[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 156 (Tuesday, October 10, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1907-E1908]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           A LAST U.S. COLONY

                                 ______


                         HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, October 10, 1995

  Mr. MINETA. Mr. Speaker, the islands of Palau rest at the far western 
edge of Micronesia in the Pacific Ocean. Few Americans know that these 
islands exist, let alone realize that they are only now emerging from 
U.S. control after nearly 50 years of U.N.-sanctioned trusteeship. But 
are the Palauans really achieving independence? Are their cherished 
goals of self-determination really being met?
  Sadly, the people of Palau have not achieved all that they set out 
for, and our Government and its policies have been a major hindrance to 
the full development of political and economic self-sufficiency.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge you and my colleagues to review a definitive 
history of this relationship, ``The last U.S. Colony,'' written by 
Prof. Marc Landy of Boston College. It would be inappropriate to 
reprint the entire manuscript in the Congressional Record, but I 
commend you to his introduction and conclusion.

                          The Last U.S. Colony

                            (By Marc Landy)

       On October 1, 1994 the United States officially ceased to 
     be a colonial power. Its last dependency, Palau, a tiny 
     archipelago at the western end of what used to be called 
     Micronesia, formally became free. Palau had been administered 
     as a strategic trust under authority granted to the United 
     States by the United Nations. It was the last remaining UN 
     trust territory. Unfortunately the jubilation that should 
     have accompanied the end of the colonial era must be muted by 
     Palau's woefully inadequate preparation for self-government. 
     Neither its economy nor its political system are sufficiently 
     mature to enable it to face the rigors of independence, this 
     despite almost fifty years of American oversight.
       Palau now threatens to become yet another of the long list 
     of small new nations to sink into the abyss, of poverty, 
     tyranny and chaos. This article examines what went wrong in 
     Palau and what can be done to prevent its economic and 
     political ruin. Compared to the problems facing many other 
     small states in the third world, Palau's difficulties are 
     relatively tractable and simple. It is not riven by ethnic 
     conflict. Nor does it suffer the scourges of ill health and 
     illiteracy. If the world community cannot prevent Palau's 
     ruin it has little chance of doing so where conditions are 
     worse. On the other hand, Palau presents a good vantage point 
     from which to consider general question of political and 
     economic development. Precisely because it provides a simpler 
     canvas, the broader problems and possibilities it illustrates 
     reveal themselves more clearly and starkly.
       The result of fifty years of American hegemony over Palau 
     has been to create a regime which is fundamentally at odds 
     with American political and economic principles. The U.S. 
     prides itself on being a democratic republic founded on 
     principles of liberty and personal security but it fostered a 
     regime in Palau that is replete with corruption and political 
     intimidation. In the past decade, one president has been 
     assassinated and another has committed suicide. Dissidents 
     have been abused and murdered. An atmosphere of suspicion and 
     mistrust pervades island politics.
       Despite America's commitment to private enterprise, Palau 
     has failed to develop a viable private sector. It has become 
     a remittance economy, dependent upon U.S. aid, and 
     remittances from Palauans living overseas. The tourist trade 
     is growing but still small. Agriculture, vital during the 
     pre-war Japanese occupation, has dwindled. Commercial fishing 
     in Palauan waters is conducted mostly by foreigners.
       And yet, the island is not poor. The United States spends 
     in excess of thirty million dollars a year in Palau. This 
     amounts to more than two thousand dollars per Palauan, more 
     per capita than the federal government spends on any single 
     American state, and twice as much as it does for any state 
     except Alaska. These U.S. funds go, for the most part, 
     directly to the government to pay for the bulk of its 
     administrative overhead. They compromise 60% of the 
     government of Palau's revenue. Because two out of three 
     Palauan workers is employed by the government, these 
     remittances are in fact the major source of the island's 
     prosperity.
       This dual failure is the result of both sins of omission 
     and sins of commission. On the one hand, the U.S. was 
     inattentive to the whole matter of economic development and 
     failed to perceive the negative impact on entrepreneurship 
     and work habits of providing so much direct aid. On the other 
     hand it abetted corruption and swindle which in turn 
     established a repressive political atmosphere.
       Palau's deepest political and economic weaknesses are a 
     direct result of American policy. The United States stifled 
     much of whatever initiative existed for building a 
     sustainable economy by smothering it with largely unearned 
     remittances. It intervened in the domestic political life of 
     the Republic in a manner that encouraged factionalism and 
     corruption and discouraged serious deliberation about the 
     country's future.
       The U.S. was not capricious. Its actions were guided by two 
