     decision of about 1,500 per year. Apparently there were ten 
     attorneys at the Commission who handled the claims against 
     Cuba. Their rate of decision was therefore approximately 150 
     per year. If Title III produces 400,000 claims from Cuban 
     Americans, the Commission, if is to determine the ownership 
     and value of these claims over a four year period, will need 
     to employ 665 attorneys if a rate of determination equal to 
     that of the Cuban claims program is to be achieved.\13\ If 
     the costs of salarying, accommodating and otherwise 
     supporting these attorneys is as little as $100,000 each per 
     year, the cost to the federal government will reach nearly 
     $250 million over a four year period in simply readying cases 
     for further disposition by the federal courts.
       Again, I make no claim of disputability for either my 
     methodology or its ultimate conclusions in this attempt to 
     estimate the number of lawsuits S. 381 may be expected to 
     engender. My purpose in writing has been achieved if the 
     various points raised in this letter prompt a reconsideration 
     by your Office of the litigation implications--and the 
     serious consequential harm to certified claimants such 
     litigation will cause--if Title III of the LIBERTAD bill is 
     enacted in its present form.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                   Robert L. Muse.


                               footnotes

     \1\ The requirement that a claimant be a U.S. national at the 
     time of property loss appears at Section 503(a) of the Cuban 
     Claims Act (22 U.S.C. Section 1643(b)). This statutory 
     requirement bespeaks the adherence by the U.S. to a long-
     settled principle of international law. See, e.g. Claim No. 
     IT-10,252, Decision No. IT-62, reprinted in 8 Department of 
     State, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1236: ``The principle of 
     international law that eligibility for compensation requires 
     American nationality at the time of loss is so widely 
     understood and universally accepted that citation of 
     authority is scarcely necessary . . .'' The proposed lawsuit 
     provisions of Title III of course would grossly violate that 
     principle of international law.
     \2\ The Department of State has said that Cuban American 
     claims against Cuba could be worth nearly $95 billion. (See, 
     letter of April 28, 1995 from Wendy R. Sherman, Assistant 
     Secretary, Legislative Affairs, to Chairman Benjamin Gilman 
     of the House Committee on Foreign Relations). To put that 
     figure in perspective, according to a recent Economist 
     Intelligence Unit report on Cuba, that country's Gross 
     Domestic Product in 1994 was 12.8 billion pesos. The official 
     rate of exchange is one peso to one dollar, but the more 
     revealing black market rate has fluctuated between 100 to 25 
     pesos per dollar over the past year.
     \3\ Title III's definition of ``trafficking'' is sufficiently 
     expansive to cover any involvement whatever by the government 
     of Cuba in ``claimed'' properties. ``Traffics'' includes: 
     ``sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, 
     or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, 
     leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, 
     uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in 
     confiscated property [or] engages in a commercial activity 
     using or otherwise benefiting from a confiscated property . . 
     .''
     \4\ Section 302(a)(1) provides that: ``. . . any person or 
     entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
     state [i.e. Cuba] in the conduct of a commercial activity, 
     that . . . traffics in property which was confiscated by the 
     Government of Cuba on or after January 1, 1959 shall be 
     liable to the United States national who owns a claim to such 
     property for money damages . . .'' (Emphasis added). It has 
     been said that your Office is of the view that few suits will 
     be brought against Cuba ``because it doesn't have any assets 
     in this country.'' With all respect, the same reasoning 
     applied to the various Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 
     programs conducted over the years would mean that no one 
     would bother to file claims pursuant to those programs, 
     because rarely does an expropriating nation have significant 
     assets in the U.S. In fact claims are indeed filed under 
     these programs, as it attested to by the 5,911 claims 
     certified against Cuba. The reason those claims were filed 
     was not to recover Cuban assets in this country (there were 
     virtually none here by the time the program commenced), but 
     rather it was to enlist the support of the United States in 
     the bilateral resolution with Cuba of the matter 

