Congressional Record, Volume 141 Issue 156 (Tuesday, October 10, 1995)

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 156 (Tuesday, October 10, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14843-S14851]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATO EXPANSION

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Senator Nunn's plane is late, so I am
going to start this dialog. Senator Nunn and I and other Democrats and
Republicans have been talking about NATO expansion. We are very
concerned that the debate needs to take place, that Americans need to
understand what is important, what the questions should be, and what
should be the criteria for the expansion of NATO.
After all, all of us understand that NATO is a mutual defense pact.
And if we expand NATO, we must ask for and receive from the entering
nation defense assurances, and we must also give those same defense
assurances. Therefore, we are talking about American troops and
American tax dollars, just as all of our NATO allies will be looking at
the obligations they must accept.
All of us must realize how very important and crucial this decision
is going to be. The expansion of NATO is a strategic decision that must
not be made in haste and must not be made before we answer the crucial
questions.
So Senator Nunn and I are taking this hour, along with others of our
colleagues, to talk about it. Let us raise some of the questions that
we think need to be answered, and let us look at potential
alternatives, as well as the actual expansion of NATO, and the
timetable that we might look at if we decide to make that decision.
The political map of Europe has changed dramatically since the
toppling of the Berlin Wall. Just as these changes were a direct result
of half a century of American leadership and NATO resolve, so, too,
does the future of peace and stability in Europe depend on a strong and
enduring NATO.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new
governments, along with old ethnic and border disputes in Eastern
Europe, a new set of challenges confronts the North Atlantic alliance.
A NATO study just released last week takes a decidedly positive
stance toward the possibility of expanding NATO membership. The NATO
study is specific in that it asserts that new NATO members will have
the same benefits and obligations of all the other members of the
alliance.
The study also anticipates no change in NATO nuclear policy or in the
forward basing of NATO ground forces. These points are important, as
far as they go. However, there are a number of very serious issues
raised by the issue of NATO enlargement, and these questions need to be
analyzed thoroughly before the United States and our NATO allies commit
ourselves to this course of action.
First, although the NATO study talks about expansion leading to
increased stability and security, it is largely silent on the real why
of NATO enlargement. The real why is the deep concern in Eastern Europe
and the Baltic countries about a future threat from Russia and the
West's stake in responding to this potential threat.
Second, the study does not address the Russian reaction to NATO
expansion. It notes that Russia has raised concerns which NATO is
attempting to address, but the fact is that eastward NATO expansion in
the near future is almost certain to prompt opponents of democracy and
economic reform in Russia to new heights of paranoia and provocative
nationalism. It could weaken the prodemocracy and proreform elements of
the Russian polity that we should be striving to support. Rather than
strengthening stability and security in Eastern Europe, repercussions
in Russia from rapid NATO expansion could undermine our most important
national security goal.
Third, full NATO membership for the nations of Eastern Europe has the
potential to draw the United States and our NATO allies into regional
border and ethnic disputes in which we have no demonstrable national
security interest.
Many Americans and many of us in Congress have serious reservations
about President Clinton's proposal to commit United States troops to a
peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia. This is an issue we will
debate here at a later date. But disagreements about the wisdom of this
commitment within this body across our Nation and within NATO are
directly relevant to NATO expansion.
Is it in America's interest to enter into treaty obligations that
could end up committing American military and political power to
current and future regional border and ethnic disputes in Eastern
Europe and the Balkans?
When President Clinton argues that we must put troops on the ground
in Bosnia in order to keep faith with our NATO allies and our
leadership within the alliance, it illustrates perfectly the very real
risks of rapid NATO expansion. Before the United States and our NATO
allies take this step to guarantee mutual defense, we must acknowledge
that the potential for civil war and border and ethnic strife in
Eastern Europe is high. After years of vacillation and debate about
what America should do about Bosnia, we must also acknowledge that
there has not been a clear policy. To embark on NATO expansion without
resolving this crucial question could be disastrous.
Potential flash points in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are easy to
identify. Current and potential NATO members are directly involved in
every one of them: Serbian opposition to Kosovo's aspirations to
independence; Greek opposition to Macedonian independence; longstanding
border disputes between Poland and Ukraine; unresolved problems
stemming from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
If we move ahead rapidly with NATO expansion and the full mutual
defense and security commitments that such membership implies, would
that set the stage for direct American military involvement in such
disputes as we have been drawn into in the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia? That is a very important question that we must answer
before we take such a giant step.
Mr. President, there are alternatives to rapid NATO expansion,
alternatives

[[Page S 14844]]
which would establish a rational progression to eventual NATO
membership and which would provide real encouragement and support to
the nations we want to help.
The economic and political integration of all the nations of Eastern
Europe is the best way to ensure long-range stability and a rational
progression to expanded NATO membership. For instance, any country
eligible for European Union membership should be considered for NATO
membership. So you start with European Union membership requirements
and the economic and trade alliances that would provide stability, and
then you take the next step to NATO membership.
Expanding trade and strengthening free market capitalism in the newly
emergent nations of Eastern Europe would establish a strong foundation
for peace and stability based on mutual interests.
In parallel fashion, resolution of regional and internal disputes
should be a precondition for eligibility for NATO membership.
The Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe should be used to help bring about permanent
solutions to ethnic and other disputes involving European countries and
the Eastern European countries anxious to join NATO. It will also
strengthen the democracies in those countries. This would maximize
security and stability within Eastern Europe and underscore that
expansion is not aimed at Russia.
I believe American and NATO leadership and influence should be
directed at setting up a means for arbitrating these disputes to bring
an end to the existing conflicts and to head off future situations that
could be caused by these disputes. No Nation should be considered for
NATO membership unless it has committed itself for the present and the
future to accept peaceful resolution of local and regional conflicts.
One approach would be to create a forum for arbitration, comprised of
peers acceptable to all parties to the conflict. To be considered for
NATO membership, all countries would agree to binding arbitration of
border and ethnic disputes. This might be part of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Partnership for Peace. But
let us put that idea on the table. If the American labor negotiation
concept is binding arbitration, if the parties agree to the peers that
would be the judges, would this not be a way to stop the ethnic and
border conflict before they erupt into the tragedy that we have seen in
the former Yugoslavia?