     conceptual premises. The first stems from a geo-political 
     obsession. The intensity of the competition between the 
     United States and the Soviet Union meant that places, even 
     small and remote ones, needed to be brought under the U.S. 
     banner to prevent them from falling prey to the Soviets. This 
     type of outlook predates the Cold War. It typified the 19th 
     Century colonial competition between France Britain and 
     Germany. That urge to gobbled up terrtiory around the globe 
     was fueled less by a positive desire to rule faraway places 
     than by a fear of ceding them to rivals.
       The second premises derives for Wilsonian Progressivism. It 
     posited not only that all peoples were entitled to self-
     determination but that no great preparation was needed to 
     enable them to exercise it wisely. At first glance, this 
     seems to conflict with the prior premise. But, in practice 
     the two were reconcilable. The trick was to make sure that 
     the indigenous people freely chose to pursue American 
     military geo-political interests. Hence the willingness of 
     the U.S. to subsidize the Palauan economy, bribe many of 
     Palau's political leaders and, generally encourage 
     dependency.
       It has become all too fashionable to criticize ``Cold War 
     thinking'' as if the Cold War was some sort of mistake that 
     could have been easily averted. This is not my contention. In 
     the aftermath of World War II it was understandable for the 
     military to place great value on the islands it had so 
     recently shed blood to conquer. Thirty years later, however, 
     after revolutions in communications and transportation, the 
     ``coaling station'' mentality that took every Pacific Island 
     to be a vital refueling depot has become outmoded.
       In the Cold War context, it also made sense for the 
     Department of State, seeking to contrast American commitment 
     to freedom with the Soviet urge to dominate, would insist 
     that military objectives be rendered compatible with national 
     self-determination. But as the Soviet threat receded, the 
     need to exaggerate Palau's readiness for independence should 
     have disappeared as well. By the 1970's, so many former 
     French, British, and Belgian colonies in Africa and Asia had 
     crashed and burned as a result of ethnic strife, demagogic 
     political leadership, and economic incompetence that the 
     language of self determination and liberation came to sound 
     increasingly hollow and shrill. The tragedy is that the modes 
     of thinking that dominated the immediate postwar era did not 
     evolve as the objective circumstances changed. The story of 
     Palau is above all one of the mischiefs caused by the 
     inability to reconsider policy premises in the light of new 
     realities.
       The consequence is that Palau has been set free to fail. To 
     survive economically and thrive politically it must live up 
     to standards that it has not been prepared to meet. Rather 
     than provide needed assistance and criticism, the United 
     States, will, in all likelihood, abstain, rationalizing its 
     default on the basis of respect for Palau's sovereignty.
       What is done cannot be undone. A return to colonial status, 
     in Palau or elsewhere, is unthinkable. But if Palau, and 
     places like it, are to progress, a more active and 
     responsible reinvolvement by former colonial powers is both 
     ethically and practically necessary. Such efforts are likely 
     to prove more politically palatable if they are carried out 
     on a multilateral basis.
       Palau's problems were born of great power rivalry, they 
     could well be solved by great power cooperation. Like the 
     U.S., Japan is Palau's former colonizer. It is relatively 
     close to Palau physically and provides the bulk of Palau's 
     current tourist business. It is therefore a very good 
     candidate to serve as a partner with the United States in an 
     effort to help Palau.
       Because Palau has among the most beautiful and diverse 
     coral reefs in the world, it has vast tourist potential. 
     Currently it has neither the trained workforce nor the 
     infrastructure to fully capitalize on this great economic 
     opportunity. Also, the fragility of those reefs require that 
     visitation be tightly controlled. Rather than lamenting the 
     devastation to come, a great opportunity exists for treating 
     Palau as a model for the creation of an ecologically 
     sustainable, profitable, tourist industry.
       This specific objective could serve as the basis for a 
     pilot project, testing the feasibility of joint Japan-United 
     States involvement in Palau. The two powers would co-sponsor 
     a team of scientists, engineers and representatives from 
     environmental organization and the tourist industry to work 
     with Palau on developing a plan for sustainable tourism. If 
     Palau proved willing to abide by the plan, and particularly 
     by the fiscal ``strings'' it would inevitably contain, the 
     two nations 

[[Page E 1908]]
     would also help assemble the capital resources to carry it out.
       Currently U.S.-Japan relations are marked by rancorous 
     discord over trade and currency disputes. Palau provides an 
     excellent example of a matter of common concern over which 
     they could find fruitful grounds for agreement and 
     cooperation. For little money or risk, they could show each 
     other, and the world, how adept they are at cooperating in a 
     good cause. A positive precedent would be set for more 
     ambitious future multilateral activities.

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