[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 156 (Tuesday, October 10, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14843-S14851]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATO EXPANSION

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Senator Nunn's plane is late, so I am 
going to start this dialog. Senator Nunn and I and other Democrats and 
Republicans have been talking about NATO expansion. We are very 
concerned that the debate needs to take place, that Americans need to 
understand what is important, what the questions should be, and what 
should be the criteria for the expansion of NATO.
  After all, all of us understand that NATO is a mutual defense pact. 
And if we expand NATO, we must ask for and receive from the entering 
nation defense assurances, and we must also give those same defense 
assurances. Therefore, we are talking about American troops and 
American tax dollars, just as all of our NATO allies will be looking at 
the obligations they must accept.
  All of us must realize how very important and crucial this decision 
is going to be. The expansion of NATO is a strategic decision that must 
not be made in haste and must not be made before we answer the crucial 
questions.
  So Senator Nunn and I are taking this hour, along with others of our 
colleagues, to talk about it. Let us raise some of the questions that 
we think need to be answered, and let us look at potential 
alternatives, as well as the actual expansion of NATO, and the 
timetable that we might look at if we decide to make that decision.
  The political map of Europe has changed dramatically since the 
toppling of the Berlin Wall. Just as these changes were a direct result 
of half a century of American leadership and NATO resolve, so, too, 
does the future of peace and stability in Europe depend on a strong and 
enduring NATO.
  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new 
governments, along with old ethnic and border disputes in Eastern 
Europe, a new set of challenges confronts the North Atlantic alliance.
  A NATO study just released last week takes a decidedly positive 
stance toward the possibility of expanding NATO membership. The NATO 
study is specific in that it asserts that new NATO members will have 
the same benefits and obligations of all the other members of the 
alliance.
  The study also anticipates no change in NATO nuclear policy or in the 
forward basing of NATO ground forces. These points are important, as 
far as they go. However, there are a number of very serious issues 
raised by the issue of NATO enlargement, and these questions need to be 
analyzed thoroughly before the United States and our NATO allies commit 
ourselves to this course of action.
  First, although the NATO study talks about expansion leading to 
increased stability and security, it is largely silent on the real why 
of NATO enlargement. The real why is the deep concern in Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic countries about a future threat from Russia and the 
West's stake in responding to this potential threat.
  Second, the study does not address the Russian reaction to NATO 
expansion. It notes that Russia has raised concerns which NATO is 
attempting to address, but the fact is that eastward NATO expansion in 
the near future is almost certain to prompt opponents of democracy and 
economic reform in Russia to new heights of paranoia and provocative 
nationalism. It could weaken the prodemocracy and proreform elements of 
the Russian polity that we should be striving to support. Rather than 
strengthening stability and security in Eastern Europe, repercussions 
in Russia from rapid NATO expansion could undermine our most important 
national security goal.
  Third, full NATO membership for the nations of Eastern Europe has the 
potential to draw the United States and our NATO allies into regional 
border and ethnic disputes in which we have no demonstrable national 
security interest.
  Many Americans and many of us in Congress have serious reservations 
about President Clinton's proposal to commit United States troops to a 
peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia. This is an issue we will 
debate here at a later date. But disagreements about the wisdom of this 
commitment within this body across our Nation and within NATO are 
directly relevant to NATO expansion.
  Is it in America's interest to enter into treaty obligations that 
could end up committing American military and political power to 
current and future regional border and ethnic disputes in Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans?
  When President Clinton argues that we must put troops on the ground 
in Bosnia in order to keep faith with our NATO allies and our 
leadership within the alliance, it illustrates perfectly the very real 
risks of rapid NATO expansion. Before the United States and our NATO 
allies take this step to guarantee mutual defense, we must acknowledge 
that the potential for civil war and border and ethnic strife in 
Eastern Europe is high. After years of vacillation and debate about 
what America should do about Bosnia, we must also acknowledge that 
there has not been a clear policy. To embark on NATO expansion without 
resolving this crucial question could be disastrous.
  Potential flash points in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are easy to 
identify. Current and potential NATO members are directly involved in 
every one of them: Serbian opposition to Kosovo's aspirations to 
independence; Greek opposition to Macedonian independence; longstanding 
border disputes between Poland and Ukraine; unresolved problems 
stemming from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
  If we move ahead rapidly with NATO expansion and the full mutual 
defense and security commitments that such membership implies, would 
that set the stage for direct American military involvement in such 
disputes as we have been drawn into in the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia? That is a very important question that we must answer 
before we take such a giant step.
  Mr. President, there are alternatives to rapid NATO expansion, 
alternatives 

[[Page S 14844]]
which would establish a rational progression to eventual NATO 
membership and which would provide real encouragement and support to 
the nations we want to help.
  The economic and political integration of all the nations of Eastern 
Europe is the best way to ensure long-range stability and a rational 
progression to expanded NATO membership. For instance, any country 
eligible for European Union membership should be considered for NATO 
membership. So you start with European Union membership requirements 
and the economic and trade alliances that would provide stability, and 
then you take the next step to NATO membership.
  Expanding trade and strengthening free market capitalism in the newly 
emergent nations of Eastern Europe would establish a strong foundation 
for peace and stability based on mutual interests.
  In parallel fashion, resolution of regional and internal disputes 
should be a precondition for eligibility for NATO membership.
  The Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe should be used to help bring about permanent 
solutions to ethnic and other disputes involving European countries and 
the Eastern European countries anxious to join NATO. It will also 
strengthen the democracies in those countries. This would maximize 
security and stability within Eastern Europe and underscore that 
expansion is not aimed at Russia.
  I believe American and NATO leadership and influence should be 
directed at setting up a means for arbitrating these disputes to bring 
an end to the existing conflicts and to head off future situations that 
could be caused by these disputes. No Nation should be considered for 
NATO membership unless it has committed itself for the present and the 
future to accept peaceful resolution of local and regional conflicts.
  One approach would be to create a forum for arbitration, comprised of 
peers acceptable to all parties to the conflict. To be considered for 
NATO membership, all countries would agree to binding arbitration of 
border and ethnic disputes. This might be part of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Partnership for Peace. But 
let us put that idea on the table. If the American labor negotiation 
concept is binding arbitration, if the parties agree to the peers that 
would be the judges, would this not be a way to stop the ethnic and 
border conflict before they erupt into the tragedy that we have seen in 
the former Yugoslavia?