[[Page S 15016]]
     of the American claimants' property losses. Title III lawsuits, it 
     should be remembered, are specifically made nondismissile 
     under Section 302(g)(2). As a set of federal court judgments 
     these Title III suits will come to constitute a future 
     bilateral issue between the United States and Cuba of no less 
     significance than the claims certified against that country 
     by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Indeed, unlike a 
     certified claim, a court judgment carries with it rights of 
     execution and attachment against any assets of the debtor 
     nation that may be found now or in future within the United 
     States. Therefore a government-to-government resolution of 
     such outstanding judgments will prove a future practical 
     necessity. In sum, Cuban Americans would be silly not to file 
     individual Title III suits that they have every reason to 
     believe will force themselves onto the prospective bilateral 
     normalization agenda of the U.S. and Cuba.
     \5\ When this letter addresses various sectors of the 
     prerevolutionary Cuban economy that are likely to engender 
     Title III property claims, I think it helpful to keep in mind 
     that Cuba was a comparatively affluent country in 1959. 
     Therefore, properties with a value of at least $3,500 were no 
     rarity. See, for example, the Blue Ribbon Commission Report 
     on the Economic Reconstruction of Cuba, 1991, prepared by the 
     Cuban American National Foundation, which says at pg. 9: 
     ``Before Castro's rise to power on 1 January, 1959, Cuba 
     ranked among the best credit risks and business partners in 
     the Western Hemisphere . . . Buttressed by Cuba's liberal 
     foreign investment laws . . . Cuba's national income doubled 
     between 1945 and 1958. Cuba's per capita Gross National 
     Product ranked third among Latin American nations in 1953, 
     behind Argentina and Venezuela.'' See also the testimony 
     given to the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means 
     Committee on June 30, 1995 by Congresswoman Ilena Ros-
     Lehtinen: ``Its fertile land, vast tracks of tourist beaches 
     and resorts, and its geographical location, led Cuba to 
     become one of the most developed countries in the 
     hemisphere.'' In any case, whatever the general level of 
     prosperity may have been in pre-revolutionary Cuba, those who 
     were of the Cuban upper economic echelons came to the United 
     States in highly disproportionate numbers, leaving, of 
     course, disproportionately valuable properties behind in 
     Cuba. This issue will be discussed in greater detail at a 
     later point in this letter.
     \6\ The life expectancy of Cubans was 64 years in 1960, by 
     late 1984 it had increased to 73.5 years. Even if the latter 
     figure is used a Cuban who was as young as 38\1/2\ years old 
     in 1960 is, as a purely actuarial matter, dead today.
     \7\ Ordinarily the laws of the place of death of the testor 
     (in most Title III cases this will be Florida) will determine 
     inheritance rights. For example, a Florida will provision 
     that says no more than the ``remainder of my property shall 
     be divided among my children'' would give each heir a cause 
     of action against Cuba under Section 302. Specific bequests 
     and intestacy would carry similar rights of action by 
     inheritance. Interestingly enough Section 303 of the LIBERTAD 
     bill provides that: ``In determining ownership, courts shall 
     not accept as conclusive evidence of ownership any findings, 
     orders, judgments, or decrees from administrative agencies or 
     courts of foreign countries [e.g., Cuba] . . .'' Therefore, a 
     decedent's actual ownership of a bequeathed Cuban property is 
     statutorily exempted from judicial inquiry.
     \8\ Assuming that \1/3\ of the owners of service 
     establishments settled in the U.S. is not at all unreasonable 
     when it is recalled that those arriving in this country in 
     the aftermath of the Cuban revolution were of the middle and 
     upper strata of Cuban society, i.e., the property-owning 
     class of that country. Given the affluence of the Cubans who 
     settled in the U.S. it is also highly likely that the 
     properties they left behind were, in almost all cases, worth 
     at least $53,500 at the time of confiscation. Of Cuba's 
     population in 1958, 22% (or 1.3 million individuals) were of 
     the upper and middle economic strata. (See, Thomas, Cuba: The 
     Pursuit of Freedom (1971) at pg. 1110 where a UNESCO study to 
     that effect is cited). It was precisely that strata of Cuban 
     society that departed for the U.S. in the early 1960's and 
     may be expected to file Title III lawsuits. For example, 
     Cubans emigrating to the United States in the years 1959-62 
     were four times more likely to have been of the professional, 
     semiprofessional and managerial classes than the general 
     Cuban population. (See, Perez, Cuba: Between Reform and 
     Revolution (1988), at pg. 344. The question is therefore not 
     what the value of the average property in Cuba was in 1960, 
     but, rather, what was the average value of the properties 
     left behind in the early 1960's by the highest socioeconomic 
     strata of that country's population.
     \9\ Cuban corporate claims themselves present an interesting 
     picture under Title III by virtue of Section 4(14) of the 
     LIBERTAD bill which defines ``United States national'' as 
     ``an legal entity organized under the laws of the United 
     States, or of any state . . . and which has it principal 
     place of business in the United States.'' In short, there is 
     no requirement that the company actually be owned by U.S. 
     citizens. (In order to qualify as a U.S. national for the 
     purposes of the Cuban Claims Act a corporation had to be 50% 
     or more owned by U.S. citizens. Yet again, Title III departs 
     from international law and abandons the sensible and long-
     established requirement that a company demonstrate some real 
     connection with the country of its purported nationality). 
     Section 4(14) quite simply means that Cuban exiles in such 
     places as Spain, Venezuela, Mexico, and Costa Rica (or Cubans 
     in the U.S., for that matter, who have not sought U.S. 
     citizenship) need only organize a ``legal entity''-i.e. form 
     a corporation in the U.S. and transfer any ``claim'' they may 
     have against Cuba to that corporation in order to file a 
     Section 302 lawsuit, the filing and prosecution of which will 
     constitute the principal business of the newly-formed U.S. 
     corporation. There is no way of estimating the number of 
     lawsuits this distinctly odd and suspect provision of Title 
     III will engender.
     \10\ See Perez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (1988) at 
     pg. 302, where the author refers to a 1946 study that gives 
     the total number of farms in Cuba at the time as 159,958, of 
     which over 95,000 were of at least 25 acres and, in most 
     cases, were considerably larger.
     \11\ This figure of 25,000 is arbitrarily selected from the 
     total of over 150,000 housing units abandoned in Cuba when 
     their owners left for the U.S. (See Jorge Dominguez, Cuba 
     since 1959, at pg. 124 in CUBA, A SHORT HISTORY (1993) where 
     the author says that from 1959 to 1975 approximately 9,300 
     housing units in Cuba were abandoned annually as a 
     consequence of emigration. Sociedad Economica of London gives 
     a figure of 139,256 housing units ``vacated by emigration 
     between 1960 and 1974,'' See, Private Property Rights in 
     Cuba: Housing (1991)
     \12\ I am at a loss to recall any statute that upon enactment 
     was capable of immediately generating several hundred 
     thousand lawsuits. Even statutes with a potentially large 
     pool of plaintiffs--for example, various anti-discrimination 
     laws--are mitigated in their impact upon the courts by the 
     fact that they are not retroactive in application. Title III 
     is by contrast distinctly retroactive in its application, in 
     that it provides non-U.S. nationals at time of injury with an 
     ex post facto cause of action for injuries occurring, for the 
     most part, over 30 years ago.
     \13\ In the case of Cuban American Title III claims it may be 
     unrealistic to assume a rate of determination as rapid as 
     that which occurred with respect U.S. nationals' claims. The 
     claims that will be filed by Cuban Americans can be expected 
     in many, if not most cases, to be thinly documented (if 
     documented at all) as a result of circumstances of the 
     claimants' departures from Cuba and the passage of time. See, 
     Edward D. Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and 
     Cuba Claims Program, 1 International Lawyer 81 at pg. 85 
     (1966): ``Past programs have shown that long delays in the 
     initiation of claims programs increase the burden of 
     adjudication. Due to the destruction of records and the 
     unavailability of witnesses, many claims have found difficult 
     substantiate. This is particularly important since Commission 
     Regulation require that claimants `shall have the burden of 
     proof on all issues involved in the determination of his 
     claim.' The difficulties are increased where there has been 
     lack of cooperation or access in the foreign country''. It 
     may be assumed the Mr. Re, as a former Chairman of Foreign 
     claims Settlement Commission, knew what he was talking about. 
     In any event, much of the evidence of ownership and value 
     that Cuban Americans can be expected to present will, of 
     necessity, be testimonial in nature and based largely upon 
     memory and hearsay. It follows that the evaluation of such 
     claims by the Commission under Section 303(a)(2) will prove 
     an exceedingly laborious, time consuming and imperfect 
     process. Ironically, President Johnson remarked, when signing 
     the Cuban Claims Act in 1964 ``. . . the importance of making 
     a permanent record which evidence and witnesses are still 
     available.'' 51 Dept. State Bull. 674(1964). Section 303 
     proposes, of course, to attempt to create such a record by 
     the Commission, for use in federal lawsuits by naturalized 
     Cuban Americans, fully thirty-one years after President 
     Johnson's remarks.
  Mr. DODD. Interestingly, my colleagues and the authors of this bill 
will say those estimates are way too high, and they will say there will 
not be that many claimants.
  I point out to my colleagues that in an earlier version of the Senate 
bill, section 301(5)(B)(ii) of that bill specifically makes the point, 
``Since Fidel Castro captured power in 1959, through his personal 
despotism he has confiscated the properties of hundreds of thousands of 
Cubans who claim asylum in the United States as refugees because of 
political persecution.''
  I do not argue with that statement at all. I endorse it. The point is 
you cannot on the one hand claim there will be very few people come 
forward and simultaneously point out about the hundreds of thousands of 
people who have legitimate claims against the Cuban Government. I stand 
by the figure of some 400,000 claims that may result from this change 
in law.
  However, my colleague from North Carolina and supporters now seem to 
have had a change of heart, as I pointed out, and assert that the 
number of claims will be minuscule. Their message to us ``we did not 
mean it when we said the Cuban Government confiscated the properties of 
hundreds of thousands of Cuban immigrants. Do not worry about the 
legislation burdening U.S. courts.''
  I suggest that is a high-risk position to take in light of the 
tremendous costs we could be inflicting on ourselves as a result of 
this legislation.
  Mr. President, the way this measure is drafted, as I pointed out 
earlier, any potential claimants would be foolish not to file a claim 
in United States courts because once a democratic government has been 
established in Cuba the right to instigate new suits, will be 
terminated. So you have to do it quickly if this bill becomes law. I 
suspect that many will step forward and seek to do just that.
  It seems to me before we move ahead to impose a new mandate in our 
courts we better understand the extent of the burden we are imposing 
and how we intend to pay for it. Otherwise we are simply imposing one 
more unfunded mandate on our economy. This time, in our Federal courts.
  As has been pointed out several times today, there are currently 
5,911 United States claims--that is claims of individuals who were 
citizens of the United States at the time of the expropriation, with 
certified claims against the Government of Cuba.
  Under international law, Mr. President, as well as United States law 
and practice, the United States Government has an obligation to espouse 
these claims with Cuban authorities. It will do so at the appropriate 
time with a Government of Cuba that is prepared to accept its 
responsibilities under international law.
  This legislation provides for lawsuits not only against the 
Government of Cuba but also other governments, foreign nationals, and 
corporations. I think it is terribly naive to think that other 
governments are going to sit back and do nothing while their citizens 
are being sued in U.S. courts for acts that are perfectly legal in 
their own country. 