Rather than pell-mell rushing into NATO membership, the implications
of which are fraught with dangers and complications, the United States
and its Eastern European allies and our Western European allies should
initiate a series of coordinated efforts to strengthen new democracies
and build a stronger economy and bind the nations of Europe to a set of
rules that would ensure peace and stability for decades to come.
The NATO allies should also make their position clear, with respect
to the overarching goal of NATO membership, the possibility of future
Russian aggression. Ironically, those countries with the most valid
concerns in this regard--the Balkan nations and the Ukraine--are,
because of their proximity to Russia, the least likely to gain NATO
membership in the short run. The people of these countries are unlikely
to feel more secure if NATO expands eastward but stops short of their
borders, in effect, placing them in a buffer zone between an enlarged
NATO and a more paranoid Russia. The NATO allies should ensure that all
parties understand that accelerated and, if necessary, immediate
enlargement of NATO would depend directly upon Russian behavior. And in
this way we would provide a basis for accelerated NATO expansion in
response to a real threat, but we would avoid provoking the very threat
we are trying to guard against.
The key criterion would remain as outlined in the NATO study recently
released, Enhancement of Europe's Security and Stability. This twofold
strategy for the post-cold-war Europe would provide the affected
nations with what they need most, a foundation to build greater
prosperity and stability and a NATO security commitment against the
possibility of future Russian aggression. This straightforward approach
is also important for our citizens and those in other NATO countries
who will have to pay the bills and make the sacrifices required by
expanding eastward NATO's security commitments.
We, in America, cannot assess public opinion in other countries, of
course. But when NATO expansion and the debate that will follow focuses
on the issues of NATO nuclear policy, NATO troop deployment, NATO
infrastructure development, and former NATO commitments, played against
the background of repercussions in Russia and priorities for our fewer
defense dollars in the United States, we must first understand public
opinion in our country, and we and our allies must undertake our
primary goal, to maintain the underlying strength of NATO.
NATO has the total support of the American people. As we move forward
to an expanding cooperation and mutual defense, we must maintain that
American support of NATO. All of the issues that I have raised must be
considered before we expand, so that once the commitment is made, we
can be assured that we have the absolute will and determination to keep
our commitment. The American people must fully understand and support
the role of the United States for that goal to be achieved.
Mr. President, as I said when I started, Senator Nunn and I and many
of our colleagues have traveled throughout the new Eastern European
democracies. We have gone to Russia, as members of the Armed Services
Committee. We have met with members of the Russian Duma. We want to
take the steps that are right, and we want to take them at the right
time. That is why Senator Nunn and I and others of our colleagues
wanted to take this time today to start the debate, to start the
thinking process, to make sure that we have thought of every
eventuality and that the American people understand what is important,
what questions must be asked, and what the criteria are for expanded
NATO membership.
Mr. President, Senator Nunn has arrived. As I said, his plane was
late, but he has now arrived. I want to take this opportunity before I
turn the floor over to the senior Senator from Georgia to say that I,
like so many of my colleagues, watched him yesterday announce that he
would not seek a fifth term to the U.S. Senate. He said he needs time
to read, write, and think. Mr. President, all of us understand in this
body how very important the time to think and to write is to a good
public debate and a solid public policy. I just want to say that I
think Senator Nunn has provided that thoughtful public policy
leadership in his four terms in the Senate, as chairman and now ranking
member of the Armed Services Committee, on which I have been very
fortunate to sit.
I have worked with Senator Nunn and have come to respect him greatly
for the thought that he gives to public policy and for the leadership
that he has given for our country. He and I agree in almost every
respect about the need for a strong national defense, the need for us
to think to the future, and I feel that by taking this time out, he is
going to continue to provide even greater leadership for what we must
do for the future to make sure that our country remains strong
militarily.
I will end by just saying that I think the best of all things that
can be said about the Senator is that he had the instinct to know when
it was time for him to go and the judgment to do it while people still
hoped that he would stay.
Mr. President, I thank you and I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague and friend from
Texas on two points. One is her very kind comments about my difficult
decision which has now been made. I appreciate very much her
thoughtfulness and her comments. I appreciate her friendship, and
serving with her on the Armed Services Committee has been a great
pleasure.
I also commend her for her substantive remarks on the question of
NATO expansion. I will have more to say about that in a few minutes as
we proceed to discuss that very important issue. But I know that the
Senator from Kansas has been on the floor. I