  Rather than pell-mell rushing into NATO membership, the implications 
of which are fraught with dangers and complications, the United States 
and its Eastern European allies and our Western European allies should 
initiate a series of coordinated efforts to strengthen new democracies 
and build a stronger economy and bind the nations of Europe to a set of 
rules that would ensure peace and stability for decades to come.
  The NATO allies should also make their position clear, with respect 
to the overarching goal of NATO membership, the possibility of future 
Russian aggression. Ironically, those countries with the most valid 
concerns in this regard--the Balkan nations and the Ukraine--are, 
because of their proximity to Russia, the least likely to gain NATO 
membership in the short run. The people of these countries are unlikely 
to feel more secure if NATO expands eastward but stops short of their 
borders, in effect, placing them in a buffer zone between an enlarged 
NATO and a more paranoid Russia. The NATO allies should ensure that all 
parties understand that accelerated and, if necessary, immediate 
enlargement of NATO would depend directly upon Russian behavior. And in 
this way we would provide a basis for accelerated NATO expansion in 
response to a real threat, but we would avoid provoking the very threat 
we are trying to guard against.
  The key criterion would remain as outlined in the NATO study recently 
released, Enhancement of Europe's Security and Stability. This twofold 
strategy for the post-cold-war Europe would provide the affected 
nations with what they need most, a foundation to build greater 
prosperity and stability and a NATO security commitment against the 
possibility of future Russian aggression. This straightforward approach 
is also important for our citizens and those in other NATO countries 
who will have to pay the bills and make the sacrifices required by 
expanding eastward NATO's security commitments.
  We, in America, cannot assess public opinion in other countries, of 
course. But when NATO expansion and the debate that will follow focuses 
on the issues of NATO nuclear policy, NATO troop deployment, NATO 
infrastructure development, and former NATO commitments, played against 
the background of repercussions in Russia and priorities for our fewer 
defense dollars in the United States, we must first understand public 
opinion in our country, and we and our allies must undertake our 
primary goal, to maintain the underlying strength of NATO.
  NATO has the total support of the American people. As we move forward 
to an expanding cooperation and mutual defense, we must maintain that 
American support of NATO. All of the issues that I have raised must be 
considered before we expand, so that once the commitment is made, we 
can be assured that we have the absolute will and determination to keep 
our commitment. The American people must fully understand and support 
the role of the United States for that goal to be achieved.
  Mr. President, as I said when I started, Senator Nunn and I and many 
of our colleagues have traveled throughout the new Eastern European 
democracies. We have gone to Russia, as members of the Armed Services 
Committee. We have met with members of the Russian Duma. We want to 
take the steps that are right, and we want to take them at the right 
time. That is why Senator Nunn and I and others of our colleagues 
wanted to take this time today to start the debate, to start the 
thinking process, to make sure that we have thought of every 
eventuality and that the American people understand what is important, 
what questions must be asked, and what the criteria are for expanded 
NATO membership.
  Mr. President, Senator Nunn has arrived. As I said, his plane was 
late, but he has now arrived. I want to take this opportunity before I 
turn the floor over to the senior Senator from Georgia to say that I, 
like so many of my colleagues, watched him yesterday announce that he 
would not seek a fifth term to the U.S. Senate. He said he needs time 
to read, write, and think. Mr. President, all of us understand in this 
body how very important the time to think and to write is to a good 
public debate and a solid public policy. I just want to say that I 
think Senator Nunn has provided that thoughtful public policy 
leadership in his four terms in the Senate, as chairman and now ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee, on which I have been very 
fortunate to sit.
  I have worked with Senator Nunn and have come to respect him greatly 
for the thought that he gives to public policy and for the leadership 
that he has given for our country. He and I agree in almost every 
respect about the need for a strong national defense, the need for us 
to think to the future, and I feel that by taking this time out, he is 
going to continue to provide even greater leadership for what we must 
do for the future to make sure that our country remains strong 
militarily.
  I will end by just saying that I think the best of all things that 
can be said about the Senator is that he had the instinct to know when 
it was time for him to go and the judgment to do it while people still 
hoped that he would stay.
  Mr. President, I thank you and I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague and friend from 
Texas on two points. One is her very kind comments about my difficult 
decision which has now been made. I appreciate very much her 
thoughtfulness and her comments. I appreciate her friendship, and 
serving with her on the Armed Services Committee has been a great 
pleasure.
  I also commend her for her substantive remarks on the question of 
NATO expansion. I will have more to say about that in a few minutes as 
we proceed to discuss that very important issue. But I know that the 
Senator from Kansas has been on the floor. I 