[[Page S 15017]]

  The World Trade Organization has already warned that provisions of 
this bill may violate international trade rules. I submit, Mr. 
President, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an 
article that that may be the case.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             WTO States Support Cuba over U.S. Embargo Plan

       Geneva, July 11.--Cuba won support from other members of 
     the World Trade Organisation on Tuesday for a warning that 
     proposed U.S. legislation extending its embargo against 
     Havana would violate the rules of the new body.
       Diplomats said the European Union as well as Mexico, 
     Washington's partner in the North American Free Trade 
     Association (NAFTA), and Colombia voiced concern over the 
     pending bill in the United States Congress.
       A Cuban trade official, M. Marciota, told the WTO General 
     Council his government was raising the issue ``in an attempt 
     to prevent this latest violation of the rules of the 
     international trading system from being enacted.''
       He called for a ``clear and vigorous statement'' from the 
     WTO warning both the U.S. administration and Congress ``of 
     the legal monstrosity which enactment of this bill would 
     represent.''
       The measure, introduced by anti-communist Republican 
     senator Jesse Helms, would tighten the 35-year-old embargo by 
     banning the import into the United States of sugar, molasses 
     and syrup from countries which import these products from 
     Cuba.
       It would also prohibit the granting of U.S. entry visas for 
     people who have invested in properties nationalised under the 
     communist administration of President Fidel Castro since it 
     came to power in 1959.
       The EU has already told Washington it might take a case to 
     the WTO, launched on January 1 under the new world trade 
     treaty signed last year, to protect its rights if the bill 
     went through.
       On Tuesday EU ambassador Jean-Pierre Leng told the General 
     Council, the WTO's ruling body, that Brussels had 
     considerable doubts on whether the measures envisaged by the 
     bill's backers were compatible with the trade watchdog's 
     rules.
       The issue came to the WTO as other Latin American countries 
     are increasingly ignoring U.S. policies aimed at isolating 
     the communist island, suffering severe economic hardship 
     following the collapse of its long-time ally, the Soviet 
     Union.
       Over the past three or four years, Cuba has built up new 
     trade links with most countries in Latin America and begun a 
     cautious switch to market economics including opening up its 
     industrial sector to foreign investment.
       Under the rules of the WTO, and its predecessor the General 
     Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, members are allowed to 
     declare trade embargoes if they perceive a threat to their 
     national sovereignty.
       The United States has justified its stance against Cuba on 
     these grounds, but many WTO members argue there can be no 
     serious grounds for insisting that Cuba presents such a 
     threat to the United States in the post-Cold War period.

  Mr. DODD. Furthermore, I am sure all of my colleagues have received 
letters and phone calls from Canadian, British, European Union, Mexican 
Government officials and others, objecting to the legislation as an 
infringement on their sovereignty and as interfering with their trade 
relations. Canada and Mexico have both argued that the measure would 
violate the NAFTA legislation.
  This bill is bad for U.S. business. Again, I would not make that the 
sole criterion, but, please think about what we are doing before we 
charge ahead here and have tremendous implications that will take some 
time to undo.
  It undercuts efforts by the current administration, and previous 
ones, to ensure that U.S. investors can expect a stable and predictable 
environment when they seek to do business abroad. We can hardly insist 
that our trading partners respect international laws in areas of trade 
and investment when we ourselves are violating them. You cannot do 
business that way.
  This legislation, if enacted, would disrupt international commercial 
relations to a significant degree. Under provisions of this bill the 
United States, in effect, expands its own right to sue in an area of 
law where we have heretofore studiously defended international law and 
practice. Having done so, how are we then going to defend the interests 
of American businesses abroad when a particular government decides that 
it no longer finds it convenient to follow international law? That 
would be a tragedy, a mistake.
  If, in reaction to this legislation, other nations respond with 
special interest domestic legislation of their own, U.S. companies 
could be open to lawsuits throughout the world. Under those 
circumstances we would be in a very poor position, a very poor one 
indeed, having enacted this bill, to turn around and defend U.S. 
interests against a foreign government simply reacting to their own 
domestic, particular, special interest concerns.
  Ironically, this legislation will also thwart the economic reform 
efforts that have slowly begun in Cuba--privatization, for example. I 
think all of us believe that the more we can secure privatization in 
Cuba, the better the results will be. Yet this measure would seriously 
undermine these efforts by targeting the very interests that are 
privatizing in Cuba. In effect we say to them, if you continue to 
undertake certain business activities then we are going to come after 
you.
  You cannot, on the one hand, say we ought to encourage privatization, 
urge the international community to move in that direction, and then 
penalize the very elements that are doing it. Yet that is exactly what 
we will be doing if we enact this bill into law. It does not make any 
sense, Mr. President.
  In fact the House-passed bill would even thwart privatization of the 
agricultural sector. Cuban farmers, availing themselves of the newly 
legalized private farmers markets, would be subject to suit in the 
United States because their produce or livestock may have been raised 
on confiscated property.
  While I believe this legislation damages U.S. interests in all the 
ways I have just mentioned, I am also of the view it is unlikely to 
promote democratic or peaceful change in Cuba.
  Do we get support in the United Nations for our Cuban policy? Only 
one country, one, joined the United States recently in voting against a 
U.N. resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. The one country that voted 
with us was Israel. Yet, business people from even Israel are doing 
business in Cuba today. They vote with us in the United Nations, the 
one vote we get, yet that country now is going to be the subject of the 
very law we are passing because, if Israel continues to do business in 
Cuba, Israelis are not going to be able to do business in this country, 
if their business activities in any way relate to confiscated 
properties.
  Please, read this bill. This is not sound legislation. This is 
emotion speaking here. It is anger, it is frustration over what has 
happened in Cuba. But it is not sound thinking at all.
  So, again I point out, one country joins us. The entire world votes 
against us on this issue. The one country that joins us, Israel, a good 
friend and loyal ally that always supports us in these things, is doing 
its own business in Cuba. It is one of the 58 countries today doing 
business in Cuba.
  By the way, the countries doing business in Cuba are not all liberal, 
communist governments. The John Major government of Great Britain, is 
that some liberal, left wing government? The Government of France today 
under Chirac, the Government of Germany, are these all bad, rotten, no 
good characters? Are we now going to subject them to the provisions of 
this law? That does not make any sense. That is not the way to achieve 
the desired results that we would all like to see here.
  Does anyone seriously believe this bill, if adopted, is likely to 
persuade other governments to adopt a policy of tightening this embargo 
and isolating Cuba diplomatically? How long have we heard those 
speeches? Non-U.S. trade and investment in Cuba have been expanding in 
recent months, not contracting. Regrettably, I would say, in many ways. 
But the facts of life are that is what is happening.
  According to recent statistics released by the United States-Cuba 
Trade and Economic Council, businesses from 58 nations have formed more 
than 200 joint ventures in order to exploit business opportunities in 
Cuba. With the recent liberalization of Cuba's foreign investment laws, 
it will be even easier for foreign companies to set up shop in Havana.
  Under the recent liberalization of Cuba's investment law, foreign 
investors will be able to wholly own their investments in most sectors 
of the Cuban economy.
  Again, I am not suggesting in any way this ought to be some reason to 
start applauding Fidel Castro. I do not at all. I am just stating a 
fact. That is 

[[Page S 15018]]
what is happening. So the idea we are going to get others to join us in 
these particular moves is not likely. Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, China, the Dominican Republic, 
France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Honduras, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy--
the list goes on. In fact, I ask unanimous consent to print in the 
Record all the countries and their companies that are doing business 
there. Some of these companies come from our strongest allies in the 
world.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         [From the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.]

          Non-United States Companies and the Republic of Cuba

       Corporations and companies cited in the international media 
     as having commercial activities with the Republic of Cuba.


                               australia

       Western Mining Corp.


                                austria

       Rogner Group (tourism).


                                 brazil

       Andrade Gutierrez Perforacao (oil).
       Coco Heavy Equipment Factory (sugar).
       Petrobras S.A. (oil).


                                 canada

       Advanced Laboratories (manufacturing).
       Anglers Petroleum International.
       Bow Valley Industries Ltd. (oil).
       Canada Northwest Energy Ltd. (oil).
       Caribgold Resources Inc. (mining).
       Commonwealth Hospitality Ltd. (tourism).
       Delta Hotels (tourism).
       Extel Financial Ltd.
       Fermount Resources Inc. (oil).
       Fortuna Petroleum.
       Fracmaster (oil).
       Globafon.
       Havana House Cigar and Tobacco Ltd.
       Heath and Sherwood (oil).
       Hola Cuba.
       Holmer Gold Mines.
       Inco Ltd. (mining).
       Joutel Resources (mining).
       LaBatt International Breweries.
       Marine Atlantic Consultant (shipping).
       MacDonalds Mines Exploration.
       Metal Mining.
       Mill City Gold Mining Corp.
       Miramar Mining Corp. (Minera Mantua).
       Pizza Nova (tourism).
       Realstar Group (tourism)
       Republic Goldfields.
       Seintres-Caribe (mining).
       Sherrit Inc. (mining).
       Talisman Energy Inc.
       Teck (mining).
       Toronto Communications.
       Val d'Or (mining).
       Wings of the World (tourism).