[[Page S 14845]]
would much prefer to hear her address the subject. She has another bill
to manage. I will listen to her attentively, and then I will make some
comments on the substantive issue myself.
I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from Texas for her kind
remarks.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I was just here to fill in for the
Senator from Georgia until he got to the floor. I just have a few very
brief remarks to make.
First, I want to say that I am very appreciative of Senator Hutchison
and Senator Nunn for organizing this debate--a beginning debate,
perhaps--on a very important subject. I think it is essential for us to
begin to think about the consequences of the expansion of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and what that may mean.
I would also like to say that the announcement of the Senator from
Georgia yesterday was one which I think all of us felt great
disappointment with, but also thoughtful understanding. Senator Nunn
has brought to the U.S. Senate, and to the United States, sincerity,
integrity, and a depth of knowledge in a debate of the public policy
issues before us in this country through the four terms he has served
that will be remembered far into the future. And his legacy will be one
that will be an inspiration to all who wish to follow in public
service. So I join with all on both sides of the aisle who will greatly
miss his presence in the U.S. Senate.
Mr. President, I would like to join for a few minutes in this
discussion on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its future.
This debate has been ongoing for years in Europe among foreign policy
experts, and in the administration. But in Congress, which would have
to approve any changes in the North Atlantic Treaty to accommodate new
members, it is long overdue. I enter this debate as a strong supporter
of NATO and a firm believer it must remain the foundation of the
security architecture in Europe, just as the Senator from Texas pointed
out in her excellent statement. Supporters of the NATO expansion have
said for some time the issue is not, why and how, but rather who and
when? In my mind, we have gotten ahead of ourselves. The issue, I
believe, remains very much why and how. I believe the first order of
business must be to clearly define in our own minds, and with our
allies, what we want NATO to do in Europe's new security environment.
The Soviet Union is gone and with it the clear threat that held NATO
together. We know we still need a security structure in Europe and that
America should be a part of that structure. But we have not in my mind
made clear the new purpose for that structure. It seems to me difficult
to construct a security system and to make significant decisions such
as whom to include, and by implication whom to exclude, without a
clear, shared purpose to pursue. The dangers of fuzzy purpose have been
made clear in Bosnia. For years, NATO hesitated, the allies could not
agree, we did not act, and, in my view, the alliance has been weakened
as a result. While NATO now seems to have found its footing in the
Bosnia conflict, I suggest Bosnia has shown our first order of business
must be to find anew our shared purpose for America's involvement in
Europe. Only then can we properly consider what security structure will
best serve that purpose.
Let me make clear that I am not arguing against changes in NATO. It
is a cold war institution that must adapt to new realities. But I am
not yet prepared to say that change necessarily equates with expansion.
Perhaps President Clinton put it best in his speech at Freedom House
last week when he called for NATO's modernization. It seems to me this
broader question about how NATO should be updated to fit our new needs,
not a predetermined notion that expansion is both desirable and
inevitable, should be the debate we now take up. As this debate
continues and reaches the Congress, we will face many questions. Are
the American people prepared to pledge, in the words of the North
Atlantic Treaty, that an armed attack against one or more of these
potential new members will be considered an attack against all? That, I
think, is a question we should keep first and foremost in our minds.
It is easy to say how important this expansion will be. It is
important to the future of the organization. But when it comes right
down to it, are we prepared to do what is asked for in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter as it stands? I do not know the
answer to that. But I do know that it is the basic issue we are
debating. Those who support this expansion have a heavy burden to make
their case.
I look forward to the comments of Senator Nunn. I think the debate is
called for by Mrs. Hutchison in her role on the Armed Services
Committee and her important role as a Senator from Texas, where there
are a number of military installations. Kansas has military
installations also. Fort Riley is always very involved in forward
deployment to Germany. And certainly the same for the senior Senator
from Georgia [Mr. Nunn]. These are issues of grave importance to all of
us, and I think, as we can begin to reason together, it will be useful
in this dialog.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Kansas, Senator
Kassebaum, for her kind remarks about my service in the U.S. Senate. I
am not here today to precipitate that discussion. We probably had
enough retirement announcements around this institution for 1 year.
That is not my purpose in taking the floor today, but I do thank her
for her remarks.
I also agree with her words of caution on NATO expansion. We have a
lot of thinking to do. We have a lot of debating to do. We have a lot
of discussion to conduct, to make the right kind of decision, both for
the alliance itself and for the stability of Europe.
I thank my friend from Texas, again, for organizing this discussion
this morning. I think it is going to be very fruitful in precipitating
other people to think and also speak on the subject. I talked to enough
Senators on both sides of the aisle to know there are a number of
people who are concerned, deeply concerned, and who have a lot of
thoughts and a lot of questions about this matter. I think we will be
hearing from them in the days and weeks ahead. So I thank both of my
colleagues for their remarks.
I say to the Senator from Kansas, she has been a very fine leader. We
have relied on her for so long in the field of foreign policy as well
as many other fields, and I have such deep admiration for her and her
leadership, and I am grateful to her for that.
Mr. President, the issue of NATO expansion deserves thorough and
careful consideration because it has important ramifications for the
future of NATO, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for
the future of Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet
Union, and for the future security order throughout Europe, East and
West.
President Clinton has declared, and NATO has concurred, the
organization's enlargement is not an issue of whether but of when and
how. I, like the Senator from Kansas, believe the when and how need to
be discussed more thoroughly.
On September 28 of this year, NATO released a study on the why and
how of enlargement. It reserves for future decisions the question of
who and when. On the positive side, the study declares that NATO
enlargement will be gradual, deliberate, and transparent. It presents
no fixed set of criteria for membership but specifies that enlargement
will be decided on a case-by-case basis, with the key judgments being
whether a given country's admission will contribute to Europe's
stability and security.
It states that new members will have the same benefits and
obligations as all other members and it anticipates no change in NATO
nuclear policy or in the forward basing of NATO ground forces.
On the less positive side, I believe three large gaps exist in the
study and give it an unrealistically optimistic tone. First, the study
provides no satisfactory answer to the key question of why, and merely
expresses what NATO hopes will be the outcome of expansion: increased
stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. All of us hope for that,
but that does not really get down to the essential reasons of how and
why expansion will lead to that result.

[[Page S 14846]]