[[Page S 14845]]
would much prefer to hear her address the subject. She has another bill 
to manage. I will listen to her attentively, and then I will make some 
comments on the substantive issue myself.
  I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from Texas for her kind 
remarks.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I was just here to fill in for the 
Senator from Georgia until he got to the floor. I just have a few very 
brief remarks to make.
  First, I want to say that I am very appreciative of Senator Hutchison 
and Senator Nunn for organizing this debate--a beginning debate, 
perhaps--on a very important subject. I think it is essential for us to 
begin to think about the consequences of the expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and what that may mean.
  I would also like to say that the announcement of the Senator from 
Georgia yesterday was one which I think all of us felt great 
disappointment with, but also thoughtful understanding. Senator Nunn 
has brought to the U.S. Senate, and to the United States, sincerity, 
integrity, and a depth of knowledge in a debate of the public policy 
issues before us in this country through the four terms he has served 
that will be remembered far into the future. And his legacy will be one 
that will be an inspiration to all who wish to follow in public 
service. So I join with all on both sides of the aisle who will greatly 
miss his presence in the U.S. Senate.
  Mr. President, I would like to join for a few minutes in this 
discussion on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its future.
  This debate has been ongoing for years in Europe among foreign policy 
experts, and in the administration. But in Congress, which would have 
to approve any changes in the North Atlantic Treaty to accommodate new 
members, it is long overdue. I enter this debate as a strong supporter 
of NATO and a firm believer it must remain the foundation of the 
security architecture in Europe, just as the Senator from Texas pointed 
out in her excellent statement. Supporters of the NATO expansion have 
said for some time the issue is not, why and how, but rather who and 
when? In my mind, we have gotten ahead of ourselves. The issue, I 
believe, remains very much why and how. I believe the first order of 
business must be to clearly define in our own minds, and with our 
allies, what we want NATO to do in Europe's new security environment.
  The Soviet Union is gone and with it the clear threat that held NATO 
together. We know we still need a security structure in Europe and that 
America should be a part of that structure. But we have not in my mind 
made clear the new purpose for that structure. It seems to me difficult 
to construct a security system and to make significant decisions such 
as whom to include, and by implication whom to exclude, without a 
clear, shared purpose to pursue. The dangers of fuzzy purpose have been 
made clear in Bosnia. For years, NATO hesitated, the allies could not 
agree, we did not act, and, in my view, the alliance has been weakened 
as a result. While NATO now seems to have found its footing in the 
Bosnia conflict, I suggest Bosnia has shown our first order of business 
must be to find anew our shared purpose for America's involvement in 
Europe. Only then can we properly consider what security structure will 
best serve that purpose.
  Let me make clear that I am not arguing against changes in NATO. It 
is a cold war institution that must adapt to new realities. But I am 
not yet prepared to say that change necessarily equates with expansion. 
Perhaps President Clinton put it best in his speech at Freedom House 
last week when he called for NATO's modernization. It seems to me this 
broader question about how NATO should be updated to fit our new needs, 
not a predetermined notion that expansion is both desirable and 
inevitable, should be the debate we now take up. As this debate 
continues and reaches the Congress, we will face many questions. Are 
the American people prepared to pledge, in the words of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, that an armed attack against one or more of these 
potential new members will be considered an attack against all? That, I 
think, is a question we should keep first and foremost in our minds.
  It is easy to say how important this expansion will be. It is 
important to the future of the organization. But when it comes right 
down to it, are we prepared to do what is asked for in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter as it stands? I do not know the 
answer to that. But I do know that it is the basic issue we are 
debating. Those who support this expansion have a heavy burden to make 
their case.
  I look forward to the comments of Senator Nunn. I think the debate is 
called for by Mrs. Hutchison in her role on the Armed Services 
Committee and her important role as a Senator from Texas, where there 
are a number of military installations. Kansas has military 
installations also. Fort Riley is always very involved in forward 
deployment to Germany. And certainly the same for the senior Senator 
from Georgia [Mr. Nunn]. These are issues of grave importance to all of 
us, and I think, as we can begin to reason together, it will be useful 
in this dialog.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Kansas, Senator 
Kassebaum, for her kind remarks about my service in the U.S. Senate. I 
am not here today to precipitate that discussion. We probably had 
enough retirement announcements around this institution for 1 year. 
That is not my purpose in taking the floor today, but I do thank her 
for her remarks.
  I also agree with her words of caution on NATO expansion. We have a 
lot of thinking to do. We have a lot of debating to do. We have a lot 
of discussion to conduct, to make the right kind of decision, both for 
the alliance itself and for the stability of Europe.
  I thank my friend from Texas, again, for organizing this discussion 
this morning. I think it is going to be very fruitful in precipitating 
other people to think and also speak on the subject. I talked to enough 
Senators on both sides of the aisle to know there are a number of 
people who are concerned, deeply concerned, and who have a lot of 
thoughts and a lot of questions about this matter. I think we will be 
hearing from them in the days and weeks ahead. So I thank both of my 
colleagues for their remarks.
  I say to the Senator from Kansas, she has been a very fine leader. We 
have relied on her for so long in the field of foreign policy as well 
as many other fields, and I have such deep admiration for her and her 
leadership, and I am grateful to her for that.
  Mr. President, the issue of NATO expansion deserves thorough and 
careful consideration because it has important ramifications for the 
future of NATO, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for 
the future of Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet 
Union, and for the future security order throughout Europe, East and 
West.
  President Clinton has declared, and NATO has concurred, the 
organization's enlargement is not an issue of whether but of when and 
how. I, like the Senator from Kansas, believe the when and how need to 
be discussed more thoroughly.
  On September 28 of this year, NATO released a study on the why and 
how of enlargement. It reserves for future decisions the question of 
who and when. On the positive side, the study declares that NATO 
enlargement will be gradual, deliberate, and transparent. It presents 
no fixed set of criteria for membership but specifies that enlargement 
will be decided on a case-by-case basis, with the key judgments being 
whether a given country's admission will contribute to Europe's 
stability and security.
  It states that new members will have the same benefits and 
obligations as all other members and it anticipates no change in NATO 
nuclear policy or in the forward basing of NATO ground forces.
  On the less positive side, I believe three large gaps exist in the 
study and give it an unrealistically optimistic tone. First, the study 
provides no satisfactory answer to the key question of why, and merely 
expresses what NATO hopes will be the outcome of expansion: increased 
stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. All of us hope for that, 
but that does not really get down to the essential reasons of how and 
why expansion will lead to that result. 

[[Page S 14846]]