                                 chile

       Dolphin Shoes (clothing).
       Ingelco S.A. (citrus).
       Latinexim (food/tourism).
       New World Fruit.
       Pole S.A. (citrus).
       Santa Ana (food/tourism).
       Santa Cruz Real Estate (tourism).


                                colombia

       SAM (an Avianca Co.) (tourism).
       Intercontinental Airlines.
       Representaciones Agudelo (sporting goods).


                                ecuador

       Caney Corp. (rum).


                                 china

       Neuke (manufacturing).
       Union de Companentes Industrials Cuba-
       China.


                           Dominican republic

       Import-Export SA (manufacturing).
       Meridiano (tourism).


                                 france

       Accord (tourism).
       Alcatel (telecommunications).
       Babcock (machinery).
       Bourgoin (oil).
       Compagnie Europeene des Petroles (oil).
       Devexport (machinery).
       Fives Lille (Machinery).
       Geopetrol.
       Geoservice.
       Jetalson (construction).
       Maxims (cigars-owned by Pierre Cardin).
       OFD (oil).
       OM (tourism).
       Pernod Ricard Group (beverages/tourism).
       Pierre Cardin.
       Pompes Guinard (machinery).
       Societe Nationale des Tabacs (Seita) (tobacco).
       Sucres et Donrees (sugar).
       Thompson (air transport).
       Total (oil).
       Tour Mont Royal (tourism).


                                germany

       Condor Airlines (charters for Lufthansa).
       LTU (LTI in Cuba) (tourism).


                                 greece

       Lola Fruits (citrus).


                                holland

       Curacao Drydock Company (shipping).
       Golden Tulips (tourism).
       ING (banking).
       Niref (minerals).


                                honduras

       Facuss Foods.


                               hong kong

       Pacific Cigar.


                                 israel

       GBM (citrus).
       Tropical (manufacturing).
       World Textile Corp. S.A.


                                 italy

       Benetton (textiles).
       Fratelli Cosulich (gambling).
       Going (tourism).
       Italcable (telecommunications).
       Italturis (tourism).
       Viaggo di Ventaglio (tourism).


                                jamaica

       Caricom Investments Ltd. (construction).
       Craicom Traders (Int'l mrktg of Cuban products).
       Intercarib (tourism).
       Superclubs (tourism).


                                 japan

       Mitsubishi (auto/tourism).
       Nissan Motor Corp. (auto).
       Nissho Iwai Corp. (sugar).
       Toyota.
       Sumitomo Trading Corp. (auto).
       Suzuki Motor Corp. (auto).


                                 mexico

       Aero-Caribe (subsidiary of Mexicana de Aviacion).
       Bufete Industrial.
       Cemex (construction).
       Cubacel Enterprises (telecommunications).
       Del Valle (manufacturing).
       Domeq (export--rum).
       DSC Consortium (tourism).
       Grupo Domos (telecommunications).
       Grupo Industrial Danta (textiles).
       Grupo Infra de Gases.
       Incorporacion International Comercial (beer).
       Industrias Unidas de Telephonia de Larga.
       Distancia.
       La Magdalena Cardboard Co.
       Mexpetrol (oil).
       Pemex.
       Bancomex.
       Mexican Petroleum Institute.
       Protexa.
       Bufete Industrial.
       Inggineiros Civiles Asociados.
       Equipos Petroleos Nacionales.
       Telecomunicacionales de Mexico.
       Vitro SA (manufacturing).


                                 panama

       Bambi Trading.


                              south africa

       Anglo-American Corp. (mining).
       Amsa (mining).
       De Beers Centenary (mining).
       Minorco (mining).
       Sanachan (fertilizers).


                                 spain

       Caball de Basto S.L.
       Camacho (manufacturing).
       Consorcio de Fabricantes Espanoles, Cofesa.
       Corporacion Interinsular Hispana S.A. (tourism).
       Esfera 2000 (tourism).
       Gal (manufacturing).
       Guitart Hotels S.A.
       Grupo Hotelero Sol.
       Hialsa Casamadrid Group.
       Iberia Travel.
       Iberostar S.A. (tourism).
       Kawama Caribbean Hotels.
       K.P. Winter Espanola (tourism).
       Miesa SA (energy).
       National Engineering and Technology Inc.
       Nueva Compania de Indias S.A.
       P&I Hotels.
       Raytur Hoteles.
       Sol Melia (tourism).
       Tabacalera S.A. (tobacco).
       Tintas Gyr SA (ink manufacturer).
       Tryp (tourism).
       Tubos Reunidos Bilbao (manufacturing).
       Vegas de la Reina (wine imports).


                                 sweden

       Foress (paper).
       Taurus Petroluem.


                             united kingdom

       Amersham (pharmaceuticals).
       BETA Funds International.
       Body Shop International (toiletries).
       British Berneo PLC (oil).
       Cable & wireless comm.
       Castrol (oil).
       ED&F Man (sugar).
       Fisions (pharmaceuticals).
       Glaxo (pharmaceuticals).
       Goldcrop Premier Ltd. (manufacturing).
       ICI Export (chemicals).
       Ninecastle Overseas Ltd.
       Premier Consolidated Oilfields.
       Rothschild (investmant bank).
       Simon Petroleum Technology.
       Tate & Lyle (sugar).
       Tour World (tourism).
       Unilever (soap/detergent).
       Welcomme (pharmaceuticals).


                               venezuela

       Cervecera Nacional.
       Covencaucho.
       Fiveca (paper).
       Fotosilvestrie.
       Gibralter Trading (steel).
       Grupo Corimon.
       Grupo Quimico.
       Ibrabal Trading.
       Interlin.
       Intesica.
       Mamploca.
       Mamusa.
       Metalnez.
       MM internacional.
       Pequiven.

[[Page S 15019]]

       Plimero del Lago.
       Proagro.
       Sidor.
       Venepal.
       Venoco.

  Mr. DODD. So, of course, as a result of the provisions in this bill 
and other regulations, we will be forced to sit on the sidelines here 
when the change begins to happen. And only after democracy comes to 
Cuba will we be able to fully engage with the new government down 
there. The requirements mandated by the House passed bill that must be 
met by the post-Castro government for it to be considered in transition 
to democracy and eligible for emergency humanitarian assistance are 
very stiff.
  I ask unanimous consent that those requirements be printed at this 
particular point in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

       For purposes of this Act, a transition government in Cuba 
     is a government in Cuba which--
       (1) is demonstrably in transition from communist 
     totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;
       (2) has recognized the right to independent political 
     activity and association;
       (3) has released all political prisoners and allowed for 
     investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international 
     human rights organizations;
       (4) has ceased any interference with Radio or Television 
     Marti broadcasts;
       (5) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable 
     progress in--
       (A) establishing an independent judiciary;
       (B) dissolving the present Department of State Security in 
     the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees 
     for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response 
     Brigades;
       (C) respecting internationally recognized human rights and 
     basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
     Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;
       (D) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and 
     freedom of the press;
       (E) organizing free and fair elections for a new 
     government--
       (i) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to 
     exceed 1 year after the transition government assumes power;
       (ii) with the participation of multiple independent 
     political parties that have full access to the media on an 
     equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or 
     other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of 
     time for such access and the times of day such allotments are 
     given; and
       (iii) to be concluded under the supervision of 
     internationally recognized observers, such as the 
     Organization of American States, the United Nations, and 
     other elections monitors;
       (F) assuring the right to private property;
       (G) taking appropriate steps to return to United States 
     citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken 
     by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
     after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation 
     to such citizens and entities for such property;
       (H) granting permits to privately owned telecommunications 
     and media companies to operate in Cuba; and
       (I) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions 
     as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International 
     Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of 
     independent social, economic, and political associations;
       (6) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro;
       (7) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the 
     speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban 
     people;
       (8) permits the deployment throughout Cuba of independent 
     and unfettered international human rights monitors; and
       (9) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United 
     States all persons sought by the United States Department of 
     Justice for crimes committed in the United States.