Second, it glosses over the increasingly negative Russian reaction to
NATO expansion.
Third, it asserts that enlargement is part of a broad security
architecture in Europe that transcends the idea of dividing lines in
Europe, yet it is silent about the fact that gradual enlargement will
create dividing lines between those countries admitted and those
countries that are not admitted.
NATO was established primarily to protect the Western democracies
from an expansionist Soviet Union that, after World War II, seemed
determined to spread its influence through subversion, through
political intimidation, and through the threat of the use of military
force. With the end of the cold war, we have witnessed a heart
pounding, terrain altering set of earthquakes centered in the former
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. These seismic events have ended an
international era. The European security environment has changed. We
have moved from a world of high risk but also high stability, because
of the danger of escalation and the balance of terror on both sides, to
a world of much lower risk but much lower stability. We are all aware
of the dramatic change in the threat environment in Europe resulting
from these seismic changes.
The immediate danger is posed by violent terrorist groups, by
isolated rogue states, by ethnic, religious and other types of
subnational passions that can flare into vicious armed conflict, as we
have seen too well and too thoroughly in the Bosnian conflict.
The lethality of any and all of these threats can be greatly
magnified by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, as well as by the spread of destabilizing conventional
weapons.
At the same time, Russia currently possesses at least 20,000 nuclear
weapons--in fact over 20,000--at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons,
advanced biological warfare capability, hundreds of tons of fissile
material, huge stores of conventional weapons, plus literally thousands
of scientists and technicians skilled in manufacturing weapons of mass
destruction.
Mr. President, this is the first time in history that an empire has
disintegrated while possessing such enormous destructive capabilities.
Even if these capabilities are greatly reduced, the know-how, the
production capability, and the dangers of proliferation will endure for
many years. Even if we do our very best job, this is going to be our
No. 1 security threat for America, for NATO, and for the world in terms
of decades; not simply a few years.
As we contemplate NATO enlargement, I believe that we must carefully
measure NATO enlargement's effect on this proliferation security
problem, which is our No. 1 security problem.
Threats cannot be cleanly delinked, resulting in one section on
proliferation and another section on NATO enlargement as if there is no
connectivity. Those two subjects are intimately related. And in the
longer term, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a resurgent and
threatening Russia. Russia not only has inherited the still dangerous
remnants of the Soviet war machine, but in its current weakened
condition Russia contains potential resources by virtue of its size and
strategic location. Russia exerts considerable weight in Europe, Asia,
and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia has inherited the former Soviet
Union's veto power in the U.N. Security Council, and, therefore, has a
major voice in multilateral decisionmaking.
Mr. President, Russia will be a major factor, for better or for
worse, across the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats that
face us over the next years ahead. Russia can fuel regional conflicts
with high-technology conventional weapons along with other political
and material support, or, on the other hand, Russia can cooperate with
us in diffusing such conflicts, particularly by preventing the spread
of Russian weaponry to irresponsible hands. Russia can emerge as a
militarily aggressive power. That is certainly possible. Or Russia can
assist the United States and the Western World and the free world in
averting new rivalry among major powers that poison the international
security environment. Russia can pursue a confrontational course that
undermines the security and cooperation in Europe, or Russia can work
with us to broaden and strengthen the emerging system of multilateral
security in Europe.
Mr. President, no one knows the answer to any of these questions at
this juncture. Russia itself does not know the answer because it is in
a period of economic stress, and political challenge and turmoil.
Mr. President, out of this background come five fundamental points.
First, preventing or curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is the most important and the most difficult security
challenge we face. And that is particularly true when you have a very
large growth of organized crime, international organized crime, and
terrorism in our own country and around the world.
Second, Russia is a vast reservoir of weaponry, weapons material, and
weapons know-how. Thousands of people in Russia and throughout the
former Soviet Union have the knowledge, the access, and the strong
economic incentives to engage in weapons traffic.
Mr. President, there are literally thousands of scientists in Russia
that know how to make weapons of mass destruction, that know how to
make high-technology weapons that can shoot down aircraft in the air
including passenger liners, that know how to make missile technology to
deliver these weapons of mass destruction across borders, and even
across continents. They have this knowledge. But several thousand of
them at least do not know where their next paycheck is coming from.
They do not know how they are going to feed their families, and they
are in great demand around the world from both terrorist organizations
and from rogue Third World countries.
The third conclusion is that increased Russian isolation, paranoia,
or instability would make our No. 1 security challenge more difficult
and more dangerous.
The fourth conclusion: Although the West cannot control events in
Russia, and probably can assist political and economic reform there
only on the margins, as the medical doctors say, our first principle
should be to do no harm.
Fifth, we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that
we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important security
priorities.
Mr. President, it is against this background that I offer a few
observations on the current approach to NATO enlargement.
NATO was founded on a fundamental truth: The vital interests of the
countries of NATO were put at risk by the military power and political
intimidation of the Soviet Union. As President Harry Truman said in his
memoirs, ``The [NATO] pact was a shield against aggression and against
the fear of aggression.'' Because NATO was built on this fundamental
truth, and because we discussed it openly and faced it truthfully with
our people, the NATO alliance endured and prevailed. There was no
misunderstanding about why we were forming NATO when we did it. Today,
we seem to be saying different things to different people on the
subject of NATO enlargement.
To the Partnership for Peace countries, we are saying that you are
all theoretically eligible, and, if you meet NATO's entrance criteria,
you will move to the top of the list. To the Russians we are also
saying that NATO enlargement is not threat-based, and it is not aimed
at you. In fact, we say to Russia you, too, can eventually became a
member of NATO.
This raises a serious question. Are we really going to be able to
convince the East Europeans that we are protecting them from their
historical threats--that usually boils down to Russia--while we
convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with
Russia as a potential military threat?
Are we really going to be able to convince the Ukraine and the Baltic
countries that they are somehow more secure when NATO expands eastward
but draws protective lines short of their borders and places them in
what Russians are bound to perceive as the buffer zone? Is that going
to make them feel more secure?
In short, Mr. President, are we trying to bridge the unbridgeable, to
explain the unexplainable? Are we deluding others, or are we deluding
ourselves?

[[Page S 14847]]

The advantages of NATO's current course toward enlargement cannot be
ignored, and I do not ignore that. If NATO expands in the near term to
take in the Visegrad countries, these countries would gain in self-
confidence and stability. It is possible that border disputes and major
ethnic conflicts would be settled before entry--for instance, the
dispute involving the Hungarian minority in Romania.
What these countries really want and what they really need is the
ability to have trade and economic relations with the European
Community and the rest of the world. They really need markets now--not
military protection. Their threat is economic at this moment, and
probably for the few years to come. No one can conceive of an invasion
by Russia in the near term. The question is in the long term. That is
another matter. But in the near term, economic trade and entry into the
European Community is what they need most of all to stabilize their
democratic efforts and their economy.
Serious disadvantages must also be thought through carefully. If
NATO's enlargement stays on its current course, reaction in Russia is
almost inevitably going to be a sense of isolation by those that are
committed to democracy and democratic reform with varying degrees of
paranoia, nationalism, and demagoguery emerging from across the current
political spectrum. In next few years Russia will have neither the
resources nor the wherewithal to respond to any NATO enlargement with a
conventional military buildup. They simply do not have the resources to
do that, even if they choose to.
If, however, the more nationalist and more extreme political forces
gain the upper hand by election or otherwise, we are likely to see
other responses that are more achievable, and also even more dangerous
to European stability. For example, while Russia would take years to
mount a sustained military threat to Eastern Europe, it can within
weeks or months exert severe external and internal pressures on its
immediate neighbors to the west, including the Baltic countries, and
including the Ukraine. This could set in motion a dangerous action-
reaction cycle.