  Second, it glosses over the increasingly negative Russian reaction to 
NATO expansion.
  Third, it asserts that enlargement is part of a broad security 
architecture in Europe that transcends the idea of dividing lines in 
Europe, yet it is silent about the fact that gradual enlargement will 
create dividing lines between those countries admitted and those 
countries that are not admitted.
  NATO was established primarily to protect the Western democracies 
from an expansionist Soviet Union that, after World War II, seemed 
determined to spread its influence through subversion, through 
political intimidation, and through the threat of the use of military 
force. With the end of the cold war, we have witnessed a heart 
pounding, terrain altering set of earthquakes centered in the former 
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. These seismic events have ended an 
international era. The European security environment has changed. We 
have moved from a world of high risk but also high stability, because 
of the danger of escalation and the balance of terror on both sides, to 
a world of much lower risk but much lower stability. We are all aware 
of the dramatic change in the threat environment in Europe resulting 
from these seismic changes.
  The immediate danger is posed by violent terrorist groups, by 
isolated rogue states, by ethnic, religious and other types of 
subnational passions that can flare into vicious armed conflict, as we 
have seen too well and too thoroughly in the Bosnian conflict.
  The lethality of any and all of these threats can be greatly 
magnified by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons, as well as by the spread of destabilizing conventional 
weapons.
  At the same time, Russia currently possesses at least 20,000 nuclear 
weapons--in fact over 20,000--at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, 
advanced biological warfare capability, hundreds of tons of fissile 
material, huge stores of conventional weapons, plus literally thousands 
of scientists and technicians skilled in manufacturing weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Mr. President, this is the first time in history that an empire has 
disintegrated while possessing such enormous destructive capabilities. 
Even if these capabilities are greatly reduced, the know-how, the 
production capability, and the dangers of proliferation will endure for 
many years. Even if we do our very best job, this is going to be our 
No. 1 security threat for America, for NATO, and for the world in terms 
of decades; not simply a few years.
  As we contemplate NATO enlargement, I believe that we must carefully 
measure NATO enlargement's effect on this proliferation security 
problem, which is our No. 1 security problem.
  Threats cannot be cleanly delinked, resulting in one section on 
proliferation and another section on NATO enlargement as if there is no 
connectivity. Those two subjects are intimately related. And in the 
longer term, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a resurgent and 
threatening Russia. Russia not only has inherited the still dangerous 
remnants of the Soviet war machine, but in its current weakened 
condition Russia contains potential resources by virtue of its size and 
strategic location. Russia exerts considerable weight in Europe, Asia, 
and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia has inherited the former Soviet 
Union's veto power in the U.N. Security Council, and, therefore, has a 
major voice in multilateral decisionmaking.
  Mr. President, Russia will be a major factor, for better or for 
worse, across the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats that 
face us over the next years ahead. Russia can fuel regional conflicts 
with high-technology conventional weapons along with other political 
and material support, or, on the other hand, Russia can cooperate with 
us in diffusing such conflicts, particularly by preventing the spread 
of Russian weaponry to irresponsible hands. Russia can emerge as a 
militarily aggressive power. That is certainly possible. Or Russia can 
assist the United States and the Western World and the free world in 
averting new rivalry among major powers that poison the international 
security environment. Russia can pursue a confrontational course that 
undermines the security and cooperation in Europe, or Russia can work 
with us to broaden and strengthen the emerging system of multilateral 
security in Europe.
  Mr. President, no one knows the answer to any of these questions at 
this juncture. Russia itself does not know the answer because it is in 
a period of economic stress, and political challenge and turmoil.
  Mr. President, out of this background come five fundamental points. 
First, preventing or curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is the most important and the most difficult security 
challenge we face. And that is particularly true when you have a very 
large growth of organized crime, international organized crime, and 
terrorism in our own country and around the world.
  Second, Russia is a vast reservoir of weaponry, weapons material, and 
weapons know-how. Thousands of people in Russia and throughout the 
former Soviet Union have the knowledge, the access, and the strong 
economic incentives to engage in weapons traffic.
  Mr. President, there are literally thousands of scientists in Russia 
that know how to make weapons of mass destruction, that know how to 
make high-technology weapons that can shoot down aircraft in the air 
including passenger liners, that know how to make missile technology to 
deliver these weapons of mass destruction across borders, and even 
across continents. They have this knowledge. But several thousand of 
them at least do not know where their next paycheck is coming from. 
They do not know how they are going to feed their families, and they 
are in great demand around the world from both terrorist organizations 
and from rogue Third World countries.
  The third conclusion is that increased Russian isolation, paranoia, 
or instability would make our No. 1 security challenge more difficult 
and more dangerous.
  The fourth conclusion: Although the West cannot control events in 
Russia, and probably can assist political and economic reform there 
only on the margins, as the medical doctors say, our first principle 
should be to do no harm.
  Fifth, we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that 
we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important security 
priorities.
  Mr. President, it is against this background that I offer a few 
observations on the current approach to NATO enlargement.
  NATO was founded on a fundamental truth: The vital interests of the 
countries of NATO were put at risk by the military power and political 
intimidation of the Soviet Union. As President Harry Truman said in his 
memoirs, ``The [NATO] pact was a shield against aggression and against 
the fear of aggression.'' Because NATO was built on this fundamental 
truth, and because we discussed it openly and faced it truthfully with 
our people, the NATO alliance endured and prevailed. There was no 
misunderstanding about why we were forming NATO when we did it. Today, 
we seem to be saying different things to different people on the 
subject of NATO enlargement.
  To the Partnership for Peace countries, we are saying that you are 
all theoretically eligible, and, if you meet NATO's entrance criteria, 
you will move to the top of the list. To the Russians we are also 
saying that NATO enlargement is not threat-based, and it is not aimed 
at you. In fact, we say to Russia you, too, can eventually became a 
member of NATO.
  This raises a serious question. Are we really going to be able to 
convince the East Europeans that we are protecting them from their 
historical threats--that usually boils down to Russia--while we 
convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with 
Russia as a potential military threat?
  Are we really going to be able to convince the Ukraine and the Baltic 
countries that they are somehow more secure when NATO expands eastward 
but draws protective lines short of their borders and places them in 
what Russians are bound to perceive as the buffer zone? Is that going 
to make them feel more secure?
  In short, Mr. President, are we trying to bridge the unbridgeable, to 
explain the unexplainable? Are we deluding others, or are we deluding 
ourselves? 

[[Page S 14847]]

  The advantages of NATO's current course toward enlargement cannot be 
ignored, and I do not ignore that. If NATO expands in the near term to 
take in the Visegrad countries, these countries would gain in self-
confidence and stability. It is possible that border disputes and major 
ethnic conflicts would be settled before entry--for instance, the 
dispute involving the Hungarian minority in Romania.
  What these countries really want and what they really need is the 
ability to have trade and economic relations with the European 
Community and the rest of the world. They really need markets now--not 
military protection. Their threat is economic at this moment, and 
probably for the few years to come. No one can conceive of an invasion 
by Russia in the near term. The question is in the long term. That is 
another matter. But in the near term, economic trade and entry into the 
European Community is what they need most of all to stabilize their 
democratic efforts and their economy.
  Serious disadvantages must also be thought through carefully. If 
NATO's enlargement stays on its current course, reaction in Russia is 
almost inevitably going to be a sense of isolation by those that are 
committed to democracy and democratic reform with varying degrees of 
paranoia, nationalism, and demagoguery emerging from across the current 
political spectrum. In next few years Russia will have neither the 
resources nor the wherewithal to respond to any NATO enlargement with a 
conventional military buildup. They simply do not have the resources to 
do that, even if they choose to.
  If, however, the more nationalist and more extreme political forces 
gain the upper hand by election or otherwise, we are likely to see 
other responses that are more achievable, and also even more dangerous 
to European stability. For example, while Russia would take years to 
mount a sustained military threat to Eastern Europe, it can within 
weeks or months exert severe external and internal pressures on its 
immediate neighbors to the west, including the Baltic countries, and 
including the Ukraine. This could set in motion a dangerous action-
reaction cycle.