     SEC. 206. REQUIREMENTS FOR A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       For purposes of this Act, a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba, in addition to continuing to comply with 
     the requirements of section 205, is a government in Cuba 
     which--
       (1) results from free and fair elections conducted under 
     the supervision of internationally recognized observers;
       (2) has permitted opposition parties ample time to organize 
     and campaign for such elections, and has permitted full 
     access to the media to all candidates in the elections;
       (3) is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and 
     human rights of the citizens of Cuba;
       (4) has made demonstrable progress in establishing an 
     independent judiciary;
       (5) is substantially moving toward a market-oriented 
     economic system;
       (6) is committed to making constitutional changes that 
     would ensure regular free and fair elections that meet the 
     requirements of paragraph (2); and
       (7) has made demonstrable progress in returning to United 
     States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken 
     by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
     after January 1, 1959, or providing full compensation for 
     such property in accordance with international law standards 
     and practice.

  Mr. DODD. I am not going to list all of these requirements now, but I 
ask my colleagues to read section 205 of the House bill. It is hard to 
disagree with any of these. But the idea that we specifically exclude 
certain people from even being elected in their own country as a 
requirement of that country being in transition to democracy seems to 
be getting to deeply into the nitty gritty of another country's 
affairs. I do not think anyone can read these requirements and think 
that they are realistic. To think that a country must meet absolutely 
meet every one of these requirements before we can even do business 
with the new government down there is preposterous.
  Assuming we had a change in that country, any kind of change at all, 
I think we would want to engage that new government. But no, under 
provisions in the House bill we have to wait until all these 
conditions--they go on for a page and a half here--are met. If we had 
applied those standards to the transitions that took place in the 
former Soviet Union, in Poland, and elsewhere in Eastern and Central 
Europe, we might have missed real opportunities to make a difference 
for democracy. In fact, many of these Newly Independent States have yet 
to meet all of the standards that we seek to impose on a post-Castro 
Cuba. If you applied the specifics to them today, for example, we have 
some people being elected in these countries that are former 
Communists--that would violate these standards. That does not make any 
sense. It is unrealistic and it is not a good idea. I wonder what would 
have happened in Poland, or in Russia, if we had applied the same kind 
of provisions of law.
  Again, it is not just me speaking here. Last month the Inter-American 
Dialog issued its second report on Cuba. A number of very distinguished 
individuals were involved in crafting the report, Republicans as well 
as Democrats, and distinguished foreign policy experts. I will ask the 
list of these members be printed in the Record. But let me just read 
some. Among the participants were Elliot Richardson, Oscar Arias, 
former President of Costa Rica, John Whitehead, former Deputy Secretary 
of State in the Reagan administration--we are not talking about some 
liberal Democrats here, who wrote the report. Listen to what they have 
to say. I ask unanimous consent that the full list of the members of 
that group be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

       Members of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Cuba

       Elliot L. Richardson (Chair), Partner, Milbank, Tweed, 
     Hadley and McCloy, Former U.S. Attorney General and Secretary 
     of Defense.
       Jorge I. Dominguez (Coordinator), Professor of Government, 
     Harvard University.
       Raul Alfonsin, Former President of Argentina.
       Oscar Arias, Former President of Costa Rica.
       Peter D. Bell, President, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, 
     Co-Chair, Inter-American Dialogue.
       Sergio Bitar, National Senator, Chile.
       McGeorge Bundy, Scholar-in-Residence, Carnegie Corporation 
     of New York, Former U.S. National Security Advisor.
       Alejandro Foxley, President, Christian Democratic Party of 
     Chile, Co-Chair, Inter-American Dialogue.
       Peter Hakim, President, Inter-American Dialogue.
       Ivan Head, Professor of Law, University of British 
     Columbia, Canada.
       Osvaldo Hurtado, Former President of Ecuador.
       Abraham F. Lowenthal, President, Pacific Council on 
     International Policy.
       Jessica T. Mathews, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign 
     Relations, Columnist, The Washington Post.
       Alberto Quiros Corradi, President, Seguros Panamerican, 
     Venezuela.
       Maurice Strong, Chairman, Ontario Hydro, Canada, Chairman, 
     Earth Council.
       Viron P. Vaky, Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue, 
     Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.
       John Whitehead, Chairman, AEA Investors, Inc., Former U.S. 
     Deputy Secretary of State.

  Mr. DODD. The task force offered a number of recommendations to both 
the Cuban and United States Governments, designed to enhance the 
prospects for peaceful democratic change in 

[[Page S 15020]]
Cuba. Among other things, and I am quoting:

       [It] urges the defeat of the Cuban Liberty and Democracy 
     Solidarity Act.

  I do not think John Whitehead, Elliot Richardson, or Oscar Arias, 
former President of Costa Rica, and a leading opponent in Central 
America against the Sandinista Government, are great friends or 
proponents of Fidel Castro. But they said this bill is a bad idea, a 
bad idea. Think twice before you do this.
  Why is this bill bad? Because ``It would injure and alienate ordinary 
Cubans, weaken Cuba's civil society--as threadbare as it may be--and 
retard Cuba's democratization. It would also reduce prospects for U.S. 
cooperation with other countries on Cuba.''
  I ask my colleagues to take a look at these recommendations, by this 
group of distinguished panelists who are bipartisan in nature.
  I ask unanimous consent the report of the Inter-American Dialog Task 
Force be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

 [The Second Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Cuba]

           Cuba in the Americas: Breaking the Policy Deadlock


                       summary of recommendations

       The prospects for change in Cuba are today greater than at 
     any time since 1959. Yet, current U.S. policy neither 
     encourages change in Cuba nor advances U.S. national 
     interests. For their part, Cuban government policies continue 
     to poorly serve the interests of the Cuban people. The 
     unbending policies of the two countries--perpetuated by 
     national pride on both sides--have allowed a continuing 
     deterioration in Cuba's circumstances and increased the 
     dangers of violent conflict. Our recommendations have one 
     fundamental purpose: to enhance the prospects for peaceful, 
     democratic change in Cuba.

                       To the Government of Cuba

       We urge Cuba's leaders to put their claim of public support 
     to the test of free and fair elections that are 
     internationally monitored.
       Political prisoners should be freed, and the laws that 
     repress dissent and prevent the operation of independent 
     organizations should be repealed.
       Cuba should broaden its economic reform program and adopt 
     policies necessary to qualify for membership in the World 
     Bank and International Monetary Fund.

                         To the U.S. Government

       U.S. policy toward Cuba should be redirected to the 
     objectives put forth by the past two administrations--to 
     encourage a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. Cuba no 
     longer poses a security threat to the United States. The main 
     danger to U.S. national interest in Cuba is the prospect of 
     prolonged violence, which could provoke mass migration and 
     U.S. military action.
       U.S. interests in Cuba would be most advanced by pursuing 
     three concrete goals:
       To reduce hostility in U.S.-Cuban relations:
       The United States should consistently make clear that it 
     has no intention of invading Cuba. It should condemn violent 
     actions by the exile groups, notify the Cuban government of 
     U.S. military exercises near Cuba, and encourage military 
     attaches throughout the world to communicate with Cuban 
     counterparts.
       U.S. Cuba policy should give greater weight to humanitarian 
     concerns by allowing charities to engage in all necessary 
     financial transactions to advance their work, permitting 
     Cuban-Americans again to aid relatives in Cuba, and lifting 
     all restrictions on shipments of food and medicine.
       Radio Marti should broadcast objective news, not 
     propaganda, and should be politically independent. TV Marti 
     should be canceled because it violates international 
     conventions.
       To encourage private markets, the rule of law, and 
     independent organizations:
       The U.S. government should exempt from its embargo all 
     transactions that foster communications between the peoples 
     of Cuba and the United States, specifically removing all 
     obstacles to travel to Cuba and encouraging cultural and 
     scientific exchanges between the two nations.
       The United States should encourage the World Bank and IMF 
     to work with the Cuban government to establish a path toward 
     eventual membership. This may be the single best way to 
     encourage sustained economic reform in Cuba. Washington 
     should also support the efforts of Secretary-General Gaviria 
     to involve the OAS in reviewing Cuba's hemispheric relations.
       To promote pragmatic exchange between the U.S. and Cuban 
     Governments:
       The United States should make plain that economic and 
     political reforms by Cuba--such as releasing political 
     prisoners, accepting UN human rights monitors, allowing 
     political dissent, and legalizing the formation of small 
     businesses--would be met by parallel changes in U.S. policy 
     toward Cuba. Both the U.S. and Cuban governments should 
     undertake a controlled process of specific initiatives, 
     conditioned understandings, and convergent steps, all limited 
     in scope, but which together could cumulatively open the way 
     for more substantial changes.
       The United States should indicate its readiness to 
     negotiate agreements with Cuba on issues in which both 
     countries have coinciding interests. The United States and 
     Cuba, for example, have both gained by recent agreements on 
     immigration, and negotiations in this area should continue. 
     Cuba and the United States would also benefit from 
     cooperation to interdict drug traffickers, reciprocally 
     inspect nuclear power plants, forecast weather-related 
     disasters, and protect the environment.