Moreover, because a conventional military response from Russia in
answer to NATO enlargement is not feasible economically, a nuclear
response in the form of a higher alert status for Russia's remaining
strategic nuclear weapons and conceivably renewed deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons is more likely.
I recall very well when the United States and our allies felt we were
overwhelmed with conventional forces by the former Soviet Union. How
did we respond? We responded by building up tactical nuclear forces. We
responded by deploying thousands of tactical nuclear forces because we
did not have the tanks, we did not have the artillery tubes to meet the
conventional challenge. Are we confident the Russians would be so
different from us if they truly have a nationalistic surge and end up
believing the NATO enlargement is a threat to them?
I am not confident that would not be their response as it was ours
years ago.
The security of NATO, Russia's neighbors and the countries of Eastern
Europe will not be enhanced if the Russian military finger moves closer
to the nuclear trigger.
Where do we go from here? I recognize full well it is much easier to
criticize than to construct, so let me make a few suggestions. I am not
opposed to NATO expansion per se, but I feel that we need to alter the
course of that expansion. I suggest a two-track approach to NATO
enlargement. The first track would be evolutionary and would depend on
political and economic developments within the European countries that
aspire to full NATO membership. When a country becomes eligible for
European Union membership, it will also be eligible to join the Western
European Union, and then it will be prepared for NATO membership,
subject, of course, to NATO's formal approval.
This is a natural process connecting economic and security interests.
We can honestly say to Russia, and particularly the democrats in Russia
who are struggling to be able to have a democracy in that country, this
process is economic in nature and is not aimed at you.
The second track would also be a clear track. It would be a threat-
based track. An accelerated and, if necessary, immediate expansion of
NATO would depend on Russian behavior. We should be candid with the
Russian leadership and the Russian people, above all be honest with the
Russian people by telling them, frankly, if you respect the sovereignty
of your neighbors, carry out your solemn arms control commitments and
other international obligations, and if you continue down the path of
democracy and economic reform, your neighbors will not view you as a
threat and neither will NATO. We will watch, however, and we will react
to aggressive moves against other sovereign states, to militarily
significant violations of your arms control and other legally binding
obligations pertinent to the security of Europe, and to the emergence
of a nondemocratic Russian Government that impedes fair elections,
suppresses domestic freedoms or institutes a foreign policy
incompatible with the existing European security system. These
developments would be threatening to the security of Europe and would
require a significant NATO response, including expansion eastward. We
would be enlarging NATO based on a real threat. We would not, however,
be helping to create the very threat we are trying to guard against.
And the Senator from Texas made this point very well a few minutes ago
in her remarks.
Mr. President, this would change the psychology of the NATO expansion
because the democrats in Russia would be able to say to their own
people: Our behavior, what we do with our military forces, what we do
with our tactical nuclear posture, what we do regarding human rights
and freedom of the press, what we do regarding our solemn arms control
obligations will have a bearing on whether NATO expands. If we do not
cause a threat, we in turn are not likely to be threatened.
That changes the psychology completely from where it is now where the
nationalists, any time you are in a meeting with Russian
parliamentarians--and I am sure the Senator from Kansas and the Senator
from Texas have experienced this--what you see is that when the
nationalists hear about NATO expansion, they start smiling and almost
clapping because it feeds right into what they want to convince their
people of, that is, they have to reconstitute not only the military but
the empire. On the other hand, when you talk about NATO expansion,
those parliamentarians that truly believe in democracy start wiping
their brow with their handkerchief because they know the kind of
problems it is going to cause them politically in their own country.
Finally, Mr. President, Partnership for Peace, I believe, is a sound
framework for this two-track approach. Its role would be to prepare
candidate countries and NATO itself for enlargement on either the
European track or the threat-based track. Programs of joint training
and exercises, development of a common operational doctrine and
establishment of the interoperational weaponry, technology and
communications would continue based on more realistic contingencies.
Tough issues such as nuclear policy and forward stationing of NATO
troops would be discussed in a threat-based environment, one which we
would hope would remain theoretical.
I know there are those in Europe and there are those here who say,
How can we handle this expansion of the European community? We have
complex matters like farm products. How do we handle farm products
coming in from Eastern Europe, or any other type product?
When you expand NATO, you are extending a nuclear umbrella over the
countries coming in. Are we to be told it is easier to say that if a
country is attacked, America is going to respond if necessary with
nuclear weapons, than it is to decide how many farm products come
across our border?
I do not buy the argument that economic expansion is more difficult
and more challenging than extending the nuclear umbrella.
As the Russian leaders and people make their important choices, they
should know that Russian behavior will be a key and relative factor for
NATO's future. This straightforward approach does not give them a veto.
I do not favor giving Russia a veto. But I do favor putting them on
notice that