  Moreover, because a conventional military response from Russia in 
answer to NATO enlargement is not feasible economically, a nuclear 
response in the form of a higher alert status for Russia's remaining 
strategic nuclear weapons and conceivably renewed deployment of 
tactical nuclear weapons is more likely.
  I recall very well when the United States and our allies felt we were 
overwhelmed with conventional forces by the former Soviet Union. How 
did we respond? We responded by building up tactical nuclear forces. We 
responded by deploying thousands of tactical nuclear forces because we 
did not have the tanks, we did not have the artillery tubes to meet the 
conventional challenge. Are we confident the Russians would be so 
different from us if they truly have a nationalistic surge and end up 
believing the NATO enlargement is a threat to them?
  I am not confident that would not be their response as it was ours 
years ago.
  The security of NATO, Russia's neighbors and the countries of Eastern 
Europe will not be enhanced if the Russian military finger moves closer 
to the nuclear trigger.
  Where do we go from here? I recognize full well it is much easier to 
criticize than to construct, so let me make a few suggestions. I am not 
opposed to NATO expansion per se, but I feel that we need to alter the 
course of that expansion. I suggest a two-track approach to NATO 
enlargement. The first track would be evolutionary and would depend on 
political and economic developments within the European countries that 
aspire to full NATO membership. When a country becomes eligible for 
European Union membership, it will also be eligible to join the Western 
European Union, and then it will be prepared for NATO membership, 
subject, of course, to NATO's formal approval.
  This is a natural process connecting economic and security interests. 
We can honestly say to Russia, and particularly the democrats in Russia 
who are struggling to be able to have a democracy in that country, this 
process is economic in nature and is not aimed at you.
  The second track would also be a clear track. It would be a threat-
based track. An accelerated and, if necessary, immediate expansion of 
NATO would depend on Russian behavior. We should be candid with the 
Russian leadership and the Russian people, above all be honest with the 
Russian people by telling them, frankly, if you respect the sovereignty 
of your neighbors, carry out your solemn arms control commitments and 
other international obligations, and if you continue down the path of 
democracy and economic reform, your neighbors will not view you as a 
threat and neither will NATO. We will watch, however, and we will react 
to aggressive moves against other sovereign states, to militarily 
significant violations of your arms control and other legally binding 
obligations pertinent to the security of Europe, and to the emergence 
of a nondemocratic Russian Government that impedes fair elections, 
suppresses domestic freedoms or institutes a foreign policy 
incompatible with the existing European security system. These 
developments would be threatening to the security of Europe and would 
require a significant NATO response, including expansion eastward. We 
would be enlarging NATO based on a real threat. We would not, however, 
be helping to create the very threat we are trying to guard against. 
And the Senator from Texas made this point very well a few minutes ago 
in her remarks.
  Mr. President, this would change the psychology of the NATO expansion 
because the democrats in Russia would be able to say to their own 
people: Our behavior, what we do with our military forces, what we do 
with our tactical nuclear posture, what we do regarding human rights 
and freedom of the press, what we do regarding our solemn arms control 
obligations will have a bearing on whether NATO expands. If we do not 
cause a threat, we in turn are not likely to be threatened.
  That changes the psychology completely from where it is now where the 
nationalists, any time you are in a meeting with Russian 
parliamentarians--and I am sure the Senator from Kansas and the Senator 
from Texas have experienced this--what you see is that when the 
nationalists hear about NATO expansion, they start smiling and almost 
clapping because it feeds right into what they want to convince their 
people of, that is, they have to reconstitute not only the military but 
the empire. On the other hand, when you talk about NATO expansion, 
those parliamentarians that truly believe in democracy start wiping 
their brow with their handkerchief because they know the kind of 
problems it is going to cause them politically in their own country.
  Finally, Mr. President, Partnership for Peace, I believe, is a sound 
framework for this two-track approach. Its role would be to prepare 
candidate countries and NATO itself for enlargement on either the 
European track or the threat-based track. Programs of joint training 
and exercises, development of a common operational doctrine and 
establishment of the interoperational weaponry, technology and 
communications would continue based on more realistic contingencies. 
Tough issues such as nuclear policy and forward stationing of NATO 
troops would be discussed in a threat-based environment, one which we 
would hope would remain theoretical.
  I know there are those in Europe and there are those here who say, 
How can we handle this expansion of the European community? We have 
complex matters like farm products. How do we handle farm products 
coming in from Eastern Europe, or any other type product?
  When you expand NATO, you are extending a nuclear umbrella over the 
countries coming in. Are we to be told it is easier to say that if a 
country is attacked, America is going to respond if necessary with 
nuclear weapons, than it is to decide how many farm products come 
across our border?
  I do not buy the argument that economic expansion is more difficult 
and more challenging than extending the nuclear umbrella.
  As the Russian leaders and people make their important choices, they 
should know that Russian behavior will be a key and relative factor for 
NATO's future. This straightforward approach does not give them a veto. 
I do not favor giving Russia a veto. But I do favor putting them on 
notice that 