                            The U.S. Embargo

       We urge defeat of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
     Solidarity Act--better known as the Helms-Burton legislation. 
     It would injure and alienate ordinary Cubans, weaken Cuba's 
     civil society, and retard Cuba's democratization. It would 
     also reduce prospects for U.S. cooperation with other 
     countries on Cuba. We continue, however, to oppose fully 
     dismantling the trade embargo. The embargo can serve as a 
     practical element of policy, if it is used as a bargaining 
     chip in negotiations with Cuba of the kind we have 
     recommended. A permanent situation of crisis around Cuba is 
     unacceptable. Provoking an even more severe crisis is not a 
     solution. The U.S. government should be prepared, step by 
     step, to lift its trade embargo in response to specific 
     initiatives taken by the Cuban government. What is needed 
     from the United States is active bargaining, not passive 
     waiting or the tightening of pressure without regard to the 
     consequences.
  Mr. DODD. I also think it behooves us to listen to the people who 
have stayed in Cuba for the last 30 years, who also want to see Castro 
go; who have experienced firsthand the impact of our policies. Speaking 
for this group, the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops has said that 
the passage of this legislation to tighten the embargo would contribute 
to ``an increase in the suffering of the people and risk of violence in 
the face of desperation.'' Again, these are not supporters of Fidel 
Castro. These are the people who have been in the frontlines in Cuba, 
fighting for change.
  Mr. President, former National Security Adviser to President Carter, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, had a very thoughtful article printed in the 
Houston Chronicle at the time of the refugee crisis last fall--again, 
someone whom I think all of us would agree was not soft on Castro, as 
some people like to use those words with anyone who disagrees with 
them. The title of this article is ``Soft Landing or a Crash Dive in 
Store for Cuba?'' Mr. Brzezinski laid out the alternative courses, and 
there are some, that we could follow in relations to Cuba to achieve 
the desired results. He concluded that it was in our interests for 
there to be a peaceful transition to a non-Communist regime in that 
country, rather than promote a social explosion and the concomitant 
tidal wave of Cuban humanity toward our shores.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the article by Mr. Brzezinski 
be printed in the Record at this point, as well.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From the Houston Chronicle, Sept. 8, 1994]

            Soft Landing or a Crash Dive in Store for Cuba?

                        (By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

       The Cuban regime is in its terminal stage. The critical 
     issue at stake is whether its final gasp will be violent or 
     relatively benign. American policy must make the strategic 
     choice as to whether a ``crash landing'' scenario is 
     preferable to a ``soft landing.''
       As things are now headed, a bloody crash landing for the 
     Castro regime is becoming more likely. U.S. sanctions are 
     intensifying social and political tensions on the island. An 
     explosion could occur before too much time has passed.
       What then?
       If an anti-Castro revolution succeeds quickly, the outcome 
     may be viewed as beneficial to the United States as well as 
     to the Cuban people themselves. The 35-year-old communist 
     experiment in the Western Hemisphere will have gone up in the 
     smoke of the final funeral pyre for the failed Marxist 
     Utopia. It would be a fitting ``Gotterdammerung'' for a 
     regime that was dedicated to violence and which ruled by 
     violence.
       But the explosion may not succeed. Castro is not only the 
     Stalin of the Cuban revolution; he is also its Lenin. He does 
     have considerable residual loyalty, not only among the ruling 
     party-army elite, but within some sections of society.
       It is also quite conceivable that Castro, faced with the 
     realization that U.S. sanctions are stimulating an uprising, 
     may use the current migration first to weaken the opposition 
     and then, quite deliberately, to provoke an explosion which 
     he can then more easily crush.

[[Page S 15021]]

       What then? Will the Clinton administration, which has made 
     so much of the idea of ``restoring'' democracy to Haiti, sit 
     back and do nothing while Cuban freedom fighters are crushed? 
     Or will the United States launch an invasion of Cuba to 
     finish the job?
       The current policy of imposing intensifying social 
     hardships on Cuba while condemning its regime--thereby also 
     causing a greater outflow of migrants--only makes sense if 
     the U.S. goal is to precipitate the early fall of the 
     Castro regime. In that case, the United States must be 
     ready to follow through on the strategic logic involved, 
     while, indeed, rebuffing any Cuban proposals of wider 
     negotiations.
       In effect, the strategy of precipitating a ``crash 
     landing'' also requires, as a last resort, clear-minded U.S. 
     determination to invade Cuba.
       Since there is reason to doubt that the Clinton 
     administration is deliberately embarked on that course, and 
     even more that it would be willing to launch a supportive 
     invasion of Cuba, the U.S. rebuff to Cuba's overture for 
     wider negotiations on the ``true causes'' for the flood of 
     migrants makes little sense. A wiser and more effective 
     response would be to seize the opportunity of the Cuban offer 
     so that the United States can pursue a soft-landing strategy.
       The Cubans have indicated that they would be prepared to 
     contain the migratory outflow upon a positive American 
     response to their proposal--and that would defuse the urgent 
     problem posed by the migration itself.
       But the U.S.-Cuban talks should not be limited to the issue 
     of migration alone. Instead, they should be exploited to 
     advance the soft-landing strategy by setting in motion a more 
     deliberate, somewhat longer-term process designed to manage 
     in a more benign way the terminal phase of the Castro regime.
       Accordingly, in the dialogue with Havana, the United States 
     should not be shy in offering its own diagnosis of the ``true 
     causes'' of that regime's failures. Its brutal political 
     dictatorship and its dogmatic economic management could be 
     subjected to a scathing critique.
       At the same time, attractive political and economic 
     alternatives could also be put on the table. More 
     specifically, the United States could propose a schedule for 
     the staged introduction of democracy--perhaps on the model of 
     what happened in Poland in 1989--as well as a similarly 
     staged economic-aid program (including a step-by-step lifting 
     of the embargo), designed to alleviate the immediate 
     suffering of the population and then to stimulate the 
     economic recovery of the island.
       Such an initiative would gain the support of much of Latin 
     American public opinion. It would also be likely to have 
     European backing, especially from Spain. These reactions 
     would be noted in Cuba, making a negative response by Castro 
     more costly for him.
       Of course, given the dictatorial nature of the Cuban 
     regime, it would be up to Castro personally to decide whether 
     to accept or reject the initiative. Acceptance could make the 
     process of transition more peaceful and also increasingly 
     difficult to resist.
       A refusal by Castro--which at this stage represents the 
     more likely reaction--might help to mobilize support for the 
     U.S. initiative even on the part of some Cubans who otherwise 
     would support Castro in a final showdown. That would further 
     weaken and isolate the old dictator, enhancing the prospects 
     of success for any eventual popular revolt against his 
     regime.
       There is little to be risked by exploring the soft-landing 
     option. And much to be gained, especially by the Cuban 
     people.