[[Page S 14848]]
what they do themselves in creating threats to others may very well
determine what the others do in terms of enlarging NATO and enlarging
the security umbrella.
This straightforward approach is also important for our own citizens
here in this country who will have to pay the bills. They will have to
make the sacrifices required by expanded NATO security commitments.
Again, I am not against expanding NATO. I think there are countries
in Eastern Europe and Central Europe that will be eligible for NATO
membership, democracies that will qualify and be eventual members. I am
concerned about how we do it and how we go about explaining our logic.
It makes a big difference.
The profound historical contrast between post-World War I Germany and
post-World War II Germany should tell us that neocontainment of Russia
is not the answer at this critical historical juncture. If future
developments require the containment of Russia, it should be real
containment based on real threats.
I thank again my colleague from Texas for organizing this. I know
there are others who are not back in town who want to speak on this
subject, and I hope by her leadership and the discussions we have had
this morning we will precipitate debate on this subject. I know there
will be debate on both sides. There are other people, whom I respect
greatly, who have different views on this subject, but it is time for
us to start paying attention before we get down to the point of having
some agreement presented to the Senate for our ratification that we
have not studied, that we have not contemplated, but that has profound
implications.
I at this point again thank my colleague from Texas and yield the
floor.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a
moment, I should like to say I really appreciate, of course, his very
articulate view of this issue. He has given speeches on this subject.
As I said earlier, he and I have traveled with the Armed Services
Committee to Russia.
We have met with members of the Duma and we have also been to many of
the new emerging Eastern European democracies. And I think that it
would be very important for us to keep in mind the conflicts that we
see in many of those different countries versus what we hear from
members of the Duma. And I thought it was especially important that
Senator Nunn mentioned the reformers, and I would like him, if he
would, to comment on the upcoming elections and the impact that this
discussion could have on those upcoming elections.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, we have had some very
interesting meetings in both Russia and this country with our Russian
parliamentarian friends. And I believe that it is clear in those
meetings that the fear among reformers and democrats is that this
issue, which most of them do not realistically see as a threat to
Russia, but that this expansion of NATO will give the nationalists, the
extremists, the demagogues, those who want to restructure and rebuild
the empire and threaten their neighbors, will give them an argument to
be made for the Russian population that has been hearing that NATO is
an enemy for the last 40, 45 years.
So, it is the great concern of the reformers in Russia that I believe
we have to take into account. We will not be doing anyone in Europe a
favor if, by taking certain action regarding NATO expansion, we end up
giving an edge in the political process to the most extremist elements
in Russia.
This is not to say that we should give them a veto. They should have
no veto. NATO should make its own decisions. But Russian behavior and
economic reality in Europe also should play a very important role in
how we go about taking these important steps.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Along that same line, if the Senator would yield, I
think it is also important that we link Russian behavior to any
expansions of NATO and how those will come about so that there will be
an incentive on the part of Russia to make sure that they are
cooperating in the community of nations and that they understand that
it is only if we begin to see a buildup or some sort of aggressive
behavior that then we would come in in a very swift manner and look at
the expansion possibilities.
Mr. NUNN. I agree with the Senator from Texas on that. I think that
is the way we ought to structure it. I believe having the natural
approach of an economic admission to the European Community be one
path, one option which is a natural course and would lead inevitably to
NATO eligibility for those countries. That is one course.
But the other course ought to be very clear, the military-threat-
based course. But where we are now is between those courses. We are
saying that the European Community is not going to be able to expand
fast enough and saying there is no threat from Russia. And we are
saying that Russia can be a member of NATO at some point in time--and
that simply does not ring true to people who have observed this process
over a period of time from the European perspective, it does not ring
very true to those in the Ukraine who worry about Russian reaction and
know they will not be the first country, one of the first countries, to
be admitted, does not ring true to the Baltics where they know that
they can be subverted by Russia on a 48-hour basis. It would take years
for Russia to be able to muster the military power to invade Poland,
but to destabilize politically the Baltics would take a matter of days.
And that may very well be the pattern that could emerge if we are not
prudent in how we go about this situation.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. One other point that I think is important. The
Senator from Georgia was very instrumental in negotiating the language
that we put in our authorization bill regarding the missile defense
capabilities that the United States would have and how that relates to
the ABM Treaty that we have with Russia, and it also affects the START
Treaty, which is being looked at for ratification by the Duma, the
Russian Duma at this time.
I think those are very important issues, along with the nuclear
warheads that are still in Russia. All of those are issues that I think
must be looked at as we determine how our relationship with Russia and
the impact that NATO expansion and the way we do it has. As the Senator
from Georgia mentioned, there will be no Russian veto of NATO
expansion. But as we move along, we can certainly make this decision in
the right way that keeps our ability to negotiate with Russia on any
changes in the ABM Treaty, on ratification of the START Treaty, those
things that are very important to our security as well as their
security and the security of Eastern Europe.
So it is not just an easy decision that we make with regard to any
one country in Eastern Europe, as the Senator from Georgia fully
realizes, especially having been so involved in the negotiations on
what we will do in the future to protect our borders and our theaters
from potential ballistic missile attack.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Texas, I could not agree more with
her on what she said. The threat in Europe now is not Russian invasion
of one of the Visegrad countries. The threat is the huge proliferation
problem with nuclear materials being smuggled across the borders to
these countries, with Russian scientists under severe economic pressure
being in demand in various parts of the world. But, hopefully, we can
work together to prevent that. That is the threat.
The threat is terrorism, the threat is ethnic strife, the threat is
religious strife. It could change in 10 years. Ten years from now
Russia could reemerge as a real military threat to some of those
countries. We have to be prepared for that. We have to make sure we are
in a position to react to that. But now we have many mutual interests,
and not just with Russians, but with the East Europeans and others, in
proliferation and working together against organized crime, which is
one of the biggest challenges Russia has right now, their organized
criminal activity which is devastating to confidence for investment,
economic kinds of commitments by business people from all over the
world.
So we have so many mutual interests with Russia. We are also going to
have many differences with Russia. They do not have the same interests
we have in many parts of the world. They have historically had
different interests. But we have got to build the common bridges. And
even when we have a disagreement, we have to continue to

[[Page S 14849]]
work at this proliferation problem because we do not want to wake up in
3 years or 5 years and find that the kind of people who just derailed
Amtrak, if that was a terrorist group, the kind of people that blew up
the Federal building in Oklahoma, or the kind of people who carried out
a chemical attack in Tokyo, we do not want to wake up and find those
people possess awesome weapons of mass destruction. Only by working
with the elements in Russia who are willing to work on this are we
going to be able to prevent this from happening. It will be difficult
at best.
So I think this factor has to be very much considered in our overall
deliberations about how we go about expanding a security alliance
which, after all, is supposed to be about security. And this is the
heart of our security threat. It is also the heart of Russia's security
threat. I, like the Senator from Texas, believe they have a threat of
missiles on their borders at some point.
I believe that at some point we will find it conducive to them and to
us to work together in this overall area of preventing the spread of
missile technology and also defending against it where required and
where necessary. So I agree with the Senator from Texas and again
commend her for her leadership and her thoughts on this subject.