[[Page S 14848]]
what they do themselves in creating threats to others may very well 
determine what the others do in terms of enlarging NATO and enlarging 
the security umbrella.
  This straightforward approach is also important for our own citizens 
here in this country who will have to pay the bills. They will have to 
make the sacrifices required by expanded NATO security commitments.
  Again, I am not against expanding NATO. I think there are countries 
in Eastern Europe and Central Europe that will be eligible for NATO 
membership, democracies that will qualify and be eventual members. I am 
concerned about how we do it and how we go about explaining our logic. 
It makes a big difference.
  The profound historical contrast between post-World War I Germany and 
post-World War II Germany should tell us that neocontainment of Russia 
is not the answer at this critical historical juncture. If future 
developments require the containment of Russia, it should be real 
containment based on real threats.
  I thank again my colleague from Texas for organizing this. I know 
there are others who are not back in town who want to speak on this 
subject, and I hope by her leadership and the discussions we have had 
this morning we will precipitate debate on this subject. I know there 
will be debate on both sides. There are other people, whom I respect 
greatly, who have different views on this subject, but it is time for 
us to start paying attention before we get down to the point of having 
some agreement presented to the Senate for our ratification that we 
have not studied, that we have not contemplated, but that has profound 
implications.
  I at this point again thank my colleague from Texas and yield the 
floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a 
moment, I should like to say I really appreciate, of course, his very 
articulate view of this issue. He has given speeches on this subject. 
As I said earlier, he and I have traveled with the Armed Services 
Committee to Russia.
  We have met with members of the Duma and we have also been to many of 
the new emerging Eastern European democracies. And I think that it 
would be very important for us to keep in mind the conflicts that we 
see in many of those different countries versus what we hear from 
members of the Duma. And I thought it was especially important that 
Senator Nunn mentioned the reformers, and I would like him, if he 
would, to comment on the upcoming elections and the impact that this 
discussion could have on those upcoming elections.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, we have had some very 
interesting meetings in both Russia and this country with our Russian 
parliamentarian friends. And I believe that it is clear in those 
meetings that the fear among reformers and democrats is that this 
issue, which most of them do not realistically see as a threat to 
Russia, but that this expansion of NATO will give the nationalists, the 
extremists, the demagogues, those who want to restructure and rebuild 
the empire and threaten their neighbors, will give them an argument to 
be made for the Russian population that has been hearing that NATO is 
an enemy for the last 40, 45 years.
  So, it is the great concern of the reformers in Russia that I believe 
we have to take into account. We will not be doing anyone in Europe a 
favor if, by taking certain action regarding NATO expansion, we end up 
giving an edge in the political process to the most extremist elements 
in Russia.
  This is not to say that we should give them a veto. They should have 
no veto. NATO should make its own decisions. But Russian behavior and 
economic reality in Europe also should play a very important role in 
how we go about taking these important steps.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Along that same line, if the Senator would yield, I 
think it is also important that we link Russian behavior to any 
expansions of NATO and how those will come about so that there will be 
an incentive on the part of Russia to make sure that they are 
cooperating in the community of nations and that they understand that 
it is only if we begin to see a buildup or some sort of aggressive 
behavior that then we would come in in a very swift manner and look at 
the expansion possibilities.
  Mr. NUNN. I agree with the Senator from Texas on that. I think that 
is the way we ought to structure it. I believe having the natural 
approach of an economic admission to the European Community be one 
path, one option which is a natural course and would lead inevitably to 
NATO eligibility for those countries. That is one course.
  But the other course ought to be very clear, the military-threat-
based course. But where we are now is between those courses. We are 
saying that the European Community is not going to be able to expand 
fast enough and saying there is no threat from Russia. And we are 
saying that Russia can be a member of NATO at some point in time--and 
that simply does not ring true to people who have observed this process 
over a period of time from the European perspective, it does not ring 
very true to those in the Ukraine who worry about Russian reaction and 
know they will not be the first country, one of the first countries, to 
be admitted, does not ring true to the Baltics where they know that 
they can be subverted by Russia on a 48-hour basis. It would take years 
for Russia to be able to muster the military power to invade Poland, 
but to destabilize politically the Baltics would take a matter of days. 
And that may very well be the pattern that could emerge if we are not 
prudent in how we go about this situation.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. One other point that I think is important. The 
Senator from Georgia was very instrumental in negotiating the language 
that we put in our authorization bill regarding the missile defense 
capabilities that the United States would have and how that relates to 
the ABM Treaty that we have with Russia, and it also affects the START 
Treaty, which is being looked at for ratification by the Duma, the 
Russian Duma at this time.
  I think those are very important issues, along with the nuclear 
warheads that are still in Russia. All of those are issues that I think 
must be looked at as we determine how our relationship with Russia and 
the impact that NATO expansion and the way we do it has. As the Senator 
from Georgia mentioned, there will be no Russian veto of NATO 
expansion. But as we move along, we can certainly make this decision in 
the right way that keeps our ability to negotiate with Russia on any 
changes in the ABM Treaty, on ratification of the START Treaty, those 
things that are very important to our security as well as their 
security and the security of Eastern Europe.
  So it is not just an easy decision that we make with regard to any 
one country in Eastern Europe, as the Senator from Georgia fully 
realizes, especially having been so involved in the negotiations on 
what we will do in the future to protect our borders and our theaters 
from potential ballistic missile attack.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, I could not agree more with 
her on what she said. The threat in Europe now is not Russian invasion 
of one of the Visegrad countries. The threat is the huge proliferation 
problem with nuclear materials being smuggled across the borders to 
these countries, with Russian scientists under severe economic pressure 
being in demand in various parts of the world. But, hopefully, we can 
work together to prevent that. That is the threat.
  The threat is terrorism, the threat is ethnic strife, the threat is 
religious strife. It could change in 10 years. Ten years from now 
Russia could reemerge as a real military threat to some of those 
countries. We have to be prepared for that. We have to make sure we are 
in a position to react to that. But now we have many mutual interests, 
and not just with Russians, but with the East Europeans and others, in 
proliferation and working together against organized crime, which is 
one of the biggest challenges Russia has right now, their organized 
criminal activity which is devastating to confidence for investment, 
economic kinds of commitments by business people from all over the 
world.
  So we have so many mutual interests with Russia. We are also going to 
have many differences with Russia. They do not have the same interests 
we have in many parts of the world. They have historically had 
different interests. But we have got to build the common bridges. And 
even when we have a disagreement, we have to continue to 

[[Page S 14849]]
work at this proliferation problem because we do not want to wake up in 
3 years or 5 years and find that the kind of people who just derailed 
Amtrak, if that was a terrorist group, the kind of people that blew up 
the Federal building in Oklahoma, or the kind of people who carried out 
a chemical attack in Tokyo, we do not want to wake up and find those 
people possess awesome weapons of mass destruction. Only by working 
with the elements in Russia who are willing to work on this are we 
going to be able to prevent this from happening. It will be difficult 
at best.
  So I think this factor has to be very much considered in our overall 
deliberations about how we go about expanding a security alliance 
which, after all, is supposed to be about security. And this is the 
heart of our security threat. It is also the heart of Russia's security 
threat. I, like the Senator from Texas, believe they have a threat of 
missiles on their borders at some point.
  I believe that at some point we will find it conducive to them and to 
us to work together in this overall area of preventing the spread of 
missile technology and also defending against it where required and 
where necessary. So I agree with the Senator from Texas and again 
commend her for her leadership and her thoughts on this subject.