  Mr. DODD. At any rate, I apologize to my colleagues for taking this 
amount of time, but my point here is I understand and appreciate the 
emotional levels that people feel when this issue comes up.
  And I have great sympathy--not as a Cuban-American--but sympathy for 
how Cuban-Americans feel who had to leave their country under the worst 
of circumstances, or watch their families be imprisoned and treated 
brutally by their Government. But I think as we are examining how we 
deal with that problem, how we try to create the transition, that we do 
so with an eye toward what is in the best interest of our country, and 
also take steps that are not rooted and grounded in an emotional 
response but that are likely to produce the result which we can all 
support.
  I strongly suggest to my colleagues that the legislation, no matter 
how well intended, does none of those things. In fact, I think it is 
bad for our country. I do not think it produces the kind of results at 
all that the proponents claim it will. In fact, I think it does quite 
the contrary. I do not think it is in the interest of this country. It 
does damage to our country, and I think it would make it that much more 
difficult to achieve the kind of results we would like to see in Cuba, 
and to see promptly.
  For those reasons, Mr. President, I strongly urge that my colleagues 
vote against invoking cloture when that vote comes up--and that will be 
the first vote we will have on this measure --to send a message that 
this bill ought to go back to committee and be reexamined thoroughly as 
to whether this legislation really makes sense. If that does not occur, 
then vote against this legislation when that opportunity arises.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. MACK addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act and encourage my colleagues to vote for 
cloture when that time arrives.
  This is a bill which would seek increased international pressure on 
Fidel Castro, hold out the promise of assistance to transition and 
democratic governments in Cuba, and provide a powerful disincentive to 
those who would use illegally expropriated property belonging to United 
States citizens to prop up the Castro regime and its instruments of 
repression.
  Despite the diligent efforts of the Clinton administration and 
apologists for Castro to misrepresent this bill, this bill is an 
effective, and thoughtful program for maintaining economic pressure on 
Castro, supporting democratic forces inside Cuba, and planning for 
future transition and democratic governments.
  Fidel Castro has been in power for 36 years. That is longer than Mao 
and Joseph Stalin. That is mindboggling.
  As happened with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 
much of the world has denied, ignored, and become inured to the litany 
of human rights abuses emanating from Cuba. Now, with the cold war 
over, there is even less interest.
  Ramming tugs full of refugees, arbitrary arrests, made-up crimes and 
lengthy imprisonment in squalid prisons and psychiatric hospitals 
apparently do not raise an eyebrow anymore.
  The final step in the process of accommodation, normalization of 
commercial and other ties, is taking place now as many countries look 
for commercial opportunities in Cuba.
  Before I go on to explain why foreign investment in Cuba will 
prolong, not end, the tyranny of Fidel Castro, let me address the state 
of human rights in Cuba today.
  I would like to read an excerpt from the 1994-95 Freedom in the World 
Report, compiled by Freedom House.

       With the possible exception of South Africa, Indonesia and 
     China, Cuba under Castro has had more political prisoners per 
     capita for longer periods than any other country.
       Since 1992 Cuba's community of human rights activists and 
     dissidents has been subject to particularly severe 
     crackdowns. Hundreds of human rights activists have been 
     jailed or placed under house arrest.
       In the extended crackdown that began in August 1994, over 
     thirty dissidents were detained and beaten while in custody.
       Dissidents are frequently assaulted in the streets and in 
     their homes by plainclothes police and the `rapid action 
     brigades,' mobs organized by state security, often through 
     the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).
       There is continued evidence of torture and killings in 
     prisons and psychiatric institutions, where a number of the 
     dissidents arrested in recent years have been incarcerated.
       Since 1990, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
     has been denied access to prisoners.
       Freedom of movement and freedom to choose one's residence, 
     education or job are restricted. Attempting to leave the 
     island without permission is a punishable offense and 
     crackdowns have been severe since 1993, except during the 
     month-long exodus in 1994. The punishment for illegal exit--
     --

  I would like just to make a point here. The idea that you would live 
in a country that would have a law that would make it illegal for you 
to leave, and the punishment for that would be 3 years in prison is 
unconscionable. At the present time, there are some 1,000 individuals, 
it is estimated, in prison for that particular crime of wanting to 
leave the country.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous 
consent request?
  Mr. MACK. Certainly.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that John F. 
Guerra, a Pearson fellow on my staff, be granted the privilege of the 
floor for the pendency of this legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MACK. Unfortunately, the world has become so conditioned to 
Castro's 

[[Page S 15022]]
abuses that the suffering of the Cuban people sometimes becomes a 
footnote in debates over maintaining the embargo, or Castro's efforts 
to revive Cuba's nuclear and military capabilities.
  Mr. President, I have had the opportunity over the years to have been 
somewhat involved in the issues of human rights violations in Cuba 
having had the opportunity to talk with Cubans who have one way or 
another left the island of Cuba. I have also been in Geneva during the 
debate surrounding the issue of human rights violations in Cuba.
  While I can understand how, over a period of time, people seem to be 
able to just brush aside the human aspects of this debate and focus on 
the legal constitutional issues, the reality of what we are talking 
about here today is not economics and it is not constitutional law. It 
is what is happening to individuals on a day-to-day basis.
  I would say to you again that in my conversations with people who 
have left Cuba and who have left recently, their reaction to our 
backing away or backing down on the economic sanctions, or the embargo 
that is in place, they say that would be the wrong thing to do even 
though they are going through tremendous suffering. They say it would 
be the wrong thing to do. It is the only message they hear from around 
the world that says that someone is concerned about their future. It 
would be a terrible mistake for the Senate to reject this legislation.
  I would like to turn the debate briefly away from the human rights 
aspect of it and talk a little bit about the embargo and maintaining 
economic pressure on Castro.
  Foreign investors in Cuba often purport to be responding to changes 
in the regime. In fact, there have been no significant economic 
changes, let alone political ones.
  Castro controls sectors of the economy that attract most foreign 
investment such as mining and petroleum, telecommunications, 
agriculture, and tourism.
  An index of foreign investment in Cuba lists over a dozen 
democracies.
  Foreign companies must make partnerships with the regime. 
Increasingly this means Cuba's military, which like China's, is getting 
more and more involved in the economy.
  Tourism is the military's cash cow, especially foreigners-only 
restaurants and resorts which have created what Cubans call tourism 
apartheid.
  The argument that foreign investment makes private citizens 
independent of state control by enabling them to support a free press, 
political parties, religious groups and labor and professional 
organizations simply does not apply to Cuba where there is no such 
thing as a right to private property, let alone free speech, 
association or assembly.
  European, Canadian, and Mexican investors have been providing crucial 
support to Castro for years yet there is no benefit to ordinary Cubans. 
The constitution requires state ownership of the fundamental means of 
production. Foreign companies may not contract with workers.
  Instead, companies pay the Government. Again, I want to stress this 
point. If you do business in Cuba today, the impression is created that 
these reforms are somehow or another dramatically changing what is 
happening in Cuba. If you are doing business in Cuba today and you hire 
a number of Cubans, you do not pay directly your work force.
  You pay the money to the Cuban Government, say, 300 United States 
dollars a month for each employee. That employee receives $4 to $5 a 
month in pesos from the Cuban Government. The balance of that money 
stays with Fidel Castro's government. In fact, it enhances Fidel 
Castro's ability to control the island.
  So this idea, this notion that somehow or other if we were to 
liberalize our approach in dealing with Fidel Castro that the people of 
Cuba will benefit is just hogwash. The individual who will benefit will 
be Fidel Castro. And anyone who has done any serious reading about 
Fidel Castro knows that his only motive is his own private power, his 
ability to remain in place as the leader. His interests are not, in 
fact, the Cuban people.
  Decree Law No. 149 directs agents to search out and seize cash or 
property of Cubans deemed unduly wealthy. Deemed unduly wealthy, 
interesting concept, is it not, that the government would define and 
determine who in the country is unduly wealthy.
  Individuals discovered with a motorbike or extra clothes can be 
charged with illegal enrichment and face lengthy prison terms. 
Sometimes foreign investments involve the $1.8 billion in U.S. 
properties seized in 1960 without compensation. Despite misleading 
representations to prospective investors, Cuba has never settled a 
single claim for these properties.
  Castro encourages and courts this investment, even inventing a 
cosmetic law that purports to protect the assets of foreign investors. 
Our State Department asks our allies to discourage their citizens from 
investing in such properties, with mixed success. Somehow transactions 
that businessmen would not touch with a 10-foot pole in their own 
countries seem all right in Cuba, where fraudulent transactions 
involving the government are above the law.
  This bill provides a powerful disincentive to those who knowingly 
invest in expropriated U.S. properties by providing another forum for 
legal action by U.S. citizens. However, neither this bill nor 
longstanding United States policy towards Cuba is inspired by the 
economic injuries suffered by our citizens. We simply refuse to prop up 
the Castro regime and its instruments of repression.
  A recent report of the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor 
Development explained Castro's strategy to substitute hard currency for 
real change.
  And I quote:

       ``[r]eforms'' are not seen as ends in themselves but as 
     temporary mechanisms for gaining enough foreign currency and 
     trade to ensure the survival of the communist system. 
     ``Privatization'' is not an open-ended invitation to foreign 
     entrepreneurs, but a tightly controlled partnership between 
     investors and government agencies, for the purpose of 
     strengthening those very agencies.