The Future of NATO--Enlarging for a New Century

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senators Nunn and
Hutchison and others in this important discussion on the future of NATO
and NATO's role in maintaining U.S. national security in the next
century. My colleague from Georgia has been a powerful driving force in
the debate on the relevance of NATO. He takes second place to no one in
his intellectual honesty and in his ability to examine this issue with
depth and intelligence. I appreciate his seeking this time to engage
the Senate in thoughtful discussion of this important issue and I thank
him for asking me to take part.
Like the Senator from Georgia and many others in this Chamber, I am
deeply concerned about the role the United States will play in
international affairs in the years ahead of us. Our involvement with
NATO--more precisely, our leadership of NATO--has been a critical part
of American involvement in global affairs since our victory in the cold
war. There is an important role for NATO to continue to play for the
stability and security of Europe and the United States and we must
continue to be an active leader in this highly successful alliance of
sovereign, democratic states.
As all of us know too well, during this century the United States
fought two world wars in Europe. We recognized that a free and stable
Europe is vital to America's own national security. Our victory in
those wars was attributable to the courage and ability of our Armed
Forces, the support of the American people, and the willingness of the
United States to form alliances with other nations when it was mutually
beneficial.
At the end of the Second World War, we developed a strong alliance of
free nations to ensure that America and Western Europe would remain
safe and free. That alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--
NATO--successfully deterred Soviet Communist expansionism which
threatened the security of the United States and our European allies
for four decades. NATO has been the most successful defensive alliance
the world has ever seen. By maintaining the military and economic
strength, and political will of its members, NATO deterred war and, in
fact, never had to fire a shot against any of the states it had been
formed to defend against.
Now the cold war is history. People in most of central and Eastern
Europe have made bold and significant steps toward democracy. They have
elected governments which share our beliefs in freedom, human rights,
and the power of free markets.
There are some in America and abroad who argue that NATO is no longer
necessary because the cold war has been won. But in my view those who
advocate the abandonment of NATO are wrong. NATO is not an anachronism.
The fundamental purpose of NATO--uniting like-minded, free, democratic
nations in common self-defense to deter attacks and prevent war--
remains as valid and worthy a purpose today as it was in 1949. It is
important to do all that is necessary to ensure that NATO can continue
to fulfill this role. That does not mean, however, that the NATO of
2001 should be or even can be identical to the NATO of 1949 or 1995.
NATO must adapt to new political geography and continue to contribute
to the development of an integrated, free Europe.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and defense thinkers have
conducted a number of studies on the future of NATO. In 1994 the Center
for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] published a report by
its Senior NATO Policy Group, upon which I was privileged to serve
along with Senators Nunn, Cohen, and McCain. Earlier this year, the
Council on Foreign Relations published the report of an independent
task force chaired by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown entitled
``Should NATO Expand?'' This year Secretary of Defense Perry provided
his views on NATO expansion in a March 10 report to Congress. Each of
these studies has moved forward the debate on NATO enlargement and new
roles for NATO.
Now the alliance itself has issued a major report on the question in
its September 1995 ``Study on NATO Enlargement.'' This most recent
study by the 16 member states of NATO sets out the purposes and
principles of enlargement and establishes a process under which NATO
will consider admitting new members on a case-by-case basis. It does
not establish a specific timetable for the admission of new members,
prioritize candidates for membership, or develop precise criteria which
must be met in order to gain membership. It does, however, convey a
number of important messages.
First, new members of NATO will need to accede to the Washington
Treaty. No state may enjoy the rights and benefits of NATO membership
without also assuming the obligations of membership.
Second, negotiations on admission of new members will consider both
the candidate state's potential contributions to collective defense as
well as broader political and security criteria.
Third, expansion of NATO, if it occurs, is intended to strengthen
relations with Russia through increased European stability and
security. While Russian sensitivities and security requirements must
and will be considered, no country outside the alliance will have a
veto over NATO enlargement.
Needless to say, a document such as this study which reflects
consensus of 16 nations is unlikely to fully satisfy everyone. Because
I have spoken often on the need for NATO to expand its membership
sooner rather than later, I would have preferred to see in this study a
statement of clear criteria for inviting new members to join the
alliance. Unfortunately, in my view, many of these central issues have
been left to the negotiations between NATO and each prospective new
member.
I have read with great interest and attention the analysis of my
friend from Georgia, Senator Nunn, on the question of NATO expansion.
The questions he poses are good ones which need to be considered as we
and NATO decide how to proceed. Senator Nunn continues to make
invaluable contributions to the debate on these critical issues which
affect our national security and I hope that he will continue to speak
out and to help focus our attention on them.
Last week, the Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] and I had the
opportunity to meet with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes and the
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter. In the course of a wide-ranging
discussion, we spoke of the importance of American leadership in NATO
and the question of NATO enlargement.
In that regard, I would like to make a few observations.
First, NATO always has been and must continue to be an alliance which
is both military and political. It will not just be the number of
troops which NATO nations can mass which will keep Europe and the
United States secure in the decades ahead as it was not just numbers
which kept Europe secure during the cold war. Rather, it is the degree
of political solidarity and agreement on fundamental principles of
democracy, human rights, and the necessity for free markets which will
keep