            The Future of NATO--Enlarging for a New Century

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senators Nunn and 
Hutchison and others in this important discussion on the future of NATO 
and NATO's role in maintaining U.S. national security in the next 
century. My colleague from Georgia has been a powerful driving force in 
the debate on the relevance of NATO. He takes second place to no one in 
his intellectual honesty and in his ability to examine this issue with 
depth and intelligence. I appreciate his seeking this time to engage 
the Senate in thoughtful discussion of this important issue and I thank 
him for asking me to take part.
  Like the Senator from Georgia and many others in this Chamber, I am 
deeply concerned about the role the United States will play in 
international affairs in the years ahead of us. Our involvement with 
NATO--more precisely, our leadership of NATO--has been a critical part 
of American involvement in global affairs since our victory in the cold 
war. There is an important role for NATO to continue to play for the 
stability and security of Europe and the United States and we must 
continue to be an active leader in this highly successful alliance of 
sovereign, democratic states.
  As all of us know too well, during this century the United States 
fought two world wars in Europe. We recognized that a free and stable 
Europe is vital to America's own national security. Our victory in 
those wars was attributable to the courage and ability of our Armed 
Forces, the support of the American people, and the willingness of the 
United States to form alliances with other nations when it was mutually 
beneficial.
  At the end of the Second World War, we developed a strong alliance of 
free nations to ensure that America and Western Europe would remain 
safe and free. That alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--
NATO--successfully deterred Soviet Communist expansionism which 
threatened the security of the United States and our European allies 
for four decades. NATO has been the most successful defensive alliance 
the world has ever seen. By maintaining the military and economic 
strength, and political will of its members, NATO deterred war and, in 
fact, never had to fire a shot against any of the states it had been 
formed to defend against.
  Now the cold war is history. People in most of central and Eastern 
Europe have made bold and significant steps toward democracy. They have 
elected governments which share our beliefs in freedom, human rights, 
and the power of free markets.
  There are some in America and abroad who argue that NATO is no longer 
necessary because the cold war has been won. But in my view those who 
advocate the abandonment of NATO are wrong. NATO is not an anachronism. 
The fundamental purpose of NATO--uniting like-minded, free, democratic 
nations in common self-defense to deter attacks and prevent war--
remains as valid and worthy a purpose today as it was in 1949. It is 
important to do all that is necessary to ensure that NATO can continue 
to fulfill this role. That does not mean, however, that the NATO of 
2001 should be or even can be identical to the NATO of 1949 or 1995.
  NATO must adapt to new political geography and continue to contribute 
to the development of an integrated, free Europe.
  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and defense thinkers have 
conducted a number of studies on the future of NATO. In 1994 the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] published a report by 
its Senior NATO Policy Group, upon which I was privileged to serve 
along with Senators Nunn, Cohen, and McCain. Earlier this year, the 
Council on Foreign Relations published the report of an independent 
task force chaired by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown entitled 
``Should NATO Expand?'' This year Secretary of Defense Perry provided 
his views on NATO expansion in a March 10 report to Congress. Each of 
these studies has moved forward the debate on NATO enlargement and new 
roles for NATO.
  Now the alliance itself has issued a major report on the question in 
its September 1995 ``Study on NATO Enlargement.'' This most recent 
study by the 16 member states of NATO sets out the purposes and 
principles of enlargement and establishes a process under which NATO 
will consider admitting new members on a case-by-case basis. It does 
not establish a specific timetable for the admission of new members, 
prioritize candidates for membership, or develop precise criteria which 
must be met in order to gain membership. It does, however, convey a 
number of important messages.
  First, new members of NATO will need to accede to the Washington 
Treaty. No state may enjoy the rights and benefits of NATO membership 
without also assuming the obligations of membership.
  Second, negotiations on admission of new members will consider both 
the candidate state's potential contributions to collective defense as 
well as broader political and security criteria.
  Third, expansion of NATO, if it occurs, is intended to strengthen 
relations with Russia through increased European stability and 
security. While Russian sensitivities and security requirements must 
and will be considered, no country outside the alliance will have a 
veto over NATO enlargement.
  Needless to say, a document such as this study which reflects 
consensus of 16 nations is unlikely to fully satisfy everyone. Because 
I have spoken often on the need for NATO to expand its membership 
sooner rather than later, I would have preferred to see in this study a 
statement of clear criteria for inviting new members to join the 
alliance. Unfortunately, in my view, many of these central issues have 
been left to the negotiations between NATO and each prospective new 
member.
  I have read with great interest and attention the analysis of my 
friend from Georgia, Senator Nunn, on the question of NATO expansion. 
The questions he poses are good ones which need to be considered as we 
and NATO decide how to proceed. Senator Nunn continues to make 
invaluable contributions to the debate on these critical issues which 
affect our national security and I hope that he will continue to speak 
out and to help focus our attention on them.
  Last week, the Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] and I had the 
opportunity to meet with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes and the 
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter. In the course of a wide-ranging 
discussion, we spoke of the importance of American leadership in NATO 
and the question of NATO enlargement.
  In that regard, I would like to make a few observations.
  First, NATO always has been and must continue to be an alliance which 
is both military and political. It will not just be the number of 
troops which NATO nations can mass which will keep Europe and the 
United States secure in the decades ahead as it was not just numbers 
which kept Europe secure during the cold war. Rather, it is the degree 
of political solidarity and agreement on fundamental principles of 
democracy, human rights, and the necessity for free markets which will 
keep 