  The Clinton administration's changeable Cuba policy may have led our 
allies to believe sentiment in the United States is divided over Cuba. 
It is not. Worse still, administration wavering may have caused Cubans 
to doubt United States resolve and take to rafts and innertubes in 
numbers greater than any time since the Mariel exodus.
  Some of our allies have criticized the bill on the grounds that the 
United States has no right to tell its allies not to do business in 
Cuba. We are doing no such thing. This legislation is directed at Fidel 
Castro and his government. Insofar as this bill has a message for our 
allies, it is that we attach the greatest importance to ending the 
decades-long nightmare of the Cuban people. Foreign investment on 
Castro's terms prolongs that nightmare.
  Other provisions of this bill would deny Cuba the money and 
legitimacy that comes from being a member of international financial 
and other institutions, like the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Organization of American States.
  This bill tells the States of the former Soviet Union they may not 
blithely restart their predecessor's close relations with Fidel Castro 
and expect the United States not to care.
  We will not subsidize Russia's assistance to Cuba so long as it 
supports Castro's destabilizing ambitions in the hemisphere and keeps 
the Cuban people under the thumb of corrupt and inefficient Socialist 
economic policies.
  We will however plan for the day, the moment, that the United States 
can help the people of Cuba make a transition to democracy. This bill 
holds out the promise of aid to transition and democratic governments 
in Cuba and allows the President great flexibility in extending the 
help and support of the United States.
  Americans right now are already the largest donors of humanitarian 
aid to Cuba. We will do more. But we won't prolong the Castro nightmare 
1 minute longer than necessary by relaxing pressure on Castro or 
helping him attract foreign investment.
  Mr. President, not too long ago I saw a movie called ``Braveheart.'' 
It is about the struggle for human freedom. And this movie was about 
the effort on the part of the Scottish people to secure their freedom. 
There was a scene in this movie in the midst of a battle in 

[[Page S 15023]]
which the hero of the movie had spoken with the nobles in the country 
asking for their support. And at the crucial moment in the battle, I 
remember again the hero turning to someone for support from these 
nobles, and at this crucial moment, the nobles turned their backs on 
freedom. They turned their backs on freedom for one reason: for their 
self-interest, for their need to continue the existing system because 
they profited from it.
  I know that the motivation, frankly, behind those who are in 
disagreement with what we are trying to accomplish is the desire to 
profit from the markets that will be available someday in Cuba. I 
understand that. I am disappointed that people react that way. We will 
never change that attitude. It has been in existence as long as man has 
been on the surface of this Earth.
  But I think we ought to recognize it for what it is. People want to 
do business in China today for exactly the same reason. For a few brief 
moments the Nation focused on Harry Wu. But now he is back, and 
everyone has forgotten. The same kind of thing is happening in Cuba. 
Day in and day out innocent people who want the same things out of life 
that you and I enjoy, and those are the basic principles and the 
freedoms that we enjoy--the freedom of assembly, the freedom of 
religion, the freedom to pursue your own livelihood--and yet we are, in 
essence, not willing to stand up and fight for those individuals 
because of the commercial interest that exists throughout the world. I 
understand it. I reject it. I wish it was not there. But I think we 
ought to recognize it because that is what is driving a lot of this 
debate.
  I would hope that just occasionally there would be an opportunity for 
the nobles of the world to say just once in this one case, ``I am 
willing to give up the opportunity for profit, the opportunity for 
growth in my company, give up those opportunities so that other 
individuals that we do not know, never will meet, but who have 
struggled for the same kinds of freedom and liberty that we enjoy 
today.'' And I certainly would hope that this Congress will pass this 
legislation so that we can provide a message of hope to the people of 
Cuba.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995. I believe this legislation will 
encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba. It 
will provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban 
people in response to the formation of a transition government or a 
democratically elected government in Cuba. This bill will also protect 
the rights of U.S. persons who own claims to confiscated property 
abroad.
  I believe this legislation will expedite the transition to a 
democratic government in Cuba. Whether you are for or against this 
bill, no one disagrees that this should be the policy of our 
government. Denying United States visas to those who trade with Cuba 
and discouraging International Financial Institutions assistance to 
Cuba are necessary steps that will strengthen the embargo and bring 
about the downfall of the Castro regime.
  One of the significant provisions of this bill is the section dealing 
with property. It is difficult to accept the argument that Fidel 
Castro's confiscation of property belonging to naturalized citizens 
should not be subject to a remedy under the domestic laws of the United 
States. Confiscations of property belonging to U.S. nationals at the 
time of the taking clearly violated international law. These takings 
were done to retaliate against U.S. nationals for acts of the U.S. 
Government, and the takings were without the payment of adequate and 
effective compensation.
  While courts have generally not recognized actions of foreign 
governments against its own citizens, international human rights law 
does recognize that in certain circumstances a state violates 
international law when it confiscates the property of either its own 
citizens or aliens based on some invidious category such a race, 
nationality, or political opinion. Some legal scholars have noted that 
the international community may be moving toward recognition of claims 
when confiscations or expropriations are the result of such 
discrimination.
  The stories of property confiscation in Cuba are repugnant. The 
confiscations of Cuban-owned property were based on such obscene 
grounds as an owner's having committed ``offenses defined by law as 
counter-revolutionary.''
  I believe this legislation establishes the framework by which Cuba 
will become a democratic nation. I have heard from many in the Cuban-
American community who spend the majority of their time working to 
realize this objective. This legislation honors the hard work of these 
fighters of freedom and I encourage my colleagues to support final 
passage. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). The Senator from California is 
recognized.


                          TRIBUTE TO SAM NUNN

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise not to speak on this bill but 
to do two things. First, to say a few words and share my respect and 
admiration for the senior Senator from Georgia. And, second to share 
some of my reflections of the past year and where I think we seem to be 
heading with the reconciliation bill.
  Mr. President, I do not serve on a committee with the senior Senator 
from Georgia, but I do try to listen to the floor when I am in the 
office. I have a very simple test, I either turn the sound up or down 
or off depending on the merit I find in the discussion. I have always 
turned the sound up to listen to Senator Sam Nunn. And, what I have 
heard is an intelligent, a reasoned, and a very informed person who has 
brought a great deal to bear in the debates on the Senate floor. He has 
been a strong and tireless advocate for a national defense policy that 
is well thought out, for foreign policy that explores each issue as 
part of a whole policy situation and not a separate stand-alone issue.
  His ability, I think, to see individual defense programs or foreign 
policy actions as part of the total debate has given him the ability to 
think independently of party and the daily public opinion poll and put 
forth a policy that is really important.
  I will miss him greatly. I very much regret his decision to retire 
from the U.S. Senate. I think it is to the Senate's loss when we lose 
one of our great minds.
  The distinguished Senator has been an advocate for a strong national 
defense, especially pushing for a well-trained and modern force. He has 
constantly lent his support to support programs which would better 
prepare our men and women in uniform for war, but moreover for 
operations-other-than-war including humanitarian missions.
  His leadership in foreign policy is marked, as well. He has been the 
single strongest voice for lessening the threat of nuclear 
proliferation from the States of the former Soviet Union with the 
policies advanced under the Nunn-Lugar program. And, he has helped our 
relationship with the new Russia and the nations of Eastern Europe 
through his ideas on NATO expansion and the Partnership for Peace 
Program.
  Senator Nunn will continue to remain a voice of moderation and 
independent thought throughout the remainder of his term. I will miss 
his contributions to some of the most important issues of our day and 
this body will miss his leadership.

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