[[Page S 14850]]
the alliance viable and provide security for its members. Candidates
for membership must demonstrate the same commitment to these democratic
principles as current members. There can be no exceptions granted with
regard to belief in and enforcement of human rights, the exercise of
freedoms by citizens, the transparency of defense budgets, real
civilian control of the military and intelligence arms of the
government, and adherence to the principles of peaceful resolution of
disputes within and beyond a state's borders.
Second, membership in the alliance carries with it obligations and
benefits. No candidate can be accepted just because it wants the fruits
of membership; each state must be able to contribute something to the
alliance. This will be a difficult issue to resolve for the new
democracies are constrained by their defense budgets and economic
difficulties. NATO must be realistic, but at the same time creative, in
determining what capabilities NATO requires and how new members can
contribute to them.
Third, membership in NATO is not a zero-sum game. The new democracies
of central and Eastern Europe are not competing with each for some
predefined number of spaces being allocated for expansion. No one knows
today whether the right number for the composition of NATO is 16, as it
is today, or 18 or 20 or more. Candidates must be evaluated on the
basis of the political and military norms which members must
demonstrate on an absolute--not comparative--basis. It should not
matter if one candidate country is less able to contribute than another
candidate country. If the required standards are met, both should be
admitted.
Fourth, participation in the Partnership for Peace is an important
transitional step for candidate countries though it need not be a
mandatory one if a candidate can demonstrate it meets the requirements
of membership without it. I personally find it hard to believe that a
country which chooses not to take part in the Partnership for Peace
would or should be an early candidate for membership. If new members
are to be full participants in all aspects of the alliance upon
ratification of their membership, they should want to start exercising
with NATO, determining what they need to achieve full integration, and
exposing their own leaders--both military and civilian--to NATO
procedures and thinking.
Fifth, contrary to the assertions of nationalist forces within
Russia, NATO expansion is not and should not be construed as a threat
to Russia. I fully agree with the conclusions of the recent NATO study
that no state outside of NATO should have a veto over the accession of
new members to the alliance. These are decisions which the independent
members of the alliance themselves must make. Nor do I believe that
decisions on membership should be based solely on threat
considerations. NATO should expand to meet the requirements for
security and stability in Europe well into the next century. Russian
conduct today cannot be used as a criterion by itself to determine
whether there is a need to expand the alliance's membership. To do so,
in fact gives Russia a de facto veto over what the alliance does in the
near-term and long-term. We must all do everything we can to assure the
leaders and people of Russia that NATO expansion is not just a shifting
of cold war confrontation lines to the east. At the same time we need
to make decisions which are right for our security and that of our
European allies today and into the next century.
Finally, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are a founding
member of NATO not just because we wanted to help our friends in
Western Europe, but because it was in our national interest. I believe
that this is as true today as it was in 1949. NATO expansion is
something we should do because it is in our interest and the interest
of security and stability in Europe. It is not a gift which we offer up
to former Communist States or a reward for beginning the movement to
full democracy.
There is no doubt in my mind that it is in our interest to find ways
to encourage and support the transitions to democracy which are taking
place today in Europe. Expanding NATO membership is one way to do this.
It should not, however, be done in isolation. Nor should it be done
solely because of what is or is not going on within Russia. We have no
desire to confront Russia along a new wall of tension and
confrontation. All of us--Americans, Russians, current members of NATO,
and prospective members--must continue to work together to find ways to
cooperate and make the world a safer and more prosperous place for us
all.
I hope that this discussion, which Senators Nunn and Hutchison have
organized, will help set a positive tone for the policy debates which
lie ahead on this important issue.
Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, could I inquire from the Senator from
Louisiana if he wishes to speak on this subject or did he want to
change subjects?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I did want to speak on this subject.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I will be happy to yield.
Let me say, before the Senator from Georgia leaves, that I think that
his last point was a very important one. That is, in the future as we
look at the ABM Treaty and the missile defense technologies, I think
that the strategic interests of the United States will probably be
parallel with the interests of Russia because both of us will want to
look for other ways to defend our own shores from potential ballistic
missile attack. That is something that I think the Russians will be in
agreement with the United States on, and I certainly hope that we can
pursue our mutual defenses as we keep the ABM Treaty able to change
with the times. It is no longer a bipolar world but, in fact, a
multipolar world. So we will want to make sure that the ABM Treaty can
last by letting it change with the times.
Well, I want to certainly yield some time to the Senator from
Louisiana.
I also do want to mention that Senator Cohen from Maine was going to
be with us today to add to this discussion. And a very sad thing
happened. He lost his father just over the weekend, so he was not able
to come. And our thoughts and prayers are certainly with Senator Cohen
at this time. And we look forward to having a debate with him included
because he is a thoughtful person who has traveled through these
countries as well and I think will add greatly to the debate.

I yield now to the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I notice that the time is due to expire
momentarily.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to extend the
time for morning business for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT IS MADNESS

Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the occupant of the chair.
Mr. President, over the Memorial Day recess, I had the opportunity,
along with the Senator from Georgia and other Members of the Senate and
of the House, to go to a conference sponsored by the Carnegie Institute
for Peace in Madrid. It was a joint conference between us and Members
of the Russian Duma. Those Members had been selected on a broad
philosophical spectrum properly and as fully representative of the Duma
as we could get. There were those who were the nationalists, there were
those who were the Democrats, there were those representing every
spectrum of the Duma.
We thought we were going to discuss a whole range of issues, but the
theme that came back over and over and over again was the threat that
all of these Members of the Duma feel from making the bordering
countries around them of Eastern Europe members of NATO subject to the
nuclear shield of the United States.
It is an obsession with those Members of the Duma, and as we
discussed it with them, it struck me, first of all, that what possible
interest is there of the United States to so threaten Russia that all
of the ongoing things we have with respect to nuclear proliferation,
with respect to the dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear weapons to
threaten that ongoing process?
I think it is one of those policies, I do not know how conceived, but
we really ought to rethink that and rethink it immediately.
A number of things occurred to me as we were at that conference in
Madrid.

[[Page S 14851]]
As I say, first was the overwhelming universal feeling of all parts,
all of the philosophical spectrum in Russia opposing this, not only
opposing it but emotionally opposing it, feeling threatened by it.
Second, Mr. President, I was struck by what you might call the
political immaturity, the fact that the political personality of Russia
has not yet matured. Their national psyche is still in the formative
process. Their emotional involvement in this new democratic
experiment--it was just overwhelming to see the emotion of these
Members of the Duma. At this critical time, at this time in a formative
process for Russia, for us to come along, rather than portray ourselves
as their friend, their ally, their helper, someone who is interested in
seeing the country move forward, to come along, in effect, with a new
policy of containment to me, Mr. President, is absolute madness.
It seems to me that we ought to find some way to have cooperation
with these new Eastern European democracies to make them feel part of
our political family without having them be part of our nuclear
umbrella, particularly when that umbrella is surrounding the former
Soviet Union, containing the former Soviet Union, and threatening the
former Soviet Union.

____________________