[[Page S 14850]]
the alliance viable and provide security for its members. Candidates 
for membership must demonstrate the same commitment to these democratic 
principles as current members. There can be no exceptions granted with 
regard to belief in and enforcement of human rights, the exercise of 
freedoms by citizens, the transparency of defense budgets, real 
civilian control of the military and intelligence arms of the 
government, and adherence to the principles of peaceful resolution of 
disputes within and beyond a state's borders.
  Second, membership in the alliance carries with it obligations and 
benefits. No candidate can be accepted just because it wants the fruits 
of membership; each state must be able to contribute something to the 
alliance. This will be a difficult issue to resolve for the new 
democracies are constrained by their defense budgets and economic 
difficulties. NATO must be realistic, but at the same time creative, in 
determining what capabilities NATO requires and how new members can 
contribute to them.
  Third, membership in NATO is not a zero-sum game. The new democracies 
of central and Eastern Europe are not competing with each for some 
predefined number of spaces being allocated for expansion. No one knows 
today whether the right number for the composition of NATO is 16, as it 
is today, or 18 or 20 or more. Candidates must be evaluated on the 
basis of the political and military norms which members must 
demonstrate on an absolute--not comparative--basis. It should not 
matter if one candidate country is less able to contribute than another 
candidate country. If the required standards are met, both should be 
admitted.
  Fourth, participation in the Partnership for Peace is an important 
transitional step for candidate countries though it need not be a 
mandatory one if a candidate can demonstrate it meets the requirements 
of membership without it. I personally find it hard to believe that a 
country which chooses not to take part in the Partnership for Peace 
would or should be an early candidate for membership. If new members 
are to be full participants in all aspects of the alliance upon 
ratification of their membership, they should want to start exercising 
with NATO, determining what they need to achieve full integration, and 
exposing their own leaders--both military and civilian--to NATO 
procedures and thinking.
  Fifth, contrary to the assertions of nationalist forces within 
Russia, NATO expansion is not and should not be construed as a threat 
to Russia. I fully agree with the conclusions of the recent NATO study 
that no state outside of NATO should have a veto over the accession of 
new members to the alliance. These are decisions which the independent 
members of the alliance themselves must make. Nor do I believe that 
decisions on membership should be based solely on threat 
considerations. NATO should expand to meet the requirements for 
security and stability in Europe well into the next century. Russian 
conduct today cannot be used as a criterion by itself to determine 
whether there is a need to expand the alliance's membership. To do so, 
in fact gives Russia a de facto veto over what the alliance does in the 
near-term and long-term. We must all do everything we can to assure the 
leaders and people of Russia that NATO expansion is not just a shifting 
of cold war confrontation lines to the east. At the same time we need 
to make decisions which are right for our security and that of our 
European allies today and into the next century.
  Finally, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are a founding 
member of NATO not just because we wanted to help our friends in 
Western Europe, but because it was in our national interest. I believe 
that this is as true today as it was in 1949. NATO expansion is 
something we should do because it is in our interest and the interest 
of security and stability in Europe. It is not a gift which we offer up 
to former Communist States or a reward for beginning the movement to 
full democracy.
  There is no doubt in my mind that it is in our interest to find ways 
to encourage and support the transitions to democracy which are taking 
place today in Europe. Expanding NATO membership is one way to do this. 
It should not, however, be done in isolation. Nor should it be done 
solely because of what is or is not going on within Russia. We have no 
desire to confront Russia along a new wall of tension and 
confrontation. All of us--Americans, Russians, current members of NATO, 
and prospective members--must continue to work together to find ways to 
cooperate and make the world a safer and more prosperous place for us 
all.
  I hope that this discussion, which Senators Nunn and Hutchison have 
organized, will help set a positive tone for the policy debates which 
lie ahead on this important issue.
  Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, could I inquire from the Senator from 
Louisiana if he wishes to speak on this subject or did he want to 
change subjects?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. I did want to speak on this subject.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I will be happy to yield.
  Let me say, before the Senator from Georgia leaves, that I think that 
his last point was a very important one. That is, in the future as we 
look at the ABM Treaty and the missile defense technologies, I think 
that the strategic interests of the United States will probably be 
parallel with the interests of Russia because both of us will want to 
look for other ways to defend our own shores from potential ballistic 
missile attack. That is something that I think the Russians will be in 
agreement with the United States on, and I certainly hope that we can 
pursue our mutual defenses as we keep the ABM Treaty able to change 
with the times. It is no longer a bipolar world but, in fact, a 
multipolar world. So we will want to make sure that the ABM Treaty can 
last by letting it change with the times.
  Well, I want to certainly yield some time to the Senator from 
Louisiana.
  I also do want to mention that Senator Cohen from Maine was going to 
be with us today to add to this discussion. And a very sad thing 
happened. He lost his father just over the weekend, so he was not able 
to come. And our thoughts and prayers are certainly with Senator Cohen 
at this time. And we look forward to having a debate with him included 
because he is a thoughtful person who has traveled through these 
countries as well and I think will add greatly to the debate.

  I yield now to the Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I notice that the time is due to expire 
momentarily.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to extend the 
time for morning business for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                    POLICY OF CONTAINMENT IS MADNESS

  Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the occupant of the chair.
  Mr. President, over the Memorial Day recess, I had the opportunity, 
along with the Senator from Georgia and other Members of the Senate and 
of the House, to go to a conference sponsored by the Carnegie Institute 
for Peace in Madrid. It was a joint conference between us and Members 
of the Russian Duma. Those Members had been selected on a broad 
philosophical spectrum properly and as fully representative of the Duma 
as we could get. There were those who were the nationalists, there were 
those who were the Democrats, there were those representing every 
spectrum of the Duma.
  We thought we were going to discuss a whole range of issues, but the 
theme that came back over and over and over again was the threat that 
all of these Members of the Duma feel from making the bordering 
countries around them of Eastern Europe members of NATO subject to the 
nuclear shield of the United States.
  It is an obsession with those Members of the Duma, and as we 
discussed it with them, it struck me, first of all, that what possible 
interest is there of the United States to so threaten Russia that all 
of the ongoing things we have with respect to nuclear proliferation, 
with respect to the dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear weapons to 
threaten that ongoing process?
  I think it is one of those policies, I do not know how conceived, but 
we really ought to rethink that and rethink it immediately.
  A number of things occurred to me as we were at that conference in 
Madrid. 

[[Page S 14851]]
As I say, first was the overwhelming universal feeling of all parts, 
all of the philosophical spectrum in Russia opposing this, not only 
opposing it but emotionally opposing it, feeling threatened by it.
  Second, Mr. President, I was struck by what you might call the 
political immaturity, the fact that the political personality of Russia 
has not yet matured. Their national psyche is still in the formative 
process. Their emotional involvement in this new democratic 
experiment--it was just overwhelming to see the emotion of these 
Members of the Duma. At this critical time, at this time in a formative 
process for Russia, for us to come along, rather than portray ourselves 
as their friend, their ally, their helper, someone who is interested in 
seeing the country move forward, to come along, in effect, with a new 
policy of containment to me, Mr. President, is absolute madness.
  It seems to me that we ought to find some way to have cooperation 
with these new Eastern European democracies to make them feel part of 
our political family without having them be part of our nuclear 
umbrella, particularly when that umbrella is surrounding the former 
Soviet Union, containing the former Soviet Union, and threatening the 
former Soviet Union.

                          ____________________